The “nine lives” of protected areas. A historical-institutional analysis from the transboundary Mt Elgon, Uganda and Kenya

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Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 251–263

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Land Use Policy

j o ur na l ho me page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / landusepol

he “nine lives” of protected areas. A historical-institutional analysisrom the transboundary Mt Elgon, Uganda and Kenya

on Geir Petursson ∗, Paul Vedeldepartment of Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, N-1432 Ås, Norway

r t i c l e i n f o

rticle history:eceived 6 October 2013eceived in revised form 26 July 2014ccepted 3 August 2014

eywords:rotected areasgandaenyat Elgon

nstitutionsath dependenceistorical-institutional analysis

a b s t r a c t

Understanding how institutions to govern protected areas (PAs) emerge and evolve has not been ananalytical concern in the ongoing debate about conservation policies and practice in Africa. Such insti-tutions however constitute and contain historical accounts of successive policies that shape the currentarrangements and further inevitable impact the prospects for institutional change. We employ Mt. Elgonin Uganda and Kenya to examine a case of PA historical evolution, from their establishment to the mostrecent policy alternative, transboundary PA management. We use institutional analytical tools to exam-ine the drivers behind the PA emergence, how their governance has been evolving, who has had powerto induce changes and what interest such changes served. A key analytical focus is put on the interac-tions between PA polices and local communities, both historically as assessing the current relations. Thestudy shows that PA regimes are highly enduring, path-dependent institutions that persist throughoutmajor societal transformations. PA policies and institutions are set and successively changed by the morepowerful actors, imposing their interests on the less powerful actors. We find local community interestsalienated throughout, and attempts for community-based institutional reforms perverted by the histor-ically nested asymmetric power relations. Our analyses show the complications to include community

rights and interests later into already established PA institutions. This becomes highly apparent in themost recent institutional change, transboundary PA management, that we find entailing further alien-ation of local actor’s interests. PA regimes with formalized rules and law enforcement services seem tohave “nine lives,” are a powerful, long lasting “fortresses”, used to impose institutional preferences bythe authoritarian actors.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

ntroduction

Protected areas (PA) have proven to be remarkably robustrrangements. In Africa, conservation policies, based on the PApproach were introduced by European colonial powers in theate 19th century (Adams and Hutton, 2007). The PA approach,xcluding human settlement was developed and introduced byhe colonial powers, became the norm during colonial rule andas inherited and in fact substantially enhanced by the national

overnments following independence (Gibson, 1999; Child, 2004).ore that century later from their first emergence, PAs prevail

s African nation states key strategy to conserve biodiversity and

arbon resources, a major land use category that now encompassround 16% of all lands in Southern/Eastern Africa (Zimmerer et al.,004; Newmark, 2008).

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +354 8667659.E-mail address: [email protected] (J.G. Petursson).

ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.08.005264-8377/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Many actors, at different levels of social organization such aslocal, regional, national and international, have interests in PAsand use their power and agencies to influence both governancestructure and processes (Gibson, 1999). The different actors andtheir interests are often conflicting and outcomes shaped by themore powerful actors imposing their interests on the less powerful(Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). Donors and the international NGOsfeed in at all levels in this policy field.

There are major debates about PA governance in Africa. Thedebate this paper contributes, revolves around the conservationefficiency of PA approaches and their social impacts and legiti-macy, mainly at local level (Child, 2004; Hutton et al., 2005; Adamsand Hutton, 2007; Petursson et al., 2011). However, despite mul-

tiple criticisms, PAs have proven to be resilient spatial units. Arecent, preliminary global investigation of PADDD1 found 89 casesin 27 countries of PA units that had been degazetted, downsized or

1 Protected area degazettment, downsize or degradation (PADDD).

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The study uses multiple data sources. Firstly, it draws on system-atic analyses of secondary sources, historical accounts, reviews and

52 J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / La

egraded since the year 1900 (Mascia and Pailler, 2010). In relationo the overall number of PA’s in the study or 60,000, this is rela-ively low number given the immense societal changes since theear 1900.

PAs are also slow in adapting to institutional changes and doot in practice quickly adapt to or adopt new evolving conserva-ion policies such as community management of different typesGosalamang et al., 2008; Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010).

Historically, PA governance in Africa has proven to be a conflictidden challenge (Brockington et al., 2006; Norgrove and Hulme,006; Adams and Hutton, 2007). For long, most PAs were gov-rned through command and control policies through what haseen termed the “fortress” approach (Hutton et al., 2005). Given thesymmetric powers and institutional properties of the “fortress”stablishment, it has inevitably become a root cause of majorocial conflicts throughout Africa, where local community liveli-oods and rights to land and resources have become central themesBrockington et al., 2006).

Institutional theory has been revitalized as a key theoreticalramework to understand and analyze formal and informal linkagesetween people and how people interact with the environmentMarch and Olsen, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991;romley, 1992; Scott, 1995; Vatn, 2005). It is now a widely applied

ramework, beyond the economist tradition, in a variety of differentnterdisciplinary contexts (Metha et al., 2001). Institutions consti-ute historical accounts of successive decisions and policies thatave evolved over time and that shape the current arrangementsThelen, 2003). Prospects for PA reforms will inevitably be affectedy historical sequences of events and should be understood againstroader historical-institutional backgrounds of power strugglesnd negotiations that have produced the current structures, hencehe concept of path dependency (Mahoney, 2000; Torfing, 2001).

There is now a growing literature analyzing PA conservationractices and outcomes as institutional challenges (e.g. Gibson,999; Barrett et al., 2001; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2005). Govern-ents establish political institutions to govern PAs that are created

nd designed to meet different interests, and observed institutionalhanges reflect the structure and performance of these institutionsnd the actors’ asymmetric power relations within them (Gibson,999).

An emerging PA policy approach is the transboundary protectedrea management (TBPAM), a widely promoted, but also highlyebated, conservation policy (Duffy, 2006; Muhweezi et al., 2007;amutsindela, 2007). TBPAM can be defined as a policy reformf the current PA structures by establishing some level of jointanagement of adjoining PAs across international borders by the

ountries involved (Fall, 2009). Although the strategy is tracedack to the year 1932 when US and Canada formalized collabo-ation in the Waterton-Glacier PA complex, the approach recentlyained momentum and has since the mid-1990s been widely pro-oted by influential pro-conservation actors, raising and focusing

n ecological arguments (Sandwith et al., 2001). In southern Africa,BPAM has gained significant momentum and is firmly establishedpproach to PA governance in the region (Van Amerom, 2001).

There is, however, growing body of work that is critical of theocio-political objectives and preliminary outcomes of TBPAM inouthern Africa (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005; Ramutsindela,007). Important aspect of that have been the arguments thatBPAM has been top-down, is greatly donor driven, entails renewalf the more traditional social exclusive “fortress” PA strategies orig-nating during the colonial period as a counter narrative to theommunity approaches, phrased “back to the barriers” (Hutton

t al., 2005; Duffy, 2006).

This paper sets out to examine a case of a PAs historical-nstitutional evolution, from their establishment to the currentevelopments that involve both community conservation and the

e Policy 42 (2015) 251–263

more recent transboundary protected area management (TBPAM)policies. It examines forces behind PAs emergence, how their gov-ernance evolves, who has had power to induce changes and whatinterest such changes reflect. A key analytical focus is put on inter-actions between the PA polices and local communities.

We conceptualize PA governance as resource governance sys-tem; develop an analytical framework to examine the key factorsof such systems and employ institutional analytical tools to studyPA emergence and evolution, using Mt Elgon in Kenya and Ugandaas a case. Mt Elgon constitutes a good case2 for this study due to itslong established PAs with history of multiple conservation strate-gies. There is further ongoing work to introduce TBPAM approachto governance of the PA’s on Mt Elgon, seeing the mountain as apioneer area for the approach in the East African region.

Our research problem is twofold: why are PAs such robust insti-tutional arrangements and what can current PA governance learnfrom the historical past when considering PA changes? We arguein the paper that PA regimes can be seen as path dependent insti-tutions and that this has important bearings on the prospects foran intended institutional change.

Our objectives are to study: (1) how PA regimes emerge and thenfurther evolve over time; (2) analyze actors and powers to imposePA regime changes; (3) the role and impact of PA policies on localcommunities; (4) the current relations between local communitiesand the PAs; (5) the implications of historical evolution on currentPA policies, hence the TBPAM considerations.

The Mt Elgon case, data and method

Mt Elgon

Mt Elgon is a 4300 m high solitary volcano on the Kenya–Ugandaboundary, endowed with rich biodiversity, fertile soils and abun-dant rainfall, being girded by layers of rich agricultural lands,productive forest ecosystems and woodlands as upper moorlandsand heaths (UWA, 2000; KFD/KWS, 2001). Approximately 2 mil-lion people live in the surrounding administrative districts in bothcountries, with population densities up to 1000 per/km2 (Soini,2007). People are predominantly small scale farmers, derivinglivelihood outcomes from agriculture and dependent substantiallyon access to various environmental incomes and services from themountain ecosystem (Scott, 1998).

The native forests, timber plantations and moorlands above thefarmlands on both sides are all embedded in formal PA regimes withdifferent conservation and management objectives (Muhweeziet al., 2007; Fig. 1). Comparing the two countries, there is quitea different PA setup on respective sides of Elgon. The Ugandan sideconsists of one large National Park, Mt. Elgon National park while inKenya there are four PA units each with its own management strat-egy. The Kenyan PA’s are Trans-nzoia and Mt Elgon Forest Reserves,Mt Elgon National Park and Chepkitale National Reserve that jointlycover similar land area as the Ugandan National Park (Peturssonet al., 2011).

Since 2004, Uganda and Kenya have been working on imple-menting transboundary PA collaboration, aiming for some leveljoint governance of the PA on Mt Elgon under a TBPAM regime(Muhweezi et al., 2007).

Data and method

2 This paper is a part of wider study on Elgon by the same authors, focusing ondifferent aspects of PA governance.

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such as PA regimes that are central to our analysis (Young,2002). According to the model, we distinguish institutions from

Fig. 1. Map of Mt Elgon s

ontent analysis of various documents relative to PA governancen Elgon. Secondly, to verify and supplement the secondary data,e used information from semi-structured interviews with local

ommunity members and staff from the key organizations3 hav-ng a role in PA governance on Elgon. Community interviews were

ith elders and key informants in communities in border regionsdjacent to all PA regimes on Elgon. Lastly, household data wereollected to study current community-PA relations (125 house-old interviews). This was conducted in villages in Uganda in twoelected parishes (local government units) that have signed agree-ents with the park authorities on access and in two parishesithout such agreements while in Kenya we selected divisions

local government units) next to the National Park and divisionsext to Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve. This represented the respective PAccess regimes in both countries. The multiple data sources allowedor data triangulation to validate the qualitative data used in thenalysis.

n institutional approach to protected areas

esource governance system framework

PAs can be conceptualized as resource governance systems.uch systems are basically constituted of three key elements, hencehe attributes of the resources, the actors/agents involved, and the

3 From: Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) in Kitale and Elgon, Uganda Wildlife Author-ty (UWA) in Mbale, Kapkwai and Kampala, Kenyan Forest Department (FD) initale and Kapsokwony, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)

n Kampala, The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) at theorwegian Embassy in Kampala and the Mt. Elgon County Council (MECC) in Kap-

okwony.

g the different PA units.

institutional arrangements. The various patterns of interactionsbetween these elements jointly define the state the resources andresource use (Vatn, 2005; Fig. 2).

Our key focus is on analyzing the institutional factors ofthe model and further, how the institutions change. This studyunderstands institutions as formal rules, norms and conventions,constructed by humans, following the perspectives of contem-porary classical institutionalism (Scott, 1995). Institutions havea dual function of mediating interactions between humans andthe environment, and between humans (Vatn, 2005). Institu-tions are therefore central when analyzing and understandinghuman-environment interactions, such as PA governance chal-lenges (Ostrom, 1990). Institutions governing environmental ornatural resources areas can be conceptualized as resource regimes,

Fig. 2. A resource governance system framework (based on Vatn, 2005).

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(Weatherby, 1967). The indigenous people on Elgon are believedto have become integrated with the Sabiny4. The ethnic “bound-aries” between groups, claiming to be indigenous to Elgon, and theSabiny are therefore blurred and can be interpreted as a part of the

54 J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / La

rganizations, where organizations are seen as actors, withesources and some directional purpose.

Various actors have a role in PA governance. Our theoreticalpproach recognizes actors as socially constructed, deriving theirgency from the institutions of the society concerned (Vatn, 2005).ctors role in PA governance may originate from a variety of capac-

ties and concerns, such as an institutional mandate, geographicalroximity, historical associations, or dependence for livelihood, asell as more traditional economic interests (Woodcock, 2002).

nstitutional change and power

Institutions are dynamic entities subject to change and evolu-ion, and they are historically constituted and reconstituted (Vatn,005). Social institutions reflect power asymmetries in the soci-ty, where powerful actors impose their institutional preferencesn the less powerful actors. The actors, their interest and actorsnterplays are often institutionalized or formulated through policyrenas where common understanding, interest and policy prefer-nces are developed and that can form powerful instruments oroalitions in governance, often mediated through policy networksRhodes, 1997). Power is the capacity of agents to achieve desiredutcomes in social practice (Giddens, 1984). Institutional changehus takes place, not in an evolutionary Darwinian sense leading to

ore superior or fit arrangement, but as successive processes thateflect actors differential power relations and where improved fit isot necessarily an outcome or goal (Kjosavik and Shanmugaratnam,007). Institutions can be perceived as “sticky” in the sense thatnce formed they often have considerable staying power, regard-ess of evidence that they are poorly suited to the biophysical andocioeconomic conditions in which they operate (Young, 2002).

ath dependent institutional change

In order to understand the mechanisms of PA institutional evo-ution, we argue that institutional change can be path-dependentTorfing, 2001). That entails that institutions, such as the PAegimes, are bargained and set at a given point of time by thosen power, and then renegotiated and restructured, formed by thexisting institutional arrangements and making other alternativesore remote (Gagliardi, 2008). Institutional change is furthermore

ot a random or discrete act nor only constituted to perform partic-lar functions, but can often intended and designed to meet certain

nterests of the powerful actors (Vatn, 2005). A successive historicalvolution therefore becomes an outcome of the interplay betweenhose in power and the path dependency, where the actors involvedxercise their power according to the path (Torfing, 2001). Suchath-dependent perspective further opens for understanding howroposed institutions may perform, such as the TBPAM, taking theistorical past into account (Mahoney, 2000).

The mechanisms behind the process of institutional evolutionnd change involve renegotiation and reproduction of some ele-ents of the preexisting institutions in place (Thelen, 2003). We

herefore perceive institutional change in accordance with theoncepts of institutional layering or “bricolage”, where the actorsrafting new institutions are working and reworking on the basis ofurrent institutional structures (Cleaver, 2002; Thelen, 2003). Insti-utional change through such layering and reworking of the currentnstitutions becomes therefore intrinsically historical and its anal-ses highly dependent on examination of historical processes thatave shaped the current institutions (Torfing, 2001).

During a given policy reform, such as the proposed TBPAM, the

ld PA governance path can significantly impact outcomes. Thenstitutional context might further produce a series of unforeseenonstraints that might hinder or pervert otherwise preferred out-omes (Torfing, 2001). If a conservation policy is path-dependent,

Fig. 3. A framework for the examination of the concepts of path-dependence andinstitutional layering in PA governance.

the powerful actors will usually seek reforms and alternative solu-tions to crises or conflicts compatible with current PA institutionsinstead of employing more “remote” or even alien conservationpolicies (Schneiberg, 2007). Our historical analyses offer an accountof the policy strategies that have been instituted in the area andprovide a context for why the specific policy strategy emerges onthe agenda.

The paper thus uses the concepts of path dependence andinstitutional layering in the analysis of historical emergence andevolution of institutions for governance of PAs (Torfing, 2001;Cleaver, 2002; Thelen, 2003). This allows for an examination of thePA regime establishment and the forces behind their successivehistorical evolutional processes (Mahoney, 2001). The institutionalproperties of the PAs are seen as redesigned and restructured onthe foundations of the earlier institutional structures, but alwayswithin the evolutionary path set by the initial decision to establishPA regimes (Fig. 3).

Protected area emergence and evolution on Mt Elgon

This study conceptualizes PAs as resources governance systems(Fig. 1). We examine the PA emergence and evolution in follow-ing sections; firstly how the trajectories of the colonial conquesttransformed power and institutional arrangements and laid thefoundation for crafting resources governance systems on Elgon,secondly the drivers behind the establishment of PAs, thirdly howtheir governance has been evolving and shaping relations with localcommunities and lastly the current level of PA-local communityconflicts.

The trajectories of colonial conquest of lands and resources on MtElgon

Colonialism transformed power relations and institutionalarrangements, related to land and natural resources on Mt Elgon,such as access to resources, land tenure and property rights.

The people on Mt Elgon can broadly be divided in two ethnicgroups. The Sabiny, that form a part of the Nilo-Hamitic clus-ter (Kalenjin), are recorded to have expanded from North intoand inhabited the whole Elgon area from the 1500th century

4 There are several terms used for groups that claim being indigenous to Elgon,such as Mosop, Benet, El-Kony, Ogiek, Dorobos or Ndorobo. However, some recentstudies describe this more as a claim to indigeneity that serves as basis for claimsto original residency (Lynch, 2006).

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Table 1Historical events describing the emergence and evolution of the Uganda/Kenya border on Elgon 1886–1963.

Year Uganda Kenya Event Relative to the border on Elgon

1886 UK declares thearea that laterbecomesUganda andKenya

UK and Germany partly agreeupon their division of EastAfrica

Elgon becomes under Britishsphere of influence

1890 UK andGermany agreeupon theboundarybetween theirterritories

UK and Germany finalize theirdivision of East Africa

1894 The Bugandakingdomdeclared asBritishprotectorate

Was gradually extended to thesurrounding kingdoms.Became the UgandaProtectorate

The whole Elgon belongs to theUganda Protectorate

1895 – Large section of current Kenyadeclared by the British as theEast Africa Protectorate

Included that area belonging tocurrent Kenya, approximatelywest to Naivasha, the currentwest Kenya was part of theUganda Protectorate

1902 EasternProvince of theUgandaprotectoratemoved to theEast AfricanProtectorate

Kenya, then East AfricaProtectorate getsapproximately its currentshape

In 1901, the railroad wascompleted from Mombasa toLake Victoria. Foradministrative convenience, itwas decided that the whole railshould belong to the sameprotectorate

The new boundary splits MtElgon into two halves betweenUganda and Kenya, followingthe Suam river in the Northand the subsequent Lungangaand Malaba rivers in the South

1920 The East African protectoratebecomes Kenya Colony

Change in the British colonialadministration, due to thegreat emphasis on Europeansettlement in the KenyanHighlands

No change

1962 Ugandabecomesindependent

– – Following independence ofboth countries, the countrydecide to maintain the colonialboundary bisecting Mt Elgoninto two halves

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1963 – Kenya becomes independent

ources: Eliot (1905), Carter et al. (1933), Bennet (1959, 1963), Roberts (1963) and M

ower struggles to land and other resources (Médard, 2010). Theabiny dominance on Elgon was interrupted in the 1700th centuryy the in-migration of the Bagishu (Scott, 1998). The Bagishu, aantu ethnic group, arrived in East Africa through the gradual West-rn Bantu expansion (Were, 1967). The Bagishu found the Sabinyccupying the whole mountain, but managed to occupy the fertilegricultural areas in the south and west, pushing the Sabiny to theorth and east. The Bagishu and Sabiny have since been rivals onlgon, entering successive conflicts, forming the current settlementattern (Bunker, 1987; Scott, 1998).

The first European expeditions to the African interior in the late9th century set the scene for the scramble for power and resourceshat brought the East African region under colonial rule.

During early colonialism, the British had a strong interest inganda, the source of the Nile. Buganda, a strong kingdom in the

egion, became agents assisting the British to successively subju-ate the entire country as the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 (Bunker,987).

In 1895, The British declared a large section of the current Kenyas the East African Protectorate, but only west to the boundary ofhe Rift Valley (Bennett, 1963). The boundary between the Ugandand Kenya was therefore first placed much further east than theurrent boundary, leaving the whole Elgon area in the Ugandarotectorate. The same year, the British started constructing the

ganda railway from Mombasa to Kampala (Bennett, 1963). Whenompleted in 1902, the colonial administration decided to transferhe Eastern Province of Uganda to the East Africa Protectorate andy that transfer the administration of the whole railway to the East

–

vie (2005).

African Protectorate (Kenya) (Bennet, 1959). This transfer estab-lished the current international boundaries on Elgon that followthe 1902 line (Table 1).

The British colonial conquest and the political and economicregime it introduced had a decisive impact on power rela-tions and organization in the societies on Elgon (Bunker, 1987;Foeken and Verstrate, 1992). The colonial administration deliber-ately transformed socio-economic conditions to meet the Britishcolonial interests by means of trade regulations, market con-trols, instigating controlled local political governance systems,etc. The British, however, employed quite different strategiesto gain power on the respective sides of Mt Elgon. This againengendered new forms of power relations and conflicts thatstill impact on local community–environment interactions in thearea.

The Uganda Protectorate beyond Buganda was largely con-quered by means of Baganda agents, employed by the Britishcolonial powers (Roberts, 1963). Following the Baganda Agree-ment in 1900 that consolidated the British takeover, a Bagandageneral, Kakungulu, was commissioned by the British to con-quer east Uganda including Elgon, and in 1904 replaced witha British regional Commissioner (Twaddle, 1966). By doing this,the Ugandan Elgon was formally brought under British colonialadministration.

In order to create a broader commerce to support the admin-istration and to facilitate export, the colonial administrationintroduced coffee as a cash-crop in Elgon in 1912 (Bunker, 1987).The Bagishu farmers initially resisted the crop, but it was forcibly

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(now Mt Elgon District5) became native land. Africans in Trans-nzoia, native to the land appropriated by Europeans, were therefore

56 J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / La

ntroduced by the British, where fines and penal labor was imposedn those not growing coffee (ibid). The conditions on Elgon alsoroved excellent for growing valuable Arabia coffee and withinhort, the production expanded. Under this system, the colonialdministration became dependent on the production of the small-cale farmers and mutually, farmers became dependent on theolonial administration to market and export their cash crops,lbeit with asymmetric power relations (Bunker, 1987).

These tactics of takeover and system of indirect rule imple-ented by the British in Uganda differed greatly from the colonial

ransformations on the Kenyan portion of Elgon. There, Europeanarmers settlements became important element of the colonialtrategy (then East African Protectorate) (Eliot, 1905). As early as899, all land in the Protectorate was unilaterally declared as Crownand–hence the tenure definition “all public land within the Eastfrican Protectorate which for the time being are subject to the con-rol of His Majesty” (Soini, 2007). These legislative measures werenforced without consent to the indigenous people of the protec-orate. This created basis for re-allocation of land rights and sethe stage for expropriation of lands belonging to the indigenouseoples, to European colonial settlers who would otherwise notualify to own such lands under African customary laws.

This had immense effect on Kenyan Elgon. The colonial admin-stration identified the Usain-Gishu plateau, including what is nowrans-nzoia district, as relative sparsely populated and ideal forettlement of white farmers (Ormsby-Gore et al., 1925). Amonghe first to settle in Usain-Gishu were South-African Boers in908, a prelude to an immense European settlement of Trans-nzoiaMwaruvie, 2005). The plains and foothills of Elgon in Trans-nzoiahus became settled by immigrant farmers of European originnd brought under large scale agriculture for export. The colonialdministration used coercive powers to forcefully evict the nativeabiny in Trans-nzoia from their lands to give way to the colo-ial settlers and became either displaced or squatters on the white

arms.

he establishment of protected areas on Mt Elgon

The colonial administration in Uganda and Kenya graduallyxpanded to most aspects of society. Important features of theolonial rule were radicalization and the expansion of the capi-alist economic regime for the colonial commerce as outlined inreceding section, and the hieratical organization, developmentf bureaucracy and establishment of formal legal system (Adams,003). Forestry and wildlife became early subjects of colonial gov-rnments, and by that, PAs became an important aspects of theolonial transformation in both countries. It took however abouthree decades of colonial rule until lands and resources on Mt Elgonere formally gazetted as PAs under formal resources governance

ystems with defined role of actors and institutional structureshence Fig. 1). However, as the colonial takeover came differentlyo the Ugandan respective Kenyan portions of Elgon, the strategieso create PA regimes also differed.

In 1929, the Ugandan colonial administration started to demar-ate and reserve forests above the farmlands on Elgon under theorest Department, as in many other forested regions of UgandaWebster, 1954). In 1938, a Forest Reserve was formally demarcatednd gazetted, achieving the legal status as Mt Elgon Crown ForestTable 3). This appropriated the lands within the PA as governmen-al tenure. However, in contrast to the Kenyan portion, it did not

odify the land tenure structures in the surrounding farmlands as

ocal farmers continued to hold their lands under customary tenure

ithout formal land titles, a system that still persists.The rationale for the forest reservation was to seize power

ver the forest natural resources and to seek maintenance of

e Policy 42 (2015) 251–263

ecological functions especially for water catchment to sustain thecoffee production (Webster, 1954).

The PA establishment as a formal resources governance sys-tem altered power relations and brought significant changes thatgradually created tensions with the local communities. The PAestablishment made access to resources within the PA conditionalto rules set unilaterally by the colonial government and insti-tuted a general ban for local people to reside within the area,with the exception of the pastoral Sabiny subgroup, the Benetup in the moorlands and a few Bagishu farmers. The institutionalarrangement enforced by the Forest Department as the executiveagent, however, allowed extraction of a range of non-timbers for-est resources such as firewood, bamboo and medical plants fromthe PA (Scott, 1998). In general, however, the immediate effect ofthe PA establishment on the Ugandan side and the first decades ofits governance with relatively limited enforcement did not sparksubstantial local conflicts. The existence and impact of the Benetpeople, a pastoralist group, within the PA was a revolving issue forthe PA administration but without any direct action for long.

The establishment of PA on Kenyan portion took place during thesame period. It was however implemented differently, as the trajec-tories of the colonial transformations in Kenya were quite differentfrom Uganda. Following the white farmers settlement expansion,the forests on Kenyan Elgon were reserved by the colonial admin-istration with the dual objective to meet the timber needs for thesettlers but also to secure the forests from clearing for agriculture. In1932, all forests and moorlands on the Kenyan side were gazettedas a Forest Reserve under the management of the Forest Depart-ment (Table 3). The land within the Forest Reserve was declaredstate tenure.

The European settlements with large scale agricultural enter-prises demanded forest products. The Forest Reserve was thereforegoverned under a much more utilitarian regime than on the Ugan-dan side. The native forest was logged intensively and large areasconverted to fast growing softwood plantations and communitiesallowed extraction of non-timber forest products (Hitimana et al.,2004).

The appropriation of land by the white farmers and reservationof forests was implemented without consent from local people. Inthe early 1930s land access had become the key grievance concern-ing colonial rule in many parts of Kenya, including Elgon (Simiyu,2008). In order to address the land issues, the British set up a com-mission to clarify the division of land between the European settlersand the native Africans, aiming to institutionalize their dominatingpower. The commission submitted a report in 1933 to the Secre-tary of State for the Colonies with suggestions of a detailed divisionof land between the European settlers and native Africans (Carteret al., 1933). The report institutionalized the colonial powers divi-sion of land in the Elgon region that in fact still guides the currentland tenure regimes. The upper moorlands in the Forest Reserveabove the tree line, called Chepkitale, became native lands wherepeople, mostly of Sabiny origin from the white settlers lands inTrans-nzoia, were relocated and allowed to settle as pastoralists.This mountainous area was not considered suitable for European-type agriculture nor for forestry plantations anyway, due to thehigh elevation (Carter et al., 1933). Chepkitale was however stillunder the Forest Department administration. Land surrounding theForests Reserve was divided in two, land in Trans-nzoia districtwas classified for European settlements while Bungoma district

5 The current Mt Elgon District was crafted out of Bungoma District in 1993.

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elocated, partly to Mt Elgon District and to Chepkitale moorlandshat had been declared as native land.

This was declared and enforced through colonial law and inter-sts. By the Highland Order in 1937/38, non-Europeans wereffectively excluded from owning land in the Kenyan Highlands,ncluding Trans-nzoia (Foeken and Verstrate, 1992). The nativeand in Chepkitale on the moorlands became Trust land, the For-st Reserve became State tenure, Trans-nzoia agricultural areasecame private property where formal land titles were issued tohite farmers and the native land in Mt Elgon district became Trust

and without formal land titles (Soini, 2007). It was not until 1961hat the law on European privileges to own land was abolishednd people of all races were allowed to own land in the Kenyanighlands (Foeken and Verstrate, 1992).

The colonial transformations that created the basis for PA estab-ishment on Kenyan Elgon therefore differed greatly from thegandan portion. In Kenya it had much more severe impacts on

ocal peoples’ livelihoods and rights and created a basis for manyf the unresolved local conflicts that still influence park-peopleelations, especially access and rights to land (Table 3).

volving PA governance on Mt Elgon

Although the PA establishment in both countries and the respec-ive resources governance systems had formally many similaritiesuch as both becoming forest reserves with a set of access rulesnd initially being under management of the forest departments,he different colonial trajectories behind the establishment of PAsave produced quite different institutional paths on the respectiveides.

The Ugandan PA governance strategies were gradually modifiedrom 1938 to 1962, but without any significant changes in strategyoward local communities. The PA-local community interactions,owever, are raised regularly in the Forest Reserves’ managementlans, both issues related to the Benet as the demands from the localommunities to access land and resources within the PA (Table 2).

When Uganda became independent in 1962, the colonial admin-stration and PA structures were largely inherited and maintainedy the interdependent politicians. The Forest Department’s centralole was further strengthened in 1967 under the new constitution,ut without major changes of policies on Mt Elgon (Synnott, 1968).

After Amin seized power in 1971, Ugandan institutions for nat-ral resource management deteriorated. The PA administrationradually collapsed in Elgon as elsewhere and became literallyneffective over the coming 15 years. Amin further declared hiseconomic war” where promoting cultivation in forest reservesas encouraged. During the turbulent Amin and post-Amin period

rom 1971 to 1986, around 25,000 ha were cultivated in the For-st Reserve, a sign of the great demand for land from the localommunities as of lost control by forest authorities.

The relative stability that was introduced in 1986 was followedy a reconstruction of PA governance, supported by powerful donorgencies (USAID and EU). This included the rehabilitation of theorestry sector, and in Elgon, Norway started funding programs,artly via IUCN in that period to re-establish PA governance (Norad,003).

The capacity of the Forest Department was, however, weak andts legitimacy and reliability low. Therefore, much due to externalressure from the powerful USAID, many Ugandan Forest Reservesere converted to National Parks in 1991–1993, including Mt Elgon

Gosalamang et al., 2008). Becoming a National Park implied a muchtricter conservation policy redrawing the PA boundaries, large

cale evictions of local people, ban on any local community access toark resources and new governing organization, Uganda Wildlifeuthority (Scott, 1998). This conversion itself reveals the deeplyooted power asymmetries in PA governance on Elgon, as decisions

Policy 42 (2015) 251–263 257

could be taken that highly constrain local livelihoods without anyformal consent needed or sought from the local communities.

The restricted access to resources and displacement of local peo-ple from the park sparked significant conflicts. Communities thathad cultivated or settled within the park for years, partly in con-sent with the current government policy claimed their rights. Thegovernment applied force to relocate the communities, in scale of25,000 households (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). This is still anunresolved conflict and has been brought to the Ugandan HighCourt.

However, stopping locals from accessing PA-resources provedto be impossible to enforce and a new community conservationstrategy was introduced in 1995 with a backing from internationaldonors (Scott, 1998). The strategy introduced formal collaborativeagreements between Uganda Wildlife Authority and local commu-nities on a confined access to a negotiated set of forest resourceswithin the national park boundary. Currently, about half of the localgovernment units bordering the park have signed such agreements.The other half of Elgon inhabitants, however, is still denied formalrights of access to resources from the park, something that has beena major cause of conflicts in the region.

After Kenya became independent in 1963, Mt Elgon remaineda Forest Reserve under the governance of the Forest Department.Independence, however, brought major transformations and landreforms, especially in Trans-nzoia. Most of the white farmers inTrans-nzoia left their farms the following years and the indepen-dent government introduced land reforms in the district. Areasclose to the PAs on Mt Elgon were either sold to African farmers,converted to parastatal farms or parceled to small scale farmersunder distinct settlement schemes (Foeken and Verstrate, 1992).This land reform has however been highly challenging, as there areallegations of powerful actors using the process to secure their owninterests appropriating large farms and land areas.

The Trust Land on the upper moorlands was settled by nativepeople in line with the colonial decisions’, an issue that was a con-stant concern for the PA authorities due to growing population andnature conservation concerns. In 1968, a part of the Forest Reservewas gazetted as a National Park (KFD/KWS, 2001). This was partlyan outcome of concerns of the large scale logging in the nativeforests and depletion of wildlife on the mountain. The new NationalPark split the Forest Reserve in Trans-nzoia and Mt Elgon ForestReserves. The administration of the National Park was set undera governmental organization (Kenya Wildlife Service) (KFD/KWS,2001).

This conversion transferred considerable area under muchstricter national park regime and new governmental authority. Thisprovoked protests from the people in Chepkitale as this excludedthem from significant parts of lands they regarded as theirs (Simiyu,2008). In 1971, there was an attempt by the government to relo-cate the people from Chepkitale down to an excision from Mt ElgonForest Reserve called Chebyuk. The whole relocation process, how-ever, has been a disaster and forms a root cause for violent conflicts,both between local communities and government authorities andalso between different Sabiny subgroups over rights to land andresources (Simiyu, 2008).

In 2000, the Kenyan government decided to convert the uppermoorland to a new PA regime, Chepkitale National Reserve. It isestablished on the native lands originating from the Kenya LandCommission report in 1933, where the land is under Trust Landtenure, governed by the district local government in Mt Elgon Dis-trict. By this, local people are allowed as pastoralists in the area, butnot to settle permanently. This regime is therefore, unlike all other

PAs on Elgon, governed by local government with the explicit aim tobring benefits to the local communities (KFD/KWS, 2001). However,due to its relatively recent establishment, its performance remainsto be seen.

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Table 2The emergence and evolution of PA regimes on Elgon, Uganda from 1929.

Year PA Episode Power and interests Impact on local communities

1929 Mt Elgon Forestreserve (MEFR)

The British colonialadministration established aForest Reserve in 1929

Implemented by the colonialpowers without any consentfrom local communities Aim tosecure timber and forestecosystem functions to sustainthe coffee production for thecolonial commerce

A major deprivation of rightsAll permanent settlementforcibly prohibited with theexception of the Benets andsome Bagishu farmers Localcommunities allowed nontimber extraction according tothe FD rules.

1937–1961 MEFR Legally gazetted. The boundarydemarcated 1936–37.Governed as a Forest reserveby the Forest Department butmultiple administrativechanges without a majorchange in governanceapproach

The colonial administrationformally reserves Elgon forests

Gradually less tolerancetoward the Benet and theBagishu in the Forest Reserve

1961–1971 MEFR Uganda gains independence Similar PA strategy maintainedon Elgon with the FD asgoverning authority

Independence did not bringchanges to the relationsbetween local communitiesand PAs on Elgon

1971–1986 MEFR The Amin and post-Aminperiod

The FD function largely brokedown

During this period ofinstability, access to the PAbecame largely open. About25,000 ha were cultivated bysmall scale farmers inside thereserve

1983 MEFR Decided to relocate the Benet The Government negotiatesrelocation with localgovernment leaders inKapchorwa.A slice of the Forest Reservedegazetted for the Benets tosettle permanently

Other actors appropriated theland the Benets were supposedto getSparks conflict that is stillongoing about the status of theBenet in the PA

1993 Mt ElgonNational Park(MENP)

MEFR converted to a Nationalpark. Administration toUganda Wildlife Authority.

USAID supports the Ugandangovernment to convert ForestReserves to National Parks.This enforces more strictnature conservation

All access of local peopleprohibited.Local people relocated Parkboundary redrawn anddemarcated

1995 MENP New strategy on communityaccess from 1995

Donors push for new PAstrategy Introduction ofcollaborative agreements tomediate local communityaccess to the NP

Collaborative agreementsoffered to communities atParish level directly borderingthe park Very limitedpossibility to influence tocontents of the agreementsParishes not bordering the parkare not offered to negotiatecollaborative agreements

2004 MENP A transboundary PA projectintroduced

Funded by NORAD andfacilitated by IUCN

No changes

S ), UWG

TafDatn

EPT(

teoob

ources: Webster (1954), Synnott (1968), Bunker (1987), GoU (1996), Scott (1998osalamang et al. (2008).

The Forest Reserves have also undergone governance reforms.he forest resources were for a long time not managed sustain-bly and actually appropriated in large scale by powerful actorsrom the timber industry (Hitimana et al., 2004). Further the Forestepartment faced for years allegations of corruption and misman-gement. In 2005, a new forest law passed in the Kenyan parliamentransformed the Forest Department gradually to a parastatal orga-ization, the Kenya Forest Service with a new mandate.

The outcome of this is that there are four PA units on the Kenyanlgon with different resources governance systems, the Nationalark, Chepkitale National Reserve and the two Forest Reserves,ranz nzoia and Mt Elgon that have similar institutional propertiesTable 4).

The newest PA conservation strategy on Elgon, still building onhe colonial past, was launched in 2004 when Uganda and Kenya

ntered transboundary protected area management collaborationn Elgon, with the aim to improve the conservation and devel-pment in the area by entering a joint PA governance across theoundary (Vedeld et al., 2005). The project involves all PAs on Elgon

A (2000), Norad (2003), Norgrove and Hulme (2006), Muhweezi et al. (2007) and

and is currently under the ownership of East African Community.The aim is to establish Mt Elgon as a pioneer TBPAM regime forEast Africa (Muhweezi et al., 2007). During our study, we foundreasons to worry that the TBPAM process entails reproduction ofthe “fortress” strategies. The TBPAM process on Elgon had been top-down and also donor driven from the early beginning, not allowingfor nor focusing on local community involvement (see further inPetursson et al., 2013). This resembles the recent critics to TBPAMfrom southern Africa where the approach has been worked onlonger (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005; Duffy, 2006).

The current levels of conflicts between local communities and PApolicies

Currently there are five main PA’s on Mt Elgon with different

resources governance systems that have evolved from the initialtwo PAs (Table 4). In order to assess how the current PA poli-cies impact on local communities, local community members wereasked about existence of conflicts between them and the respective

Page 9

J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 251–263 259

Table 3The emergence and evolution of PA regimes on Elgon, Kenya from the year 1932.

Year PA Episode Power and interests Impact on local communities

1932 Mt Elgon ForestReserve (MEFR)

The British colonialgovernment establishes ForestReserve

Reserving forests was a part ofthe colonial strategy, to meetthe demands of the large whitesettlers’ community inTrans-nzoia.Governance by the ForestDepartment

Major deprivation of localpeople rights and livelihoods.Local people displaced,especially those living inTrans-nzoia

1962 MEFR Kenya independent The independent governmentlargely continues the same PApolicy

No change

1968 – MEFR split into three PA units Conservation interests drivethe establishment of a NationalPark, aiming to enforce morestrict protection of wildlife andforests

–

1968 Mt ElgonNational Park

New regime. Placed underwhat became Kenya WildlifeService

Established to meet natureconservation interests

The NP becomes a no go areafor local people

1968 Trans-nzoiaForest Reserve

The north eastern part of theformer MEFR becameTrans-nzoia Forest Reserve

Governed by the ForestryDepartment. The key interestsare commercial forestry. TheFD sets conditions for localcommunity access

Local people allowed access toresources, but are supposed topay for the resources theycollect

1968 Mt Elgon ForestReserve

The southern part of theformer MEFR became the newMt Elgon Forest Reserve

(Same as above) (Same as above)

1971 Mt Elgon ForestReserve

Decision to relocate the Mosoppeople

The government decides torelocate the Mosop from themoorlands downhill. A sectionof Mt Elgon Forest Reserve inChebyuk is degazetted

Sparks a major conflict in MtElgon district.

2000 ChepkitaleNationalReserve

Mt Elgon District CountyCouncil

Strong pressure from thedistrict local government in MtElgon district. Partly to try toresolve the violet conflict in thearea. Get local mandate overthe moorlands for grazingpurposes

Allows local communitiesaccess to grazing land andresources.

2004 All PA regimes A transboundary PA project Funded by NORAD and No changes

S weez

Pdpvcro

tarl

iTdflabmta

T

b

introduced

ources: Foeken and Verstrate (1992), KFD/KWS (2001), Hitimana et al. (2004), Muh

A they live adjacent to (Table 5). Together, 67.4% of the respon-ents claimed that there was conflict between them and the PA’solicies. The level of conflict was however different between thearious PA regimes, ranging from almost all respondents claimingonflict with the Kenyan Forest Reserve (93.3%) to about half theespondents in Uganda having signed the collaborative agreementsn resources access with UWA (47.2%).

The respondents that claimed conflicts were asked what fac-ors within each regime where causing the conflicts. That provided

long list of constraints in their relations to the respective PAegime, indicating the complex and contested relations betweenocal communities and PA’s on Elgon (Table 6).

From this list, it is evident that there are many factors constrain-ng relations between PA’s and local communities, causing conflicts.hese constraints are context dependent, livelihood related, andiffer between PA’s with different institutional properties. The con-icts are still high in PA’s that have explicitly been designed toddress local community relations. Therefore, although PAs haveeen operating as a key land use policies on Elgon for long, theajority of the community members still claims conflicts between

hem and the PA administration and further identifies the conflictss multi-dimensional and diverse.

he “nine lives” of protected areas on Mt Elgon

The PA as spatial units on Elgon have largely persisted in timeut the institutional properties gradually evolved and changed. Our

facilitated by IUCN

i et al. (2007), Soini (2007), Simiyu (2008) and Médard (2010).

analysis of the PA institutional emergence and evolution on Elgondemonstrates that PA’s can be understood as path-dependent insti-tutions. The institutional path has significant implications for thecurrent PA policy considerations, and provides insights from thepast to understand contemporary challenges. From our analysis,we identify a range of issues that aid in explicating the drivers andmechanisms of path dependency in PA governance.

PA emergence on Elgon

The colonial transformations that created the basis for the PAestablishment differed greatly between Uganda and Kenya. Thedriving forces behind the PA establishment were, however, similaron both sides of Elgon. By the establishment of PAs, the land withinwas brought under governmental tenure by the same colonialpower to secure rights over forest and wildlife resources. This wasenforced without any consideration to local community’s histori-cal rights to the land and resources. Land rights in the surroundingfarmlands were, however, not formalized, except in Trans-noziain Kenya that was settled by Europeans. This institutional designcreated from day-one asymmetric power relations between the PAauthorizes controlling the state property, and the surrounding localcommunities that lacked – and are still lacking – any formal rights to

their customary lands nor resources or lands within the PA’s. Theseasymmetric powers give leverage to sustain the hegemonic rela-tions and conflicts between PA authorities and local communitieson access and control of the valuable natural resources.

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260 J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 251–263

Table 4The current PA governance structure on Elgon.

PA unit Mt Elgon

Uganda Kenya

Name Mt ElgonNational Park

Mt ElgonNational Park

Mt Elgon Forest Reserve Trans-nzoia Forest Reserve Chepkitale National Reserve

Authority UgandaWildlifeAuthority(UWA)

Kenya WildlifeService (KWS)

Kenya Forest Service Kenya Forest Service Mt Elgon District Countycouncil

Size (ha) 100,000 16,000 45,000 20,000 17,000

Key attributes Native forestsandwoodlands,moorlands,Timberplantations Nolarge mammals

ForestsMoorlandsWildlife

Native forests, wildlife Plantations and native forests Upper moorlands. Somewildlife

Institutionalaspects

Wildlife Statue1996 Formalcollaborativeagreementswith somecommunitiesParamilitarynorms Natureconservationfocus

WildlifeConservationandManagementact, Chapt. 376.Paramilitarynorms LawenforcementNo local access

Forestry Act 2005 Ban ontimber harvesting Communitypay for access

Forestry Act 2005Communities pay for accessBan on timber harvesting

Trust Land. Anthropocentricfocus Grazing and someresource use allowed Humansettlement not allowed

Governancepriorities

Natureconservation.Tourism.Plantationforestry (twosites). Security.

Tourism NatureconservationWildlifemanagementSecurity

Forestry Nature conservationLocal community access

Forestry Nature conservation Local community access

nPtamllTdsrte

TP

Localcommunityaccess

This manifests further in the PA management cultures. The colo-ial regime established paramilitary management culture aroundA governance, where armed and uniformed park rangers wererained with militant mind-set toward local people. This man-gement culture still prevails with law enforcement as the keyanagement strategy applied. This historical antagonization of

ocal people constraints any changes toward more PA-people col-aboration like the promoted community conservations strategies.his strong management culture is an important driver of pathependency in PA governance and is an important element wheneeking understanding for their robustness. If local community

ights and interest are not addressed during the establishment ofhe PA, it becomes highly challenging exercise to include their inter-st later.

able 5ercentage of local respondents claiming conflicts between them and PA’s on Elgon.

Respondents Conflict

Yes (%) No (%)

Uganda1. MENP with collaborative agreements 47.2 52.82. MENP not collaborative agreements 63.3 36.7

Mean 55.3 44.7

Kenya3. ME Forest Reserve 93.3 6.74. ME National Park 65.5 34.5

Mean 78.3 21.7

Grand total 67.4 32.6

Path dependent institutional evolution

The historical-institutional analyses on Elgon reveal differentevolutionary paths of the PA institutions on the two sides (Fig. 4).

Initially, the colonial actors established PAs in both countriesand governed them as Forest Reserves, basically for the benefitsof the colonial commerce. The PAs, however, were supposed tomeet the colonial demands under quite different socio-economictransformations. In Uganda, the British colonial authorities forciblyintroduced coffee to the local farming systems, using local farmersas agents to produce the valuable export crop. On the Kenyan side,the colonial powers introduced a much more destructive regime tothe local conditions, displaced local people and established largescale white farmers’ agricultural enterprises. These differences hadstrong bearing on objectives and priorities of the regimes estab-lished by the foreign powers to govern the PAs. Both however,deprived local communities from the rights to settle and accessresources within the park unless adhering to the colonial rules.

Following independence, we find the two countries continuingto reform and reshaping their PA regimes in different trajecto-ries in accordance with the colonial legacies. In both countries, thePA governance has followed similar path toward more strict con-servation. This has included institutional change, hence a gradualshift and institutional layering from the initial open access situa-tion to a forest reserve regime with strong local connections andfrom there toward more centrally governed forest reserve and then

to a national park with more strict conservation agenda. Ugandahas maintained one large PA unit, while Kenya diversified intofour distinct PA units with different governance strategies, reflect-ing the land tenure differences from the colonial past. These two

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J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / Land Use Policy 42 (2015) 251–263 261

Table 6Type of conflicts identified by local respondents living adjacent to PA’s on Elgon.

Conflict factor Mt ElgonUganda Kenya1. Mt Elgon NP with CA (%) 2. Mt Elgon NP without CA (%) 3. Mt Elgon FR (%) 4. Mt Elgon NP (%)

Access to resourcesAllow access to other forest products 0.0 26.7 26.7 0.0Allow grazing 5.6 16.7 0.0 41.4Allow other resources 38.9 10.0 0.0 20.7Not allowed access 0.0 3.3 0.0 27.6Provide fodder 47.2 10.0 0.0 0.0

SecurityCattle rustling 63.9 46.7 13.3 24.1Insecurity/theft 25.0 36.7 6.7 10.3

LandGet the shamba system back 0.0 0.0 86.7 34.5Provide land in the forest 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0

PA authorityTo high payment demanded from authority 0.0 0.0 40.0 0.0Employ locals 5.6 3.3 3.3 49.0Not allowed benefits 0.0 0.0 0.0 55.2Ranger harassment 8.3 40.0 46.7 6.9Share revenues 5.6 3.3 6.0 56.0Stop charging people 5.6 56.7 0.0 0.0

WildlifeStop the wildlife 5.6 0.0 53.3 34.5Compensation for lost crop/livestock 52.8 20.0 16.7 17.2Fence the PA’s boundary 0.0 23.3 20.0 0.0Wildlife – livestock conflict 58.3 90.0 50.0 44.8Wildlife-crop conflict – large animals 0.0 0.0 86.7 0.0Wildlife-crop conflict – small animal 55.6 40.0 80.0 93.1

n, Uga

dhts

Peisa

Fig. 4. The process of PA emergence and evolution on Mt Elgo

ifferent paths and subsequent institutional layering or “bricolage”ave not been random acts, but are intentionally designed to servehe interests of those in power. Still, decisions in the past have atrong influence on the present PA policies and decisions.

This further has bearings on considering TBPAM, the most recentA institutional reform on Elgon. Although TBPAM might be an

cologically attractive idea, it should pay attention to the challeng-ng historical-institutional forces that have generated the currenttructures and conflicts and PA policies that have alienated localctors’ interests. Most of the PA challenges and conflicts are local,

nda and Kenya. The current PA units are marked in grayscale.

not regional. There is a considerable risk that a regional approachto PA governance like TBPAM will further alienate the local actors.

Conclusions

Recalling our objectives, this study has used historical-

institutional analyses to examine the emergence and evolution ofPAs on Elgon in Uganda and Kenya, and further, assessed the currentcommunity–PA relations. We find the resources governance systemframework useful in order to conceptualize and understand how

Page 12

2 nd Us

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62 J.G. Petursson, P. Vedeld / La

As emerged on Elgon and how institutions regarding their gov-rnance have evolved over time. PA regimes are path dependentnstitutions, strongly influenced by the historical past. The pathependent nature of the PA institutions helps in understandingheir robustness through major societal changes.

We have shown how colonialism transformed power rela-ions and institutional arrangements, related to land and naturalesources on Mt Elgon. Without any consideration for local commu-ity’s historical rights to land and resources, coercive power wassed to change land tenure regimes, gazette lands as state propertynd institute new rules for local people access to resources. The PAsn Elgon were established to meet the interests of the external pow-rs that directly deprived local people of rights. Further, we findocal communities alienated throughout in PA governance deci-ion making. The study shows that there are still multiple conflictsetween local communities and the PA governance. Our historical-

nstitutional analyses unfold the multiple power asymmetries thatctors have used to impose PA policies to meet the different inter-sts at respective sides of Elgon. We see a risk for further alienationf local power in the newest PA reform, hence the TBPAM. If localommunity interests cannot addressed properly at local/nationalevel, it will be even more difficult to negotiate their interests at aegional level.

Importantly, there are two distinct PA evolutionary paths onhe different portions of Elgon. Those paths have both resulted inA-people conflicts, but differ substantially between Uganda andenya. The institutional aspects of the conflicts on the Kenyan sidere deeply rooted in the land tenure arrangements introduced andnforced by the colonial administration and then inherited dur-ng the independence. In Uganda, the main conflicts relate to moreecent events, especially decisions taken during the Amin/Post-min chaos and the decisions in the aftermath aiming to “restorerder” by enforcing human relocations and instituting more strictegimes for local community access to land and resources.

Currently, there are major international processes promotingarious types of PA expansion, both for carbon and biodiversityurposes. Our analyses reveal that the persistent PA policies oftenenerate and perpetuate long lasting social conflicts and seri-usly impact local community livelihoods. Once established, theAs seem to prevail. Therefore, PA expansion policies need toe designed to address local community rights and secure local

nvolvement from the beginning. The Mt Elgon case shows us howifficult it is to include community rights and interests later intolready established PA resources governance systems.

PAs can be understood as resources governance systems, estab-ished to control and distribute power. In the Mt Elgon case fromganda and Kenya, we have shown how powerful actors in such

ystems impose their institutional preferences on the less pow-rful, hence the local people. We find PAs not only persisting aspatial units in time but path-dependent regimes, enduring andesilient structures, where authority is negotiated and renegoti-ted to meet new interests. This partly explains their resiliencehrough subsequent societal transformations. Once an area haseen brought under legal protection, the powerful actors can sub-equently transform the institutional properties according to theirnterests. Therefore we find the PAs on Elgon have “nine lives”

here the last in line is the proposed TBPAM reform, still buildingn the old foundations from the British colonial period.

cknowledgements

Thanks to Dr. John Kaboggoza Makerere University, Kampalaor various support in gathering information in Uganda and Kenya.urther we want to express our appreciation to all who assisteduring the fieldwork in the Elgon area.

e Policy 42 (2015) 251–263

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