THE NEW THE NEW NORMAL FOR NATURALNATURALNATURAL …

THE NEW THE NEW NORMAL FOR NORMAL FOR

NATURALNATURALNATURAL NATURAL DISASTERSDISASTERS

Tom O’RourkeThomas R Briggs ProfessorThomas R. Briggs Professor

of EngineeringCornell University

EERI Distinguished Lecture

TOPICSTOPICS•• Tohoku EarthquakeTohoku Earthquake•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence

H iH i•• HurricanesHurricanes•• New OrleansNew OrleansNew OrleansNew Orleans•• New York New York CityCity

•• New NormalNew Normal


TOPICSTOPICS•• Tohoku EarthquakeTohoku Earthquake•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence•• HurricanesHurricanes

•• New OrleansNew Orleans•• New OrleansNew Orleans•• New York New York CityCityyy

•• New NormalNew Normal


TOHOKU EARTHQUAKETOHOKU EARTHQUAKE•• 9.0 Mw (~ 49.0 Mw (~ 4thth Largest EQ Measured)Largest EQ Measured)

1010 25 Shift i25 Shift i•• 1010--25 cm Shift in 25 cm Shift in Earth’s AxisEarth’s Axis

•• 1000 x more power 1000 x more power than 1995 Kobe EQthan 1995 Kobe EQ

•• 600 million x more 600 million x more power thanpower thanpower than power than Hiroshima bombHiroshima bomb


TOHOKU EARTHQUAKETOHOKU EARTHQUAKE•• 15,870 Deaths15,870 Deaths

•• 2 814 Missing2 814 Missing•• 2,814 Missing2,814 Missing

•• 129,225 129,225 Buildings Buildings Destroyed; > 1 Million Destroyed; > 1 Million Heavily DamagedHeavily Damaged

•• $235 B Direct Losses$235 B Direct Losses

$ f l$ f l•• ~ $620 B for Nuclear ~ $620 B for Nuclear Decontamination & Decontamination & D i i iD i i i

EERI Distinguished LectureDecommissioningDecommissioning

TOHOKU TSUNAMITOHOKU TSUNAMI• Inundation = 561 km2• Tsunami Heights = 3 to

7 3 m7.3 m• 50 km Run-up on

Kitakami River

SendaiSendai

10 km10 km• 190 of 300 km Seawalls Heavily Damaged


FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR PLANTFUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR PLANT46 hi h l h46-m-high splash

FukushimaFukushimaUnits 1Units 1--44


BOILING WATER REACTORBOILING WATER REACTOR

50-mm-thick steel200-mm-thick steel


BOILING WATER REACTORBOILING WATER REACTORZi i l ddi f f l d d t t h dZirconium cladding of fuel rods decomposes to generate hydrogen


FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR PLANTNUCLEAR PLANT

•• Electric power toElectric power toElectric power to Electric power to plant lost, including plant lost, including steel tower failuresteel tower failure

•• Tsunami flooded all Tsunami flooded all diesel generators diesel generators (DGs) except one(DGs) except one

2 134(DGs) except one (DGs) except one airair--cooled DG at cooled DG at higher elevationhigher elevation

S W t C li S t•• Sea water cooling Sea water cooling

system destroyedsystem destroyed

Sea Water Cooling System


FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR PLANTNUCLEAR PLANT

•• Partial meltdowns in Partial meltdowns in Units 1, 2, & 3 in Units 1, 2, & 3 in primary reactor primary reactor pressure vesselspressure vesselspressure vessels pressure vessels (RPVs) and primary (RPVs) and primary containment vessels containment vessels (PCVs)(PCVs)

2 134

(PCVs)(PCVs)

•• Loss of cooling in Loss of cooling in Unit 4 spent fuel poolUnit 4 spent fuel poolUnit 4 spent fuel poolUnit 4 spent fuel pool

•• Hydrogen explosions Hydrogen explosions at all 4 unitsat all 4 units

EERI Distinguished Lectureat all 4 unitsat all 4 units

FUKUSHIMA INDEPENDENT PANEL FUKUSHIMA INDEPENDENT PANEL ((HatamuraHatamura Panel)Panel)(( ))

•• Loss of OffLoss of Off--Site Emergency Site Emergency CenterCenter

•• Failure to Delegate AuthorityFailure to Delegate Authority

•• Poor Coordination withPoor Coordination withPoor Coordination with Poor Coordination with Prime Minister’s OfficePrime Minister’s Office

•• Errors in Use of Critical Errors in Use of Critical EquipmentEquipment

•• Inadequate Radiation Inadequate Radiation MM it i & Di i tiit i & Di i tiMMonitoring & Dissemination onitoring & Dissemination of Informationof Information

•• Evacuation MistakesEvacuation Mistakes

EERI Distinguished Lecture•• Evacuation MistakesEvacuation Mistakes

869 SANRIKU EQ AND TSUNAMI869 SANRIKU EQ AND TSUNAMI•• Trenches & Soil Coring Trenches & Soil Coring

Revealed Tsunami DepositsRevealed Tsunami Deposits

S d L B t P tS d L B t P t

Trenches

•• Sand Layers Between Peat Sand Layers Between Peat Layers, Carbon Dating of Layers, Carbon Dating of OrganicsOrganicsgg

•• Historical Documents Confirm Historical Documents Confirm TsunamiTsunami

T i D it•• Models Show ~ 8.4 MModels Show ~ 8.4 MWW EQEQ

•• Current Studies Suggest Current Studies Suggest

Tsunami Deposits

Sendai Bay

Tsunami RunTsunami Run--up > Extent of up > Extent of Sand DepositsSand Deposits

1100 Y R1100 Y R

EERI Distinguished Lecture•• ~~1100 Yr. Recurrence1100 Yr. Recurrence

JAPAN’S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSJAPAN’S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTSO 5 M 12• On 5 May 12 all 54 nuclear reactors down working or 0working, or 0 % of total nuclear; 1 reactor on linereactor on line 1 July 12

• Japan imports 84% of energy• Nuclear reactors supplied ~ 30% electricity• Japan planned to increase to 40% by 2017

f

EERI Distinguished Lecture• Nuclear was part of C02 reduction strategy

WORLDWIDE EFFECTS:WORLDWIDE EFFECTS: NUCLEAR POWER NUCLEAR POWER

•• Germany to Close Out Nuclear Power (Germany to Close Out Nuclear Power (22.4% Electricity, 201022.4% Electricity, 2010))

•• Switzerland to Terminate Nuclear (Switzerland to Terminate Nuclear (40% Electricity, 200840% Electricity, 2008))Switzerland to Terminate Nuclear (Switzerland to Terminate Nuclear (40% Electricity, 200840% Electricity, 2008))

•• Italy Referendum (2011): > 94% Voters Oppose Plans to Italy Referendum (2011): > 94% Voters Oppose Plans to Resume Nuclear Power (abandoned 1980s)Resume Nuclear Power (abandoned 1980s)


NEW ZEALANDNEW ZEALANDNEW ZEALANDNEW ZEALAND

ChristchurchChristchurch

Ch i t h hChristchurch


CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCECANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE

MMWW = 7 1= 7 1MMWW = 7.1= 7.14 Sept 104 Sept 10

MMWW = 6.0= 6.023 Dec 1123 Dec 11

MMWW = 6.0= 6.0MMWW = 6.0= 6.013 June 1113 June 11

MMWW = 6.2= 6.222 Feb 1122 Feb 11


CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCECANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE•• ~ 190 Deaths~ 190 Deaths•• ~ 190 Deaths~ 190 Deaths

•• CBD DestroyedCBD Destroyed–– ~ 1800 CBD Bldgs. ~ 1800 CBD Bldgs.

DemolishedDemolished ChristchurchChristchurch

–– ~ 55,000 Residences ~ 55,000 Residences DamagedDamaged

•• $25$25--30 B Direct Losses, 30 B Direct Losses, >>2020 %% GDPGDP h i h hh i h h>>20 20 % % GDPGDP

•• Massive Liquefaction & Massive Liquefaction & I f t t DI f t t D

ChristchurchChristchurch

EERI Distinguished LectureInfrastructure DamageInfrastructure Damage

STRONG MOTION RECORDSSTRONG MOTION RECORDS((Christchurch Earthquake)Christchurch Earthquake)((Christchurch Earthquake)Christchurch Earthquake)

00 5 km5 km

CCCCCCCCCHHCCHHC NN

HVSCHVSCSCSC


STRONG STRONG MOTION MOTION

RECORDSRECORDSRECORDSRECORDS


STRONG STRONG MOTION MOTION

RECORDSRECORDSRECORDSRECORDS


CHRISTCHURCH LIQUEFACTIONCHRISTCHURCH LIQUEFACTION

52 km2

96 km291 km291 km2

Bexley


CHRISTCHURCHCHRISTCHURCHCHRISTCHURCH CHRISTCHURCH LIQUEFACTIONLIQUEFACTION


WASTEWATER SYSTEM

Bromley Plant

Lagoons

Grit Tanks

PrimaryTrickling

FiltersClarifiers

PrimarySettlement

Tanks


Water Distribution System


NEW ZEALAND INSURANCENEW ZEALAND INSURANCE80% Insurance Coverage80% Insurance Coverage•• ~80% Insurance Coverage ~80% Insurance Coverage

Before EarthquakesBefore Earthquakes

•• After EQs, Renegotiation of After EQs, Renegotiation of ReinsuranceReinsuranceReinsurance Reinsurance

•• FourFour--fold Increase in Insurancefold Increase in Insurance•• FourFour--fold Increase in Insurance fold Increase in Insurance EQC Rates, with More ProjectedEQC Rates, with More Projected

•• Termination of Local Authorities Termination of Local Authorities Protection Program (LAPP)Protection Program (LAPP)

EERI Distinguished LectureProtection Program (LAPP)Protection Program (LAPP)

TOPICSTOPICS•• Tohoku EarthquakeTohoku Earthquake•• Tohoku EarthquakeTohoku Earthquake•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence

••HurricanesHurricanes••HurricanesHurricanes••New OrleansNew Orleans••New OrleansNew Orleans••New YorkNew York CityCity••New York New York CityCity

•• New NormalNew NormalEERI Distinguished Lecture

New NormalNew Normal

New Orleans

Mississippi River

New Orleans

Mississippi Mississippi DeltaDeltaDeltaDelta

25000 km225000 km2Most Recent

Delta


New Orleans Elevation New Orleans Elevation CrossCross--SectionSection

EERI Distinguished LectureEntergy (2006)Entergy (2006)

HURRICANE KATRINAHURRICANE KATRINA

•• Greatest U.S. DisasterGreatest U.S. Disaster2000 D d2000 D d && Mi iMi i

•• Complete Failure of Complete Failure of Hurricane ProtectionHurricane Protection•• 2000 Dead 2000 Dead && MissingMissing

•• > $ 120 Billion Losses> $ 120 Billion Lossesll

Hurricane Protection Hurricane Protection SystemSystem•• Hurricane HazardHurricane Hazard•• 80% New Orleans 80% New Orleans

Flooded, 53 Days to Flooded, 53 Days to DewaterDewater

•• Hurricane HazardHurricane Hazard

•• Incomplete Design & Incomplete Design & ConstructionConstructionDewaterDewater

•• Impacts on Gulf Impacts on Gulf Offshore InfrastructureOffshore Infrastructure

ConstructionConstruction

•• Poor MaintenancePoor Maintenance

•• I Walls & FoundationsI Walls & FoundationsOffshore Infrastructure Offshore Infrastructure & Energy Delivery & Energy Delivery System System

•• I Walls & FoundationsI Walls & Foundations

•• Poor PreparationPoor Preparation

•• Inadequate ResponseInadequate Response


yy •• Inadequate ResponseInadequate Response

EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTEVOLUTION OF CONCEPTSeptember 11September 11::

•• Protection of CriticalProtection of CriticalProtection of Critical Protection of Critical InfrastructureInfrastructure

H i K t iH i K t iHurricane KatrinaHurricane Katrina::•• Resilient CommunitiesResilient Communities

EERI Distinguished Lecture 31

Mississippi Mississippi ppppRiver Drains River Drains 41% of US41% of US41% of US41% of US

65 Kilo65 Kilo--tonnes/s tonnes/s 1927 ’37 ‘731927 ’37 ‘73

EERI Distinguished Lecture1927, 37. 731927, 37. 73

100 km2 1100 km2 1--2m2m100 km2, 1100 km2, 1 2m 2m Deep per YearDeep per Year

200 Million Tonnes200 Million Tonnes200 Million Tonnes 200 Million Tonnes of Sediment/Yr.of Sediment/Yr.


2005 2005 H iH i

ii

HurricanesHurricanes

RitaRita KatrinaKatrina

WilmaWilma•• 28 Storms28 Storms

EmilyEmily•• 15 Hurricanes15 Hurricanes•• > $120 Billion> $120 Billion


GovernmentGovernmentRiverRiver Corps of EngineersCorps of Engineers

Communities & Communities & InfrastructureInfrastructureControlControl

St SSt SLoss of Loss of

Storm SurgeStorm SurgeWetlandsWetlands


HURRICANE IRENEHURRICANE IRENE•• 56 Killed56 Killed

•• $10$10--15 Billion Direct Losses15 Billion Direct Losses$10$10 15 Billion Direct Losses15 Billion Direct Losses

•• 7.4 7.4 MMillion illion HHomes & omes & Businesses Without PowerBusinesses Without PowerBusinesses Without PowerBusinesses Without Power

•• NYC NYC Evacuation & Evacuation & Shutdown of MTA & Public Shutdown of MTA & Public TransportationTransportation

Track

•• Record FloodingRecord Flooding

•• Near MissNear Miss

EERI Distinguished Lecture•• Near MissNear Miss

HURRICANE SANDYHURRICANE SANDY•• >> 120 Killed US (~70120 Killed US (~70 CarribeanCarribean))•• >> 120 Killed US (~70 120 Killed US (~70 CarribeanCarribean))•• > $60 Billion Property and > $60 Billion Property and

Business LossesBusiness LossesBusiness LossesBusiness Losses

•• 8.5 8.5 MMillion illion HHomes & Businesses omes & Businesses Without PowerWithout PowerWithout PowerWithout Power

•• NYC NYC Evacuation & Shutdown of Evacuation & Shutdown of MTA & Public TransportMTA & Public TransportMTA & Public TransportMTA & Public Transport

•• Wall Street Shut 2 DaysWall Street Shut 2 Days

•• Record Flooding (Surge)Record Flooding (Surge)

•• Direct HitDirect Hit

EERI Distinguished Lecture•• Direct HitDirect Hit

STORM SURGE STORM SURGE AT BATTERYAT BATTERYAT BATTERYAT BATTERY


NEW YORK CITY HURRICANENEW YORK CITY HURRICANEFLOOD ZONESFLOOD ZONESFLOOD ZONESFLOOD ZONES

NYU Hospital

NYC Tech Campus

Battery

EERI Distinguished LectureBattery

STORM WATER AT BATTERYSTORM WATER AT BATTERY

4.23 m PeakHurricane 4 23 mHurricane

Sandy4.23 m

- 0.61 m~ 3 62 m

0 61 Tid

~ 3.62 m Surge

0.61 m Tide


HURRICANE SANDY INNUNDATIONHURRICANE SANDY INNUNDATION

LaGuardiaWorldTrade LaGuardia

AirportCenter

BatteryNYSE

BatteryBrooklyn

Bridge




HURRICANE SANDY INNUNDATIONHURRICANE SANDY INNUNDATIONFlooded Tunnels

• 7 Subway Tunnels• Brooklyn BatteryBrooklyn Battery• Midtown Tunnel• PATH Tunnels• Holland Tunnel



Electric Power

SteamDistribution


HURRICANE HURRICANE SIMULATIONSIMULATION(Lin et al. , 2010)(Lin et al. , 2010)( , )( , )

•• Simulated 7555 Simulated 7555 Storm Tracks Within Storm Tracks Within 200 km of Battery200 km of Battery

•• Hydrodynamic Models: Hydrodynamic Models: 3.6m3.6m

SLOSH and ADCIRCSLOSH and ADCIRC~ 4500 yrs.~ 4500 yrs.

Fit Tail with Generalized Pareto Distribution

Return Period, yrs.

SandySandy

Surge at Battery m

yy

3.6m3.6m

EERI Distinguished LectureSurge at Battery, m

TOPICSTOPICST h k E th kT h k E th k•• Tohoku EarthquakeTohoku Earthquake

•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence•• Canterbury EQ SequenceCanterbury EQ Sequence•• HurricanesHurricanesHurricanesHurricanes

•• New OrleansNew Orleans•• New York New York CityCity

••New NormalNew NormalEERI Distinguished Lecture

OBSERVATIONSOBSERVATIONS•• Anything But NormalAnything But Normal

•• Target nuclear failure Target nuclear failure probability ≈ 1x 10probability ≈ 1x 10--6/6/yryr

•• 5 major nuclear releases in 5 major nuclear releases in 14 000 reactor years = 3x14 000 reactor years = 3x14,000 reactor years = 3x 14,000 reactor years = 3x 1010--4/4/yryr

•• Probability tails controlProbability tails controlProbability tails controlProbability tails control

•• Problems Compounded by Problems Compounded by Institutional ConstraintsInstitutional ConstraintsInstitutional Constraints, Institutional Constraints, Politics, Lack of Politics, Lack of Perspective, & DysfunctionPerspective, & Dysfunction


Perspective, & DysfunctionPerspective, & Dysfunction

NEW NORMALNEW NORMAL•• Too Big To FailToo Big To Fail

•• Reassess Risk Related to CriticalReassess Risk Related to CriticalReassess Risk Related to Critical Reassess Risk Related to Critical InfrastructureInfrastructure

•• Reassess & IdentifyReassess & Identify CriticalCritical•• Reassess & Identify Reassess & Identify CriticalCriticalInfrastructureInfrastructure

Local CoalitionsLocal Coalitions•• Local CoalitionsLocal Coalitions•• Coalitions to Protect Critical Coalitions to Protect Critical

I f T Bi F ilI f T Bi F ilInfrastructure Too Big to FailInfrastructure Too Big to Fail•• Punctuated ResiliencePunctuated Resilience


SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER SUPPLYSOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER SUPPLY

70% Imported70% ImportedWater:Water:

•• Southern California highly Southern California highly dependent on imported waterdependent on imported water•• Population: 22 MillionPopulation: 22 Million

•• California California AqueductAqueduct

Population: 22 MillionPopulation: 22 Million

East Branch Most Vulnerable•• Los Angeles Los Angeles

AqueductsAqueducts

ColoradoColorado•• Colorado Colorado River River AqueductAqueduct

30 % Ground 30 % Ground WaterWater


SHAKEOUT SCENARIOSHAKEOUT SCENARIO7.8 M7.8 MWW San Andreas Fault EarthquakeSan Andreas Fault Earthquake7.8 M7.8 MWW San Andreas Fault EarthquakeSan Andreas Fault Earthquake


SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER SUPPLYSOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER SUPPLY((after Davis, 2010after Davis, 2010))(( ,, ))

•• CA Aqueduct (CA DWR)CA Aqueduct (CA DWR)•• 49 billion m3/49 billion m3/yryr•• 49 billion m3/49 billion m3/yryr•• FFaulting Rupture in >15 placesaulting Rupture in >15 places

LA A d t (LADWP)LA A d t (LADWP)•• LA Aqueducts (LADWP)LA Aqueducts (LADWP)•• 390 million m3/390 million m3/yryr•• Elizabeth TunnelElizabeth Tunnel

•• Colorado River Aqueduct (MWD)Colorado River Aqueduct (MWD)q ( )q ( )•• 900 million m3/900 million m3/yryr•• Multiple fault ruptures & ~ 4 m upliftMultiple fault ruptures & ~ 4 m uplift


Multiple fault ruptures & 4 m upliftMultiple fault ruptures & 4 m uplift

LOS ANGELES AQUEDUCTSLOS ANGELES AQUEDUCTS•• 3 3m Horizontal3 3m Horizontal FFaultault

LakeLake

•• 3.3m Horizontal 3.3m Horizontal FFault ault DDisplacement isplacement

•• 2.9m Wide Elizabeth Tunnel2.9m Wide Elizabeth TunnelLake Lake ElizabethElizabeth •• Cuts off tunnelCuts off tunnel

San AndreasSan AndreasFaultFault

LAA Elizabeth LAA Elizabeth TunnelTunnel

Elizabeth Tunnel(through fault)


LA WATER SUPPLY CROSSES SAN LA WATER SUPPLY CROSSES SAN ANDREAS FAULTANDREAS FAULTSan Joaquin ValleyValley

Lake HughesPalmdale

Palm Springs

LosAngeles

San BernardinoVentura

Salton Sea


WELLINGTON SEISMIC RISKWELLINGTON SEISMIC RISK•• Urgent Need to Apply Urgent Need to Apply

Christchurch LessonsChristchurch LessonsChristchurch Lessons Christchurch Lessons •• Harbor FacilitiesHarbor Facilities

•• Water SupplyWater Supply Wellington Water Supply Water Supply

•• Fire HazardsFire Hazards

•• Major HighwaysMajor Highways

Fault

•• Major HighwaysMajor Highways

•• Electric Power SystemElectric Power System

TelecommunicationsTelecommunications

Wellington

•• TelecommunicationsTelecommunications

•• National GovernmentNational GovernmentElectric Power &

TelecommunicationsCables


CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTSCRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

•• Southern California Water SupplySouthern California Water Supply•• Sacramento River Delta FloodSacramento River Delta Flood•• Sacramento River Delta Flood Sacramento River Delta Flood

Protection SystemProtection System•• San Francisco Fire Protection System &San Francisco Fire Protection System &•• San Francisco Fire Protection System & San Francisco Fire Protection System &

Auxiliary Water SupplyAuxiliary Water SupplyNew York City Water SupplyNew York City Water Supply•• New York City Water SupplyNew York City Water Supply

•• New Madrid Zone Transportation & New Madrid Zone Transportation & Li id F l Lif liLi id F l Lif liLiquid Fuel LifelinesLiquid Fuel Lifelines

•• Mississippi Delta Flood ManagementMississippi Delta Flood Management


MULTIDSICIPLINARY MULTIDSICIPLINARY DIALOGUEDIALOGUEDIALOGUEDIALOGUE

N E i f 28No Engineers of 28Speakers

< 10 % Engineers

3 Engineers gof 300

Participants


INFRASTRUCTUREINFRASTRUCTUREFINANCINGFINANCING

Access to Region’s CoreBoston Central Artery/Tunnel

FINANCINGFINANCINGAccess to Region s Core

ARC Project• $ 8.7 B among Federal

& state governmentsCanceled

Boston Central Artery/Tunnel

(1990 ) • Canceled

• $ 2.8 B ( )

(1990s)

(1982)• $ 6.0 B

(1996)( )• $14.8 B

(2007)


LEADERSHIP & PUBLIC LEADERSHIP & PUBLIC OUTREACHOUTREACHOUTREACHOUTREACH


NEW NORMAL FOR NATURAL DISASTERSNEW NORMAL FOR NATURAL DISASTERS

Punctuated Resilience to Protect Against What is Possible Beyond What is

Probable
