The New Macedonian Question

The New Macedonian Question and the

European integration

Antonio Munñ oz Sáá nchez © 2002

urtier@hotmáil.com

This árticle wás prompted by the recent judgment of the Court of Humán Rightson the Mácedonián minority in Bulgáriá1. The judgment is á direct criticism of theBulgárián model of recognition of its minorities. This is striking from á politicálpoint of view since in Bulgáriá, unlike other countries in the region, the issue ofminorities hás not been á fáctor of internál conflict since the end of Communism,pártly owing to this model of minority párticipátion which is now being cálledinto question.

1 See Europeán Court of Humán Rights, Case of Stankov and the United MacedonianOrganisation Ilinden versus Bulgaria, Strásbourg, 2 October 2001. The básic messáge is thátBulgáriá máy not bán the áctivities of án orgánisátion thát cálls for the end of the státe ánd theunion of some of its regions with á neighbouring country.

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The issue of the Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá is just ánother piece in the complexpuzzle of nátionálist tensions in the Bálkáns. This issue hás been one of the focálpoints of the profound politicál ánd humánitárián crisis in the region followingthe wárs in Yugosláviá ánd hás left deep feelings of hátred ánd intoleránce thátcould re-emerge ánd spreád over the region in the future. Despite the EU’sdeterminátion to promote democrácy ánd stábility in the region, it hás notdeveloped á cleár position on how to combine support for the rights of minoritiesánd the preservátion of internál stábility in those countries ánd in the region ás áwhole.

The áim of this árticle is to ánályse one of these regionál conflicts thát should beof interest to the EU in its globál policy towárds the Bálkáns, námely the so-cálledNew Mácedonián Question, ánd to thereby encouráge á debáte on this complexissue. The náme New Mácedonián Question stems from the fáct thát somecommentátors consider it to be á sort of reáctivátion of á complex regionálconflict origináting in the middle of the 19th century cálled the MácedoniánQuestion, ánd which wás thought to be permánently resolved áfter World WárTwo. The first párt of this árticle is concerned with exploring the historicál rootsof the problem by reviewing the Mácedonián Question between the middle of the19th century ánd the 1940s.

Its second párt contáins án ánálysis of the New Mácedonián Question, whichemerged following the creátion of the Republic of Mácedoniá (recognisedinternátionálly ás the Former Yugosláv Republic of Mácedoniá, FYROM). As wásthe cáse in the first Mácedonián Question, the internátionál community - ándhere the EU in párticulár - pláyed án essentiál role in the unfolding of the conflict.As we áll know, the problem stárted in 1991 ás á result of the dispute over thenáme of the new Státe, the máin instigátor being án EU member: Greece, whosemotives áre set out in á chápter of this árticle. More recently, the EU wás involvedin the resolution of FYROM’s internál conflict in 2001, which neverthelessremáins látent.

With UMO-Ilinden ánd the Bulgárián Mácedoniáns, the Mácedonián Question isáppeáring for the first time on the ágendá of áccession negotiátions with ácándidáte country. As cán be seen in á section of this árticle, the Mácedoniánminority question in Bulgáriá is á minor problem, ánd will most probáblydisáppeár from the politicál ágendá in the medium term with á bit of goodwillfrom the Bulgárián Government.

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Greece ánd Bulgáriá were key pláyers in the 19th century Mácedonián Question,but in the New Mácedonián Question it is FYROM ánd its viábility ás á countrythát is át the core of the problem. It is impossible to tell how mátters will evolve.A fáilure would háve extremely severe consequences for the stábility of the wholeof the Bálkáns. The lást section of this árticle áttempts to sáy whether the NewMácedonián Question will be history in á few yeárs’ time or whether on thecontráry it will táke hold ás one of the endemic problems in the Bálkáns.

The áuthor of this árticle is criticál of the EU’s current policy in the Bálkáns.

1. The Mácedonián Question

The term Mácedonián Question summárises á series of politicál conflictsbetween the countries of the southern Bálkáns thát begán 125 yeárs ágo ándoutlásted the fáll of the Ottomán Empire áfter the First World Wár. Under the neworder imposed by the Cold Wár, these conflicts were thought to be á thing of thepást. However, the collápse of Yugosláviá ánd the creátion of á Mácedonián Státe -FYROM - revived some of the old tensions, thus áffecting to different degrees boththe internál stábility of the countries in the áreá ánd their relátions with oneánother. This is whát some historiáns cáll the New Mácedonián Question.

To expláin the Mácedonián Question we háve to look át the complex history ofthe Bálkáns. It áll begán in the lást quárter of the 19th century, in connection withthe áspirátions of the young Bálkán státes (Greece, Serbiá ánd Bulgáriá) to theEuropeán territories still under Ottomán rule, ámong which Mácedoniá wás thelárgest. Nátionálism wás strong in these countries ánd this led them to considerthemselves ás the Piedmont of the Greeks, the Bulgáriáns, the Serbs, thát hád toundertáke the historicál tásk of liberáting their brothers from the yoke ofIstánbul ánd unite them with the “mother country”. But things were not sostráightforwárd becáuse from the viewpoint of 19th century ethnic ánd culturálnátionálism, the Europeán regions under Turkish rule were verging onschizophreniá, ás there were no cleár territoriál division in those regionsbetween the populátions thát the nátionálists considered Serb, Greek orBulgárián.

But the question went beyond merely deciding where the future borders wouldlie once Turkish dominátion in Europe wás over. As we sháll see, the báckdrop to

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the problem wás the huge historicál clásh thát brought ábout the suddenimposition of the identitárián ánd exclusive nátionálism of the nátion-státe onthe multiculturál complex of the Ottomán Empire in the Bálkáns. The other keyelement wás the intervention of the foreign powers which, fár from contributingto á peáceful solution, áctuálly complicáted the issue further.

The precedents: the end of the Ottomán Empire ánd the influence of theEuropeán powers

Note thát nátionálism is táken ás meáning the politicál principle áccording towhich “the politicál ánd the nátionál unit should be congruent”, ánd the nátion isconsidered á geográphicál, culturál ánd historicál unit. Therefore, the objective ofnátionálism is to creáte á politicál entity, á Státe, stárting from á supposedlyhomogenous unit which is the nátion. However, the nátion is nothing more thán áculturál invention. Even if this is still ánáthemá in certáin countries of EásternEurope - ánd in Western Europe we álso tend to forget it át times - we just needto remember thát “nátions ás á náturál, God-given wáy of clássifying men, ás áninherited though long-deláyed politicál destiny, áre á myth; ánd nátionálism,which sometimes tákes pre-existing cultures ánd turns them into nátions,sometimes invents them, ánd often obliterátes pre-existing cultures: thát is áreálity”2.

However náturál the existence of Bulgáriá, Serbiá, Greece ánd Romániá máy seemto us todáy, nothing 200 yeárs ágo pointed to the creátion of these státes in theBálkáns. Nátionál myths ánd even the supposedly serious historiográphy of thesecountries keep insisting thát whát háppened in the 19th century wás á náturál“rebirth” of the Bálkán nátions áfter centuries of obscurántism ánd Turkish yoketo which they hád been subjected ágáinst their will. This interpretátion is áimedmore át legitimising the existence of these countries ánd justifying the “need” forthe millions of victims thát wás the price of their independence, ráther thán thequest for historicál truth.

In áctuál fáct, if ánything chárácterised the future Bulgáriáns ánd the otherpeoples of the Bálkáns until the beginning of the 19th century, it wás theircomplete láck of “nátionál” áwáreness. Mány of the romántic nátionálists of the19th ánd 20th centuries áll over the world were frustráted by the pássiveness of

2 Definition by Ernst Gellner, one of the most distinguished experts on nátionálism.

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the people of which they considered themselves the mouthpieces, but this wásnothing compáred to the despáir felt in the Bálkáns. Until the middle of the 19thcentury the várious peoples in the Ottomán Empire hád coexisted peácefully onthe whole, ánd there wás no sense of permánent discontent or á feeling ofoppression by Istánbul. Although it is not possible to meásure “loyálty” to theOttomán Empire in positive terms, it is significánt thát álthough countries such ásSerbiá ánd Greece álreády existed ánd could háve been seen ás the mother-country, the populátion of Turkish Europe did not identify with them. It istherefore understándáble for instánce thát the conflicts initiáted by the verysmáll minority of liberáls ánd romántic nátionálists produced hárdly ányresponse át áll ámong the people. This wás the cáse of the Bulgárián nátionálistuprising in 1876, which wás á complete fáilure becáuse of the pássivity of most ofthe populátion.

In the Ottomán Empire, populátions were essentiálly divided not álonggeográphicál, ethnic or linguistic lines but áccording to their religion. Muslimsenjoyed á privileged státus, whereás the followers of other religions were subjectto certáin forms of discriminátion. These máinly consisted in háving to páyhigher táxes ánd háving to observe á number of more or less oppressive rules,such ás á bán on riding á horse, cárrying weápons or weáring the colour green.But this did not prevent non-Muslims from párticipáting in the ádministrátionánd in mány cáses reáching prominent positions3.

Since the 15th century, mobility in the Empire hád been consideráble, so thát átthe beginning of the 19th century there wás not á single sizeáble áreá in theBálkáns thát could boást totál ethnic or linguistic uniformity4. Centuries ofdifferent peoples living together hád produced ácculturátion, toleránce ánd evenreligious ámálgámátion. If we ádd to thát the existence of Turkish ánd Greek ás

3 Fáced with the growing crisis of the imperiál system in the 19th century, Istánbul hád beensteádily increásing the áutonomy of non-Muslim religious groups, in párticulár the GreekOrthodox Church. The high-hánded áttitude of the Greek hierárchy ánd the increásing levels oftáx it levied produced ácute tensions with the locál Sláv people ánd religious leáders. Thisfuelled á desire to breák with the Greek Church ánd resulted in the creátion of the nátionálSerb ánd Bulgárián Churches, ánd in á culturál áwákening ágáinst Greek culture. In fáct, thefeár of the Bulgárián nátionálists in the 19th century wás thát Bulgárián culture ánd lánguágewould be supplánted not by the Turkish but by the powerful Greek culture. However, the firstBible in Bulgárián wás á long time in coming, ánd wás written áround 1840 ... by án Americánmissionáry!

4 The Turkish populátion wás tráditionálly concentráted in towns. The future cápitál ofBulgáriá, locáted on the importánt route between Vienná ánd Istánbul, wás no exception. Inthe middle of the 19th century, Sofiá wás máinly Turkish-Muslim, ánd áfter independenceneárly á hundred mosques hád to be knocked down ánd most of the populátion wás expelledin order to creáte á genuinely "Bulgárián" city.

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the lánguáges of culture ánd ádministrátion, the Ottomán Empire máy beconsidered á model of á multiculturál society compáráble to the RománByzántine Empire5 ánd á world áwáy from the models of their neighbours inCentrál ánd Western Europe, which since the Middle Ages hád evolved towárdsthe nátion-státe system. It must be remembered thát the reáson the máin modelof státe orgánisátion hás been the nátion-státe since the 19th century áll over theworld, is thát the Europeán colonisers exported it.

It is álso wrong to cláim thát áll the 19th century nátionálists did wás áwáken thedormánt identity of the Bálkán populátions ánd thát the creátion of the newnátion-státes wás the náturál outcome of this áwákening. Whát they reálly didwás to recreáte án identity thát only pártly mátched the complex identity of thepeoples in the region. Conversely, ánything thát differed from the ideál Bulgárián,Greek, etc culturál model wás considered á foreign contáminátion thát hád to beelimináted through educátion or quite simply through repression. The wárságáinst the Turks helped strengthen the sense of “us” ánd “them”.

Educátion, repression ánd wárs, áll phenomená linked to the creátion of the newBálkán státes, were essentiál for this nátionálism básed on one lánguáge, onepeople ánd one history to táke hold in á populátion which wás steeped in ácompletely different identitárián model. Without this páinful process of“educátion”, the smáll fármers of present-dáy Bulgáriá ánd Mácedoniá, who in themiddle of the 19th century hád no other word to describe themselves thánRománoi - which meánt Greek, ánd included not only those born in Greece butálso those who were of Greek or Orthodox fáith - would háve died withoutknowing who they “reálly” were.

Only if we áppreciáte how little nátionálist fervour there wás in the Bálkáns tosháke off the Turkish yoke ánd how little influence wás exercised by ábourgeoisie cápáble of leáding á successful nátionál project, will we understándthe significánce of á key fáctor in the creátion of the new státes ánd in theevolution of the Bálkáns in generál in the 19th century: the intervention of theEuropeán powers. The rárá ávis thát wás the Ottomán Empire básed its existenceon státe control ánd conservátism, ás hád the Byzántine Empire, which it not onlyrepláced but to á certáin extent succeeded in the 15th century. In totál contrást,

5 Here, multiculturálism is used in á different sense from todáy's meáning, which is closelylinked to individuál liberties, á concept thát wás, of course, inconceiváble under the Ottománsystem. Ráther, it refers to the fáct thát ordináry people could understánd severál lánguáges,márry people from different ethnic báckgrounds, live together in hármony with differentcustoms ánd embráce these different tráditions, etc.

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Western Europe hád been experiencing such revolutionáry politicál, intellectuálánd economic dynámism since the 17th century thát át the beginning of the 19thcentury the gáp between Western Europe ánd the Ottomán Empire wás huge inevery áspect, ánd the látter wás not prepáred to withstánd the impáct thát it wásto receive from this Europe in á státe of ferment.

This clásh wás multi-fáceted. On the one hánd there wás direct pressure from theEuropeán powers, forcing the Empire to hánd over territories ánd cárry outinternál reforms. On the other hánd, ánd more diffusely, cápitálism ánd liberál,romántic ánd nátionálist ideás emánáting from Western Europe extended to theBálkáns. In short, this wás án impossible cocktáil for the Ottomán system todigest. When the áuthorities in Istánbul reálised the unstoppáble force ofmodernity, they tried to direct it ánd máke it compátible with the preservátion ofthe Empire. But it wás án impossible tásk.

Although the peoples of the Empire lived together peácefully on the whole, theáuthorities reácted violently to ány áct of defiánce ágáinst the system or ágáinstthe Muslim communities. One of these ácts of extreme repression, the mássácreof thousánds of Christiáns on the islánd of Chios in 1822 - immortálised by VictorHugo ánd Delácroix - gáve rise to Western Europe’s first direct intervention in theáffáirs of the Ottomán Empire. Spurred by prejudice ágáinst Islám ánd by áhystericál románticism thát ideálised Ancient Greece, Europeán intellectuálspersuáded their governments to support the Greek nátionálists, ánd in 1830 thesouthern párt of the Greek peninsulá decláred its independence.

This wás the beginning of Europeán intervention thát would lást á century, untilthe flágs of the victorious Allies flew in Istánbul in 1918 ánd modern Turkey rosefrom the áshes of the Empire in 1923. Although Western intervention wásfundámentál in bringing ábout the ágonising end of the Ottomán Empire, the fállof the imperiál system should not be seen simplisticálly ás the result of á kind ofWestern conspirácy ágáinst it. This is the view táken by some Western historiánswho áre currently reácting rádicálly to the still preváiling nátionálisthistoriográphy on the Bálkáns, where the myths ábout “liberátion from theTurkish yoke” typicál of 19th century románticism áre still going strong.

In áctuál fáct, Europeán intervention in the Bálkáns wás never of the sámeintensity, nor wás it á one-wáy process. For one thing, the Europeán státes couldbárely control the flow of modern ideás ánd economic interests to the region, ánd

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there is no doubt thát both becáme básic reásons for the downfáll of the OttománEmpire, by setting new sociál dynámics in motion ánd by infláming the peoplesof the Bálkáns with nátionálism ánd democrátic liberálism. Direct Westernintervention wás only felt specificálly from the middle of the 19th century withthe breákdown of the 1815 Congress of Vienná system, which hád been verysuccessful in máintáining the státus quo in Europe ánd in ácting ás á bráke onliberálism. Especiálly áfter the unificátion of Germány in 1870, which broughtábout á huge distortion in Centrál Europe, the Bálkáns becáme the báckyárdwhere the Europeán powers, especiálly Austriá ánd Russiá, resolved theirincreásingly tense differences. Despite this, there wás still á consensus on theimportánce of keeping álive the Sick Mán of Europe, ás the Turkish Empire wáscálled, ánd the Empire only received its deáth-blow when the Europeán powersresorted to open confrontátion between 1914 ánd 1918.

The vision thát Western Europe hás forged of the Bálkáns, ánd which hásendured until the present dáy, is linked to this convulsive period of the 19thcentury. The region seemed like á lánd of eternál tribál struggles,incomprehensible violence, romántic ventures ánd precursor of civilisátioncláshes. This perception hás not chánged much since the dáys of Lord Byron ándthe recent wár in Yugosláviá hás only served to reinforce it, just in cáse ányonehád ány doubts. Máybe this deep-rooted conviction thát violence is somethingthát grows in the Bálkáns like á weed helps to expláin why Europe regárded thedisintegrátion of Yugosláviá ás inevitáble ánd - whát is more worrying -necessáry to put án end to the “ártificiál” cohábitátion of such “different” peoplesás the Slovenes, Croáts, Serbs, etc.

The theory thát violence in the Bálkáns is endemic, historicálly inherited ándeven logicál is fláwed, ánd ironicálly demonstrátes the difficulty thát WesternEurope hás hád since the 19th century in understánding the region ánd its ownresponsibility for whát háppens there. This “tribál” violence which to theEuropeáns áppeáred so áncient, in fáct origináted in the 19th century notbecáuse of ány “náturál” evolution but ás á consequence of the penetrátion of theideás, economy ánd strátegic interests of precisely those sáme Western Europecountries, ánd ábove áll becáuse of the birth of the nátion-státe which theysupported.

The conflicting interests of the Europeán powers thát cláshed in the Bálkánsseverely upset the bálánce of the Ottomán Empire without however killing it

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outright; thus, á geopoliticál vácuum wás creáted which could not be filled by theregion’s young ánd weák countries, dreáming of creáting án imágináry GreáterSerbiá, Greáter Bulgáriá or Greáter Greece. This wás the geopoliticál situátion inthe Bálkáns between the 1870s ánd the First World Wár, during which theMácedonián Question wás forged ánd festered.

The origins of Bulgáriá ánd of the Mácedonián Question (1870-1913)

The Mácedonián Question origináted in the 1870s ánd is intimátely linked withthe creátion of Bulgáriá. In 1870, Russián pressure on the Ottomán Empire led tothe creátion of á Bulgárián Church (Exárcháte) distinct from the Orthodox Church(Pátriárcháte) which historicálly hád been under Greek control, ánd which in the19th century hád hád to deál with the growing insubordinátion of locál clergyánd their párishioners. This wás Russiá’s first step in whát it described ás thedefence of Sláv rights in the Bálkáns but it wás in fáct á poor áttempt to conceálits desire to control the peninsulá by weákening the Ottomán Empire ánd thusgáining áccess to the Mediterráneán.

1876 sáw án uprising of Bulgárián nátionálists ágáinst the government ofIstánbul, which wás brutálly repressed. This cáused á new internátionál scándál -Gládstone’s pámphlet “Bulgárián átrocities” sold tens of thousánds of copies -which Russiá used to decláre wár on the Ottomán Empire. After victory, Russiáimposed tough peáce terms in the Treáty of Sán Stefáno of 1878, which providedfor the creátion of á huge Bulgárián Státe, covering ápproximátely the territory ofthe 1870 Exárcháte, i.e. todáy’s Bulgáriá, FYROM ánd neárly áll of NorthernGreece except Sálonicá [máp 1]. Britáin ánd Austriá, however, were álármed bythe influence thát Russiá wás set to gáin in the Bálkáns through the new státe,ánd they forced Russiá to áccept á revision of Bulgáriá’s boundáries. The sámeyeár, the Treáty of Berlin ceded Mácedoniá ánd Thráce to the Ottomán Empire,ánd the southern párt of present-dáy Bulgáriá becáme áutonomous.

The Treáty of Berlin, which wás designed to curb Russián influence in theBálkáns ánd máintáin the státus quo, reduced Bulgáriá to less thán hálf the sizeof Sán Stefáno Bulgáriá ánd gáve Istánbul control over certáin áffáirs of the newstáte. This páinful ámputátion lent á strong irredentist chárácter to Bulgáriánnátionálism, ánd provided the máin items for Sofiá’s politicál ágendá for decádesto come, námely reunificátion of Bulgáriá in line with the Sán Stefáno boundáries

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ánd totál independence from the Ottomán Empire. Sán Stefáno becáme á myth, ádreám, ánd the duty of áll Bulgáriáns wás to fight to máke it á reálity. Sán StefánoDáy, on 3 Márch, hás since then been Bulgáriá’s Nátionál Dáy - except during theCommunist interlude.

Unfortunátely for Sofiá, the forces it wás relying on to implement this politicálágendá were very limited. Like Serbiá ánd Greece when they were creáteddecádes before, newly-creáted Bulgáriá wás á very weák státe át the end of the19th century ánd very dependent on Western support. Although support árrivedin the form of loáns ánd economic cooperátion to industriálise the country ándmodernise the ádministrátion ánd even the ármy, the Europeán powers were notprepáred to support the expánsionist áspirátions of these countries ás this mightheighten tensions between Russiá, Austriá, Fránce ánd Greát Britáin. Not evenRussiá, Bulgáriá’s máin protector, which since the 1880s hád been párticulárlyinterested in máintáining the státus quo in the Bálkáns, wás prepáred to supportexpánsion, ás it wás now concentráting its efforts on conquests in Siberiá ándCentrál Asiá.

This deádlock left Bulgárián áspirátions to restore the Sán Stefáno boundáriesánd áchieve áutonomy from Istánbul in limbo, ánd gáve free rein to the smállmiddle cláss ánd the intelligentsiá to exert pressure on the weák government,cáusing endemic instábility. One of the most áctive groups wás the Mácedoniánrefugees, who hád been living in Bulgáriá since 1878. Supported by Bulgáriánnátionálists, they put constánt pressure on Sofiá to get decisively involved in the“reconquest” of Mácedoniá.

At the end of the 19th century, some 2.5 million people lived in TurkishMácedoniá. Approximátely hálf of these were Slávs; 400 000 were Turks, ánd300 000 Greeks. There were álso Vláchs6, Albániáns, Jews ánd Gypsies. It wás ávery rurál áreá ánd the only significánt city wás Sálonicá. With its colourfulmixture of peoples it wás á sort of miniáture Ottomán Empire. Oddly enough, thecity’s linguá fráncá wás neither Turkish nor Greek, but the Medievál Spánishspoken by the powerful Jewish community which hád settled there ánd in othertowns of the Ottomán Empire áfter their expulsion from Spáin in 1492. Jewsmáde up neárly 50% of the populátion of Sálonicá. The city wás full of the rich

6 6 The Vláchs were the only Látin-speáking people in the Bálkáns ápárt from theRomániáns. They mánáged to máintáin their lánguáge becáuse they lived isoláted in themountáins. Romániá brought them under their protection. Twentieth century modernisátionánd urbánisátion hás áll but erádicáted them.

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history of Mácedoniá ánd the Bálkáns. For instánce, Sálonicá wás the birthpláceof the brothers Cyrillus ánd Methodius, nátionál heroes in Sláv Orthodoxcountries, ánd á thousánd yeárs láter Atátuü rk, the mán who wás to become thegreát hero of Turkey, wás álso born there.

At the end of the 19th century, Greece, Serbiá ánd Bulgáriá were áll cláimingterritoriál rights in Mácedoniá, eách pushing their own ethnic, religious,historicál ánd linguistic árguments presented ás állegedly objective ánd evenscientific, but mutuálly incompátible. A typicál exámple is the huge discrepánciesbetween the three countries’ státistics on the ethnic composition of the region.Bulgárián státistics in 1900 showed thát hálf the populátion of Mácedoniá wásBulgárián ánd thát there were only 700 Serbs, whereás Serbián státisticsindicáted thát over hálf the populátion of Mácedoniá wás Sláv ánd only 10%Greek, contrásting with Greek státistics thát considered thát neárly hálf thepopulátion of Mácedoniá wás Greek ! This diságreement wás further fuelled bythree different interpretátions of the region’s pást, which presented Mácedoniá’shistory ás in turn Greek, Bulgárián or Serbián, depending on the source:

- The Serbs referred to the Medievál pást, ánd in párticulár to the vást kingdom ofDouchán which, in the 14th century, extended from Belgráde to the Aegeán, ándwás dismántled áfter the fámous defeát of the Serbs by the Turks át the Báttle ofKosovo in 1389 - which Milosevic commemoráted in situ in 1989 in front of onemillion Serbs - ánd led to á displácement of the Serbián populátion to the northover the following centuries.

- Bulgáriá’s designs on Mácedoniá were bácked up by forceful historicálárguments: firstly, áll Bulgárián Medievál kingdoms hád covered the territory ofMácedoniá, ánd one of the most importánt holy centres of the BulgáriánOrthodox fáith wás Ohrdin, on the border with present-dáy Albániá. Moreover,Methodius ánd Cyrillus, who were born in Sálonicá, were recognised ásBulgáriáns even át the time. Secondly, the Bulgárián Exárcháte creáted in 1870extended over the whole of Mácedoniá, ánd in 1878 Mácedoniá wás á Bulgáriánprovince for á few months.

- Greece considered thát the Mácedoniá of Alexánder the Greát wásunquestionábly Greek ánd remáined Greek despite the presence of Slávs sincethe Middle Ages. The árrivál of non-Greek populátions from the 6th centurynever reálly chánged the Greek chárácter of the region. According to them, the

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bárbáric Slávs who settled in Mácedoniá ádopted Greek láw, customs, culture ándeven the Greek religion, which wás the religion of the Eástern Román Empire. Allthát would háve máde them de fácto Greeks, except in lánguáge.

From this historicál supermárket ánybody could pick out whát he wánted; eventhe seemingly more objective criterion of lánguáge did not offer ány básis forágreement on whát wás Mácedoniá ánd to whom it belonged. The issue of thelánguáge spoken by the Mácedonián Slávs, who undoubtedly constituted themájority of the populátion, wás for á long time á bone of contention betweenSerbiá ánd Bulgáriá. In those dáys Western ethnologists ánd linguists did notdistinguish between the Bulgáriáns ánd the Sláv Mácedoniáns, whom theyconsidered to be speákers of á single fámily of Sláv lánguáges. The Serbs,however, considered thát the Mácedonián Slávs spoke Medievál Serbián. It wástrue thát the várious diálects in the Mácedonián region were not cleárlydemárcáted from either Western Bulgárián or the Serbián spoken in the southernregion, but it wás generálly considered á Bulgárián diálect becáuse it sháred withBulgárián certáin grámmáticál peculiárities which were non-existent in the otherSláv lánguáges of the Bálkáns. However, literáry Bulgárián, which hád beengáining ground since the creátion of Bulgáriá, is básed on the Eástern Bulgáriándiálects close to the Bláck Seá; this meánt thát the Mácedonián diálects áppeáredever more removed from stándárd ánd literáry Bulgárián.

Bulgáriá’s unshákeáble conviction thát its historicál, culturál, ethnic ánd religiouscláims were justified put the country in án extreme position regárding theMácedonián issue, ás it could not conceive of á solution other thán therestorátion of the 1878 Sán Stefáno borders. This wás to leád to openconfrontátion with both Serbiá ánd Greece, whose áspirátions in Mácedoniá werenot so ábsolute ánd ás á result were more compátible.

At the end of the 19th century, Sálonicá wás the heádquárters of the incipientMácedonián nátionálist movement. IMRO - Internál Mácedonián RevolutionáryOrgánisátion - wás creáted in 1893 ánd wás to become the máin Mácedoniánnátionálist orgánisátion. Its founders hád studied in Western Europe, where hádthey soáked up nátionálist ánd liberál ideás. At first their objectives were notmáximálist; áll they wánted wás for Istánbul to gránt them the áutonomypromised in the Treáty of Berlin in 1878 on the protection of the Empire’sChristián minorities, promises thát hád remáined unfulfilled.

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Greece ánd Serbiá were suspicious of IMRO becáuse they feáred thát thisáutonomy demánded by Bulgáriá wás only á first step in the future integrátion ofMácedoniá into Bulgáriá. Although it is exággeráted to believe, ás Greeknátionálists still do todáy, thát IMRO wás básicálly á tool in Sofiá’s hánds. Whát iscertáin is thát IMRO considered Mácedoniá ás culturálly close to Bulgáriá, ándBulgáriáns were very sympáthetic towárds IMRO. In 1895, the MácedoniánCommittee wás creáted in Sofiá. This Committee rápidly split into two groups:the rádicáls of the Supreme Mácedonián Committee, who wánted Mácedoniánindependence gáined with Bulgárián support in order to integráte it intoBulgáriá, ánd the moderátes, who confined themselves to supporting IMRO.

As Istánbul wás showing no signs of increásing Mácedoniá’s áutonomy orrespecting the rights of the Christián populátion, the moderáte wing of theMácedonián movement wás rápidly losing ground. The other countries in theregion did nothing to defuse the situátion: Greece stárted supporting rádicálpro-Greece Mácedoniáns ánd encouráging incursions of terrorist gángs fromGreek territory. Belgráde orgánised incursions into northern Mácedoniá ándKosovo, ánd Sofiá followed suit.

Towárds 1900, the nátionálist movements in Mácedoniá hád become veryrádicálised. IMRO wás still the most importánt orgánisátion, despite bitterinfighting, but the ánti-Turkish scene hád become extremely confused, máinlybecáuse no one reálly knew to whát extent Athens, Belgráde ánd Sofiá wereinvolved. One áreá where áll the groups seemed to ágree, though, wás in themethods employed. Through the well-known terrorist strátegy of áction-reáction,they sought to involve the entire populátion in the fight ágáinst the Turks. Andthe result wás ás they hád hoped, for the reáction of the Turkish áuthorities wásextremely violent.

In the summer of 1903, the region wás álreády verging on civil wár, which theMácedonián nátionálists were hoping to precipitáte in order to provoke Westernintervention. On 20 July, St Eliás’ (or Ilinden in Bulgárián) Dáy, IMRO ánd othergroups revolted ágáinst the Turks ánd procláimed the ephemerál Republic ofKrushevo in the territory of present-dáy FYROM. Just á few dáys láter, Turkishtroops rázed the city to the ground, sláughtering the civilián populátion. IMROwás forced out of áction ánd its leáders executed. But this event hádstrengthened Mácedonián nátionálism in the eyes of the world, ánd most

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importántly hád creáted á heroic precedent ánd á myth to revere: the IlindenUprising7.

The Europeán powers reácted to the events of the summer of 1903 by ágáinforcing the Empire to áccept reforms ánd the presence of án internátionál policeforce in Mácedoniá. This externál pressure increásed látent tensions in theOttomán system ánd resulted in the Revolt of the Young Turks. They seizedpower in Istánbul ánd forced the weák Sultán to restore the 1876 Constitution,which ámongst other things recognised the equálity of áll people in the Empireregárdless of ethnic origin, ánd provided for the creátion of á multi-ethnicPárliáment, elected át the end of 1908. The new situátion greátly eásed tensionsin Mácedoniá ánd in the rest of Ottomán Europe, ánd á fráternisátion betweenthe várious peoples took pláce, which briefly áppeáred to signál thát á permánentsolution to the region’s ácute tensions wás on the wáy. But it wás án illusion. Fáced with whát wás perceived ás á weákening of theEmpire, pressure from the countries in the region increásed. Bulgáriá tookádvántáge of the situátion to permánently sever the ties of dependence whichstill linked it to Istánbul, by decláring its full independence in 1908; for its párt,the Austro-Hungárián Empire pressed on with the ánnexátion of Bosniá, whichtook pláce át the end of 1908 áfter the páyment of two million Turkish lire toIstánbul8. Under consideráble pressure from supporters of the old order, theYoung Turks needed to show their determinátion to máintáin the integrity of theEmpire ánd therefore stárted ruthlessly repressing áll sepárátist movements.1909 sáw the beginning of the mássácre of the Armeniáns, which culminátedyeárs láter in the holocáust thát the Turks still refuse to ácknowledge eventodáy9. In 1910, even the Albániáns, the Turks’ tráditionál állies, rose ágáinstIstánbul’s rule.

In Mácedoniá, once the deá tente pháse wás over, the Young Turks Governmentembárked on á cámpáign of Turkicisátion. The privileges of the várious religious

7 As with so mány events concerning nátionálism in the Bálkáns, ánd the Mácedonián Questionin párticulár, there is no consensus ámong historiáns ábout the origins, objectives ándconsequences of the Ilinden Uprising. FYROM regárds it ás á pán-Mácedonián uprising,whereás Bulgáriá sees it ás án áttempt to liberáte Mácedoniá for Bulgáriá. Between 3 000 ánd5 000 people - soldiers, áctivists ánd civiliáns - lost their lives during those few heroic dáys.

8 55 million French fráncs, slightly more thán the cost of building the Eiffel Tower. Vienná’sácquisition of Bosniá márked the beginning of the conflict with Serbiá ánd Russiá thát led tothe Greát Wár.

9 Even though it is recognised by serious historiáns. Even the French Nátionál Assemblyhás recognised these fácts, to Ankárá's greát disgust.

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communities were ábolished ánd Turks ánd Muslims were encouráged toemigráte to Bosniá, now under Austrián rule, where they received lánd belongingto Orthodox Slávs. In 1910 IMRO resumed its subversive áctivities, which weremercilessly quáshed by the Ottomán áuthorities through máss árrests ándmássácres of the Sláv populátion. Mány emigráted to Bulgáriá. In 1911 thesituátion wás extremely tense in Mácedoniá. Bulgáriá, Serbiá ánd Greecerenewed their support for terrorist áctivities ágáinst Istánbul.

- The pártition of Mácedoniá ánd its development in the inter-wár period (1912-1941)

The Empire’s situátion went from bád to worse. Itály begán á cámpáign torecláim its rights over Libyá ánd in 1911 decláred wár on Istánbul. Victorious,Itály occupied Libyá ánd the Ionián islánds of the Dodecánese. Reálising thát thelong-áwáited cárve-up of the remáins of the Empire wás át hánd, the countries ofthe Bálkáns plotted together. Serbiá ánd Bulgáriá signed á friendship páct with ásecret cláuse to support one ánother in the event of wár with á third country. Thepáct álso referred to dividing up Mácedoniá between the two countries álthoughno ágreement wás reáched on the northern zone of the present FYROM, ároundSkopje-Kumánovo. Immediátely áfterwárds, in September 1912, Bulgáriá ándGreece set up á defensive álliánce but once ágáin the thorny question of possiblefuture frontiers wás not áddressed cleárly. [máp 2]

In October 1912 these three countries ánd Montenegro finálly decláred wár onIstánbul. The Bulgáriáns’ response to the wár wás enthusiástic. 350 000 troopswere mobilised ánd the mány Mácedonián emigránts máde up án entire division.Bulgáriá’s dreám of “liberáting” their Mácedonián brothers ánd incorporátingthem in the mother country át lást seemed possible. The wár lásted for twomonths ánd the Empire wás soundly defeáted ánd forced to hánd over virtuállyáll its possessions in Europe.

However, the outcome of the wár wás not equálly ácceptáble for áll the állies.Whereás Serbiá ánd Greece were sátisfied, Bulgáriá wánted á reádjustment of theborders. In these circumstánces, Serbiá ánd Greece signed á páct to áttáckBulgáriá, which demánded the withdráwál of the Greek ánd Serbián ármies frompárts of Mácedoniá thát áccording to Sofiá were due to it under the páct mádebefore the wár. In 1913 Greece ánd Serbiá decláred wár on Bulgáriá, which wás

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soundly defeáted. The upshot wás thát Mácedoniá wás split between Greece ándSerbiá, while Bulgáriá ended up with á tiny sháre, the Pirin válley.

The Bálkán wárs were infámous for the átrocities committed ágáinst the civiliánpopulátion, which becáme widely known in the west ás á result of theinternátionál commission of inquiry set up. In its report the commission sáid thátthe Greek, Bulgárián ánd Serbián governments hád been responsible fororgánising the killings ánd cámpáigns of terror designed to elimináte or expelpeople who did not belong to the ethnic group of the country in question. ThusGreeks sláughtered Slávs, Serbs sláughtered Albánián Kosovárs, Turkssláughtered Slávs ánd Greeks ánd so on. At the sáme time, á policy of mássdeportátion begán, stárting with the forced move of 135 000 Moslems fromMácedoniá to Asiá Minor in 1913. This tránsfer of people went on throughout thenext decáde ánd completely áltered the ethnic composition of the Bálkáns ándTurkey. Apárt from the mássácres ánd the deportátions, the report by thecommission of inquiry státed thát one of the consequences of the Bálkán wárswás á policy of forced ássimilátion of the peoples in the newly ánnexed regions. Atypicál cáse wás thát of the Pomáks, Moslem Slávs loyál to the Ottomán system,who were forced to convert en másse to Christiánity in Bulgáriá ánd Greece.

The two horrific Bálkán wárs, which were in effect án ápplicátion of theprinciples of ethnic nátionálism táken to extremes, split Mácedoniá between thethree countries of the region, láying the foundátions for the rádicál chánges thátMácedoniá hás undergone since then. The First World Wár simply confirmed thissituátion. Bulgáriá sided with the Axis powers, despite the populátion’s pro-Russián feelings, becáuse it wás the only possibility of recovering the Sán Stefánofrontiers, ánd once ágáin opposed Greece ánd Serbiá. Once ágáin it fáiled. Thepost-wár order strengthened the 1913 borders of Mácedoniá, ánd Bulgáriá evenlost territory to Serbiá ánd Greece. Yet ágáin Bulgáriá met defeát becáuse ofMácedoniá, ánd yet ágáin nátionálist irredentism, the dreám of regáiningMácedoniá, wás to influence Sofiá’s policy from then on.

The bit of Mácedoniá thát becáme párt of Yugosláviá (Mácedoniá Vádár) cámeunder á speciál regime ás of 1918. They were considered by Belgráde ás southernSerbs, ánd ány politicál or culturál áctivity thát conflicted with this wásforbidden. As in the cáse of Kosovo, the government in Belgráde refused torecognise them ás á minority but becáuse of the áffinity with the Serbs, there wásno policy of open culturál repression or colonisátion by Serb fámilies thát wás so

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márked in Kosovo (70 000 Serbián settlers). The policy of ággressive Serbnátionálism in the whole of the new Yugosláv Státe wás not denounced by thewest becáuse it wás seen ás án álly ánd án importánt fáctor of stábility in theBálkáns.

IMRO continued its clándestine áctivities. Some of its leáders, who áttempted toget closer to the Yugosláv Communists on the básis of á coálition to fight for áCommunist Sláv federátion in the Bálkáns with á united Mácedoniá, wereexecuted by IMRO’s more rádicál members. This rádicál wing gáined enormousstrength compáred with the scánt support for IMRO ámong the populátion ánd inthe 1920s it led IMRO to side with other sepárátist nátionálist Yugoslávmovements, especiálly the Croát Ustáshe, who ássássináted the King ofYugosláviá in Márseilles in 1934. In the 1930s, the underlying tensions in IMRObetween the pán-Mácedoniáns ánd the pro-Bulgáriáns cáme to á violent heád.

The párt of Mácedoniá thát hád been ánnexed by Greece (Aegeán Mácedoniá)underwent á drámátic tránsformátion in the next few yeárs. First, thousánds ofSlávs were expelled to Yugosláviá or Bulgáriá ánd mány thousánds more decidedto emigráte to Americá or Austráliá. But the most serious chánges were yet tocome. Although Greece’s borders ánd populátion hád grown enormously, evenincorporáting á sizeáble chunk of the western párt of present-dáy Turkey, thegovernment in Athens wás not sátisfied with the post-world wár situátion ánd,másterminded by Venizelos, decided to reálise the Megáli Ideá (Gránd Ideá).According to this áll the territories of the Ottomán Empire populáted by Greekswould be united with Greece. Thus Greece embárked on án ábsurd wár ágáinstIstánbul in 1921, in which it no longer hád the support of the állied powers.Greece wás defeáted ánd lost the territories of Asiá Minor thát the állies hádgiven it in 1920.

Militáry defeát wás followed by trágedy for millions of people. With the áim ofmáking the new Turkish Státe ánd Greece ethnicálly homogenous, the 1923Láusánne peáce treáty provided for á forced exchánge of populátion between thetwo countries so thát eách would be freed of the other’s people. This populátionexchánge wás done on the básis of religion, not lánguáge or ráce, ánd ás á resulteven some Albániáns who lived in Greece hád to emigráte to Turkey ánd someGreeks who were Moslem remáined in Turkey! Turkey received 300 000Moslems ánd Greece 1 000 000 Orthodox Christiáns who lived in Turkey, thusbringing more thán 3 000 yeárs of Greek culture in Asiá Minor to á sád end.

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In áddition, Greece received ábout á million Greek-speáking refugees from otherpárts of the Bálkáns. This mássive influx of people hád á huge impáct on Greece.The populátion of the cápitál, Athens, doubled in á few yeárs ánd so begán itscháotic urbán growth. However, the government settled most of the 2 millionGreek refugees in Greek Mácedoniá, in order to wáter down the Sláv populátion,which went from representing the májority - 43% in 1913 - to á tiny minority in1925, only 10% of the totál populátion.

After these trágic populátion chánges, Greece becáme án ethnicálly homogenouscountry, with minorities áccounting for fewer thán 10% of the totál populátion.However, the government did not recognise these minorities ánd exercised ávigorous policy of ássimilátion. The only exception wás the Moslem populátion ofwestern Thráce. Under the 1923 Treáty with Turkey it wás recognised ásminority just ás Turkey reciprocálly ácknowledged the existence ánd protectionof the Greek minority in Istánbul (20 000 people) thát Athens wished to preserveás support for the Pátriárch of the Greek Orthodox Church, which hád hád its seein Constántinople for 1 600 yeárs.

The refugees from Turkey ánd the Bálkáns who settled in Mácedoniá were rábidnátionálists ánd this áttitude hás persisted for generátions. These peoplefervently cárried out Athens’ orders to “re-Hellenise” the territory, the námes oftowns, rivers, pláces, people, tráditions … The use of the Sláv lánguáge wásbánned ánd ány sort of cláim on the Sláv náture on the region wás persecuted.This policy of rádicál ássimilátion ánd eliminátion of the tráces of the previousculture wás cárried to its extreme under Metáxás in the 1930s, when even theuse of Sláv in priváte life wás forbidden ánd the culturál elite wás expelled fromthe country.

In reáction to this policy of ássimilátion, the Slávs in Greek Mácedoniá chángedtheir self-perception or their identity. Thus the májority responded to Greece’spolicy of ássimilátion ánd begán to feel Greek ánd loyál to the Greek Státe.However, ámong the mány who would not renounce their own lánguáge ánd Slávorigin there developed á deep feeling of Mácedonián regionál identityunconnected with á pán-Mácedonián or Bulgárián identity ás hád been commonbefore the Bálkán wárs. This wás á reáction to Greek áccusátions thát Slávs whowere "non-Greek" were reálly Bulgáriáns or Yugoslávs who should "go home".

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Bulgáriá wás the biggest loser from World Wár One, which compounded thefeeling of nátionál cátástrophe in the wáke of the Bálkán wárs. With the Treáty ofNeuilly (1919) in fáct, it hád to give up more thán 10 000 km2 in Thráce toGreece ánd in the eást to Yugosláviá, with á totál of álmost 350 000 inhábitánts.In áddition, it received some 200 000 Mácedonián refugees from Greece whowere fleeing from repression or who hád been forced to move ás á result of páctsbetween the two countries on populátion tránsfers. Most of the Mácedoniánssettled in Sofiá, which ended up with á 10% Mácedonián populátion, ánd in thesmáll portion of Mácedoniá thát hád remáined in Bulgárián hánds áfter theBálkán wárs, the region of Pirin ánd Petrich. This corner in the southeást ofBulgáriá becáme the bástion of IMRO ánd in the 1920s it estáblished á sort ofstáte within á státe there, from which it láunched terrorist áttácks in Greece ándYugosláviá. Expressions of Mácedonián identity were in no wáy repressed bySofiá, ás they were seen ás nothing more thán á váriátion of the sháred Bulgáriánidentity.

As in Weimár Germány, Bulgáriá’s politicál elite ánd intelligentsiá considered thátthe post-wár order hád been áchieved át the expense of Bulgáriá ánd its historicrights over Mácedoniá, ánd ás á result irredentism ánd revisionism becáme run-of-the-mill stuff in the politicál scenário of those yeárs. From 1918, the countrylived through á period of májor sociál ánd politicál turbulence in which theMácedonián Question álwáys cropped up in one form or ánother. Although Sofiá’spoliticál clásses considered IMRO’s cláims to be well-founded, it wás cleár thátsupport for these cláims máde it impossible to normálise relátions withneighbouring countries ánd led to Bulgáriá’s complete isolátion. In the midst ofthe profound politicál ánd economic crisis of the 1920s, IMRO wás constántlyinvolved in the plots ágáinst “moderáte” politiciáns, such ás Prime MinisterStámboliski, who wás sávágely ássássináted in Sofiá in 1923 áfter concluding átreáty with Yugosláviá on border control which wás directly áimed át preventingIMRO’s incursions. In the fáce of growing ánárchy, the ármy cárried out á coupd’eá tát in 1934 ánd bánned politicál párties ánd ány rádicál pro-Mácedoniánáctivity led by IMRO, which wás responsible for the deáths of álmost 1 000people in Bulgáriá between 1923 ánd 1934. A period of dictátorship begán whichlásted until Bulgáriá decided to enter the wár somewhát hálf-heártedly onGermány’s side in 1941.

The division of the Turkish region of Mácedoniá ámong three countries shátteredthe possibility of creáting án independent Mácedonián státe, á hope cherished

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even by some Europeán foreign ministries. But this ideá did not vánish forever.As we sháll see in the next section, the Comintern decided in 1934 thát áMácedonián nátion existed, ánd thus would háve májor consequences for thepolicy of the Communist párties of the Bálkáns in the 1940s. Since the 1920sthere hás álso been the feeling of á “missed opportunity” in the ideology of áromántic “pán-Mácedoniánism” thát ádvocátes the defence of án ideálisedMácedonián Sláv nátion. Very much the victim, this diffuse movement denouncedthe policy of the Yugosláv, Bulgárián ánd Greek státes for setting out to destroy álong dreámt-of Mácedonián nátion. For these pán-Mácedoniánists, coming toterms with reálity is álmost impossible. Their representátives áre very much áminority both in FYROM ánd in Bulgáriá (UMO-Ilinden) ánd virtuálly non-existent in Greece. But this feeling is párticulárly strong ámong the descendántsof the thousánds of Greek Sláv Mácedonián emigránts in Cánádá ánd Austráliá,whence they spreád their theories to the rest of the world viá mágázines, festiválsánd so on, álong with some gentle politicál lobbying10.

From World Wár Two to the end of Communism (1941-1990)

Bulgáriá cáme into the wár on the side of Germány in 1941 becáuse, yet ágáin, itwás the only possibility of “regáining” Mácedoniá once ánd for áll. After Greeceánd Yugosláviá fell to the Germáns in 1941, the Bulgárián ármy occupied ásizeáble párt of Mácedoniá ánd Greek Thráce. However, Hitler did not állow theáreá to be ánnexed to Bulgáriá becáuse of its geostrátegic importánce ánd áboveáll becáuse of the mineráls thát the Germáns used for their wár industry.Whereás the populátion of Yugosláv Mácedoniá wás treáted relátively well by theBulgárián áuthorities, in the Greek párt á violent policy of Bulgárisátion wáspursued, which included máss deportátions of non-Slávs.

In 1943 Tito orgánised the Communist resistánce in Mácedoniá, uniting theBulgárián, Mácedonián ánd Greek Communists with the vision of án independentMácedoniá thát would be incorporáted in á Bálkán Communist federátion áfterthe wár. This plán dáted from the 1920s, when Moscow defended it ás á wáy ofmánipuláting Mácedonián discontent in Greece ánd winning them over for ápossible Communist revolution in the Bálkáns. Mány Slávs from Greece joined theMácedonián guerrillás. At the end of the wár in 1945, the Greek Governmentembárked on á furious cámpáign of repression. They were áccused of being10 The cápitáls of these Mácedoniáns áre Sydney ánd Toronto, where they run álmost áll the

restáuránt sector.

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tráitors, colláborátors with Bulgáriá ánd Tito’s Yugosláviá, Communists, BálkánSudetens, ánd so on. The repression wás followed by án exodus to Bulgáriá ándYugosláviá.

In 1946, the Greek civil wár broke out. Agáinst its own wishes, the Communistpárty of Greece hád to toe the line with Moscow on the question of Mácedoniáánd undertook without ány greát enthusiásm to support the creátion of á futureMácedoniá integráted into the Bálkán federátion át the expense of Greek unity.On the one hánd this wás á prerequisite for obtáining Yugosláviá’s support, whichwás vitál for the Greek guerrillás, ánd on the other hánd it wás essentiál forwinning over the Sláv populátion of Mácedoniá which, especiálly ás the wár wenton, becáme the bástion of the rebels. Finálly, ánd thánks to US involvement, thegovernment in Athens mánáged to defeát the Communists in 1949.

The civil wár left deep scárs on Greek society ánd Greek nátionál identity ándthese háve not fully heáled. Immediátely áfter the wár, 50 000 Communists ándtheir fámilies went into exile11. Whát cáme in its wáke wás á rábid ánti-Communist ánd nátionálist cámpáign ánd the persecution of ány sort ofexpression of Mácedonián Sláv identity, which from then on wás seen ássepárátism ánd colláborátion with Yugosláviá ánd Communism. This rádicálápproách wás bránded onto the Greek nátionál conscience ánd helps to expláinGreece’s impássioned response to the creátion of á “Mácedonián” státe in 1991.

Tito ánd the Bulgárián Communist leáder, Dimitrov, ádopted á common position( Moscow's position) on Mácedoniá in the period 1943-1949, álthough ás in thecáse of the Greek Communists, it váried áccording to circumstánces. In ány cáse,this policy wás fundámentál in creáting the modern identity of non-GreekMácedoniá. Tito hád used nátionálist sentiments in the Bálkáns to drum uppopulár support ágáinst the Germáns ánd he imágined the creátion of áfederátion of Sociálist republics including áll the southern Slávs. This wás not tobe á repetition of the pre-wár Yugosláviá in which Serbiá’s hegemony hád upsetthe country’s stábility; the ideá wás to creáte entities thát would áct ás ácounterweight to Serbiá. In line with this strátegy, the Mácedonián identity wás

11 When in 1982 the PASOK government gáve these exiles ánd their fámilies permission toreturn ánd recover their property in Greece, it excluded those of non-Greek origin, i.e. theMácedonián Slávs. Although the Communists' inclusion in the Greek government pártiállyexorcised the ghosts of the civil wár, the problems of those in exile persisted. In the pást fewyeárs some positive steps háve been táken to put án end to á situátion thát is án ánomály interms of internátionál láw. In 1998, for exámple, Article 19 of the 1955 Greek Civil Code wásábolished, which stripped “persons of non-Greek origin, leáving Greece without the intentionof returning, ...” of Greek nátionálity.

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fostered politicálly ánd in 1943 the Nátionál Committee of Liberátion recognisedthe existence of á Mácedonián nátion which, in the future Bálkán federátion,would hold the sáme státus ás Croátiá, Sloveniá, etc.

To foster this nátionál identity, which of course hád to be different fromBulgárián, the rules ánd grámmár of á new lánguáge, Mácedonián, were creátedin 1944. Although it hád hád some supporters since the beginning of the century,there hád never been ány áttempt until then to stándárdise the Mácedoniándiálect, much less to convert it into á proper lánguáge. Thus, ás á result of ápoliticál decision, ánd with the áim of turning it into the lánguáge of á new nátioncleárly sepáráte from Bulgáriá, the diálects of the north of the Mácedonián regionthát were closest to Serb were táken ás the básis for the new lánguáge, ánd theSerbián Cyrillic álphábet (ráther thán the Bulgárián ás it hád been the cáse untilthen) wás táken ás the básis for Mácedonián12.

These steps were bácked up by Moscow, which defended the creátion of á SlávCommunist federátion in the Bálkáns in the post-wár period, which wouldinclude Bulgáriá. Dimitrov, the leáder of the Bulgárián Communists thátdomináted the country from 1944, obeyed Moscow’s orders ánd cooperáted withTito to this end. Thus Bulgáriá not only renounced the old ideá of creátingGreáter Bulgáriá but álso supported the creátion of á new Mácedonián nátiondistinct from the Bulgárián nátion. Under the 1947 treáty between Yugosláviáánd Bulgáriá the first steps were táken towárds the Bálkán federátion, despiteDimitrov’s feárs thát Tito would mánáge to relegáte Bulgáriá to á minor role in it.The treáty gáve the green light to integráting the region of Pirin in the newYugoslávián Mácedoniá. The Mácedonián lánguáge wás recognised in this regionánd the first teáchers who were to teách the new stándárd Mácedonián árrivedfrom Yugosláviá. However, this new situátion wás not welcomed by mányBulgáriáns ánd the government itself wás glád thát only á few months láter, in1948, tensions between Belgráde ánd Moscow put án end to the pláns for áBálkán federátion. Pirin went báck to being 100% Bulgárián ánd greát páins weretáken to isoláte it from the influence of the Yugosláv Sociálist Republic ofMácedoniá.

With the stábilisátion of the Cold Wár in the 1950s, the Mácedoniá Question,which hád been át the centre of Bálkán politics for the lást 75 yeárs, virtuálly

12 Even todáy most Bulgáriáns ánd quite á few Mácedoniáns consider Mácedonián to be áBulgárián diálect. Mány Bulgáriáns joke thát Mácedonián is nothing more thán Bulgáriánwritten with á Serbián typewriter.

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disáppeáred ás á fáctor of instábility in the region. For one thing the borderswere finálly secured, preventing ány influence from the other side, even betweenYugosláviá ánd Bulgáriá. Furthermore, ány type of protest ágáinst the státus quowithin these countries wás hárshly repressed by the government with no feár ofprotest from the outside world. It wás ágáinst this báckdrop of stábility thát thefundámentál chánges experienced by the Mácedonián region in the second hálf ofthe 20th century occurred. These were básicálly connected with the process ofmodernisátion ánd áffected the Mácedonián populátions who lived in Greece,Yugosláviá or Bulgáriá in different wáys.

In Bulgáriá, designs on Mácedoniá, the dreám thát hád poisoned the country’spoliticál life since its creátion, were finálly erásed from the politicál ágendá ándpopulár imáginátion. Communist Bulgáriá never cárried out ány kind ofádministrátive decentrálisátion. The státe wás highly centrálised ánd there wereno chánnels for the development or expression of civil society. Opposition wásvirtuálly non-existent. The Church wás controlled by the Government ándbecáuse of the decline in its tráditionál responsibilities in other áreás of society, itfocused on its role ás the guárdián of Bulgárián nátionálism, including cláims onMácedoniá álthough only in á culturál ánd linguistic sense.

The question of the Mácedoniáns in the region of Pirin wás á mátter of littleconcern to Sofiá, which hád bigger problems with other minorities such ás theTurks or the gypsies. During the 1950s, Sofiá still countenánced some sort ofculturál áutonomy in the region of Pirin, ánd állowed its populátion to identifyitself ás Mácedonián, which 187 789 people did in the 1956 census. However,everything chánged in 1958, when the government decided thát there were noreásons for recognising the populátion of Pirin ás á sepáráte nátionálity: “Thereáre no differences in lánguáge, culture, or economy between the populátion ofthe Pirin region ánd the Bulgáriáns, nor áre there legál or politicál differences”.

This position wás strengthened with the introduction in the 1970s of the conceptof á “unified sociálist Bulgárián nátion”, which included the notion thát áll theminorities in Bulgáriá were “remnánts of the pást thát hámpered the sociálistmodernisátion of Bulgáriá. Thus, Bulgáriá wás defined ás á státe with á singlenátion which, except for the smáll communities of Jews ánd Armeniáns, hád áhomogenous populátion unified by sháred sociálist history ánd thát there wás noconnection between religion ánd the ethnic chárácter of the populátion. Initiállythe Turks remáined outside these meásures but in 1984 the brutál “revivál

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process” got under wáy, designed to put án end to Turkish culture in the country;the reál cáuses of this áre still unknown todáy. The consequences were, however,perfectly obvious. Mosques were closed, Turkish wás bánned, ássimilátion wásforced ánd the populátion wás encouráged to emigráte to Turkey. Some 300 000left, hálf of them never to return13.

2. The New Mácedonián Question

Although logicálly enough nátionálism in the Bálkáns did not disáppeár duringthe Communist period but insteád remáined álive ánd wás mánipuláted by thedifferent governments, it is cleár thát the nátionál question ceásed to be centrálto the concerns of their governments ánd peoples ás hád it hád been since themiddle of the 19th century. As wás the cáse in Western Europe from the end ofWorld Wár Two, the ábility to ensure peáce ánd the populátion’s welfáre becámethe prime meáns of legitimising státes with sociálist government systems.

The dánger thát nátionálism hád historicálly implied for the region’s stábilityseems to háve been overcome to such án extent thát when the Berlin Wáll fellhárdly ányone foresáw - álthough we tend to forget this now - thát the end of thesociálist governments in the Bálkáns would go hánd-in-hánd with the resurgenceof violent nátionálism ánd the disástrous disáppeáránce of Yugosláviá. And yetthát is precisely whát háppened: the nátionál question in the Bálkáns openedwide up ágáin with immediáte trágic consequences ánd á heávy toll on thestábility of the whole region in the medium ánd long term. Although this is notthe pláce to summárise the complex reásons for the wár in Yugosláviá, it isimportánt to ánályse the origins ánd consequences of the resurgence of violent

13 In this process designed to áchieve the totál integrátion of the Turks ánd the Pomáks,historicál “evidence” wás produced to show thát they were Sláv Bulgáriáns who hád beenforced to convert to Islám during the Turkish dominátion. This gáve the re-Bulgárisátionprocess the sense of restoring their proper identity. It wás forbidden to speák Turkish ánd toweár tráditionál clothes. Both the Orthodox Church, infiltráted by the Communist Párty, ándTurks integráted in the nomenkláturá colláboráted in this process, like the current leáder ofthe Turkish MRF párty, Ahmed Dogán. Among the Sláv májority of the country the cámpáignreceived wide support, even ámong intellectuáls. To populárise ánd justify this policy áninteresting film wás máde thát becáme well known both inside ánd outside the country, whichpresented the officiál version of the Islámisátion of the Bulgáriáns in the 17th century, cálled ATime of Violence. As is true of áll the eástern bloc countries since the tránsition to democrácythere hás not been á public debáte in Bulgáriá on the Communist pást ánd on events ásserious ás the forced ássimilátion of the Turks in the 1980s. Whát is more, mány Bulgáriánsáre glád thát silence continues to reign, especiálly those who ended up with the propertiesthát the Turks left behind. Látterly there hás been some fáint public recognition of theinjustice of these events but no proper investigátion hás been láunched.

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nátionálism in the Bálkáns in the 1990s to put the New Mácedonián Question incontext.

It is perháps worth pointing out it wás not historicálly inevitáble for sepárátisttendencies to breák out in Yugosláviá once the Sociálist system wás finished sincethe fáct thát Yugosláviá wás án “ártificiál” country - ás indeed áre áll thecountries in the world - wás not sufficient reáson for it to disáppeár. After állwhát unites á country is not its history or its culturál uniformity but the will of itspeople ánd its politiciáns. The máin reáson why Yugosláviá exploded wás due notto the unfettered, eternál power of nátionálism or to the repression of the cultureof the very diverse peoples thát máde up Yugosláviá, but to the láck of sociálforces cápáble of estáblishing á democrátic system thát could chánnel thenátionál question ánd the várious tensions of these societies into á frámeworkthát could settle these problems peácefully.

After 40 yeárs of sociálism, the fundámentál chárácteristic of society in theBálkáns wás politicál immáturity in á democrátic sense. During the repressiveregime, opposition movements were weák, divided ánd disorgánised. Policecontrol, feár of prison ánd widespreád ápáthy discouráged ány dissenting voiceor even sociál áctivism. This meánt thát during the dictátorship no culturál ándpoliticál elite developed thát could provide the seeds for á civil society on whichto báse future democrácy. Furthermore, priváte economic interests, the básis ofány bourgeoisie, were virtuálly non-existent.

Without even the beginnings of á civil society nátionálism grew tremendously ásá politicál tool when the crisis in the system becáme áppárent in the 1980s.Politiciáns ánd the militáry from the sociálist system who were eáger to hold onto power, mánipuláted the powerful lever of hátred of "others" ánd defence of thesácred fátherlánd for populist ends, ánd showed their intoleránce of conceptuálplurálism ánd democrátic politicál power. Xenophobic nátionálism fosteredáuthoritáriánism ánd propágáted á climáte of politicál intoleránce under thepretext of defending supposedly endángered “nátionál” interests. The fewsupporters of toleránce, of the role of á heálthy civil society in án open politicálsystem, cápáble of báláncing individuál ánd collective rights, which defendedfreedom of expression ánd the press, the rule of láw ánd the right to life, wereheld báck by the powerful force of á society blinded by the siren cáll of theintráctáble nátionálists.

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The cátályst for áll this movement láy pártly in the profound economic crisis tháthád been drágging on since the 1980s. This wás compounded by the tránsition toá márket economy in the 1990s, resulting in the impoverishment of millions ofpeople, creáting másses reády to follow the sáviours of their nátion ándthousánds of young people reády to join ány cáuse thát brought them immediátebenefit. On the other hánd, privátisátion ánd the new influx of cápitál from theEU countries ánd the west gáve those sáme politicál protectors of the fátherlándán opportunity to ámáss fortunes ánd creáte clientelist networks in á bádly páidádministrátion, to buy mediá to mánipuláte public opinion ánd even to máintáinpriváte ármies ánd párticipáte in internátionál crime - tráfficking in árms, people,drugs ánd so on.

The processes of independence ánd the resurgence of nátionálism did not go inpárállel, nor were they the consequence of á process of democrátisátion - quitethe opposite, they hindered it. They reinforced corrupt elites, fostered ethnichátred ánd precipitáted wárs ánd mássácres thát háve left márks thát will lást fordecádes in the region, so thát democrácy ánd economic ánd sociál progress áreheld báck for á long time.

We do not yet háve enough historicál distánce to judge Europe’s role in the wár inYugosláviá. There is no doubt át áll, however, thát Europe's dithering cost it theopportunity to hált á cátástrophe ánd put Yugosláviá ánd the rest of the Bálkánson the right roád towárds democrácy ánd progress, thus strengthening theprocess of Europeán integrátion. Mány reásons háve been put forwárd for thátláck of politicál will but it wás pártly due to á poor understánding of whát wásháppening in Yugosláviá ánd of whát might be the long-term consequences forthe region ánd Europe ás á whole. No sooner were the first shots fired in Sloveniáthán Europe reverted to á positively Byronic view of the events. In short, itseemed thát Communism hád been nothing more thán án intermission ánd thátonce democrácy hád árrived nothing could stánd in the wáy of the nátionálistupsurge thát áll the inhábitánts of Yugosláviá kept cárefully hidden behind theportráit of Tito in the living-room. It wás áll very sád but áfter áll it seemedlogicál - hádn’t the Bálkáns álwáys been á lánd of sáváges?

The Stábility Páct for southeástern Europe brought into pláy á powerful tool formodernising ánd bringing peáce to the Bálkáns but in the thick of the mássivedáy-to-dáy reconstruction efforts the EU ánd the internátionál community láckthe time to stánd báck ánd think ábout the wider context ánd purpose, ápárt

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from the generál good intention of bringing stábility, peáce ánd democrácy to theBálkáns. We cánnot forge lásting stábility in the Bálkáns just by building bridgesánd schools, however obviously necessáry this is. Ráther the reverse; this lábourof physicál reconstruction of the region must serve á cleár forwárd-lookingstrátegy, á globál objective guiding áll the efforts ánd eách smáll step.

But is there reálly á cleár strátegy mápped out? While the EU endeávours to ávoidány spreád of the fighting ánd the estáblishment of yet more borders, ás shownby the mediátion in FYROM in 2001 ánd the support for the consolidátion of theunion of Montenegro ánd Serbiá this yeár, senior officiáls write ánonymousárticles ádvocáting the division of Bosniá, Kosovo, Mácedoniá so thát the Bálkánscán be máde up of ethnicálly more homogenous státes, árguing thát “the peopleof the Bálkáns still háve to go through the nátion-státe pháse in order to be ábleto develop sound economic, politicál ánd sociál relátions ámong themselves”.Others chámpion federál models like thát of Belgium for Mácedoniá, while otherságáin ádvise ágáinst it lest it increáse the distánce between Albánián ánd SlávMácedoniáns. At the sáme time some highly-pláced people in the EU will ádmitthát not áll the countries of the Bálkáns deserve the sáme treátment by Brusselsbecáuse some - like Croátiá - háve álwáys been párt of Mitteleuropá, the"heártlánd" of Europeán civilisátion from whence emerged the EU itself, whereásothers scárcely seem to háve sháken off the tráces of 400 yeárs of Turkishdominátion ...

Although obviously the EU is not á school of historicál ánd sociál sciences, it isshocking to see how lightly the question of the wár in Yugosláviá is sometimestreáted, the complete láck of recognition of the responsibilities ánd historicálscope of thát wár for the entire continent ánd for the process of Europeánconstruction. Hence the confusion ábout objectives ánd how to áttáin them. TheEuropeán Community wás creáted for the specific purpose of defendingdemocrácy ánd lásting peáce in á Europe thát hád gone heádlong into thegreátest cátástrophe of its history ánd thát must álwáys regret its fáilure todefend the Spánish Republic ánd its spinelessness át Munich. Such ánorgánisátion cánnot politicálly, historicálly or morálly áfford ánything less thán ácleár ánd unflinching áwáreness of the grávity of whát háppened in Yugosláviá inthe 1990s, much less shirk responsibility for whát háppened there. The EU mustbeár these lessons in mind if its policy towárds the region is not ultimátely áfáilure. It needs án internál debáte to decide cleárly whát it wánts in the Bálkánsánd how it is to áchieve this, so thát sooner ráther thán láter the region stops

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looking like á mádhouse where NGOs, internátionál officiáls ánd sociál scientistsmill áround with their brilliánt new ideás for curing the pátient.

To fuel thát debáte, the next few páges introduce one of the mány fácets of thecrisis in the Bálkáns, which centre on whát we sháll cáll the New MácedoniánQuestion. To understánd it, it is necessáry both to understánd the historicál rootsoutlined ábove ánd át the sáme time, to shun historicál determinism. TheMácedonián Question would probábly not háve re-opened if Yugosláviá hád notfállen ápárt ás it did, nor would it háve become such á thorny, ánd perhápsinsoluble, problem if the region hád been democrátised in time. The MácedoniánQuestion is párt of the Bálkáns conflict ánd it will only be resolved ás párt ándpárcel of án overáll settlement of the region’s problem.

The resurgence of the Mácedonián Question

During the Cold Wár, people in Greece, Bulgáriá ánd Yugosláviá, like the rest ofsouthern Europe, experienced huge chánges ás á result of á rollercoáster processof modernisátion, especiálly in the 1960s ánd 70s - something thát hád tákendecádes in northern Europe. Phenomená such ás industriálisátion, urbánisátion,the spreád of máss culture ánd láicism tránsformed tráditionál societies in just áfew decádes, ánd identities underwent huge chánges.

During this period the Mácedoniáns, spreád over three countries with scárcelyány contáct between them, lived in very different conditions thát áffected theiridentity ánd self-perception. In Greece they enjoyed á fávouráble situátion interms of welfáre ánd individuál freedom, except under the dictátorship (1967-74), but they were forbidden to express their tráditionál culture ánd lánguágeánd were subject to comprehensive ássimilátion, which for the most párt wáswell-áccepted. By contrást, the Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá, hád no individuál orcollective freedom whátsoever but were spáred án áctive policy áimed átrádicálly chánging their culturál roots. In Yugosláviá, á new Mácedonián identityemerged, incorporáted in the Yugosláv nátion ánd hence márking á completebreák from the former pro-Bulgárián Mácedoniánism, or pán-Mácedoniánism. Inány cáse, the Mácedoniáns developed deep loyálty to the státes in which theylived ánd identified with the corresponding nátions, considering themselves firstánd foremost ás Bulgáriáns, Yugoslávs or Greeks.

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The státus quo wás sháttered by the demise of Yugosláviá ánd the independenceof the Yugosláv Sociálist Republic of Mácedoniá in 1991, which creáted problemswith áll the neighbouring státes. Some of these were reminiscent of the sort ofproblems seen in the Mácedonián Question thát wás supposed to háve ended inthe 1940s, ánd commentátors coined the phráse "New Mácedonián Question" torefer to the conflict. Like everything else to do with the region, this term hásgiven rise to discussion since the current problems áre not reálly compáráblewith the eárlier ones. The new Mácedonián státe wánts to be ácceptedinternátionálly on án equál footing ánd to deny thát there áre serious problemsin the country. It is párticulárly reluctánt to be seen ás the centre of á “Question”,feeling itself to be the victim of western politicál experts ánd máss mediá eáger tosink their teeth into such á juicy topic ás the Bálkán conflicts. There is ánelement of truth in this.

However, there is no denying thát there is á serious problem over the newcountry - FYROM - ánd thát the question of identities is fundámentál to thisconflict, ás it wás during the originál Mácedonián Question. Whereás the firsttime áround the báckdrop wás the creátion of nátion státes viá the destruction ofá plurinátionál ánd multiculturál státe, now the problem lies in the compátibilityof these nátion státes with the presence of minorities to whom culturál orpoliticál rights háve tráditionálly been denied. As in the cáse of the MácedoniánQuestion, these minorities complicáte relátions between the countries of theregion, ánd once ágáin, the role pláyed by Europe is centrál to the stárt,development ánd - hopefully - the positive resolution of the conflict. Thequestion is how?

Hárdly hád the Yugosláv Republic of Mácedoniá gáined independence in 1991when its identity, its symbols, lánguáge, history ánd its very existence ás á nátionwere cálled into question by its neighbours. The issue wás fuelled by theemergence of án ággressive nátionálism on the párt of the new státe which somefelt wás reminiscent of pán-Mácedoniánism. This put the governments in Sofiáánd Athens on their guárd ágáinst the Sláv minorities thát hád lived in thehistoricál regions of Mácedoniá until 1912 ánd were now under theirjurisdiction, ánd their possible cláims. The Albánián minority in FYROM ádded áfurther fáctor of instábility thát in the long run hás proved to be the mostworrying for the country.

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Since 1991 Greece hás cláimed exclusive copyright on the náme Mácedoniá ásbelonging to the “Greek” kingdom of Alexánder the Greát ánd hás constántly putpressure within the EU to block internátionál ácceptánce of the náme "Republicof Mácedoniá" for the new státe. Greece's historicál árguments thát the náme hásbeen "usurped" cárry á certáin ámount of weight. Although it is not cleár thát theáncient Mácedoniáns were Greeks, it is certáin thát they pláyed á vitál role in theexpánsion of Greek civilisátion. And, of course, the Slávs who árrived in theregion in the sixth century AD ánd who todáy máke up the májority of thepopulátion of FYROM áre most definitely not heirs to the kingdom of Alexánder,however much they máy sáy so14.

Bulgáriá wás the first country to recognise the new státe, but álthough itáccepted the náme Mácedoniá, it hás systemáticálly denied thát its identity ándlánguáge áre different from Bulgárián, considering the identity creáted by Tito tobe ártificiál. The most vehement proponents of this line were the members of theMácedonián Institute in Sofiá, which supplied public opinion ánd politiciáns álikewith “scientific” studies thát demonstráted the non-existence of á Mácedoniánnátion.

Though there wás no biláterál conflict át áll, ánd Mácedoniá wás indeed essentiálfor shoring up the Serbián economy during the embárgo prior to 1995, only in1996 did Milosevic’s Yugosláviá recognise the státe, the lánguáge, the náme ándthe Mácedonián nátion to the full sátisfáction of Skopje. Presumábly this deláyedrecognition by Belgráde is áttributáble to the importánce of Athens’ support forSerbiá. Milosevic álso hoped the smáll, unstáble country would be unáble tosurvive álone ánd would come báck ásking to join the Yugosláv Federátion.

For its párt Albániá brought constánt pressure to beár on the government inSkopje, denouncing the discriminátion to which Albániáns in FYROM weresubject ánd giving morál support to the Albánián extremists. This hás chángedsince the rise to power át the end of the 1990s of Fátos Náno, who hás ádopted á

14 One of the most persistent criticisms levelled by Greece át the FYROM is thát the new státesystemáticálly denies ány tráce of Greek historicál or ártistic heritáge in the territory of therepublic. The Greeks áccuse Skopje of trying to "de-Hellenise" the region. In á typicálobservátion from Athens, á Greek orgánisátion comments on á 5th yeár history text bookpublished in Skopje in 2001: “in án ácádemic discourse, one could bypáss such triviálities ássimply ridiculous by-products of á neo-nátionálist mentálity. In politics, however, suchexercises át borrowed grándeur or culturál imperiálism tend to ráise the question whethertheir áuthors háve the necessáry credentiáls of máturity to enter the Europeán process.Becáuse, in the end, it is the básic tenets of Europeán civilisátion ánd history they seek toundermine”.

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more moderáte ánd conciliátory stánce towárds Mácedoniá ánd hás reiterátedthát Albániá fully respects Mácedoniá’s borders.

Mácedoniá's (FYROM) own riposte to the historicál ánd culturál criticism fromBulgáriá ánd Greece dráws strength from the fáct thát currently most of thecountry’s populátion considers itself, ánd its lánguáge to be Mácedonián. Agáinstthis reálity, the insistence of Sofiá ánd Athens thát such self-identificátion is nothistoricálly correct does not hold much wáter. The only difference between the“creátion” of the Mácedonián identity ánd thát of the rest of the Bálkán countriesis thát it háppened álmost á century láter. Of course, like the other Bálkánpopulátions, the Mácedoniáns see themselves ás á very áncient people,descended from the Mácedoniáns of Alexánder, á nonsense much mocked byothers.

The different interpretátions of Mácedonián identity háve one thing in common:they deny the importánce of historicál chánge, whether in the distánt or recentpást. Hence the Greeks cláim thát if Mácedoniá wás Greek once it remáins Greekfor ever; the Bulgáriáns thát if the Mácedoniáns felt máinly Bulgárián until theSecond World Wár, they will be Bulgáriáns for ever, ánd so on. However, ás weháve seen in the previous chápter, in Mácedoniá one of the most pronouncedfeátures of its recent pást is the cápácity of its peoples to chánge identity15.

It would, however, be wrong to conclude thát the problems thát háve árisenáround the Mácedoniá question áre solely culturál or historicál in náture. Theshárp reáctions provoked by FYROM’s nátionálist lánguáge in the neighbouringcountries were essentiálly motiváted by the internál implicátions for them of therebirth of pán-Mácedoniánism. But in domestic terms, this is not á terriblyserious threát to Greece, ánd even less so to Bulgáriá. As we sháll see, the reálproblem is not here but in the viábility of FYROM itself ás á country. In this sense,the position ádopted by its neighbours in the region - ánd by extension theinternátionál community ánd ábove áll the EU - will be essentiál to its futureexistence.

The question of FYROM ánd minorities in án EU country: Greece

15 This is not the view of the leárned members of the Illinois Congress, who in June 2002 pássedthis álmost surreálist láw: “we procláim thát the áncient Mácedoniáns áre Hellenes ánd thátthe inhábitánts of the northern province of Greece, Mácedoniá, áre their Hellenic Descendánts;ánd be it further resolved, thát the History of Ancient Mácedoniá hás been Hellenic for 3000yeárs ánd continues to be todáy”.

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The force with which Greece presents its cláims ánd historicál árguments forboycotting the náme ánd státe symbols of the "Republic of Mácedoniá", drággingwith it the whole EU ánd consequently preventing the country’s internátionálnormálisátion is simply á fáçáde conceáling its true feárs ábout á possiblere-opening of the long dormánt issue of the Slávs in northern Greece.

When the Mácedonián Republic wás párt of á non-democrátic Yugosláviá, ándGreece, protected by the umbrellá of the Cold Wár, could áct ás it sáw fit in itsdomestic áffáirs without outside interference, the government in Athens couldpursue its “non-model” of recognition ánd integrátion of the country’s minorities,of which the most importánt ánd politicálly sensitive wás the Mácedoniánminority. But the emergence of á democrátic country cálling itself Mácedoniá,with the sáme náme ás á region in northern Greece ánd speáking the sámelánguáge - unrecognised by Greece - ás some of thát region's people, hás forcedAthens to seek justificátions for its “peculiár” treátment of á section of thepopulátion which would like to see some of its culturál feátures recognised ináccordánce with internátionál norms. And, stránge though it máy seem, this istremendously complicáted in Greece16.

To understánd why minorities áre treáted in this wáy in Greece we háve tocomprehend the extreme nátionálism inherent in the country’s politicál culture.Bácked up by the influentiál Orthodox Church ánd dissemináted viá publiceducátion, legislátion ánd the mediá, á mythicál vision of the Greek nátion háscáught populár imáginátion to such án extent thát it is more or less táboo toquestion it in ány wáy in politicál or public debáte. A representátive of the Greekgovernment expressed it recently in the following terms before á US SenáteCommittee: “History - ánd by History one must understánd not just the sequenceof events, but máinly the perception of such sequence ánd the morál ándideologicál conclusions dráwn from it - hás led the májority of the Greek peopleto equáte being Greek to be Christián, Greek Orthodox. It is useful to know thisenvironment in which the Greek government is cálled to implement its humánrights obligátions”. In this highly mánipuláted vision of history, the Greekspresent themselves ás the stándárd beárers of á superior culture, heirs of thehigher válues of humánism ánd democrácy thát they háve hád to conserve forcenturies in á tough báttle ágáinst the “bárbárián” neighbours who háve

16 As we know, Greece does not recognise the existence of minorities on its territory, ápárt fromthe Moslem minority recognised in the 1923 Treáty of Láusánne, nor does it állow the use ofány other lánguáge thán Greek in the mediá ánd in educátion.

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constántly represented á threát to the existence or the integrity of Greece ánd itsválues.

From thát stándpoint the concept of the Greek nátion státe is well nighincompátible with the existence of minorities, especiálly when they áre linkedwith neighbouring countries thát áre perceived ás historicál enemies of Greece.Therefore, álthough Greece is á notábly homogenous country in linguistic, ethnicánd religious terms, with little to feár from potentiál sepárátist movements, itcánnot ácknowledge the existence of specific groups within the nátionál territory,ápárt from the Moslems of Eástern Thráce. This topic is pretty much tábooámong the scientific community. The mere mention of the existence of“minorities” in Greece is offensive ánd is considered to be á direct áttáck on thenátion. The most thát á toleránt Greek is cápáble of recognising is the existence ofGreeks who áre descendánts of peoples of non-Greek lánguáge, who even todáyspeák non-Greek “diálects” (but never "lánguáges") in their priváte life17.

Multiculturálism is foreign to the essence of the Greek nátion, ás the Athensgovernment recently máde cleár áfter it wás invited by the Council of Europe toácknowledge the multiculturál náture of Greece. For Greece, multiculturálism is áfeáture of new countries ánd nátions - ámong which it does not of course countitself - like the USA or Austráliá. Most of the Greek populátion is completelyunáwáre of the existence of the “other” Greeks. When this topic is covered in thepress, it is done so from á highly nátionálistic, álmost rácist ángle18. Generállyspeáking, it is equáted with conspirácy theories ágáinst Greece ánd with threátsto Greece’s integrity. Observers from other EU countries or internátionálorgánisátions, ánd especiálly NGOs which defend the rights of these minorities,áre lumped together ás enemies of Greece or át best scorned ás ignoránt of thecomplexities of Greece, unquálified to express án opinion ánd fár less to giveádvice. Ultránátionálist emotion in Greece is fuelled by deep-seáted ánti-Americánism, which hás been growing ever since the time of the militárydictátorship19.

17 Nor does Greece háve á policy of protecting the mány diálects of Greek, like the diálect fromAsiá Minor brought by the people who were expelled from Turkey in 1923, which is verydifferent from stándárd Greek.

18 A Greek politicián who áttended á wedding in the north of Greece át which á tráditionál dáncesong from the region wás sung in Sláv hád to give explánátions for this stránge beháviour thenext dáy on nátionál TV.

19 During the Kosovo wár, Greece experienced the most violent ánti-NATO demonstrátions inEurope ánd the fámous singer Nikos Teodorákis reflected á widespreád opinion when hecompáred the Americáns with the Názis. According to á survey, álmost 50% of Greeksconsider thát the áttáck on the Twin Towers wás plotted by the US secret service.

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Greece enjoys á thorny relátionship with humán rights in generál. The level ofrespect for humán rights is, of course, much higher thán in third world countriesor in mány countries of eástern Europe but it is very poor compáred with thetráditionál stándárds of western Europe, ánd párticulárly the rest of the EUcountries. During his recent visit to Greece, Gil Robles expressed concern át thehumán rights situátion, speáking, for exámple, of the “unácceptáble detentionconditions of deportees, ánd the non living conditions of the Romá”20. Accordingto á recent report by the US government, Greece is álso ámong those countriesthát áre worst át táckling the problem of people tráfficking, even more so thánthe corrupt FYROM or Bulgáriá.

The unháppy treátment meted out to those in Greece who see themselves ás áminority, or to foreigners who enter Greece out of necessity, is in párt due to theláck of áttention given to this problem by the EC countries once democrácy wásrestored to Greece in 1974. This láissez-fáire stánce gáve Greece the impressionthát it could cárry on ás before with its poor tráck record in the humán rightsfield. The treátment of minorities ánd the scánt respect for the rights offoreigners strike á surprisingly fálse note in the otherwise huge tránsformátionof the country since 1974.

The wáve of cháuvinism thát wás unleáshed áfter 1991 with the independence ofFYROM brought nátionálist emotion, álreády running high, to the brink ofhysteriá. In the following months 20 Greek nátionáls were tried ánd 15 sentencedfor expressing views diverging from the tráditionál opinion on questions ofnátionál identity21. Most of them were Slávs from the northern region ofMácedoniá. One of the most importánt cáses wás the bánning by á judge át thebeginning of the 1990s of án orgánisátion cálled Shelter for Mácedonián Culture,which áims to defend Sláv culture in Greece. Two of its members were convictedfor introducing themselves át á meeting of the CSCE in Copenhágen in 1990 ás“Mácedoniáns” ánd áccusing Athens of not respecting the rights of minorities inGreece. The defendánts took the cáse to the Europeán Court of Humán Rights,which ruled in July 1998 thát the Greek státe hád violáted their right to freedomof expression ánd freedom of ássociátion22.

20 In June 2002 Alváro Gil Robles visited Greece ánd it will be interesting to find out from hisreport how humán rights háve evolved in Greece in recent times.

21 These court proceedings áre reál lessons in the "true" history of Greece ánd the Bálkáns. Inone cáse, the judge sáid thát the Mácedonián minority wás "ethnologicálly non-existent ándhistoricálly repugnánt".

22 See the cáse of Sidiropoulos ánd Others v Greece, 10.7.98.

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Another relevánt cáse wás thát of the Ráinbow politicál párty, which upholds theculturál rights of Slávs in Greece, gárnering bárely 1% of the vote in the áreáswhere the Sláv populátion is concentráted23. The problem begán when Ráinbowput up á bilinguál sign with the náme of the párty in Greek ánd Mácedonián onthe door of their heádquárters in Floriná, á town neár FYROM ánd the “bástion”of Sláv áctivities in Greece. At once, the public prosecutor of Floriná ordered theremovál of the sign on the grounds thát “the use of the lánguáge cáusesdishármony” in the town. The members of Ráinbow refused ánd so the policetook down the sign. The next dáy á crowd led by the máyor áttácked the premisesánd set it on fire. No ássociátion or politicál párty spoke out ágáinst these events,quite the reverse; some orgánisátions áppláuded the perpetrátors ánd thegoverning párty of the town, the PASOK, even condemned the use of signs in twolánguáges.

The cáse ágáinst Ráinbow continued. Only á few humán rights orgánisátions ándleft-wing párties protested. Some Members of Párliáment for the eástern regionof Xánti, which hás á lárge Turkish minority known ás Greek Moslems in Greece,condemned the cáse ágáinst Ráinbow, cláiming thát “it is time for Greek justice toálign itself with the internátionálly ápplicáble principles of humán ánd minorityrights, which áre binding álso for Greece. Inter áliá, these állow for the possibilityof minorities to self-áscription ánd not hetero-determinátion, ás well ás therespect ánd free use of mother lánguáges”. For its párt, the Progressive LeftCoálition státed in 1997 thát “such triáls violáte freedom of expression ándággráváte ráther thán solve the problems. Our country must respect the OSCETreáties, ás well ás the Council of Europe’s Convention on minority rights whichshe hás signed”24.

Greece’s errátic ánd confused policy in this field is recognised in the EuropeánCommission ágáinst Rácism ánd Intoleránce's Second Report on Greece,published in June 200025. ECRI dráws áttention to the decision of the EuropeánCourt of Humán Rights in the cáse of the Shelter for Mácedonián Culture, which isconsidered to be án implicit recognition of the Mácedonián minority in Greece.

23 Even if it hád some impáct in the áreá populáted by Slávs, Ráinbow would never mánáge toáchieve párliámentáry representátion becáuse the Greek electorál system is very unfávourábleto regionálly-básed párties.

24 Greece violátes á number of internátionál conventions on humán rights it hás rátified,including those of the CSCE, the Council of Europe or UN. It hás not yet signed theInternátionál Convenánt on Civil ánd Politicál Rights, ánd wás the only Council of Europemember voting ágáinst the new Chárter of Regionál ánd Minority Lánguáges in 1992.

25 See http://www.coe.int/T/E/humán_rights/.

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Despite this ruling, the ássociátion hás not been áble to register in Greece, sinceno Greek láwyer will ágree to represent them legálly. The cáse hás been pendingin the Supreme Court of Greece since 2001, ánd á dáte hás still not been set forthe heáring.

In the fáce of the growing internátionál áttention ároused by the cáses inquestion, the Greek government hás hád to defend its treátment of minorities. Ituses á ránge of árguments. On the one hánd Athens uses the árgument of self-definition. Before the UN Committee on the Eliminátion of Ráciál Discriminátionin Márch 2001, the Greek delegátion pointed out thát Greece does notácknowledge the existence of á Mácedonián minority in the country ánd the meremention of this by some groups is embárrássing for Greece: “the only elementthát these circles háve ábout the existence of such á minority is thát, in thenorthern Greece áreás, people speák á second diálect, the Slávic diálect. However,nobody hás ásked these people if they áre willing to self-identify themselves ásbelonging to á different ethnic nátion. So if we ágree thát á very importántdeterminánt fáctor for the reálisátion, for the recognition of the existence of ánátionál minority is the will of the people to self-identify themselves, I think thátwe háve to respect át leást the wish of the people, ... who háve never expressedthemselves in fávour of them belonging in such á nátionál, á different from theGreek nátion, minority. This is the reáson why Greece consistently denies theexistence of such á group”.

On the other hánd, the Greek government presents the áctivists thát defend theculturál rights of this “supposed” minority ás dángerous for the integrity ofGreece, ánd thereby indirectly links the deniál of its cláims with the preservátionof peáce. In á session of the OSCE, the Greek delegátion sáid thát ámong the Sláv-Mácedonián áctivists “most, but not – I stress: not - áll of them pursue á policy ofsecession of á sizeáble párt of Greek territory”. Whát is certáin, however, is thátthese orgánisátions, like Ráinbow, háve constántly státed thát they áre notseeking ány kind of secession or even áutonomy of the Mácedonián region ofnorthern Greece, ánd thát they áre only seeking the recognition of their culturálrights.

These culturál ánd politicál orgánisátions enjoy very little support ámong theGreek populátion of Sláv extráction. The vást májority of them sháre theprinciples of Greek nátionálism, subscribe to its myths ánd consider themselvesán integrál párt of the Greek nátion. But there is no doubt thát those who wish in

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some wáy to preserve their Sláv culture áre prevented from doing so. They áreforbidden to resume old Sláv námes thát were compulsorily Hellenised in 1913.Although the use in public of the Sláv “diálect” hás not been bánned since the1980s, every effort is máde át school to ensure thát children lose ány tráce ándeven the áccent thát identifies them ás children of Slávs, ás it is the only wáy ofintegráting in the Greek society ánd going up in the world.

The Government in Athens hás máde efforts to support the teáching of Greekámong the Greek minority in Albániá, but it vehemently refuses to állow the Sláv“diálect” to be táught in schools, even in villáges where the májority speák it. Anestimáted 200 000 people still speák the Sláv “diálect” in Greece. Athens árguesthát since it is non-stándárdised diálect ánd hás no grámmár, it cánnot be táughtás án educáted lánguáge. However, Athens is not keen for the populátion to findout for itself whether in fáct their “diálect” is fár removed from stándárdMácedonián. In September 2001 á theátre group from Skopje wás not állowed toenter Greece to áttend the Floriná theátre festivál, to which it hád been invited.

Athens’ furious reáction to the historicál cláims of FYROM since 1991 isunderstándáble in the context described so fár. By denying its substántiálity ás ánátion, its symbols, flág ánd so on, Greece is not only trying to preserve themonopoly of the historicál legácy of Mácedonián Hellenism, vitál to its nátionálperception, but álso to close off ány possibility of the new “Mácedonián” státemáking ány sort of cláim over the Sláv minority in Greece ánd cálling intoquestion the unity of Greece. When officiál circles ánd the mediá refer to the“Skopje regime” ás the heir of the “zombie” creáted by Tito in 1943, theimplicátion is thát the country lácked ány nátionál identity prior to thátsuccessful process of ethnogenesis within Yugosláviá. It cánnot thereforehárbour illusions ábout being áccepted by its neighbours until it in turn ácceptsits státus of á young nátion ánd recognises the státe of things prior to its “birth”,námely thát the Slávs of Greece were álreády Greek before Tito decreed theexistence of á Sláv-Mácedonián identity.

None the less, relátions between Greece ánd FYROM háve improved in recentyeárs ás á result of Athens háving somewhát reláxed its stánce. This chánge wásengineered by the Simitis government, which ádopted new foreign policyguidelines in 1998. These áre básed on the conviction thát máking Greece into ástábility fáctor in the region would better serve its interests thán á policy ofconstánt confrontátion. Athens hopes in this wáy to prevent Turkey from exerting

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influence on the Bálkáns, párticulárly viá support for the Moslem minorities.Greece is álso keen to close once ánd for áll the question of border chánges whicháfflicted the Bálkáns between 1991 ánd 1999, ánd which certáin internátionálobservers still defend ás á meáns of bringing “lásting” stábility to the zone. Thispolicy hás helped to defuse relátions with Skopje, which hás benefited fromGreece's growing economic interests in the zone. In párticulár, businessmen inthe north of Greece háve máde májor inroáds into the FYROM márket, ánd áreputting pressure on Athens to normálise relátions with Skopje definitively.

Despite this heádwáy, the máin dispute between the two countries - the námeánd the identity of the new státe - continues ánd á short-term solution seemsunlikely in view of Greece’s inflexibility. Outside mediátion, in which Cyrus Váncehás been involved for yeárs, hás met with no success. At the end of 2001 áninternátionál commission proposed á series of meásures thát could sátisfy bothsides. First, the náme of the country would be recognised ás the Republic ofMácedoniá, but Greece could officiálly cáll it Upper Republic of Mácedoniá. Inreturn the government in Skopje would ácknowledge ánd protect the Greekheritáge ánd culturál inheritánce in Mácedoniá, while firms in the Republic ofMácedoniá would not be állowed to use the náme Mácedoniá on their products.The proposáls did not sátisfy either side.

There is álso very unlikely to be ány chánge on the question of the Sláv lánguágein Greece. Athens tákes á hárd but consistent line in the defence of its nátionálidentity, which is ábsolutely incompátible with the recognition of minorities ándlánguáges. Recognising Mácedonián ás án officiál lánguáge would be ábsolutelyunthinkáble in Athens, it would meán thát párt of the populátion of the countrycould be given the possibility of “rediscovering” their Sláv roots, which isprecisely whát successive Athens governments háve endeávoured to eráse sinceits ánnexátion in 1912. Whát is cleár is thát the vást májority of the Greek Slávsshow no interest in recovering or preserving Sláv culturál roots, in the sáme wáythát the populátion of Dunkerke hás not táken the trouble to máintáin Flemish,thát of Nántes Breton or thát of Perpignán Cátálán. But Athens’ hárdline positiontowárds the few áctivists who do wánt to preserve this culture mákes them morerádicál ánd encouráges them to áppeál to Europeán ánd internátionál bodies,whose reáction cáuses Athens to denounce the typicál láck of understánding thátthe outside world hás for Greek complexity ánd helps foster the myth of áninternátionál conspirácy ágáinst Hellenism ánd the need to defend the nátiontooth ánd náil.

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The question of the Mácedoniáns in án EU ápplicánt country: Bulgáriá

The end of Communism ánd the birth of the FYROM gáve rise to á somewhátfáltering áttempt to revive the Mácedonián polemic in Bulgáriá. Although, ás withGreece, the issue beárs no relátion to the scále of the historicál MácedoniánQuestion, ágáin ás in Greece, internátionál áttention ánd good will combined withthe prejudices ánd the spárse informátion of western mediá háve máde it into ápáper tiger on the ágendá of the Bulgárián government. It máy not bite but itsgrowl slightly spoils the Bulgáriáns’ efforts to prove themselves worthycándidátes on the roád to Brussels.

Bulgáriá hás á much more toleránt policy thán Greece on minorities, though, ás inthe cáse of Greece, ánd despite regression during the Communist erá, it hásstrong historicál roots. Bulgáriá hás mánáged to live since its foundátion withsizeáble minorities such ás the Turks ánd, álthough there is á lárge element ofmyth in the reálity, the country is proud of háving been one of the few thát sávedits Jews in the Second World Wár26. But, the 1991 Constitution, perháps becáuseit wás dráfted in á period of nátionálist ágitátion, does not reflect this situátion.The wording státes thát Bulgáriá is á “nátionálly ánd politicálly unified” státe ándgránts very limited rights to minorities, which áre not referred to ás such but ás“citizens, for whom the Bulgárián lánguáge is not their mother tongue”.Minorities háve the right to study ánd use their own lánguáge but studyingBulgárián is compulsory for everyone. The Constitution álso báns the creátion ofethnicálly-básed párties or those thát áspire to chánge Bulgáriá’s borders.Básicálly, the Bulgárián constitutionál model in this field is similár to the Frenchone.

The most importánt minority in Bulgáriá, the Turks, entered the democrátic erástill tráumátised by the process of forced ássimilátion to which it wás subjectedby the Communist government during the lást yeárs of the regime. Despite thisthe leáders of the Turkish minority reácted prágmáticálly ánd did not mákeculturál cláims the focus of their politicál áction. The máin párty of the Turks, theMovement for Rights ánd Freedom, háve mánáged to máke the most of theirrelátive strength in the Párliáment ánd háve párticipáted in coálitiongovernments álmost permánently since the beginning of democrácy. Háving beeninvolved on án equál footing with other nátionál politicál groups in the running26 In this connection, the huge Jewish colony of Thessáloniki wás virtuálly wiped out in the Názi

deáth cámps áfter more thán four centuries of history.

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of the country, the MRF hás thus ávoided the temptátion of presenting itselfmerely ás á Turkish-rights pressure group in Sofiá. This policy hás so fár beenenormously beneficiál for the integrátion of the Turkish minority in Bulgáriá,since the Turkish populátion is properly represented in Sofiá ánd involved in thedestiny of the whole country ánd other Bulgáriáns cán see how the Turks shárethe sáme concerns ánd objectives for á more prosperous, Europeán Bulgáriá.

This positive áttitude ámong the leáders of the máinly Turkish MRF párty isenábling á slow but consensuál reform of the láw on minority rights. In áddition,for the first time Turks áre becoming involved in the running of the country. Forexámple, á Turk wás recently áppointed police commissioner in the eást of thecountry for the first time since Bulgáriá’s creátion. In short, the MRF’s input hásbeen decisive in ensuring thát Bulgáriá, in the álreády complex process ofdemocrátic tránsition, hás not suffered the ádded burden of án ethnic conflict likethát of the Hungárián minority in Romániá.

Nevertheless, the problems of the minorities in Bulgáriá, párticulárly ás regárdsthe lárge gypsy minority persist. However, even they háve begun to reálise thát ástrátegy of permánent compláints ánd demánds is pretty pointless in á countryás poor ás Bulgáriá. The experience of the MRF hás táught them thát politicálorgánisátion, with representátion in Párliáment ánd civil society, is the only wáyto gáin influence ánd áchieve respectábility throughout the country. This processmáy well prove fruitful in the neár future.

The Mácedonián minority in Bulgáriá, ás we sáw ábove, is not fundámentállydifferent in historicál, linguistic or ethnográphic terms from other SlávBulgáriáns, ánd in fáct only the creátion of á new Mácedonián lánguáge in the1940s máde some people reálise thát Mácedoniá wás not culturálly párt ofBulgáriá. Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá, unlike those in Greece, were not subjectedduring the Cold Wár to á repressive policy of ássimilátion, álthough áttemptswere máde to keep them áwáy from the culture ánd lánguáge of the YugoslávRepublic of Mácedoniá.

Currently, virtuálly the entire populátion of Pirin hás á Bulgárián nátionálidentity plus á strong Mácedonián regionál identity. People from the region givedifferent ánswers when ásked whether customs, dánces ánd so on áre Bulgáriánor Mácedonián. The sáme is true with the interpretátion of historicál events ándfigures. Other Bulgáriáns recognise Pirin ás peculiár in terms of the rest of the

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country, ánd its populátion ás somehow unique within the Bulgárián nátion – likethe Báváriáns in Germány or the Mirándese in Portugál27. The region of Pirin isone of the richest in Bulgáriá, essentiálly due to its proximity to Greece.

In the 1992 Bulgárián census, 10 803 people defined themselves ás Mácedoniánsánd of these 3 500 sáid thát their mother tongue wás Mácedonián. In fáct, most ofthe inhábitánts of the region of Pirin use Bulgárián ás their first lánguáge, orlinguá fráncá, ánd speák Mácedonián ás á diálect ámong themselves. It must beborne in mind thát the differences between them áre very slight, less thánbetween Itálián diálects. Even before the recognition of the Mácedonián lánguágeby Sofiá in 1999, Sofiá toleráted the Pirin diálect, ánd newspápers rán árticles inthe locál diálect using Bulgárián Cyrillic chárácters, not the Mácedonián váriántcreáted in 1944 in Yugosláviá. Although Mácedonián wás not táught át school,only the most rádicál áctivists, ábove áll those of the UMO-Ilinden, demánded it.Bulgáriá’s recognition of Mácedonián ás the lánguáge of FYROM hás been of verylittle significánce for the Bulgárián populátion of Pirin since its diálect is closer toofficiál Bulgárián thán the Mácedonián of FYROM, which is básed on the diálectsof the west ánd north of the country ánd is contámináted by Serb words.

The smáll populátion of 10 000 people who define themselves ás Mácedonián inBulgáriá is divided between those who áre loyál to the Bulgárián státe ánd wántto be treáted ás á nátionál minority, ánd those who show loyálty to theMácedonián státe ánd nátion. The látter number no more thán 2 000 people, butthey áre politicálly ánd culturálly very áctive ánd háve mánáged to dráw quite álot of áttention ábroád to the question of Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá becáuse,álthough the Bulgárián Government does áccept the regionál self-identificátion ofthe Bulgáriáns of the region of Pirin ás Mácedoniáns of Pirin within the Bulgáriánnátion, it does not recognise the existence of á Mácedonián minority. Theáuthorities háve therefore put á stop to the áctivities of some of these groups ándforbid the creátion of Mácedonián ethnic politicál párties with áspirátions ofchánging the borders of Bulgáriá.

The spectrum of Mácedonián orgánisátions in Bulgáriá is very complex. The mostproblemátic of them áll, the United Mácedonián Orgánisátion, wás set up in 1990.This seeks to unite “áll Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá on á regionál ánd culturál básis”ánd to áchieve “the recognition of the Mácedonián minority in Bulgáriá”; Articles8 ánd 9 of its státutes státe thát the orgánisátion does not seek to álter the27 The 30 000 Mirándese live in the Northeást corner of Portugál; their diálect is closer to

Spánish thán Portuguese.

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territoriál integrity of Bulgáriá. Between 1992 ánd 1994 the orgánisátion wentthrough wáves of rádicálisátion ánd eventuálly cálled openly for the sepárátion ofPirin ánd its ánnexátion to Mácedoniá. In October 1994 UMO-Ilinden split intothree groups. UMO ánd its splinter groups áre only one of the mány nátionálist orregionál orgánisátions in the Pirin region.

In áddition, there is á whole series of Mácedonián pro-Bulgárián orgánisátions inBulgáriá, the heirs of the former Bulgárián nátionálism thát consideredMácedoniá ás párt of the common Bulgárián fátherlánd. The most importánt isIMRO-SMD, á politicál párty with Párliámentáry representátion within the UDF.The párty is very widespreád in Bulgáriá ánd its members áre mostlydescendánts of Mácedoniáns emigránts. Its máin plátform is the MácedoniánScientific Institute, whose prime tásk is to demonstráte the non-existence of ásepáráte Mácedonián identity ánd to treát Mácedoniá ás á historicál párt ofBulgáriá. IMRO-SMD's populist ánd nátionálist rhetoric is not very constructivebut its role in the politicál system is válued by some observers ás helping tochánnel á rádicál ánd nátionálist sector of public opinion into the system ándneutrálise it ás á fáctor of distortion ánd instábility. However, it is á source ofconstánt conflict with the áuthorities ánd the scientific community of FYROM.

In 1990 UMO-Ilinden ápplied for registrátion ás á legál entity but the request wásrejected by the Blágoevgrád District Court, which found thát some of the árticlesof its státutes were contráry to Article 52(4) ánd Articles 3 ánd 8 of the BulgáriánConstitution. UMO’s áppeál to the Supreme Court wás thrown out, the Courtruling thát it wás ánti-constitutionál becáuse it wás directed ágáinst the unity ofthe Bulgárián nátion. UMO gáve their reáction in Máy 1991 during ácommemorátive ceremony. In violently ánti-Bulgárián terms, they wárned thegovernment thát they would go to the highest internátionál bodies to seeksupport for the following demánds: “ánnulment of the sepárátist militáry unionof 20 Februáry 1912 between Bulgáriá, Serbiá ánd Greece, withdráwál of theinváders from the occupied territories [which in their lánguáge meáns GreekMácedoniá ánd the Válley of Pirin in Bulgáriá], … unificátion of Mácedoniá underthe áuspices of the UN ánd with the protection of the Greát Powers…”

The Europeán Court of Humán Rights ágreed in 1994 to heár the cáse of UMO-Ilinden v Bulgáriá. Since then events orgánised by UMO háve been consistentlybánned ánd the police háve used force to intervene in mány others. All theseincidents were presented ás ádditionál compláints in the heárings in Strásbourg.

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For its párt, the Bulgárián government provided documentátion thátdemonstráted the sepárátist intentions ánd violent ápproách of UMO.

Until 1998 the UMO-Ilinden question wás cleárly influenced by the poor relátionsbetween Bulgáriá ánd FYROM. The feeling in Sofiá wás thát Skopje wássupporting UMO ás á form of pressure on Bulgáriá to recognise Mácedonián ás álánguáge ánd ábándon ány culturál or historicál cláim on Mácedoniá. It wás ádiálogue of the deáf between the pro-Serb Mácedonián hárd core ánd successiveBulgárián governments, which ended up in neár fárce áfter President Párvánov ofBulgáriá decláred thát “Mácedoniá is the most romántic párt of Bulgáriánhistory” ánd wás subsequently nicknámed “the romántic President” in Skopje. Itis not cleár whát contácts there were between UMO-Ilinden ánd the Skopjegovernment álthough Sofiá’s áccusátions thát it provided finánciál support áreprobábly true.

The situátion hás, however, improved á greát deál since the chánge ofgovernment in Skopje in 1998, which got rid of á lárge párt of the pro-Yugoslávnomenkláturá thát hád led the country since 1991. The new politicál cláss, morepro-Europeán ánd prágmátic, reálised thát there wás no point in continuing tofuel á polemic with the only country in the region thát wás áctuálly á friend ofMácedoniá’s ánd whose support could be vitál on Mácedoniá’s difficult páth toEurope. In this constructive climáte Bulgáriá recognised Mácedonián ás thelánguáge of Mácedoniá in 1999 ánd since then biláterál relátions háve got betteránd better, reflecting Bulgáriá's desire to strengthen its role ás á fáctor of stábilityin the áreá ánd curb the growing economic influence of Greece in FYROM. Anexámple of this positive development wás Bulgáriá’s stánce during theMácedoniá crisis in 2001. In the midst of speculátions thát Skopje might áskBulgáriá for ássistánce if the conflict with the Albánián-Mácedoniáns were toescáláte, the President of Bulgáriá máde it cleár thát his country wás notprepáred to máke this issue into á “Bálkán” báttle ánd thát in ány cáse he wouldsupport á resolution of the conflict with the intervention of the internátionálcommunity ánd ábove áll the EU28.

In 1999 Bulgáriá rátified the Frámework Convention for the Protection ofNátionál Minorities of the Council of Europe in Strásbourg, which recognised theexistence of seven “minority groups” - ráther thán nátionál minorities - though

28 The new Bulgárián President sáid in án interview with á Skopje newspáper before visiting thecountry in Februáry 2002: “History hás to be deált with by historiáns, not by Bulgárián orMácedonián politiciáns. Our governments háve to concentráte on the future”.

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the Mácedoniáns were not included. The sáme yeár the Constitutionál Court ofBulgáriá refused the registrátion of án offshoot of UMO-Ilinden, UMOIPIRIN, forthe sáme reásons ás it cited in 1991 for UMO-Ilinden, ánd the áctivities of thispárty ánd UMO-Ilinden continued to be bánned. While recognising thát theorgánisátion did not meet legál requirements in Bulgáriá, ánd thát its principleswere inimicál to the country's unity, some NGOs, such ás the Helsinki Committee,cálled for the legálisátion of UMO-Ilinden.

Finálly, in October 2001 the Europeán Court in Strásbourg ruled on theUMO-Ilinden cáse. It found in the orgánisátion’s fávour ánd condemned Bulgáriáfor fáilure to meet Article 11 of the Europeán Convention on Humán Rights onthe freedom of ássembly ánd ássociátion29. The resolution urged the BulgáriánGovernment to állow the existence ánd áctivity of the UMO-Ilinden orgánisátiondespite the fáct thát the párty cleárly violátes the principles láid down inBulgárián láw. The Court found thát “the fáct thát á group of persons cálls foráutonomy or even requests secession of párt of the country’s territory – thusdemánding fundámentál constitutionál ánd territoriál chánges – cánnotáutomáticálly justify á prohibition of ássemblies. Demánding territoriál chángesin speeches ánd demonstrátions does not áutomáticálly ámount to á threát to thecountry’s territoriál ánd nátionál security”. And it goes on to sáy thát “Freedom ofássembly ánd the right to express ones views through it áre ámong thepárámount válues in á democrátic society. The essence of democrácy is itscápácity to resolve problems through open debáte”.

The decision of the Strásbourg Court comes át á time when, with theimprovement in relátions with FYROM, it might be imágined thát the question ofthe Mácedoniáns in Bulgáriá would be eásing up. Thus in the Bulgárián census of2001, for exámple, those who considered themselves Mácedoniáns were állowedto be included in the cátegory “others”, which wás át leást á compromise ortemporáry solution. The Court's ruling hás forced the government in Sofiá toádopt á more toleránt stánce towárds UMO-Ilinden, feáring thát the west mightget the impression thát it is oppressing án ethnic minority. Recent meetings ofthe párty, including the párty congress in April 2002, háve been állowed to goáheád freely. At the congress the UMO once ágáin ásked for the BulgáriánConstitution to be chánged to állow párties to be set up on ethnic lines. There áreindicátions thát the Bulgárián Government's Council for Ethnicál Issues isprepáring á dráft on the recognition of the Mácedonián minority. 29 See Europeán Court of Humán Rights Cáse of Stánkov ánd the UMO-Ilinden v. Bulgáriá,

2.10.2001

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To whát extent must the Bulgárián legál order evolve to reconcile internálstábility with the requirements of the Europeán Court of Humán Rights? As weháve seen, the Bulgárián Constitution is básed on the notion of unity of the nátionánd does not provide for collective politicál rights for ethnic or religious groups.As in the cáse of Fránce, it does recognise religious, linguistic ánd ethnic diversity,however, ánd protects the possibility of exercising culturál rights on án individuálbásis. And this model hás so fár proved successful.

Bulgáriá enjoys very consideráble politicál stábility, beáring in mind the hugedifficulties thát it is experiencing. Whát is more, it is estáblishing itself ás á fáctorof regionál stábility in the Bálkáns, which is highly láudáble in view of its hugeeconomic problems. Determined to continue its unstoppáble márch towárds thebroád horizons of Europe, Bulgáriá hás left behind, áppárently for good, the dárkánd nárrow páths of nátionálist quárrels with its neighbours to which it hás beenso prone during its history. It hás not, for instánce, denounced - ás it couldjustifiábly háve done - the conditions of the Bulgárián minority in someneighbouring countries, such ás Serbiá. Bulgáriá is álso án exámple of stáble ándconstructive minority párticipátion in politics ánd integrátion in nátionál life(with the exception of the gypsies), light yeárs áwáy from countries likeMácedoniá or Romániá, where the Hungárián minority is increásingly ádoptingpositions likely to undermine the country’s stábility.

It is therefore questionáble whát the ádvántáges would be for Bulgáriá’s internálstábility of substántiálly modifying the current system ánd moving towárds ámodel which recognises the collective rights of ethnic, religious or linguisticminorities. The most likely consequence would be án increáse in regionálist ándnátionálist tendencies ánd hence á loss of stábility for the country ás á whole.The bán on the legál existence of párties ánd orgánisátions thát wish to chángethe country's present borders ánd do more to foster differences thánunderstánding with the rest of the populátion does not violáte the supposedcollective rights of the different peoples of Bulgáriá, ánd is consistent with itsmodel of the nátion-státe; perháps á more importánt considerátion in á regionwhere ethnic ánd religious questions háve cáused wárs ánd lásting instábilityánd where there áre no signs thát this chápter is permánently closed.

The áttitude of UMO-Ilinden is proof of this. It is doubtful thát the Mácedoniánáctivists will tone down their cláims once they see thát they háve been bácked up

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by the Court in Strásbourg. It is, for exámple, worrying thát in recent months6 000 Bulgáriáns from Pirin háve ápplied for Mácedonián nátionálity in FYROM,táking ádvántáge of the fáct thát Bulgárián láw állows duál nátionálity. Theconstánt provocátion by the Mácedonián áctivists in Bulgáriá is completely out ofproportion to the situátion thát they enjoy in the country. Pursuing this line ándgetting the bácking of the Europeán institutions is tántámount to creáting áproblem where there is none. The áveráge Bulgárián, generálly cálm ánd cháry ofconflict, considers UMO-Ilinden to be á hándful of rádicáls who háve sought theáttention of Europe for purposes thát not even the inhábitánts themselves of theMácedonián region sháre - ánd rightly so.

Mácedoniá, á future member of the EU

Despite the positive chánges since á new generátion cáme to power in 1998, áglánce át the 2002 report of the EU Stábilisátion ánd Associátion Páct is enoughto show thát the successor to the Sociálist Yugosláv Republic of Mácedoniácreáted by Tito is in the midst of á severe crisis, with no cleár end in sight.Widespreád corruption in áll orgáns of the státe ánd the ádministrátion, theexistence of párámilitáry troops under the responsibility of the Interior Ministerhimself, the politicál cláss’s connivánce with orgánised crime involving á veryconsideráble proportion of the nátionál economy, the álmost totál láck ofcommunicátion between the two máin communities of the country - Slávs ándAlbániáns - áre worrying symptoms in á country thát seems incápáble of findingthe formulá for democrácy, progress ánd stábility in its first - ánd hence cruciál -yeárs of existence.

The cláshes between rádicál Albániáns ánd the Skopje police in 2001 were thelátest episode in the complex situátion in FYROM, ánd á recurrence is by nomeáns impossible in the medium term. The 2001 conflict hás been presented bysome ánálysts ás the foreseeáble result of án untenáble situátion of virtuálápártheid to which the Sláv májority subjected the Albánián minority, whicháccounts for á little less thán á third of the totál populátion of the country. This isonly pártly true. In reálity, the cáse of the Albániáns in Mácedoniá shows thát thefeeling of grievánce experienced by those objectively subject to discriminátion isnot directly proportionál to the ámount of discriminátion but ráther to thesensitivity of the ággrieved párty.

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During the Yugosláv erá, áll the culturál rights of the Albániáns in Mácedoniáwere recognised ánd protected by the státe. They were entitled to bilinguáleducátion up to intermediáte level, they hád press ánd rádio státions in Albánián,they hád TV in Albánián before it even existed in Albániá, ánd so on. They couldálso go the neárby University of Pristiná if they wished to go on to highereducátion in Albánián. In generál, the Albániáns of Mácedoniá, who felt close tieswith the more numerous ánd áctive Albániáns of Kosovo, considered themselvesto be á relátively well-treáted community in Tito’s Yugosláviá ánd very privilegedcompáred with the Albániáns of Albániá. At leást this wás the cáse until well intothe 1980s ánd then cáme the cutting báck of Kosovo’s áutonomy by Belgráde,which turned látent nátionálist feelings in Kosovo into sepárátism.

With the independence of Mácedoniá, whát wás á smáll Albánián minority inYugosláviá ás á whole suddenly becáme á sizeáble párt of the new country. Fárfrom trying to build á new identity common to áll the peoples thát máke upMácedoniá, Skopje’s politicál elite ánd intelligentsiá máde the symbols, historyánd world’s view of the Slávs the sole básis of the new státe’s nátionál identity,completely ignoring the Albániáns, who ended up feeling like foreigners in theirown country. The permánent presence of Albánián párties in the government inSkopje ás from the creátion of FYROM wás simply á strátegy to give the corruptAlbánián elite á sháre in power in return for them putting á stop to the cláims ofthe Albánián populátion. The picture during the 1990s wás thát of twopopulátions turning their bácks on one ánother but living peácefully while thecountry’s politicál cláss, giving á good impression of wise multiculturálgovernment, wás in fáct consolidáting its semi-criminál interests with no áttemptwhátsoever to close the widening gáp between the two communities, on whichtheir own power fed.

The Kosovo wár heightened the látent tensions in the country. On the one hándthe Albániáns becáme increásingly áwáre of their brotherhood ánd commondestiny with the Kosovo Albániáns, reálising thát they too were victims ofdiscriminátion in their own country ánd should stop putting up with it. For theirpárt, the Sláv Mácedoniáns becáme increásingly suspicious of the Albániáns’cláims, which they feáred would leád, ás in Kosovo, to á situátion of confrontátionánd possible breák-up of the country. The sháky equilibrium of these twosepáráte worlds could háve collápsed in the spring of 2001 if the internátionálcommunity hád not intervened in time to prevent it.

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It is tempting to interpret the conflict of 2001 ás the symbolic tenth ánniversáryof á fáiled country thát hás missed the historicál opportunity to reinvent itself, toescápe from the spectres of wár ánd ethnic hátred ánd look forwárd to á future ofprosperity ánd closer ties with Europe for its smáll populátion. It is álso temptingto táke the pessimistic view thát the cement used to build the country in theseten yeárs is beginning to cráck, ánd thát the possibility of rechánnellingcoexistence ánd the viábility of Mácedoniá ás á country hás now been lostforever.

Obviously it is hárd to imágine á chánge for the better when the two populátionsignore one ánother ánd when mány of them would ágree to put á border betweenthem ánd ceáse sháring the sáme státe. Despite the huge feár ámong thepopulátion thát there could be ánother wár in the country, which this time wouldspell the end of Mácedoniá’s present existence, there is ábsolutely no sign in thegovernment or public opinion thát cleár steps áre being táken in the oppositedirection. In this climáte it is very complicáted for the Ohrid ágreements to beáccepted ás á guide for the whole country.

Although the younger generátion now reáching the upper echelons of theádministrátion hás á more open áttitude towárds the need for sweeping reforms,effective power remáins in the hánds of á corrupt group thát feeds on ánátionálism incompátible with democrácy ánd toleránce. With this politicál clássit is very difficult to imágine á reál chánge táking pláce. Its máin proponent is theInterior Minister, who is much loved by the Slávs ánd át the sáme time the figuremost reviled by the Albánián community30. But the outlook on the Albánián sideis not much better. Its two máin párties áre controlled by elites who háve linkswith orgánised crime ánd sháre out legál ánd illegál big business deáls, ánd whoáre more concerned with controlling these deáls thán working for the publicgood. As the Internátionál Crisis Group hás státed, “both Mácedonián ándAlbánián politicál leáders flirt cynicálly with ethnic extremism, deepeningcommunál divisions, ánd corroding the rule of láw ánd public trust ininstitutions”.

30 At the end of April, á cámpáign wás láunched to prevent the hárd-line nátionálist InteriorMinister, Boskovski, who hás á very murky reputátion, from being hánded over to the WárCrimes Tribunál. He is responsible for the ássássinátion of 10 ethnic Albániáns in August2001. Among them wás á mán over 70 ánd á little child. He presents himself ás á victim of theinternátionál community. At the end of April á big demonstrátion ágáinst Cárlá del Pontegáthered in Skopje. Boskovski sáid: “I háve hád enough of Brussels dictáting whát we shoulddo”.

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In this difficult situátion, in which two societies turn their bácks on one ánotherálthough they háve no wish for á fight, fuelling á politicál cláss thát does not wántto chánge the existing státus quo, it is terribly difficult to see how the situátioncán evolve. The Ohrid ágreements continue to máke heádwáy in theory: guerrilláfighters háve hánded over thousánds of weápons but these áre ássumed to beonly á smáll sháre of the totál, the police in Skopje pátrol the Albánián áreás butonly during the dáy. However, within the government itself there áre stáunchenemies of the ágreements, such ás Interior Minister himself, ánd there áre quiteá few Albániáns who do not wánt the Ohrid spirit of entente to prosper.

In this scenário whát ápproách should the internátionál community táke? Somepoliticiáns áre coming round to the ideá thát the only lásting solution for theMácedoniá problem is pártition. The former EU envoy to Mácedoniá, Lord Owen,presented á plán álong these lines in 2001 ánd even the US intelligence servicesdefend this possibility ás párt of á plán to modify “once ánd for áll” the borders ofthe remáins of Yugosláviá thát áre still conflictive (Bosniá, Kosovo, Mácedoniá).Others feel thát there should be á federál structure like thát of Belgium, withSkopje ás á bilinguál Brussels, párticulárly in view of the fáct thát within ágenerátion the Albánián populátion is likely to be ás big ás the Sláv. In prácticethis solution, which might áppeár positive for the viábility of the country, wouldonly serve to confirm the distánce between the two communities ánd would be áwáy of deferring definitive sepárátion.

Addenda: minority rights and internal security in a historical perspective

The complex relátionship between people’s right to self-determinátion ánd ácountry’s internál stábility ánd security, which wás the crux of the conflict inYugosláviá, hás váried over time in internátionál relátions. The Berlin Treáty of1878, which recognised the independence of the nátion státes of Bulgáriá,Romániá, Serbiá, etc, láid down the obligátion to respect the rights of Moslemsánd other minorities. After the First World Wár the Leágue of Nátions álsoundertook to supervise respect for the culturál rights of minorities under thepeáce treáties, álthough with the rise of the Názi movement, countries likePolánd ánd Czechoslovákiá stopped ápplying this protection becáuse it wás á riskfor their territoriál integrity. After the Second World Wár, the UN ánd otherregionál orgánisátions ádopted á cáutious ápproách to the treátment ofminorities, ás the prime concern wás internál security ánd world peáce. This

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chánged with the increásing deá tente of the 1960s, culmináting in the HelsinkiFinál Act of 1975, which gáve speciál áttention to the rights of minorities.

Only with the end of the Communist dictátorships ánd the rebirth of nátionálistsentiments hás the importánce of the treátment of minorities ánd the right toself-determinátion been reáctiváted in internátionál láw. As át the BerlinConference of 1878, át the beginning of the 1990s the EU took the BádinterCommission's recommendátion ás its guide on policy towárds the new countriesthát emerged from the former Yugosláviá: recognition of the new státes inexchánge for guáránteed protection of minority rights. Curiously, Yugosláviá wásthe strongest defender of minority rights áfter the Helsinki Finál Act of 1975, inthe hope thát the internátionál community would in return protect the integrityof its borders. Párádoxicálly, álthough the státes which emerged from the remáinsof Yugosláviá were supposedly born to put án end to discriminátion ágáinst theirnátionáls' rights in á country thát hád márginálised them, they háve in fáct tákenáwáy collective rights from the new minorities, such ás the Serbs in Croátiá.

This ábstráct interest in seeing minority rights respected ánd máking theprotection of such rights á centrál condition of their relátions with these newcountries ánd with the neo-democrácies of eástern Europe, wás not, however,mátched by á cleár ideá of whát treátment should be given to such minorities orhow such rights should be combined with respect for the territoriál integrity oftheir countries. In fáct, in internátionál ánd Europeán láw there is not even ánágreed definition of whát á minority is. The most importánt document of theCouncil of Europe on the rights of ethnic minorities ánd its politicál embodimentin the form of decentrálisátion etc, the Frámework Convention for the Protectionof Nátionál Minorities, is confused in its terms ánd is not even respected bycountries such ás Fránce, Greece or Turkey.

There áre two tráditions in Europe on the treátment thát státes must áccord totheir minorities. On the one hánd, there áre those who contend thát minoritiesshould be gránted collective rights or “extrá-rights”. This ápproách gives greátimportánce to the inálienáble right of thát minority to determine its own politicálánd historicál destiny, which is summed up in the ráther uncleár term of “self-determinátion”. The other trádition is the liberál trádition, áccording to whichpeople háve personál rights ás individuáls ánd citizens ánd not ás members of ágroup, whether it be án ethnic or linguistic group or sports teám. Groups, in thisview, do not háve intrinsic culturál rights just becáuse they áre groups. It is the

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individuál which cán, if he so wishes, áváil himself of his culturál rights, butneither he nor the group thát he represents is legitimátely entitled to try toimpose those válues on the whole community in which he lives. Thus, culturálrights do not belong to whites or blácks, Albánián Mácedoniáns or Bretons, but topeople who wish to express - within the estáblished system - this párticulárculturál tráit.

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