7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
1/55
1
Introduction The Objective o This Paper 2
Previous vs. New Hungarian Electoral System
Minor Shit toward the Majority System 3
Emergence o the Hungarian Electoral System Ater
the Political Changes 3
The Hungarian Electoral System ater the Political Changes 6
The New Hungarian Electoral System 10
Impact o the New Electoral System 13
Proportionality o Constituencies Remedying Decade-long Shortcomings 16
Voting Rights or Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries
a European-conorm Solution 22
Parliamentary Representation o National Minorities Living
in Hungary Progress in the Protection o Minority Rights 28
The Right to Vote as a Fundamental Right
Closing the Gap in International Expectations 33
Full-time MPs End o Multiple Mandates 37
Transormation o the Candidacy System
Changes Aimed at Eradicating Abuse 39
Changing Campaign Rules A More Transparent System 42
The Electoral Management Bodies System
Stronger Organisational Autonomy 46
The Electoral Legal Redress Procedure
High Level Protection Remains in Place 50
Voting by Persons with Disabilities Enhanced Equal Opportunity 53
SZZADVG FOUNDATION
THE NEWHUNGARIANELECTORAL SYSTEM
Contents
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
2/55
2
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Reducing the numbero MPs and the intro-duction o preerentialnaturalisation werethe main reasons orreorming the electoralsystem.
Besides eliminatingproblems experiencedearlier, the aim o thereorm is to create asimpler and more trans-parent system.
Introduction the Objective of this Paper
Voters having the right to decide about who exercises the supreme
power o state at set intervals and under appropriately regulated cir-cumstances is the undamental precondition underlying the operation
o every modern democratic state. Elections constitute an essential
tool or the unctioning o the democratic institutional system and are
also a undamental right. Consequently, the reorm o the electoral sys-
tem almost always generates political and legal debate.
The transormation o public law began ater the general election o
2010, which, ollowing the adoption o the Fundamental Law, also en-
gendered the amendment o regulations relating to exercising certain
undamental rights, as well as key institutions o public law. The reor-
mulation o substantive electoral law, ollowed by rules pertaining to the
election procedure was carried out within this ramework. Decreasing
the number o MPs, which the Fundamental Law dened as 199 in-
stead o 386 set the trajectory o the amendment o election rules.
Moreover, permanent residency in Hungary no longer constituted a
precondition or voting, as stipulated in the Fundamental Law, which
paved the way or Hungarian citizens living beyond the borders o the
country to vote in Hungarian elections. This created an entirely new
situation, and ensuring the right to vote or new voters living outside thecountry was also to be incorporated in the new electoral laws.
While the mixed system was retained, the most substantive overhaul to
the electoral system involved introducing a simple and more transpar-
ent dual ballot system (single-member constituencies and national par-
ty lists) replacing the ternary system (single-member constituencies,
regional party lists, national party lists). Moreover, electoral reorm also
provided the opportunity to incorporate the experiences o the six gen-
eral elections, six local government elections, two European Parliamentelections and numerous by-elections held over the past twenty years
in the electoral system, making it more ecient and more transparent.
However, the way in which issues that caused numerous anomalies
during previous elections could also be sorted out was an even more
relevant aspect o electoral reorm. These anomalies were threatening
the legitimacy, airness and cleanliness o elections, in which regard
both Hungarian and international orums solicited intervention. Ensur-
ing proportionality between constituencies or eliminating the anoma-
lies o the recommendation system are two prime examples or how
the new electoral system opened the opportunity to make amends or
problems that have been persisting or decades.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
3/55
3
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The aim o the present paper is to present the changes and key tra-
jectories o electoral reorm carried out within the ramework o the
transormation o public law. This paper does not ocus on presenting
election rules and the electoral system in ull detail. It simply wishes to
highlight certain points that have substantively changed in accordancewith the new laws and have in some cases also been under re.
Previous vs. New Hungarian Electoral
System Minor Shift toward
the Majority System
Emergence of the Hungarian Electoral System afterthe Political Changes
Ater the collapse o communism, existing models and alternatives de-
termined the architecture o electoral systems in Central and Eastern
Europe, with the perception o the political players shaping the targets
set and nally deals concluded between political groups determining
the outcome o negotiations. These three actors also determined the
orm o the electoral system adopted in Hungary during the period o
political transition. In Hungary, both MSZMP (the Hungarian SocialistWorkers Party) and the parties in opposition endeavoured to enorce
the principle o minimum risk when the National Round Table negotia-
tions began in 1989. During this particular period, the Hungarian elec-
toral system was not designed on the grounds o some sort o elaborate
and comprehensive plan wishing to satisy presumed or actual social
needs, but was codied by piecing together dierent elements. Both
the Opposition Round Table (EKA) and the party controlling the state
(MSZMP) attempted to establish a system through which they could
have maximised the parliamentary representation o their respectiveparties and enabled the new party elite1 to win seats.
1 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki edit.The Script o the Regime Change: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiationsin 1989 Volume 7 Constitutional Revolution Papers, p. 540
MSZMP as well asthe parties in oppositionendeavoured toenorce the principleo minimum risk.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
4/55
4
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
This is why setting up dierent electoral systems was in the interest
o political powers with dierent acilities; however, the electoral sys-
tem-related preerences o the parties also changed due to changes
in power relations and lack o inormation associated with the ormer.
During the negotiations, MSZMP initially proposed having 80% o the
seats decided in single-member constituencies with the remaining
20% allocated rom national party, compensation lists. Voters would
have only had a single ballot in this system. The proportional system
would have been more advantageous or the historical parties who
were more well-known to the people. At the same time, the Independ-
ent Smallholders Party backed the introduction o the mixed system,
leaving one-third o the seats or the single-member constituencies.
The Free Democratic Alliance, which party was less well-known, but
whose caucus included several well-known public gures, proposed
that 75% o representatives should be elected to parliament rom sin-gle-member constituencies. Based on internal compromise, the Op-
position Round Table ended up proposing a mixed system in which
hal o the seats could be won in single-member constituencies and
the other hal rom the national party lists. Contrary to the communists
proposal, EKA backed the dual ballot system.2
MSZMP accepted the proposal put orth by the opposition that voters
should have two ballots; however, was initially unwilling to make any
compromise in respect o the proportion o representatives elected othe national party list. Public opinion poll data revealing that MDF is
ar more popular than MSZMP convinced the top party leaders that a
more proportionate system would be more advantageous or MSZMP.
Ater this episode, the communists proposed that proportionality, ma-
jority representation and compensation should equally be incorporated
in the new electoral system. The opposition essentially accepted this;
however, disagreed with voters casting ballots on the national party list
and instead wanted 19 constituencies or the counties and one or Bu-
dapest, in which constituencies ballots could be cast or the party lists.In collaboration with the experts o the Ministry o Interior they eventu-
ally agreed on a system in which 70 seats are allocated rom the na-
tional party list on the grounds o ractional votes, 152 seats based on
proportionality and likewise 152 based on absolute majority. However,
the relatively low number o seats that could be won in single-member
constituencies prompted an outcry in the last undemocratically elected
parliament.
2 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki edit.The Script o the Regime Change: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiations in1989 Volume 7 Constitutional Revolution Papers, p. 540
Party preerences alsochanged because ochanging powerrelations and the lacko inormation.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
5/55
5
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Finally, EKA came up with a compromise proposing to decrease the
number o seats that can be won rom the compensation list to 58
and increase the number o seats that can be won in single-member
constituencies to 176. Eventually, the National Assembly approved 386
seats and the proposal setting out the breakdown o 58-152-176. In
the midst o the round table discussions, the MSZMP Nmeth Gov-
ernment delineated the single-member constituencies within its own
scope o authority. In view o how during the course o negotiations
the emphasis was on other components o the electoral system, the
constituencies were nalised without any major opposition on behal o
the democratic powers in opposition based on the orders given by the
single party in power and without negotiating.
The designing o the Hungarian electoral system during the period o
political transition can be well-described with the help o models re-lating to prot maximising through political negotiation.3 Endeavours
relating to the enorcement o the interests o political parties eclipsed
theoretical issues, such as, the issue o political representation or mi-
norities, and orced these into the background. During the transitional
period, the electoral law was athomed through party deals, with the
perception the communists had about their very own interests having
a decisive impact. In the meantime, the political leaders o MSZMP
realised early enough, that their candidates running in single-member
constituencies are incapable o winning the majority o votes, which ishow the party managed to avoid the Croatian scenario. The Croatian
communists hoped that the majority system would be advantageous
or them, but in 1990 the opposition won a landslide election victo-
ry thanks to the majority electoral system. In Hungary, ater the rst
ree elections no single party or coalition won by such a majority that
would have made it possible to change the cardinal laws, which is
why the negotiatory transition branded the next two decades. At the
same time, two changes relevant rom a political perspective never-
theless did take place. The threshold or securing a seat in parliament
was raised rom 4% to 5% in 1994 and in 1997 the National Assembly
passed legislation stipulating that parties must each separately reach
the 5% threshold in the case o so-called joint lists.4
3 Birch, S. et al. 2002. Embodying Democracy.Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe, p. 654 Dezs, M. Tth, Z. 2002. Elections and the Voting Procedure. Rejtjel, p. 70
When the politicalsystem changed theelectoral lawmaterialised throughparty deals, and theperception that thecommunists had o theirown interestsdecisively impacted it.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
6/55
6
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The Hungarian Electoral System
after the Political Changes
The two-vote system incorporating the distribution o seats accordingto three various principles created during the period o political tran-
sition was one o the most complex electoral systems in Europe. Cit-
izens cast one vote or parties on regional party lists, on the basis o
which votes regional party list seats were distributed by applying the
Hagenbach-Bischo quota.5 A maximum o 152 seats was distribut-
ed through these regional party lists, with the remainder (20-25 seats)
going to the national party list. Votes that were not decisive in terms o
winning a seat o the regional party list were added to the ractional
votes, whilst in the event o the application o the two-thirds rule, the
dierence between the Hagenbach-Bischo quota and the number o
votes cast was deducted.
Signicant disproportionality was identied here too as the outcome o
the 20 regional party list electoral districts. This considerable margin
did not result in any deviation in respect o the number o seats won by
the parties due to the low district magnitudes. In practice, due to the
implicit threshold, small parties had no chance o winning seats be-
cause o the regional party lists, as a result o which the larger parties
were over-represented.6 Regional party lists are generally applied incountries that have exclusively adopted a proportional system in order
or regional representation to also appear in parliament. However, sin-
gle-member constituencies have already lled this unction in Hungary,
while voters are unaware o the regional dimension o party lists, which
is why several parties, civil society organisations and think tanks called
or this list to be replaced by a national party list.7
5 The quota was calculated by adding up the total number o votes cast in regional list con-stituencies, which was divided the number o distributable seats plus one. The number oseats distributable on the regional party list was equivalent to the ratio between the numbero votes cast or parties and the quota. The so-called two-thirds rule was applied i a seatcould not be distributed in a given constituency through the above means, i.e., the partythat reached two-thirds o the quota could also win a seat.6 Fbin Gy. 1999. A magyar vlasztsi rendszer kelet-kzp-eurpai sszehasonlts-ban (The Political Changes in Hungary in Central-Eastern Comparison). PolitikatudomnyiSzemle (Political Science Review), Issue 3, pp. 116-118; Krsnyi A. et al. 2003. A magyar
politikai rendszer. (The Hungarian Political System) Budapest, Osiris, pp. 244-2487 For example: Medin-HVG 2009 Proposal or Reorming the Electoral Systemhttp://www.median.hu/object.045a478-a27e-45a1-9b3-70de2733978.ivy
It was one o themost complex electoralsystems in Europe.
Several organisationsand think tanks backedreplacing regional partylists with national partylists.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
7/55
7
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Voters could cast their other vote or individual candidates. The dispro-
portionaility o the Hungarian electoral system does not lie in the unique
components o the proportional system o lists, but is to be sought in
its single-member constituency dimension.8 However, rom the very
beginning the objective o this was to ensure a clear majority or thewinner, hence acilitating governability.9
The majority electoral system was a two-round system. Voting conduc-
ted in 176 single-member constituencies also had to comply with vali-
dity and eciency criteria.10 In the 1990s, typically ater a valid, yet in-
decisive rst round, the ate o seats was decided in the second round.
As an outcome o the concentration o the party system, decisive rst
round voting became more and more common in the 2000s. Even can-
didates nishing in third place typically stood or election in the second
round in 1990 and 1994. However, in 1998, as a main rule candidates
ranked in third place withdrew in avour o one o the other candidates
as a result o the polarised party system. The Hungarian electoral sy-
stem was much criticised by those opposing that small parties could
potentially gain a disproportionate position o extortion. The withdrawal
o the candidates o smaller parties could considerably infuence the
outcome o the election in a tight race in a two-round voting system.
The objective o the national party list was to reduce disproportionality
ensuing rom the results o the regional party list and single-memberconstituencies. Votes cast or the national party list in which case a
seat was not won by any given party that ailed to reach the 5% thres-
hold at a national level were counted as ractional votes o the regional
party list and were transerred and counted as the compensation bal-
lots as well as negative ballots by applying the two-thirds rule.
8 Szoboszlai Gy. Kpviselet s arnyossg. A vlasztsi rendszer reorm-irnyai (Rep-resentation and Proportionality. Directions o the Reorm o the Electoral System). In: StumpI. (edit.): Kt vlaszts kztt (In Between Two Elections). Budapest, Szzadvg, 1997, p. 309 Tth Cs. 2002. A magyar vlasztsi rendszer mkdse (How the Hungarian ElectoralSystem Works).http://www.ajk.elte.hu/fle/TothCsaba-ValasztasiRedszer.pd10 I over 50% o eligible voters cast their votes in the rst round, i.e., the round was valid,and the winning candidate obtained over hal o the votes, this candidate won in the rstround and the second round was cancelled. I the rst round o voting was not valid, only25% o eligible voters had to turn out or the second round or this round to be valid andevery rst-round candidate could re-run in the second round. I the rst round was valid
without a obtaining a nal result, the rst three candidates, or any candidate that won atleast 15% o the votes was eligible to run in the second round. The candidate that receivedthe most votes won the second round.
The absolute majorityvote througha two-round systemwas also widelycriticised.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
8/55
8
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Ballots cast in single-member constituencies or candidates that did
not win were transerred to the national party list o the nominating par-
ty. In theory, a minimum o 58 seats could be distributed rom the com-
pensation list; however, in practice, additional seats were transerred
rom the regional party list. Seats were distributed based on ractionalvotes by applying the DHondt method.11
Altogether six elections were held in Hungary on the grounds o the
electoral system adopted in 1989. The adoption o the 1997 rules o
procedure was the biggest change to rules pertaining to voting rights
since the political changes took place. Aside rom technical problems,
in spite o how international election observers did not nd anything
that could have eectively infuenced the outcome o an election,
election raud was nevertheless suspected on numerous instances.
In addition, the electoral system had several neuralgic points that were
criticised time and again and which were not resolved over the past
two decades (e.g.: the anomalies o the recommendation system and
pre-election silence). Accordingly, the overhaul o the electoral system
was one o the components o the transormation o public law in 2010,
which was required or two undamental reasons, namely: remedying
two-decades long shortcomings by more accurately dening election
rules and meeting a social expectation relating to reducing the number
o the political elite in Hungary.
To satisy the latter, one o the very rst decisions passed by the Na-
tional Assembly in 2010 stipulated that, by amending the constitution,
the maximum number o MPs was dened as 200 instead o 386. This
measure was eectively implemented when the new electoral law that
was due was passed ollowing the adoption o the Fundamental Law.
According to the so-called cube root rule, the ideal number o MPs
in parliament can be calculated based on the adult population o the
country that can be mobilised.12 Taking the cube root o the literate
adult population is the method applied in respect o this rule. Taking apopulation o 8 million, this value is exactly 200 in Hungary.
11 This method is based on compiling a table in the rst row o which the number o votescast or individual party lists is registered, ater which columns are generated, the rst valueo which represents hal o the votes cast or the given list, with the third o the votes castrepresenting the next value, ollowed by the third and the ourth and so on. Seats are dis-tributed with the help o this table the lists with the highest value in the table win a seat.12 Taagepera, R. The Size o National Assemblies. Social Science Research, 1972.Vol. 1,Issue 4, pp. 385-401
Making amends ortwo-decades-longshortcomings, the needto accurately deneelection rules and theelection promise madeto reduce the number othe political elite madeit necessary to reormthe electoral system.
Instead o 386 MPs,capping the numbero MPs at 200 wasthe very rst decisionpassed by the NationalAssembly in 2010.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
9/55
9
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The ollowing diagrams present the number o MPs and
the number o citizens to one seat in international comparison.
Number of MPs(in the lower house in the case of two-chamber parliaments)
Number of citizens to one MP (in the lower house)(Thous. ind.)
Source: Szzadvg, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Eurostat
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
02 0 40 60 80 100 120 140
Germany (2009-2013) 131.94
France 113.26
United Kingdom 97.2
Poland 83.7
Czech Republic 52.57
Hungary (2014-) 49.96
Hungary (1990-2014) 25.76
Germany (2009-2013) 600
France 577
United Kingdom 650
Poland 460
Czech Republic 200
Hungary (2014-) 199
Hungary (1990-2014) 386
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
10/55
10
SZZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The New Hungarian Electoral System
The National Assembly passed the new electoral law on 23 December
2011 by a vote o 256 in avour to 36 against. As mentioned earlier, in
accordance with the new law the number o MPs in the National As-sembly decreases rom 386 to 199, with the two-vote mixed system
remaining in place in Hungary. However, in the new electoral system
seats can only be won through two means instead o the current three.
93 MPs are elected through the proportional system in a way that the
ractional votes o single-member constituencies also count, whilst 106
MPs are elected in a single-round relative majority electoral system. As
a result, the proportion o MPs elected in single member constituenci-
es changes slightly rom 46% to 53%.
The electoral system also has a number o new components, such as
votes cannot be cast or parties on the regional party list, but must ins-tead be cast or the national party list in the proportional system, hence
eliminating one o the much criticised attributes o the previous system.
The new system ensures the opportunity to win parliamentary seats
under preerential terms or the thirteen national minorities in Hungary
through the proportional vote. Should a national minority ail to win
a seat on its national list it may send a spokesperson to parliament.
Ensuring the right to vote or citizens out o the country, which votes
are cast or national party lists is another new eature, which complies
with recommendations put orth by the Venice Commission. Seats are
distributed based on the number o votes cast or national party lists
and ractional votes by applying the DHondt matrix.
Source: Szzadvg
450
54%
210
46%
176
47%
93
53%106
400
350
300
150
200
250
50100
0
Two-vote mixed sys-tem remains in place
in Hungary. However,the proportion o MPselected by majorityincreases rom 46% to53%.
In the new system
votes are cast orparties on the nationallist instead o theregional party list inthe case o theproportional list.
Distribution o seats by proportional
representation (compensation)
Distribution o seats by single-member
constituency National Assembly
2009-13
National Assembly
2014-
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
11/55
11
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
In accordance with the new electoral law, requirements or nominating
candidates and orming national party lists have changed. An indivi-
dual candidate must be nominated in a minimum o 27 single-member
constituencies in at least 9 counties and Budapest and at least 500
recommendations rom individuals registered on the electoral roll o asingle-member constituency is needed in each constituency.13 Ther-
eore, the new rules make it easier to orm national party lists. The
most relevant change in the single-member constituency system is
that constituencies largely identical in size have been created and that
the absolute majority procedure (TRS) has been replaced by a relative
majority procedure (FPTP). Another key change is that there is no va-
lidity threshold or single-member constituencies in the new electoral
law and that every ractional vote not required or winning the given
seat will be added to the ballots cast or national party lists, hence also
the dierence between the number o ballots cast or the winning can-
didate and the number o ballots cast or the second place candidate
plus one vote.
The ollowing map presents changes to constituency boundaries.
It clearly shows that the new constituencies with a blue boundary orm
a coherent area in a way that their boundaries coincide with county
boundaries. There are no constituencies on the map that have an unu-
sual shape raising suspicion o gerrymandering. Constituencies with
strange boundaries, or example in Komrom-Esztergom County orSzabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg County, were more common in the previous
system.
13 Until recently, at least 750 recommendation slips had to be collected in single-mem-ber constituencies. Parties that were able to nominate candidates in at least 25% o the
single-member constituencies belonging to a given region, however, in no less than twodistricts were eligible to orm a regional party list. Parties that were able to orm at leastseven regional lists were entitled to orm national party lists.
As regards individualseats, the way in whichsimilar size single-member constituencieswere created and thatthe relative majorityprocedure replaced theabsolute majorityprocedure representthe two most relevantchanges.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
12/55
12
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Constituency Boundaries in Hungary until 2014
Source: Szzadvg, Geox Ltd.
New Constituency Boundaries in Hungary
Source: Szzadvg, Geox Ltd.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
13/55
13
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Impact of the New Electoral System
Szzadvg examined the impact o the new electoral system on the
distribution o seats by applying estimation models. We added up the
votes cast during the 2006 and 2010 general elections according tothe new constituencies, ater which we analysed the potential impact
o the redrawn single-member constituencies and compensation rules
on the distribution o seats.
When making the model estimations, the impact o the new electoral
system on the strategies and behaviour o the parties also needs to
be taken into account. Taking the rst round o the previous election
as a basis would be highly misleading. Consequences drawn rom se-
cond-round withdrawals and coalition ormation must also be incorpo-
rated in the model. In 2006, SZDSZ and MSZP withdrew their respec-
tive candidate in every district in which a given candidate backed both
parties had a realistic chance o winning. SZDSZ withdrew 55 candi-
dates and MSZP withdrew 3 candidates. These two parties were in
government prior to the election and a let-wing government was once
again ormed in 2006. This implies that in their case, contrary to the ab-
solute majority system, the relative majority system would have orced
them to nominate a single joint candidate in the rst round. Accordingly,
when we made our model estimations we also assumed that MSZP
and SZDSZ would nominate joint candidates and stand or election ona joint national party list. Mass withdrawals did not take place in 2010,
which is why in this case we can take the rst-round results as a basis.
Until 2010, 176 seats could be won in single-member constituencies.
In 2006 MSZP won 102 seats, SZDSZ won 5 seats and FIDESZ-KDNP
won 68 o the seats. MSZP and SZDSZ candidates won 60.8% o the
single-member constituencies, with FIDESZ-KDNP candidates winning
38.6%. According to our model estimation, in the new electoral sys-
tem MSZP-SZDSZ would have won 69 o the 106 seats, with FIDESZwinning 37 seats. Consequently, let-wing candidates would have won
in 65.1% o the districts, while right-wing candidates would have won
in 34.9%. The right-wing won by a landslide victory in 2010 FIDESZ
won 98.3% or 173 seats in the 176 single-member constituencies.
MSZP won seats in two constituencies. By using the 2010 ballots as
input data in our model, FIDESZ would have won in 105 districts, while
MSZP would have won in 1 district (District 07 o Budapest).
Lessons learnedrom second roundwithdrawals and theormation o coalitionsalso need to beincororated in themodel.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
14/55
14
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Contrary to certain analysis14, in our opinion when we were building
the model we also had to take account o whether certain parties ran
popular candidates in a given constituency, which is why we take the
ballots cast in the ormer single-member constituencies as a basis du-
ring the course o modelling.
In the previous electoral system, altogether 120 seats were distributed
rom regional and national party lists based on the number o regional
party list votes cast and ractional votes. In the new system, 93 seats
are distributed based on the number o ballots cast or national party
lists and ractional votes. Changing the way ractional votes are coun-
ted avours the winning party - promoting governability. However, con-
currently the national party list system (in relation to the regional party
list system in place earlier) aects proportionality. The outcome is that
the internal ratio o seats distributed rom the list does not substantially
change i the result is tight. However, in the event o victory by a large
margin, the proportion o seats o the party receiving the highest num-
ber o votes urther increases due to changes to the mode o counting
ractional votes.
The ollowing table summarises the actual combined results o the
elections and model estimations. In this case, the potential impact o
the minority vote and votes cast by Hungarian citizens living in neigh-
bouring countries has been excluded rom the model and will be pre-sented in the ollowing.
14 E.g.: http://hazaeshaladas.blog.hu/2011/08/05/az_uj_valasztasi_rendszer_reszletes_modellje
I the new electoralsystem had beenapplied in 2006, out othe 106 seats, elected in
single-member constit-uencies, MSZP-SZDSZwould have won 69,while FIDESZ wouldonly have won 37.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
15/55
15
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
According to the lessons learnt rom the public opinion poll conducted
by Szzadvg at the end o May 2013, Fidesz is on 47% and MSZP is
on 25% among denite voters, with Jobbik on 13% and LMP on 2%.
10% o voters would vote or Egytt 2014 and 1% would vote or the
Democratic Coalition. A total o 2% o denite voters would vote or
other parties.15 Based on the discrepancy o constituency results in the
2006 and 2010 general elections in relation to the national average,
we made an estimate o how seats would be distributed in the new
electoral system in the case o a voting ratio corresponding to the data
gathered in the latest public opinion poll.
Changes to Seat Distribution Based on the Resultsof the Elections held in 2006 and 2010
Number of Seats Estimated Based on the Public OpinionPoll Conducted in May 2013
First model
estimation
Second
model
estimation
Source: Szzadvg, National Election Ofce
Source: Szzadvg
15 Szzadvg conducted a telephone public opinion poll between 25 and 27 May 2013 poll-
ing 1,000 randomly selected adult respondents with the CATI method. Owing to the samplingprocedure, there is a maximum +/- 3.2% deviation in the data published in the analysis inrelation to the data that would have been generated by polling the entire adult population.
164
42,5%
210 (190+20)
54,4%
114
57,3%
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP-SZDSZ
2006 2010
MDF
80
40,2%
11
2,8%
5
2,5%
263
68,1%
59
15,3%
23
11,6%
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP Jobbik
152
76,4%
47
12,2%
18
9,0%
LMP
16
4,1%
6
3,0%
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP-Egytt-PM-DK
Jobbik
47%
36%
13%
80
26
0
41
37
15
121
63
15
60,8%
31,7%
7,5%
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP-Egytt-PM
Jobbik
47%
35%
13%
85
21
0
41
37
15
126
58
15
63,3%
29,1%
7,5%
Previous
Electoral system
New electoral
system
Number
Ratio
Number
Ratio
Seats
Vote ratio Ind. List Total Seat ratio
Seats
Vote ratio Ind. List Total Seat ratio
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
16/55
16
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The above table presents the vote and seat ratio o parties that would
exceed the 5% threshold according to the latest polls. It is necessary
to note that in this case the model disregards the turnout o voters
that are currently still undecided voters, nor does it take account
o the minority ballot or votes cast in neighbouring countries. The
results in Table 1 present the scenario in which all let-wing parties
join orces, while the estimation in Table 2 is based on the assump-
tion that Ferenc Gyurcsnys party is let out o this coalition.
Proportionality of Constituencies
Remedying Decade-long Shortcomings
One o the most important attributes o the current overhaul o the
electoral system is that ewer constituencies are needed as a con-
sequence o the dramatic decrease in the number o MPs. Accor-
ding to Giovanni Sartori, proportionality o the electoral system is
not simply a mathematical ormula transposing votes to seats, but
equally represents proportionality between the size o constituencies
and the number o voters in relation to the number o distributable
seats.16 The principle o equality serves to ensure that every vote is
equal, or at least similar in weight. This is achieved i largely the same
number o votes is required in every constituency to win a seat. Inthis regard, delineating the boundaries o constituencies is a particu-
larly relevant issue, as is dening how many representatives can be
elected in a given district in countries in which several representa-
tives may be elected to parliament rom a single constituency.
International legal documents on elections also ocus on these is-
sues. Point 21 o the ocial comments made to Article 25 o the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on ensuring the
right to vote stipulates that signatory states must apply the principleo one person, one vote, i.e., every persons vote must more or
less be equal. Accordingly, in regard to drawing the constituency
boundaries, according to the comment it is necessary to ensure that
these are not disadvantageous or any given social group or mino-
rity.17
16 Sartori, G. 2003. Comparative Constitutional Engineering; An Inquiry into Structures,
Incentives and Outcomes, 1.4, p. 21, Akadmiai Publishing, Budapest17 General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public aairs, voting rights andthe right o equal access to public service (Art. 25): 12/07/96., point 21.
The principle o equalopportunity is enorcedi by and large the samenumber o votes isneeded in every constit-uency to win a seat.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
17/55
17
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The electoral code o the Venice Commission also mentions that it
is important to distribute seats in equal proportion among constitu-
encies, at least in the case o the lower house and local and regional
representative bodies. The Commission deems that a 10% deviation
is acceptable in respect o the proportionaility o constituencies, al-lowing or a deviation o 15% only in particularly justied cases, or
example, to protect minorities. To continually ensure proportionate
constituencies the Venice Commission recommends the review o
constituency boundaries at set intervals, at least every 10 years, whi-
ch should preerably not take place during the election period or one
year prior to an election. I there are multi-member electoral districts
in a given country, instead o reviewing boundaries, the Commissi-
on in this case recommends the periodical review o the number o
seats that can be won in a given electoral district.18
Both the substantive legal review and the review o rules o procedu-
re o the electoral system have been carried out in the new public law
ramework. The review o substantive legal electoral rules could no
longer be put o because they were the products o deals conclu-
ded over twenty years ago during the period o political transition
between the political parties o the era and aligned to their respective
interests, which were not duly circumspect and dened rules perta-
ining to the election o parliamentary MPs, as well as constituency
boundaries in line with the interests o the political players o the era.19In addition, election rules have become so outdated over the past
decade, among others, the boundaries o single-member constitu-
encies due to demographic shits, that they had come to eectively
threaten universal surage, the right to vote granted to all citizens.
During the course o the round table discussions, the MSZMP N-
meth Government delineated the single-member constituencies wit-
hin its own scope o authority and only ater they were drawn was
it presented to the Opposition Round Table. Since the oppositions
emphasis was on other components o the electoral system duringthe course o negotiations, the constituencies were nalised without
any major opposition on behal o the democratic powers.
18 CDL-AD(2002)023rev Code o Good Practice in electoral Matters19 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki ed. The Script o the RegimeChange: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiations in 1989 Volume 7 Constitu-tional Revolution Papers, pp. 557-558
The boundaries osingle-member constit-uencies threatened theequality o surage as aconsequence o demo-graphic changes.
In terms o theproportionality oconstituencies, theVenice Commission
deems that a 10%deviation is acceptable,allowing or a deviationo 15% only in particu-larly justied cases.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
18/55
18
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Constituency boundaries were, thereore, determined pursuant to the
decree issued by the Council o Ministers in 199020, which has ne-
ver been reviewed over the past 20 years. Disproportionaility among
constituencies is clearly evident when considered that there was a two
and hal old dierence between the size o the largest and the smallestconstituency in 2010. While there were 27,073 eligible voters in District 6
o Veszprm, there were 67,092 in District 4 o Gdll in Pest County.21
Consequently, votes cast in electoral districts with a higher population
were worth less than those cast in smaller districts, as an outcome o
which the requirement o ensuring equal voting rights was breached.
The Constitutional Court examined this or the rst time in 2005 and
stipulated in its decision that i the dierence between the number o
voters on the electoral roll o constuencies reaches 200%, this is de-
nitely a breach o equal voting rights which the body cannot deem
constitutional in any case whatsoever. In addition, the Constitutional
Court dened areas the National Assembly must regulate in a cardinal
law, because these constitute substantive elements or ensuring voting
rights. Areas to be regulated within the scope o a cardinal law includes
criteria applied or determining constituency boundaries, the degree o
deviation between the size o constituencies, as well as rules o pro-
cedure, the extent o and the body carrying out the review. Although
delineating concrete constituency boundaries is an implementation
regulation in the context o these rules o guarantee, regulating this ina decree is, however, not sucient and needs to be dened in a law.22
The National Assembly ailed to comply with the requirements stipula-
ted by the Constitutional Court up to the set deadline o 30 June 2007,
hence a state o constitutional deault emerged. Changing the existing
constituency boundaries was not in the interest o the governing par-
ties. The lack o commitment on behal o the parties in power is well
demonstrated by how the National Assembly not only ailed to pass
amendments requiring a two-third majority o votes, but also ailed to
make constituencies proportionate, or which a simple majority wouldhave been sucient. Finally, recognising that the body is incapable o
coercing any change, in 2010 the Constitutional Court abolished the
decree issued by Council o Ministers determining the boundaries and
seats o constituencies, as well as provisions o the law on voting rights
and the election procedure which delegates the delineation o constitu-
ency boundaries to the scope o authority o the Government.23
20 Council o Ministers Decree 21/1990 (I.11.) on Determining the Single-Memberand Regional Constituencies in the National Assembly
21http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/parval2010/350/350_0_index.html22 Constitional Court Decision 22/2005 (VI. 17.)23 Constittional Court Decision 193/2010 (XII. 8.)
The ConstitutionalCourt abolished theCouncil o MinstersDecree determining theboundaries and seats oconstituencies in 2010.
There was a two andhal old dierencebetween the size o thelargest and smallest
constituency in 2010.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
19/55
19
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
In the new electoral system lawmakers consequently decreased the
number o single-member constituencies rom 176 to 106 by reducing
the number o MPs, as an outcome o which there will be 76,000 voters
to an MP winning a seat in a single-member constituency. By decrea-
sing the number o constituencies, or example, the number o districtsin Budapest decreases to 18 rom 32, with the ewest constituencies
in Nogrd County where the county will be subdivided into 2 districts
instead o 4 as an outcome o the changes made.
The law on the election o MPs regulates the ormation o constituenci-
es at two levels. On the one hand, the law denes rules to be applied in
respect o the ormation o constituencies. As a basic rule, constituen-
cies need to orm a coherent area; cannot cross over county bounda-
ries or the municipal boundaries o Budapest and the number o voters
in districts should be largely identical. Districts o Budapest or a given
settlement may also be subdivided into several constituencies whereby
justied. To ensure equal voting rights, the law stipulates that the num-
ber o voters living in a given constituency should not deviate rom the
national average by a margin exceeding 15%, except i required due
to the county boundaries or the coherent area, or historical, national
minority, religious or other local specicities. I this deviation reaches
20% the National Assembly needs to modiy constituency boundaries
to restore proportionality. However, on the other hand, the annex to the
law precisely denes the boundaries and seats o each constituency.The unconstitutional state that has been persisting or years in respect
o constituency boundaries has thereore been rectied with the entry
into orce o the new law.
The ollowing map clearly demonstrates the extreme dierences in pla-
ce in respect o the population o certain constituencies prior to the
overhaul o the electoral system. In several places there was a devia-
tion o up to 60% in relation to the ideal population, especially in Pest
County. The dispersion o the population is much lower in the newconstituencies.
There are 76,000 voterson average to each MPin the uture.
Constituencies mustorm a coherent area;they cannot cross overthe boundaries ocounties or themunicipal Budapest andthe number o voters inthe districts should belargely identical.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
20/55
20
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Distribution of the Total Population in Single-Member Constituencies(176 single-member constituencies, 1990-2011)
Distribution of the Total Population in Single-member Constituencies(106 single-member constituencies from 2012)
Source: Szzadvg, Geox Ltd.
Source: Szzadvg, Geox Ltd.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
21/55
21
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Pursuant to the request o the Hungarian Government, alongside ot-
her cardinal laws the Venice Commission also examined the law on
the election o MPs. The Commission put orth several specic re-
commendations or Hungary in regard to orming constituencies in its
position issued on 18 June 201224
. Among others, the Commissionpoints out that precise rules are missing rom the law on the grounds
o which the National Assembly denes the boundaries o constitu-
encies. In addition, the Commission recommends adopting a 10%
deviation threshold, instead o the 15% dened in the law, in relation to
the national average or the number o voters in a given constituency
and reviewing district boundaries at set intervals, preerably every ten
years, to prevent a 20% deviation. In addition, the Venice Commission
also recommends that instead o dening constituency boundaries in
a law an independent body should be set up or this purpose. Howe-
ver, it is necessary to note that a qualied majority, i.e., a two-thirds
majority, is required in Hungary to modiy district boundaries, which,
on the one hand, is dicult to achieve with a lack o political con-
sensus, but at the same time serves as a guarantee to prevent the
suracing o the phenomenon o gerrymandering. Besides these re-
commendations, the Commission also deemed that several changes
introduced by the new law are explicitly positive, such as eliminating
disproportionaility among constituencies which has been persisting
or several years, as well as ensuring preerential seats or national
minority representatives.
24 CDL-AD(2012)012 Joint Opinion on the Act on the Elections o Memberso Parliament o Hungary
A two-third majority isrequired to changeconstituency bounda-ries, which is hard toachieve with a lack o
political consensus.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
22/55
22
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Voting Rights for Hungarians Living
in Neighbouring Countries
a European-conform Solution
The National Assembly passed the amendment o Act LV o 1993 on
Hungarian citizenship on 26 May 2011 by a large majority, which ena-
bled the preerential naturalisation o Hungarians living in neighbouring
countries. In accordance with this amendment, any individual o Hun-
garian descent or any individual that presumes this and certies lan-
guage prociency is eligible or Hungarian citizenship without having to
have a place o residence in Hungary. The aim o the National Assem-
bly, which passed this bill almost unanimously, was to enable the sig-
nicant number o Hungarians living beyond the countrys borders or
historical reasons to acquire citizenship preerentially anywhere around
the world. The National Assembly opted or legal solutions applied in
several Central-eastern European countries, which is how they man-
aged to avoid neighbouring countries protesting against preerential
naturalisation. Slovakia was the only exception, the parliament o which
country passed a law banning multiple citizenship in response to the
Hungarian legislative amendment. Criticism o the institution o preer-
ential naturalisation was not espoused by any infuential international
organisation. 350,000 individuals have received Hungarian citizenshipup to April 2013 since the law was adopted.
The new citizenship law and the new electoral law were adjustments to
the political system that also enabled Hungarians living in neighbouring
countries to become an integral part o the political community. Per-
manent residency in Hungary was not stipulated as a precondition or
voting rights by the Fundamental Law, hence also ensuring Hungarians
that do not live in Hungary the right to vote. The overhaul o the elector-
al system also had to respond to the appearance due to preerentialnaturalisation - o a mass o several hundreds o thousands o voters in
the electoral system whose data has never been registered on electoral
rolls and who must be ensured the opportunity to vote on Election Day
some way or other.
In accordance with the preamble o the law on general elections, the
National Assembly guarantees that Hungarian citizens living outside
our borders are a part o the political community. However, while vot-
ers with permanent residency in Hungary are entitled to vote or one
single-member constituency candidate and one national party list, vot-
ers that do not have residency in Hungary are only entitled to vote or
The National Assemblyopted or legal solutionsalso applied in severalCentral and EasternEuropean countries toensure voting rightsor Hungarians living inneighbouring countries.
Hungarians living inneighbouring countriesalso became memberso the politicalcommunity.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
23/55
23
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
the national party list. Consequently, contrary to citizens with a place
o residence in Hungary entitled to cast two votes, citizens living in
another country only have the right to cast one vote, which may also
be interpreted as a hal-vote. This complies with Article XXI-II(4) o the
Fundamental Law stipulating that By a cardinal Act o Parliament, vot-ers may be required to reside in Hungary in order to exercise or ully
exercise their right to vote, or they may also be required to meet addi-
tional criteria to stand or election. However, lack o compliance with
international conventions may arise in the case o the provision o the
electoral law under scrutiny. According to Andrs Jakabs analysis, the
way in which individuals that do not have residency in Hungary are only
entitled to vote or the national party list may be in breach o Point b) o
Article 25 o the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Article 3 o Protocol 1 o the European Convention on Human Rights,
i.e., the principle o equal right to vote.25 On the contrary, in the opin-
ion o the Venice Commission26 the new rule can be considered good
practice, because it extends the right to vote to Hungarians citizens
living outside the country based on recommendations made by the ad-
visory body, and thereore adheres to universal surage. According to
the Venice Commission, technical circumstances explicitly justiy that
lawmakers have limited the right to vote ensured or Hungarian citizens
living in other countries to the national party list.
Although the parties in government have been widely criticised abouthow they want to cement their hold on power with the votes o Hun-
garians living outside the country, in reality, the impact o their votes
is more symbolic than decisive. In practice, o the 199 seats to be dis-
tributed in the National Assembly, these votes may only infuence 93
national party list seats, or rather, only 91-92 due to the preerential
national minority seat, and does not infuence the 106 single-member
constituency seats. However, not only votes cast or national party
lists, but the ractional votes o single-member constituencies also
infuence the distribution o these seats. Every vote cast which wasnot required or winning a seat in a single-member constituency and
was cast or the candidate o a party exceeding the 5% threshold on
the national party list will count as a ractional vote in 2014. Due to the
Hungarian three-party system, depending on the nal results, some
60-75% o the total number o votes cast in single-member constitu-
encies may count as ractional votes and added to the ballots cast or
25 Jakab, Andrs: A klldn l magyar llampolgrok vlasztjoga egyenlsgnek
krdse a vlasztsi trvny koncepcijban (The issue o equality in the right to vote orHungarian citizens living in oreign countries in the concept o the electoral law). Pzmny LawWorking Papers No. 2011/38.26 Opinion No. 662/2012, CDL-AD(2012)012, Strasbourg, 18 June 2012
Voters that do not havepermanent residencyin Hungary are onlyentitled to vote or thenational party list.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
24/55
24
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
national party lists.27 Ater calculating this, MP seats are distributed by
applying the DHondt ormula.
Out-o-country votes may on the one hand be cast by Hungarian cit-
izens that emigrated earlier and their descendants holding Hungariancitizenship, as well as Hungarian citizens temporarily residing in a or-
eign country who do not have a place o residence in Hungary, and on
the other hand by citizens naturalised within the scope o the simplied
naturalisation procedure. There is no accurate register recording the
individuals classied in the rst category and their address, which is
why their registration on the electoral roll presumes an active interest,
gathering o inormation and registration on their behal without receiv-
ing any notication about this in a letter. This is highly unlikely in the vast
majority o cases. Primarily individuals naturalised within the ramework
o the simplied procedure need to be taken into account or estimating
the potential voting weight o out-o-country votes. 440,000 individuals
applied or Hungarian citizenship within the ramework o the simplied
procedure between January 2011 and April 2013 and nearly 350,000
were naturalised by the end o April 2013. Preerential naturalisation is
equally available or Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin and the Hun-
garian Diaspora. 98% o the total number o applications made to date
was received rom citizens living in neighbouring countries. 67% o the
total number o applications made was received rom Romanian citi-
zens, 18% rom Hungarians in Vojvodina and 12% rom Hungarians liv-ing in the Sub-Carpathian region.28 Thereore, it is primarily necessary
to ocus on the larger Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin,
with the exception o Upper Hungary where barely over 1,500 individ-
uals applied due to the restrictive measures adopted.
According to the 2011 census data, over 1,237,000 Hungarians live in
Romania, 458,000 Hungarians live in Slovakia and over 253,000 Hun-
garians live in Serbia. The census will only be taken in Ukraine in 2013,
which is why we rely on the data o the 2001 census to estimate thepopulation o the ourth largest Hungarian community in the Carpathian
Basin, which was 156,000 at the time. As regards neighbouring coun-
tries, approximately 25,000 ethnic Hungarians with Austrian citizenship
live in Austria, 15,000 ethnic Hungarians live in Croatia and 6,000 in
Slovenia. In April 2013, the ratio o applications or naturalisation in re-
lation to the Hungarian population was 30% in the case o Hungarians
27 It is necessary to note that the proportion o ractional votes is even higher in the event othe ragmentation o the party system or a similar landslide victory to that o 2010.
28http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=251:hirek1304042&catid=1:riss-hirek&Itemid=50
Nearly 350,000 individ-uals were naturalisedup to April 2013.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
25/55
25
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
living in Vojvodina and the Sub-Carpathian region and 23% in the
case o Hungarians in Romania. We may assume that the number
o applications or citizenship made per month will not signicantly
change over the next year. The whole procedure, rom applying to
the ceremony, takes 5-7 months in most cases. According to ourestimates, a urther 200,000 individuals may be naturalised within
the ramework o the preerential procedure up to April 2014 taking
account o the assumed proportion o the voting-age population.
Consequently, approximately 440,000 individuals naturalised within
the ramework o the preerential procedure will have the opportunity
to register on electoral rolls.
Registration will presumably decrease turnout among Hungarians
living in neighbouring countries. Voters that do not have a place o
residence in Hungary will have to request their registration on the
electoral roll, which they can do 15 days prior to every election. This
constitutes a precondition or exercising voting rights in Hungary.
The individuals concerned may register on the electoral roll via mail
or the Internet. It is necessary to note that in the case o Hungarians
living in other countries the Constitutional Court ruled registration to
be constitutional, since Hungarian authorities do not have a certi-
ed register recording the addresses o these voters, without which
ensuring voting rights is unimaginable.29 The ratio o Hungarian citi-
zens living in other countries motivated to register prior to electionsbecause o interest in Hungarian politics, citizenship awareness or
political attitudes or values is presumably relatively low. In any case,
it is dicult to accurately estimate how many will apply or registra-
tion on the electoral roll and take part in the elections. In Croatia, o
the 400,000 out-o-country Croatians registered on the electoral roll
the ratio o participants varied between 5% and 22% in the past last
three general elections held.30 In relation to this, active registration
may have a negative impact, while voting by mail and the higher ra-
tio o Hungarian national minority communities in the neighbouringcountries in relation to the Diaspora may have a positive impact.31
29 Constitutional Court Decision1/2013 (I. 7.)30http://www.izbori.hr/2003Sabor/index.htm, http://www.izbori.hr/2007Sabor/rezul-tati/i_02_011_0000.html, http://www.izbori.hr/2011Sabor/rezultati/rezultati.html31 The legal regulation relating to registration was amended in December 2012 in Croatia andactive registration was introduced or Croatian living in oreign countries, implying that they
have to register beore every election.
Registration willpresumably havea considerablenegative impact onturnout amongHungarians living inother countries.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
26/55
26
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Assuming that 40% o individuals that acquired citizenship through the
preerential naturalisation procedure turn up to vote and that the ma-
jority o these 176,000 votes were cast or a single party, with a sim-
ilar turnout o 65% in Hungary to that o 2010, it is plausible to state
that out-o-country Hungarian votes infuence the distribution o 1 or2 seats. This is equally reinorced by the model estimations made by
Szzadvg on the grounds o the results o the general elections held
in 2006 and 2010. We grouped the electoral districts o these two gen-
eral elections according to the electoral districts o the new electoral
system and examined what the election outcome would have been i
votes were transposed to seats according to the current system, as
well as what infuence out-o-country votes would have had on the
outcome o the election. When making this model estimation, we took
the assumption presented in the table below as a point o departure or
the distribution o out-o-country votes, which is based on the results
o available surveys.32
When making the model estimation, we also assumed that MSZP and
SZDSZ orm a single national list and delegate joint candidates in 2006.
Results clearly demonstrate that the votes o Hungarians living in neigh-
bouring countries would have by no means infuenced the outcome othe general elections held in 2006 and 2010. According to our esti-
mates, one seat would have been won by the right-wing coalition with
the 200,000 out-o-country votes, which would have not infuenced the
result in 2010 whatsoever.
32 For example: Juhsz A. Lszl R. 2012. A klhoni magyar llampolgrok vlasztjoga(The Right to Vote or Hungarians Living in Other Countries). In: Political Capital: Flton avlasztsi reorm (Halway to electoral reorm), p. 20
Estimated Ratio of Out-of-Country Votes
Source: Szzadvg
2006 2010
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP-SZDSZ
MDF
egyb
80%
10%
2%
8%
80%
10%
8%
2%
Fidesz-KDNP
MSZP
Jobbik
LMP
Ballots cast byHungarians living inother countries willbarely aect the
distribution o seats.
200,000 ballots castby Hungarians living inneighbouring countries
would have notinfuenced the outcomeo the 2010 electionwhatsoever.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
27/55
27
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
It is necessary to note that a 40% turnout (176,000 votes) is also quite
an optimistic estimate. For example, generally ewer voters turn out in
the Romanian and Serbian general elections in relation to Hungary. In
other countries like Ukraine and Slovakia, laws banning dual citizen-
ship in accordance with which individuals that applied or Hungariancitizenship in Slovakia may even lose their Slovak citizenship may also
inhibit the turnout o voters. This demonstrates that contrary to ears
according to which out-o-country votes may determine the outcome
o the election, in reality, voters naturalised within the ramework o the
preerential procedure will most probably only decisively infuence the
distribution o a single seat. Due to a lack o research conducted on
Diaspora turnout within the European Union and abroad it is dicult
to provide estimates; however, due to diculties involved in receiving
notication about registration and the weaker ties o these individualsto Hungary, their turnout is expected to be very low. The weight o their
combined number o votes will surely be considerably lower than that
o Hungarian voters in the Carpathian Basin.
Model estimation: Impact of out-of-country voteson the distribution of seats
Source: Szzadvg
40% turnout,i.e. 176,000 votesseems a veryoptimistic estimate.
0
100 000
200 000
300 000
400 000
500 000
80
80
81
81
82
82
23
23
23
22
22
22
18
18
18
18
18
17
6
6
6
6
6
6
114
114
113
113
112
112
152
152
152
153
153
154
5
5
5
5
5
5
2006 2010
Fidesz-
KDNP
MSZP-
SZDSZMDF
Fidesz-
KDNPMSZP JobbikL MP
Number o valid
out-o-country
votes
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
28/55
28
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Parliamentary Representation of National
Minorities Living in Hungary Progress
in the Protection of Minority Rights
Ensuring representation or national minorities living in Hungary in the
National Assembly has never been achieved under any government
over the more than two decades since transition to democracy. Con-
cepts promoting the parliamentary representation o minorities never-
theless did exist (such as, the proposal made by Juhsz in October
1989; the independent motion o MP Mezey o January 1990; Tabajdi
and Jakabs proposal; several proposals put orth by the Ministry o
Interior in 1992; the Vralvi model; positions issued by minority com-
missioners). However, eventually none o these became a law.33
The Constitutional Court declared that lawmakers induced an un-
constitutional situation by deault by ailing to ensure parliamentary
representation or minorities.34 Although the Constitutional Court did
acknowledge that parliamentary representation does not constitute a
precondition or enorcing minority rights, at the same time it is without
doubt that ensuring parliamentary representation is the most eective
means o legal protection in the minority rights system.35 The National
Assembly passed the national and ethnic minorities act in 1993, asa result o which national and ethnic minorities were entitled to set
up independent sel-governments. Clariying the situation o nation-
al and ethnic minorities was an exceptionally important issue during
the course o the transormation o Hungarian public law, which, aside
rom ensuring the existing level o legal protection or minorities, implied
moving beyond this ramework and urther developing the system.
Based on the new set o regulations adopted in connection with na-
tional and ethnic minorities, rights ensured or minorities are exemplary
even in international comparison and were also acknowledged by theVenice Commission.36
33 Pap A. L. 2007. Identits s reprezentci. Az etnikai hovatartozs meghatrozstl a poli-tikai kpviseletig (Identity and Representation. From Determining Ethnic Belonging to PoliticalRepresentation). Budapest, MTA Gondolat, pp. 21526634 Constitutional Court Decision 35/1992 (VI.10.)35 A debate in which quite a diverse range o opinions suraced was launched several timesin regard to whether the National Assembly complied with commitments relating to remedyingthe state o constitutional deault when the system o sel-government or national and ethnicminorities was devised. Without going into the legal positions posited in detail, what is certainis that there is no reerence to the decision issued by the Constitutional Court in regard to
ensuring representation or national and ethnic minorities on its ocial website.http://www.mkab.hu/kozerdeku-adatok/mulasztasok36http://www.venice.coe.int/weborms/documents/?pd=CDL-AD%282012%29011-e
Based on the newset o rules, rights en-sured or minorities areexemplary even in inter-national comparison.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
29/55
29
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
In light o international documents, ensuring equal opportunity or mi-
norities can be realised through positive discrimination.37 In this re-
gard, this is ensured by co-opting preerential quotas reserved or
minorities and delegation in several countries.38 For example, in Ro-
mania 5% o votes required to elect an MP is sucient or gaining apreerential seat. In Croatia, gaining a minority seat in parliament is
also subject to obtaining a minimum number o votes, as an outcome
o which Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenians, as well as
Czechs and Slovaks may be jointly represented in parliament, in ad-
dition to ensuring independent representation or Serbs, Italians and
Hungarians. Representation o the Italian and Hungarian community
in Slovenia is ensured through auto-representation.39 The Italian and
Hungarian minority with Slovenian citizenship may vote or parties, as
well as minority representatives, which somewhat diers to the Hun-
garian procedure.
At the level o the Fundamental Law, the National Avowal section
proclaims that the nationalities living with us orm part o the Hun-
garian political community and are constituent parts o the State []
we commit to promoting and saeguarding [] the languages and
cultures o nationalities living in Hungary. Article XXIX o the chapter
Freedom and Responsibility recognises nationalities living in Hunga-
ry constituting an integral part o the state. Consequently, rights o
national minorities have been incorporated in the catalogue o unda-mental rights, concurrently to which the Fundamental Law continues
to maintain a unique minority status that moves beyond undamental
human and civil rights.40 Substantive legal regulations pertaining to
the parliamentary representation o national minorities is specied in
the act on the election o MPs. This legislation makes both active
and passive voting rights subject to registration on the electoral roll.
Thereore, only individuals that request registration on the electoral
roll are eligible to vote in local, regional and national local government
and general elections. Pursuant to this law, registration as a minorityvoter includes making a declaration about ethnic belonging, as well
as a declaration by the individual applying or registration on the elec-
37 See: U.N. Convention on the Protection o National Minorities; The Council o EuropeFramework Convention on the Protection o National Minorities; U.N Declaration on the Rightso Persons Belonging to a National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; OECD Co-penhagen Document; Lung Declaration o 1999, etc.38 Pap A. L. 2007. Identits s reprezentci (Identity and Representation). Budapest, 2007,MTAKI-Gondolat, pp. 18619239 Article 64 o the Slovenian constitution stipulates special rights or indigenous Italian and
Hungarian national minorities.40 Gerencsr B. Sz. 2012. Gondolatok az j nemzetisgi trvnyrl (On the New NationalMinority Law). Pzmny Law Working Papers. Issue 2012/34.http://plwp.jak.ppke.hu/en/muhelytanulmanyok/2012/79-2012-34.html
Representation isensured or minoritiesin several countries byco-opting preerentialquotas reserved orminorities and
delegation.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
30/55
30
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
toral roll that the given individual also wishes to vote in the general
election, in addition to ensuring the option o being removed rom the
electoral roll. A national minority list can be ormed during general
elections, the precondition or which is receiving recommendations
rom at least 1% o the voters registered on the national minority list,however, no more than 1,500. Any national minority voter registered
on the national minority list may stand or election and any voter on
the electoral roll that has the right to vote or MPs is entitled to rec-
ommend a national minority list.
Ensuring preerential seats or the top candidate o the given national
minority list is the positive dimension o the new national minority
law. The number o votes required or gaining a preerential national
minority seat, i.e., the preerential quota, is calculated in the ollowing
manner: ater aggregating the total number o votes cast or national
party lists and national minority lists, the result received is divided by
93, which is then divided again by 4. The quotient derived is round-
ed to receive the preerential quota. I a given national minority list
receives an identical number o votes or more than the preerential
quota, a preerential seat is gained o the given list. Only one preer-
ential seat may be gained o one national minority list. The number
o seats that can be won o the national party list must be decreased
ater every additional preerential seat, i.e., a total o 199 MPs may be
elected to parliament together with every preerential seat.
The recommendation
o at least 1% o na-tional minority voters,or a maximum 1,500recommendations isrequired to orm a list.
The law ensures theopportunity or onecandidate at the top othe national minoritylist to win a preerential
minority seat.
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
31/55
31
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
In accordance with the law, any national minority list that does not
gain a seat is entitled to delegate its leading candidate to the National
Assembly as a minority spokesperson. The smaller minorities (presum-
ably, the Bulgarian, Greek, Polish, Armenian, Serb, Slovenian, Ukrain-
ian and Ruthenian minorities cannot count on ull parliamentary rep-
resentation) will thereore be granted the right o consultation by having
the right to delegate a spokesperson. Non-voting spokespersons andrepresentatives with ull voting rights at plenary sessions will be entitled
to set up committees representing national minorities. This commit-
tee may unction as a parliamentary body with the right to put orth
initiatives, proposals and opinions and conduct control, in addition to
presenting their position on reports compiled by the government about
the status o national minorities and reports presented by the commis-
sioner or undamental rights. Owing to demographic characteristics,
ull voting representation and representation through a spokesperson
will ensure a dierent status or specic communities; however, the
spokesperson status is seen as a major step orward in relation to the
current situation.
n. a.
6 404
n. a.
13 895
n. a.
11 310
n. a.
8 874
n. a.
2 805
9 101
1 731
n. a.
54 120
n. a.
142 683
n. a.
13 570
n. a.
30 824
n. a.
10 740
n. a.
2 905
10 459
1 930
n. a.
226 728
1 358
189 984
2 509
15 597
2 962
62 105
620
7 995
1 098
3 816
17 693
3 025
5 070
313 832
3 556
308 957
3 916
23 561
5 730
131 951
3 293
26 345
3 323
7 210
29 647
2 385
5 633
555 507
3 500 - 10 000
400 000 - 600 000
4 000 - 4 500
80 000 - 90 000
3 000 - 3 500
200 000 - 220 000
6 000
25 000
2 000
5 000 - 10 000
100 000 - 110 000
5 000
10 000
835 000 - 1 083 995
1980 1990 2001 2011
Table 3: Changes in the number of individuals belonging to a national minority
Source:* Hungarian Central Statistical Ofce (KSH, 2011;
** Report J/1397 on the situation of national and ethnic minorities living in the territoryof the Republic of Hungary. 1999. This data was provided by national minorities.
Any national minoritylist that does not gaina seat may delegate itsleading candidate to theNational Assembly as aminority spokesperson.
Bulgarian
Gypsy
Greek
Croation
Polish
German
Armenian
Romanian
Ruthene
Serbian
Slovak
Slovenian
Ukrainian
Total
Census data by national minority*
National minority estimate**
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
32/55
32
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
Szzadvg Foundation prepared a preliminary estimate in connection with
the preerential quota. According to this estimate, taking the average o the
number o votes cast in the past two general elections (which was a total
o 5.3 million) and assuming that ractional votes represent 65% o the to-
tal number o votes cast or candidates in single-member constituenciesand that Hungarian citizens living in other countries cast 160,000 votes,
in accordance with the ormula set orth in the law the preerential quota
represents approximately 24,000 votes. I we compare this to the census
data, more specically, the demographic breakdown o the national minority
population, this means that there is mathematical probability or the Gypsy,
Romanian, Slovak and German communities to gain seats.41 However, oth-
er actors may also infuence attaining the preerential quota, such as, voter
turnout; the degree o activeness o the national minorities, more specically
the inclination o non-Hungarian citizens to vote; number o individuals be-
longing to a national minority applying or registration on the electoral roll or
the campaign strategies o minority sel-governments and parties.
Szzadvg Foundation conducted a telephone public research poll be-
tween 14 and 17 April 2013 to survey the backing o parliamentary rep-
resentation o national minorities.42 Based on this survey, 58.1% o respond-
ents agree with the parliamentary representation o national minorities. In
other words, one year beore the election it is plausible to state that there is
signicant backing o this. Party preerence did not play a major role in the
case o respondents since, with the exception o the voters o the radicalright-wing party in parliament, a similarly large proportion o voters sym-
pathising with the other parties (60-70%) backed minority representation.
This act, i.e., high level o support regardless o party preerence urther
legitimises the parliamentary representation o minorities.
41http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_teruleti_00, 2.1.6.Table 1: Population by ethnicity,age group, highest level o education and gender42 Interviews were conducted with 1,027 randomly selected individuals in this research by
applying the CATI method. Owing to the sampling procedure, there is a maximum +/- 3.2%deviation in data published in the analysis in relation to the data that would have been gener-ated by polling the entire adult population.
Do you agree with the representation of minorities living in Hungary inthe national assembly? (%)
Source: Szzadvg
The majority o societybacks the parliamentaryrepresentation o na-tional minorities.
58.1 Yes
35.1 No
6.8 Dont know/no response
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
33/55
33
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
The Right to Vote as a Fundamental
Right Closing the Gap in International
Expectations
The electoral system is ar more than a actor determining the party
structure. Elections orm the undamental components, conditions un-
derpinning the unctioning o democratic rule o law, and the right to
vote is above-all a undamental right. Thereore, elections have a two-
old character. On the one hand the election represents the means or
exercising democratic power based on the principle o establishing and
renewing representational bodies, the sovereignty o the people and the
popular vote. The outcome o the election determines which political
parties will have their hands on the legislative and executive power, and
also serves to ensure the legitimacy o these. However, on the other
hand, participating in elections and the right to vote is a undamental
right o all citizens, which oers an opportunity or voters to decide who
to delegate to representational bodies active voting rights and or
voting citizens to assume positions in these representational bodies.43
In Hungary, it is plausible to state that constitutional-level regulations in
regard to elections are structured in a similar way in the Fundamental Law
to the previous constitution. The right to vote is a undamental politicalright which cannot be considered an absolute right, i.e., exercising this
right can be made subject to conditions. At present, the combination o
two preliminary requirements needs to be met or an individual to have the
right to vote. Belonging to the given political community is one o these, i.e.,
holding Hungarian citizenship,44 whilst the other is being o legal voting age
and the ability to cast the ballot. In addition, the way in which a given citizen
has not been disenranchised within the scope o the relevant procedure
is a negative precondition or voting. The latter provides legitimate grounds
or exclusion rom voting. Aside the act that the Fundamental Law con-tinues to stipulate that there will be general, direct, ree, equal and secret
elections, the way in which voters need to be ensured the opportunity to
reely express their will has also been declared. The denition or ree elec-
tions has been incorporated in the Fundamental Law as a word-or-word
translation o Article 25 o the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (hereinater ICCPR). The European Convention on Human Rights
and, based on the ormer, the practice ollowed by the European Court o
Human Rights (hereinater ECHR) have also been incorporated in the law.
The right tovote is above-alla undamental right.
Two preliminaryrequirements need
to be met or a givenindividual to have theright to vote, namely:Hungarian citizenshipand reaching the legalvoting age.
43 Dezs M. 1995. A politikai jogok s a vlasztjog az Alkotmnyban (Political Rights andRight to Vote in the Constitution). Acta Humana 1995/18-19, p. 17244 Pursuant to the entry into orce o the Fundamental Law, permanent residency is no longera requirement in respect o ensuring the right to vote (Article XXIII o the Fundamental Law)
7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
34/55
34
SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System
However, the Constitutional Court has not yet managed to issue any
guidelines in respect o how ree elections should be understood. There
are undamentally two ways to approach this issue. According to one o
the denitions, the principle o ree elections is, in practice, none other
than the synthesis o the other our undamental voting right principles,i.e., ree elections are established by enorcing these. According to the
other more sophisticated denition, the new principle introduced has a
separate meaning and it will be the task o the Constitutional Court to
dene it.45
Holding Hungarian citizenship is one o the requirements or voting. As
mentioned above, the right to vote is just as much a undamental right
as it directly relates to the structure and unctioning o the state. Dening
who enjoys this right essentially states who belongs to the given political
community. Prior to the adoption o the Fundamental Law, besides Hun-
garian citizenship, residence in Hungary constituted a urther require-
ment, which, however, was not incorporated in the Fundamental Law,
hence opening the opportunity or Hungarian citizens living outside the
country to enjoy the right to vote. With this solution, the model essentially
shited in the Hungarian electoral system re-positioning the country in
the mainstream, instead o being an exception, since in most countries
the political community is dened as the community o citizens irrespec-
tive o where they happen to live.46 The opinion issued by the Venice
Commission equally denes belonging to a given state as the legitimatemeans or eligibility to vote and also explicitly declares that citizens living
in oreign countries should also be given the right to vote.47 In their joint
opinion issued in respect o the electoral law, the Venice Commission
and OSCE posit that granting voting rights to Hungarian citizens tha