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    WWW.IPPR.ORG

    TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity,WorkingPaperNo.1

    byIanKearnsandKenGude

    February2008

    ippr2008

    InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy

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    ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld3

    Aboutippr ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ........................................................................................................................................ 4

    Abouttheauthors ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5

    Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5

    Commentsandfeedback............................................................................................................................................................. 5

    Executivesummary...................................................................................................................................................................... 6

    1.Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 10

    2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape .......................................................................................................... 12i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion....................................................................................................................................... 12ii)Povertyandfailingstates ................................................................................................................................................... 19

    iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity................................................................................................................................ 20iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam ............................................................................................................................................. 23v)Socio-economicvulnerability.............................................................................................................................................. 25Driversandeffects:conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26

    3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape ...................................................................................................................... 28Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy................................................................................................... 28Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach ................................................................................ 30Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy .............................................................................................................................. 32

    4.Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................. 37

    References .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38

    Appendix:Thenewfrontlineofnationalsecuritypolicy .......................................................................................................... 42

    Contents

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    ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld4

    TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producing

    cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.

    Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through

    ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical

    solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

    WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,

    whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships

    andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

    ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

    www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

    ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2008.ippr2008

    Aboutippr

    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity

    Lord(Paddy)Ashdown,Co-Chair,formerleaderoftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformerHighRepresentativeforBosnia.

    Lord(George)Robertson,Co-Chair,formerSecretaryofStateforDefenceandformerSecretaryGeneralofNATO.

    DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector,ippr.

    SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchleyFoundationandformerBritishAmbassadortotheUnitedNations.

    SirDavidOmand,formersecurityandintelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOfficeandformerPermanentSecretaryintheHomeOffice.

    Lord(Charles)Guthrie,formerChiefoftheDefenceStaff.

    ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyandformerHomeOfficelawyer.

    Lord(Martin)Rees,PresidentoftheRoyalSocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,Cambridge.

    SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableofNorthamptonshireandformerPresidentoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.

    ProfessorMaryKaldor,CentreforGlobalGovernance,LondonSchoolofEconomics.

    ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorofDefenceStudiesatKingsCollegeLondon.

    FrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearchFellowattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandacommissionerontheCommissionfor

    EqualityandHumanRights(CEHR).ProfessorTariqModood:Director,University

    ofBristolResearchCentrefortheStudyofEthnicityandCitizenship.

    SenatorTomDaschle,formerMajorityLeaderoftheUnitedStatesSenate.

    ConstanzeStelzenmller,DirectoroftheBerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.

    DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicyatSavetheChildrenandformerlyHeadoftheInternationalProgrammeatippr.

    ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutiveoftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyandnowattheInstituteofDirectors.

    IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativePartyPolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology,EngineeringandMathematics,ConservativeMPforEsherandWaltonandformerministerforScienceandTechnologyattheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry.

    ThisworkingpaperformspartoftheongoingactivitiesoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity.

    Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itis

    co-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.Thefull

    Commissionmembershipincludes:

    TheworkingpaperserieseditorisIanKearns.FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security

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    ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld5

    IanKearns isDeputyChairoftheCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,Deputy

    DirectorofipprandiscurrentlyleadingtheInstitutesinternationalandsecurityprogramme.Hehasa

    broadrangeofexperienceintheprivatesector,asaformerDirectorintheGlobalGovernment

    IndustrypracticeatElectronicDataSystems(EDS),andinacademia,asformerDirectorofthe

    GraduateProgrammeinInternationalStudiesandLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofSheffield.

    KenGude isaVisitingFellowatipprandSeniorAdvisertotheCommissiononNationalSecuirtyin

    the21stCentury.HeiscurrentlytheAssociateDirectoroftheInternationalRightsandResponsibility

    ProgramattheCenterforAmericanProgressandhaspreviouslyworkedforseveralleadingAmerican

    thinktanks,includingtheCenterforNationalSecurityStudiesandtheCouncilonForeignRelations.

    Abouttheauthors

    AcknowledgementsAsisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thispaperistheproductofthelabourofmany,and

    withouttheirassistanceandsupport,weneverwouldhavebeenabletopublish.TheauthorswishtothanktheCommissionersoftheipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whose

    discussionsprovidedthesparkformanyoftheideaswehaveputforwardhereandallowedthis

    analysistobetestedanddebated.WewouldalsoliketothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstitute

    forPublicPolicyResearch,especiallyAlexGennieandKatiePaintinfromtheInternationaland

    SecurityProgrammeandmanyothersincludingGeorginaKyriacou,CareyOppenheimandMatt

    Jacksonwhohelpedgetustothefinishline.Finally,wewerefortunatethatmanyofourcolleagues

    andassociatesworkingoutsideipprtookthetimetoreadandreviewourworkandprovideinsight

    andguidancethatenabledustosharpenthemanuscriptandimproveourarguments.

    ipprwouldliketothankEDSandRaytheonwhoaresupportersofalltheCommissionsactivities.Wewouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofworkfeedingintothe

    Commission'sdeliberations:BoozAllenHamilton(energysecurityandprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersandidentitymanagement),andtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionandpost-conflictreconstruction).

    Theviewsinthisworkingpaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthe

    hopeofadvancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelorthe

    viewsofanysponsoringorganisation.

    Wewelcomewrittencomments onallsectionsandaspectsofthematerialpresentedhere,andthese

    shouldbesentinthefirstinstancetotheCommissionsDeputyChair,IanKearns,on

    i.kearns@ippr.org.TheCommissionwillalsoberunningaseriesoftargetedcallsforevidencethroughout2008andmoredetailsofthesecanbefoundatwww.ippr.org/security

    Commentsandfeedback

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    ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld6

    Thispaperanalysesthekeychangestakingplaceinthenationalandinternationalsecuritylandscape

    andassessestheirimplicationsforpolicy,examiningthecontextwithinwhichanationalsecurity

    strategymustnowbeforged.ItisasubmissiontoipprsindependentCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,capturingsomeoftheearlydeliberationsoftheCommission.However,it

    shouldnotatthisstagebetakentorepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionitself.

    Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape

    Thepaperidentifiesfivedriversofchangeandtheireffects:

    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

    ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates

    iii)Climatechange

    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam

    v)Socio-economicvulnerability.Asaresult,itbecomesclearthatthecontemporarysecuritylandscapeisaboutmuchmorethan

    terrorismalone.

    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

    Aglobalisation-drivendiffusionofpowerisunderwayinthreesenses.

    Thefirstisarelativediffusionofpowerwithinandamongthecommunityofstates.Thisisvisiblein

    theriseofChinaandIndia,intheemergenceofawiderangeofnewlyimportantenergystatesand

    regions(includingtheCaspianSearegion,centralAsia,Nigeria,Iran,Qatar,AlgeriaandVenezuela)

    andinthepotentialriseofnewnuclearpowers(notjustviaIranandNorthKoreabutalsothrough

    theregionalnucleararmsracestheymightprovoke).Thiselementofpowerdiffusioniscreatingnew

    centresofpower,newregionsofpotentialtensionandconflict,andraisesfundamentalquestionsovertheextenttowhichimportantinternationalinstitutionsstillreflecttherealitiesofglobalpower.

    Thesecond dimensionofpowerdiffusionisfromstatetonon-stateactors,andtoterroristgroupsand

    organisedcrimenetworksinparticular.Thisisdrivenbyaprocessoftechnologydispersalandis

    evidentintheincreaseddestructivepotentialofsuchgroups(aparticularworrybeingthepotential

    linkbetweenterroristgroupsandaccesstoweaponsofmassdestruction)andintheiraccessto

    communicationsandencryptiontechnologieswhichamplifytheirvoice,extendtheirorganisational

    reachandincreasetheircapacityforevadinglawenforcement.Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors

    raisesquestionsoverwhatwaspreviouslyseenasastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.It

    also,particularlythroughcorruption,raisesquestionsaboutthecapacityoforganisedcrimenetworks

    tochangetheverycharacterofstates,turningsomeofthemintopariahterritories.

    Third,anunplannedincreaseininter-statepower-sharingisconsideredintheformofincreased

    securityinterdependence,bothintermsofglobalinterdependence(onissuessuchasclimatechange)

    andintermsofthespecificsoftheUKsinterfacewiththeglobalisedworldeconomy.New

    vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedhere,onenergysecurity,ondrugsmugglingintotheUK,onthe

    vulnerabilityofkeystrategictraderoutesandonourexposuretoanewpandemic.Onalltheseissues,

    thekeypointmadeisthattheUKisreliantforitssecuritynotonlyondecisionstakenathomebuton

    decisionstakenelsewhereandbyothers.

    ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates

    Theseconddriverofchangeidentifiedrelatestotheclutchofissuesinthesecurity-development

    nexus.Thisisthepointatwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonof

    weakandfailingstatesinteract,todevastatingeffect.Povertykillsmorepeoplethanpoliticalviolence,andisadriverofconflictandinstabilityinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.Whilenotall

    weakandfailingstatesarepoor,manyofthemare,andpovertyisakeyfactorintheproliferationof

    ungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Theseinturn,asAfghanistan

    Executivesummary

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    andSomaliahaveshown,canbecomesafehavensforterroristandorganisedcrimeactivity.Inthis

    context,thestrongignoretheweakattheirperilandforwealthiercountriesliketheUK,moral

    imperativestoaddressglobalpovertyhavenowbeenjoinedbynarrowersecurityinterests.

    iii)Climatechange

    Evenundermid-rangeIPCCtemperatureincreasescenarios,climatechangeissettohaveanumberofprofoundimplicationsinthenexttwotothreedecades.Chinawillfaceseverewaterstressand

    decliningfoodproductioninimportantregions,atthesametimeasfacinghugepressuretomaintain

    veryhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth.Howitrespondstothesepressurescouldbeoneofthedefining

    featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.SouthAsia,particularly

    Bangladesh,willbebadlyaffectedbytheshrinkageoftheHimalayanglaciers,possiblycausinghuge

    flowsofenvironmentalrefugeesacrosstheregionsborders,andresultinginregionalinstability.Anew

    hydrologicalsecuritycomplexmaydevelopintheMiddleEastaswaterdependencyrelationships,

    particularlyforIsrael,maybecomenewsourcesoftensioninanalreadyvolatileregion.North,East

    andWestAfricawillallbebadlyaffectedbywaterstress,placingadditionalstrainonsomeweakand

    failingstatesandpossiblycausingpopulationmovementsacrosstheSaharaandintoSouthernEurope

    asaresult.TheUKitselfwillalsobeaffected,inareassuchasEastAngliathatwillbepronetostormsurgesand

    floods.Importantmilitaryassets,suchasnavalandRAFbases,mayalsobeatrisk,asmightoverseas

    assetssuchasthesupplyandlogisticsbaseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean.

    Climatechange,inshort,islikelytoaccentuateanumberofexistingproblemsonthesecurityagenda,

    andaddnewdifficultiestothosealreadypresent.Asasecurityissue,itmayquicklycometodwarfthe

    issueofterrorism.

    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam

    OurfourthdriverofchangeispoliticalIslam,whichwedefinehereasapoliticalmovementusing

    religionforcoverratherthanasareligiousmovementengagedinpolitics.Thismovement,inits

    extremeforms,dividestheworldintocategoriesofgood(thosewhobelieveintheIslamistsinterpretationofIslam)andevil(countriessuchastheUK,theUSandFrance).Thepolitical

    programmeofgroupsthatsubscribetothisideologytendstobebasedonaccusationsofthe

    manipulationoftheMuslimworldbyboththesecountriesdirectlyandbytheapostaterulerstheyare

    saidtoimposeonpredominantlyMuslimcountries.TheIslamistsobjectivesthereforefocusonthe

    removalofsuchapostaterulers,theendingofmaligninterferenceintheaffairsoftheMuslimworld,

    andeven,forsome,ontheoverthrowoftheentiresystemofliberaldemocracyintheWest.

    ThesemovementsmakeappealstothegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandtothoseinterested

    inpossibleconversiontotheIslamistsversionofIslam,andmayconnectwithconcernsoversocial

    exclusion,IslamophobiaandidentitycrisesexperiencedbysomesecondandthirdgenerationMuslims

    livingintheWest.Wearguethatunderlyingradicalisationprocessesarenotwellunderstoodand

    policyresponsesasyet,arenothighlynuancedandwelltargeted.

    v)Socio-economicvulnerability

    Theissueofsocio-economicvulnerability,ourfifthdriver,isrisingupthesecurityagenda,partlyasa

    consequenceofchangestoUKbusinesspractices(movingtoleanproduction,reducedinventories,

    justintimedelivery),partlyasaresultofstretchedglobalsupplychainsandpartlyasaconsequence

    ofsomechangestoourowndomesticinfrastructure.Theresultistheemergenceofamoretightly

    coupledsociety,increasinglyreliantonacriticalinfrastructurethathaslittlesparecapacity.This

    exposestheUKtopossiblesevereconsequencesintheeventoffailuresininfrastructurebrought

    aboutbyterrorism,accidentorsevereweatherincident,asthefloodsofsummer2007madeclear.

    Changesinownershipandcontrolstructuresinrelationtoinfrastructurealsocreategovernance

    challenges(around80percentofimportantUKinfrastructureisownedbytheprivatesector).

    Conclusions:wheredoesallthisleaveus?

    First,thelandscapedescribedisoneinwhichthepowertocontrolthesecurityenvironmentisslipping

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    beyondthereachofgovernmentsactingalone.Thisistrueatthegloballevelonissueslike

    climatechangeandthegrowthofungovernedspaces,anditistrueathomeonissueslike

    protectionofacriticalnationalinfrastructurethattheGovernmentnolongerowns.

    Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,weincreasinglyliveinaworldofshareddestinies

    inwhichthegrievance,policyfailureorinsecurityofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontextsecuritymustbecommontoallorisunlikelytobe

    deliveredforany.

    Third,andgiventheabove,itisclearthatthecorechallengeofsecuritypolicytodayisto

    enhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybettermapontoandreflect

    thecurrentrealitiesofglobalpowerandbetteraddressthesecurityconcernsofall.

    Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape

    Belowweaddresstheimplicationsthatflowfromthisanalysis.

    Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy

    Weneedtobroadentheterraincurrentlyclassifiedasrelevanttosecuritypolicy.AconcernwithdefendingtheUKagainstexternalmilitaryattackisstillimportantbutmustnowbenestedwithin

    concernformoreissues,morethreatsandrisks,awiderrangeofactors,andalsomanymorelevels

    ofanalysis(fromtheglobaltothelocal).Itisalsoarguedthatoldnotionsofthesecurityfront

    linenolongerworkandthatsomefrontlinesnowexistoverseasinplaceslikeAfghanistan,while

    somealsoexistatthelocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Manyfrontlinesinvolvethemilitary,

    butothersinvolveeconomicactors,communitygroups,andprivatesectorbusinessestoo.Thenew

    terrainofsecuritypolicyisthereforemorediverseandcomplexthantheold.

    Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach

    Arethinkinoverallstrategicapproachisalsorequired.Itisnotjustthatpowerisbeingdiffused

    morewidelyandthattherangeofchallengesisbecomingbroaderandmorecomplex,butthatthe

    requirementsofprojectinginfluenceinthesecircumstanceshavechangedtoo.

    BelowwesummarisefiveprinciplesthatunderpinUKpolicyresponsesinthesecircumstances:

    Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower,thatis,amoreintegrateduseofawiderrangeofpolicyinstruments,frommilitaryandpolicinginstrumentsatoneendofthespectrumtoeconomic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsattheother.

    Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers,notjustatmultilaterallevelbutalsobetweendifferentactorswithinthesamestateandbetweenstateactorsandactorsfromtheprivateandvoluntarysector.Inanerainwhichpowerisbeingdiffusedacrossawiderrangeofactors,influencewillbemaximisedbythoseabletoorchestrateandfacilitateawidelydistributedresponse.

    Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction.Partnershiprequiresanagreedobjectiveandvisionacrossmanyactors.Thisitselfcanonlybebuiltonawidelyperceivedbasisoflegitimacy.Althoughitisnotalwayseasytoachievewidespreadagreement,itisworththeeffortaslegitimacyactsasaninfluencemultiplier,turningpotentialinfluenceinthesecurityenvironmentintoactualinfluenceasmanymoreactorspullinthesamedirection.

    Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking. Legitimacyisaboutprocess,notjustsubstance.Itcanonlybedemonstratedifallactorsfeelagenda-settingapproachesanddecision-makingprocessesareopen.Officialactorsandmultilateralpartnersmustthereforelooktosharemoreinformationandtoopenupdecision-makingprocessesiftheywanttobeeffectiveincurrentcircumstances.

    Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform.Giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouthowtoinfluencethesecurityenvironment,acommitmenttoinstitutionalreformwillbeessential.Old

    institutionaloperatingproceduresandboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostiflenecessaryinnovation.

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    Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy

    Anumberofapparentlypressingpolicyquestionscanbeidentifiedgiventheprecedinganalysisofthe

    securityenvironment.Onesetisrelatedtoanticipatoryactiononthesourcesoffuturepossible

    threatsandrisks,andanotherisrelatedtoareasofcurrentvulnerability.

    Anticipatoryquestionsfocuson:

    Howbesttoreformkeyinternationalinstitutionsandhowbesttostrengthenarules-basedinternationalorder

    Thelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandotherelementsofthesecurityagenda,bothathomeandabroad

    Thestepsthatmightbenecessarytostrengthenthenuclearnon-proliferationregime Thelinksbetweennationalenergystrategyandinternationalsecurity,includingonsecurityof

    energysupply,andthesecurityissuesthatmayberaisedbyaninternationalexpansionincivilnuclearpower

    TherequirementsofapoliticalstrategytodefeatthechallengeofpoliticalIslam

    Howbesttotacklethepovertyandinequalitythatarekeyfactorsinmanyfailedandweakstatesandinmuchconflictandinstabilityinthedevelopingworld Howbesttoenhanceourcapacitiesforconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionin

    failedandfailingstatesandconflictzones

    Howbesttoprepareforthedangerofanewdiseasepandemic.

    Questionsoncurrentvulnerabilitiesfocuson:

    HowbesttoreducetheUKssocio-economicvulnerabilityandtobuildnationalandlocalresilience

    Howbesttointegratepolicyinstrumentsinthefightagainsttransnationalorganisedcrime Thesecurityofstrategictraderoutes

    Thesecurityofglobalstocksoffissilematerial.Byidentifyingsuchawiderangeofquestions,thepaperhopestoframesomeoftheforwarddebate

    onthedevelopmentoftheUKsfirstnationalsecuritystrategy.

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    OverthelasttwentyyearstheUKandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthaschangeddramatically.

    TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arebuttwodevelopmentsamongmanythat

    havesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcenturylandscape.Newprocessesanddrivers,fromglobalisationtoclimatechange,andfromthegrowthofpoliticalIslamtoamoreinfrastructure-reliant

    societyhavecometotheforeandnowchallengebothoutdatedanalyticalframeworksandoldpolicy

    prescriptions.Poweritselfisonthemove,beingdiffusedmorewidelywithinandamongthe

    communityofstatesandouttoawidergroupofactorsincludingprivatebusinesses,terroristgroups

    andorganisedcrimenetworks.Inthedevelopingworld,interactivecyclesofpoverty,conflictand

    instabilityareplaguingmanyareas,creatingungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaceswhichinturn

    becomesafehavensforthosewhowoulddousharm.Thescaleofunderlyingchangeishuge,andthe

    consequencesbecomingmoreandmoreapparent.

    Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchangebutthedifficulties

    presentedaresignificantandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilemanyoftheeffortsalready

    underwayaretobecommended,andtheGovernmentscommitmenttothedevelopmentand

    publicationofaUKnationalsecuritystrategyfortheveryfirsttimeistobewelcomed,now,more

    thaneverbefore,theneedforconstructiveexternalchallengeisgreat.

    TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whichhasnowmetseveraltimesunder

    theco-chairmanshipofLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon,has

    beensetuppreciselytoprovidesuchchallengethroughthedevelopmentofanindependently

    arrived-atnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

    Purposeofthispaper

    Inthisipprdiscussionpaper,whichisasubmissiontotheCommissionfromtheDeputyChairand

    CommissionSecretaryandnotanexpressionoftheviewsoftheCommissionitself,wecapture

    someoftheemergingthemesfromtheCommissionsearlydeliberations.Indoingso,wetakestockofthechangesoccurringandofferanaccountofthemanychallengestheynowpresent.Wealsoassess

    theimplicationsofchangebothforthescopeofsecuritypolicyitselfandforthestrategicpriorities

    thatmaynowneedtobeaddressed.Assuch,thisisnotsomuchapaperexpressingviewsonwhat

    theUKsnationalsecuritystrategyshouldnowbe,asapaperanalysingthecontextwithinwhichthe

    UKsnationalsecuritystrategyoughtnowtobeforged.

    Structureofthepaper

    Thematerialthatfollowscomesintwomainparts.InPart2 wepresentanaccountofcontemporary

    securityconditions.Weaddressshiftsintheglobaldistributionofpower,issuesrelatedtoterrorism,

    thechangingroleofbothstateandnon-stateactors,andsecurityrelevantfeaturesofeconomic

    interdependence.Wealsoexaminethelinkagesbetweenglobalpoverty,inequalityandconflictandthenationalsecurityimplicationsofaworldincreasinglythreatenedbyclimatechange.

    Inthispartofthepaper,ourobjectiveistoshowthattherangeandcharacteroftodayssecurity

    challengesincludesbutgoesbeyondatraditionalconcernforthemilitarydefenceofourhome

    territory.Indescribingamuchwiderlandscape,werelocatethedebateonsecuritypolicytonewand

    differentterrainandprovide,intheprocess,thebasisformuchneededreflectiononhowwemight

    changestrategyandpolicyinresponse.

    Thisisfollowed,inPart3,withamoredetailedassessmentoftheimplicationsoftheanalysis

    presented.Weofferanewaccountoftheterrainofsecuritypolicy,whichopensupthefieldtomany

    moreactors,issuesandlevelsofanalysisthancanbecapturedbyamoretraditionalapproach.A

    concernwithglobalpoverty,withcriticalinfrastructureprotectionandwithdomesticpublicsafety

    frompandemicdiseasesandnaturaldisastersisadded,forexample,tomoretraditionalmilitaryanddiplomaticconcerns.Nextwesetoutourthoughtsonthecharacteroftheoverallstrategicresponse

    requiredinthenewcircumstances,beforegoingontoidentifysomeofthekeyquestionstowhichwe

    believeanyforward-lookingnationalsecuritystrategymustnowbesensitive.

    1.Introduction

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    Emergingthemes

    Threethemesemergeasthepaperdevelops.Thefirstisthatweneedtorethinkournotionofwhat

    doesanddoesnotconstitutethefrontlineinthebattleforsecurity.Indeed,ifthereisoneprimary

    distinguishingfeatureofthenewenvironmentfromtheolditisthattraditionalnotionsofasecurity

    frontlinenolongerapply.Todaywefacemultiplefrontlines,acrossamuchwiderrangeofissuesandthreats,someoutsideofourownterritoryattheothersideoftheworldoratgloballevel,andothers

    downatlocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Thehighlycomplextaskofasecuritystrategyinthis

    environmentistodirectactivityinacoherentwayacrossallissues,frontsandlevelsofactionatthe

    sametime.

    Second,thepaperarguesthatpublicauthoritiesatalllevelsfromthelocaltotheglobalarefindingit

    hardertomaintainsufficientcontrolovertherapidlychangingsecurityenvironment.Poweriseither

    slipping,orinsomecaseshasalreadyslipped,beyondthem.Thekeychallengeofthetimes,therefore,

    relatestohowbesttostrengthenourgovernancemechanismssuchthattheyarebetterableto

    maintainand,wherenecessary,regaincontroloverthatenvironmentatalllevels.

    Third,thepaperspellsouttheneedforcommonsecurity,oraneedtobeinterestednotjustinour

    ownsecuritybutalsointhesecurityofothers.Thisneedisnotaltruisticbutgroundedinabeliefthat

    wenowliveinaworldofgenuinelyshareddestiniesinwhichthegrievance,insecurityorpolicyfailure

    ofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontext,acollaborative

    approachtosecuritypolicy,builtonawiderandmoreeffectivelyintegratedrangeofpolicy

    instrumentsbutalsodrawingintheeffortsofawidelydistributedrangeofactors,islikelytobethe

    keytosuccess.Here,thestressisonnationalgovernments,internationalorganisations,regional

    bodies,NGOs,communitygroups,localauthoritiesandindividualcitizensneedingtopulltogetherto

    deliverthedesiredoutcomesinacollaborativeprocess.Governmentsnolongersimplydelivernational

    securityto,oronbehalfoftherestofusinthisenvironment,butmustalsofacilitate,coordinateand

    orchestratetheactivitiesofmanyotheractorsthatarenowrelevanttopolicysuccess.Toputit

    anotherway,wearguethatanincreaseinthesocialdepthofsecuritypolicycancontributetoits

    ultimatereachandeffectiveness.

    TheCommissiongoingforward

    Theideaspresentedinthispaperareaworkinprogressandtheintentioninpublishingistostimulate,

    andtofocus,furtherdiscussion.Theviewsexpressedhere,toreiterate,capturetheflavourand

    characterofsomeoftheCommissionsearlydeliberationsbutaretheviewsoftheauthorsonlyand

    nottheviewsoftheCommissionitself.TheCommissionwillpublishaninterimreportlaterin2008

    andafinalreportin2009,settingoutitsviewsandofferinganindependentlydevelopednational

    securitystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

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    Inthispartofthepaperwepresentouraccountofthekeydriversofthecontemporarysecurity

    environment.Wedothisthroughatreatmentoffivecorethemes.Theseare:

    i) Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

    ii)Povertyandfailingstates

    iii)Climatechange

    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam

    v)Socio-economicvulnerability.

    Webelievethatindividually,eachofthesecapturesbothanimportantdriverofchangeandan

    importantsetofeffectsandthatwhentakentogethertheyamounttoavaluableframeworkfor

    thinkingaboutthesecurityenvironmentasawhole.Inthematerialthatfollows,thethemeof

    globalisationandpowerdiffusionisdealtwithatgreaterlengththaneachoftheothers(primarilyasa

    resultofitscomplexity),butall,inourview,haveequalsignificance.

    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

    Akeyfeatureofthesecuritylandscapetodayisanongoingprocessofpowerdiffusion.1 Power

    diffusionisoccurringlargelyasaconsequenceofglobalisationandfundamentallyislinkedtosomeof

    globalisationsunderlyingfeatures,namelytechnologyadvanceanddispersal,improved

    communications,andreducedtransportationcosts.Itisvisibleinseveralrespects:

    First,andperhapsmostobviously,itisvisibleinarelativeredistributionofpowerwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates.

    Second,itisreflectedintheincreasedimportanceofarangeofnon-stateactorssuchasglobalbusinesses,terroristgroups,transnationalcriminalnetworksandsometransnationalpoliticalmovements.

    Third,itisevidentintheunplannedgrowthofpower-sharingbetweenstates,suchthatthesecurityofonenowoftendependsondecisionstakeninandbyothers.(KeohaneandNye1973)

    Wedealwitheachoftheseinturnbelow.

    Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates

    Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesrelatesfirsttoarelativeredistributionof

    powerfromtheAtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific.Thisisnot,intheshorttermatleast,about

    asignificantshiftinthemilitarybalance:giventhedemiseoftheSovietUnion,noonestateoreven

    collectionofstateswillrivalthemilitarypoweroftheUnitedStatesintheimmediatefuture.This

    dimensionofpowerdiffusionis,rather,economicsledandissignalledprincipallybytheriseofChina

    andIndia.

    Chinasincreasedpowerisaproductoftworelateddevelopments.Thefirstisitssustainedandrapid

    economicgrowthwhich,overthelast20years,hasaveragedanannualrateofjustbelow9percent,a

    figurecomparabletoJapansaverage10percentannualgrowthrateduringitsboomyearsof1955to

    1972.ChinasGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)isnow,asaconsequence,theworldsfourthlargest

    behindthetheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany. 2 Second,Chinasincreasingeconomicpowerisa

    functionofitshugeforeigncurrencyreserveswhichhavebeenbuiltonthebackofitsseemingly

    endlesssupplyoflow-costlabour,aconsequentriseinitsmanufacturingsector,andtheunprecedented

    1.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemeantheresourcesandcapacitiesthatmaypotentiallybeusedto

    achieveinfluenceoverthesecurityenvironment.Inthissectionofthepaper,wediscusstherelative

    distributionofsuchresourcesandcapacitiesamongactorsintheinternationalsystem.InSection3we

    returntotheissueofwhichresourcesandcapacitiesarethoughtmostimportantincurrentcircumstances,andtohowtheymightbestbecombinedformaximumeffect.

    2.ThoughinGDPpercapitaterms,in2006,itlaggedbehindLebanon,KazakhstanandArmenia.All

    figuresbasedonUSBureauofLaborStatisticsandHumanDevelopmentReport,2006.

    2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape

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    severalrecenteventshaveshown,isnotaversetoflexingitspoliticalandmilitarymusclesagainstthis

    newsituation.Forexample,ithastemporarilycutoffgassuppliestoUkraineandresumedlong-range

    strategicbomberpatrols.Otherstatesandregionstooareincreasinginimportanceasenergymarkets

    change,theCaspianSearegion,theformerSovietstatesofcentralAsia,Iran,Qatar,Nigeriaand

    Venezuelaamongthem.Thisallcreatesnewcentresofpowerintheinternationalsystem,new

    potentialflashpointsbetweenstatesinneedofenergysupplies,andnewareasofstrategicinterest

    andsignificanceforallthemajorpowers.

    Third,intermsoftheissueswehighlightasdriversofpowerdiffusionamongthecommunityof

    states,wecometothespreadofnuclearweaponstechnology.EventhoughIsraeldevelopeditsown

    nuclearcapabilityoutsidethenuclearnon-proliferationregime,thisregimeremainedrelativelystable

    untilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclearpowers(theUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrance)

    largelymaintainingamonopolyovernuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint.

    Thelastdecade,however,haswitnessedadisturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.Indiaand

    Pakistaneachconductedaseriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalof

    acknowledgednuclearweaponsstatestoseven.NorthKorearesumedthereprocessingofplutonium

    in2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince1994.TheNorthKoreans,whowerepreviouslybelievedtohavedevelopedenoughnuclearfuelto

    maketwobombs,nowpossessenoughmaterialtoconstructtwobombsperyear.In2006,moreover,

    NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becomingtheeighthacknowledgedmemberofthe

    nuclearclub,althoughithasnowonceagainsuspendedreprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclear

    reactor.InIran,meanwhile,thegovernmentisbelievedtobepursuinganuclearweaponsprogramme,

    eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurelyintendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy.

    Westernintelligenceagenciesandindependentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfrom

    twototenyearsawayfromobtaininganuclearweapon.

    ThesedevelopmentshavespurredatleastanotherelevencountriestohedgeagainstanIranianbomb

    andtoseekassistancefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)todeveloptheirown

    nuclearenergyprograms.Egypt,Turkey,andSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthatmasteryofnucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional

    hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhaspledgedtobuild

    threenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefiveothermembersoftheGulf

    CooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(CirincioneandLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrends

    arenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatileMiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates

    (IsraelandIran)andadozenothercountrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsof

    nuclearfuel.Theseareprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion.

    Evenmorefundamentally,however,theproliferationofnucleartechnologiesandweaponsrepresents

    asignificantadditionalmodificationtothewiderrelativedistributionofpoweramongstatesinthe

    internationalsystem.Whenseenincombinationwiththeotherchangesdescribedinthissection,this

    representsashifttoanewandpotentiallyfarlessstableeraofinter-staterelationsandalso,importantly,tooneinwhicharangeofinternationalinstitutionsandregimesfromtheUNSecurity

    CounciltotheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatynolongerappeartoreflectorcapturetherealitiesof

    globalpower.

    Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors

    Thesecondevidentdimensionofpowerdiffusionthatweobserveisthatinvolvingarelativediffusion

    ofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactors.Someofthisdiffusionhasbeendrivenbystatesthemselves

    throughuseofprivatemilitaryfirms.Muchofit,however,hasoccurredinspiteof,andnotbecauseof

    theviewsanddecisionsofstates.Terroristgroups,groupsengagedintransnationalorganisedcrime,

    andsometransnationalpoliticalmovements,particularlyintheMiddleEast,haveallbeenvisible

    beneficiariesofthiswiderprocessinrecentyears.Inthissection,wefocusprimarilyonthislatter

    groupofactors,believingtheyareofmoreimmediateandpressingsecurityconcern.

    Totaketerroristgroupsfirst,thesehaveobviouslybeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepoint

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    atwhichanewformofsuper-terrorismtookcentrestageininternationalaffairs(Freedman2002).

    Theyarealong-termandstructuralchallenge,however,whatevertheirideologicalorientation,fortwo

    underlyingreasons.

    Thefirstconcernstheirincreasinglydestructivenatureandpotential.Thisisevidencedbythefactthat

    thelevelofviolenceinactsofterrorismhasbeenincreasinginrecentdecades.ThebombingoftheWorldTradeCenteron26February1993tooksixlivesandinjured1,000.HugebombsattheUS

    embassiesinKenyaandTanzaniainAugust1998killed220andwounded4,000betweenthem.The

    eventsof11September2001saw2,986peoplelosetheirlivesasthreeairlinersflewintothe

    PentagoninWashingtonandbothtowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork.

    Thetrend,therefore,isclear.Itmaynotbesmoothandannualdeathtollsfromterrorismarenot

    goingupatanevenrateyearonyear,buttherecordnowstandsatnearly3,000deathsforasingle

    terroristoperationcarriedoutonasingleday.Inthiscontext,PlutaandZimmermanwererightto

    recentlyconcludethatfewpsychologicalbarrierstotruemass-casualtyterrorismremain(Plutaand

    Zimmerman2006:66).Intermsoffuturepotential,moreover,thekeyworryisthatterroristgroups

    willgainaccesstoweaponsofmassdestructionandtoanuclearweaponinparticular.Some,suchas

    RobinFrostinarecentAdelphipaper,havedismissedthisasanunrealisticpossibility,arguingthattheriskofnuclearterrorism,especiallytruenuclearterrorismemployingbombspoweredbynuclear

    fission,isoverstated(Frost2005:7).Butthisseemsanextraordinarilycomplacentpositiontotake

    whenoneconsidersthewidercontext.

    First,weknowthatsometerroristgroupshaveaclearintenttoaccessweaponsofmassdestruction,

    includingnuclearweaponsandmaterials,ifatallpossible.ThisiscertainlytrueofAlQaeda.Drawing

    oninsideexperienceandseniorintelligencesources,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefenceGraham

    AllisonnotesthatOsamaBinLadentriedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)fromSouthAfrica

    asearlyas1992andalsothatBinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedarepresentativesmetwithsenior

    figuresfromthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).Materialsdiscoveredin

    AlQaedasafehousesinAfghanistan,moreover,showthatAlQaedaofficialsspenttimeresearching

    theprocessesrequiredtobuildanuclearweaponandalsounderstoodthepossibleshortcutsthatcouldbetakeninbuildingacrudenucleardevice.OthergroupsbeyondAlQaeda,suchasJaish-e-

    Mohammed(JEM),agroupfocusedontheKashmirconflictbutwithreportedlinkstothePakistani

    establishment,andHezbollah,withitscloselinkstoIran,cannotberuledoutasorganisationsalso

    seekingthenuclearoption.

    Ifdemandforthisoptionexiststhensotoo,worryingly,doespotentialsupply.Thedangerherecomes

    intwoforms,namelythatterroristgroupswillillegallyacquireeitheraready-madenuclearweapon,a

    so-calledloosenuke,orthefissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.Controversyhasragedontheissue

    ofloosenukeseversinceAlexanderLebed,theformernationalsecurityadvisertoPresidentYeltsin,

    confidedtobothpublicandprivateaudiencesintheUnitedStatesin1997thattheRussian

    governmentcouldnotaccountfor84one-kilotonSovietsuitcasenucleardevices(Allison2006).Since

    thattime,despitesomeimprovementsinsecurityaroundRussiasnuclearfacilities,onlyjustover50percentofRussiasnuclearweaponsandmaterialshaveundergoneacomprehensivesecurityupgrade

    (NuclearThreatInitiative2006).

    Onthesecondthreat,thatterroristgroupswillgettheirhandsonweaponsgradefissilematerial,the

    pictureishardlymorereassuring.Toachieveanuclearexplosion,aminimumof15.9kgofHighly

    EnrichedUraniumor4.1kgofplutoniumisrequired.4 Arecentstrategicdossieronnuclearblack-

    marketsbytheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,usinghighlyconservativeestimatesdrawn

    fromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheDatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,Theft

    andOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)statedbaldlythat:ThetotalamountofHEUandplutonium

    seizedinstate-confirmedandotherhighlycredibleincidentsregisteredintheperiod1991-2006is

    4.Theseamountsapplyifaberylliumreflectorisusedinthedevice.Withoutsuchareflector,more

    fissilematerialisneeded.

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    roughly38kg(IISS2007:126).Notallofthis38kgwasweaponsgradematerialbutaround8kgofit

    was,andthisrepresentsonlytherecoveredamountsofbomb-relevantmaterialfromknown attempts

    atsmugglinginrecentyears.5 Bydefinition,itdoesnottellustheamountofnuclearmaterialstolen

    butnotdetectedbylawenforcementagenciesoverthesameperiodandwecannotretrospectively

    calculatewhatthatamountmightbesincethereisnoglobalinventoryofHEUandplutoniumandit

    isnotknownexactlyhowmuchplutoniumandHEUhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand

    Zimmerman2006).

    Thepointaboutallofthesedevelopmentsisthat,withoutfurthersignificantefforttoaddressthe

    trendsandchallengesdescribed,theypointtoa21stcenturyinwhichitishighlyunlikelythatstate

    actorswillretaintheirmonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.

    Aseconddevelopmentthatisenhancingtherelativepowerofterroristgroupsresidesinthe

    advantagesnowbeingbestoweduponthembydigitaltechnologyandcommunications.Thesehave

    amplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,andenhancedthelawenforcementevasion

    capabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellitecommunicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmuch

    easierforterroristgroupstobothmakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.TheInternethas

    becomeakeyplacefortherecruitment,radicalisationandmobilisationofmanyyoungextremistsand,forthoseseekingtomaketheswitchfromextremismtooperationalterrorism,akeyknowledge-

    sharingtoolandaidforattack-coordinationandplanning(Ryan2007).Strongencryptiontools,

    meanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuch

    communicationschannelsinasecureandsecretenvironment(MinistryofDefence2007).Thislast

    developmentinparticularrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstatetonon-stateactors

    since,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuchparticularfinancialand

    computingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates.

    Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,thesetooarebecomingmoreprominentandthreatening.

    Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossbordersbecausedecliningtransportcosts,improvedglobal

    communicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofbothpeopleandgoodsmakesthisfareasier

    thaneverbefore.Thesheerscaleofcriminalactivityisalsoincreasing,partlybecauseoftheextendedgeographicalreachofthecriminalnetworksthemselves,partlybecauseforsome,particularlyinthe

    developingworld,criminalactivityisseenasonepotentialrouteoutofpovertyandpartlybecausein

    somepatrimonialstatesthereisnowanattitudethatnationalresourcesaretheretobeexploitedfor

    thebenefitofthecorruptfewinpower.Consequently,theUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralsHigh

    LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangesrightlyidentified,inareportin2004,transnational

    organisedcrimeasoneofthemajorsecuritychallengesfacingtheworld(UnitedNations2004).

    Theillicitdrugstradeisthemostlucrativeoftheactivitiesunderway(accordingtotheUnitedNations

    OfficeonDrugsandCrime,theoverallturnoveroftheworldwideillicittradeindrugsalonenow

    standsataround$300bnannually[UNODC2006]),thoughthevarietyofcriminalactivitiesisalso

    widening.AstheUNsAntonioMazzitellirecentlypointedout,criminalactivitiessuchastraffickingin

    people,stolenvehicles,naturalresources,firearmsandcontraband,counterfeitingandintellectualpiracy,smugglingofmigrants,andcybercrimeallfeatureonthemenuofservicesoffered(Mazzitelli

    2007:1074).

    Launderingofmoneyandcorruptionarethetwofurtheressentialfeaturesofthisactivity,thefirstto

    allowcriminalstobenefitfromtherevenuesraisedandthesecondtoreducetheriskofcapturebylaw

    enforcementagenciesandtoincreaseinfluenceoverpoliticaldecisionsincountriesofoperation.

    Transnationalorganisedcrimethereforeflourishesmostwherestateinstitutionsareopento

    corruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawisweakandwherebordersareporous.Evenmore

    importantlyfromthepointofviewofunderstandingthecontemporarynationalsecurityenvironment,

    criminalnetworksnotonlylocatethemselvesinareasthathavesomeofthesecharacteristics,suchas

    5.Forweaponspurposes,HEUneedstobeenrichedtoatleast80percentoraboveandmorenormally

    to90percentorabove.

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    inWestAfrica,butdothemselvesalsohavethepotentialtocreateandsustainpariahstates6 which,

    nomatterwhattheirformalarrangementsofgovernanceare,actuallyserveassafehavensforcriminal

    gangsandtheiractivities.Thisisaserioussituation,bothbecausethestatesinquestioncan

    effectivelyspreadinstabilitythroughouttheregionsinwhichtheyarelocatedandbecausethereare

    alsolinksbetweencriminalnetworksandterroristgroups,withtheformeroftenprovidingmoney

    launderingandotherfinancialservicestothelatteraswellasassistingintheillicittraffickingofgoods

    thatmaybeofvaluetothem.

    Whereasterroristgroupsarechallengingastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforceandare

    increasingly,therefore,notfindingstatebordersahindrance,transnationalorganisedcrimegroupsare

    changingtheverycharacterofsomestatesintheinternationalsystem,turningthemintovehiclesfor

    privateprofitandspreadinginstabilityandmiseryintheprocess.

    Athirdandfinalsetofnon-stateactorswebelieveitimportanttohighlightarethetransnational

    politicalmovementsthathavecometoexertimportanceinfluenceoninternationalaffairsinrecent

    years.OnesuchmovementisHezbollah,aparticularlyimportantorganisationinthecontextofthe

    contemporaryMiddleEast.

    Hezbollah,anIslamistpoliticalgroupformedin1982toresistwesterncolonialisminLebanonand

    acrossthewiderregion,toengageinarmedstruggleagainstIsraelandtoworktowardsthe

    establishmentofaLebaneseIslamicRepublic,runsschools,hospitalsandmediaservices,andhas

    implementedmanydevelopmentprogrammesinareasinwhichitisoperational.Itsso-calledMartyrs

    Institutegivesfinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthosewhodieinconflictand,followingtheJuly

    2006waragainstIsrael,Hezbollahhasbeenextremelyactiveinthereconstructionprocess,often

    doingmoreonthisfrontthantheLebanesegovernmentitself.Hezbollah,inotherwords,anddespite

    thenarrowcoverageofitsactivitiesintheWest,paysmuchattentiontoawiderangeofsocialwelfare

    activitiesaswellastotheconflictwithIsrael(Salem2006).

    Inhighlightingthisgroup,thepointwemakeisnot,ofcourse,apoliticaloneinsupportofit.

    Hezbollahhasanobjectionablepolicyplatformonmanyissuesandislessthanfullyconstructivein

    relationtobringingpeaceandstabilitytotheMiddleEast.Thepointwemake,rather,istheanalytical

    onethatinconditionsofconflictandweak,absentorineffectualstateinstitutions,transnational

    politicalmovementssuchasHezbollahcananddoemergetofillthevacuumandtoplaysignificant

    rolesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Theyalsooftendosoonthebasisofacarefully

    cultivated,deep-rootedandoftenlong-termrelationshipoflegitimacywiththepopulationsthey

    claimtorepresent.Sometransnationalpoliticalactorswithsocialpower,inotherwords,havebecome

    seriousplayersininternationalpolitics.Whiletheymighthavestatebackers(inthiscaseSyriaand

    Iran)theyarenotentirelyinthepocketsoftheirbenefactors.Assuch,theycannoteasilybeby-

    passedorignoredwhenthinkingaboutpolicyresponsesand,inthiscase,theyareapopulist

    challengetothelegitimacyofmanyWest-backedstateactorsintheMiddleEast.

    Non-stateactorstoday,therefore,enjoyincreasedpowerandinfluencewhethertheyareterrorist

    groups,transnationalcriminalgangsortransnationalpoliticalmovementsactiveontheinternational

    stage.Someoftheseactorsareacquiringsomeofthepowerattributesofstates,arealteringthe

    characterofsomestatesand,farmoreeffectivelythaninthepast,areofteninfluencing,undermining,

    destabilisingandevenquestioningthelegitimacyofstates.Thisaddsanewsetofdynamicsand

    challengestotheinternationalsecurityenvironment.

    Powerdiffusionbeyondstateborders:securityinterdependence

    Thethirdandfinaldimensionofpowerdiffusionwehighlightrelatestomorepower-sharingbetween

    statesintheformofincreasedsecurityinterdependence.Thisitselfcomesintwoforms.Thefirst

    relatestoasetofchallengesthataretrulyglobalinnatureandwhereconsequentlyonlysolutionsof

    6.Bypariahstates,wemeanonesthatessentiallybehaveasoutcasts,alienatedfrommostotherstates

    andacceptednormsofinternationalbehaviour.

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    globalreachandwithallthemajorpowersinvolvedwilldo.Climatechangemitigation,orattemptsat

    effectivecontrolofglobalstocksoffissilematerial,wouldbeemblematicissuesinthiscategory:there

    isastrongsenseontheseissuesthatthecommunityofstateseithersinksorswimstogether.

    Thesecondform,however,relatestothespecificthoughdifferentvulnerabilitiespresentedtoeach

    stateasaby-productofitsowneconomicinterdependencewithtodaysglobalisedworldeconomy.InthecaseoftheUK,thereareatleastfoursuchvulnerabilities.

    First,intermsofenergysupplies,theUKisadvancingintoaperiodoflesssecurityofsupplythanit

    hasexperiencedinrecentdecades,asitmovesfrombeinganetenergyexportertoanetenergy

    importer.Norwayiscurrentlyourmostimportantenergypartnerasamajorsupplierofbothoiland

    gas(Norwayaccountedfor75percentofUKoilimportsin2005).However,intheyearsahead

    Russia,theCaspianSearegion,Nigeria,Algeria,andtheMiddleEast,arealllikelytobecomemore

    importantsupplierstotheUK.OurkeyEuropeantradingpartners,meanwhile,arealsowitnessing

    shiftsintheirenergysupplybase.TheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,predictsthatthe

    biggestsupplierofgastoEuropein2030willbeAfrica,followedbyRussiaandtheMiddleEast(Bird

    2007:12;IEA2006).Thesechangesincreaseourvulnerabilitytoeventsin,andpressurefrom,awide

    rangeofsuppliercountries.

    Second,ourincreasingrelianceontrade(in2006,tradeaccountedfor60percentoftheUKsGDP)

    makesthesecurityofkeystrategictraderoutesmoreimportantforbothBritainandtheEUthanever

    before.Onesuchstrategictraderouteofgrowingimportanceisthealreadymassiveandrapidly

    expandingmaritimefreightroutelinkingtheeconomiesofAsiatothoseofEurope(seeFinancial

    Times 2007b).Anysignificantdisruptiontothisorotherroutes,broughtonbymaritimeterrorismor

    otherevents,couldhavemassiveeconomicconsequencesfortheUKandindeedfortheEUasa

    whole(seeRichardson2004).

    Third,transnationalcrimeisamajorsourceofvulnerabilityfortheUK,comingonthebackofthe

    vastlyincreasedmovementofbothpeopleandgoodsacrossourborders.7 Wecannotandshouldnot

    ruleoutcollaborationbetweencriminalgangsactiveacrossourbordersandterroristgroupsintenton

    smugglingharmfulmaterialsintotheUK.Suchcollaborationcouldhaveveryserioussecurity

    consequences.Thepotentialeconomicimpactofsuchcriminalactivityisalsogreat,however.Tax

    revenuesattheborder,forexample,currentlyamountto22billionperannum,oraround5percent

    ofthetotaltaxtakeofaround420billion.Inthiscontext,successfullarge-scalecross-borderfraud

    couldhaveaseriousimpactonthepublicpurse(CabinetOffice2007).

    Anestimated25-35tonnesofheroin,meanwhile,enterstheUKannuallyalongwith35-45tonnesof

    cocaineandbothcontributetoadrugsproblemthatisestimatedtocost15.4billionayearinthe

    formoflawenforcement,crimeandhealth-relatedcosts(ibid:22).Therearealsosocialvulnerabilities.

    Activitiessuchasdrugsmugglingimpactdirectlyonourcommunitiesintheformofsocialbreakdown

    andareducedsenseofpublicsafety.

    Fourthandlast,givenourpositionasaglobalhubforpeoplemovementinaneraofpeoplemovementonanunprecedentedscale,theUKisinanexposedpositioninrelationtothreatssuchas

    aninfluenzapandemicbroughtinfromtheoutside.Apandemicisnowconsideredabiological

    certainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthestraininvolved,theseverityoftheoutcomeandthe

    timingoftheoutbreak.ManyexpertsbelievethatH5N1birdfluisthestraintoworryaboutandthis,

    asweknow,cankillhumanbeings(globally,therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1wereto

    mutateintoavirusthatcouldbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween

    humanbeings,thatwouldbeapotentiallycatastrophicdevelopment.Recentstudieshavesuggested

    that,incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolveslunginfection,theH5N1virusmight

    7.Thecurrentannualflowofmorethan218millionpassengerjourneysacrossUKbordersisexpectedto

    increaseto450millionby2030.Totalfreightflowsarealsonowmassive,witharound440milliontonnesoffreightflowingacrossourborderseachyear,afigurelikelytoincreaseto580milliontonnesby2030

    (CabinetOffice2007).

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    bedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffectmultipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionofthe

    immunesystemknownasacytokinestorm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelpto

    explainwhythe1918-19pandemicwassodeadly(Osterholm2007:50).Consequently,inassessing

    thelikelyoutcomeofapandemic,arecentstudybytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy

    (McKibbin2006)foundthatwereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-19tooccur,over142million

    peoplewoulddieandtheworldsGDPwouldsufferalossofsomeUS$4.4trillion(McKibbinquoted

    inOsterholm2007:48).

    Ourreadinessandlevelofprotectionfromsuchaneventisinadequatebutmorethanthat,itisalso

    intricatelytiedupwithandreliantuponthepublicandanimalhealthsystemsandfreedomof

    movementstrategiesadoptedbymanyothercountriesandnotonlyonthestrategiesweputinplace

    hereintheUK.

    Infact,inalloftheformsofvulnerabilitydescribedinthissection,thekeypointtonoteisashiftin

    thepowertoaddresspolicychallengesawayfromtheindividualstatelevelandtowardseitherthe

    globallevelontheonehand(verticalshift)ortoanotherstate,orgroupofstatesontheother

    (horizontalshift).Thisappliestoclimatechange,tothesupplyofenergy,tothesecurityofourtrade

    routes,tolawenforcementactivitiesoverseasonorganisedcrimeandterrorismandtoprecautionstakenagainstanewpandemic.Theoutcomeofsecurityinterdependence,inshort,isaworldinwhich

    thesecurityofonestateanditspeopleismoredependentthaneverbeforeondecisions,actionsand

    eventsunfoldingelsewhereinothers.

    ii)Povertyandfailingstates

    Ourseconddriverofchangeinthesecuritylandscaperelatestoglobaleconomicconditionsandtoa

    clutchofissuesaroundwhatismostoftencalledthesecurity-developmentnexus.Thisisthepoint

    atwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonofweakandfailingstates

    interact,todevastatingeffect.

    Povertyitselfhasbeenhighontheinternationalagendainrecentyearsthanksinnosmallparttothe

    Britishgovernmentand,globally,thankstothehighprofilegiventoattemptstomeettheMilleniumDevelopmentGoals.Therehavebeensomerealandquantifiablesuccessestoo.Thenumberofpeople

    livinginabjectpovertyonlessthanUS$1perday,forexample,hasmorethanhalved,fallingfrom

    40.1percentoftheworldspopulationin1981to18.1percentin2004(WorldBank2007).An

    estimated135millionpeoplewerepulledoutofpovertyintheperiod1999to2004alone.Muchof

    thiseffort,however,hasbeenconcentratedintheeconomicmiraclesinChinaandotherpartsof

    rapidlydevelopingEastAsia,ratherthanbeingevenlyspread(Sachsetal2007).Consequently,

    accordingtotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,almost50percentoftheworldschildren

    werestilllivinginpovertyin2005.Indeed,thetermdevelopingcountryisstillamisnomerwhen

    appliedtosomeoftheworldspoorestcountries,asmorethanthreebillionpeoplearelivingonless

    thanUS$2aday,withlittleimmediatehopeofmajorimprovement.

    Thislevelofcontinuedpovertyiscentraltoourargumentsforthreereasons.

    First,povertyisamajorthreattohumanlife.Inanygivenyearinwhichthereisanabsenceofamajor

    globalconflict,povertydirectlyaccountsformorelossofhumanlifethanpoliticalviolenceandthisin

    itselfprovidesapowerfulargumentforthinkingaboutsecurityintermsthatgowellbeyondthe

    traditionalfocusonexternalmilitaryattack.8 Whilenearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksof9/11,

    forexample,preventablediseaseinducedbypovertyclaimstentimesthatnumberofchildrenevery

    day.Bythatmeasure,oureffortstocombatpovertyhavesofarbeenadismalfailureandasaresult,

    inmoraltermsatleast,thelegitimacyofthecurrentinternationaleconomicordermustbe

    questionableatbest(Rice2007).

    8.Thisisoneofthemajorreasonsforwhichmanyanalystshavecalledfortheadoptionofahuman

    securityperspectivewhenthinkingaboutsecuritypolicy,aperspectivethatwesupportandreturnto

    later.

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    Second,povertyonthisscaleisamajorconcernbecauseitisnowagrowingthreattointernational

    peaceandstability.ThereisadirectrelationshipbetweenacountryspercapitaGDPandits

    susceptibilitytocivilconflict.Evidenceshowsthatifacountryranksinthefiftiethpercentileofper

    capitaGDP,ithasa7.5percentriskofcivilconflict,halfofthelevelforcountriesthatrankinthe

    tenthpercentile(Collieretal2004).Povertyisalso,importantly,akeydriverofthephenomenonof

    weakandfailingstates,itselfagrowingandcorrosiveproblemontheinternationalstage.Weakstates

    lackthecapacitytopreventviolentconflict,togovernlegitimately,tomeetbasichumanneedsandto

    fostersustainableandequitableeconomicgrowth(Weinsteinetal2004).Notallweakstatesarepoor,

    buttheentiretopteninForeignPolicymagazinesFailedStateIndexrankinthebottomthirdof

    statesintermsofpercapitaGDP,andpovertyisclearlyakeyfactorintheseungovernedorbadly

    governedspaces(ForeignPolicy2007).Suchspacesthemselvesserveasactiveorpassiveincubators

    ofinstabilitythatcanspilloverintoneighbouringcountriesandwholeregionsintheformof

    economicdisruption,refugeeflows,andthespreadofarmedconflictacrossinternationallyrecognised

    borders.

    Anelevatedriskofconflictis,infact,oneofthemostsignificanteffectsofweakandfailingstates

    andthisisnowalsoreflectedinchangingpatternsofconflictaroundtheworld.Ratherthantheinter-

    statewarsthatmarkedmuchofmodernhistorythroughtoWorldWarII,conflictpatternsoverthelast

    sixtyyearshavebeencharacterisedmorebyintra-stateandcivilconflict.Ninety-fivepercentofall

    conflictsarenowofthiskind(HumanSecurityCentre2005).Civilconflictslastlonger,moreover,and

    arehardertoresolvethaninter-statewars,oftenlockingcountriesintoaconflicttrapofmutually

    reinforcingpovertyandconflictleadingtoaprocessdescribedbytheWorldBankasdevelopmentin

    reverse(WorldBank2003).

    Third,thiscombinationofpovertywithweakandfailingstatesisaconcernbecauseitisnow

    providingadirectthreattoourownsecurity.PresidentJohnF.Kennedysstatement,inhisinaugural

    addressin1961,thatifafreesocietycannothelpthemanywhoarepoor,itcannotsavethefewwho

    arerich(Kennedy1961)istruertodaythanitwasnearlyfivedecadesago.Thisisbecauseterrorist

    groupsandcriminalnetworks,bothofwhichoftenhaveglobalreach,cananddonowtakeadvantage

    ofweakandfailingstates.EvenwiththousandsofNATOtroopsnowinAfghanistan,thatcountrystill

    produced87percentoftheworldsheroinin2005(UNODC2005).Ofcourse,drugshavenotbeen

    theonlydangerousexportemergingfromthatcountrysinceterroristsusedthesafe-havengrantedby

    theTalibantosetinmotiontheattacksof9/11.Somaliastotallackofnationalgovernancehasalso,

    inrecenttimes,allowedthatcountrytobeusedasaprimarybaseofoperationsandshelterfor

    terroristsactivethroughoutEastAfrica.Severaloftheindividualssuspectedofinvolvementinthe

    bombingsofUSembassiesinKenyaandTanzaniain1998,forexample,arebelievedtostillbeatlarge

    inSomalia(Payne2007).

    Morality,concernsoverwiderinternationalpeaceandstability,andoverourownphysicalsecurity,

    therefore,allmakepovertyandtheattendantgrowthofweakandfailingstatesasignificantdriverof

    thecurrentinternationalsecuritylandscape.Asaresult,fordevelopedandwealthiercountriessuchastheUK,thelong-standingmoralimperativetotackletheissuesinthesecuritydevelopmentnexushas

    beenjoinedbyanimperativebasedonself-interest.

    iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity

    Athirdandmorerecentlyemergeddriverofchangeintheinternationalsecurityenvironmentis

    climatechange.Thisislikelytohaveamajorshapinginfluenceoninternationalaffairsinthedecades

    ahead,thoughpreciselyhowandtowhatextentwilldependonthelevelofglobalwarmingthat

    actuallyoccurs.TheFourthAssessmentReportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)

    producedarangeoffuturetemperaturescenarios,basedonassumptionsaboutpopulationgrowth,

    patternsofeconomicdevelopment,andthedevelopmentandadoptionofnewenergytechnologies

    (IPCC2007).Thesescenariosshowbest-estimateprojectionsofaglobalaveragetemperatureincrease

    thiscenturyintherangeof1.8Cto4.0C.Inthematerialthatfollows,webaseourdiscussiononthelikelyimpactofthemid-rangescenario,whichsuggestsabest-estimatetemperatureincreaseof2.8C

    duringthecourseofthecenturyandanincreaseinthenexttwodecadesof1.5Cto2C.Underthis

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    scenario,anumberofdevelopmentsinkeyregionsfromEasttoSouthAsia,theMiddleEastandon

    throughmuchofAfricawilllikelyimpacttheinternationalsystem.

    First,theIPCCprojectsthatChina willbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,particularlycomingunder

    pressureinrelationtowaterstress,statingthat:InpartsofChina,theriseintemperaturesanddecreases

    inprecipitation,alongwithincreasingwaterusehavecausedwatershortagesthatledtodryingupoflakesandrivers(IPCC2007:477).Chinasownfirstnationalreportonclimatechange,releasedinlate

    2006,alsoforetoldacomingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycrop

    yieldsby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustalsobethecountrysvulnerabilitytosea

    levelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedonthecoast.

    TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayplayabigroleinshapingboththecharacter

    andstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelastfewyears,concernsover

    environmentalissueshaveprovokedthousandsofChinesecitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry,

    andthepotentialimpactsofclimatechangearenowhighinthemindsoftheChinesepeople.A2006

    pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfound

    80percentofrespondentsagreedthatwithintenyearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportant

    threattotheircountrysvitalinterest(ChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs2006).KeyquestionsfortheChineseleadershipthereforearewhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhilerespondingto

    thesedemandsforenvironmentalimprovementsandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegreeandat

    suchpaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregimehandlesthesechallenges

    couldhaveaprofoundeffectalargepartofinternationalaffairsinthedecadestocome.

    Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmediumtermisthe

    HimalayanregionofAsia,andthiswilllikelyimpactnearlyallofthesub-continent(IPCC2007).

    TheHimalayanglaciersarethelargestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately

    500,000km2,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacialareainthe

    world.UndercurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycoulddisappearaltogetherby

    2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80percenttocoveronly100,000km2.

    ThiswillhavetheeffectofdeprivingtheIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmainsourceofwater,likelymakingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood

    production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsealevelswillalso

    harmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemanymega-deltasintheregion,furtherstressingagricultureand

    foodsuppliesdependentonfishing.

    ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchanextentthatthe

    widerstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladeshisexploding(itisprojected

    tonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)asclimatechangedestroysasignificantportionofthe

    countrysalreadylimitedhabitableland,forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastable

    environmentwithoutregardtotheregionsmanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwill

    alsofaceclimatestressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbours,isalreadybracingitselfagainsta

    waveofBangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealongthe2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007).

    TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillbecomplicatedfurtherby

    whatsomehavedescribedasanewhydrologicalsecuritycomplex(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEast

    regionishometo6.3percentoftheworldspopulationbutonly1.4percentoftheworlds

    renewablefreshwater.Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries,

    namelyTurkey,Iran,IraqandSyria.Acomplexsetofwaterdependencyrelationshipsthereforeexists

    andissettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemostvulnerablepositionsofallstatesintheregion

    (Campbelletal2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetresofwaterpercapitaby2025;1000

    cubicmetrespercapitaisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadevelopedcountry

    (Homer-Dixonetal1993).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedinpoliticallyfraught

    territory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthemountainaquiferthatunderliestheWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointstotheIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinian

    relationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcouldbecomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionand

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    conflictintheregion(Bitar2005).

    InAfrica,highertemperaturesandlesserandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250million

    moreAfricansunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffectEast,WestandNorthAfrica,the

    lattersufferingarapidandseveredeclineinpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentupto

    2050.EastAfricawilllikelyseeupto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion,whileatthesametimethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryerresultinginseveredroughtsand

    additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesupnearlyhalfof

    EastAfricasGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.Anylossinsovitalan

    economicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesontheregionsoveralleconomicandpolitical

    development(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,isalreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification:

    approximately1,350squaremilesofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersand

    herdsmanandcausinginternalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asa

    result,by2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million

    inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiverdelta,thougheven

    thisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentireareaisalsoatmajorriskfromsea

    levelrise(McCarthy2006,IPCC2007).

    ThissetofdevelopmentsinAfrica,insomeoftheworldspoorestregions,maywelladdfurtherstress

    totheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedintheprevioussection.Climateevents

    themselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebutmigrationflowsarealsolikely

    tobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstateauthoritiestorespondinanumberofareas.

    ThismaybeaparticularlyacuteprobleminEastAfricawheretheconcentrationofweakorfailing

    statesisalreadyhighandnumerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort,

    climatechangemaybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica.

    Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabovepointto

    significantinternationalmigratorypressuresanditcannotbeassumedthattheseflowsofpeoplewill

    staywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itishighlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsof

    peoplewillbedirectedattheWestandattheEuropeanUnionandtheUKinparticular.BritishcolonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,forexample,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthe

    surroundingareamustbeanticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoing

    mixofconflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentrypoint

    ofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapethechallengesanddifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Thiswilllikely

    presentadditionalchallengestosocialunityintheEU,evenasEUmemberstatesturntomigrant

    labourasaresponsetotheirowndemographicandlabourmarketchallenges.

    IntheUK,therearealsolikelytobedirecteffects,asmuchoflow-lyingEastAngliainparticularislikely

    tobeatincreasedriskofflooding.Observedmeasurementshaveshownthatthesea-levelofftheEast

    Angliancoastisrisingbyanaverage4.5mmperyear,which,combinedwith1.5mmperyearofisostatic

    adjustment(groundlevelsinking),isleadingtoa6mmperyearsealevelriseintheregion(Edwards

    2005).IncreasedwindsandstormsintheNorthSeawillalsolikelycausemorepowerfulstormsurgesthatcouldbreachcoastaldefences,floodinginlandareas.Thesechangestothephysicalenvironmentof

    theUKarelikelytobesmallrelativetosomeotherareasintheworld,butstillsignificant.

    Severalimportantmilitaryassetswillalsobeatriskfromenvironmentaldamage.Sealevelrisecould

    negativelyaffecttheSouthCoastnavalbasesatPortsmouthandDevonport.TheMinistryofDefenceis

    currentlymodellingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthesebases(Liddell2007),andalthoughno

    seriousdamageispredictedoverthenext20-25years,theIPCCpredictsthatsealevelrisealongthe

    Englishcoastlinecouldbeupto50percenthigherthantheglobalaverage,whichunderworst-case

    scenarioscouldseverelydisruptoperationsatthesebasesincurrentoperatingconditions.Increased

    floodingcouldalsojeopardiseseveralRAFbases,namelyValleyontheIsleofAngleseyoffWalesand

    twobasesinEastAngliacurrentlyusedbytheUSAirForce,LakenheathandMildenhall(Ministryof

    Defence2006).Eachofthesethreeairfieldsisonly10metresabovesealevelleavingthemhighlyvulnerabletoflooding.AmongtheUKsoverseasmilitaryassets,thenavalstationatDiegoGarcia,a

    tinyatollintheIndianOceanonlyonemetreabovesealevelatitshighestpoint,isinmoreimmediate

    dangerfromrisingsealevels.TheCenterforNavalAnalysisintheUnitedStateswarnedina2007

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    reportthatthebase,amajorforwardlogisticshubforbothBritishandAmericanforcesoperatinginthe

    PersianGulfandMiddleEastregion,couldbelosttosealevelrise(CenterforNavalAnalysis2007).

    Tore-cap,climatechangeissettohavedirectconsequencesfortheUKbothhereathomeandin

    relationtoimportantoverseasassets,islikelytoprovokenewinter-statetensionsandtogeneratenew

    sourcesandinstancesofstatefailure,particularlyinAfrica,andmayevenplayamajorroleinshapingthecharacterandoutlookofamajorpowerlikeChina.Itmayalsoputaddedpressureonsocialunity

    indevelopedcountriesinacontextinwhichthatunityisalreadyunderstrain.Thisallamountstoa

    verysignificantdestabilisingpressureinanumberofimportantstatesandregionsaroundtheworld

    andintermsofitssecurityconsequences,mayyetcometodwarfandover-shadowthecurrently

    high-profileissueofterrorism.

    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam

    Thefourthandpenultimatedriverofthecontemporarysecuritylandscapethatwehighlightisthe

    growthofpoliticalIslam,orIslamism.9 Thisnowrepresentsbothanimmediatethreattopublicsafety

    andalong-termpoliticalchallengetoWesternliberaldemocracies.Thoughitsoriginscanbetraced

    backovermanycenturies,initsmodernformpoliticalIslamowesitsdevelopmenttowritersand

    thinkersactiveinthemid-20thcentury,suchasAbulAlaMaududiinSouthAsiaandSayyidQutbin

    Egypt(forathoroughanalysisoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofpoliticalIslamseeRoy2004and

    Burke2003).Themovementsthesemenspawned,Jamaat-e-IslamiandtheMuslimBrotherhood,

    werethevanguardinwhatMaududiopenlydescribedasarevolutionarydoctrineandsystemthat

    seekstooverthrowgovernments(MaududiquotedinHusain2007).ModernIslamism,then,isbest

    viewedasapoliticalmovementthatutilisesaparticularinterpretationofreligionratherthanasa

    fundamentalistreligiousmovementthatattimespractisespolitics.NeitherMaududi,norQutb,nor

    othersofnotelikethem,wereeventrainedclericsortheologians.

    Intermsofitsideologicalcontent,Islamismisbasedonadivisionoftheworldintoconflictingcamps

    ofgoodandevil.Good,inthisstoryline,arethetrueMuslimsfullydevotedtotheIslamists

    interpretationofIslam.Evilontheotherhand,consistsinagroupofcountriesincludingtheUnited

    States,theUnitedKingdom,France,andRussiawhicharesaidtorigtheinternationalsystemagainst

    MuslimsandtouseanetworkofapostaterulersintheIslamicworldtoplunderitsresourcesandkeep

    itscitizenssubdued.Consequently,Islamistpoliticalobjectivesrelatetotheremovalofsuchapostate

    rulersfromtheMuslimworld,totheintroductionofmoretrulyIslamic(undertheirinterpretation)

    societies,totheremovalofWesterninterferenceinMuslimaffairsandforsome,attheextreme,tothe

    completeoverthrowofWesternliberalsocietyinitsentirety.

    Inmorerecenttimesandinsomemanifestations,Islamismhasofcoursebecomeviolent,intheform

    ofAlQaedaandAlQaeda-inspirednetworks,andintheformofothergroupsnotlinkedtoAlQaeda

    inanyway.AkeyturningpointinrelationtoIslamistviolenceappearstohavebeentheSoviet

    invasionofAfghanistan.IslamistorganisationsissuedacalltoMuslimseverywheretohelpinresisting

    theSovietoccupation.Thousandsansweredthatcalland,furtherradicalisedbytheexperience,

    subsequentlyreturnedtotheirhomecountrieswiththeviewthatviolenceconstitutedalegitimate

    formofpoliticalexpression(Mamdani2005).Apsychologicalthresholdhadbeencrossedandviolence

    becameameanstoachieverevolutionarypoliticalobjectivesinplacessuchasAlgeria,Egypt,Yemen,

    Chechnya,Indonesia,andthePhilippines(BergenandReynolds2005).

    Asweknow,politicalIslamtoday,eveninitsviolentforms,hasalsonowextendeditsreachinto

    Westernliberaldemocraciesdirectly,beyondcountriesthatarepredominantlypopulatedbyMuslims.

    ItseekstotargetandtorecruitboththegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandthosenon-

    MuslimswhomaybesusceptibletoconversiontotheIslamistsparticularinterpretationofthereligion

    ofIslam.

    9.Thereisadebatetobehadontherightlanguagetousetocapturethisphenomenon.Wearestill

    reflectingonthisbutforthepurposesofthispaper,thekeypointtonoteisthatwearedescribinga

    politicalandnotareligiousphenomenon.

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    Organisationallyandpolitically,politicalIslamisnothomogeneousanditsadherentscanbestbe

    describedasexistinginaseriesofconcentriccircles.Atthecentreisasmallgroupofhard-core

    radicalscommittedtoorchestratingviolentactioninfurtheranceoftheirpoliticalagenda,though

    membersofthisgrouparenotoftentheperpetratorsoftheviolencethemselves.Inthenext,larger,

    circle,arethefoot-soldiersmostlikelytocommitactsofviolence.Beyondthisgroup,inalargercircle

    still,arethemembersofthemostradicalIslamistorganisationsfromwhoseranksthefoot-soldiersof

    Islamistviolencecanmosteasilybedrawn.Then,attheouteredges,therearethemembersofmost

    otherIslamistorganisationswhopursueIslamistpoliticalobjectivesbutdosobyworkingthrough

    existingpoliticalsystemsratherthanthroughattemptstoviolentlyoverthrowthem.Finally,andat

    leastpartiallymovingbeyondthosewhocanbedescribedinanyrealsenseasbelieversintheIslamist

    politicalmessage,theremaybeatacitcircleofsupport(Saggar2006,Klausen2007).

    IntheUKcontextthistacitcircleofsupporthasbeencapturedinopinionpollquestionnaire

    responses.APopuluspollofattitudesamongBritishMuslimscarriedoutforTheTimes attheheight

    oftheDanishcartoonscontroversy,forexample,had7percentofaweightedsampleagreeingwith

    thestatementthat:TherearecircumstancesinwhichIwouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil

    (Saggar2006:314).Thisfigureapproximatestoover100,000MuslimslivingintheUK.AfurtherICM

    pollshowedthatafifthofrespondentshadsomesympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesofthose

    whocarriedouttheLondonattacks(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).Finally,asurveyofMuslim

    studentsintheUK,bytheFederationofStudentIslamicSocieties,showed4percentunableto

    condemnthe7/72005attacksonLondon,afurther11percentrefusingtobackorcondemnthe

    attacksand20percentsayingthattheywouldnotreportapossiblesuicidebomberintheirranksto

    thepolice(FOSIS2005).

    DespitetheseriousnessofthissituationandoftheIslamistchallengeaswehavedescribedithere,in

    bothsecurityandpoliticalterms,policymakersstilldonothaveagoodunderstandingofwhatis

    drivingit.OnecontextualfactorthatmayhaveassisteditsgrowthinWesterncountriesisthedecline

    andcollapseofrevolutionaryleftistpoliticsinrecentdecades,whichhaseffectivelyleftpoliticalIslam

    asthepredominantrepositoryforradicalpoliticalexpression.Anotherpotentialfactoristhegenuine

    senseofpoliticalgrievancefeltbymanyMuslims.ThiscentresonWesternforeignpolicyand,tobe

    morespecific,onperceptionsofinjusticeandhumiliationinrelationtotheIsrael-Palestinequestion,

    onperceptionsofalossofeffectivecontrolofthenaturalenergyresourcesoftheMiddleEastin

    particular,andonperceptionsoftheWesternroleinthemaintenanceandsupportofoppressiveand

    autocraticregimesinseveralpredominantlyMuslimcountries.

    SomeanalystshavefurthernotedasenseofalienationamongMuslimcommunitieslivingintheWest.

    Thisappearstobeanissueamongsecond-andthird-generationMuslimcitizensinparticularandmay

    begroundednotjustinoppositiontomuchWesternforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastbutina

    complexmixoffactorsincludingperceivedsocialexclusionongroundsofraceandstrongconcerns

    overIslamophobia.AsShivMaliksrecentpieceofinvestigativejournalismintosomeofthoseinvolved

    intheattacksof7/7inLondonalsomakesclear,forsomeyoungMuslimsintheUKtheremayalsobeaparticularlyacutecrisisofidentityinwhichneitherthedominantculturalvaluesoftheparent

    population,northemainstreamcultureofthenewhomecountryisseenasappealing(Malik2007).

    Thetruth,however,isthatweareinsufficientlyclearaboutwhattheunderlyingcausesofthegrowth

    inpoliticalIslamare,evenatthishighlevelofgenerality.Moreover,theradicalisationprocesses,for

    thosemovingfromtacitcircleofsupporttofullacceptanceoftheIslamistworldview,andfrom

    radicalisedpoliticstoactiveengagementinpoliticalviolenceareboth,ifanything,evenlesswell

    understood.ThepersonalaccountsofthosewhohavebeeninvolvedinIslamistpoliticsandhavethen

    pulledback,suchasEdHusain(Husain2007),haveprovidedvaluableinsighthere,buttheliterature

    pointstoawiderangeofpossiblefactorsintheradicalisationprocessincludingpersonalrelationships,

    psychologicalfactors,socialgroupdynamics,andtheparticularcommunicationopportunitiesofthe

    internet,andtheoverallpictureremainsconfused.Makingpublicpolicyinthiscontextisnoteasy.TheIslamistsuseofreligiontomaskthepolitical

    natureoftheirprojecthasputWesternliberaldemocraticregimesinadifficultpositionastheyseek

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    topreserveacommitmenttotoleranceanddiversityintheirownsocietiesontheonehandwhile

    addressingtheIslamistchallengewithoutappearingtodemonisefollowersoftheIslamicfaithonthe

    other.

    Thepolicychallengeitselfisalsocomplex.Onekeychallengeforgovernmentishowbesttoprotect

    citizensfromtheIslamistthreatwithoutintroducingsecuritymeasuresthatinadvertentlyexpandtheoutercirclesofsupportforIslamistgroupsorpushmorepeoplefromtheoutercirclesofsupport

    towardstheviolentcore.Anotherchallengeistounderstandhowbesttoproactivelyshrinktheouter

    circles,bothathomeandinternationally,tosuchanextentthatthoseintheinnercorebecomeso

    isolatedthatitisdifficultforthemtocontinueoperations.Bothareprofoundlydifficultand,without

    animprovedunderstandingoftheradicalisationprocess,almostimpossible.Onlylimitedprogressis

    likelytobemadeintheshorttermtherefore,andtheIslamistchallengeislikelytoremainakeydriver

    ofboththedomesticandinternationalsecurityagendaforalongtimetocome.

    v)Socio-economicvulnerability

    Ourfifthdriverofchangeinthesecurityenvironmentissocio-economicvulnerability.Thishasrisen

    upthesecurityagendapartlyasaresultofrecentchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomy,partly

    asaconsequenceofchangestotheconditionofsomeelementsofourcriticalnationalinfrastructure,

    andpartlyasaconsequenceoftheincreasedthreatofterrorismand/ordisruptiveclimateevents.

    Whenitcomestothestructureofoureconomyanditsbusinesses,overthelastdecadeagreatdeal

    ofworkhasbeendonetoencourageBritishcompaniestoadoptaleanapproachtobusiness

    operations.Movingtojustintimemanufacturing,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingand

    intermediaries,sheddingexcessstaff,allofthesedevelopmentshavesubstantiallyimprovedthe

    competitivenessoftheUKeconomy.Atthesametime,thesupplychainsofBritishbusinesseshave

    becomestretchedasaconsequenceofglobalisation.Thishasitselfbroughtefficiencygainsandhas

    increasedtherangeofproductsandservicesavailabletotheUKconsumer.However,asJimNorton

    haspointedout,thereisaghostatthisparticularfeast(Norton2008).Runninglean,morediverse

    andstretchedsupplychainsmakesexcellentbusinesssensebutitassumesthatthebasic

    infrastructureintheUKandbeyond,inenergy,communications,andtransportation,issecureand

    reliable.Themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewithmajor

    disruption.

    Sadly,theassumptionofasecureandreliableinfrastructureisnotasafeone.Justasour

    organisationshaveimprovedtheircollectiveefficiencyandthustheirdependenceonsupporting

    infrastructure,wehavemadeinfrastructuredecisionsthatincreaseourvulnerabilitytodisruption.In

    communications,forexample,therehasbeenashiftfromsecureprivatemobilesystemstoshared

    (non-resilient)publicmobilecommunicationsinsomekeysectors.Effectivecommunicationinthe

    eventofextrapressurebeingplacedonthemobilenetworkinanemergency,therefore,cannotbe

    guaranteed.

    Thereisconcern,also,overalackofstoragefacilitiesforgas,justasaccesstoourownNorthSeasuppliesrunsdown,andanequivalentconcernoveralackofinvestmentinlocalandregional

    electricitydistribution,whichhasresultedinincreasedfailuresandthelossofsomekeyskillsandsub-

    contractors.

    Inothersectors,weoperateclosetocapacitylimitsinwaysthatcouldhavesevereconsequences.In

    theeventofaflupandemic,forexample,areasonableassumptionwouldbethatupto20percentof

    theUKsHeavyGoodsVehicledriverswouldbeunavailable,afigurelargeenoughtocripplethe

    nationalfoodsupply,leavesupermarketshelvesempty,andpossiblycausecivilunrest.

    Weaknessesinoneareaofourinfrastructure,moreover,canleadtobreakdowninothersbecause

    severalkeyelementsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructureareinterdependent.Power,transport,

    communications,water,andbroadcastingforexample,couldallbebadlyaffectedbyalossof

    electricitysupply,thelattercausingacascadingeffectintoeachoftheothers.WhenpartsoftheUS

    andCanadasufferedthelargestelectricpoweroutageintheirhistoryon14August2003,50million

    peoplelostpower,4millionpeoplelostwater,andmanyrailroadsandairportswereshutdown(Doshi

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    etal2007).IntheUK,thesummerfloodsof2007,thoughonamuchsmallerscale,also

    demonstratedthepoint.

    Terroristorganisationsappeartohavenoticedthisvulnerabilitytoo.InMarch2004,policeraidedthe

    homeofOmarKhyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceterroristplotand

    foundCD-ROMswithdetailedplansofBritainselectricityandgassystems.AccordingtoaNewYorkTimes reportlaterin2006,Khyamwasalsorecordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackon

    Britainsgas,electricity,andwatersystems(Wolsey2007).

    Thecascadeeffectsofalossofkeyinfrastructure,whetherbroughtonbysevereweather,terrorist

    attackorsimplemaintenancefailures,wouldobviouslyalsogofarbeyondanimpactonother

    infrastructuresectorsthemselves.FeworganisationsorservicesintheUKwouldbeabletofunction

    effectivelyforlonginsuchcircumstances.Giventhis,theCabinetOfficeCivilContingenciesSecretariat

    haspreviouslypublishedplanningguidancethataskskeyorganisationstopreparefor:

    Lossofmainselectricitysupplyforuptothreedayslocallyor24hoursregionally Lossofwatersupplyforuptothreedays

    LossofthepublicswitchedtelephonenetworkforuptothreedaysDisruptiontofuelsupplyforuptotendaysSignificantdisruptiontotransportforuptotendays Accessdeniedtomainpremisesforuptothreemonths.

    However,itisunclearhowmanyorganisationscouldreallyclaimtohaveplansinplacetocope

    withtheseguidelinesandmakingprogressinthiswholeareaisdifficultingovernanceterms.

    DavidOmand,forexample,hasnotedthat80percentoftheUKscriticalnationalinfrastructure

    isinprivatesectorhands,notallofitevenownedbyUKcompanies.Evenwithinthesectors

    definedascorepartsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,thereremainsasignificantchallenge

    tocoordinateactivityacrossmanydifferentsectorsandthischallengeonlymultiplieswhenone

    considerstheneedtoplanforwiderbusinessandorganisationalresiliencethroughouttheentire

    economyandsociety.Giventhesecircumstances,theissuesofcriticalnationalinfrastructure

    protection,businessandorganisationalresilience,andemergencyplanningandpreparedness

    havetakenonnewsecuritypolicyprominence.

    Driversandeffects:conclusion

    Wehaveattemptedinthispartofthepapertocapturethemultipleandinteractingdrivers

    shapingthecurrentsecuritylandscape.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,poverty,

    climatechange,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamandsocio-economicvulnerabilityarecreatinganew

    setofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodealwith.Thedistributionof

    powerbetweenstatesischangingandthis maymeanmoreinstabilityandconflictintheyears

    aheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportant

    too,bothintheirownright,andduetotheircapacitytoinflue