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WWW.IPPR.ORG
TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld
ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity,WorkingPaperNo.1
byIanKearnsandKenGude
February2008
ippr2008
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy
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Aboutippr ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Abouttheauthors ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Commentsandfeedback............................................................................................................................................................. 5
Executivesummary...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 10
2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape .......................................................................................................... 12i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion....................................................................................................................................... 12ii)Povertyandfailingstates ................................................................................................................................................... 19
iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity................................................................................................................................ 20iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam ............................................................................................................................................. 23v)Socio-economicvulnerability.............................................................................................................................................. 25Driversandeffects:conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26
3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape ...................................................................................................................... 28Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy................................................................................................... 28Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach ................................................................................ 30Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy .............................................................................................................................. 32
4.Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................. 37
References .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38
Appendix:Thenewfrontlineofnationalsecuritypolicy .......................................................................................................... 42
Contents
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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producing
cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through
ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical
solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,
whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships
andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2008.ippr2008
Aboutippr
ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity
Lord(Paddy)Ashdown,Co-Chair,formerleaderoftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformerHighRepresentativeforBosnia.
Lord(George)Robertson,Co-Chair,formerSecretaryofStateforDefenceandformerSecretaryGeneralofNATO.
DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector,ippr.
SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchleyFoundationandformerBritishAmbassadortotheUnitedNations.
SirDavidOmand,formersecurityandintelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOfficeandformerPermanentSecretaryintheHomeOffice.
Lord(Charles)Guthrie,formerChiefoftheDefenceStaff.
ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyandformerHomeOfficelawyer.
Lord(Martin)Rees,PresidentoftheRoyalSocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,Cambridge.
SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableofNorthamptonshireandformerPresidentoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.
ProfessorMaryKaldor,CentreforGlobalGovernance,LondonSchoolofEconomics.
ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorofDefenceStudiesatKingsCollegeLondon.
FrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearchFellowattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandacommissionerontheCommissionfor
EqualityandHumanRights(CEHR).ProfessorTariqModood:Director,University
ofBristolResearchCentrefortheStudyofEthnicityandCitizenship.
SenatorTomDaschle,formerMajorityLeaderoftheUnitedStatesSenate.
ConstanzeStelzenmller,DirectoroftheBerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.
DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicyatSavetheChildrenandformerlyHeadoftheInternationalProgrammeatippr.
ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutiveoftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyandnowattheInstituteofDirectors.
IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativePartyPolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology,EngineeringandMathematics,ConservativeMPforEsherandWaltonandformerministerforScienceandTechnologyattheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry.
ThisworkingpaperformspartoftheongoingactivitiesoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity.
Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itis
co-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.Thefull
Commissionmembershipincludes:
TheworkingpaperserieseditorisIanKearns.FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security
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IanKearns isDeputyChairoftheCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,Deputy
DirectorofipprandiscurrentlyleadingtheInstitutesinternationalandsecurityprogramme.Hehasa
broadrangeofexperienceintheprivatesector,asaformerDirectorintheGlobalGovernment
IndustrypracticeatElectronicDataSystems(EDS),andinacademia,asformerDirectorofthe
GraduateProgrammeinInternationalStudiesandLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofSheffield.
KenGude isaVisitingFellowatipprandSeniorAdvisertotheCommissiononNationalSecuirtyin
the21stCentury.HeiscurrentlytheAssociateDirectoroftheInternationalRightsandResponsibility
ProgramattheCenterforAmericanProgressandhaspreviouslyworkedforseveralleadingAmerican
thinktanks,includingtheCenterforNationalSecurityStudiesandtheCouncilonForeignRelations.
Abouttheauthors
AcknowledgementsAsisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thispaperistheproductofthelabourofmany,and
withouttheirassistanceandsupport,weneverwouldhavebeenabletopublish.TheauthorswishtothanktheCommissionersoftheipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whose
discussionsprovidedthesparkformanyoftheideaswehaveputforwardhereandallowedthis
analysistobetestedanddebated.WewouldalsoliketothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstitute
forPublicPolicyResearch,especiallyAlexGennieandKatiePaintinfromtheInternationaland
SecurityProgrammeandmanyothersincludingGeorginaKyriacou,CareyOppenheimandMatt
Jacksonwhohelpedgetustothefinishline.Finally,wewerefortunatethatmanyofourcolleagues
andassociatesworkingoutsideipprtookthetimetoreadandreviewourworkandprovideinsight
andguidancethatenabledustosharpenthemanuscriptandimproveourarguments.
ipprwouldliketothankEDSandRaytheonwhoaresupportersofalltheCommissionsactivities.Wewouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofworkfeedingintothe
Commission'sdeliberations:BoozAllenHamilton(energysecurityandprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersandidentitymanagement),andtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionandpost-conflictreconstruction).
Theviewsinthisworkingpaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthe
hopeofadvancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelorthe
viewsofanysponsoringorganisation.
Wewelcomewrittencomments onallsectionsandaspectsofthematerialpresentedhere,andthese
shouldbesentinthefirstinstancetotheCommissionsDeputyChair,IanKearns,on
i.kearns@ippr.org.TheCommissionwillalsoberunningaseriesoftargetedcallsforevidencethroughout2008andmoredetailsofthesecanbefoundatwww.ippr.org/security
Commentsandfeedback
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Thispaperanalysesthekeychangestakingplaceinthenationalandinternationalsecuritylandscape
andassessestheirimplicationsforpolicy,examiningthecontextwithinwhichanationalsecurity
strategymustnowbeforged.ItisasubmissiontoipprsindependentCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,capturingsomeoftheearlydeliberationsoftheCommission.However,it
shouldnotatthisstagebetakentorepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionitself.
Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape
Thepaperidentifiesfivedriversofchangeandtheireffects:
i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates
iii)Climatechange
iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
v)Socio-economicvulnerability.Asaresult,itbecomesclearthatthecontemporarysecuritylandscapeisaboutmuchmorethan
terrorismalone.
i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
Aglobalisation-drivendiffusionofpowerisunderwayinthreesenses.
Thefirstisarelativediffusionofpowerwithinandamongthecommunityofstates.Thisisvisiblein
theriseofChinaandIndia,intheemergenceofawiderangeofnewlyimportantenergystatesand
regions(includingtheCaspianSearegion,centralAsia,Nigeria,Iran,Qatar,AlgeriaandVenezuela)
andinthepotentialriseofnewnuclearpowers(notjustviaIranandNorthKoreabutalsothrough
theregionalnucleararmsracestheymightprovoke).Thiselementofpowerdiffusioniscreatingnew
centresofpower,newregionsofpotentialtensionandconflict,andraisesfundamentalquestionsovertheextenttowhichimportantinternationalinstitutionsstillreflecttherealitiesofglobalpower.
Thesecond dimensionofpowerdiffusionisfromstatetonon-stateactors,andtoterroristgroupsand
organisedcrimenetworksinparticular.Thisisdrivenbyaprocessoftechnologydispersalandis
evidentintheincreaseddestructivepotentialofsuchgroups(aparticularworrybeingthepotential
linkbetweenterroristgroupsandaccesstoweaponsofmassdestruction)andintheiraccessto
communicationsandencryptiontechnologieswhichamplifytheirvoice,extendtheirorganisational
reachandincreasetheircapacityforevadinglawenforcement.Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors
raisesquestionsoverwhatwaspreviouslyseenasastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.It
also,particularlythroughcorruption,raisesquestionsaboutthecapacityoforganisedcrimenetworks
tochangetheverycharacterofstates,turningsomeofthemintopariahterritories.
Third,anunplannedincreaseininter-statepower-sharingisconsideredintheformofincreased
securityinterdependence,bothintermsofglobalinterdependence(onissuessuchasclimatechange)
andintermsofthespecificsoftheUKsinterfacewiththeglobalisedworldeconomy.New
vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedhere,onenergysecurity,ondrugsmugglingintotheUK,onthe
vulnerabilityofkeystrategictraderoutesandonourexposuretoanewpandemic.Onalltheseissues,
thekeypointmadeisthattheUKisreliantforitssecuritynotonlyondecisionstakenathomebuton
decisionstakenelsewhereandbyothers.
ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates
Theseconddriverofchangeidentifiedrelatestotheclutchofissuesinthesecurity-development
nexus.Thisisthepointatwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonof
weakandfailingstatesinteract,todevastatingeffect.Povertykillsmorepeoplethanpoliticalviolence,andisadriverofconflictandinstabilityinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.Whilenotall
weakandfailingstatesarepoor,manyofthemare,andpovertyisakeyfactorintheproliferationof
ungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Theseinturn,asAfghanistan
Executivesummary
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andSomaliahaveshown,canbecomesafehavensforterroristandorganisedcrimeactivity.Inthis
context,thestrongignoretheweakattheirperilandforwealthiercountriesliketheUK,moral
imperativestoaddressglobalpovertyhavenowbeenjoinedbynarrowersecurityinterests.
iii)Climatechange
Evenundermid-rangeIPCCtemperatureincreasescenarios,climatechangeissettohaveanumberofprofoundimplicationsinthenexttwotothreedecades.Chinawillfaceseverewaterstressand
decliningfoodproductioninimportantregions,atthesametimeasfacinghugepressuretomaintain
veryhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth.Howitrespondstothesepressurescouldbeoneofthedefining
featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.SouthAsia,particularly
Bangladesh,willbebadlyaffectedbytheshrinkageoftheHimalayanglaciers,possiblycausinghuge
flowsofenvironmentalrefugeesacrosstheregionsborders,andresultinginregionalinstability.Anew
hydrologicalsecuritycomplexmaydevelopintheMiddleEastaswaterdependencyrelationships,
particularlyforIsrael,maybecomenewsourcesoftensioninanalreadyvolatileregion.North,East
andWestAfricawillallbebadlyaffectedbywaterstress,placingadditionalstrainonsomeweakand
failingstatesandpossiblycausingpopulationmovementsacrosstheSaharaandintoSouthernEurope
asaresult.TheUKitselfwillalsobeaffected,inareassuchasEastAngliathatwillbepronetostormsurgesand
floods.Importantmilitaryassets,suchasnavalandRAFbases,mayalsobeatrisk,asmightoverseas
assetssuchasthesupplyandlogisticsbaseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean.
Climatechange,inshort,islikelytoaccentuateanumberofexistingproblemsonthesecurityagenda,
andaddnewdifficultiestothosealreadypresent.Asasecurityissue,itmayquicklycometodwarfthe
issueofterrorism.
iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
OurfourthdriverofchangeispoliticalIslam,whichwedefinehereasapoliticalmovementusing
religionforcoverratherthanasareligiousmovementengagedinpolitics.Thismovement,inits
extremeforms,dividestheworldintocategoriesofgood(thosewhobelieveintheIslamistsinterpretationofIslam)andevil(countriessuchastheUK,theUSandFrance).Thepolitical
programmeofgroupsthatsubscribetothisideologytendstobebasedonaccusationsofthe
manipulationoftheMuslimworldbyboththesecountriesdirectlyandbytheapostaterulerstheyare
saidtoimposeonpredominantlyMuslimcountries.TheIslamistsobjectivesthereforefocusonthe
removalofsuchapostaterulers,theendingofmaligninterferenceintheaffairsoftheMuslimworld,
andeven,forsome,ontheoverthrowoftheentiresystemofliberaldemocracyintheWest.
ThesemovementsmakeappealstothegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandtothoseinterested
inpossibleconversiontotheIslamistsversionofIslam,andmayconnectwithconcernsoversocial
exclusion,IslamophobiaandidentitycrisesexperiencedbysomesecondandthirdgenerationMuslims
livingintheWest.Wearguethatunderlyingradicalisationprocessesarenotwellunderstoodand
policyresponsesasyet,arenothighlynuancedandwelltargeted.
v)Socio-economicvulnerability
Theissueofsocio-economicvulnerability,ourfifthdriver,isrisingupthesecurityagenda,partlyasa
consequenceofchangestoUKbusinesspractices(movingtoleanproduction,reducedinventories,
justintimedelivery),partlyasaresultofstretchedglobalsupplychainsandpartlyasaconsequence
ofsomechangestoourowndomesticinfrastructure.Theresultistheemergenceofamoretightly
coupledsociety,increasinglyreliantonacriticalinfrastructurethathaslittlesparecapacity.This
exposestheUKtopossiblesevereconsequencesintheeventoffailuresininfrastructurebrought
aboutbyterrorism,accidentorsevereweatherincident,asthefloodsofsummer2007madeclear.
Changesinownershipandcontrolstructuresinrelationtoinfrastructurealsocreategovernance
challenges(around80percentofimportantUKinfrastructureisownedbytheprivatesector).
Conclusions:wheredoesallthisleaveus?
First,thelandscapedescribedisoneinwhichthepowertocontrolthesecurityenvironmentisslipping
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beyondthereachofgovernmentsactingalone.Thisistrueatthegloballevelonissueslike
climatechangeandthegrowthofungovernedspaces,anditistrueathomeonissueslike
protectionofacriticalnationalinfrastructurethattheGovernmentnolongerowns.
Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,weincreasinglyliveinaworldofshareddestinies
inwhichthegrievance,policyfailureorinsecurityofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontextsecuritymustbecommontoallorisunlikelytobe
deliveredforany.
Third,andgiventheabove,itisclearthatthecorechallengeofsecuritypolicytodayisto
enhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybettermapontoandreflect
thecurrentrealitiesofglobalpowerandbetteraddressthesecurityconcernsofall.
Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape
Belowweaddresstheimplicationsthatflowfromthisanalysis.
Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy
Weneedtobroadentheterraincurrentlyclassifiedasrelevanttosecuritypolicy.AconcernwithdefendingtheUKagainstexternalmilitaryattackisstillimportantbutmustnowbenestedwithin
concernformoreissues,morethreatsandrisks,awiderrangeofactors,andalsomanymorelevels
ofanalysis(fromtheglobaltothelocal).Itisalsoarguedthatoldnotionsofthesecurityfront
linenolongerworkandthatsomefrontlinesnowexistoverseasinplaceslikeAfghanistan,while
somealsoexistatthelocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Manyfrontlinesinvolvethemilitary,
butothersinvolveeconomicactors,communitygroups,andprivatesectorbusinessestoo.Thenew
terrainofsecuritypolicyisthereforemorediverseandcomplexthantheold.
Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach
Arethinkinoverallstrategicapproachisalsorequired.Itisnotjustthatpowerisbeingdiffused
morewidelyandthattherangeofchallengesisbecomingbroaderandmorecomplex,butthatthe
requirementsofprojectinginfluenceinthesecircumstanceshavechangedtoo.
BelowwesummarisefiveprinciplesthatunderpinUKpolicyresponsesinthesecircumstances:
Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower,thatis,amoreintegrateduseofawiderrangeofpolicyinstruments,frommilitaryandpolicinginstrumentsatoneendofthespectrumtoeconomic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsattheother.
Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers,notjustatmultilaterallevelbutalsobetweendifferentactorswithinthesamestateandbetweenstateactorsandactorsfromtheprivateandvoluntarysector.Inanerainwhichpowerisbeingdiffusedacrossawiderrangeofactors,influencewillbemaximisedbythoseabletoorchestrateandfacilitateawidelydistributedresponse.
Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction.Partnershiprequiresanagreedobjectiveandvisionacrossmanyactors.Thisitselfcanonlybebuiltonawidelyperceivedbasisoflegitimacy.Althoughitisnotalwayseasytoachievewidespreadagreement,itisworththeeffortaslegitimacyactsasaninfluencemultiplier,turningpotentialinfluenceinthesecurityenvironmentintoactualinfluenceasmanymoreactorspullinthesamedirection.
Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking. Legitimacyisaboutprocess,notjustsubstance.Itcanonlybedemonstratedifallactorsfeelagenda-settingapproachesanddecision-makingprocessesareopen.Officialactorsandmultilateralpartnersmustthereforelooktosharemoreinformationandtoopenupdecision-makingprocessesiftheywanttobeeffectiveincurrentcircumstances.
Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform.Giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouthowtoinfluencethesecurityenvironment,acommitmenttoinstitutionalreformwillbeessential.Old
institutionaloperatingproceduresandboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostiflenecessaryinnovation.
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Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy
Anumberofapparentlypressingpolicyquestionscanbeidentifiedgiventheprecedinganalysisofthe
securityenvironment.Onesetisrelatedtoanticipatoryactiononthesourcesoffuturepossible
threatsandrisks,andanotherisrelatedtoareasofcurrentvulnerability.
Anticipatoryquestionsfocuson:
Howbesttoreformkeyinternationalinstitutionsandhowbesttostrengthenarules-basedinternationalorder
Thelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandotherelementsofthesecurityagenda,bothathomeandabroad
Thestepsthatmightbenecessarytostrengthenthenuclearnon-proliferationregime Thelinksbetweennationalenergystrategyandinternationalsecurity,includingonsecurityof
energysupply,andthesecurityissuesthatmayberaisedbyaninternationalexpansionincivilnuclearpower
TherequirementsofapoliticalstrategytodefeatthechallengeofpoliticalIslam
Howbesttotacklethepovertyandinequalitythatarekeyfactorsinmanyfailedandweakstatesandinmuchconflictandinstabilityinthedevelopingworld Howbesttoenhanceourcapacitiesforconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionin
failedandfailingstatesandconflictzones
Howbesttoprepareforthedangerofanewdiseasepandemic.
Questionsoncurrentvulnerabilitiesfocuson:
HowbesttoreducetheUKssocio-economicvulnerabilityandtobuildnationalandlocalresilience
Howbesttointegratepolicyinstrumentsinthefightagainsttransnationalorganisedcrime Thesecurityofstrategictraderoutes
Thesecurityofglobalstocksoffissilematerial.Byidentifyingsuchawiderangeofquestions,thepaperhopestoframesomeoftheforwarddebate
onthedevelopmentoftheUKsfirstnationalsecuritystrategy.
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OverthelasttwentyyearstheUKandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthaschangeddramatically.
TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arebuttwodevelopmentsamongmanythat
havesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcenturylandscape.Newprocessesanddrivers,fromglobalisationtoclimatechange,andfromthegrowthofpoliticalIslamtoamoreinfrastructure-reliant
societyhavecometotheforeandnowchallengebothoutdatedanalyticalframeworksandoldpolicy
prescriptions.Poweritselfisonthemove,beingdiffusedmorewidelywithinandamongthe
communityofstatesandouttoawidergroupofactorsincludingprivatebusinesses,terroristgroups
andorganisedcrimenetworks.Inthedevelopingworld,interactivecyclesofpoverty,conflictand
instabilityareplaguingmanyareas,creatingungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaceswhichinturn
becomesafehavensforthosewhowoulddousharm.Thescaleofunderlyingchangeishuge,andthe
consequencesbecomingmoreandmoreapparent.
Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchangebutthedifficulties
presentedaresignificantandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilemanyoftheeffortsalready
underwayaretobecommended,andtheGovernmentscommitmenttothedevelopmentand
publicationofaUKnationalsecuritystrategyfortheveryfirsttimeistobewelcomed,now,more
thaneverbefore,theneedforconstructiveexternalchallengeisgreat.
TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whichhasnowmetseveraltimesunder
theco-chairmanshipofLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon,has
beensetuppreciselytoprovidesuchchallengethroughthedevelopmentofanindependently
arrived-atnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.
Purposeofthispaper
Inthisipprdiscussionpaper,whichisasubmissiontotheCommissionfromtheDeputyChairand
CommissionSecretaryandnotanexpressionoftheviewsoftheCommissionitself,wecapture
someoftheemergingthemesfromtheCommissionsearlydeliberations.Indoingso,wetakestockofthechangesoccurringandofferanaccountofthemanychallengestheynowpresent.Wealsoassess
theimplicationsofchangebothforthescopeofsecuritypolicyitselfandforthestrategicpriorities
thatmaynowneedtobeaddressed.Assuch,thisisnotsomuchapaperexpressingviewsonwhat
theUKsnationalsecuritystrategyshouldnowbe,asapaperanalysingthecontextwithinwhichthe
UKsnationalsecuritystrategyoughtnowtobeforged.
Structureofthepaper
Thematerialthatfollowscomesintwomainparts.InPart2 wepresentanaccountofcontemporary
securityconditions.Weaddressshiftsintheglobaldistributionofpower,issuesrelatedtoterrorism,
thechangingroleofbothstateandnon-stateactors,andsecurityrelevantfeaturesofeconomic
interdependence.Wealsoexaminethelinkagesbetweenglobalpoverty,inequalityandconflictandthenationalsecurityimplicationsofaworldincreasinglythreatenedbyclimatechange.
Inthispartofthepaper,ourobjectiveistoshowthattherangeandcharacteroftodayssecurity
challengesincludesbutgoesbeyondatraditionalconcernforthemilitarydefenceofourhome
territory.Indescribingamuchwiderlandscape,werelocatethedebateonsecuritypolicytonewand
differentterrainandprovide,intheprocess,thebasisformuchneededreflectiononhowwemight
changestrategyandpolicyinresponse.
Thisisfollowed,inPart3,withamoredetailedassessmentoftheimplicationsoftheanalysis
presented.Weofferanewaccountoftheterrainofsecuritypolicy,whichopensupthefieldtomany
moreactors,issuesandlevelsofanalysisthancanbecapturedbyamoretraditionalapproach.A
concernwithglobalpoverty,withcriticalinfrastructureprotectionandwithdomesticpublicsafety
frompandemicdiseasesandnaturaldisastersisadded,forexample,tomoretraditionalmilitaryanddiplomaticconcerns.Nextwesetoutourthoughtsonthecharacteroftheoverallstrategicresponse
requiredinthenewcircumstances,beforegoingontoidentifysomeofthekeyquestionstowhichwe
believeanyforward-lookingnationalsecuritystrategymustnowbesensitive.
1.Introduction
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Emergingthemes
Threethemesemergeasthepaperdevelops.Thefirstisthatweneedtorethinkournotionofwhat
doesanddoesnotconstitutethefrontlineinthebattleforsecurity.Indeed,ifthereisoneprimary
distinguishingfeatureofthenewenvironmentfromtheolditisthattraditionalnotionsofasecurity
frontlinenolongerapply.Todaywefacemultiplefrontlines,acrossamuchwiderrangeofissuesandthreats,someoutsideofourownterritoryattheothersideoftheworldoratgloballevel,andothers
downatlocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Thehighlycomplextaskofasecuritystrategyinthis
environmentistodirectactivityinacoherentwayacrossallissues,frontsandlevelsofactionatthe
sametime.
Second,thepaperarguesthatpublicauthoritiesatalllevelsfromthelocaltotheglobalarefindingit
hardertomaintainsufficientcontrolovertherapidlychangingsecurityenvironment.Poweriseither
slipping,orinsomecaseshasalreadyslipped,beyondthem.Thekeychallengeofthetimes,therefore,
relatestohowbesttostrengthenourgovernancemechanismssuchthattheyarebetterableto
maintainand,wherenecessary,regaincontroloverthatenvironmentatalllevels.
Third,thepaperspellsouttheneedforcommonsecurity,oraneedtobeinterestednotjustinour
ownsecuritybutalsointhesecurityofothers.Thisneedisnotaltruisticbutgroundedinabeliefthat
wenowliveinaworldofgenuinelyshareddestiniesinwhichthegrievance,insecurityorpolicyfailure
ofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontext,acollaborative
approachtosecuritypolicy,builtonawiderandmoreeffectivelyintegratedrangeofpolicy
instrumentsbutalsodrawingintheeffortsofawidelydistributedrangeofactors,islikelytobethe
keytosuccess.Here,thestressisonnationalgovernments,internationalorganisations,regional
bodies,NGOs,communitygroups,localauthoritiesandindividualcitizensneedingtopulltogetherto
deliverthedesiredoutcomesinacollaborativeprocess.Governmentsnolongersimplydelivernational
securityto,oronbehalfoftherestofusinthisenvironment,butmustalsofacilitate,coordinateand
orchestratetheactivitiesofmanyotheractorsthatarenowrelevanttopolicysuccess.Toputit
anotherway,wearguethatanincreaseinthesocialdepthofsecuritypolicycancontributetoits
ultimatereachandeffectiveness.
TheCommissiongoingforward
Theideaspresentedinthispaperareaworkinprogressandtheintentioninpublishingistostimulate,
andtofocus,furtherdiscussion.Theviewsexpressedhere,toreiterate,capturetheflavourand
characterofsomeoftheCommissionsearlydeliberationsbutaretheviewsoftheauthorsonlyand
nottheviewsoftheCommissionitself.TheCommissionwillpublishaninterimreportlaterin2008
andafinalreportin2009,settingoutitsviewsandofferinganindependentlydevelopednational
securitystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.
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Inthispartofthepaperwepresentouraccountofthekeydriversofthecontemporarysecurity
environment.Wedothisthroughatreatmentoffivecorethemes.Theseare:
i) Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
ii)Povertyandfailingstates
iii)Climatechange
iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
v)Socio-economicvulnerability.
Webelievethatindividually,eachofthesecapturesbothanimportantdriverofchangeandan
importantsetofeffectsandthatwhentakentogethertheyamounttoavaluableframeworkfor
thinkingaboutthesecurityenvironmentasawhole.Inthematerialthatfollows,thethemeof
globalisationandpowerdiffusionisdealtwithatgreaterlengththaneachoftheothers(primarilyasa
resultofitscomplexity),butall,inourview,haveequalsignificance.
i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
Akeyfeatureofthesecuritylandscapetodayisanongoingprocessofpowerdiffusion.1 Power
diffusionisoccurringlargelyasaconsequenceofglobalisationandfundamentallyislinkedtosomeof
globalisationsunderlyingfeatures,namelytechnologyadvanceanddispersal,improved
communications,andreducedtransportationcosts.Itisvisibleinseveralrespects:
First,andperhapsmostobviously,itisvisibleinarelativeredistributionofpowerwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates.
Second,itisreflectedintheincreasedimportanceofarangeofnon-stateactorssuchasglobalbusinesses,terroristgroups,transnationalcriminalnetworksandsometransnationalpoliticalmovements.
Third,itisevidentintheunplannedgrowthofpower-sharingbetweenstates,suchthatthesecurityofonenowoftendependsondecisionstakeninandbyothers.(KeohaneandNye1973)
Wedealwitheachoftheseinturnbelow.
Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates
Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesrelatesfirsttoarelativeredistributionof
powerfromtheAtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific.Thisisnot,intheshorttermatleast,about
asignificantshiftinthemilitarybalance:giventhedemiseoftheSovietUnion,noonestateoreven
collectionofstateswillrivalthemilitarypoweroftheUnitedStatesintheimmediatefuture.This
dimensionofpowerdiffusionis,rather,economicsledandissignalledprincipallybytheriseofChina
andIndia.
Chinasincreasedpowerisaproductoftworelateddevelopments.Thefirstisitssustainedandrapid
economicgrowthwhich,overthelast20years,hasaveragedanannualrateofjustbelow9percent,a
figurecomparabletoJapansaverage10percentannualgrowthrateduringitsboomyearsof1955to
1972.ChinasGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)isnow,asaconsequence,theworldsfourthlargest
behindthetheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany. 2 Second,Chinasincreasingeconomicpowerisa
functionofitshugeforeigncurrencyreserveswhichhavebeenbuiltonthebackofitsseemingly
endlesssupplyoflow-costlabour,aconsequentriseinitsmanufacturingsector,andtheunprecedented
1.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemeantheresourcesandcapacitiesthatmaypotentiallybeusedto
achieveinfluenceoverthesecurityenvironment.Inthissectionofthepaper,wediscusstherelative
distributionofsuchresourcesandcapacitiesamongactorsintheinternationalsystem.InSection3we
returntotheissueofwhichresourcesandcapacitiesarethoughtmostimportantincurrentcircumstances,andtohowtheymightbestbecombinedformaximumeffect.
2.ThoughinGDPpercapitaterms,in2006,itlaggedbehindLebanon,KazakhstanandArmenia.All
figuresbasedonUSBureauofLaborStatisticsandHumanDevelopmentReport,2006.
2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape
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severalrecenteventshaveshown,isnotaversetoflexingitspoliticalandmilitarymusclesagainstthis
newsituation.Forexample,ithastemporarilycutoffgassuppliestoUkraineandresumedlong-range
strategicbomberpatrols.Otherstatesandregionstooareincreasinginimportanceasenergymarkets
change,theCaspianSearegion,theformerSovietstatesofcentralAsia,Iran,Qatar,Nigeriaand
Venezuelaamongthem.Thisallcreatesnewcentresofpowerintheinternationalsystem,new
potentialflashpointsbetweenstatesinneedofenergysupplies,andnewareasofstrategicinterest
andsignificanceforallthemajorpowers.
Third,intermsoftheissueswehighlightasdriversofpowerdiffusionamongthecommunityof
states,wecometothespreadofnuclearweaponstechnology.EventhoughIsraeldevelopeditsown
nuclearcapabilityoutsidethenuclearnon-proliferationregime,thisregimeremainedrelativelystable
untilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclearpowers(theUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrance)
largelymaintainingamonopolyovernuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint.
Thelastdecade,however,haswitnessedadisturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.Indiaand
Pakistaneachconductedaseriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalof
acknowledgednuclearweaponsstatestoseven.NorthKorearesumedthereprocessingofplutonium
in2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince1994.TheNorthKoreans,whowerepreviouslybelievedtohavedevelopedenoughnuclearfuelto
maketwobombs,nowpossessenoughmaterialtoconstructtwobombsperyear.In2006,moreover,
NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becomingtheeighthacknowledgedmemberofthe
nuclearclub,althoughithasnowonceagainsuspendedreprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclear
reactor.InIran,meanwhile,thegovernmentisbelievedtobepursuinganuclearweaponsprogramme,
eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurelyintendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy.
Westernintelligenceagenciesandindependentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfrom
twototenyearsawayfromobtaininganuclearweapon.
ThesedevelopmentshavespurredatleastanotherelevencountriestohedgeagainstanIranianbomb
andtoseekassistancefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)todeveloptheirown
nuclearenergyprograms.Egypt,Turkey,andSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthatmasteryofnucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional
hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhaspledgedtobuild
threenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefiveothermembersoftheGulf
CooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(CirincioneandLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrends
arenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatileMiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates
(IsraelandIran)andadozenothercountrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsof
nuclearfuel.Theseareprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion.
Evenmorefundamentally,however,theproliferationofnucleartechnologiesandweaponsrepresents
asignificantadditionalmodificationtothewiderrelativedistributionofpoweramongstatesinthe
internationalsystem.Whenseenincombinationwiththeotherchangesdescribedinthissection,this
representsashifttoanewandpotentiallyfarlessstableeraofinter-staterelationsandalso,importantly,tooneinwhicharangeofinternationalinstitutionsandregimesfromtheUNSecurity
CounciltotheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatynolongerappeartoreflectorcapturetherealitiesof
globalpower.
Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors
Thesecondevidentdimensionofpowerdiffusionthatweobserveisthatinvolvingarelativediffusion
ofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactors.Someofthisdiffusionhasbeendrivenbystatesthemselves
throughuseofprivatemilitaryfirms.Muchofit,however,hasoccurredinspiteof,andnotbecauseof
theviewsanddecisionsofstates.Terroristgroups,groupsengagedintransnationalorganisedcrime,
andsometransnationalpoliticalmovements,particularlyintheMiddleEast,haveallbeenvisible
beneficiariesofthiswiderprocessinrecentyears.Inthissection,wefocusprimarilyonthislatter
groupofactors,believingtheyareofmoreimmediateandpressingsecurityconcern.
Totaketerroristgroupsfirst,thesehaveobviouslybeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepoint
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atwhichanewformofsuper-terrorismtookcentrestageininternationalaffairs(Freedman2002).
Theyarealong-termandstructuralchallenge,however,whatevertheirideologicalorientation,fortwo
underlyingreasons.
Thefirstconcernstheirincreasinglydestructivenatureandpotential.Thisisevidencedbythefactthat
thelevelofviolenceinactsofterrorismhasbeenincreasinginrecentdecades.ThebombingoftheWorldTradeCenteron26February1993tooksixlivesandinjured1,000.HugebombsattheUS
embassiesinKenyaandTanzaniainAugust1998killed220andwounded4,000betweenthem.The
eventsof11September2001saw2,986peoplelosetheirlivesasthreeairlinersflewintothe
PentagoninWashingtonandbothtowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork.
Thetrend,therefore,isclear.Itmaynotbesmoothandannualdeathtollsfromterrorismarenot
goingupatanevenrateyearonyear,buttherecordnowstandsatnearly3,000deathsforasingle
terroristoperationcarriedoutonasingleday.Inthiscontext,PlutaandZimmermanwererightto
recentlyconcludethatfewpsychologicalbarrierstotruemass-casualtyterrorismremain(Plutaand
Zimmerman2006:66).Intermsoffuturepotential,moreover,thekeyworryisthatterroristgroups
willgainaccesstoweaponsofmassdestructionandtoanuclearweaponinparticular.Some,suchas
RobinFrostinarecentAdelphipaper,havedismissedthisasanunrealisticpossibility,arguingthattheriskofnuclearterrorism,especiallytruenuclearterrorismemployingbombspoweredbynuclear
fission,isoverstated(Frost2005:7).Butthisseemsanextraordinarilycomplacentpositiontotake
whenoneconsidersthewidercontext.
First,weknowthatsometerroristgroupshaveaclearintenttoaccessweaponsofmassdestruction,
includingnuclearweaponsandmaterials,ifatallpossible.ThisiscertainlytrueofAlQaeda.Drawing
oninsideexperienceandseniorintelligencesources,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefenceGraham
AllisonnotesthatOsamaBinLadentriedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)fromSouthAfrica
asearlyas1992andalsothatBinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedarepresentativesmetwithsenior
figuresfromthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).Materialsdiscoveredin
AlQaedasafehousesinAfghanistan,moreover,showthatAlQaedaofficialsspenttimeresearching
theprocessesrequiredtobuildanuclearweaponandalsounderstoodthepossibleshortcutsthatcouldbetakeninbuildingacrudenucleardevice.OthergroupsbeyondAlQaeda,suchasJaish-e-
Mohammed(JEM),agroupfocusedontheKashmirconflictbutwithreportedlinkstothePakistani
establishment,andHezbollah,withitscloselinkstoIran,cannotberuledoutasorganisationsalso
seekingthenuclearoption.
Ifdemandforthisoptionexiststhensotoo,worryingly,doespotentialsupply.Thedangerherecomes
intwoforms,namelythatterroristgroupswillillegallyacquireeitheraready-madenuclearweapon,a
so-calledloosenuke,orthefissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.Controversyhasragedontheissue
ofloosenukeseversinceAlexanderLebed,theformernationalsecurityadvisertoPresidentYeltsin,
confidedtobothpublicandprivateaudiencesintheUnitedStatesin1997thattheRussian
governmentcouldnotaccountfor84one-kilotonSovietsuitcasenucleardevices(Allison2006).Since
thattime,despitesomeimprovementsinsecurityaroundRussiasnuclearfacilities,onlyjustover50percentofRussiasnuclearweaponsandmaterialshaveundergoneacomprehensivesecurityupgrade
(NuclearThreatInitiative2006).
Onthesecondthreat,thatterroristgroupswillgettheirhandsonweaponsgradefissilematerial,the
pictureishardlymorereassuring.Toachieveanuclearexplosion,aminimumof15.9kgofHighly
EnrichedUraniumor4.1kgofplutoniumisrequired.4 Arecentstrategicdossieronnuclearblack-
marketsbytheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,usinghighlyconservativeestimatesdrawn
fromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheDatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,Theft
andOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)statedbaldlythat:ThetotalamountofHEUandplutonium
seizedinstate-confirmedandotherhighlycredibleincidentsregisteredintheperiod1991-2006is
4.Theseamountsapplyifaberylliumreflectorisusedinthedevice.Withoutsuchareflector,more
fissilematerialisneeded.
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roughly38kg(IISS2007:126).Notallofthis38kgwasweaponsgradematerialbutaround8kgofit
was,andthisrepresentsonlytherecoveredamountsofbomb-relevantmaterialfromknown attempts
atsmugglinginrecentyears.5 Bydefinition,itdoesnottellustheamountofnuclearmaterialstolen
butnotdetectedbylawenforcementagenciesoverthesameperiodandwecannotretrospectively
calculatewhatthatamountmightbesincethereisnoglobalinventoryofHEUandplutoniumandit
isnotknownexactlyhowmuchplutoniumandHEUhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand
Zimmerman2006).
Thepointaboutallofthesedevelopmentsisthat,withoutfurthersignificantefforttoaddressthe
trendsandchallengesdescribed,theypointtoa21stcenturyinwhichitishighlyunlikelythatstate
actorswillretaintheirmonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.
Aseconddevelopmentthatisenhancingtherelativepowerofterroristgroupsresidesinthe
advantagesnowbeingbestoweduponthembydigitaltechnologyandcommunications.Thesehave
amplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,andenhancedthelawenforcementevasion
capabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellitecommunicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmuch
easierforterroristgroupstobothmakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.TheInternethas
becomeakeyplacefortherecruitment,radicalisationandmobilisationofmanyyoungextremistsand,forthoseseekingtomaketheswitchfromextremismtooperationalterrorism,akeyknowledge-
sharingtoolandaidforattack-coordinationandplanning(Ryan2007).Strongencryptiontools,
meanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuch
communicationschannelsinasecureandsecretenvironment(MinistryofDefence2007).Thislast
developmentinparticularrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstatetonon-stateactors
since,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuchparticularfinancialand
computingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates.
Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,thesetooarebecomingmoreprominentandthreatening.
Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossbordersbecausedecliningtransportcosts,improvedglobal
communicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofbothpeopleandgoodsmakesthisfareasier
thaneverbefore.Thesheerscaleofcriminalactivityisalsoincreasing,partlybecauseoftheextendedgeographicalreachofthecriminalnetworksthemselves,partlybecauseforsome,particularlyinthe
developingworld,criminalactivityisseenasonepotentialrouteoutofpovertyandpartlybecausein
somepatrimonialstatesthereisnowanattitudethatnationalresourcesaretheretobeexploitedfor
thebenefitofthecorruptfewinpower.Consequently,theUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralsHigh
LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangesrightlyidentified,inareportin2004,transnational
organisedcrimeasoneofthemajorsecuritychallengesfacingtheworld(UnitedNations2004).
Theillicitdrugstradeisthemostlucrativeoftheactivitiesunderway(accordingtotheUnitedNations
OfficeonDrugsandCrime,theoverallturnoveroftheworldwideillicittradeindrugsalonenow
standsataround$300bnannually[UNODC2006]),thoughthevarietyofcriminalactivitiesisalso
widening.AstheUNsAntonioMazzitellirecentlypointedout,criminalactivitiessuchastraffickingin
people,stolenvehicles,naturalresources,firearmsandcontraband,counterfeitingandintellectualpiracy,smugglingofmigrants,andcybercrimeallfeatureonthemenuofservicesoffered(Mazzitelli
2007:1074).
Launderingofmoneyandcorruptionarethetwofurtheressentialfeaturesofthisactivity,thefirstto
allowcriminalstobenefitfromtherevenuesraisedandthesecondtoreducetheriskofcapturebylaw
enforcementagenciesandtoincreaseinfluenceoverpoliticaldecisionsincountriesofoperation.
Transnationalorganisedcrimethereforeflourishesmostwherestateinstitutionsareopento
corruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawisweakandwherebordersareporous.Evenmore
importantlyfromthepointofviewofunderstandingthecontemporarynationalsecurityenvironment,
criminalnetworksnotonlylocatethemselvesinareasthathavesomeofthesecharacteristics,suchas
5.Forweaponspurposes,HEUneedstobeenrichedtoatleast80percentoraboveandmorenormally
to90percentorabove.
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inWestAfrica,butdothemselvesalsohavethepotentialtocreateandsustainpariahstates6 which,
nomatterwhattheirformalarrangementsofgovernanceare,actuallyserveassafehavensforcriminal
gangsandtheiractivities.Thisisaserioussituation,bothbecausethestatesinquestioncan
effectivelyspreadinstabilitythroughouttheregionsinwhichtheyarelocatedandbecausethereare
alsolinksbetweencriminalnetworksandterroristgroups,withtheformeroftenprovidingmoney
launderingandotherfinancialservicestothelatteraswellasassistingintheillicittraffickingofgoods
thatmaybeofvaluetothem.
Whereasterroristgroupsarechallengingastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforceandare
increasingly,therefore,notfindingstatebordersahindrance,transnationalorganisedcrimegroupsare
changingtheverycharacterofsomestatesintheinternationalsystem,turningthemintovehiclesfor
privateprofitandspreadinginstabilityandmiseryintheprocess.
Athirdandfinalsetofnon-stateactorswebelieveitimportanttohighlightarethetransnational
politicalmovementsthathavecometoexertimportanceinfluenceoninternationalaffairsinrecent
years.OnesuchmovementisHezbollah,aparticularlyimportantorganisationinthecontextofthe
contemporaryMiddleEast.
Hezbollah,anIslamistpoliticalgroupformedin1982toresistwesterncolonialisminLebanonand
acrossthewiderregion,toengageinarmedstruggleagainstIsraelandtoworktowardsthe
establishmentofaLebaneseIslamicRepublic,runsschools,hospitalsandmediaservices,andhas
implementedmanydevelopmentprogrammesinareasinwhichitisoperational.Itsso-calledMartyrs
Institutegivesfinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthosewhodieinconflictand,followingtheJuly
2006waragainstIsrael,Hezbollahhasbeenextremelyactiveinthereconstructionprocess,often
doingmoreonthisfrontthantheLebanesegovernmentitself.Hezbollah,inotherwords,anddespite
thenarrowcoverageofitsactivitiesintheWest,paysmuchattentiontoawiderangeofsocialwelfare
activitiesaswellastotheconflictwithIsrael(Salem2006).
Inhighlightingthisgroup,thepointwemakeisnot,ofcourse,apoliticaloneinsupportofit.
Hezbollahhasanobjectionablepolicyplatformonmanyissuesandislessthanfullyconstructivein
relationtobringingpeaceandstabilitytotheMiddleEast.Thepointwemake,rather,istheanalytical
onethatinconditionsofconflictandweak,absentorineffectualstateinstitutions,transnational
politicalmovementssuchasHezbollahcananddoemergetofillthevacuumandtoplaysignificant
rolesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Theyalsooftendosoonthebasisofacarefully
cultivated,deep-rootedandoftenlong-termrelationshipoflegitimacywiththepopulationsthey
claimtorepresent.Sometransnationalpoliticalactorswithsocialpower,inotherwords,havebecome
seriousplayersininternationalpolitics.Whiletheymighthavestatebackers(inthiscaseSyriaand
Iran)theyarenotentirelyinthepocketsoftheirbenefactors.Assuch,theycannoteasilybeby-
passedorignoredwhenthinkingaboutpolicyresponsesand,inthiscase,theyareapopulist
challengetothelegitimacyofmanyWest-backedstateactorsintheMiddleEast.
Non-stateactorstoday,therefore,enjoyincreasedpowerandinfluencewhethertheyareterrorist
groups,transnationalcriminalgangsortransnationalpoliticalmovementsactiveontheinternational
stage.Someoftheseactorsareacquiringsomeofthepowerattributesofstates,arealteringthe
characterofsomestatesand,farmoreeffectivelythaninthepast,areofteninfluencing,undermining,
destabilisingandevenquestioningthelegitimacyofstates.Thisaddsanewsetofdynamicsand
challengestotheinternationalsecurityenvironment.
Powerdiffusionbeyondstateborders:securityinterdependence
Thethirdandfinaldimensionofpowerdiffusionwehighlightrelatestomorepower-sharingbetween
statesintheformofincreasedsecurityinterdependence.Thisitselfcomesintwoforms.Thefirst
relatestoasetofchallengesthataretrulyglobalinnatureandwhereconsequentlyonlysolutionsof
6.Bypariahstates,wemeanonesthatessentiallybehaveasoutcasts,alienatedfrommostotherstates
andacceptednormsofinternationalbehaviour.
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globalreachandwithallthemajorpowersinvolvedwilldo.Climatechangemitigation,orattemptsat
effectivecontrolofglobalstocksoffissilematerial,wouldbeemblematicissuesinthiscategory:there
isastrongsenseontheseissuesthatthecommunityofstateseithersinksorswimstogether.
Thesecondform,however,relatestothespecificthoughdifferentvulnerabilitiespresentedtoeach
stateasaby-productofitsowneconomicinterdependencewithtodaysglobalisedworldeconomy.InthecaseoftheUK,thereareatleastfoursuchvulnerabilities.
First,intermsofenergysupplies,theUKisadvancingintoaperiodoflesssecurityofsupplythanit
hasexperiencedinrecentdecades,asitmovesfrombeinganetenergyexportertoanetenergy
importer.Norwayiscurrentlyourmostimportantenergypartnerasamajorsupplierofbothoiland
gas(Norwayaccountedfor75percentofUKoilimportsin2005).However,intheyearsahead
Russia,theCaspianSearegion,Nigeria,Algeria,andtheMiddleEast,arealllikelytobecomemore
importantsupplierstotheUK.OurkeyEuropeantradingpartners,meanwhile,arealsowitnessing
shiftsintheirenergysupplybase.TheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,predictsthatthe
biggestsupplierofgastoEuropein2030willbeAfrica,followedbyRussiaandtheMiddleEast(Bird
2007:12;IEA2006).Thesechangesincreaseourvulnerabilitytoeventsin,andpressurefrom,awide
rangeofsuppliercountries.
Second,ourincreasingrelianceontrade(in2006,tradeaccountedfor60percentoftheUKsGDP)
makesthesecurityofkeystrategictraderoutesmoreimportantforbothBritainandtheEUthanever
before.Onesuchstrategictraderouteofgrowingimportanceisthealreadymassiveandrapidly
expandingmaritimefreightroutelinkingtheeconomiesofAsiatothoseofEurope(seeFinancial
Times 2007b).Anysignificantdisruptiontothisorotherroutes,broughtonbymaritimeterrorismor
otherevents,couldhavemassiveeconomicconsequencesfortheUKandindeedfortheEUasa
whole(seeRichardson2004).
Third,transnationalcrimeisamajorsourceofvulnerabilityfortheUK,comingonthebackofthe
vastlyincreasedmovementofbothpeopleandgoodsacrossourborders.7 Wecannotandshouldnot
ruleoutcollaborationbetweencriminalgangsactiveacrossourbordersandterroristgroupsintenton
smugglingharmfulmaterialsintotheUK.Suchcollaborationcouldhaveveryserioussecurity
consequences.Thepotentialeconomicimpactofsuchcriminalactivityisalsogreat,however.Tax
revenuesattheborder,forexample,currentlyamountto22billionperannum,oraround5percent
ofthetotaltaxtakeofaround420billion.Inthiscontext,successfullarge-scalecross-borderfraud
couldhaveaseriousimpactonthepublicpurse(CabinetOffice2007).
Anestimated25-35tonnesofheroin,meanwhile,enterstheUKannuallyalongwith35-45tonnesof
cocaineandbothcontributetoadrugsproblemthatisestimatedtocost15.4billionayearinthe
formoflawenforcement,crimeandhealth-relatedcosts(ibid:22).Therearealsosocialvulnerabilities.
Activitiessuchasdrugsmugglingimpactdirectlyonourcommunitiesintheformofsocialbreakdown
andareducedsenseofpublicsafety.
Fourthandlast,givenourpositionasaglobalhubforpeoplemovementinaneraofpeoplemovementonanunprecedentedscale,theUKisinanexposedpositioninrelationtothreatssuchas
aninfluenzapandemicbroughtinfromtheoutside.Apandemicisnowconsideredabiological
certainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthestraininvolved,theseverityoftheoutcomeandthe
timingoftheoutbreak.ManyexpertsbelievethatH5N1birdfluisthestraintoworryaboutandthis,
asweknow,cankillhumanbeings(globally,therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1wereto
mutateintoavirusthatcouldbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween
humanbeings,thatwouldbeapotentiallycatastrophicdevelopment.Recentstudieshavesuggested
that,incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolveslunginfection,theH5N1virusmight
7.Thecurrentannualflowofmorethan218millionpassengerjourneysacrossUKbordersisexpectedto
increaseto450millionby2030.Totalfreightflowsarealsonowmassive,witharound440milliontonnesoffreightflowingacrossourborderseachyear,afigurelikelytoincreaseto580milliontonnesby2030
(CabinetOffice2007).
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bedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffectmultipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionofthe
immunesystemknownasacytokinestorm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelpto
explainwhythe1918-19pandemicwassodeadly(Osterholm2007:50).Consequently,inassessing
thelikelyoutcomeofapandemic,arecentstudybytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy
(McKibbin2006)foundthatwereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-19tooccur,over142million
peoplewoulddieandtheworldsGDPwouldsufferalossofsomeUS$4.4trillion(McKibbinquoted
inOsterholm2007:48).
Ourreadinessandlevelofprotectionfromsuchaneventisinadequatebutmorethanthat,itisalso
intricatelytiedupwithandreliantuponthepublicandanimalhealthsystemsandfreedomof
movementstrategiesadoptedbymanyothercountriesandnotonlyonthestrategiesweputinplace
hereintheUK.
Infact,inalloftheformsofvulnerabilitydescribedinthissection,thekeypointtonoteisashiftin
thepowertoaddresspolicychallengesawayfromtheindividualstatelevelandtowardseitherthe
globallevelontheonehand(verticalshift)ortoanotherstate,orgroupofstatesontheother
(horizontalshift).Thisappliestoclimatechange,tothesupplyofenergy,tothesecurityofourtrade
routes,tolawenforcementactivitiesoverseasonorganisedcrimeandterrorismandtoprecautionstakenagainstanewpandemic.Theoutcomeofsecurityinterdependence,inshort,isaworldinwhich
thesecurityofonestateanditspeopleismoredependentthaneverbeforeondecisions,actionsand
eventsunfoldingelsewhereinothers.
ii)Povertyandfailingstates
Ourseconddriverofchangeinthesecuritylandscaperelatestoglobaleconomicconditionsandtoa
clutchofissuesaroundwhatismostoftencalledthesecurity-developmentnexus.Thisisthepoint
atwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonofweakandfailingstates
interact,todevastatingeffect.
Povertyitselfhasbeenhighontheinternationalagendainrecentyearsthanksinnosmallparttothe
Britishgovernmentand,globally,thankstothehighprofilegiventoattemptstomeettheMilleniumDevelopmentGoals.Therehavebeensomerealandquantifiablesuccessestoo.Thenumberofpeople
livinginabjectpovertyonlessthanUS$1perday,forexample,hasmorethanhalved,fallingfrom
40.1percentoftheworldspopulationin1981to18.1percentin2004(WorldBank2007).An
estimated135millionpeoplewerepulledoutofpovertyintheperiod1999to2004alone.Muchof
thiseffort,however,hasbeenconcentratedintheeconomicmiraclesinChinaandotherpartsof
rapidlydevelopingEastAsia,ratherthanbeingevenlyspread(Sachsetal2007).Consequently,
accordingtotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,almost50percentoftheworldschildren
werestilllivinginpovertyin2005.Indeed,thetermdevelopingcountryisstillamisnomerwhen
appliedtosomeoftheworldspoorestcountries,asmorethanthreebillionpeoplearelivingonless
thanUS$2aday,withlittleimmediatehopeofmajorimprovement.
Thislevelofcontinuedpovertyiscentraltoourargumentsforthreereasons.
First,povertyisamajorthreattohumanlife.Inanygivenyearinwhichthereisanabsenceofamajor
globalconflict,povertydirectlyaccountsformorelossofhumanlifethanpoliticalviolenceandthisin
itselfprovidesapowerfulargumentforthinkingaboutsecurityintermsthatgowellbeyondthe
traditionalfocusonexternalmilitaryattack.8 Whilenearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksof9/11,
forexample,preventablediseaseinducedbypovertyclaimstentimesthatnumberofchildrenevery
day.Bythatmeasure,oureffortstocombatpovertyhavesofarbeenadismalfailureandasaresult,
inmoraltermsatleast,thelegitimacyofthecurrentinternationaleconomicordermustbe
questionableatbest(Rice2007).
8.Thisisoneofthemajorreasonsforwhichmanyanalystshavecalledfortheadoptionofahuman
securityperspectivewhenthinkingaboutsecuritypolicy,aperspectivethatwesupportandreturnto
later.
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Second,povertyonthisscaleisamajorconcernbecauseitisnowagrowingthreattointernational
peaceandstability.ThereisadirectrelationshipbetweenacountryspercapitaGDPandits
susceptibilitytocivilconflict.Evidenceshowsthatifacountryranksinthefiftiethpercentileofper
capitaGDP,ithasa7.5percentriskofcivilconflict,halfofthelevelforcountriesthatrankinthe
tenthpercentile(Collieretal2004).Povertyisalso,importantly,akeydriverofthephenomenonof
weakandfailingstates,itselfagrowingandcorrosiveproblemontheinternationalstage.Weakstates
lackthecapacitytopreventviolentconflict,togovernlegitimately,tomeetbasichumanneedsandto
fostersustainableandequitableeconomicgrowth(Weinsteinetal2004).Notallweakstatesarepoor,
buttheentiretopteninForeignPolicymagazinesFailedStateIndexrankinthebottomthirdof
statesintermsofpercapitaGDP,andpovertyisclearlyakeyfactorintheseungovernedorbadly
governedspaces(ForeignPolicy2007).Suchspacesthemselvesserveasactiveorpassiveincubators
ofinstabilitythatcanspilloverintoneighbouringcountriesandwholeregionsintheformof
economicdisruption,refugeeflows,andthespreadofarmedconflictacrossinternationallyrecognised
borders.
Anelevatedriskofconflictis,infact,oneofthemostsignificanteffectsofweakandfailingstates
andthisisnowalsoreflectedinchangingpatternsofconflictaroundtheworld.Ratherthantheinter-
statewarsthatmarkedmuchofmodernhistorythroughtoWorldWarII,conflictpatternsoverthelast
sixtyyearshavebeencharacterisedmorebyintra-stateandcivilconflict.Ninety-fivepercentofall
conflictsarenowofthiskind(HumanSecurityCentre2005).Civilconflictslastlonger,moreover,and
arehardertoresolvethaninter-statewars,oftenlockingcountriesintoaconflicttrapofmutually
reinforcingpovertyandconflictleadingtoaprocessdescribedbytheWorldBankasdevelopmentin
reverse(WorldBank2003).
Third,thiscombinationofpovertywithweakandfailingstatesisaconcernbecauseitisnow
providingadirectthreattoourownsecurity.PresidentJohnF.Kennedysstatement,inhisinaugural
addressin1961,thatifafreesocietycannothelpthemanywhoarepoor,itcannotsavethefewwho
arerich(Kennedy1961)istruertodaythanitwasnearlyfivedecadesago.Thisisbecauseterrorist
groupsandcriminalnetworks,bothofwhichoftenhaveglobalreach,cananddonowtakeadvantage
ofweakandfailingstates.EvenwiththousandsofNATOtroopsnowinAfghanistan,thatcountrystill
produced87percentoftheworldsheroinin2005(UNODC2005).Ofcourse,drugshavenotbeen
theonlydangerousexportemergingfromthatcountrysinceterroristsusedthesafe-havengrantedby
theTalibantosetinmotiontheattacksof9/11.Somaliastotallackofnationalgovernancehasalso,
inrecenttimes,allowedthatcountrytobeusedasaprimarybaseofoperationsandshelterfor
terroristsactivethroughoutEastAfrica.Severaloftheindividualssuspectedofinvolvementinthe
bombingsofUSembassiesinKenyaandTanzaniain1998,forexample,arebelievedtostillbeatlarge
inSomalia(Payne2007).
Morality,concernsoverwiderinternationalpeaceandstability,andoverourownphysicalsecurity,
therefore,allmakepovertyandtheattendantgrowthofweakandfailingstatesasignificantdriverof
thecurrentinternationalsecuritylandscape.Asaresult,fordevelopedandwealthiercountriessuchastheUK,thelong-standingmoralimperativetotackletheissuesinthesecuritydevelopmentnexushas
beenjoinedbyanimperativebasedonself-interest.
iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity
Athirdandmorerecentlyemergeddriverofchangeintheinternationalsecurityenvironmentis
climatechange.Thisislikelytohaveamajorshapinginfluenceoninternationalaffairsinthedecades
ahead,thoughpreciselyhowandtowhatextentwilldependonthelevelofglobalwarmingthat
actuallyoccurs.TheFourthAssessmentReportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)
producedarangeoffuturetemperaturescenarios,basedonassumptionsaboutpopulationgrowth,
patternsofeconomicdevelopment,andthedevelopmentandadoptionofnewenergytechnologies
(IPCC2007).Thesescenariosshowbest-estimateprojectionsofaglobalaveragetemperatureincrease
thiscenturyintherangeof1.8Cto4.0C.Inthematerialthatfollows,webaseourdiscussiononthelikelyimpactofthemid-rangescenario,whichsuggestsabest-estimatetemperatureincreaseof2.8C
duringthecourseofthecenturyandanincreaseinthenexttwodecadesof1.5Cto2C.Underthis
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scenario,anumberofdevelopmentsinkeyregionsfromEasttoSouthAsia,theMiddleEastandon
throughmuchofAfricawilllikelyimpacttheinternationalsystem.
First,theIPCCprojectsthatChina willbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,particularlycomingunder
pressureinrelationtowaterstress,statingthat:InpartsofChina,theriseintemperaturesanddecreases
inprecipitation,alongwithincreasingwaterusehavecausedwatershortagesthatledtodryingupoflakesandrivers(IPCC2007:477).Chinasownfirstnationalreportonclimatechange,releasedinlate
2006,alsoforetoldacomingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycrop
yieldsby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustalsobethecountrysvulnerabilitytosea
levelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedonthecoast.
TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayplayabigroleinshapingboththecharacter
andstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelastfewyears,concernsover
environmentalissueshaveprovokedthousandsofChinesecitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry,
andthepotentialimpactsofclimatechangearenowhighinthemindsoftheChinesepeople.A2006
pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfound
80percentofrespondentsagreedthatwithintenyearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportant
threattotheircountrysvitalinterest(ChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs2006).KeyquestionsfortheChineseleadershipthereforearewhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhilerespondingto
thesedemandsforenvironmentalimprovementsandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegreeandat
suchpaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregimehandlesthesechallenges
couldhaveaprofoundeffectalargepartofinternationalaffairsinthedecadestocome.
Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmediumtermisthe
HimalayanregionofAsia,andthiswilllikelyimpactnearlyallofthesub-continent(IPCC2007).
TheHimalayanglaciersarethelargestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately
500,000km2,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacialareainthe
world.UndercurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycoulddisappearaltogetherby
2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80percenttocoveronly100,000km2.
ThiswillhavetheeffectofdeprivingtheIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmainsourceofwater,likelymakingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood
production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsealevelswillalso
harmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemanymega-deltasintheregion,furtherstressingagricultureand
foodsuppliesdependentonfishing.
ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchanextentthatthe
widerstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladeshisexploding(itisprojected
tonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)asclimatechangedestroysasignificantportionofthe
countrysalreadylimitedhabitableland,forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastable
environmentwithoutregardtotheregionsmanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwill
alsofaceclimatestressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbours,isalreadybracingitselfagainsta
waveofBangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealongthe2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007).
TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillbecomplicatedfurtherby
whatsomehavedescribedasanewhydrologicalsecuritycomplex(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEast
regionishometo6.3percentoftheworldspopulationbutonly1.4percentoftheworlds
renewablefreshwater.Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries,
namelyTurkey,Iran,IraqandSyria.Acomplexsetofwaterdependencyrelationshipsthereforeexists
andissettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemostvulnerablepositionsofallstatesintheregion
(Campbelletal2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetresofwaterpercapitaby2025;1000
cubicmetrespercapitaisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadevelopedcountry
(Homer-Dixonetal1993).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedinpoliticallyfraught
territory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthemountainaquiferthatunderliestheWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointstotheIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinian
relationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcouldbecomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionand
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conflictintheregion(Bitar2005).
InAfrica,highertemperaturesandlesserandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250million
moreAfricansunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffectEast,WestandNorthAfrica,the
lattersufferingarapidandseveredeclineinpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentupto
2050.EastAfricawilllikelyseeupto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion,whileatthesametimethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryerresultinginseveredroughtsand
additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesupnearlyhalfof
EastAfricasGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.Anylossinsovitalan
economicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesontheregionsoveralleconomicandpolitical
development(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,isalreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification:
approximately1,350squaremilesofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersand
herdsmanandcausinginternalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asa
result,by2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million
inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiverdelta,thougheven
thisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentireareaisalsoatmajorriskfromsea
levelrise(McCarthy2006,IPCC2007).
ThissetofdevelopmentsinAfrica,insomeoftheworldspoorestregions,maywelladdfurtherstress
totheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedintheprevioussection.Climateevents
themselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebutmigrationflowsarealsolikely
tobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstateauthoritiestorespondinanumberofareas.
ThismaybeaparticularlyacuteprobleminEastAfricawheretheconcentrationofweakorfailing
statesisalreadyhighandnumerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort,
climatechangemaybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica.
Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabovepointto
significantinternationalmigratorypressuresanditcannotbeassumedthattheseflowsofpeoplewill
staywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itishighlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsof
peoplewillbedirectedattheWestandattheEuropeanUnionandtheUKinparticular.BritishcolonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,forexample,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthe
surroundingareamustbeanticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoing
mixofconflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentrypoint
ofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapethechallengesanddifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Thiswilllikely
presentadditionalchallengestosocialunityintheEU,evenasEUmemberstatesturntomigrant
labourasaresponsetotheirowndemographicandlabourmarketchallenges.
IntheUK,therearealsolikelytobedirecteffects,asmuchoflow-lyingEastAngliainparticularislikely
tobeatincreasedriskofflooding.Observedmeasurementshaveshownthatthesea-levelofftheEast
Angliancoastisrisingbyanaverage4.5mmperyear,which,combinedwith1.5mmperyearofisostatic
adjustment(groundlevelsinking),isleadingtoa6mmperyearsealevelriseintheregion(Edwards
2005).IncreasedwindsandstormsintheNorthSeawillalsolikelycausemorepowerfulstormsurgesthatcouldbreachcoastaldefences,floodinginlandareas.Thesechangestothephysicalenvironmentof
theUKarelikelytobesmallrelativetosomeotherareasintheworld,butstillsignificant.
Severalimportantmilitaryassetswillalsobeatriskfromenvironmentaldamage.Sealevelrisecould
negativelyaffecttheSouthCoastnavalbasesatPortsmouthandDevonport.TheMinistryofDefenceis
currentlymodellingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthesebases(Liddell2007),andalthoughno
seriousdamageispredictedoverthenext20-25years,theIPCCpredictsthatsealevelrisealongthe
Englishcoastlinecouldbeupto50percenthigherthantheglobalaverage,whichunderworst-case
scenarioscouldseverelydisruptoperationsatthesebasesincurrentoperatingconditions.Increased
floodingcouldalsojeopardiseseveralRAFbases,namelyValleyontheIsleofAngleseyoffWalesand
twobasesinEastAngliacurrentlyusedbytheUSAirForce,LakenheathandMildenhall(Ministryof
Defence2006).Eachofthesethreeairfieldsisonly10metresabovesealevelleavingthemhighlyvulnerabletoflooding.AmongtheUKsoverseasmilitaryassets,thenavalstationatDiegoGarcia,a
tinyatollintheIndianOceanonlyonemetreabovesealevelatitshighestpoint,isinmoreimmediate
dangerfromrisingsealevels.TheCenterforNavalAnalysisintheUnitedStateswarnedina2007
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reportthatthebase,amajorforwardlogisticshubforbothBritishandAmericanforcesoperatinginthe
PersianGulfandMiddleEastregion,couldbelosttosealevelrise(CenterforNavalAnalysis2007).
Tore-cap,climatechangeissettohavedirectconsequencesfortheUKbothhereathomeandin
relationtoimportantoverseasassets,islikelytoprovokenewinter-statetensionsandtogeneratenew
sourcesandinstancesofstatefailure,particularlyinAfrica,andmayevenplayamajorroleinshapingthecharacterandoutlookofamajorpowerlikeChina.Itmayalsoputaddedpressureonsocialunity
indevelopedcountriesinacontextinwhichthatunityisalreadyunderstrain.Thisallamountstoa
verysignificantdestabilisingpressureinanumberofimportantstatesandregionsaroundtheworld
andintermsofitssecurityconsequences,mayyetcometodwarfandover-shadowthecurrently
high-profileissueofterrorism.
iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
Thefourthandpenultimatedriverofthecontemporarysecuritylandscapethatwehighlightisthe
growthofpoliticalIslam,orIslamism.9 Thisnowrepresentsbothanimmediatethreattopublicsafety
andalong-termpoliticalchallengetoWesternliberaldemocracies.Thoughitsoriginscanbetraced
backovermanycenturies,initsmodernformpoliticalIslamowesitsdevelopmenttowritersand
thinkersactiveinthemid-20thcentury,suchasAbulAlaMaududiinSouthAsiaandSayyidQutbin
Egypt(forathoroughanalysisoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofpoliticalIslamseeRoy2004and
Burke2003).Themovementsthesemenspawned,Jamaat-e-IslamiandtheMuslimBrotherhood,
werethevanguardinwhatMaududiopenlydescribedasarevolutionarydoctrineandsystemthat
seekstooverthrowgovernments(MaududiquotedinHusain2007).ModernIslamism,then,isbest
viewedasapoliticalmovementthatutilisesaparticularinterpretationofreligionratherthanasa
fundamentalistreligiousmovementthatattimespractisespolitics.NeitherMaududi,norQutb,nor
othersofnotelikethem,wereeventrainedclericsortheologians.
Intermsofitsideologicalcontent,Islamismisbasedonadivisionoftheworldintoconflictingcamps
ofgoodandevil.Good,inthisstoryline,arethetrueMuslimsfullydevotedtotheIslamists
interpretationofIslam.Evilontheotherhand,consistsinagroupofcountriesincludingtheUnited
States,theUnitedKingdom,France,andRussiawhicharesaidtorigtheinternationalsystemagainst
MuslimsandtouseanetworkofapostaterulersintheIslamicworldtoplunderitsresourcesandkeep
itscitizenssubdued.Consequently,Islamistpoliticalobjectivesrelatetotheremovalofsuchapostate
rulersfromtheMuslimworld,totheintroductionofmoretrulyIslamic(undertheirinterpretation)
societies,totheremovalofWesterninterferenceinMuslimaffairsandforsome,attheextreme,tothe
completeoverthrowofWesternliberalsocietyinitsentirety.
Inmorerecenttimesandinsomemanifestations,Islamismhasofcoursebecomeviolent,intheform
ofAlQaedaandAlQaeda-inspirednetworks,andintheformofothergroupsnotlinkedtoAlQaeda
inanyway.AkeyturningpointinrelationtoIslamistviolenceappearstohavebeentheSoviet
invasionofAfghanistan.IslamistorganisationsissuedacalltoMuslimseverywheretohelpinresisting
theSovietoccupation.Thousandsansweredthatcalland,furtherradicalisedbytheexperience,
subsequentlyreturnedtotheirhomecountrieswiththeviewthatviolenceconstitutedalegitimate
formofpoliticalexpression(Mamdani2005).Apsychologicalthresholdhadbeencrossedandviolence
becameameanstoachieverevolutionarypoliticalobjectivesinplacessuchasAlgeria,Egypt,Yemen,
Chechnya,Indonesia,andthePhilippines(BergenandReynolds2005).
Asweknow,politicalIslamtoday,eveninitsviolentforms,hasalsonowextendeditsreachinto
Westernliberaldemocraciesdirectly,beyondcountriesthatarepredominantlypopulatedbyMuslims.
ItseekstotargetandtorecruitboththegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandthosenon-
MuslimswhomaybesusceptibletoconversiontotheIslamistsparticularinterpretationofthereligion
ofIslam.
9.Thereisadebatetobehadontherightlanguagetousetocapturethisphenomenon.Wearestill
reflectingonthisbutforthepurposesofthispaper,thekeypointtonoteisthatwearedescribinga
politicalandnotareligiousphenomenon.
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Organisationallyandpolitically,politicalIslamisnothomogeneousanditsadherentscanbestbe
describedasexistinginaseriesofconcentriccircles.Atthecentreisasmallgroupofhard-core
radicalscommittedtoorchestratingviolentactioninfurtheranceoftheirpoliticalagenda,though
membersofthisgrouparenotoftentheperpetratorsoftheviolencethemselves.Inthenext,larger,
circle,arethefoot-soldiersmostlikelytocommitactsofviolence.Beyondthisgroup,inalargercircle
still,arethemembersofthemostradicalIslamistorganisationsfromwhoseranksthefoot-soldiersof
Islamistviolencecanmosteasilybedrawn.Then,attheouteredges,therearethemembersofmost
otherIslamistorganisationswhopursueIslamistpoliticalobjectivesbutdosobyworkingthrough
existingpoliticalsystemsratherthanthroughattemptstoviolentlyoverthrowthem.Finally,andat
leastpartiallymovingbeyondthosewhocanbedescribedinanyrealsenseasbelieversintheIslamist
politicalmessage,theremaybeatacitcircleofsupport(Saggar2006,Klausen2007).
IntheUKcontextthistacitcircleofsupporthasbeencapturedinopinionpollquestionnaire
responses.APopuluspollofattitudesamongBritishMuslimscarriedoutforTheTimes attheheight
oftheDanishcartoonscontroversy,forexample,had7percentofaweightedsampleagreeingwith
thestatementthat:TherearecircumstancesinwhichIwouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil
(Saggar2006:314).Thisfigureapproximatestoover100,000MuslimslivingintheUK.AfurtherICM
pollshowedthatafifthofrespondentshadsomesympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesofthose
whocarriedouttheLondonattacks(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).Finally,asurveyofMuslim
studentsintheUK,bytheFederationofStudentIslamicSocieties,showed4percentunableto
condemnthe7/72005attacksonLondon,afurther11percentrefusingtobackorcondemnthe
attacksand20percentsayingthattheywouldnotreportapossiblesuicidebomberintheirranksto
thepolice(FOSIS2005).
DespitetheseriousnessofthissituationandoftheIslamistchallengeaswehavedescribedithere,in
bothsecurityandpoliticalterms,policymakersstilldonothaveagoodunderstandingofwhatis
drivingit.OnecontextualfactorthatmayhaveassisteditsgrowthinWesterncountriesisthedecline
andcollapseofrevolutionaryleftistpoliticsinrecentdecades,whichhaseffectivelyleftpoliticalIslam
asthepredominantrepositoryforradicalpoliticalexpression.Anotherpotentialfactoristhegenuine
senseofpoliticalgrievancefeltbymanyMuslims.ThiscentresonWesternforeignpolicyand,tobe
morespecific,onperceptionsofinjusticeandhumiliationinrelationtotheIsrael-Palestinequestion,
onperceptionsofalossofeffectivecontrolofthenaturalenergyresourcesoftheMiddleEastin
particular,andonperceptionsoftheWesternroleinthemaintenanceandsupportofoppressiveand
autocraticregimesinseveralpredominantlyMuslimcountries.
SomeanalystshavefurthernotedasenseofalienationamongMuslimcommunitieslivingintheWest.
Thisappearstobeanissueamongsecond-andthird-generationMuslimcitizensinparticularandmay
begroundednotjustinoppositiontomuchWesternforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastbutina
complexmixoffactorsincludingperceivedsocialexclusionongroundsofraceandstrongconcerns
overIslamophobia.AsShivMaliksrecentpieceofinvestigativejournalismintosomeofthoseinvolved
intheattacksof7/7inLondonalsomakesclear,forsomeyoungMuslimsintheUKtheremayalsobeaparticularlyacutecrisisofidentityinwhichneitherthedominantculturalvaluesoftheparent
population,northemainstreamcultureofthenewhomecountryisseenasappealing(Malik2007).
Thetruth,however,isthatweareinsufficientlyclearaboutwhattheunderlyingcausesofthegrowth
inpoliticalIslamare,evenatthishighlevelofgenerality.Moreover,theradicalisationprocesses,for
thosemovingfromtacitcircleofsupporttofullacceptanceoftheIslamistworldview,andfrom
radicalisedpoliticstoactiveengagementinpoliticalviolenceareboth,ifanything,evenlesswell
understood.ThepersonalaccountsofthosewhohavebeeninvolvedinIslamistpoliticsandhavethen
pulledback,suchasEdHusain(Husain2007),haveprovidedvaluableinsighthere,buttheliterature
pointstoawiderangeofpossiblefactorsintheradicalisationprocessincludingpersonalrelationships,
psychologicalfactors,socialgroupdynamics,andtheparticularcommunicationopportunitiesofthe
internet,andtheoverallpictureremainsconfused.Makingpublicpolicyinthiscontextisnoteasy.TheIslamistsuseofreligiontomaskthepolitical
natureoftheirprojecthasputWesternliberaldemocraticregimesinadifficultpositionastheyseek
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topreserveacommitmenttotoleranceanddiversityintheirownsocietiesontheonehandwhile
addressingtheIslamistchallengewithoutappearingtodemonisefollowersoftheIslamicfaithonthe
other.
Thepolicychallengeitselfisalsocomplex.Onekeychallengeforgovernmentishowbesttoprotect
citizensfromtheIslamistthreatwithoutintroducingsecuritymeasuresthatinadvertentlyexpandtheoutercirclesofsupportforIslamistgroupsorpushmorepeoplefromtheoutercirclesofsupport
towardstheviolentcore.Anotherchallengeistounderstandhowbesttoproactivelyshrinktheouter
circles,bothathomeandinternationally,tosuchanextentthatthoseintheinnercorebecomeso
isolatedthatitisdifficultforthemtocontinueoperations.Bothareprofoundlydifficultand,without
animprovedunderstandingoftheradicalisationprocess,almostimpossible.Onlylimitedprogressis
likelytobemadeintheshorttermtherefore,andtheIslamistchallengeislikelytoremainakeydriver
ofboththedomesticandinternationalsecurityagendaforalongtimetocome.
v)Socio-economicvulnerability
Ourfifthdriverofchangeinthesecurityenvironmentissocio-economicvulnerability.Thishasrisen
upthesecurityagendapartlyasaresultofrecentchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomy,partly
asaconsequenceofchangestotheconditionofsomeelementsofourcriticalnationalinfrastructure,
andpartlyasaconsequenceoftheincreasedthreatofterrorismand/ordisruptiveclimateevents.
Whenitcomestothestructureofoureconomyanditsbusinesses,overthelastdecadeagreatdeal
ofworkhasbeendonetoencourageBritishcompaniestoadoptaleanapproachtobusiness
operations.Movingtojustintimemanufacturing,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingand
intermediaries,sheddingexcessstaff,allofthesedevelopmentshavesubstantiallyimprovedthe
competitivenessoftheUKeconomy.Atthesametime,thesupplychainsofBritishbusinesseshave
becomestretchedasaconsequenceofglobalisation.Thishasitselfbroughtefficiencygainsandhas
increasedtherangeofproductsandservicesavailabletotheUKconsumer.However,asJimNorton
haspointedout,thereisaghostatthisparticularfeast(Norton2008).Runninglean,morediverse
andstretchedsupplychainsmakesexcellentbusinesssensebutitassumesthatthebasic
infrastructureintheUKandbeyond,inenergy,communications,andtransportation,issecureand
reliable.Themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewithmajor
disruption.
Sadly,theassumptionofasecureandreliableinfrastructureisnotasafeone.Justasour
organisationshaveimprovedtheircollectiveefficiencyandthustheirdependenceonsupporting
infrastructure,wehavemadeinfrastructuredecisionsthatincreaseourvulnerabilitytodisruption.In
communications,forexample,therehasbeenashiftfromsecureprivatemobilesystemstoshared
(non-resilient)publicmobilecommunicationsinsomekeysectors.Effectivecommunicationinthe
eventofextrapressurebeingplacedonthemobilenetworkinanemergency,therefore,cannotbe
guaranteed.
Thereisconcern,also,overalackofstoragefacilitiesforgas,justasaccesstoourownNorthSeasuppliesrunsdown,andanequivalentconcernoveralackofinvestmentinlocalandregional
electricitydistribution,whichhasresultedinincreasedfailuresandthelossofsomekeyskillsandsub-
contractors.
Inothersectors,weoperateclosetocapacitylimitsinwaysthatcouldhavesevereconsequences.In
theeventofaflupandemic,forexample,areasonableassumptionwouldbethatupto20percentof
theUKsHeavyGoodsVehicledriverswouldbeunavailable,afigurelargeenoughtocripplethe
nationalfoodsupply,leavesupermarketshelvesempty,andpossiblycausecivilunrest.
Weaknessesinoneareaofourinfrastructure,moreover,canleadtobreakdowninothersbecause
severalkeyelementsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructureareinterdependent.Power,transport,
communications,water,andbroadcastingforexample,couldallbebadlyaffectedbyalossof
electricitysupply,thelattercausingacascadingeffectintoeachoftheothers.WhenpartsoftheUS
andCanadasufferedthelargestelectricpoweroutageintheirhistoryon14August2003,50million
peoplelostpower,4millionpeoplelostwater,andmanyrailroadsandairportswereshutdown(Doshi
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etal2007).IntheUK,thesummerfloodsof2007,thoughonamuchsmallerscale,also
demonstratedthepoint.
Terroristorganisationsappeartohavenoticedthisvulnerabilitytoo.InMarch2004,policeraidedthe
homeofOmarKhyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceterroristplotand
foundCD-ROMswithdetailedplansofBritainselectricityandgassystems.AccordingtoaNewYorkTimes reportlaterin2006,Khyamwasalsorecordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackon
Britainsgas,electricity,andwatersystems(Wolsey2007).
Thecascadeeffectsofalossofkeyinfrastructure,whetherbroughtonbysevereweather,terrorist
attackorsimplemaintenancefailures,wouldobviouslyalsogofarbeyondanimpactonother
infrastructuresectorsthemselves.FeworganisationsorservicesintheUKwouldbeabletofunction
effectivelyforlonginsuchcircumstances.Giventhis,theCabinetOfficeCivilContingenciesSecretariat
haspreviouslypublishedplanningguidancethataskskeyorganisationstopreparefor:
Lossofmainselectricitysupplyforuptothreedayslocallyor24hoursregionally Lossofwatersupplyforuptothreedays
LossofthepublicswitchedtelephonenetworkforuptothreedaysDisruptiontofuelsupplyforuptotendaysSignificantdisruptiontotransportforuptotendays Accessdeniedtomainpremisesforuptothreemonths.
However,itisunclearhowmanyorganisationscouldreallyclaimtohaveplansinplacetocope
withtheseguidelinesandmakingprogressinthiswholeareaisdifficultingovernanceterms.
DavidOmand,forexample,hasnotedthat80percentoftheUKscriticalnationalinfrastructure
isinprivatesectorhands,notallofitevenownedbyUKcompanies.Evenwithinthesectors
definedascorepartsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,thereremainsasignificantchallenge
tocoordinateactivityacrossmanydifferentsectorsandthischallengeonlymultiplieswhenone
considerstheneedtoplanforwiderbusinessandorganisationalresiliencethroughouttheentire
economyandsociety.Giventhesecircumstances,theissuesofcriticalnationalinfrastructure
protection,businessandorganisationalresilience,andemergencyplanningandpreparedness
havetakenonnewsecuritypolicyprominence.
Driversandeffects:conclusion
Wehaveattemptedinthispartofthepapertocapturethemultipleandinteractingdrivers
shapingthecurrentsecuritylandscape.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,poverty,
climatechange,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamandsocio-economicvulnerabilityarecreatinganew
setofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodealwith.Thedistributionof
powerbetweenstatesischangingandthis maymeanmoreinstabilityandconflictintheyears
aheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportant
too,bothintheirownright,andduetotheircapacitytoinflue