The New Front Line: Security in a changing world

8/14/2019 The New Front Line: Security in a changing world

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WWW.IPPR.ORG

TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity,WorkingPaperNo.1

byIanKearnsandKenGude

February2008

ippr2008

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy


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ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld3

Aboutippr ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Abouttheauthors ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5

Commentsandfeedback............................................................................................................................................................. 5

Executivesummary...................................................................................................................................................................... 6

1.Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 10

2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape .......................................................................................................... 12i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion....................................................................................................................................... 12ii)Povertyandfailingstates ................................................................................................................................................... 19

iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity................................................................................................................................ 20iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam ............................................................................................................................................. 23v)Socio-economicvulnerability.............................................................................................................................................. 25Driversandeffects:conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26

3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape ...................................................................................................................... 28Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy................................................................................................... 28Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach ................................................................................ 30Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy .............................................................................................................................. 32

4.Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................. 37

References .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38

Appendix:Thenewfrontlineofnationalsecuritypolicy .......................................................................................................... 42

Contents


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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producing

cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.

Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through

ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical

solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,

whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships

andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2008.ippr2008

Aboutippr

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity

Lord(Paddy)Ashdown,Co-Chair,formerleaderoftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformerHighRepresentativeforBosnia.

Lord(George)Robertson,Co-Chair,formerSecretaryofStateforDefenceandformerSecretaryGeneralofNATO.

DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector,ippr.

SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchleyFoundationandformerBritishAmbassadortotheUnitedNations.

SirDavidOmand,formersecurityandintelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOfficeandformerPermanentSecretaryintheHomeOffice.

Lord(Charles)Guthrie,formerChiefoftheDefenceStaff.

ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyandformerHomeOfficelawyer.

Lord(Martin)Rees,PresidentoftheRoyalSocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,Cambridge.

SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableofNorthamptonshireandformerPresidentoftheAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.

ProfessorMaryKaldor,CentreforGlobalGovernance,LondonSchoolofEconomics.

ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorofDefenceStudiesatKingsCollegeLondon.

FrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearchFellowattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandacommissionerontheCommissionfor

EqualityandHumanRights(CEHR).ProfessorTariqModood:Director,University

ofBristolResearchCentrefortheStudyofEthnicityandCitizenship.

SenatorTomDaschle,formerMajorityLeaderoftheUnitedStatesSenate.

ConstanzeStelzenmller,DirectoroftheBerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.

DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicyatSavetheChildrenandformerlyHeadoftheInternationalProgrammeatippr.

ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutiveoftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyandnowattheInstituteofDirectors.

IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativePartyPolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology,EngineeringandMathematics,ConservativeMPforEsherandWaltonandformerministerforScienceandTechnologyattheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry.

ThisworkingpaperformspartoftheongoingactivitiesoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity.

Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itis

co-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.Thefull

Commissionmembershipincludes:

TheworkingpaperserieseditorisIanKearns.FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security


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IanKearns isDeputyChairoftheCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,Deputy

DirectorofipprandiscurrentlyleadingtheInstitutesinternationalandsecurityprogramme.Hehasa

broadrangeofexperienceintheprivatesector,asaformerDirectorintheGlobalGovernment

IndustrypracticeatElectronicDataSystems(EDS),andinacademia,asformerDirectorofthe

GraduateProgrammeinInternationalStudiesandLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofSheffield.

KenGude isaVisitingFellowatipprandSeniorAdvisertotheCommissiononNationalSecuirtyin

the21stCentury.HeiscurrentlytheAssociateDirectoroftheInternationalRightsandResponsibility

ProgramattheCenterforAmericanProgressandhaspreviouslyworkedforseveralleadingAmerican

thinktanks,includingtheCenterforNationalSecurityStudiesandtheCouncilonForeignRelations.

Abouttheauthors

AcknowledgementsAsisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thispaperistheproductofthelabourofmany,and

withouttheirassistanceandsupport,weneverwouldhavebeenabletopublish.TheauthorswishtothanktheCommissionersoftheipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whose

discussionsprovidedthesparkformanyoftheideaswehaveputforwardhereandallowedthis

analysistobetestedanddebated.WewouldalsoliketothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstitute

forPublicPolicyResearch,especiallyAlexGennieandKatiePaintinfromtheInternationaland

SecurityProgrammeandmanyothersincludingGeorginaKyriacou,CareyOppenheimandMatt

Jacksonwhohelpedgetustothefinishline.Finally,wewerefortunatethatmanyofourcolleagues

andassociatesworkingoutsideipprtookthetimetoreadandreviewourworkandprovideinsight

andguidancethatenabledustosharpenthemanuscriptandimproveourarguments.

ipprwouldliketothankEDSandRaytheonwhoaresupportersofalltheCommissionsactivities.Wewouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofworkfeedingintothe

Commission'sdeliberations:BoozAllenHamilton(energysecurityandprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersandidentitymanagement),andtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionandpost-conflictreconstruction).

Theviewsinthisworkingpaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthe

hopeofadvancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelorthe

viewsofanysponsoringorganisation.

Wewelcomewrittencomments onallsectionsandaspectsofthematerialpresentedhere,andthese

shouldbesentinthefirstinstancetotheCommissionsDeputyChair,IanKearns,on

i.kearns@ippr.org.TheCommissionwillalsoberunningaseriesoftargetedcallsforevidencethroughout2008andmoredetailsofthesecanbefoundatwww.ippr.org/security

Commentsandfeedback


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Thispaperanalysesthekeychangestakingplaceinthenationalandinternationalsecuritylandscape

andassessestheirimplicationsforpolicy,examiningthecontextwithinwhichanationalsecurity

strategymustnowbeforged.ItisasubmissiontoipprsindependentCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,capturingsomeoftheearlydeliberationsoftheCommission.However,it

shouldnotatthisstagebetakentorepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionitself.

Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape

Thepaperidentifiesfivedriversofchangeandtheireffects:

i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates

iii)Climatechange

iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam

v)Socio-economicvulnerability.Asaresult,itbecomesclearthatthecontemporarysecuritylandscapeisaboutmuchmorethan

terrorismalone.


Aglobalisation-drivendiffusionofpowerisunderwayinthreesenses.

Thefirstisarelativediffusionofpowerwithinandamongthecommunityofstates.Thisisvisiblein

theriseofChinaandIndia,intheemergenceofawiderangeofnewlyimportantenergystatesand

regions(includingtheCaspianSearegion,centralAsia,Nigeria,Iran,Qatar,AlgeriaandVenezuela)

andinthepotentialriseofnewnuclearpowers(notjustviaIranandNorthKoreabutalsothrough

theregionalnucleararmsracestheymightprovoke).Thiselementofpowerdiffusioniscreatingnew

centresofpower,newregionsofpotentialtensionandconflict,andraisesfundamentalquestionsovertheextenttowhichimportantinternationalinstitutionsstillreflecttherealitiesofglobalpower.

Thesecond dimensionofpowerdiffusionisfromstatetonon-stateactors,andtoterroristgroupsand

organisedcrimenetworksinparticular.Thisisdrivenbyaprocessoftechnologydispersalandis

evidentintheincreaseddestructivepotentialofsuchgroups(aparticularworrybeingthepotential

linkbetweenterroristgroupsandaccesstoweaponsofmassdestruction)andintheiraccessto

communicationsandencryptiontechnologieswhichamplifytheirvoice,extendtheirorganisational

reachandincreasetheircapacityforevadinglawenforcement.Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors

raisesquestionsoverwhatwaspreviouslyseenasastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.It

also,particularlythroughcorruption,raisesquestionsaboutthecapacityoforganisedcrimenetworks

tochangetheverycharacterofstates,turningsomeofthemintopariahterritories.

Third,anunplannedincreaseininter-statepower-sharingisconsideredintheformofincreased

securityinterdependence,bothintermsofglobalinterdependence(onissuessuchasclimatechange)

andintermsofthespecificsoftheUKsinterfacewiththeglobalisedworldeconomy.New

vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedhere,onenergysecurity,ondrugsmugglingintotheUK,onthe

vulnerabilityofkeystrategictraderoutesandonourexposuretoanewpandemic.Onalltheseissues,

thekeypointmadeisthattheUKisreliantforitssecuritynotonlyondecisionstakenathomebuton

decisionstakenelsewhereandbyothers.

ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates

Theseconddriverofchangeidentifiedrelatestotheclutchofissuesinthesecurity-development

nexus.Thisisthepointatwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonof

weakandfailingstatesinteract,todevastatingeffect.Povertykillsmorepeoplethanpoliticalviolence,andisadriverofconflictandinstabilityinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.Whilenotall

weakandfailingstatesarepoor,manyofthemare,andpovertyisakeyfactorintheproliferationof

ungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Theseinturn,asAfghanistan

Executivesummary


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andSomaliahaveshown,canbecomesafehavensforterroristandorganisedcrimeactivity.Inthis

context,thestrongignoretheweakattheirperilandforwealthiercountriesliketheUK,moral

imperativestoaddressglobalpovertyhavenowbeenjoinedbynarrowersecurityinterests.

iii)Climatechange

Evenundermid-rangeIPCCtemperatureincreasescenarios,climatechangeissettohaveanumberofprofoundimplicationsinthenexttwotothreedecades.Chinawillfaceseverewaterstressand

decliningfoodproductioninimportantregions,atthesametimeasfacinghugepressuretomaintain

veryhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth.Howitrespondstothesepressurescouldbeoneofthedefining

featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.SouthAsia,particularly

Bangladesh,willbebadlyaffectedbytheshrinkageoftheHimalayanglaciers,possiblycausinghuge

flowsofenvironmentalrefugeesacrosstheregionsborders,andresultinginregionalinstability.Anew

hydrologicalsecuritycomplexmaydevelopintheMiddleEastaswaterdependencyrelationships,

particularlyforIsrael,maybecomenewsourcesoftensioninanalreadyvolatileregion.North,East

andWestAfricawillallbebadlyaffectedbywaterstress,placingadditionalstrainonsomeweakand

failingstatesandpossiblycausingpopulationmovementsacrosstheSaharaandintoSouthernEurope

asaresult.TheUKitselfwillalsobeaffected,inareassuchasEastAngliathatwillbepronetostormsurgesand

floods.Importantmilitaryassets,suchasnavalandRAFbases,mayalsobeatrisk,asmightoverseas

assetssuchasthesupplyandlogisticsbaseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean.

Climatechange,inshort,islikelytoaccentuateanumberofexistingproblemsonthesecurityagenda,

andaddnewdifficultiestothosealreadypresent.Asasecurityissue,itmayquicklycometodwarfthe

issueofterrorism.


OurfourthdriverofchangeispoliticalIslam,whichwedefinehereasapoliticalmovementusing

religionforcoverratherthanasareligiousmovementengagedinpolitics.Thismovement,inits

extremeforms,dividestheworldintocategoriesofgood(thosewhobelieveintheIslamistsinterpretationofIslam)andevil(countriessuchastheUK,theUSandFrance).Thepolitical

programmeofgroupsthatsubscribetothisideologytendstobebasedonaccusationsofthe

manipulationoftheMuslimworldbyboththesecountriesdirectlyandbytheapostaterulerstheyare

saidtoimposeonpredominantlyMuslimcountries.TheIslamistsobjectivesthereforefocusonthe

removalofsuchapostaterulers,theendingofmaligninterferenceintheaffairsoftheMuslimworld,

andeven,forsome,ontheoverthrowoftheentiresystemofliberaldemocracyintheWest.

ThesemovementsmakeappealstothegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandtothoseinterested

inpossibleconversiontotheIslamistsversionofIslam,andmayconnectwithconcernsoversocial

exclusion,IslamophobiaandidentitycrisesexperiencedbysomesecondandthirdgenerationMuslims

livingintheWest.Wearguethatunderlyingradicalisationprocessesarenotwellunderstoodand

policyresponsesasyet,arenothighlynuancedandwelltargeted.

v)Socio-economicvulnerability

Theissueofsocio-economicvulnerability,ourfifthdriver,isrisingupthesecurityagenda,partlyasa

consequenceofchangestoUKbusinesspractices(movingtoleanproduction,reducedinventories,

justintimedelivery),partlyasaresultofstretchedglobalsupplychainsandpartlyasaconsequence

ofsomechangestoourowndomesticinfrastructure.Theresultistheemergenceofamoretightly

coupledsociety,increasinglyreliantonacriticalinfrastructurethathaslittlesparecapacity.This

exposestheUKtopossiblesevereconsequencesintheeventoffailuresininfrastructurebrought

aboutbyterrorism,accidentorsevereweatherincident,asthefloodsofsummer2007madeclear.

Changesinownershipandcontrolstructuresinrelationtoinfrastructurealsocreategovernance

challenges(around80percentofimportantUKinfrastructureisownedbytheprivatesector).

Conclusions:wheredoesallthisleaveus?

First,thelandscapedescribedisoneinwhichthepowertocontrolthesecurityenvironmentisslipping


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beyondthereachofgovernmentsactingalone.Thisistrueatthegloballevelonissueslike

climatechangeandthegrowthofungovernedspaces,anditistrueathomeonissueslike

protectionofacriticalnationalinfrastructurethattheGovernmentnolongerowns.

Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,weincreasinglyliveinaworldofshareddestinies

inwhichthegrievance,policyfailureorinsecurityofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontextsecuritymustbecommontoallorisunlikelytobe

deliveredforany.

Third,andgiventheabove,itisclearthatthecorechallengeofsecuritypolicytodayisto

enhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybettermapontoandreflect

thecurrentrealitiesofglobalpowerandbetteraddressthesecurityconcernsofall.

Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape

Belowweaddresstheimplicationsthatflowfromthisanalysis.

Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy

Weneedtobroadentheterraincurrentlyclassifiedasrelevanttosecuritypolicy.AconcernwithdefendingtheUKagainstexternalmilitaryattackisstillimportantbutmustnowbenestedwithin

concernformoreissues,morethreatsandrisks,awiderrangeofactors,andalsomanymorelevels

ofanalysis(fromtheglobaltothelocal).Itisalsoarguedthatoldnotionsofthesecurityfront

linenolongerworkandthatsomefrontlinesnowexistoverseasinplaceslikeAfghanistan,while

somealsoexistatthelocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Manyfrontlinesinvolvethemilitary,

butothersinvolveeconomicactors,communitygroups,andprivatesectorbusinessestoo.Thenew

terrainofsecuritypolicyisthereforemorediverseandcomplexthantheold.

Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach

Arethinkinoverallstrategicapproachisalsorequired.Itisnotjustthatpowerisbeingdiffused

morewidelyandthattherangeofchallengesisbecomingbroaderandmorecomplex,butthatthe

requirementsofprojectinginfluenceinthesecircumstanceshavechangedtoo.

BelowwesummarisefiveprinciplesthatunderpinUKpolicyresponsesinthesecircumstances:

Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower,thatis,amoreintegrateduseofawiderrangeofpolicyinstruments,frommilitaryandpolicinginstrumentsatoneendofthespectrumtoeconomic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsattheother.

Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers,notjustatmultilaterallevelbutalsobetweendifferentactorswithinthesamestateandbetweenstateactorsandactorsfromtheprivateandvoluntarysector.Inanerainwhichpowerisbeingdiffusedacrossawiderrangeofactors,influencewillbemaximisedbythoseabletoorchestrateandfacilitateawidelydistributedresponse.

Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction.Partnershiprequiresanagreedobjectiveandvisionacrossmanyactors.Thisitselfcanonlybebuiltonawidelyperceivedbasisoflegitimacy.Althoughitisnotalwayseasytoachievewidespreadagreement,itisworththeeffortaslegitimacyactsasaninfluencemultiplier,turningpotentialinfluenceinthesecurityenvironmentintoactualinfluenceasmanymoreactorspullinthesamedirection.

Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking. Legitimacyisaboutprocess,notjustsubstance.Itcanonlybedemonstratedifallactorsfeelagenda-settingapproachesanddecision-makingprocessesareopen.Officialactorsandmultilateralpartnersmustthereforelooktosharemoreinformationandtoopenupdecision-makingprocessesiftheywanttobeeffectiveincurrentcircumstances.

Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform.Giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouthowtoinfluencethesecurityenvironment,acommitmenttoinstitutionalreformwillbeessential.Old

institutionaloperatingproceduresandboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostiflenecessaryinnovation.


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Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy

Anumberofapparentlypressingpolicyquestionscanbeidentifiedgiventheprecedinganalysisofthe

securityenvironment.Onesetisrelatedtoanticipatoryactiononthesourcesoffuturepossible

threatsandrisks,andanotherisrelatedtoareasofcurrentvulnerability.

Anticipatoryquestionsfocuson:

Howbesttoreformkeyinternationalinstitutionsandhowbesttostrengthenarules-basedinternationalorder

Thelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandotherelementsofthesecurityagenda,bothathomeandabroad

Thestepsthatmightbenecessarytostrengthenthenuclearnon-proliferationregime Thelinksbetweennationalenergystrategyandinternationalsecurity,includingonsecurityof

energysupply,andthesecurityissuesthatmayberaisedbyaninternationalexpansionincivilnuclearpower

TherequirementsofapoliticalstrategytodefeatthechallengeofpoliticalIslam

Howbesttotacklethepovertyandinequalitythatarekeyfactorsinmanyfailedandweakstatesandinmuchconflictandinstabilityinthedevelopingworld Howbesttoenhanceourcapacitiesforconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionin

failedandfailingstatesandconflictzones

Howbesttoprepareforthedangerofanewdiseasepandemic.

Questionsoncurrentvulnerabilitiesfocuson:

HowbesttoreducetheUKssocio-economicvulnerabilityandtobuildnationalandlocalresilience

Howbesttointegratepolicyinstrumentsinthefightagainsttransnationalorganisedcrime Thesecurityofstrategictraderoutes

Thesecurityofglobalstocksoffissilematerial.Byidentifyingsuchawiderangeofquestions,thepaperhopestoframesomeoftheforwarddebate

onthedevelopmentoftheUKsfirstnationalsecuritystrategy.


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OverthelasttwentyyearstheUKandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthaschangeddramatically.

TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arebuttwodevelopmentsamongmanythat

havesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcenturylandscape.Newprocessesanddrivers,fromglobalisationtoclimatechange,andfromthegrowthofpoliticalIslamtoamoreinfrastructure-reliant

societyhavecometotheforeandnowchallengebothoutdatedanalyticalframeworksandoldpolicy

prescriptions.Poweritselfisonthemove,beingdiffusedmorewidelywithinandamongthe

communityofstatesandouttoawidergroupofactorsincludingprivatebusinesses,terroristgroups

andorganisedcrimenetworks.Inthedevelopingworld,interactivecyclesofpoverty,conflictand

instabilityareplaguingmanyareas,creatingungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaceswhichinturn

becomesafehavensforthosewhowoulddousharm.Thescaleofunderlyingchangeishuge,andthe

consequencesbecomingmoreandmoreapparent.

Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchangebutthedifficulties

presentedaresignificantandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilemanyoftheeffortsalready

underwayaretobecommended,andtheGovernmentscommitmenttothedevelopmentand

publicationofaUKnationalsecuritystrategyfortheveryfirsttimeistobewelcomed,now,more

thaneverbefore,theneedforconstructiveexternalchallengeisgreat.

TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whichhasnowmetseveraltimesunder

theco-chairmanshipofLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon,has

beensetuppreciselytoprovidesuchchallengethroughthedevelopmentofanindependently

arrived-atnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

Purposeofthispaper

Inthisipprdiscussionpaper,whichisasubmissiontotheCommissionfromtheDeputyChairand

CommissionSecretaryandnotanexpressionoftheviewsoftheCommissionitself,wecapture

someoftheemergingthemesfromtheCommissionsearlydeliberations.Indoingso,wetakestockofthechangesoccurringandofferanaccountofthemanychallengestheynowpresent.Wealsoassess

theimplicationsofchangebothforthescopeofsecuritypolicyitselfandforthestrategicpriorities

thatmaynowneedtobeaddressed.Assuch,thisisnotsomuchapaperexpressingviewsonwhat

theUKsnationalsecuritystrategyshouldnowbe,asapaperanalysingthecontextwithinwhichthe

UKsnationalsecuritystrategyoughtnowtobeforged.

Structureofthepaper

Thematerialthatfollowscomesintwomainparts.InPart2 wepresentanaccountofcontemporary

securityconditions.Weaddressshiftsintheglobaldistributionofpower,issuesrelatedtoterrorism,

thechangingroleofbothstateandnon-stateactors,andsecurityrelevantfeaturesofeconomic

interdependence.Wealsoexaminethelinkagesbetweenglobalpoverty,inequalityandconflictandthenationalsecurityimplicationsofaworldincreasinglythreatenedbyclimatechange.

Inthispartofthepaper,ourobjectiveistoshowthattherangeandcharacteroftodayssecurity

challengesincludesbutgoesbeyondatraditionalconcernforthemilitarydefenceofourhome

territory.Indescribingamuchwiderlandscape,werelocatethedebateonsecuritypolicytonewand

differentterrainandprovide,intheprocess,thebasisformuchneededreflectiononhowwemight

changestrategyandpolicyinresponse.

Thisisfollowed,inPart3,withamoredetailedassessmentoftheimplicationsoftheanalysis

presented.Weofferanewaccountoftheterrainofsecuritypolicy,whichopensupthefieldtomany

moreactors,issuesandlevelsofanalysisthancanbecapturedbyamoretraditionalapproach.A

concernwithglobalpoverty,withcriticalinfrastructureprotectionandwithdomesticpublicsafety

frompandemicdiseasesandnaturaldisastersisadded,forexample,tomoretraditionalmilitaryanddiplomaticconcerns.Nextwesetoutourthoughtsonthecharacteroftheoverallstrategicresponse

requiredinthenewcircumstances,beforegoingontoidentifysomeofthekeyquestionstowhichwe

believeanyforward-lookingnationalsecuritystrategymustnowbesensitive.

1.Introduction


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Emergingthemes

Threethemesemergeasthepaperdevelops.Thefirstisthatweneedtorethinkournotionofwhat

doesanddoesnotconstitutethefrontlineinthebattleforsecurity.Indeed,ifthereisoneprimary

distinguishingfeatureofthenewenvironmentfromtheolditisthattraditionalnotionsofasecurity

frontlinenolongerapply.Todaywefacemultiplefrontlines,acrossamuchwiderrangeofissuesandthreats,someoutsideofourownterritoryattheothersideoftheworldoratgloballevel,andothers

downatlocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Thehighlycomplextaskofasecuritystrategyinthis

environmentistodirectactivityinacoherentwayacrossallissues,frontsandlevelsofactionatthe

sametime.

Second,thepaperarguesthatpublicauthoritiesatalllevelsfromthelocaltotheglobalarefindingit

hardertomaintainsufficientcontrolovertherapidlychangingsecurityenvironment.Poweriseither

slipping,orinsomecaseshasalreadyslipped,beyondthem.Thekeychallengeofthetimes,therefore,

relatestohowbesttostrengthenourgovernancemechanismssuchthattheyarebetterableto

maintainand,wherenecessary,regaincontroloverthatenvironmentatalllevels.

Third,thepaperspellsouttheneedforcommonsecurity,oraneedtobeinterestednotjustinour

ownsecuritybutalsointhesecurityofothers.Thisneedisnotaltruisticbutgroundedinabeliefthat

wenowliveinaworldofgenuinelyshareddestiniesinwhichthegrievance,insecurityorpolicyfailure

ofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontext,acollaborative

approachtosecuritypolicy,builtonawiderandmoreeffectivelyintegratedrangeofpolicy

instrumentsbutalsodrawingintheeffortsofawidelydistributedrangeofactors,islikelytobethe

keytosuccess.Here,thestressisonnationalgovernments,internationalorganisations,regional

bodies,NGOs,communitygroups,localauthoritiesandindividualcitizensneedingtopulltogetherto

deliverthedesiredoutcomesinacollaborativeprocess.Governmentsnolongersimplydelivernational

securityto,oronbehalfoftherestofusinthisenvironment,butmustalsofacilitate,coordinateand

orchestratetheactivitiesofmanyotheractorsthatarenowrelevanttopolicysuccess.Toputit

anotherway,wearguethatanincreaseinthesocialdepthofsecuritypolicycancontributetoits

ultimatereachandeffectiveness.

TheCommissiongoingforward

Theideaspresentedinthispaperareaworkinprogressandtheintentioninpublishingistostimulate,

andtofocus,furtherdiscussion.Theviewsexpressedhere,toreiterate,capturetheflavourand

characterofsomeoftheCommissionsearlydeliberationsbutaretheviewsoftheauthorsonlyand

nottheviewsoftheCommissionitself.TheCommissionwillpublishaninterimreportlaterin2008

andafinalreportin2009,settingoutitsviewsandofferinganindependentlydevelopednational

securitystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.


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Inthispartofthepaperwepresentouraccountofthekeydriversofthecontemporarysecurity

environment.Wedothisthroughatreatmentoffivecorethemes.Theseare:

i) Globalisationandpowerdiffusion

ii)Povertyandfailingstates

iii)Climatechange


v)Socio-economicvulnerability.

Webelievethatindividually,eachofthesecapturesbothanimportantdriverofchangeandan

importantsetofeffectsandthatwhentakentogethertheyamounttoavaluableframeworkfor

thinkingaboutthesecurityenvironmentasawhole.Inthematerialthatfollows,thethemeof

globalisationandpowerdiffusionisdealtwithatgreaterlengththaneachoftheothers(primarilyasa

resultofitscomplexity),butall,inourview,haveequalsignificance.


Akeyfeatureofthesecuritylandscapetodayisanongoingprocessofpowerdiffusion.1 Power

diffusionisoccurringlargelyasaconsequenceofglobalisationandfundamentallyislinkedtosomeof

globalisationsunderlyingfeatures,namelytechnologyadvanceanddispersal,improved

communications,andreducedtransportationcosts.Itisvisibleinseveralrespects:

First,andperhapsmostobviously,itisvisibleinarelativeredistributionofpowerwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates.

Second,itisreflectedintheincreasedimportanceofarangeofnon-stateactorssuchasglobalbusinesses,terroristgroups,transnationalcriminalnetworksandsometransnationalpoliticalmovements.

Third,itisevidentintheunplannedgrowthofpower-sharingbetweenstates,suchthatthesecurityofonenowoftendependsondecisionstakeninandbyothers.(KeohaneandNye1973)

Wedealwitheachoftheseinturnbelow.

Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates

Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesrelatesfirsttoarelativeredistributionof

powerfromtheAtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific.Thisisnot,intheshorttermatleast,about

asignificantshiftinthemilitarybalance:giventhedemiseoftheSovietUnion,noonestateoreven

collectionofstateswillrivalthemilitarypoweroftheUnitedStatesintheimmediatefuture.This

dimensionofpowerdiffusionis,rather,economicsledandissignalledprincipallybytheriseofChina

andIndia.

Chinasincreasedpowerisaproductoftworelateddevelopments.Thefirstisitssustainedandrapid

economicgrowthwhich,overthelast20years,hasaveragedanannualrateofjustbelow9percent,a

figurecomparabletoJapansaverage10percentannualgrowthrateduringitsboomyearsof1955to

1972.ChinasGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)isnow,asaconsequence,theworldsfourthlargest

behindthetheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany. 2 Second,Chinasincreasingeconomicpowerisa

functionofitshugeforeigncurrencyreserveswhichhavebeenbuiltonthebackofitsseemingly

endlesssupplyoflow-costlabour,aconsequentriseinitsmanufacturingsector,andtheunprecedented

1.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemeantheresourcesandcapacitiesthatmaypotentiallybeusedto

achieveinfluenceoverthesecurityenvironment.Inthissectionofthepaper,wediscusstherelative

distributionofsuchresourcesandcapacitiesamongactorsintheinternationalsystem.InSection3we

returntotheissueofwhichresourcesandcapacitiesarethoughtmostimportantincurrentcircumstances,andtohowtheymightbestbecombinedformaximumeffect.

2.ThoughinGDPpercapitaterms,in2006,itlaggedbehindLebanon,KazakhstanandArmenia.All

figuresbasedonUSBureauofLaborStatisticsandHumanDevelopmentReport,2006.

2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape


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severalrecenteventshaveshown,isnotaversetoflexingitspoliticalandmilitarymusclesagainstthis

newsituation.Forexample,ithastemporarilycutoffgassuppliestoUkraineandresumedlong-range

strategicbomberpatrols.Otherstatesandregionstooareincreasinginimportanceasenergymarkets

change,theCaspianSearegion,theformerSovietstatesofcentralAsia,Iran,Qatar,Nigeriaand

Venezuelaamongthem.Thisallcreatesnewcentresofpowerintheinternationalsystem,new

potentialflashpointsbetweenstatesinneedofenergysupplies,andnewareasofstrategicinterest

andsignificanceforallthemajorpowers.

Third,intermsoftheissueswehighlightasdriversofpowerdiffusionamongthecommunityof

states,wecometothespreadofnuclearweaponstechnology.EventhoughIsraeldevelopeditsown

nuclearcapabilityoutsidethenuclearnon-proliferationregime,thisregimeremainedrelativelystable

untilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclearpowers(theUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrance)

largelymaintainingamonopolyovernuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint.

Thelastdecade,however,haswitnessedadisturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.Indiaand

Pakistaneachconductedaseriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalof

acknowledgednuclearweaponsstatestoseven.NorthKorearesumedthereprocessingofplutonium

in2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince1994.TheNorthKoreans,whowerepreviouslybelievedtohavedevelopedenoughnuclearfuelto

maketwobombs,nowpossessenoughmaterialtoconstructtwobombsperyear.In2006,moreover,

NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becomingtheeighthacknowledgedmemberofthe

nuclearclub,althoughithasnowonceagainsuspendedreprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclear

reactor.InIran,meanwhile,thegovernmentisbelievedtobepursuinganuclearweaponsprogramme,

eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurelyintendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy.

Westernintelligenceagenciesandindependentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfrom

twototenyearsawayfromobtaininganuclearweapon.

ThesedevelopmentshavespurredatleastanotherelevencountriestohedgeagainstanIranianbomb

andtoseekassistancefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)todeveloptheirown

nuclearenergyprograms.Egypt,Turkey,andSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthatmasteryofnucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional

hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhaspledgedtobuild

threenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefiveothermembersoftheGulf

CooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(CirincioneandLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrends

arenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatileMiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates

(IsraelandIran)andadozenothercountrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsof

nuclearfuel.Theseareprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion.

Evenmorefundamentally,however,theproliferationofnucleartechnologiesandweaponsrepresents

asignificantadditionalmodificationtothewiderrelativedistributionofpoweramongstatesinthe

internationalsystem.Whenseenincombinationwiththeotherchangesdescribedinthissection,this

representsashifttoanewandpotentiallyfarlessstableeraofinter-staterelationsandalso,importantly,tooneinwhicharangeofinternationalinstitutionsandregimesfromtheUNSecurity

CounciltotheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatynolongerappeartoreflectorcapturetherealitiesof

globalpower.

Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors

Thesecondevidentdimensionofpowerdiffusionthatweobserveisthatinvolvingarelativediffusion

ofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactors.Someofthisdiffusionhasbeendrivenbystatesthemselves

throughuseofprivatemilitaryfirms.Muchofit,however,hasoccurredinspiteof,andnotbecauseof

theviewsanddecisionsofstates.Terroristgroups,groupsengagedintransnationalorganisedcrime,

andsometransnationalpoliticalmovements,particularlyintheMiddleEast,haveallbeenvisible

beneficiariesofthiswiderprocessinrecentyears.Inthissection,wefocusprimarilyonthislatter

groupofactors,believingtheyareofmoreimmediateandpressingsecurityconcern.

Totaketerroristgroupsfirst,thesehaveobviouslybeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepoint


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atwhichanewformofsuper-terrorismtookcentrestageininternationalaffairs(Freedman2002).

Theyarealong-termandstructuralchallenge,however,whatevertheirideologicalorientation,fortwo

underlyingreasons.

Thefirstconcernstheirincreasinglydestructivenatureandpotential.Thisisevidencedbythefactthat

thelevelofviolenceinactsofterrorismhasbeenincreasinginrecentdecades.ThebombingoftheWorldTradeCenteron26February1993tooksixlivesandinjured1,000.HugebombsattheUS

embassiesinKenyaandTanzaniainAugust1998killed220andwounded4,000betweenthem.The

eventsof11September2001saw2,986peoplelosetheirlivesasthreeairlinersflewintothe

PentagoninWashingtonandbothtowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork.

Thetrend,therefore,isclear.Itmaynotbesmoothandannualdeathtollsfromterrorismarenot

goingupatanevenrateyearonyear,buttherecordnowstandsatnearly3,000deathsforasingle

terroristoperationcarriedoutonasingleday.Inthiscontext,PlutaandZimmermanwererightto

recentlyconcludethatfewpsychologicalbarrierstotruemass-casualtyterrorismremain(Plutaand

Zimmerman2006:66).Intermsoffuturepotential,moreover,thekeyworryisthatterroristgroups

willgainaccesstoweaponsofmassdestructionandtoanuclearweaponinparticular.Some,suchas

RobinFrostinarecentAdelphipaper,havedismissedthisasanunrealisticpossibility,arguingthattheriskofnuclearterrorism,especiallytruenuclearterrorismemployingbombspoweredbynuclear

fission,isoverstated(Frost2005:7).Butthisseemsanextraordinarilycomplacentpositiontotake

whenoneconsidersthewidercontext.

First,weknowthatsometerroristgroupshaveaclearintenttoaccessweaponsofmassdestruction,

includingnuclearweaponsandmaterials,ifatallpossible.ThisiscertainlytrueofAlQaeda.Drawing

oninsideexperienceandseniorintelligencesources,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefenceGraham

AllisonnotesthatOsamaBinLadentriedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)fromSouthAfrica

asearlyas1992andalsothatBinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedarepresentativesmetwithsenior

figuresfromthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).Materialsdiscoveredin

AlQaedasafehousesinAfghanistan,moreover,showthatAlQaedaofficialsspenttimeresearching

theprocessesrequiredtobuildanuclearweaponandalsounderstoodthepossibleshortcutsthatcouldbetakeninbuildingacrudenucleardevice.OthergroupsbeyondAlQaeda,suchasJaish-e-

Mohammed(JEM),agroupfocusedontheKashmirconflictbutwithreportedlinkstothePakistani

establishment,andHezbollah,withitscloselinkstoIran,cannotberuledoutasorganisationsalso

seekingthenuclearoption.

Ifdemandforthisoptionexiststhensotoo,worryingly,doespotentialsupply.Thedangerherecomes

intwoforms,namelythatterroristgroupswillillegallyacquireeitheraready-madenuclearweapon,a

so-calledloosenuke,orthefissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.Controversyhasragedontheissue

ofloosenukeseversinceAlexanderLebed,theformernationalsecurityadvisertoPresidentYeltsin,

confidedtobothpublicandprivateaudiencesintheUnitedStatesin1997thattheRussian

governmentcouldnotaccountfor84one-kilotonSovietsuitcasenucleardevices(Allison2006).Since

thattime,despitesomeimprovementsinsecurityaroundRussiasnuclearfacilities,onlyjustover50percentofRussiasnuclearweaponsandmaterialshaveundergoneacomprehensivesecurityupgrade

(NuclearThreatInitiative2006).

Onthesecondthreat,thatterroristgroupswillgettheirhandsonweaponsgradefissilematerial,the

pictureishardlymorereassuring.Toachieveanuclearexplosion,aminimumof15.9kgofHighly

EnrichedUraniumor4.1kgofplutoniumisrequired.4 Arecentstrategicdossieronnuclearblack-

marketsbytheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,usinghighlyconservativeestimatesdrawn

fromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheDatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,Theft

andOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)statedbaldlythat:ThetotalamountofHEUandplutonium

seizedinstate-confirmedandotherhighlycredibleincidentsregisteredintheperiod1991-2006is

4.Theseamountsapplyifaberylliumreflectorisusedinthedevice.Withoutsuchareflector,more

fissilematerialisneeded.


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roughly38kg(IISS2007:126).Notallofthis38kgwasweaponsgradematerialbutaround8kgofit

was,andthisrepresentsonlytherecoveredamountsofbomb-relevantmaterialfromknown attempts

atsmugglinginrecentyears.5 Bydefinition,itdoesnottellustheamountofnuclearmaterialstolen

butnotdetectedbylawenforcementagenciesoverthesameperiodandwecannotretrospectively

calculatewhatthatamountmightbesincethereisnoglobalinventoryofHEUandplutoniumandit

isnotknownexactlyhowmuchplutoniumandHEUhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand

Zimmerman2006).

Thepointaboutallofthesedevelopmentsisthat,withoutfurthersignificantefforttoaddressthe

trendsandchallengesdescribed,theypointtoa21stcenturyinwhichitishighlyunlikelythatstate

actorswillretaintheirmonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.

Aseconddevelopmentthatisenhancingtherelativepowerofterroristgroupsresidesinthe

advantagesnowbeingbestoweduponthembydigitaltechnologyandcommunications.Thesehave

amplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,andenhancedthelawenforcementevasion

capabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellitecommunicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmuch

easierforterroristgroupstobothmakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.TheInternethas

becomeakeyplacefortherecruitment,radicalisationandmobilisationofmanyyoungextremistsand,forthoseseekingtomaketheswitchfromextremismtooperationalterrorism,akeyknowledge-

sharingtoolandaidforattack-coordinationandplanning(Ryan2007).Strongencryptiontools,

meanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuch

communicationschannelsinasecureandsecretenvironment(MinistryofDefence2007).Thislast

developmentinparticularrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstatetonon-stateactors

since,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuchparticularfinancialand

computingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates.

Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,thesetooarebecomingmoreprominentandthreatening.

Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossbordersbecausedecliningtransportcosts,improvedglobal

communicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofbothpeopleandgoodsmakesthisfareasier

thaneverbefore.Thesheerscaleofcriminalactivityisalsoincreasing,partlybecauseoftheextendedgeographicalreachofthecriminalnetworksthemselves,partlybecauseforsome,particularlyinthe

developingworld,criminalactivityisseenasonepotentialrouteoutofpovertyandpartlybecausein

somepatrimonialstatesthereisnowanattitudethatnationalresourcesaretheretobeexploitedfor

thebenefitofthecorruptfewinpower.Consequently,theUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralsHigh

LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangesrightlyidentified,inareportin2004,transnational

organisedcrimeasoneofthemajorsecuritychallengesfacingtheworld(UnitedNations2004).

Theillicitdrugstradeisthemostlucrativeoftheactivitiesunderway(accordingtotheUnitedNations

OfficeonDrugsandCrime,theoverallturnoveroftheworldwideillicittradeindrugsalonenow

standsataround$300bnannually[UNODC2006]),thoughthevarietyofcriminalactivitiesisalso

widening.AstheUNsAntonioMazzitellirecentlypointedout,criminalactivitiessuchastraffickingin

people,stolenvehicles,naturalresources,firearmsandcontraband,counterfeitingandintellectualpiracy,smugglingofmigrants,andcybercrimeallfeatureonthemenuofservicesoffered(Mazzitelli

2007:1074).

Launderingofmoneyandcorruptionarethetwofurtheressentialfeaturesofthisactivity,thefirstto

allowcriminalstobenefitfromtherevenuesraisedandthesecondtoreducetheriskofcapturebylaw

enforcementagenciesandtoincreaseinfluenceoverpoliticaldecisionsincountriesofoperation.

Transnationalorganisedcrimethereforeflourishesmostwherestateinstitutionsareopento

corruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawisweakandwherebordersareporous.Evenmore

importantlyfromthepointofviewofunderstandingthecontemporarynationalsecurityenvironment,

criminalnetworksnotonlylocatethemselvesinareasthathavesomeofthesecharacteristics,suchas

5.Forweaponspurposes,HEUneedstobeenrichedtoatleast80percentoraboveandmorenormally

to90percentorabove.


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inWestAfrica,butdothemselvesalsohavethepotentialtocreateandsustainpariahstates6 which,

nomatterwhattheirformalarrangementsofgovernanceare,actuallyserveassafehavensforcriminal

gangsandtheiractivities.Thisisaserioussituation,bothbecausethestatesinquestioncan

effectivelyspreadinstabilitythroughouttheregionsinwhichtheyarelocatedandbecausethereare

alsolinksbetweencriminalnetworksandterroristgroups,withtheformeroftenprovidingmoney

launderingandotherfinancialservicestothelatteraswellasassistingintheillicittraffickingofgoods

thatmaybeofvaluetothem.

Whereasterroristgroupsarechallengingastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforceandare

increasingly,therefore,notfindingstatebordersahindrance,transnationalorganisedcrimegroupsare

changingtheverycharacterofsomestatesintheinternationalsystem,turningthemintovehiclesfor

privateprofitandspreadinginstabilityandmiseryintheprocess.

Athirdandfinalsetofnon-stateactorswebelieveitimportanttohighlightarethetransnational

politicalmovementsthathavecometoexertimportanceinfluenceoninternationalaffairsinrecent

years.OnesuchmovementisHezbollah,aparticularlyimportantorganisationinthecontextofthe

contemporaryMiddleEast.

Hezbollah,anIslamistpoliticalgroupformedin1982toresistwesterncolonialisminLebanonand

acrossthewiderregion,toengageinarmedstruggleagainstIsraelandtoworktowardsthe

establishmentofaLebaneseIslamicRepublic,runsschools,hospitalsandmediaservices,andhas

implementedmanydevelopmentprogrammesinareasinwhichitisoperational.Itsso-calledMartyrs

Institutegivesfinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthosewhodieinconflictand,followingtheJuly

2006waragainstIsrael,Hezbollahhasbeenextremelyactiveinthereconstructionprocess,often

doingmoreonthisfrontthantheLebanesegovernmentitself.Hezbollah,inotherwords,anddespite

thenarrowcoverageofitsactivitiesintheWest,paysmuchattentiontoawiderangeofsocialwelfare

activitiesaswellastotheconflictwithIsrael(Salem2006).

Inhighlightingthisgroup,thepointwemakeisnot,ofcourse,apoliticaloneinsupportofit.

Hezbollahhasanobjectionablepolicyplatformonmanyissuesandislessthanfullyconstructivein

relationtobringingpeaceandstabilitytotheMiddleEast.Thepointwemake,rather,istheanalytical

onethatinconditionsofconflictandweak,absentorineffectualstateinstitutions,transnational

politicalmovementssuchasHezbollahcananddoemergetofillthevacuumandtoplaysignificant

rolesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Theyalsooftendosoonthebasisofacarefully

cultivated,deep-rootedandoftenlong-termrelationshipoflegitimacywiththepopulationsthey

claimtorepresent.Sometransnationalpoliticalactorswithsocialpower,inotherwords,havebecome

seriousplayersininternationalpolitics.Whiletheymighthavestatebackers(inthiscaseSyriaand

Iran)theyarenotentirelyinthepocketsoftheirbenefactors.Assuch,theycannoteasilybeby-

passedorignoredwhenthinkingaboutpolicyresponsesand,inthiscase,theyareapopulist

challengetothelegitimacyofmanyWest-backedstateactorsintheMiddleEast.

Non-stateactorstoday,therefore,enjoyincreasedpowerandinfluencewhethertheyareterrorist

groups,transnationalcriminalgangsortransnationalpoliticalmovementsactiveontheinternational

stage.Someoftheseactorsareacquiringsomeofthepowerattributesofstates,arealteringthe

characterofsomestatesand,farmoreeffectivelythaninthepast,areofteninfluencing,undermining,

destabilisingandevenquestioningthelegitimacyofstates.Thisaddsanewsetofdynamicsand

challengestotheinternationalsecurityenvironment.

Powerdiffusionbeyondstateborders:securityinterdependence

Thethirdandfinaldimensionofpowerdiffusionwehighlightrelatestomorepower-sharingbetween

statesintheformofincreasedsecurityinterdependence.Thisitselfcomesintwoforms.Thefirst

relatestoasetofchallengesthataretrulyglobalinnatureandwhereconsequentlyonlysolutionsof

6.Bypariahstates,wemeanonesthatessentiallybehaveasoutcasts,alienatedfrommostotherstates

andacceptednormsofinternationalbehaviour.


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globalreachandwithallthemajorpowersinvolvedwilldo.Climatechangemitigation,orattemptsat

effectivecontrolofglobalstocksoffissilematerial,wouldbeemblematicissuesinthiscategory:there

isastrongsenseontheseissuesthatthecommunityofstateseithersinksorswimstogether.

Thesecondform,however,relatestothespecificthoughdifferentvulnerabilitiespresentedtoeach

stateasaby-productofitsowneconomicinterdependencewithtodaysglobalisedworldeconomy.InthecaseoftheUK,thereareatleastfoursuchvulnerabilities.

First,intermsofenergysupplies,theUKisadvancingintoaperiodoflesssecurityofsupplythanit

hasexperiencedinrecentdecades,asitmovesfrombeinganetenergyexportertoanetenergy

importer.Norwayiscurrentlyourmostimportantenergypartnerasamajorsupplierofbothoiland

gas(Norwayaccountedfor75percentofUKoilimportsin2005).However,intheyearsahead

Russia,theCaspianSearegion,Nigeria,Algeria,andtheMiddleEast,arealllikelytobecomemore

importantsupplierstotheUK.OurkeyEuropeantradingpartners,meanwhile,arealsowitnessing

shiftsintheirenergysupplybase.TheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,predictsthatthe

biggestsupplierofgastoEuropein2030willbeAfrica,followedbyRussiaandtheMiddleEast(Bird

2007:12;IEA2006).Thesechangesincreaseourvulnerabilitytoeventsin,andpressurefrom,awide

rangeofsuppliercountries.

Second,ourincreasingrelianceontrade(in2006,tradeaccountedfor60percentoftheUKsGDP)

makesthesecurityofkeystrategictraderoutesmoreimportantforbothBritainandtheEUthanever

before.Onesuchstrategictraderouteofgrowingimportanceisthealreadymassiveandrapidly

expandingmaritimefreightroutelinkingtheeconomiesofAsiatothoseofEurope(seeFinancial

Times 2007b).Anysignificantdisruptiontothisorotherroutes,broughtonbymaritimeterrorismor

otherevents,couldhavemassiveeconomicconsequencesfortheUKandindeedfortheEUasa

whole(seeRichardson2004).

Third,transnationalcrimeisamajorsourceofvulnerabilityfortheUK,comingonthebackofthe

vastlyincreasedmovementofbothpeopleandgoodsacrossourborders.7 Wecannotandshouldnot

ruleoutcollaborationbetweencriminalgangsactiveacrossourbordersandterroristgroupsintenton

smugglingharmfulmaterialsintotheUK.Suchcollaborationcouldhaveveryserioussecurity

consequences.Thepotentialeconomicimpactofsuchcriminalactivityisalsogreat,however.Tax

revenuesattheborder,forexample,currentlyamountto22billionperannum,oraround5percent

ofthetotaltaxtakeofaround420billion.Inthiscontext,successfullarge-scalecross-borderfraud

couldhaveaseriousimpactonthepublicpurse(CabinetOffice2007).

Anestimated25-35tonnesofheroin,meanwhile,enterstheUKannuallyalongwith35-45tonnesof

cocaineandbothcontributetoadrugsproblemthatisestimatedtocost15.4billionayearinthe

formoflawenforcement,crimeandhealth-relatedcosts(ibid:22).Therearealsosocialvulnerabilities.

Activitiessuchasdrugsmugglingimpactdirectlyonourcommunitiesintheformofsocialbreakdown

andareducedsenseofpublicsafety.

Fourthandlast,givenourpositionasaglobalhubforpeoplemovementinaneraofpeoplemovementonanunprecedentedscale,theUKisinanexposedpositioninrelationtothreatssuchas

aninfluenzapandemicbroughtinfromtheoutside.Apandemicisnowconsideredabiological

certainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthestraininvolved,theseverityoftheoutcomeandthe

timingoftheoutbreak.ManyexpertsbelievethatH5N1birdfluisthestraintoworryaboutandthis,

asweknow,cankillhumanbeings(globally,therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1wereto

mutateintoavirusthatcouldbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween

humanbeings,thatwouldbeapotentiallycatastrophicdevelopment.Recentstudieshavesuggested

that,incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolveslunginfection,theH5N1virusmight

7.Thecurrentannualflowofmorethan218millionpassengerjourneysacrossUKbordersisexpectedto

increaseto450millionby2030.Totalfreightflowsarealsonowmassive,witharound440milliontonnesoffreightflowingacrossourborderseachyear,afigurelikelytoincreaseto580milliontonnesby2030

(CabinetOffice2007).


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bedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffectmultipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionofthe

immunesystemknownasacytokinestorm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelpto

explainwhythe1918-19pandemicwassodeadly(Osterholm2007:50).Consequently,inassessing

thelikelyoutcomeofapandemic,arecentstudybytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy

(McKibbin2006)foundthatwereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-19tooccur,over142million

peoplewoulddieandtheworldsGDPwouldsufferalossofsomeUS$4.4trillion(McKibbinquoted

inOsterholm2007:48).

Ourreadinessandlevelofprotectionfromsuchaneventisinadequatebutmorethanthat,itisalso

intricatelytiedupwithandreliantuponthepublicandanimalhealthsystemsandfreedomof

movementstrategiesadoptedbymanyothercountriesandnotonlyonthestrategiesweputinplace

hereintheUK.

Infact,inalloftheformsofvulnerabilitydescribedinthissection,thekeypointtonoteisashiftin

thepowertoaddresspolicychallengesawayfromtheindividualstatelevelandtowardseitherthe

globallevelontheonehand(verticalshift)ortoanotherstate,orgroupofstatesontheother

(horizontalshift).Thisappliestoclimatechange,tothesupplyofenergy,tothesecurityofourtrade

routes,tolawenforcementactivitiesoverseasonorganisedcrimeandterrorismandtoprecautionstakenagainstanewpandemic.Theoutcomeofsecurityinterdependence,inshort,isaworldinwhich

thesecurityofonestateanditspeopleismoredependentthaneverbeforeondecisions,actionsand

eventsunfoldingelsewhereinothers.

ii)Povertyandfailingstates

Ourseconddriverofchangeinthesecuritylandscaperelatestoglobaleconomicconditionsandtoa

clutchofissuesaroundwhatismostoftencalledthesecurity-developmentnexus.Thisisthepoint

atwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonofweakandfailingstates

interact,todevastatingeffect.

Povertyitselfhasbeenhighontheinternationalagendainrecentyearsthanksinnosmallparttothe

Britishgovernmentand,globally,thankstothehighprofilegiventoattemptstomeettheMilleniumDevelopmentGoals.Therehavebeensomerealandquantifiablesuccessestoo.Thenumberofpeople

livinginabjectpovertyonlessthanUS$1perday,forexample,hasmorethanhalved,fallingfrom

40.1percentoftheworldspopulationin1981to18.1percentin2004(WorldBank2007).An

estimated135millionpeoplewerepulledoutofpovertyintheperiod1999to2004alone.Muchof

thiseffort,however,hasbeenconcentratedintheeconomicmiraclesinChinaandotherpartsof

rapidlydevelopingEastAsia,ratherthanbeingevenlyspread(Sachsetal2007).Consequently,

accordingtotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,almost50percentoftheworldschildren

werestilllivinginpovertyin2005.Indeed,thetermdevelopingcountryisstillamisnomerwhen

appliedtosomeoftheworldspoorestcountries,asmorethanthreebillionpeoplearelivingonless

thanUS$2aday,withlittleimmediatehopeofmajorimprovement.

Thislevelofcontinuedpovertyiscentraltoourargumentsforthreereasons.

First,povertyisamajorthreattohumanlife.Inanygivenyearinwhichthereisanabsenceofamajor

globalconflict,povertydirectlyaccountsformorelossofhumanlifethanpoliticalviolenceandthisin

itselfprovidesapowerfulargumentforthinkingaboutsecurityintermsthatgowellbeyondthe

traditionalfocusonexternalmilitaryattack.8 Whilenearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksof9/11,

forexample,preventablediseaseinducedbypovertyclaimstentimesthatnumberofchildrenevery

day.Bythatmeasure,oureffortstocombatpovertyhavesofarbeenadismalfailureandasaresult,

inmoraltermsatleast,thelegitimacyofthecurrentinternationaleconomicordermustbe

questionableatbest(Rice2007).

8.Thisisoneofthemajorreasonsforwhichmanyanalystshavecalledfortheadoptionofahuman

securityperspectivewhenthinkingaboutsecuritypolicy,aperspectivethatwesupportandreturnto

later.


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Second,povertyonthisscaleisamajorconcernbecauseitisnowagrowingthreattointernational

peaceandstability.ThereisadirectrelationshipbetweenacountryspercapitaGDPandits

susceptibilitytocivilconflict.Evidenceshowsthatifacountryranksinthefiftiethpercentileofper

capitaGDP,ithasa7.5percentriskofcivilconflict,halfofthelevelforcountriesthatrankinthe

tenthpercentile(Collieretal2004).Povertyisalso,importantly,akeydriverofthephenomenonof

weakandfailingstates,itselfagrowingandcorrosiveproblemontheinternationalstage.Weakstates

lackthecapacitytopreventviolentconflict,togovernlegitimately,tomeetbasichumanneedsandto

fostersustainableandequitableeconomicgrowth(Weinsteinetal2004).Notallweakstatesarepoor,

buttheentiretopteninForeignPolicymagazinesFailedStateIndexrankinthebottomthirdof

statesintermsofpercapitaGDP,andpovertyisclearlyakeyfactorintheseungovernedorbadly

governedspaces(ForeignPolicy2007).Suchspacesthemselvesserveasactiveorpassiveincubators

ofinstabilitythatcanspilloverintoneighbouringcountriesandwholeregionsintheformof

economicdisruption,refugeeflows,andthespreadofarmedconflictacrossinternationallyrecognised

borders.

Anelevatedriskofconflictis,infact,oneofthemostsignificanteffectsofweakandfailingstates

andthisisnowalsoreflectedinchangingpatternsofconflictaroundtheworld.Ratherthantheinter-

statewarsthatmarkedmuchofmodernhistorythroughtoWorldWarII,conflictpatternsoverthelast

sixtyyearshavebeencharacterisedmorebyintra-stateandcivilconflict.Ninety-fivepercentofall

conflictsarenowofthiskind(HumanSecurityCentre2005).Civilconflictslastlonger,moreover,and

arehardertoresolvethaninter-statewars,oftenlockingcountriesintoaconflicttrapofmutually

reinforcingpovertyandconflictleadingtoaprocessdescribedbytheWorldBankasdevelopmentin

reverse(WorldBank2003).

Third,thiscombinationofpovertywithweakandfailingstatesisaconcernbecauseitisnow

providingadirectthreattoourownsecurity.PresidentJohnF.Kennedysstatement,inhisinaugural

addressin1961,thatifafreesocietycannothelpthemanywhoarepoor,itcannotsavethefewwho

arerich(Kennedy1961)istruertodaythanitwasnearlyfivedecadesago.Thisisbecauseterrorist

groupsandcriminalnetworks,bothofwhichoftenhaveglobalreach,cananddonowtakeadvantage

ofweakandfailingstates.EvenwiththousandsofNATOtroopsnowinAfghanistan,thatcountrystill

produced87percentoftheworldsheroinin2005(UNODC2005).Ofcourse,drugshavenotbeen

theonlydangerousexportemergingfromthatcountrysinceterroristsusedthesafe-havengrantedby

theTalibantosetinmotiontheattacksof9/11.Somaliastotallackofnationalgovernancehasalso,

inrecenttimes,allowedthatcountrytobeusedasaprimarybaseofoperationsandshelterfor

terroristsactivethroughoutEastAfrica.Severaloftheindividualssuspectedofinvolvementinthe

bombingsofUSembassiesinKenyaandTanzaniain1998,forexample,arebelievedtostillbeatlarge

inSomalia(Payne2007).

Morality,concernsoverwiderinternationalpeaceandstability,andoverourownphysicalsecurity,

therefore,allmakepovertyandtheattendantgrowthofweakandfailingstatesasignificantdriverof

thecurrentinternationalsecuritylandscape.Asaresult,fordevelopedandwealthiercountriessuchastheUK,thelong-standingmoralimperativetotackletheissuesinthesecuritydevelopmentnexushas

beenjoinedbyanimperativebasedonself-interest.

iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity

Athirdandmorerecentlyemergeddriverofchangeintheinternationalsecurityenvironmentis

climatechange.Thisislikelytohaveamajorshapinginfluenceoninternationalaffairsinthedecades

ahead,thoughpreciselyhowandtowhatextentwilldependonthelevelofglobalwarmingthat

actuallyoccurs.TheFourthAssessmentReportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)

producedarangeoffuturetemperaturescenarios,basedonassumptionsaboutpopulationgrowth,

patternsofeconomicdevelopment,andthedevelopmentandadoptionofnewenergytechnologies

(IPCC2007).Thesescenariosshowbest-estimateprojectionsofaglobalaveragetemperatureincrease

thiscenturyintherangeof1.8Cto4.0C.Inthematerialthatfollows,webaseourdiscussiononthelikelyimpactofthemid-rangescenario,whichsuggestsabest-estimatetemperatureincreaseof2.8C

duringthecourseofthecenturyandanincreaseinthenexttwodecadesof1.5Cto2C.Underthis


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scenario,anumberofdevelopmentsinkeyregionsfromEasttoSouthAsia,theMiddleEastandon

throughmuchofAfricawilllikelyimpacttheinternationalsystem.

First,theIPCCprojectsthatChina willbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,particularlycomingunder

pressureinrelationtowaterstress,statingthat:InpartsofChina,theriseintemperaturesanddecreases

inprecipitation,alongwithincreasingwaterusehavecausedwatershortagesthatledtodryingupoflakesandrivers(IPCC2007:477).Chinasownfirstnationalreportonclimatechange,releasedinlate

2006,alsoforetoldacomingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycrop

yieldsby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustalsobethecountrysvulnerabilitytosea

levelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedonthecoast.

TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayplayabigroleinshapingboththecharacter

andstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelastfewyears,concernsover

environmentalissueshaveprovokedthousandsofChinesecitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry,

andthepotentialimpactsofclimatechangearenowhighinthemindsoftheChinesepeople.A2006

pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfound

80percentofrespondentsagreedthatwithintenyearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportant

threattotheircountrysvitalinterest(ChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs2006).KeyquestionsfortheChineseleadershipthereforearewhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhilerespondingto

thesedemandsforenvironmentalimprovementsandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegreeandat

suchpaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregimehandlesthesechallenges

couldhaveaprofoundeffectalargepartofinternationalaffairsinthedecadestocome.

Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmediumtermisthe

HimalayanregionofAsia,andthiswilllikelyimpactnearlyallofthesub-continent(IPCC2007).

TheHimalayanglaciersarethelargestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately

500,000km2,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacialareainthe

world.UndercurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycoulddisappearaltogetherby

2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80percenttocoveronly100,000km2.

ThiswillhavetheeffectofdeprivingtheIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmainsourceofwater,likelymakingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood

production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsealevelswillalso

harmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemanymega-deltasintheregion,furtherstressingagricultureand

foodsuppliesdependentonfishing.

ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchanextentthatthe

widerstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladeshisexploding(itisprojected

tonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)asclimatechangedestroysasignificantportionofthe

countrysalreadylimitedhabitableland,forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastable

environmentwithoutregardtotheregionsmanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwill

alsofaceclimatestressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbours,isalreadybracingitselfagainsta

waveofBangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealongthe2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007).

TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillbecomplicatedfurtherby

whatsomehavedescribedasanewhydrologicalsecuritycomplex(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEast

regionishometo6.3percentoftheworldspopulationbutonly1.4percentoftheworlds

renewablefreshwater.Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries,

namelyTurkey,Iran,IraqandSyria.Acomplexsetofwaterdependencyrelationshipsthereforeexists

andissettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemostvulnerablepositionsofallstatesintheregion

(Campbelletal2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetresofwaterpercapitaby2025;1000

cubicmetrespercapitaisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadevelopedcountry

(Homer-Dixonetal1993).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedinpoliticallyfraught

territory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthemountainaquiferthatunderliestheWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointstotheIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinian

relationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcouldbecomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionand


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conflictintheregion(Bitar2005).

InAfrica,highertemperaturesandlesserandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250million

moreAfricansunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffectEast,WestandNorthAfrica,the

lattersufferingarapidandseveredeclineinpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentupto

2050.EastAfricawilllikelyseeupto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion,whileatthesametimethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryerresultinginseveredroughtsand

additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesupnearlyhalfof

EastAfricasGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.Anylossinsovitalan

economicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesontheregionsoveralleconomicandpolitical

development(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,isalreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification:

approximately1,350squaremilesofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersand

herdsmanandcausinginternalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asa

result,by2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million

inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiverdelta,thougheven

thisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentireareaisalsoatmajorriskfromsea

levelrise(McCarthy2006,IPCC2007).

ThissetofdevelopmentsinAfrica,insomeoftheworldspoorestregions,maywelladdfurtherstress

totheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedintheprevioussection.Climateevents

themselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebutmigrationflowsarealsolikely

tobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstateauthoritiestorespondinanumberofareas.

ThismaybeaparticularlyacuteprobleminEastAfricawheretheconcentrationofweakorfailing

statesisalreadyhighandnumerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort,

climatechangemaybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica.

Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabovepointto

significantinternationalmigratorypressuresanditcannotbeassumedthattheseflowsofpeoplewill

staywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itishighlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsof

peoplewillbedirectedattheWestandattheEuropeanUnionandtheUKinparticular.BritishcolonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,forexample,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthe

surroundingareamustbeanticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoing

mixofconflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentrypoint

ofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapethechallengesanddifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Thiswilllikely

presentadditionalchallengestosocialunityintheEU,evenasEUmemberstatesturntomigrant

labourasaresponsetotheirowndemographicandlabourmarketchallenges.

IntheUK,therearealsolikelytobedirecteffects,asmuchoflow-lyingEastAngliainparticularislikely

tobeatincreasedriskofflooding.Observedmeasurementshaveshownthatthesea-levelofftheEast

Angliancoastisrisingbyanaverage4.5mmperyear,which,combinedwith1.5mmperyearofisostatic

adjustment(groundlevelsinking),isleadingtoa6mmperyearsealevelriseintheregion(Edwards

2005).IncreasedwindsandstormsintheNorthSeawillalsolikelycausemorepowerfulstormsurgesthatcouldbreachcoastaldefences,floodinginlandareas.Thesechangestothephysicalenvironmentof

theUKarelikelytobesmallrelativetosomeotherareasintheworld,butstillsignificant.

Severalimportantmilitaryassetswillalsobeatriskfromenvironmentaldamage.Sealevelrisecould

negativelyaffecttheSouthCoastnavalbasesatPortsmouthandDevonport.TheMinistryofDefenceis

currentlymodellingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthesebases(Liddell2007),andalthoughno

seriousdamageispredictedoverthenext20-25years,theIPCCpredictsthatsealevelrisealongthe

Englishcoastlinecouldbeupto50percenthigherthantheglobalaverage,whichunderworst-case

scenarioscouldseverelydisruptoperationsatthesebasesincurrentoperatingconditions.Increased

floodingcouldalsojeopardiseseveralRAFbases,namelyValleyontheIsleofAngleseyoffWalesand

twobasesinEastAngliacurrentlyusedbytheUSAirForce,LakenheathandMildenhall(Ministryof

Defence2006).Eachofthesethreeairfieldsisonly10metresabovesealevelleavingthemhighlyvulnerabletoflooding.AmongtheUKsoverseasmilitaryassets,thenavalstationatDiegoGarcia,a

tinyatollintheIndianOceanonlyonemetreabovesealevelatitshighestpoint,isinmoreimmediate

dangerfromrisingsealevels.TheCenterforNavalAnalysisintheUnitedStateswarnedina2007


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reportthatthebase,amajorforwardlogisticshubforbothBritishandAmericanforcesoperatinginthe

PersianGulfandMiddleEastregion,couldbelosttosealevelrise(CenterforNavalAnalysis2007).

Tore-cap,climatechangeissettohavedirectconsequencesfortheUKbothhereathomeandin

relationtoimportantoverseasassets,islikelytoprovokenewinter-statetensionsandtogeneratenew

sourcesandinstancesofstatefailure,particularlyinAfrica,andmayevenplayamajorroleinshapingthecharacterandoutlookofamajorpowerlikeChina.Itmayalsoputaddedpressureonsocialunity

indevelopedcountriesinacontextinwhichthatunityisalreadyunderstrain.Thisallamountstoa

verysignificantdestabilisingpressureinanumberofimportantstatesandregionsaroundtheworld

andintermsofitssecurityconsequences,mayyetcometodwarfandover-shadowthecurrently

high-profileissueofterrorism.


Thefourthandpenultimatedriverofthecontemporarysecuritylandscapethatwehighlightisthe

growthofpoliticalIslam,orIslamism.9 Thisnowrepresentsbothanimmediatethreattopublicsafety

andalong-termpoliticalchallengetoWesternliberaldemocracies.Thoughitsoriginscanbetraced

backovermanycenturies,initsmodernformpoliticalIslamowesitsdevelopmenttowritersand

thinkersactiveinthemid-20thcentury,suchasAbulAlaMaududiinSouthAsiaandSayyidQutbin

Egypt(forathoroughanalysisoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofpoliticalIslamseeRoy2004and

Burke2003).Themovementsthesemenspawned,Jamaat-e-IslamiandtheMuslimBrotherhood,

werethevanguardinwhatMaududiopenlydescribedasarevolutionarydoctrineandsystemthat

seekstooverthrowgovernments(MaududiquotedinHusain2007).ModernIslamism,then,isbest

viewedasapoliticalmovementthatutilisesaparticularinterpretationofreligionratherthanasa

fundamentalistreligiousmovementthatattimespractisespolitics.NeitherMaududi,norQutb,nor

othersofnotelikethem,wereeventrainedclericsortheologians.

Intermsofitsideologicalcontent,Islamismisbasedonadivisionoftheworldintoconflictingcamps

ofgoodandevil.Good,inthisstoryline,arethetrueMuslimsfullydevotedtotheIslamists

interpretationofIslam.Evilontheotherhand,consistsinagroupofcountriesincludingtheUnited

States,theUnitedKingdom,France,andRussiawhicharesaidtorigtheinternationalsystemagainst

MuslimsandtouseanetworkofapostaterulersintheIslamicworldtoplunderitsresourcesandkeep

itscitizenssubdued.Consequently,Islamistpoliticalobjectivesrelatetotheremovalofsuchapostate

rulersfromtheMuslimworld,totheintroductionofmoretrulyIslamic(undertheirinterpretation)

societies,totheremovalofWesterninterferenceinMuslimaffairsandforsome,attheextreme,tothe

completeoverthrowofWesternliberalsocietyinitsentirety.

Inmorerecenttimesandinsomemanifestations,Islamismhasofcoursebecomeviolent,intheform

ofAlQaedaandAlQaeda-inspirednetworks,andintheformofothergroupsnotlinkedtoAlQaeda

inanyway.AkeyturningpointinrelationtoIslamistviolenceappearstohavebeentheSoviet

invasionofAfghanistan.IslamistorganisationsissuedacalltoMuslimseverywheretohelpinresisting

theSovietoccupation.Thousandsansweredthatcalland,furtherradicalisedbytheexperience,

subsequentlyreturnedtotheirhomecountrieswiththeviewthatviolenceconstitutedalegitimate

formofpoliticalexpression(Mamdani2005).Apsychologicalthresholdhadbeencrossedandviolence

becameameanstoachieverevolutionarypoliticalobjectivesinplacessuchasAlgeria,Egypt,Yemen,

Chechnya,Indonesia,andthePhilippines(BergenandReynolds2005).

Asweknow,politicalIslamtoday,eveninitsviolentforms,hasalsonowextendeditsreachinto

Westernliberaldemocraciesdirectly,beyondcountriesthatarepredominantlypopulatedbyMuslims.

ItseekstotargetandtorecruitboththegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandthosenon-

MuslimswhomaybesusceptibletoconversiontotheIslamistsparticularinterpretationofthereligion

ofIslam.

9.Thereisadebatetobehadontherightlanguagetousetocapturethisphenomenon.Wearestill

reflectingonthisbutforthepurposesofthispaper,thekeypointtonoteisthatwearedescribinga

politicalandnotareligiousphenomenon.


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Organisationallyandpolitically,politicalIslamisnothomogeneousanditsadherentscanbestbe

describedasexistinginaseriesofconcentriccircles.Atthecentreisasmallgroupofhard-core

radicalscommittedtoorchestratingviolentactioninfurtheranceoftheirpoliticalagenda,though

membersofthisgrouparenotoftentheperpetratorsoftheviolencethemselves.Inthenext,larger,

circle,arethefoot-soldiersmostlikelytocommitactsofviolence.Beyondthisgroup,inalargercircle

still,arethemembersofthemostradicalIslamistorganisationsfromwhoseranksthefoot-soldiersof

Islamistviolencecanmosteasilybedrawn.Then,attheouteredges,therearethemembersofmost

otherIslamistorganisationswhopursueIslamistpoliticalobjectivesbutdosobyworkingthrough

existingpoliticalsystemsratherthanthroughattemptstoviolentlyoverthrowthem.Finally,andat

leastpartiallymovingbeyondthosewhocanbedescribedinanyrealsenseasbelieversintheIslamist

politicalmessage,theremaybeatacitcircleofsupport(Saggar2006,Klausen2007).

IntheUKcontextthistacitcircleofsupporthasbeencapturedinopinionpollquestionnaire

responses.APopuluspollofattitudesamongBritishMuslimscarriedoutforTheTimes attheheight

oftheDanishcartoonscontroversy,forexample,had7percentofaweightedsampleagreeingwith

thestatementthat:TherearecircumstancesinwhichIwouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil

(Saggar2006:314).Thisfigureapproximatestoover100,000MuslimslivingintheUK.AfurtherICM

pollshowedthatafifthofrespondentshadsomesympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesofthose

whocarriedouttheLondonattacks(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).Finally,asurveyofMuslim

studentsintheUK,bytheFederationofStudentIslamicSocieties,showed4percentunableto

condemnthe7/72005attacksonLondon,afurther11percentrefusingtobackorcondemnthe

attacksand20percentsayingthattheywouldnotreportapossiblesuicidebomberintheirranksto

thepolice(FOSIS2005).

DespitetheseriousnessofthissituationandoftheIslamistchallengeaswehavedescribedithere,in

bothsecurityandpoliticalterms,policymakersstilldonothaveagoodunderstandingofwhatis

drivingit.OnecontextualfactorthatmayhaveassisteditsgrowthinWesterncountriesisthedecline

andcollapseofrevolutionaryleftistpoliticsinrecentdecades,whichhaseffectivelyleftpoliticalIslam

asthepredominantrepositoryforradicalpoliticalexpression.Anotherpotentialfactoristhegenuine

senseofpoliticalgrievancefeltbymanyMuslims.ThiscentresonWesternforeignpolicyand,tobe

morespecific,onperceptionsofinjusticeandhumiliationinrelationtotheIsrael-Palestinequestion,

onperceptionsofalossofeffectivecontrolofthenaturalenergyresourcesoftheMiddleEastin

particular,andonperceptionsoftheWesternroleinthemaintenanceandsupportofoppressiveand

autocraticregimesinseveralpredominantlyMuslimcountries.

SomeanalystshavefurthernotedasenseofalienationamongMuslimcommunitieslivingintheWest.

Thisappearstobeanissueamongsecond-andthird-generationMuslimcitizensinparticularandmay

begroundednotjustinoppositiontomuchWesternforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastbutina

complexmixoffactorsincludingperceivedsocialexclusionongroundsofraceandstrongconcerns

overIslamophobia.AsShivMaliksrecentpieceofinvestigativejournalismintosomeofthoseinvolved

intheattacksof7/7inLondonalsomakesclear,forsomeyoungMuslimsintheUKtheremayalsobeaparticularlyacutecrisisofidentityinwhichneitherthedominantculturalvaluesoftheparent

population,northemainstreamcultureofthenewhomecountryisseenasappealing(Malik2007).

Thetruth,however,isthatweareinsufficientlyclearaboutwhattheunderlyingcausesofthegrowth

inpoliticalIslamare,evenatthishighlevelofgenerality.Moreover,theradicalisationprocesses,for

thosemovingfromtacitcircleofsupporttofullacceptanceoftheIslamistworldview,andfrom

radicalisedpoliticstoactiveengagementinpoliticalviolenceareboth,ifanything,evenlesswell

understood.ThepersonalaccountsofthosewhohavebeeninvolvedinIslamistpoliticsandhavethen

pulledback,suchasEdHusain(Husain2007),haveprovidedvaluableinsighthere,buttheliterature

pointstoawiderangeofpossiblefactorsintheradicalisationprocessincludingpersonalrelationships,

psychologicalfactors,socialgroupdynamics,andtheparticularcommunicationopportunitiesofthe

internet,andtheoverallpictureremainsconfused.Makingpublicpolicyinthiscontextisnoteasy.TheIslamistsuseofreligiontomaskthepolitical

natureoftheirprojecthasputWesternliberaldemocraticregimesinadifficultpositionastheyseek


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topreserveacommitmenttotoleranceanddiversityintheirownsocietiesontheonehandwhile

addressingtheIslamistchallengewithoutappearingtodemonisefollowersoftheIslamicfaithonthe

other.

Thepolicychallengeitselfisalsocomplex.Onekeychallengeforgovernmentishowbesttoprotect

citizensfromtheIslamistthreatwithoutintroducingsecuritymeasuresthatinadvertentlyexpandtheoutercirclesofsupportforIslamistgroupsorpushmorepeoplefromtheoutercirclesofsupport

towardstheviolentcore.Anotherchallengeistounderstandhowbesttoproactivelyshrinktheouter

circles,bothathomeandinternationally,tosuchanextentthatthoseintheinnercorebecomeso

isolatedthatitisdifficultforthemtocontinueoperations.Bothareprofoundlydifficultand,without

animprovedunderstandingoftheradicalisationprocess,almostimpossible.Onlylimitedprogressis

likelytobemadeintheshorttermtherefore,andtheIslamistchallengeislikelytoremainakeydriver

ofboththedomesticandinternationalsecurityagendaforalongtimetocome.

v)Socio-economicvulnerability

Ourfifthdriverofchangeinthesecurityenvironmentissocio-economicvulnerability.Thishasrisen

upthesecurityagendapartlyasaresultofrecentchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomy,partly

asaconsequenceofchangestotheconditionofsomeelementsofourcriticalnationalinfrastructure,

andpartlyasaconsequenceoftheincreasedthreatofterrorismand/ordisruptiveclimateevents.

Whenitcomestothestructureofoureconomyanditsbusinesses,overthelastdecadeagreatdeal

ofworkhasbeendonetoencourageBritishcompaniestoadoptaleanapproachtobusiness

operations.Movingtojustintimemanufacturing,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingand

intermediaries,sheddingexcessstaff,allofthesedevelopmentshavesubstantiallyimprovedthe

competitivenessoftheUKeconomy.Atthesametime,thesupplychainsofBritishbusinesseshave

becomestretchedasaconsequenceofglobalisation.Thishasitselfbroughtefficiencygainsandhas

increasedtherangeofproductsandservicesavailabletotheUKconsumer.However,asJimNorton

haspointedout,thereisaghostatthisparticularfeast(Norton2008).Runninglean,morediverse

andstretchedsupplychainsmakesexcellentbusinesssensebutitassumesthatthebasic

infrastructureintheUKandbeyond,inenergy,communications,andtransportation,issecureand

reliable.Themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewithmajor

disruption.

Sadly,theassumptionofasecureandreliableinfrastructureisnotasafeone.Justasour

organisationshaveimprovedtheircollectiveefficiencyandthustheirdependenceonsupporting

infrastructure,wehavemadeinfrastructuredecisionsthatincreaseourvulnerabilitytodisruption.In

communications,forexample,therehasbeenashiftfromsecureprivatemobilesystemstoshared

(non-resilient)publicmobilecommunicationsinsomekeysectors.Effectivecommunicationinthe

eventofextrapressurebeingplacedonthemobilenetworkinanemergency,therefore,cannotbe

guaranteed.

Thereisconcern,also,overalackofstoragefacilitiesforgas,justasaccesstoourownNorthSeasuppliesrunsdown,andanequivalentconcernoveralackofinvestmentinlocalandregional

electricitydistribution,whichhasresultedinincreasedfailuresandthelossofsomekeyskillsandsub-

contractors.

Inothersectors,weoperateclosetocapacitylimitsinwaysthatcouldhavesevereconsequences.In

theeventofaflupandemic,forexample,areasonableassumptionwouldbethatupto20percentof

theUKsHeavyGoodsVehicledriverswouldbeunavailable,afigurelargeenoughtocripplethe

nationalfoodsupply,leavesupermarketshelvesempty,andpossiblycausecivilunrest.

Weaknessesinoneareaofourinfrastructure,moreover,canleadtobreakdowninothersbecause

severalkeyelementsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructureareinterdependent.Power,transport,

communications,water,andbroadcastingforexample,couldallbebadlyaffectedbyalossof

electricitysupply,thelattercausingacascadingeffectintoeachoftheothers.WhenpartsoftheUS

andCanadasufferedthelargestelectricpoweroutageintheirhistoryon14August2003,50million

peoplelostpower,4millionpeoplelostwater,andmanyrailroadsandairportswereshutdown(Doshi


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etal2007).IntheUK,thesummerfloodsof2007,thoughonamuchsmallerscale,also

demonstratedthepoint.

Terroristorganisationsappeartohavenoticedthisvulnerabilitytoo.InMarch2004,policeraidedthe

homeofOmarKhyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceterroristplotand

foundCD-ROMswithdetailedplansofBritainselectricityandgassystems.AccordingtoaNewYorkTimes reportlaterin2006,Khyamwasalsorecordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackon

Britainsgas,electricity,andwatersystems(Wolsey2007).

Thecascadeeffectsofalossofkeyinfrastructure,whetherbroughtonbysevereweather,terrorist

attackorsimplemaintenancefailures,wouldobviouslyalsogofarbeyondanimpactonother

infrastructuresectorsthemselves.FeworganisationsorservicesintheUKwouldbeabletofunction

effectivelyforlonginsuchcircumstances.Giventhis,theCabinetOfficeCivilContingenciesSecretariat

haspreviouslypublishedplanningguidancethataskskeyorganisationstopreparefor:

Lossofmainselectricitysupplyforuptothreedayslocallyor24hoursregionally Lossofwatersupplyforuptothreedays

LossofthepublicswitchedtelephonenetworkforuptothreedaysDisruptiontofuelsupplyforuptotendaysSignificantdisruptiontotransportforuptotendays Accessdeniedtomainpremisesforuptothreemonths.

However,itisunclearhowmanyorganisationscouldreallyclaimtohaveplansinplacetocope

withtheseguidelinesandmakingprogressinthiswholeareaisdifficultingovernanceterms.

DavidOmand,forexample,hasnotedthat80percentoftheUKscriticalnationalinfrastructure

isinprivatesectorhands,notallofitevenownedbyUKcompanies.Evenwithinthesectors

definedascorepartsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,thereremainsasignificantchallenge

tocoordinateactivityacrossmanydifferentsectorsandthischallengeonlymultiplieswhenone

considerstheneedtoplanforwiderbusinessandorganisationalresiliencethroughouttheentire

economyandsociety.Giventhesecircumstances,theissuesofcriticalnationalinfrastructure

protection,businessandorganisationalresilience,andemergencyplanningandpreparedness

havetakenonnewsecuritypolicyprominence.

Driversandeffects:conclusion

Wehaveattemptedinthispartofthepapertocapturethemultipleandinteractingdrivers

shapingthecurrentsecuritylandscape.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,poverty,

climatechange,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamandsocio-economicvulnerabilityarecreatinganew

setofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodealwith.Thedistributionof

powerbetweenstatesischangingandthis maymeanmoreinstabilityandconflictintheyears

aheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportant

too,bothintheirownright,andduetotheircapacitytoinflue

The New Front Line: Security in a changing world

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