The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraints in Contemporary Western Military Operations

8/6/2019 The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraints in Contemporary Western Military Operations

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ADVANCING

STRATEGIC THOUGHT

SERIES

THE NEW AZTECS:

RITUAL AND

RESTRAINT IN

CONTEMPORARY

WESTERN

MILITARY

OPERATIONS

Zhivan Alach

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STRATEGIC

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INSTITUTE

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The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategicstudies that develop policy recommendations on:

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Advancing Strategic Thought Series

THE NEW AZTECS:RITUAL AND RESTRAINT IN

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN MILITARYOPERATIONS

Zhivan Alach

July 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov-ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publicationsenjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas-

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ISBN 1-58487-500-3


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FOREWORD

The idea that the military environment is con-stantly evolving, becoming more and more dangerousand technologically sophisticated, is a common one.In the past century, we have seen the emergence of to-tal war, nuclear weapons, and bloody unconventionaland asymmetric campaigns. We have used many ofthe offshoots of this evolutionary idea to guide our

own setting of defense policy, seeing in the evolutiona constant escalation, albeit one perhaps marred byoccasional yet small oscillations.

In an earlier monograph, Slowing Military Change,Dr. Zhivan Alach questioned whether or not we areindeed in an era of rapidly evolving military technol-ogy. In this monograph, he takes an even longer view,

examining the scope of military history from the an-cient to the present day and comparing the character-istics of the various eras within the situation today. Heargues that, for the most part, there has been a steadyescalation from primitive, indirect, low-casualty con-ict to the massive total wars of the 20th century.However, from that time the momentum has changed.

Instead of a new era of war, Dr. Alach argues that

we have returned to something akin to primitivewarfare, with ritual and restraint now as importantas what might be seen as objective standards of mili-tary success. He argues that Western popular culture,the news media, and democracy have all preventedmilitaries from ghting in an unrestrained manner.Another factor for such restraint has been a decline in

the perceived utility of war in the absence of crediblethreats.


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The monograph raises some interesting questions.What are the implications of this return to ritual and

restraint? Has the West blinded itself to the realities ofwar? What if some foe emerges that is not restrainedby such niceties of civilization? In the setting of strate-gic policy, all of these questions need to be answered,and the true value of this monograph is in bringingthem to light.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Director

Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ZHIVAN ALACH is currently employed by aNew Zealand security agency. Previously, he was ananalyst for the New Zealand Defence Force. A longerversion of this monograph was published in DefenceStudies, Vol.10, Issues 1 and 2, March 2010. Dr. Alachholds a Ph.D. in defence policy from the University ofAuckland.


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SUMMARY

Centuries ago, the Aztecs of Central Americafought their wars in a ritualized and restrained man-ner, not seeking total victory but rather the captureof live prisoners. It was a style of warfare that seemsstrange to us today, who have been brought up onClausewitzian concepts of the meaning of war. Wethink of ourselves as scientic, instrumentalist prac-

titioners of the art of war, seeking maximum militaryeffectiveness.

The key argument of this monograph is that theWestern way of war has actually come full circle andreturned to its primitive roots. The monograph beginsby identifying the primary factors that shape war. Itthen studies the evolution of warfare over time, be-

ginning with what is known as primitive warfare.War began as gloried hunting, an extension of mar-tial culture, heavily circumscribed by both ritual andrestraint. The monograph then examines the majorhistorical eras of warfare. While there was no steadyevolution in a single direction, by and large, warfarebecame less and less subject to cultural restraint, andmore and more total.

The monograph then briey examines a range ofrecent Western operations that show a clear moveaway from total war and back toward ritual and re-straint. Our most recent wars are driven far more bycultural beliefs and moral standards, including respectfor international law, than they are by considerationsof raw military effectiveness. A secondary argument,

linked intimately to the rst, is that we in the West,especially the media, do not seem to realize that weare limiting our arms to such an extent. We continueto see contemporary warfare as brutal and extremelydeadly.


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The monograph then posits a series of interlinkedfactors contributing to this reemergent ritual and re-

straint. The main factors are a decline in the perceivedutility of war, sociocultural attitudes in the West, theimpact of democracy, and the professionalism of con-temporary soldiers. Finally, the monograph looks atthe implications of this return to ritual and restraint.Are the new Aztecs in danger of appeasing the sungod, but ignoring the conquistadors at the gates?


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THE NEW AZTECS:RITUAL AND RESTRAINT IN

CONTEMPORARY WESTERN MILITARYOPERATIONS

So adamantly can a society, or part of it, desire to forcewarfare into accepted patterns that the society may re-place real war with a Perfected Reality that more com-pletely conforms to the relevant Discourse on War.

John A. Lynn.1

Roughly half a millennium ago, the Aztecs ofCentral America fought a series of what were knownas Flower Wars. At various times, depending on theharvest,2 which limited the windows of opportunity,Aztec armies would be sent forth.

The Aztecs purpose, however, was not the con-

quest of their enemy, the expansion of Aztec territory,or some other goal we might term policy today; rath-er, it was the taking of captives for religious rituals.Restraint was key; killing a foe in battle was of littleuse. Thus their weapons were designed to cripple, notkill,3 and in battle, Aztec warriors would deliberatelyavoid lethal blows, thus putting themselves in danger

when ghting enemies whose lives would later be for-feit and who fought to kill. Furthermore, the Aztecs,though they had large armies, fought as individuals.The captives would be brought back to the great cityof Tenochtitlan, where they would be sacriced to oneof several Aztec gods, usually through the rippingof the captives still-beating hearts from their chests.Nor was nonlethality limited to native wars, for even

when the Aztecs fought the Spanish conquistador,Hernando Cortes, they continued to ght for captivesrather than simple victory.


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For us in the West today, these Flower Wars mayseem absurd. War is far too serious for us to limit it

through rituals and risk death by deliberately re-straining our own weaponry. Surely, the West ghtslogically and rationally,4 identifying its goals and thenapplying the forces required to achieve them. Ourway of war is perceived as being dominated by Karlvon Clausewitz, whose dictums lead so easily to a de-mand for total war.5

And yet, closer examination of the evidence sug-gests that the contemporary Western practice of war-fare is far closer in nature to that of the Aztecs 500years ago, than it is to that utilized by the West itself inthe World Wars.6 We are the new Aztecs. We too areghting for abstract spiritual concepts. Although oursare the product of reasoned discourse and a lengthyphilosophical tradition, they are abstract spiritual con-

cepts nonetheless. We do not have the sinister Tlacaxi-peualiztliOur Lord, the Flayed Onebut rather theconcepts of humanitarianism and pacism. Ourpriests are lawyers and United Nations (UN) ofcials,and our goal the sanctity of life, not military victory.

The key argument of this monograph is that theWestern way of war has come full circle and returnedin a sense to its primitive roots, of which the Aztecspresent a colorful but not unique example. Their wayof war began as gloried hunting, an extension ofmartial culture, heavily circumscribed by both ritualand restraint. Over time, war shed its ritualistic leg-acy. While there was no steady evolution in a singledirection,7 by and large warfare became less and lessrestrained by cultural suasion, and more and more

total. Some have argued recently that instrumentalityhas triumphed, and that war will not allow culturallydriven but militarily ineffective ideas and practices


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to prosper.8 Yet our most recent wars are driven farmore by cultural beliefs and moral standards, includ-

ing respect for international law, than they are by con-siderations of raw military effectiveness. A secondaryargument, linked intimately to the rst, is that we inthe West, especially the news media, do not seem torealize that we are limiting our arms to such an extent.We continue to see contemporary warfare as brutaland extremely deadly.

This monograph rst identies the primary fac-tors that shape war. It then looks at the evolution ofwarfare over time, beginning with what is known asprimitive warfare, identifying the key themes of thatphenomenon, then analyzing some of the major erasof warfare. This historical summary shows clearly thatthe practice of warfare became increasingly total andinstrumental. The monograph then briey examines a

range of recent Western military operations that showa clear move away from total war and back towardritual and restraint.

The monograph then posits a series of interlinkedfactors contributing to this reemergent ritual and re-straint. The main factors are a decline in the perceivedutility of war, sociocultural attitudes in the West, theimpact of democracy, and the professionalism of con-temporary soldiers. Finally, the monograph looks atthe implications of this return to ritual and restraint.Are the new Aztecs in danger of appeasing the sungod, but ignoring the conquistadors at the gates?

Claiming that modern warfare resembles primi-tive warfare in its emphasis on ritual and restraint isa controversial thesis. It ies in the face of many who

try to present contemporary warfare as intense, bru-tal, and dangerous,9 fought against a foe who seeksnothing less than the destruction of Western civiliza-


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tion and who may soon have the means to do exactlythat. It also implies that the Hansonesque concept of a

decisive, amoral, annihilatory Western way of waris at least for now inaccurate.10 Finally, it should beemphasized that identifying a trend does not implya normative judgment about that trend. It is not theauthors goal to criticize or praise resurgent ritual andrestraint, but rather to make its existence clear.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WARFARE

War is not a biological necessity.11 While the in-stinct of pugnacity appears to be an essential aspectof human nature,12 pugnacity is not the same as war-fare. Warfare is organized behavior that requires de-liberation, control, and purpose, although it shouldbe remembered that control is not synonymous with

restraint.13

As stated clearly by William Graham Sum-ner, War arises from the competition of life, not fromthe struggle for existence.14

As with all organized activity, warfare is facilitat-ed by a concept. A society must know how it wants toght. It is this ideal concept that is the starting pointfor what occurs on the battleeld.15 Styles of war-fare reect the self-conceptions, character traits, andmodes of dealing with internal conicts of the soci-eties that go to war.16 They are not xed, however.17There is a constant evolving interaction between howa society wishes to ght, and how it can ght, given atleast some degree of the instinct of self-preservation.

Some commentators have identied a trialoguedetermining the conduct of warfare:

1. What technology permits;2. What politics requires; and,3. What society allows.18


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To this should be added the culture of the warmak-

ing body, although some might suggest this is merelya sub-element of society.19 Bernard Brodie has notedthat nations at war, which are the key actors for muchof this monographs analysis, reect a strong culturalelement in their behavior.20

There is no historical record of primitive warfarein the West; our evidence begins with the Greeks. Itcan be plausibly hypothesized, however, that the war-fare of the Wests forgotten past resembled much ofwhat passes for warfare in todays primitive tribalworld. Because of this, the study of primitive warfarehas largely fallen to anthropologists and sociologists,21rather than military historians.22

Space does not allow for a closer examination ofthe styles of war of multiple primitive peoples, but

those of the Nguni,23

Yanomamo,24

Maring,25

Iban,26

Maori27and, of course, Aztecs, as already notedare greatly indicative. Some generalizationsthemesthat will later be shown to have overleaped the longintervening centuries to reemerge todaycan be ex-tracted from these examples.

The rst important theme is that primitive societ-ies existed largely in a state of perpetual warfare.28Partly because of this, primitive warfare was neitherrational nor instrumental.29 Warfare for primitive war-riors was as much an expression of personal identityas anything else. There was a focus on individualism,on reputation and honor, and warfare was felt to de-ne warriors in a way that does not necessarily applyto modern soldiers.30

Another important element was the heavily ritual-ized nature of primitive warfare, which in many casesresembled an extremely bloody game.31 Cultural con-


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trols were key to this restraint.32 Much primitive war-fare had a three-stage structure, exemplied by the

Maring and Yanomamo, which escalated from feud-ing to raiding and thence to formal battle. The last wasthe least common, and primitive warriors seldom,if ever, aspired to the annihilation of their enemies.Close combat was usually avoided; instead, treacheryand hit-and-run attacks were favored due to their lowlevel of risk.33 Armies fought with little coordination,and battle was usually more a series of individual du-els than a collective activity.34

Restraint usually extended to the treatment of non-combatants, although this did vary, with some tribestreating them more brutally than others.35 Usually,women, children, and the elderly were exempt fromviolence;36 when violence against them did occur, itwas usually an intertribal war rather than intratribal.

Further restraints focused on the justication forwar; there was usually a careful consideration of therationale for any war, and whether that rationalemeshed with cultural beliefs. Often, conciliation andarbitration processes occurred simultaneously withthe battle, sometimes on the battleeld itself. A naltheme of primitive warfare involved conventions lim-iting the time and place. Events such as harvests usu-ally dened the window for warfare, and the presenceof sacred places limited potential battleelds, as didphysical geography.

Overall, while primitive warfare was endemic,it was heavily restricted. Since thenthat is, duringthe period of recorded historyWestern warfare haspassed through at least three main phases: the War-

rior Period; the Grotian Period; and the Total WarPeriod.37 While they are approximations and full ofanomalies, these three phases do provide a useful


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construct for exploring the evolutionary distancing ofWestern warfare from its primitive roots.

The Warrior Period.

It was the Greeks, from approximately 500 BC on-ward, who rst developed what became known as theWestern way of war,38 cutting loose from at leastsome of the constraints of primitive warfare.39 Greekwarfare was waged largely between Greek city-states,small independent actors in a land whose geographyfavored such a patchwork political structure. Battleswere usually fought in the summer, when men couldleave their farms and when the ground was rmenough for battle. Greek warfare was focused ondecisiveness, since a quick resolution of any battlewould enable the soldier-farmers to return swiftly to

their work in the elds. Yet battles seldom ended inannihilation, and there was usually no real effort tofollow up success on the battleeld with a pursuit.Ritual acts, especially the raising of a trophy on thebattleeld, demonstrated victory. Alexander the Greatcarried the Greek style further,40 stripping away someof the restraints of time and place,41 even annihilatinghis enemies at times,42 yet he was still a recognizablyprimitive warrior, dominated by superstition andritual.

The Romans came next. They present the rst major anomaly in the development of the Western wayof war, for they were more ruthless and total in theirmethods than any society for almost 2,000 years.43 Theyrazed Carthage to the ground and salted its lands, and

brought re and the sword to much of Europe. Yetthey were still heavily restricted by cultural beliefs,such as the reading of auguries, the need for a time for


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commanders to be appointed for political purposes,and even the loyalty of their soldiers to their com-

manders, rather than to the state itself.With the arrival of the Middle Ages came some re-

turn to ritual and restraint. The church was at the heartof efforts to restrain warfare in Europe,44 promulgat-ing strict regulations known as jus militaire, which,although motivated by theology, bore a strong resem-blance to contemporary humanitarian law.45 Combatoften took on a judicial air, being seen as a means toresolve conict through the supposed intervention ofGods will.46 Yet this peaceful message was not alwaysrespected, with mounted raids known as chevaucheesbringing terror and death to noncombatants in thepursuit of political gains.47 Medieval warfare was,however, further limited by the usual absence of largebattles, with warfare devolving into a series of raids

and sieges.48

The Grotian Period.

The Grotian period, so-called from the writings ofthe Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius on just war theory, es-pecially from approximately 1631, was dominated bybattles. It has been known as the Age of Battles, butwith ritualized tactics and efforts to establish restrain-ing rules for the damage inicted by war. There wasan ongoing quest for decisiveness, and yet, if anything,warfare became less so.49

Ritualized tactics, wherein sides would approacheach other to point-blank range and then exchange vol-leys of musket and cannon re, resulted in extremely

bloody battles, with sides sustaining 30-percent casu-alties at times.50 Battles were dominated by a cultureof honor and decorum that demanded baring the


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breast to the enemy, exemplied best at Fontenoy,Belgium.51 There was also a military rationale in ex-

ploiting the effectiveness of massed musket volleys,the tactics followed were seldom altered, indicatinghow ritualized they had become.

Yet, even as battles grew bloodier, there were ef-forts in the legal and political elds to restrict the ef-fects of warfare on society as a whole.52 It was duringthe Grotian period that the rst legal conventions onrestraint in warfare appeared in Europe.53 Key to theseconventions was an attempt to protect civilians, an at-tempt that proved largely successful. The 17th centurywasin the words of one authoritative historianmarked by virtually no departures in Europe . . . fromthe principle of noncombatant immunity.54 Sacking atown, which was usually regarded as standard prac-tice previously, now became abhorrent.55

At the end of the 18th century, the French Revolu-tion altered the face of warfare, introducing new moti-vations of spirit, will, and nationalism. Building fromthese new motives, the French reintroduced some ofthe strategies of annihilation favored by the Romansalmost 2,000 years before.56 While technology waslargely unchanged, nationalism made massive armiespossible, which in turn made an increasingly totalstyle of war possible.

Once Napoleon had been defeated, much of the re-mainder of the 19th century was marked by attemptsto reimpose restraints upon warfare. In the secondhalf of the century, the convergence of internationalhumanitarian opinion, international law, and mili-tary modernization resulted in further formalization

of the rules of war established by Grotius, expressedin a range of new international conventions.57 Specialcare was taken to forbid certain types of weapons andensure the protection of civilians.


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It should be emphasized that the restraint spokenof during this period was largely limited to European

wars. As in previous periods, the civilized norms ofEuropean conict were seldom reected in more dis-tant realms, where brutality was commonplace.58 Andin America in the middle of the 19th century, therewere signs that the more total aspects of the Westernway of war had become rmly implanted, with theruthless American Civil War indicating, potentially,a new development in warfare as important as theFrench Revolution.

THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR

The largely bloodless wars of the late 19th cen-tury led to a new era of war in the 20th: the Age ofTotal War.59 Warfare, motivated by mass spirit and

will, motivations that had rst emerged in the FrenchRevolution, became increasingly divorced from thevestiges of judicial and ritualistic elements.60 Pickingselectively from Clausewitz, commentators declaredthat only total war could be successful, and that only afoolish country would wage restrained war.61

The rst of these total wars, World War I, wasdistinctly un-Clausewitzian in one important regard,however. It illustrated an astonishing mismatch be-tween political purpose and military design.62 Thesides went to war with seemingly clear aims, withtheir peoples clamoring for war, blood, and redress.63However, military technology resulted in stalemate,and, as time went on, the gap between political goalsand military strategy grew wider and wider.

World War I was a brutal war. The dictum of thetrenches involved thousands of infantry troops charg-ing across No-Mans Land to be cut down by machine


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guns and artillery. The strategy of attritional warfarelargely followed by all sides, with some late excep-

tions, demanded sending more and more young mento die in an effort to destroy the reserves of the enemy.World War I saw war become its own raison detre. En-tire economies were mobilized to produce weapons,and troops were raised from across the globe.

World War I was perceived, at rst, to have beenthe last of its kind, the war to end all wars. Moveswere soon underway to outlaw war entirely, and tofurther limit it in any event.64 This was not the rsttime that a war had been followed by a pacist coun-terreaction.

These attempts failed. World War I was followedby an even more total war, World War II, a war thatmade all the wars that had gone before it seem likethe mere exchange of arrows in a Yanomamo noth-

ing ght. World War II was a global war. It was a warof ideology: Fascism and Nazism against Democracyand Socialism. It was a battle of industry: the Uralsand Detroit against the Ruhr. It was a battle fought,especially on the Russian and Pacic Fronts, withlittle restraint.65 In the few instances in which sidesconstrained their methods, as with chemical weapons,such restraint was motivated by fear of retaliationrather than humanitarianism.

The Nazis sought to conquer Eurasia, to extermi-nate entire populations, and to enslave much of therest. The Japanese pursued similar goals in the Pacic.The Allies, though less extreme, still demanded the to-tal surrender of both Nazi Germany and Japan. Somepolicymakers even suggested decimating the more

militaristic elements of Germany, destroying its in-dustry, and turning it into a pastoral idyll.


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The war in Europe ended with Germanys un-conditional surrender and occupation. In the Pacic,

the war ended with the dropping of the rst atomicbombs on Japan. Thus, by 1945, history showed avery clear trend toward unrestrained and total war,a trend made all the more terrifying by the presenceof nuclear weapons. As a response to this, there wereagain further moves to outlaw or restrict war, largelythrough the formation of the UN.66

There was a third total war in the 20th century, al-beit one that never erupted: the Cold War.67 Had thisbecome hot, it would have pitted the Soviet Unionagainst the United States, each armed with an arsenalof nuclear weapons. It is probable that Clausewitzsdictums would have reached their ultimate extensionhere, helping justify a global nuclear exchange thatwould have killed billions. Luckily, this Third World

War did not erupt; instead, Western states fought onlya few expeditionary wars during the period.68

Throughout the periods examined above, a discern-ible Western way of war has emerged, a way of warthat has grown more distinctive as it has developed.69It is a lethally amoral tradition, and over time it hasbecome less shackled by religion, ritual, tradition, orethical standards.70 Western armies have pursued theannihilation of their enemies, rather than social rec-ognition, religious salvation, or personal status.71 Thesocial ramications of technology, which constrainedthe development of effective armies in countries suchas Japan and Turkey, have been regarded as less im-portant than military efcacy.72

This is not to say that the West has always fought

fully in such a way. Many of these tendencies grewstronger over time, as war grew more total, amoral,and unrestrained, although there were substantial his-


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torical oscillations.73 The total war impulse seeminglyreached its culmination in 1945. Since that critical in-

ection point, there has been a shift back toward ritualand restraint. This new trend is marked by a growingintolerance for casualties, both friendly and enemy,both soldier and civilian, and an emphasis on limitedmeans of war.74

RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY RITUAL ANDRESTRAINT IN WARFARE

The following case studies illuminate the ritualis-tic and restrained elements present in several recentand contemporary conicts involving the West. Thecase studies focus on the character of, rather than therationale behind, that restraint. Later in the mono-graph, more detailed analysis of the reasons behind

the return of restraint is given. It should also be notedthat although ritual and restraint are usually linked,this is not always the case. Again, there is no intent torender value judgments about the return of primitivewarfare traits in recent conicts.

Apart from Somalia and the enforcement periodthat preceded the ground phase in Kosovo, this mono-graph does not examine peace-support operations, be-cause such operations, by denition, are deliberatelyrestrained and ritualized. Analyzing them, especiallygiven their greatly increased frequency in the post-Cold War period, would only strengthen the thesisthat the West is once again ghting in a highly con-strained fashion.


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Vietnam.

Vietnam presents an excellent example for study,for it was a halfway house, the rst clear sign fol-lowing World War II75 of nonmilitary considerationsrestraining the conduct of war in a way that was great-ly harmful to military efcacy.76 While to the NorthVietnamese and the Viet Cong the war was a total war,demanding the full utilization of national resources,the Americans perceived it in a more limited fashion.77As a result, the American military, used to having alargely free hand in military operations,78 found itselfheavily restrained.79 Its methods illustrated many ofthe trends characteristic of primitive war.

America did not pursue annihilation, refusing toemploy substantial parts of its arsenal, including nu-clear weapons, or even sustained strategic bombing of

urban areas.80

It restricted the place of war, allowinglarge parts of the war zone to serve as sanctuaries81where American ground troops were never sent, andwhere air strikes were seldom undertaken.82 Strictrequirements were imposed on air combat aircraft tovisually identify their potential targets, thus render-ing their long-range missiles largely useless. At othertimes, micromanagement extended to battalion com-manders in the jungle, who receive instructions direct-ly from the President.83 Bombing halts were linked toarbitration processes, a high-technological version ofvillage elders standing on the Maring battleeld.

Although American soldiers were conscripted, anelement common to total war, they served only 1-yeartours of duty. In theater, they were often able to ac-

cess luxury goods unimaginable to soldiers in previ-ous conicts. Indeed, for many of the personnel at thelarger bases, life in Vietnam was decidedly unwarlike.


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The peacelike atmosphere was further intensied bythe omnipresence of the news media. Casualty rates

were also lower than those experienced in previouswars, such as the World Wars and American CivilWar, with just over 57,000 dying in well over half adecade of ground operations.

Yet at the same time, Vietnam still showed endur-ing elements of the Western way of war. Carpet bomb-ing against area targets was undertaken, and therewas wholesale defoliation of swaths of jungle in an ef-fort to deny enemies overhead cover. Some weaponsregarded as inhumane, such as napalm, were used inlarge quantities.

American restraint in Vietnam was largely moti-vated by political considerations, and in particular afear of Chinese and Soviet intervention. Despite thisrestraint, the few atrocities that were committed by

American troops, as well as a perceived lack of clearwar goals, helped make the war deeply unpopular athome. Vietnam helped shape the American psyche,contributing to a developing cultural malaise thatplaced a declining value on heroism and self-sacri-ce.84 It was an important milestone on the path toresurgent ritual and restraint, as the following casestudies further illustrate.

Somalia.

The UN conducted a peacekeeping operation inSomalia in 1992, some 20 years after American troopshad left Vietnam. The international news media haddrawn attention to massive suffering in Somalia, the

result of warlordism, with thousands, if not millions,of people starving.85 The operation soon proved farmore deadly than had been anticipated. Warfare is


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motivated by negative news media attention,95 but itmust be remembered that it was not the media that

made the nal decision.96

In bringing about such anabrupt withdrawal, the primitive Somalis illustratedbrilliantly the resurgence of primitive traits withinthe American warmaking machine: ghting in a re-strained manner, indulging in hit-and-run tactics, andeeing as soon as a few casualties were inicted.

Kosovo.

Kosovo provides an even ner exemplar of re-emergent primitivism, for unlike Somalia, it was os-tensibly an enforcement action rather than peacekeep-ing. The war in Kosovo came about due to a belief thatYugoslav forces were waging a campaign of ethniccleansing within the borders of Kosovo, a province

in Yugoslavia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion (NATO) offered to deploy a peacekeeping forcein the province; Yugoslavia refused, feeling such wasan infringement of its sovereignty. In response, NATOlaunched Operation ALLIED FORCE.

NATO, which combined the military forces ofmost of the worlds strongest states, could havecrushed Yugoslavia in a few days had it fully utilizedthe arsenals at its disposal, but it did not even send inground troops. Instead, it embarked on a 78-day aerialbombardment, which was assisted in its aim by theefforts of Russian diplomats.97 This aerial campaignwas heavily restrained. At the heart of this restraintwas a perceived popular aversion to casualties, bothfriendly and enemy.98 Aircraft were forced to bomb

from high altitudes to avoid defensive re, which se-verely limited their accuracy and effectiveness; duringthe entire campaign, NATO aircraft destroyed only 30


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armored vehicles and 20 artillery pieces.99 Offensively,effective assets such as the AH-64 Apache attack heli-

copter, which might have been vulnerable to defen-sive re, were not used.100 Overall, this tentative use ofaerial stand-off weapons, all the while protected by amassive electronic shield, was strongly reminiscentalbeit in a high-technology mannerof primitive war-fare, particularly that of the Maring.

There were still criticisms of the perceived in-humane nature of some activities undertaken byNATO.101 Operation ALLIED FORCE did target somecivilian facilities, including power and sewage fa-cilities. However, immense care was taken to ensurethat any targets struck caused minimum civilian ca-sualties.102 Micromanagement similar to that whichemerged in Vietnam recurred, although now it wasfurther complicated by the multinational nature of

the committees determining which targets could bestruck.103 Yet there was also a paradox, in that effortsto avoid friendly casualties, such as high-altitude at-tacks, were the cause on some occasions of civiliancasualties, such as the bombing of a refugee convoy.

From the beginning, there was great hesitationabout deploying ground troops due to concern aboutpotential casualties. However, as the air campaigndragged on seemingly without effect on the Milosevicgovernment, some efforts were made to prepare fora ground offensive.104 The United Kingdom (UK) of-fered to commit 50,000 British troops, and Germany,Italy, and even France seemed increasingly open tothe prospect. However, the fact that a ground inva-sion did not take place within the rst 78 days, and in-

deed was unlikely to have happened within the rst 6months of the campaign, indicates how much of a lastresort such a move was seen. NATO was extremely


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unwilling to resort to unrestrained measures, and themere possibility of a ground invasion should not be

seen as indicating anything to the contrary. Indeed,the true likelihood of a ground campaign needs to beclosely evaluated, given NATOs unwillingness to en-gage in more-restricted escalations, such as an intensi-cation of the air campaign.

Other elements typical of primitive war were alsopresent in Operation ALLIED FORCE. The opera-tion was preceded by a lengthy and complex diplo-matic process, which continued in Byzantine fashionthroughout the bombing. There were constant con-cerns about treachery within the Alliance, includingthe possibility that countries within NATO were feed-ing information to the Yugoslavs.

In the end, NATO sustained zero casualties dur-ing Operation ALLIED FORCE.105 It managed to insert

a peacekeeping force in the province, as had been itsgoal all along. Yet some commentators have claimedthat the restrained methods utilized by the Alliance,reminiscent of primitive war, caused this goal to besubstantially delayed.106

Afghanistan.

On September 11, 2001 (9/11), al Qaeda terroristscrashed airliners into the World Trade Center in NewYork and Pentagon in Washington, DC. The Ameri-can reprisal, assisted by several allies, was swift. AlQaedas leadership was tracked to Afghanistan.When the Taliban government of that country re-fused assistance in capturing those al Qaeda leaders,

America, leading a coalition of the willing, invadedAfghanistan. Given the history of conicts involvingthe West against non-West, as well as the fact that


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American soil had been attacked, one might have ex-pected a brutal war.

Afghanistan, like Somalia, has a culture in whichwar is endemic. For much of its history, Afghan war-fare was limited in time, space, and degree;107 as such,it was an exemplar of primitive warfare. When rstthe British, and later the Russians, invaded, however,this traditional code was broken. The Afghans beganto ght in increasingly brutal fashion.108 As in Soma-lia, the invading Americans encountered a militantculture.109

Since 2001, Afghan insurgents have fought in asavage fashion, targeting civilians and in some waystrying to turn theirjihad, or holy war, into a total com-mitment.110 Their use of terrorist tactics has contrib-uted to a developing perception that such is the con-temporary Arab/Muslim way of war.111 This is no true

Clausewitzian war, although it is cruel. Violence forthe mujahedin is ritualized, expressive, and focused onblood.112

America, unlike the Afghan insurgents, has themeans to wage total war. Yet its operations againstthe Taliban have been heavily restrained. At rst, itsent in only a few small elite units, usually consistingof Special Forces.113 These worked closely with localactors, buying out the allegiance of Afghan war-lords,114 and relying on the exible loyalties of manyactors in a way that would have been very familiar toa feudal baron of the Middle Ages. A series of surgicalstrikes was undertaken, often using airpower as well,to eliminate the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.

Since the initial invasion, much of Afghanistan has

been occupied by a Western coalition.115 Despite oscil-lating levels of insurgent activity, Western forces haveengaged in a ritualized and restrained style of warfare


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that again is reminiscent of primitive warfare in manyrespects.

The theater is a particularly benign one if mea-sured by casualty rates. In approximately the rst 5years, British troops sustained only 16 killed in action,as well as an additional 21 deaths due to accidents orillness.116 From the start of 2006 to almost the end of2008, 34 British soldiers were killed in action.117 Whilesome within the media have tried to present such g-ures as somehow comparable to World War II casualtyratesa ridiculous claimit is immediately apparentthat the chance of being killed in action in Afghani-stan is particularly low. The same has been true for theUnited States, which, for example, lost only 52 soldierskilled in action for the whole of 2004, or roughly onea week.118 The casualty rate has increased since then,but overall, 7 years of operations in Afghanistan have

resulted in fewer casualties than a single bad day ineither World War. This is partly a result of the charac-ter of operations. Rather than engaging in large-scaleoperations, Western units largely live in fortied out-posts and engage in daily patrols; as such, operationsare reminiscent of extremely dangerous police work,albeit employing much heavier equipment.

Restraint is particularly apparent in the strict rulesof engagement applying to the forces in theater. TheGermans, for example, have a strict principle of pro-portionality, allowing the use of lethal force only whenan attack is taking place or is imminent.119 Again, suchan approach is more reminiscent of police work thanwarfare. From at least 2005, the United States ex-pressed some concerns about the rules of engagement

followed by various countries in the coalition, notingthey could prove counterproductive in more danger-ous areas.120 These rules have heavily restricted the use


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of repower, limiting civilian casualties: approximate-ly 500 Afghans died in 2006, and 1600 in 2007, a very

low rate in the historical context.121

Despite this lowrate, in the past year, there have been further movesto tighten the rules further to restrict the likelihood ofcollateral damage.122

Civilians are never deliberately targeted, and areregarded as inviolate, although as the gures aboveshow, accidents do occur. Soldiers are required to berespectful of the local culture as well, even thoughmany of the locals respond with hatred. And yet,despite the degree of restraint apparent in Westernbehavior, Afghanistan remains perceived as a partic-ularly dangerous place, one in which the West is ght-ing brutally. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, playingto local political pressure, has criticized the coalitionfor accidental civilian deaths, perhaps ignorant of the

degree of civilian casualties that was usual for mostwars during the 20th century.123 When mistakes aremadea few soldiers stranded without air support,or a few Afghans killed by a misguided bombthemedia response is astonishing. War, to them, shouldbe as it was many thousands of years ago: a ritualizedgame where none need die.

Iraq.

After the rst Gulf War, Iraq proved a constantproblem in the Middle East, largely due to its per-ceived weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pro-gram and support for terrorists. A series of limitedair strikes, such as Operation DESERT FOX, was un-

dertaken by the United States in an effort to modifyIraqs behavior.124 These failed, and in the aftermathof 9/11, Iraq was regarded as an even greater threat


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due to the possibility of it providing WMD to terroristorganizations. The situation continued to deteriorate

until early 2003. Following a series of ritualistic dip-lomatic maneuvers in the UN, including showboatingstatements from both the American and Iraqi govern-ments, an American-led coalition invaded Iraq. Thissteady escalation, from feuding to raiding and nallyto battle, was reminiscent of the three-stage combatundertaken by many primitive groups.

The initial conventional campaign went bril-liantly.125 Up to 8 percent of the overall Allied forceconsisted of special forces, who proved highly adeptat pinning down Iraqi units.126 The armored columnssliced through all opposition, soon reaching and seiz-ing Baghdad. Airpower was employed in a calculatedmanner, with no attempt to atten cities or destroy in-frastructure. Strict rules of engagement were followed,

and civilians were carefully protected; the invasionforce moved like a band of explorers navigating thecountryside with minimum disturbance to the locals.Only 154 American casualties were incurred duringthis phase.127

Since that conventional campaign, an insurgen-cyindeed, something more than an insurgency128developed in Iraq, partly due to the restrained andundermanned style in which America waged the con-ventional phase.129 Ralph Peters put it aptly, declar-ing that we tried to make war on the cheap, only tomake the endeavor vastly more expensivein everyrespectthan it needed to be.130

Many Iraqis saw foreign intervention as a massiveinsult to their collective honor, and in turn responded

violently.131 As with the Somalis and Afghans, war-fare has been endemic in Iraqi culture for many cen-turies;132 it has often been seen as a natural element


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of life.133 Again, as in Somalia and Afghanistan, dis-locations of traditional structures of society, and the

effects of those dislocations on culture often caused byexternal intervention, have had the effect of increasingthe brutality of traditional styles of war.134 The Iraqiinsurgency lacks the heavy weapons available to in-surgents in other wars.135 However, what it has lackedin tanks and aircraft, it has made up for in lethal im-provised explosive devices and a tendency to targetcivilians rather than military personnel.

Despite the brutality of its foes, the Western coali-tion in Iraq has continued to restrain its methods. Asin Afghanistan, war in Iraq resembles extreme polic-ing.136 Crime has been perceived as the greatest threatto security.137 Indeed, many U.S. Marines sent to thetheater have been trained by the Los Angeles, CA, Po-lice Department in an effort to teach them necessary

civil-policing skills.138

There are relatively few Allied troops, given the

size of the country. The most common activity is thepatrol from a fortied outpost. Operations are usuallycarried out by small units, with the battalion the larg-est formation.139 Where there have been larger opera-tions, such as the rst battle of Fallujah in April 2004,they have not been carried through to a decisive con-clusion.140

As in Afghanistan, restraint is further evident inrestrictive rules of engagement and low casualty rateson both sides. During a major operation involvingseven battalions at the end of 2005, not a single deathwas sustained on either side, despite the capture of377 suspected insurgents.141 During one phase of the

Fallujah battle, civilians were allowed to leave the warzone before Western forces attacked. In almost 6 years,the United States has sustained just over 4,200 deaths


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in theater; this works out to be roughly two a day, avery low rate compared with past wars.142 Even dur-

ing the worst periods, the death rate was still less thanve a day across the entire theater.143 Recently, thedeath rate has dropped to as low as four a month.144In almost 2 1/2 years from the start of 2006, the UKsustained just two killed in action.145 Casualties on theIraqi side have also been remarkably low.146

Despite ghting a frustrating, culturally confusingconicta mixture that in the past has led to massa-cresWestern troops in Iraq have committed an ex-traordinarily low number of criminal acts.147 And suchacts that have been committed have been heavily pub-licized and punished. Yet, as with Afghanistan, publicopinion continues to demonize Western forces in Iraq,expecting them to wage immaculate war, which is, ofcourse, an oxymoronic impossibility.

Lebanon 2006.

In 2006, tired of constant provocations by the ter-rorist group Hezbollah, based largely in Lebanon, Is-rael took military action. This was not the rst timesuch provocation had occurred; in 1982, Israel usedtanks and heavy artillery to atten resistance, whichincluded Syrian forces. Israels technique changed in2006.

As with NATO in Kosovo, at rst the Israelis reliedalmost entirely on air power, reecting their continu-ing refusal to countenance even minimal casualties.148This tentativeness was also perceived by some as anIsraeli refusal to ght seriously.149 Only after it had

become apparent that airpower by itself would be in-sufcient did the Israelis move to a ground campaign,using special forces at rst in seek-and-destroy mis-


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sions, and then escalating to a more general offensiveposture.150

Despite the fact that their homeland was underre, the Israelis took great care to ght in a restrainedmanner that minimized civilian casualties. They de-manded accurate intelligence before launching strikes,and refused to engage in such damaging activities aslarge-scale artillery barragespreferring more surgi-cal attacks.151 Despite this, as much as 15 percent of theLebanese population was internally displaced duringthe war,152 as much a result of the constrained size ofthe theater as any particularly aggressive Israeli be-havior.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, proved far less re-strained. It launched random rocket attacks againstIsraeli towns and took hostages. Its combatants weremore willing to die, its tactics more creative, and its

methods more brutal. It often co-located its combat-ants with civilians,153 thus confronting the Israeli forc-es with the dilemma of whether to inict civilian ca-sualties or allow enemy forces to survive. Relying ontraditional, perhaps primitive, ties of culture, religion,and society,154 Hezbollah fought a disciplined defense.Eventually, it fought the technologically advanced Is-rael Defense Forces to a standstill. As in Somalia, sup-posed primitivism had triumphed; again, however, ithad triumphed because of the reemergent primitiv-ism apparent in the methods of the force perceived asmore Clausewitzian. Primitivism had not beaten in-strumentalism: a more brutal primitivism had beatena less brutal type.


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warfare. The West is partly to blame here, for it wasWestern involvement in the region that crippled and

mutated traditional martial cultures, imbuing themwith the bloodthirsty ideologies they have today.

We may thus be seeing an evolving and ahistoricaldivergence in global military culture.161 The West maybe retreating toward restraint in warfare, whereas non-Western actors may be charging headlong toward un-restrained methods.162 Again, it must be emphasizedthat this is not a value judgment. It may well be thatrestrained methods of war, reminiscent of primitivewar, are actually superior, at least from a moral per-spective, to the unrestrained methods supported by aselective reading of Clausewitz; at least one renownedmilitary historianJohn Keeganbelieves so.163

COUNTERFACTUALS OF TOTAL WAR

Counterfactual history does not have a good name,but it is particularly useful here. It is often difcult forus to imagine that past events might have happeneddifferently; once they have occurred, they seem entire-ly logical, natural, and even inevitable, and we forgetthat they developed as only one of myriad potentialoptions. As such, counterfactual history can be used toindicate how some of these recent conicts might haveunfolded had the West not returned to a ritualizedand restrained way of war, but rather continued thetrend toward totality exemplied by the World Wars.There is no intent to suggest that the counterfactualsdescribed would have been better methods of ghtingthe wars mentioned.164 But we can devise better policy

to the extent that we can reliably compare outcomes ofrival courses of action.


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In Vietnam, America might have unleashed almostthe full power of its arsenal. Massive conventional

forces might have landed in the north. Airpowermight have been liberated from restrictive rules of en-gagement, allowing it to destroy almost anything thatmoved that was not regarded as friendly. An airtightblockade might have been imposed along the entireNorth Vietnamese coast. Strong censorship mighthave countered the anti-war movement, allowing thepursuit of rational national war aims.

In Somalia, America might have responded to theBlackhawk down incident with a massive escalationof force. Mogadishu might have been attened, andthe insurgent groups destroyed, regardless of collat-eral damage. In Kosovo, NATO might have quicklyooded the battleeld with armor from both northand south, accepting the risk of heavy casualties from

anti-tank defenses in order to achieve a decisive vic-tory and thus end perceived ethnic cleansing.

In Lebanon, Israel might have preceded a massivetank assault with a murderous artillery barrage remi-niscent of the Somme, aiming to dig Hezbollah out ofits holes with high explosives. In Afghanistan, a furiousAmerica might have dispatched a much larger inva-sion force to secure the border with Pakistan and thenengage in sweep-and-destroy missions reminiscent ofthe Boer War, turning the mountains of Afghanistaninto a depopulated wasteland. Finally, in Iraq, a muchlarger multinational force might have advanced morecarefully, occupying and securing important citieswith large garrisons, pacifying as it went. Once Sad-dam Hussein was defeated, the country might have

been quartered in a manner reminiscent of Germanyafter World War II. A large occupation force wouldthen have been maintained, one authorized to kill asmany locals as required to ensure security and stabil-ity.


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war would become increasingly unlimited; however,it would also need to be remembered that the after-

math of major wars is often notable for efforts to re-strict further conict. The evidence in this case seemsto indicate a complex interrelationship between theend of the Cold War and the perceived utility of war.

This analysis began with a quotation from JohnLynn discussing the interaction between a societysideal conception of warits Perfected Realityandthe actual war.171 The stronger a part of society is,the more it can dominate the physical discourse onwar, and the closer will be the resulting relationshipbetween its ideal of war and the actuality of war.

With the end of the Cold War, no Western societyfaces a serious military threat, and as such the Westis militarily hegemonic. Terrorism, which justied theWests intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, appears

incredibly deadly when compared to the relativepeace into which terrorism has reemerged,172 but palesinto insignicance when compared to the destructivepotentials inherent in the Cold War, the World Wars,or the threat of the Ottomans. The nature of militaryoperations carried out by the West since the end of theCold Warpeace operations, humanitarian interven-tions, and counterinsurgenciesis strong evidence forour military hegemony, for they are all wars of choice.

In the absence of a serious military threat, questionsabout the utility of a warits cost-benet ratio, bothin terms of money and of livesbecome absolutelycentral.173 Modern warfare, due largely to hyperina-tion in equipment costs, has become so expensive thatit seldom makes economic sense.174 Whereas in the

past a quick raid or a colonial expedition could seizesubstantial compensatory booty, that is no longer thecase today. And because there are few serious threats


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to state security, the motivation of self-preservation isalso reduced. As such, war is regarded as a less useful

tool of policy than it once was, and fewer resourcesare allocated to it.

Decisionmakers have thus tried to make war onthe cheap.175 They have been seduced by the prom-ises of technology, often promoted as the key to rapid,low-cost success.176 This has led to a belief that tech-nology, if sufciently advanced, is a substitute forquantity, leading to calls for small, elite forces thatcan supposedly carry out missions that previously re-quired much larger forces; this belief was behind themajor mistake made in Iraq. In some cases, a skewedattitude has developedas in Kosovothat a war isa victory merely because the costs of the war, both inblood and treasure, are low, even if the benets areinnitesimal.177 This concept of a victory without casu-

alties has become very appealing to Western democra-cies with narrow self-interest.178

However, cost and lack of utility are not sufcientconditions for restrained war. After all, one could ghtwith limited means but in a brutal fashion; moreover,few wars are cheaper than a single nuclear strike. Thekey is the interaction between the declining utility ofwar and cultural beliefs.

Culture, Media, and Democracy.

Giving shape to the Wests Perfected Reality ofwarwhich, as noted, is possible because of the hege-monic power of the Westis a combination of culturalattitudes on morality, especially humanitarianism; the

inuence of the media; and the power of democracy.Western cultures, far more than their non-Western

counterparts, are constantly in a state of ux. Given


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this, it is not surprising that Western cultures have re-cently attempted to remake their style of warfare in

what is felt to be the culturally correct form. Freed ofthe need to ensure its own survival, the West has de-cided to ght in a self-righteous manner, i.e., with onehand tied behind its back.179 This has had a strong ef-fect on both its justications for, and conduct in, war.There have been strong drives to rehumanize warfare,to make it more consistent with perceived widespreadmoral beliefs including the sanctity of life and respectfor international law.180 This is particularly the casewith the Global War on Terror. Because this war hasbeen presented to the public in a way that makes itseem as much about Western values as about militarysuccess, it has constrained the methods regarded asacceptable.181

The nature of democracies forces leaders to be

cognizant of public attitudes toward warfare, whichin turn affects the means utilized.182 There is usuallya lack of military experience among democratic poli-ticians and, accordingly, they are especially prone topersuasive sophistry. Sophistical public attitudes aregiven further impetus by the news media, which, giv-en their own liberal bias, demand strongly humanitar-ian behavior by military personnel.183 The end resultof these attitudes is a democracy-induced restrainedghting calculus, a way of war that attempts to bal-ance cultural demands, military efcacy, and politicalrequirements, but which seldom results in particular-ly effective military operations.184 Indeed, this calculusoften increases the duration of wars, increases casual-ties, and causes costs to skyrocket.185

Contemporary humanitarian attitudes are com-plex, but can be roughly compressed to two main is-sues: what happens to our soldiers, and what is done


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to the forces of the enemy and his civilians. Westernsocieties today impose high standards on how their

forces treat their enemies, in stark contrast to the his-torical Western tradition of seeing its non-Western foesas barbarous.186 In those military operations where theWest is perceived to have an unfair advantage, thereis additional pressure for it to take the moral highground and avoid the use of all the capabilities avail-able to it.187 Three of the most militarily active statesthe United States, the UK, and Israelall take greatpains to avoid inicting civilian casualties.188 Theyalso make it clear that they do not perceive it to bemoral to punish a civilian population for the actionsof its leaders.189

An entirely natural belief that friendly deathsshould be avoided has been given additional strengthby the perceived lack of utility in contemporary war-

fare.190

Because of this, risk aversion has become cen-tral to contemporary Western ways of war.191 Westerngovernments seem relatively willing to send soldiersto war, but extremely unwilling to have those soldiersdie.192

This latent pacism is intensied by the technol-ogy that,193 as noted earlier, has deluded leaders intothinking war can be cheap;194 it has also deluded theminto thinking that war can be immaculate, surgical,and nonlethal.195 Precision munitions are now shapingthe types of operations undertaken in a range of con-icts. The accuracy of these weapons has become thecontrolling factor, with strikes often disallowed unlessthey can meet some gold standard of accuracy. Whenmunitions go wrong, as they are wont to do due to the

friction of war, there is seldom an honest appreciationof the inevitable limitations. A single laser-guidedbomb hitting a civilian warehouse is seen as a major


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catastrophe, showing the medias ignorance of theenormous latent potentialities present in the arsenals

of every Western military if they truly chose to ght ina brutal fashion.196

A further cultural element is oscillation in supportfor the military.197 In the West, attitudes toward themilitary have changed dramatically since Vietnam,especially in America; it was a war that delegitimizedmuch of military endeavor.198 Contemporary America,and by extension Western culture, is far more inclinedto honor the dead but benevolent hero over the livebut death-dealing hero.199 The military heroes of to-day are not those who storm machinegun nests andslaughter entire platoons of Taliban, but rather thosewho save others under re.200

Public attitudes toward the military have beenshaped by the increasing isolation of the military from

broader society. Without conscription, militaries aresmall professional bodies; accordingly, a much smallerpercentage of any Western population has experienceof military life. Furthermore, the way in which manysoldiers are now isolated from risk201 and can commu-nicate from their theater across the world further con-tributes to a perception of soldiering as just anotherjob, rather than a profession that trafcs in death anddanger. Peoples do not understand the Clausewitzianfriction of war, and consequently they demand thatwar be carried out in a way that is unrealistic.

Professionalism.

The nal factor contributing to resurgent primi-

tivism in warfare is the increasing professionalismof Western military personnel. The inuences aboveare important, but they are not deterministic forces


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of nature. It does not matter how a president, primeminister, or general decides to ght, or that he decides

to ght in that way due to a consideration of culturalbeliefs, if the chain of command is not robust enoughto ensure that those commands are turned into actionat the individual level.202 The individual soldiers whoconduct war are human, and, as such, they are moti-vated by love, greed, hate, honor, and envy.

Contemporary rules of engagement, for exam-ple, require even the lowliest private soldier to havesome understanding of the laws of armed conict,something that was surely not expected amongst theslave-soldier hordes of Xerxes. Historically, increas-ing professionalism has contributed to restraint inwar, as disciplined soldiers are less likely to commitacts of brutality.203 In recent years, professionalism hascontinued to improve,204 partly as an outcome of the

development of military technology, but also partlybecause of demands posed by the increasing com-plexity in the tactics and strategy of war.205 There isthus a somewhat circular relationship, in that increas-ing complexity demands increasing professionalism,which in turn enables even more complex and re-strained styles of warfare.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RITUAL ANDRESTRAINT

This monograph has taken the position that theWest, turning aside from the progression of history,has returned, at least for now, to a ritualized and re-strained method of warfare, albeit for very different

reasons than those that motivated primitive tribes tobehave in such a manner. What does this mean for theWest?


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A positive implication is the possibility that West-ern military behavior will affect the behavior of other

military cultures. This may then lead to humanitar-ian, restrained warfare becoming the norm. It willlikely have positive effects for humanity as a whole,strengthening respect for life and reducing the num-ber of people who die from conict. However, thereare other more ominous implications as well.

One is that that the West will lose an accurate un-derstanding of the nature of war. The longer it con-tinues to ght in a constrained manner, the morenormalized that methodology will become. The deci-sionmaking spectrum available to leaders for futuremilitary endeavors will be restricted to those low-dan-ger, low-intensity options favored today.

A further implication of this style of warfare is thatfuture military operations will be driven by public

opinion and politics more than by policy. Tradition-ally, it has been the role of leaders to lead; while theyhave been cognizant of popular beliefs, they have alsounderstood that there are some elements of nationalpolicy that are unpopular, but necessary. In someways, this is still so in the West; countries are still will-ing to embark on unpopular expeditions. The prob-lem develops, however, when leaders are anxious togo to war, but unwilling to ght. Leaders, ignorantof the realities of war, try to limit the political harmowing from an unpopular operation by heavily re-stricting the methods used in order to minimize thecasualties and costs.

Another implication is the prospect of the Westlosing the moral high ground through grandiose ef-

forts to keep the moral high groundparadoxicallya self-defeating approach. Treating ones enemy withsome respect is wise, for it prevents overcondence.


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Is there a Cortes awaiting the West today? Will we,the contemporary Flower Warriors, face a foe who, to

be defeated, requires our willingness to kill, be killed,and ght to the bitter end? Is the current style of West-ern warfare but a mere historical blip, a momentaryanomaly that will disappear when the world changesagain? History cannot answer that question, but wehad better be prepared to answer it ourselves.


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