The Naxalite Tactical Line

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must specify that the issue at handis not mere boycott of elections by_the 'people" but Ito ~conV\ince themthat people's war is the path for themand that the village soviets and peo-ple's committees which would con-stitute the foundation of the ~newpeople's democratic revolutionaryState" in the villages and provide theleadership for implementing the agra-rian programme.

The RCC thinks that its attemptto give a positive content to the slo-gan of election boycott at the gras,-roots level gives a new dimension tothe concept of organising the pea-santry for action. Where the RCCcommands the majority followi,ng ina panchayat village, boycott of elec-tions leads to an unprecedented situa-tion. The majority will be outsidethe government-sponsored panchayatcommi ttee and form their own paral-lel "people's committee". The peo-pIe's committees in the "boycott"villages will function in competitionwith the government-sponsored com-mittees, the sanction coming fromthe majority of the people. These com-mittees will undertake law, revenue,village defence (against attacks oflandlords or government machinery)tasks and when the peasant strugglesmove to higher forms, would becomethe v~llage soviets. These committeeswould also work as the united frontcommittees, initiate and carry outagrarian reform and will play theirrole in the armed struggle. Revolu-tionary communists would domina tethese committees and provide theleadership but these would have theparticipation of agricultural labourand the poor peasants and others.As the movement goes ahead, a fewrepresenta ives of the rich peasantsmight be taken in. But these com-mittees are to have a clear class out-look and ideology ..

The 'Immediate Programme clearlyemphasises the role of mass organisa-tions for t he peasantry, working class,students and other sections of thepeople. In contrast the CPI (ML)seems to have a distrust of mass or-ganisations and urban areas in gene-ral.

It would be quite some time be-fore the major Maoist groups out-

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side the CPI (ML) 's fold find agree-ment on a tactical line and form a'new pan y or before there is a fulldiscussion on a tactical line leadingto a single, unified Maoist party inIndia. But at the moment the rela-tionship between the CPI (ML) andother Maoist groups including theReC is a non-antagonistic one, justas the relationship between the twonon-Maoist communist parties is anon-antagonistic one.

But meantime, the application ofthe two different tactical lines-ofthe C'P\I (ML) and of the RCC-and their results would be a £asci-nating experiment to watch.

The Naxalite TacticalLine

ABHIJNAN SEN

EVER since the beginning of theNax.albari movement an inter-

minable controversy has been going onoyer the question of strategy and tac-tics of the Indian revolution. Theamount of polemical literature that!has so far been 'chu,rned out maywell fill several voillimes. So thepresent article does not intend toadd to these staggering volumes. Itspurpose simply is to trace in bareoutline the evolution of Naxa]itetactics in the countryside. To bemore precise, the focus is strictly onthe principal Naxalite stream thatorganised itself as the CPIII(ML) .

The tactical line of mobilising androusing the peasantry through "anni-hilation of class enemies" which wasfinalised arol~nd April 1969 had,however, been taking shape for quitesome time. One of the first impor-tant attempts in this regard was madeby Kanu Sanyal in his "Report onthe Peasant Struggle in the Terai"(Deshabrati, October 24, 1968). Thereport dealt not oilly with the tacticsra<::tually employed by the revc~:ultionary peasants of the Naxalbari,Kharibari and Phansidewa areas butmade some general observationsabout the tactics to be employed inthe next phase of the struggle.

The broad strategic objective of thecommunist revolutionaries who laun-ched the Naxalbari stru[~gle is toliberate the countryside by waging aprotracted people's war and then en-circle the cities. Naturally one oftheir princip:l1 tactical problems re-lates to the moLilisation bf the pea-sants for armed struggle and creationof liberated areas. Kanu Sanyal des-cribed in detail the way the peasantswere drawn into the struggle andhow they set up aon embryonic formof people's power in a limited area.

The process of poli ticalising thepeasants of the area had started quitea few years ago. The local peasants'association under the leadership ofthe revolutionaries had in the pastlaunched a number of struggles onpartial and economic demands. Aqualitative change came in March1967 when the Peasants' Associationof the Siliguri sub-division called up-on the peasants to launch a strugglefor the seizure of political power.Specifically the peasants were urged toestablish the control of the peasamcommittees on all the affairs of thevillage, to get organised and armedfor smashing the resistance of jote-dars and other reactionaries, tobreak the monopolistic hold of jote-dars over land and redistribute themthrough peasant committees. In res-ponse to this call thousancls of pea--sants. held numerous group discus-sions and meetings, formed branchesof peasant committees and armedthemselves. As Sanyal noted, sinceevery small struggle of the peasantshad in the past edcountered armeelrepression the sl6gan 'political powergrows ou t of the barrel of a gun' hada magic effect in organising them.Thus after the peasants had beenaroused and organised they wentahead to implement the elecisions ofthe Peasa·nts' Association.

The ten principal activities of thepeasants listed by Kanu Sanyal giveao\1 idea of the methods by which thedecision was implemented. The firstachievement of the peasants was tustrike at the monopolistic lanel-holcl-ing of the jotedars which js the baSISof the latter's political, economic anelsocial dominance. The land of thewhole of Terai was "nationalised"

JULY 4, 1970

for redistribu.tion among peasants.The second, third and fourth cate-gories consisted in the destruction ofall land records and papers concern-ing debt and seizure of foodgrains,livestock and other properties of thejotedars for redistribution among thepeople, T.he fifth was public trialand execution of jotedars knownfor their oppressive past or of thosewho resisted peasant struggle. Theirother achievements, according toKanu Sanyal, consisted in the b\lild-ing TIp of a village self-defence forcearmed with home-made and captur.ed weapons and replacement ofbourgeois-feudal power by people'spower.

One thing that comes out clearlyfrom Sanyal's report is that, al-though initiated by the revolution-aries of the Peasants' Association, theN axalbari movement was somethingof a mass upsurge in which spon-taneity and mass initiative far out.weighed the planning and disciplinerequired 'Of a revoh .•tionary ,move-ment. Without praper politicalisa_tion, military experience and disci-pline the movement suffered setbacksin t~e face of police repression. Thevery open and public nature 'Of theirdeclaratian and preparation for arm-ed struggle must also have exposedthem too much befare they could getsufficiently organised. Perhaps thatis why Kanu Sanyal suggested thatin the next phase 'Of struggle theywould set up party units which willnat 'Only be armed but will also be"trained to maintain secrecy". Suchparty units wm /prDpagate lMao1'~thaughts, intensi.fy class struggle and"as guerilla units strike and annihi-late class enemies". They were alsaexpected ta participate with the peo-ple in praduction whenever possible.

Mazumdar's SuggestionsA conference of the revalutionary

peasants 'Of the Naxalbari area heldin September 1968 ~reaffirmEld Itheline suggested by Sanyal-the build_ing 'Of party units ta prapagate Maa'sthoughts, intensify class struggle andlaunch guerilla attacks on class ene-mies, police informers and even thearmy if such appartunity arises. Safar the sole concern 'Of the party

JULY 4, 1970

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unit, it had been thaught, was assa.ciated with armed struggle far theseizure 'Of palitical power. However,Charu M azumdar had by that timejust come up with same additianalsuggestions about the tactical line.Tn an article entitled "1''0 the Com-rades" (Deshabrati, August 1, 1968)he said, "the comrades wha are wark-ing in peasant areas, while engagedin propagating palitics should natminimize the necessity 'Of placing ageneral slagan an econamic demands.Because withaut drawing the largesectian of peasants intD the move-ment backward peasants cannot bebrought in a position to grasp poli-tics or keep up their hatred againstclass enemies." In another articlepu blished in Deshabrati (October 17,1968) Charu Mazumdar further ela-barated on the prohlem of mobilis-ing the backward sections of the pea-santry. While insisting on the neces.si1:Jyof secret political propaganda bythe party so as not to prematurelyexpose it ta repression, he however,pointed out that backward peasantswould be late in grasping politicsunder this methad. "And for thisreason", he wrote, "it is and will benecessary to launch economic strug-gles against the feudal classes. Forthis reason it is necessary tD leadmovements for the seiZure of crops,the form 'Of the struggle dependingon the political consciausness andorganization of the area." He fur-ther stated that "without widespreadmass struggle of the peasants andwithout the participitian of largesections of the masses in the move.ment the palitics of seizure of powerwould take time in striking roots inthe consciousness of the peasants".

This line of launching mass strug-gles for economic demands did not,however, quite fit into the tactics ofsecret paliticalisatian by underQ'roundand armed party units. Implicit inMazumdar's writing was that haththese methods of arousing the pea-sants would continue simultcmeotlsly.But the 'Open nature of the massstruggle for economic gains wouldexpose the party apparatus and de-feat the purpose 'Of secret politicalpropaganda by the party units. Thisdilemma was resolved in mid.1969

when, drawing on the teaching 'OfLin Piaa that "gu,erilla warfare is theonly way ta mabilise and apply thewhole strength 'Of the peaple againstthe enemy", Mazumdar said, "therevolutionary initiative 'Of wider sec-tion~ of the peasant masses can bereleased thr'Ough annihilatian 'Of classenemies by guerilla methods andneither ma,~s organization nor massmovement is indispensable befarp.starting guerilla war." (Quoted inDe'Shahrati, April 23, 1970, p. II).Later he further clarified his standta mean that mass struggle for eco-namic gains wauld follow guerillaaction, not precede or accampany it.In his "A Few ""ards on GuerillaAction' (Deshabrati, January 15,1970) he explained in detail howafter some preliminary propagandawark for the seizure of pawer hasbeen dane by the party unit, smallguerilla bands wauld be formed in awmpletely conspiratarial way forstriking dawn the most hated classenemies, After the first action hastaken place political cadres would&tart whispering around innocentlyabout the advantages ta be 'Obtainedwhen the oppressors have left thearea in fear or have been liquidated.Then the peasants could enjay un-disturbed the land and wealth of thevillage. Many peasants would nawbe shaken out of their inertia and en-couraged to j'oin the struggle. "vVhenfjuite a number 'Of aITensive 'actions'have taken place and the revolution-ary political line 'Of annihilating theclass enemies has been firmly estab.lished" 'Only then the palitical cadreswould give the general econamic sla-gan 'seize the crap of the classenemy'. This slogan wi!] achievemiracles. Even the most backwardpeasant would now jain the struggle".

Guerilla ActionThe Ion?; way that has been tra.

velled by the revolutianaries sincethe Naxalbari struggle can best beguessed bv comparing Kanu Sanyal'sreport with that of the Bengal-Bihar_Orissa barder regional cammittee ofthe CPT (ML) Ion the Debra-C'Opi-ballavpur struggle published in Desha_brati, April 23, 1970. As the reportself-critically admits, initially the re-

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volutionaries of the area had a vaguenotion about a Naxalbari-type ofarmed peasant uprising and theyhoped that guerilla bands wouldemerge ou t of armed clashes for thfSeizure of crops. But in practice the)could not adopt any specific pro-gramme other than propagate thepolitics of seizme of power througharmed struggle, Rather by resortingto pure economism and public de-monstrations at places they exposedthe organization and invite'"d replCs-sion. The movement for the timebeing was in the doldrums. It wasonly after Charu Mazumdal hadgiven the line of starting guerillawarfare through annihilation of classenemies that they could break out oftheir inertia, it was stated. OnAugust 21, 1969 the regional com-mittee of the CPT,(ML) met at Soor-muhi ;md decided upon launching anannihilation campaign against classenemies. As the report said, the veryfirst armed action which was noteven successful released the floodgatesof peasant initiative, which could nothave been possible by their prop a-,ganda work. "With every actionmass initiative and class hatred ofthe .peasants started growing and sodid rise the level of their politicalconsciousness." Simultaneous politi-cal propaganda also helped the pro-cess. After two months of guerillaoffensive against jotedars in Novem-ber 1969 thousands of peasants, itwas claimed. rose up in arms. Underthe leadership of the party armedpeasants seized alI the crops of op-pressive jotedars and those of enemyagents. Many jotedars were disarm-ed and fled the villages. The pea-sants set up people's courts to try theoppressors. They secured the returnof all their mortgaged property fromthe moneylenders. The jotedars whostayed on agreed to abide by the dic-tates of the peasants who fixed thewage for khctmajurs (landless labour-

For Frontier contactPeople's Book HouseMeher Houlse,Cowasji Patel Street,Fort, Bombay

JULY 4l 1970

ers). Shop prices were also fixed bythem. In the wake of this camebrutill police repression. But, as thereport says, "after the taste of litera- _tion they had, any amount of repres-sion would not be Cl ble to rob thepeasar.ts 'of their dream of brightdays of liberation in future." Facedwith the encirclement and suppres.sion campaign by Eastern FrontierRifles the guerilla squads dispersedover a wider area and carried on theirannihilation campaign simultaneouslywith political propaganda.

The way the struggle in Gopibal.lavpur, Debra and Baharagora start-ed and developed sets it apart fromthe Naxalbari struggle. In Naxalbarithousands of peasants responding tothe call of the Peasants' Associationsprang into action, concentratingmainly on the seizure of land, thebasis of feudal domination. In theGopiballavpm area the struggle waslaunched by small guerilla squads.By delivering lightning blows at theclass enemies they created a sort ofpower vacuum in the area into whichthousands of peasants moved in,seized crops and properties and setup peasants' rule. Kanu Sanyalstressed at the end of his report thenecessity of thoroughly carrying outrevolutionary land redistribution.But the report on the Gopiballavpur,Debra and Baharagora struggles sum- -marised above does not mention thisaspect. Rather than formal redistribu-tion of land the emphasis seems tohave been placed on the actual con_trol of the peasant committees onvillage affairs including appropria-tion of crops. Compared to N axal-bari this struggle appears to be muchmore disciplined and planned. It isclaimed that the "Red power" whichcame into existence, even if tempo-rarily, helped to politi calise and en.thuse the peasants. Poli tical cons-ciousness of the peasants has in factbeen raised to such a level that thepolice as well the administration, asadmitted even by the bourgeois press,find the local people totally un-co-operative and often hostile. All thisperhaps explains why the struggle inGopiballavpur has survived and con-tinues to develop in the face of mas-sive repression.

The Worker And HisLeaders

NIRODE Roy

A top brass of the Brhish TradeUnion Congress once viewed

Capital and Labour as two sides ofindustry, working towards a commongoal, recogniz,ing the merit of oneanother, understanding the rules ofthe game and observing them. "Thespectators", hc further added, "willenjoy a good match with no stoppagesfor foul play; thet respect of theplayers for one another and the res-pect for the quality of the play willalso be good for t11e future."

Our nat.ional trade unions-allspeaking in favour of one or otherkind of socialism and committed tomajor social change-have. been overt-ly in love with this two-sides-of-in-dustry theory. While a few haveconsistently advocated a philosophyof class collaboration in the name ofnational progress, the others, in courseof theh 'class war', allowed their poli-tical struggle to blend with economicstruggle in the form of trade unionstrikes. This has g.iven rise to moreor less permanent organisations of ablended type as we see today in theshape of left trade union organisa-t.;ons on the national scale.

The Indian industrial labour,though constituting a small fractionof the total population jn 1921, drewconsiderable attention from Britishsocial democracy. A deputation ofthe Brit.ish trade unionists waitingupon the Secretary of State for Indiain March ]921 observed:

"You cannot have industrialisa-tion of a great emp.ire like Indiawithout the assistance of orga-nised labour, and therefore justas you have got to use capitaland research you have got totry and see that labour is pro-perly and carefully organised."

Th.is observation came just abouta year after the formation of theAITUC which heJd its first sessionin Bombay under the presidentshipof Lala Lajpat Raj who was then also

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