The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

7/18/2019 The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood 1/16

The Moderate Muslim BrotherhoodAuthor(s): Robert S. Leiken and Steven BrookeReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2007), pp. 107-121Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287 .

Accessed: 15/03/2012 06:28

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign

Affairs.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfr

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cfr



The Moderate

Muslim B rotherhood

Robert S.Leiken and SterenBrooke

FRIEND OR FOE?

THEMUSLIMBROTH RHOODs theworld'soldest, argest,ndmost

influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,

condemned by both conventional opinion in theWest and radical

opinion in theMiddle East. American commentators have called the

Muslim Brothers "radical slamists"and "a italcomponent ofthe enemy's

assault force ...deeply hostile to theUnited States."Al Qaeda'sAyman

al-Zawahiri sneers at them for "lur[ing] thousands of youngMuslim

men into lines for elections ... insteadof into the lines ofjihad."

Jihadists loathe theMuslim Brotherhood (known inArabic as

al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing

democracy.These positions seem tomake themmoderates, the very

thing theUnited States, short on allies in theMuslim world, seeks.

But the Ikhwan lsoassails .S. foreign olicy, speciallyashington'ssupport for Israel,and questions linger about its actual commitment to

thedemocratic rocess.Over the past year,we havemet with dozens of Brotherhood lead

ers and activists fromEgypt, France, Jordan, Spain, Syria,Tunisia, and

theUnited Kingdom. In long and sometimes heated discussions, we

explored theBrotherhood's stance on democracy and jihad, Israel and

Iraq, the United States, and what sort of society the group seeks to

ROBERT S. LEIKEN isDirector of the Immigration and National

Security Programs at theNixon Center and the author of the forthcoming

Europe'sAngry Muslims. STEVEN BROOKE is aResearch Associate at

the Nixon Center.

[107]



Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke

create. he Brotherhood s a collection f national roups ith differingoutlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance

itsmission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and

other features of democracy. There is also a current within the

Brotherhood willing to engage with the United States. In the past

several decades, this current-along with the realities of practical

politics-has pushedmuch of theBrotherhoodtowardmoderation.

U.S. policymaking has been handicapped byWashington's tendency

to see theMuslim Brotherhood-and the Islamist movement as a

whole-as amonolith. Policymakers should instead analyze each

national and local group independently and seek out those that are open

to engagement. In the anxious and often fruitless search forMuslim

moderates, olicymakershould ecognizehat heMuslimBrotherhoodpresentsa notableopportunity.

BIG BROTHERS

SINCEITS ounding nEgypt in 1928, heMuslim Brotherhoodhas

sought to fuse religious revivalwith anti-imperialism-resistance to

foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. At its begin

ning, theBrotherhooddiffered romearlierreformersy combininga profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political

activism.The Brotherhood pursued an Islamic society through tarbiyya

(preaching and educating), concentrating firston changing theoutlook

of individuals,then families,and finally societies.Although theBrother

hood's origins were lower-middle class, it soon pushed Islamization

into the local bourgeoisie and then clear to the palace. At the sametime, it formed the armed Special Apparatus, replicating Young

Egypt's Greenshirts, theWafd's Blueshirts, nascent Nazi Brown

shirts, and other paramilitary organizations that were rife in the

Middle East at the time.

In 1948,with civil strife looming, the Egyptian government dis

solved the Brotherhood. Later that year, a number of Brothers were

implicated in the murder of the prime minister. Despite his public

denunciation of the assassins, Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood'sfounder, was soon assassinated aswell-leaving the factionalized

Brothers squabbling over a successor.

[1o8] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Vo/ume86N o.2



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

VotersfromheMuslimBrotherhoodprayingutsidepollingstation,

ElMansura,Egypt,Decemberl, 005

In a gesture of conciliation to the palace (and also to prevent a

singlefaction romdominating), heBrotherhoodchoseanoutsider,therespectedudgeHasan al-Hudaybi, osucceed anna as its leader.

Hudaybi's selection coincidedwith themilitary coup that toppledtheEgyptianmonarchy. he FreeOfficersMovement, ledbyColonel

Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, had

worked closelywith theMuslim Brothers,who were attractedby

the soldiers'nationaliststance and Islamicrhetoric.But the FreeOfficers'promise to Islamize the new constitution soon provedillusory. n embitteredmemberof theBrotherhood'sparamilitarySpecialApparatus mptiedapistolatNasserduringaspeech, rompting the new regime to herd into Nasser's squalid jails much of the

organization,ewmembers fwhich hadany nklingfthe hair-brainedassassination dventure. asser, uninjured ndunfazed,emergedasa stoichero,theBrotherhood'sotorious pecial pparatusas thegang

thatcouldnot shootstraight.In prison, the guards applied the kind of torture thatwould

make Arab nationalism infamous, inEgypt aswell as in Iraq and

FOREIGN AFFAIRS *March/April2007 [109]



Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke

Syria.The Brothers'wounds throbbed ith fatefulquestions:Howcould those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the

British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting

devoutMuslims reallybeMuslims themselves?SayyidQutb, thenthe Ikhwan's ost profoundthinker, roducedan answer hatwouldecho into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates,

kafireen. ccordingly,the torturers nd theirregimewere legitimatetargets of jihad.

But fromhis own cell,Hudaybi disputedQutb's conclusion.Only

God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of

declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that "whoever

judges that someone is no longer aMuslim ... deviates from Islam

and transgressesod'swill by judginganotherperson's aith." ithintheBrotherhood,Hudaybi's tolerantview-in linewith Banna's

founding ision-prevailed,cementing hegroup's oderatevocation.But it appalled the takfiris,who streamed out of the Brotherhood.

Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser's gallows in 1966,went on to

become the prophet and martyr of jihad. "Qutb has influenced all

those interested in jihad throughout the Islamicworld," said a founding

member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known

for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during

the 1980s. "The Brothers," he continued sadly, "have abandoned the

ideas of Sayyid Qutb."

The Ikhwan followed the path of toleration and eventually came

to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization.

An Islamic society, the ideagoes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders

and support them at the ballot box. The Ikhwan also repeatedlyjustified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that "the umma

[theMuslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority]."

In pursuit of popular authority, theBrotherhood has formed electoral

allianceswith secularists, nationalists, and liberals.

Having lost the internal struggle for theBrotherhood, the radicals

regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes through

out theMuslim world. (Groups such as al Jihadwould furnish the

Egyptian core of alQaeda.) These jihadists view theBrotherhood'sembraceof democracy asblasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that

any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy

[110] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 6No.2



TheModerateMuslimBrotherhood

is not just amistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it

gives humans sovereignty overAllah. Osama bin Laden's lieutenant,

Zawahiri, calls it"the deification of thepeople."Abu Hamza al-Masri,

the one-eyed radicalclericwho presidedoverLondon'snotoriousFinsbury Parkmosque, considers democracy "the call of self-divinity

loud and clear, inwhich the rights of one group of people, who have

put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over

the decisions of Allah." Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent

West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist

thinker) nveighs,"Democracysobviouspolytheismand thusjustthe kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, inHis Book."

Many analysts,meanwhile,sensiblyquestionwhether theBrotherhood's adherence to democracy ismerely tactical and transitory

anopportunistic commitment to, in the historian Bernard Lewis'words,

one man, one vote, one time." Behind thatwarning is an extensive

history of similar cadre organizations that promised democracy and

then recanted once in power: the Bolsheviks, theNazis, the Baath

Party in Iraq and Syria, even the Nasserists. There is slim evidence

that the Brotherhood has pondered what itwould do with power.

Although it has been prodded by the electoral process to define its

slogan-"Islam Is the Solution"-Islamistgovernmental lueprintsare scarce, even ones as sketchy as Lenin's State and Revolution or

Marx's Critique of theGotha Program.

But in at least one respect, the Brotherhood differs from those

admonitory precedents: its road to power is not revolutionary; it

depends onwinning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization.

Under this Fabian strategy, the Brotherhood seeks a compact with

the powers that be-offering a channel for discontent while slowly

expanding its influence. As one seniormember told us, "Itwould be

unjust if theBrotherhood were to come topower before amajority of

the society isprepared to support them."Another Ikhwan leader told

us that if theBrotherhood should rule unwisely and then face elec

toral defeat, "wewill have failed the people and the new party will

have the right to come to power.We will not take away anyone's

rights."nd inextensive onversationsith theMuslim Brotherhood'sdisparate allies throughout theMiddle East,we heardmany expressions

of confidence hatitwould honordemocratic rocesses.

FO R E IGN AF FA IRS March/April 2007 [iiil]



Robert S.Leiken and StevenBrooke

INTERNAL DEBATES

MIDDLEEASTERNails,petrodollars,eopoliticalrivalries,nd the

"Muslim Awakening" have given rise to a highly variegated Islamist

movement.Unfortunately, uanceis lostinmuch of currentWestern

discourse.Herding thesedifferentbeasts into a single conceptual

corral labeled "Salafi"or "Wahhabi" ignores the differences and fault

lines between them-and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result.

When we askedMuslim Brothers in theMiddle East and Europe

whether theyconsidered hemselvesSalafists(as theyare frequently

identified), heyusuallymet ourquestionwith aClintonianresponse:"That depends onwhat your definition of Salafist is."If by Salafismwe

meant themodernist, renaissance Islam ofJamal ad-Din al-Afghani

andMuhammadAbduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-centuryeformers

who influencedBanna), thenyes, theywere Salafists.Yet theubiquitous

Web sitewww.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who

believe that religion should nevermix with politics and that existing

rulers houldbe supported lmostunconditionally, ttacksAfghani

andAbduh forbeing "faraway from the Salafi aqidah [creed]." (This

is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.)

Such "pietists,"most ofwhom were trained inofficial Saudi institutions,

argue that the Brotherhood's participation in politics has converted

them nto he"Bankruptrotherhood."ccording oone,"TheMuslim

Brothers have political goals and strategies,which induce them tomake

concessions to theWest. For us, theSalafists, thegoal ispurely religious."

Other critics speculate that the Brotherhood helps radicalize

Muslims inboth theMiddle East and Europe. But in fact, it appears

that the Ikhwan works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead

channeling them into politics and charitable activities. As a senior

member of the Egyptian Brotherhood's Guidance Council told us

inCairo, "If itwasn't for theBrotherhood, most of the youths of this

erawould have chosen the path of violence. The Ikhwan has become

a safetyvalve formoderate Islam."The leaderof theJordanian Islamic

Action Front, theMuslim Brotherhood's political party in Jordan,

said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad:

"We'rebetter able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not

a security confrontation,with the forcesof extremism and fanaticism."




TheModerateMuslim Brotherhood

In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that

of radical groups, such asHizb ut-Tahrir (HT), that "seek to bring

society to aboiling point."The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its

ranks hrough rganizationalisciplineandapainstaking ducationalprogram. OneMuslim Brothernoted that the organization'sotto

could be "Listen andObey.") If aMuslim Brother wishes to commit

violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so.That said, a

numberof militants have passed through heBrotherhood since itsinception, nd thepath from heBrotherhood

to jihad is not buried in sand. Defectionshavehistorically ccurred hen theorganization has faced a conjunction of internal

and external pressures, aswhen the takfirielement merged nderrepressionoproduce

theEgyptian ihadist ovement.Today, owever,Brotherswho leave the organizationaremore likely to join themoderate center

rather than to take up jihad. In themid-9ggos, internal dissent overregistering as a political party occurred in the context of agovernment

crackdown against a jihadist assault. These pressures resulted in

an exodus of Brothers, many of whom formed the core of the liberal

Islamistwasatiyyamovement, including hemoderateHizb al-Wasat(CenterParty).

One issue of enduring concern isQutb's ambiguous legacy in the

Brotherhood. Critiquing "themartyr," asQutb isknown, requires a

surgeon's touch: he died in the service of the organization yet hadstrayed far from the founder's vision. Even Hudaybi's Preachers,Not

Judges,an indirect but clear refutation ofQutb, never mentions him.

Today, the Brotherhood lionizes Qutb, admittedly amajor figure

whose views cannot be reduced to jihad. But it straddles a barbed

fence in embracing Qutb while simultaneously arguing that his violent

teachings were "taken out of context."What lessons will younger

members tempted to radical action draw?

While jihadistshave been sortingout the finerpoints of internationalslaughter, the Ikhwan has hunkered down topursue national goals. In

theNovember 005 egislativelectionsnEgypt,independentandidates

FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2007 [113]

The Brotherhood

seems to dissuade

Muslims fromviolence,

channelingthem into

politics and charity.



Robert S.Leiken and Steven Brooke

affiliated ith theIkhwan, hich isofficially annedbut still tolerated,won a surprising 0 percentof the assembly-especially impressive

consideringidespread overnmentraud ndvoter intimidation.n thenew parliament,heBrotherhood as coordinatedts legislativeffortsby forming n internal xperts ommittee, icknamed theparliamen

tarykitchen," hatgroupsBrotherhoodcandidates ccording o their

specialties. nstead f pursuinga divisivereligious r cultural genda,theBrotherhood aspushed ormore affordableousing,criticized hegovernment's handling of the avian flu threat, and demanded account

ability for the recent series of bus, train, and ferry disasters.

These electoraladvancesandmoderate, practicalcriticismshavemade for an increasingly tense relationshipwith the Egyptian govern

ment. The Ikhwan's electoral gains were followed, inMay 2006, by

theirsupport orjudicialreformand independence.residentHosniMubarak's suspected preparations for handing over power to his son

Gamal have led to further crackdowns on the opposition.

Suchpressurexacerbatesifferences etweenvarious endenciesn

theEgyptianBrotherhood. incethe1980S, iddle-classprofessionals

have pushed it in amore transparent and flexible direction.Workingwithin laborunions andprofessional rganizations, hesereformershave learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their

constituents. A leader of the reformist faction told us, "Reform will

only happen if Islamistswork with other forces, including secularistsand

liberals."This current finds a comfortable home within theEgyptian

umbrellamovementKifaya(Enough ), hich embraces heBrotherhood along with allmanner of secularists, liberals, nationalists, and

leftists. Kifaya was born in fervent opposition to thewar in Iraqand now forms thebattered core of Egyptian democratic opposition.

(It is ironic that awar waged in the name of promoting democracy

has midwifed a democratic front inEgypt that is at odds with the

United States and itswar.)

The Brotherhood's eformist ing contendswith conservativesn

high positions in the organization who bear the scars of repression

and secrecy.The sharpest divisions have occurred over the issue of

forming a political party, a key plank of the reformist agenda. Doingso, reformists argue,would serve the broader goals of the organi

zation by giving the Brotherhood a platform to spread itsmessage

[114] FOR E IGN AF FAI R S Volume 6 No. 2




to an otherwise unavailable audience. The conservatives argue that a

party should be an annex to themovement, devoted solely to politics.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhoood'ssocialmovementwould performtasks outside of politics, such as charity, education, and health.

BROTHERLY LOVE OR SIBLING RIVALRY?

ALTHOUGH THE Egyptian branch remains the most influential

Brotherhood group, offshoots have prospered throughout theMiddle East and Europe. But there is no Islamist "Comintern."

The Brotherhood's dreaded International Organization is in fact a

loose and feeble coalition scarcely able to convene its own members.

Indeed, the Brotherhood's international debility is a product of its

local successes: national autonomy and adjustability to domestic

conditions.The ideologicalaffiliations hatlinkBrotherhoodorganizations internationally are subject to the national priorities that

shapeeach individually.Suppressed throughout much of theMiddle East, the Brother

hood spread across theArab world and, via students and exiles, to

Europe. In the early 198os, theEgyptian Ikhwan sought to establish

coordinationamong dozens of nationaloffspring.But oppositionwas universal. Right next door, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood

powerhouse Hasan al-Turabi protested, "Youcannot run theworld

from Cairo." When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaiti

Muslim Brothersobjectedto theacquiescence f theInternationalOrganization andwithdrew, takingwith them their plump wallets.

The U.S.-installed government in Iraq is another apple of discord.

While Muslim Brothers throughout theMiddle East and Europe

inveighed against the "puppet" Iraqi government, the Iraqi branch

of theMuslim Brotherhood satprominently in the IraqiParliament.

More recently, the alliance between the Syrian Muslim Brother

hood and Abdel Halim Khaddam, the dissident former Syrian

vice president, has beenwidely offensive to other Brotherhoodbranches. The war inLebanon last summer sharpened that divide,

as theSyrianBrothers leaped todenounce President Bashar al-Assad's

meddling in Lebanon, while the rest of the Brotherhood rallied

behindHezbollah.

FORE IGN AF FA IRS March/Apri/2007 [115 ]



Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke

The national branches also have divergent views ofthe United States.

In Egypt and Jordan, even as it has considered a partnership with

Washington against"autocracynd terrorism,"heBrotherhood, rivenpartlyby electoral oncerns,has harshlycriticizedtheUnited States.The Syrian rotherhood, eanwhile,keenly upports heBush administration'sfforts o isolate heAssad regime; hekindof inflammatory

anti-U.S. statements typical inJordan and Egypt are rare in Syria.

Even on the central issue of Israel, each national organization calls

itsown tune.EveryMuslim Brotherhood eader ith whom we spokeclaimed a willingness to follow suit shouldHamas-the Palestinian

offshootof theBrotherhood-recognizetheJewishstate.Such earnestprofessions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas

recalcitrance,but that position nonetheless stands in sharp relief to that

ofmost jihadists.As Zawahiri expresses the jihadist view, "No one has

the right,whether Palestinian or not, to abandon a grain of soil from

Palestine,which was aMuslim land,which was occupied by infidels."

The Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories

occupied by a foreign power. Like inAfghanistan under the Soviets,

the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraqand against Israel as "defensive

jihad" against invaders, theMuslim functional equivalent of the

Christian doctrine of "justwar."However, the Brotherhood's failure

to stress the religious dimension incenses the jihadists,who mock the

Brotherhood (including Hamas) for conducting jihad "for the sakeof

territory" rather than for the sake of Allah. Compare the statement

from the Brotherhood's Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who argues that "the

enmity between us and theJews is for the sakeof land only,"with this

one from Zawahiri: "God, glory to him, made the religion the cause

of enmity and the cause of our fight."

Muslim Brothers expressly deny theirorganization is anti-Semitic.

The currentEgyptian general guide,Muhammad Mahdi Akef, argues

that there is no conflict between theMuslim Brotherhood and the

Jews, only between theMuslim Brotherhood and theZionists (who,

Akef told us, "arenot Jews").Despite these denials,Brotherhood litera

turehas expressed hatred for allJews, not just "Zionists."The October

1980children'ssupplement to theBrotherhood newspaperA/Dawa, for

example,was designed to instructyoung children on "the enemies of

your religion":"Such are the Jews,my brother,Muslim lion cub, your





enemies and the enemies of God. ...Muslim' lion cub, annihilate their

existence."But in a recent sermon at aSomalimosque inNorth London,

Kamal El Helbawi-reportedly themost influentialMuslim Brother in

theUnited Kingdom-declared that tobe agoodMuslim, faithwas not

enough.After faith therewas neighborliness, andHelbawi relateda story:

"Thewell-known scholarAbdullah Ibn al-Mubarak had aJewish neigh

bor.The Jewwanted to sellhis house. The buyers asked him the price,

and he said, 'Two thousand.'They said tohim, 'Butyour house isonly

worth one thousand.'He said, 'Yes, ut Iwant one thousand formy house

and another one thousand because of the good neighbourwhom I am

going to leave behind."' After the service,we asked Helbawi whether

recent ewsaccounts fMuslim anti-Semitismn theEnglishMidlands

inspiredhis sermon,which publicly laudedaJew fordisplaying a sacred

Islamic irtue."Precisely,"e replied.Islamists avebeen accused f usingdeceptive"double iscourse":

good moderate cop inEnglish, bad fumndamentalistop inArabic. A

recent article in the journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology found

worryingdiscrepanciesetween heEnglishandArabicversions f cer

tainarticleson the officialMuslim BrotherhoodWeb site.But Helbawi's

sermonwas deliveredexclusively inEnglish,with no restatement inAra

bic. This public, on-the-record displaywas farmore persuasive than the

usualBrotherhood pinseparatingnti-Zionism romanti-Semitism.

BROTHERS ABROAD

INEUROPE, rotherhood-led roupsrepresent inorities in secular,

democraticountries,ndtheyunderstandhat heywill emain inorities for the foreseeable future.None actively pursues the objective of

converting itscompatriots to Islam. Instead, the emphasis fallson the

rights f religiousminorities.(Ironically,heEuropeanBrotherhoodinspired organizations take full advantage of Europe's extreme official

religious olerance,nspired y theexperience fNazi anti-Semitism.)One example of the Brotherhood's European approach came after

aDanish newspaper printed cartoons satirizing theProphetMuhammad

last year.Although its transnational networks helped spread theword about thecartoons, allbranches officiallycalled forpeaceful protest.

The Federation of Islamic Organizations inEurope, a grouping of the

FOR E IGN A FFA IRS MarchApril007 [117 ]



Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke

most importantEuropeanBrotherhood-ledbodies, condemnedtheEuropean papers that printed the cartoons but hardly in stinging

terms.Although itcriticizedthe cartoons or"hurt[ing] he feelingsofMuslims," itdevoted more space to calling for increasedcooperation

betweenMuslims andnon-Muslims.The jihadists, n contrast,wereoffering loodmoney for theheadsof thecartoonists ndcoordinating"embassy urningdays."

In France, the sheer number of Muslims, alarming press and

government reports about the Islamization of schools, radical "garage

mosques,"clamorousMuslim protestsagainstIsrael,desecrations fJewish graveyards, attacks on uncovered women, and several foiled

terroristplots have created the general impression, inside and outside

the country, of a powerful rising Islamism. That iswhy a number of

Frenchandoverseasobserversrushedto labelthe stone-throwing,car-burning riots of 2005 in the largelyMuslim slums "the French

intifada."But in threeand ahalfweeks of riots, Islamism failed tomake

itspresence felt, still less to establish sharia in some obscure precinct,

as reported by overwrought observers. "Islamic radicals played no

role in the triggering or spreadof the violence," according toFrance's

domestic intelligence service, Renseignements Generaux. "On the

contrary, they had every interest in a rapid return to calm in order to

avoid being accused of anything."The chief of theParis branch of the

Renseignements Generaux told us that of the 3,ooo rioters arrested

inParis last fall, therewas "notone known asbelonging to an Islamist

crowd, andwe monitor them quite closely."

In fact,when the Islamistsemerged, itwas to try to calm the autumn

rioters,who often greeted thesemissionaries with hails of stones.TheBrotherhood-linked organizationUnion des Organisations Islamiques

de France (UOIF)repudiated the riots in a fatwa.That fatwawas the

culmination of aUOIFstrategy, forged 15years earlier, to be perceived

as a reliable partner of the French government. The highest-ranking

permanent official of the domestic surveillance agency told us that

the UOIF"needs" them, presumably to certify that the organization

poses no danger.

Similarly,when French authorities banned thewearing of the hijab(or foulard), the position of the UOIFwas accommodation. The UOIF'S

cautious stance on the lawdisappointed other European branches of the





Brotherhood. hey wished theirFrenchcounterpart ould bemoreaggressive and feared theFrenchwere setting aprecedent of quiescence

forother European Islamist groups of amore separatistpersuasion.As partof theircollaborationist,ow-profile trategy, heUOIFas

alsomaintained a prudent distance from such lightning rods as the

Ikhwan igureQaradawi,notorious ntheWest forjustifying ihadinIsrael and Iraq.Qaradawi has gone notably uninvited to recent UOIF

annual congresses. (Formany Islamists, Qaradawi isno radical; as far

as the jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi isconcerned, Qaradawi

deserves xcommunicationorhis "moderation.")

The UOIFewspaperA/Ittihadevenreats hePalestinian uestioncautiously,supportingonly charitabledonations to refugees andpresenting hePalestinians svictimsratherthanwarriors. he UOIFoesnotparticipateinpro-Palestinianemonstrationsnd steersclearof the chargedArab-Israeli dispute.It did not take part in the 2003 national dem

onstration against thewar in Iraq,nor in the

massive marches in the springof 2006.The organization's bsence fromboth theriots and themarches, in theEuropean country with themost Mus

lims, ought to soothe fears of an Islamist takeover of Europe.

The UOIF'Siscretiondifferssharply rom itsBritishcounterpart,theMuslimAssociationofBritain(MAB),hichwarmlywelcomesthelikesof Qaradawi. Although a quarter the size of theFrenchMuslim

population, theUnited Kingdom'sMuslim population ismore

angry and assertive, and farmore prone to terrorism.The UOIF iSmore influential than theMAB,but the smallerMABsplashes in amuch

stormier sea.When theMuslim Brothers formed theMAB in 1997, it

was but one of many Muslim organizations in the United King

dom.Many were radical, rejecting themild, ifmore frundamentalist,

Deobandi andBarelwi traditions of theirparents.Already in the field

for ageneration was theU.K. IslamicMission, an offshoot of the

Pakistani slamistmovement foundedbyAbulAlaMaududi.While

theUOIF'SoiceboomedinthesmallroomofFrenchMuslim activists,the MAB'Swas a small voice trying to be heard in a vast auditorium

inwhich the young were already pitching rotten eggs at their elders.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2007 [119]

Policymakersmust

learntodifferentiate the

Muslim Brotherhood

fromradicalIslam.



Robert S.Leiken and Steven Brooke

As theMAB rew inprominence, tbegantoworkwith theBritish

government.his cooperation asbeen notableatLondon'sFinsbury

Parkmosque.Thatmosque gained notorietythanksto its infamouserstwhile reacher.espiteMasri'sarrestndexpulsionrom hemosque,

his followerseturnedndquickly egainedontrol. he police,hesitant

to intervene irectlyin a houseof worship,offeredtheMAB ontrol

of themosque in exchange for ridding it of radicals.The MAB gained

amajority on themosque board and gathered to retake the building.

AlthoughMasri'smen triedtostormthemosque, theassembledMAB

supporters routed them. Since then, Scotland Yard tells us that their

"reliable nd effectivepartners" ave even "deradicalized"omeofMasri's formerfollowers.

Open cooperation with the authorities has put the MAB at odds

with radical groups such as HT. The contest between the MAB and

HTroughly ollowsethnic andgenerational ines: oungMuslims of

Pakistani descent areheavily represented inHT,whereas the older and

fewerMuslims ofArab descent join theMAB. formerHTmember

told us that his group "dominates the British scene."He estimated

that HT had some 8,500 members in the United Kingdom; theMAB

could boast only i,ooo. The formally nonviolent HT itself is a full step

away from the subjects of theBritish internal security chief's recent

assessmentof jihadistactivity:"Some200 groupingsor networks,

totaling over 1,6oo identified individuals (and therewill bemany we

don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating,

terrorist acts here and overseas." In light of these numbers, nowonder

MABofficials told us that their group was "adecade behind," and not

gaining ground against, radical groups in theUnited Kingdom.

DIVIDE AND ENGAGE

BORN AS an anti-imperialist asmuch as an Islamic revivalistmove

ment, the Brotherhood, like theUnited States, will follow its own

star.If individualbranches resist the intercessionoffellow organizations,

how much less likely is it that theywill embrace U.S. tutelage?But

cooperation in specific areas ofmutual interest-such as oppositionto alQaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to

expanding Iranian influence-could well be feasible.

[120] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 6No. 2




One place to startwould bewith representativesofthe Brotherhood's

reformist wing, especially those already living in theWest. The

United States lost an opportunity tohear from one of these reformers

last October when Helbawi-the imamwhom we heard deliver a

sermon extolling aJew--was forcedoff a flight en route to a conference

at New York University. This treatment of a figure known for his

brave stand against radicalIslam and for his public advocacyof dialogue

with theUnited States constitutes yet another bewildering act by the

Departmentof Homeland Security, hich providedno explanation.This London-based admirerof Shakespeare and theBrontes appears

tobe exactly hesortof interlocutorho couldhelpbridge ivilizations.Instead, his public humiliation was a gift for the radicals, a bracing

serving of"we told you so"on the subjectof engaging Americans.

U.S. policy toward heBrotherhoodiscontestedbetween thosewho view theBrotherhood and its affiliates as a vital component of

the global jihadistnetwork and thosewho argue that theBrotherhood's

popular support in keyMuslim countries andmoderating potential

require some degree of engagement. The formerview seems ascendant

and explains an increase inU.S. efforts to isolate theBrotherhood

such aspreventingHelbawi and other reformistmembers of theBroth

erhoodrom ntering heUnited Statesorprohibiting.S. governmentpersonnel romengagingwith theBrotherhood.

But if theUnited States is to cope with theMuslim revivalwhile

advancing key national interests,policymakersmust recognize its almost

infinitevariety of political (and apolitical) orientations.When itcomes

to theMuslim Brotherhood, thebeginning ofwisdom lies indifferenti

ating it from radical Islam and recognizing the significant differencesbetweennationalBrotherhoodorganizations.hat diversity uggests

Washington should adopt a case-by-case approach, letting the situation

in each individual country determine when talking with-or even

working with-the Brotherhood is feasible and appropriate. In the

United States'often futilesearch or"moderate uslims"with activecommunity support-and at amoment when, isolated and suspect,

Washington should be taking stock of its interests and capabilities in

theMuslim world-a conversation ith theMuslim Brotherhoodmakes strongstrategic ense.@

FORE IGN AFFAI RS March/April 2007 [121]

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

Documents