The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaisesikas - Selected Chapters on Number and Apeksabuddhi

Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 28

THE

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY , OF THE EARLY VAISE~IKAS

With An Appendix , - -

DASAPADARTHI OF CANDRAMATI

(A Translation with a Reconstructed

Sanskrit Text, Notes and a Critical

Edition of the Chinese Version}

BY

KEIICHI MIYAMOTO

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

PUNE 411004 (India)

199~

CHAPTER l

ON NUMBER ( SANKHYA)

Except for Vaise~ika texts there are few texts which argue from the purely theoretical point of view how we acquire the cognition of numbers.1 We shall examine the Prasastapada· bhii~ya and the Vaise§fkasutra in detail, and show that their theory of number is deeply connected with their theory of cognition, particularly direct cognition.

1. Definition of number

Number belongs to the category of quality. defines number as follows:

Prasastapada J

''Number is the cause of pragmatics of 'one' etc. " 2

According to Candramati and Srldhara, • pragmatics ' ( vyavahiira ) here indicates both ' cognition ' and 'expression '. Consequently

1 The Vaise~ika theory of number seems to have been difficult also for traditional scholars to understand. Since the thirteentll century there bas prevailed, for example, following proverb :

" One who retains unshakable understanding as to ( a~;~d ,des­truction of] the number two. the production of f qualities which are] produced by burning and separation which is produced by separation is indeed known as a Vaise~ika."

dvitve ca pakajotpattau vibhage ca vibhagaje, yasya na skhalita buddhis fUll} vai vaUetikOlfl vidu~. ( Madbava's Sa1·va 'arsa11asangraha, A11liikyadarsana, pp. 81-82; Kesavamisra's Tarkabha~a. p. 32)

As for pakajotpatti, sec III. 3. The MimiiJ!lsakas also enumerate number as one of qualities, but they do not refer to the complicated pro~ss of our attaining the cognition of number. Cf. Manameyodaya, p. 241. .

2 ekadivyavaharahetu~ sa1ikhya. The term ' vyavahara' has many meanings- • cognition,' 'expression,' 'volition, ' • behaviour, ' • secular life' and so on. I translated it as • pragmatics ' with intention to incl~de such many meanings. The term • pragmatics ' itself has recently been used in order to build a new philosophy which should overcome reductionism and nihilism.

60 PART II : On Cogniiion

number is not 'one' ( eka) etc., but it i~ the cause of the cogni­tion and expression 'This is one' etc., and it is conceived as the number one ( ekatm ), the number two ( :lvitra) etc. We should be conscious of the fact that dvitvattm as a universal, for example, was sometimes also written as 'd••it Pa '. l We need to distinguish

- betwe,en dvitva as a quality and as a universal.

2. How we get the cogniton of number ... in the Prasas ta·

padabha~ya ... The process of the production and destruction of the number two ...

The Vaise~ikas distinguish between the number one and other numbers in the following way.~

First of all, the number one inheres in one substance. The eternity and non-eternity of the number one depends on whether its locus is eternal or not. The number one is conceived as exist­ing independently of cognizers. Direct cognition of the number one is produced by contact of the sense organs and the number

: one.

Secondly, the numbers two etc. inhe1e in plural substances, and are all non-eternal. The numbers two etc. do not exist in­dependently of cognizers. First of all, the numbers two etc. are produced and come to inhere in piural substances through the

3. To dist.nguish beiween two kinds of t!vit•·a, the terms of d•'il 1•a-8amiinya ( = dvtt1•atva, twoness) and dvitmgu~ra (the number tvw) are a lso used.

4 "And it [is divided into] that 1-vhich has one substance and tbt which has many substances. Of them, that which has cne su b.stancc i ~ like colour etc. of atoms of water etc., lin one ca8C ] etcmal and [ i ~ another case] non eternal. On the other hand, that which has many sub­stances is the number two to the Elaximum n umber, [ and is non-eternal] .' ' (sa panar ekadm i')'J canekadravya ca. ta!raikadravyay ii!J saTiladipara!lla(:(l­,.ii,adlnam ivii•Iitya>lityatl'ani~pattaya!J. anekadravyi tu d~itl'adika pararddfJa;;­tii.) 'Water e tc. • means water, fi cr and air. Colo ur etc. of their a toms eternal. But tho se of atoms of ea rth a rt: not 8(). They turn into another ones by burning, ::.nd are called qua!i lit:s which are produced by burning. As for the Vais~~ika and Naiyayika theory of the production of t:1em. see III. 3.

On N11mber ( Smikhyii) 61

process of counting, and only then direct cognition of the numbers two etc. is produced. To understand th~ VaiSe~ika theory of number, there-for;;, is to understand their theory of direct cognition.

Pras:Jstapiida e':~bins the process of the productiJn and destruction of t !Jc number lwo as follows" : (Each of the nine stages represenis only or:e moment.)

( 1 ) A visual sense organ and two substances come to be in contact.

( 2) The cognition of oneness ( ekatvasiimiinya=ekatvatva) is produced.6

( 3) The cognition as efficient cause ( iipek~iibuddhi ),1 which takes two n umber ones as its objects, is itself produced by oneness, the relation beiween oneness and two number ones, and the cognition of oneness.8

( 4) Th~ number two is produced in its loci ( two substances) by the cognition as effident cause.

:; y:d~ :,,, id1n~ cai<,~!t~a s-7n(i i1asmnanajiitlyayor dravyayo~ sanrjkar~e sat i I .1 ' >".'1 ' !1 l'it.'; !.~ 3:i f11 2 i·' :!!asa ·na ~.octafkat v ,; s'im1nyaj ;fano tpal t iiv ekatvasii manya­ta.f;,;:/1 11.1 : r!i: .<J :iii il.cb.'zy.:~ !!k a::u.::ayor anekm'I~ayi~IJ' eka buddhir utpadyat? tada la t1l a~·J<.·,t."yaika:rOb.'~.J-·{;;!1 .c: 1·afraya_vor dtdtvanJ Grabi;yate . tala ~, punas las1nin

d vith1Sa 'iia ll_:···•.i:/a.';am u'pulyate. tasmad dvitva.riimallyajiianad apekl[abilddlzer virw fyalt 1. d:,it:•nsiitil:7!!;ut"tNmbandh.1tajj.:fa uebhyo dvi fl ,agu(Jabuddlter utpa­dyamaw;tety ek t;/; krzi:: ~; !a ta idi.ia1m apd. {jbuddUrina.fad dvitvagu~tasyG ~·ina­

§ J-•at t Ci: dvitP~Jg!t :'E:7j -::i · ; ·~: ~ : rh·!!J.·(!2ilrnGnya.,! na 'tasya ,~iru:-;§ akO.rar-anz , dvit vagu~ta­tajj!Iii:zasr:n tb! ~ih fli "lx·;_~ ·o :_/;!e rlr[! l'J'e iti dravyaj iiU. uasyoiplzdo dt·itt'asya vinQ.{o

dvitva~:f .:: F?ind.lk:r vi,n ~ya!ta dravyajiia liat Sai!i skf.irasyotpadyamtinatel)' eka~ ka!a~r. fcJd,·•:Itnfar,« ~l d:· n•yaj tYiinad dvftvug:t ;:;ab<~ddhcr a.oinafo dravyabuddher a pi sm(zo·karii t .

6 The co:snii i,>:1 ;:;.s cftkient ca!.lse ( apek~abuddhi), at this moment, comes to th -.; sta~c 0; i.: C'.ir;g about to he p~odL:c.:d .

7. H is not ::1 the '/ai {e~ikas t.tra, but in the Dafapal artlll and the P rafasfapar/.•&lio:;)'a that :;,e tcr<11 'apek~ab!lddhi ' a j,1pears. Apek:;ahuddlzi has been mi•;underslooJ by many mod~rn scholars. As for the correct n1caning nf ope.' {~rbitddh i., s:-: ~ d. :!.

8 Vyo;m§iva a nd Srfdh:1ra ment ion th31, in this case, two sub­stauc.:s arc the matcr:a t cause, two number ones are the non-material cause and apekvabuddhi is the efficient cause.

62 PART II : On Coguitioti

( 5) The cognition of twoness ( dvit1•asiimanya = dvitvat1•a) is then produced. The cognition as efficient cause is about

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On Number ( Sarikhyii ) 63

to be destroyed ( vinasyattii ). 9 The cognition of the number two is about to be produced ( utpadyamiinatii )1° by twoness, the relation between twoness and the number two, and the cognition of twoness.

( 6) The cognition as efficient cause is then destroyed. The number two is about to be destroyed. The cognition of the number two is produced. The cognition • These are two substances' is about to be produced by the number two, the relation between the number two and two sub­stances, and the cognition of the number two.

( 7) The cognition ' These are two substances • is then pro­duced. The number two is destroyed . [The cognition of twoness is destroyed.] The impression ( sa'!lskiira=smrti)

is about to be produced. The cognition of the number two is about to be destroyed.

( 8) The impression is then produced. The cognition of the number two is destroyed. [The cognition ' These are two substances' is about to be destroyed. ]11

(9) [The cognition' These are two substances • is destroyed.]

This is the process of the production and destruction of the number two. Next, we shall examine some reasons which require such a process.

A. Cognition produces the number two

It is a vital point that the number two is produced by cog• nition. According to Srldhara, it is not a mystery, but it is well

9 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to be destroyed means that [ all the ] causes of destruction are present ( vinaf a­kara~a[ -samagrl-] sannidhya ).

10 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to be produced means that [all] causes of production are present ( utpatti· kara~a[ -samagrl-] s(mnidhya ).

11 According to Prasastapiida, it takes three kalas for the process to pass from stage ( 2) to stage ( 7 ) . According to Sr f dhara, 1 kala=~

( Continued on the next page)

64 PART II : On Cognition

known that an external object can be produced by cognition. 11

This is refuted by the oppenents ( probably the Buddhists) sa follows:

''Because it is established that a substratum of two quali­ties (two number ones ) makes emerge the nu mber two, it

is not that [ the number two ] is produced dctcnninately

immediately aft-~r the cognition [is p ro duced]. " ' 1

Sridhara presents the following syliogism as a reply.

" [Statement] the number two is produced by cognit ion .

[Reason ] Because [the number two is 1 cognized by only one cognizer .

[Illustra tion] All that are cognized by only one cognizer are those which are produced by cognition, !ike plea­

sure etc.

[Application 1 The number two is also cognized by only one cognizer.

[Conclusion 1 Therefore, [ the number two 1 is also pro­duced by cognition. '>~4

Udanaya, while presenting almost the same syllogism10 as Sri­dhara's also presents another syllogism :

( Continued from the last page )

k~a~as. Including stages ( l} and ( 8 ), whok p rocess takes eight k ,val!as, which also accords with the explanation of the Upaskara on the Vaife f fka· suira 7. 2. 9 ( 7. 2. 8 accord ing to the Upaskara ).

12 jfi(i nad arthasyotpida iti na!.wkikam hbm smik!n•adl:iam tasmad utpattidarfana t. bahyartlzasyotp:ido na dr,~ ra iii . na, v;idharm};amarrnm ta lanvayatirek e ljii nuvidhayit1•a syobltay :lfravis e$ii t . ·

13 ubhayagw;alamb'lnasya d~·itvabhfryaiijakaive siddhe sati j iianasya tada n(mantary aniyamotpat.ti ~'·

14 prayogas f u- d vifV{!I?Z buddh'j.~m niyamenaikapratipatt rredyatr(i f. yan niyamenaikapratipatt [l;edym(Z tad b:td . .filijm!z yatha sukhadik am . niyamc· naikapratipatt rl·edya'!z ca dviti'Q111. tasm{ui idam a pi buddhijam.

15 dvitvam buddhijam. pra tiniyatapw·u~avedyalviit. suk lull'ad it i .

On Number ( Sarikhya ) 65

" [ Statement] The cognit ion as effi r.ieut cause produC{s the number two .

[ Reason ] J3eC1!.1S<: [ the cognition as efficient cause is] ac tually fo ll m:v<~d by it ( the number tvvo ), while [sub­

stances :ue J im possible to make emerge [the number two J.

[Illustra tion ] Like conneclivn and separation in the case of SO Ui1d . "lo

Thus, in order to explain the production of the number two, it is necessary to con ~e i ve tha t cognition produces external objects. The Vaise~ik :'. s say, we acqui re !.he cogn iton 'These are two' not by cognizing t h.! n umber two \Vhich al ready inheres in external

objects, but by cognizi ~ g the number 1\vo after it has been produc· ed by cogni tion.

But th is does not mean that cognit ion is the material cause of the n umber two . According to the Vaisel?ikas, a quality connot be t!Je material cau~e of a quality.11 As Vyom a&iva etc . point

out, the material ca.use of ibe number two is the two substances,

the non·materia l cause is th e two number ones, and the efficient cause is cognitioa. l l

B. DEstruction of the number two by the destruction of cognition

At sta ge ( G) ( see above), the number two is about to be destroyed b;: the destruction of the cognition as efficient cause, and it is destroyed ::tt st ::g~ ( 7 ). The question then arises as to whether qualities can be destroyed by the destruction of its effic.i-

16 apek!abuddhis tu dvit asyotpadika. vya fijakatvan:w~pattau tenan11-

v!dhiJ!imliiwrt rat. sc.bdm~l prati sm~ryogavad it i.

17 See the Vaiff c,,ika~ Lirra J. l . 15 which expounds the defin ition of quality. It reads : dra.·y-:ifmri O'fU(l'IVtlll sm(zyortavibhage~ l' akaral)am ana· pek~a iii guy:l~k!f2c:am. V _:·{j,{ hl·a reads: dravya.<f rayl na gu(lr.l'an san.zyoga­vibhage~ ·· ,•kiira .~am anapeklf .:J iti gu(ta!ak~a (wm.

18 See note 8 . . .. 9

66 PART II : On Cognition

eot cause. A piece af cloth .. for example, is destroyed by the destruction of its threadf, namely, its m2terial cat;ses, but it is not influenced at all by t.he destruction or the shuttle of the loom etc., namely, its efficient cause.

Srldhara does not mention any particular argument about this. It is an empirical fact for bim that a quality can be destroy­

ed by the destruction of its efficient cause . He illustrates this by the case of final release. When one is about to attain fi nal release , the last true cognition is destroyed by the destruction of his body. The last true cognition is a quality, and his body is an efficient -cause.1ll

Udayana presents a syllogism as follows :

" [Statement] The nnmber two is destroyed by the destruction of its efficient cause.

( Reason] Because it is destroyed, even if its loci ( two substances) are not destroyed, and, moreover, even if there does not appe :1r another quality which is incom­patible with it, and although it is a quality.

[Illustration] Like the last cognition [immediately before the final release]. " 20

C. Different /eJ!els of cognition

At stage ( 3 ), the cogo!tio~ of two number ones comes after the cognition of oneness. At stage ( 5 ), the cognition of the number two comes after the cognition of twoness. At stage ( 6 ), the cognition 'These are two substances' comes after the cogni­tion of the number two. In this way, the cognitions, which lead to the cognition ' These are hvo ( or three ) substa nces, ' p rocctd from stage to stage by first graspi;1g universals, then qual ities and finally sul:-stances. This rule is tbe key to the Vaisl~ika theory of

19 dmo grl (zona m nimittakara~rad api vinaso yar!zii mok~apraptya­vasth:jyiim antyatattvajfiiin(Jsya sar1rm•iniifiit.

20 dvitl'am nimit•a vi.'l?if avi:; ~.(v r!m. iis rayariiiJm•irodhigu~;antarapriidur­bhaviibhiive ga,asya sato vinasitviit caramajniinavat.

Oil N umber ( Smikhya·) 67

number. This seems to m ake the theory of number confusing.U

But it is quite consis!ect in light of the theory of direct cognition.

As is weH known , the Vaisef!ikas divide direct cognition into two kinds . Thi 5 civisio :J originates in the Vaisc$ikasutra. One is the direct cognitien \v J!ch is not verbalizablc ( nirvika"r;ajiiiina }, and which cannot be m;:!morized, wh ile another is the direct cog· nition which is verbaliz:t h!e ( savikalpakafniina ), and which can be mem o rized , al though tb terminology developed much later. The latter belongs to the group of cogniti on of what is qualified

( ~·isi${a} by the qaalifier ( vise~a,;a ). For example, the cognition 'This is a cow' is a cognition of the qualified (this) by cowness. the quali fier .

Prasa stapada utiliz.: s this division, though used different ter· minology. As for the essence of the theory of direct cognition, we

shaH examine it in detail in II. 3.

N ow, tak ing the theory of direct cognition into consideration. we shall investiga<.e some points about the theory of number.

First of all, the cog nition 'These are two substances' is the cognit;on of wha t is qualified by some qualifier. For example, in the case of the cogniti0!1 of mere man, but the cognition of a man qualified by a stick, the q ualifier. Sridhara presents the following

syllogism :

" [Statement] The cognition 'These are two substances~ comes after the cognition of the qualifier.

[Reason] Because of its being the cognition of the qualified.

( Illustrati cn ] Like the cognition ' He is a man with a stick. ' " 22

21 Faddegon, who fa ;led to u ndcn ta~d th~ theo ry of number, says; "t h:s ca pricious and af;cr a ll nons': nsical constn :ctic n " (B. Fa ddegon, Vaife~ika-Srstem. W icsbaden : D r. !lhrtin Sa ndig oH G, 1969 (Reprint of 1818 ], p. 206 ) .

22 dve dravye it i j .-ia 'Ia:~z ••ifqa~wjiianapurvakam. visi~tajiilir.atvat, da1.uftti j iianavad iti.

68 PART II : On Cognition

In this way, if a cognition is the cognition of the qua!ified, it ought to come after th~ cognition of the qualifier. The cognition of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of the qualified. In the case of the cognition ' These are two substances,' its cause is the cognition of the number two. And this ensures that the cog­nition of the number t\VO precedes the cognition 'These are two substances. ' This means that the two cognitions take place in different moments.

Thus, the cognition of the qualifier precedes the cognition of the qualified. Now, Srldhara quotes an opponent who argues that these two cognitions could be simultaneous.

''Now, there are some who assert that the qualifier and the qualificand ( ~'ise~ya) are the objects of the same cognition. -But, for them, how about [ the cognition of] ' This is a sandal wcod with good fragrance'?- A visual sense organ does not take good fragrance as its object, and a sense organ of smell does not catch the subst:mce. Therefore, two [sense organs] do not perceive the relation [ between two objects] ... This [cognition] should be produced by a visual sense organ and a sense organ of smeli simultaneous· ly, and takes both as its objects through the ability of two causes. " 23

The direct cognition of a sandal wood witb good fragr~:mce is produced by special contact ( scmnikar~a} which is strictly dd!;Jcd

in later texts as fniina!ak0Wl ii· Now, Srldhara refutes the oppo­nents in the following way (summary ) :

A cognition bas no parts. If the opinion of the opponen!s is admitted, the cognition would have to have parts, thcr.,

23 ye .ftt v!7t.~: :l -: ~ ~n· .:fe$)'t:.yor e/(.a.i :i a na.!cunb~zaaln (i /; r::~t. f~§Ql~l s11ru/1.~·

c:z .•ufa ;r~lli i(v a!r ~z ka vtir!la '! na lt i caf.:~ :t;· ga :u/i;,..?vi~ cyr.f~l na ca glzrii~taitt

dravyam ii 'lt.tte. «Ia e ~ ,, IW tabhyal(! sam.'Hmdhagraha(Uim . .. . . •.•. cak~ 11;. ghra(l4bhyG!!J 'ambhuya jauyamiinam idm!z kiira1Jad1•ayasan1arthyad ubhayt -..ifayaTti syad ( i iy eke samarthayani i).

On Number ( Sa1ikhya) 69

a visual cognition, and a smelling cognition etc. would be confusing in one and the s:1me cognition.a

Then, he pres-:nts the foilowing syllogism :

" [ Statern ·~ nt J The cognition of the qua lificed, the point at issue, takes only tLe qualificand as its object.

[Reason J Because of its being a direct cognition 25 and, moreover, of its being the cognition of the qualificand.

[Illustration J Like the cognition of ' This is a sandal wood with good fragrance. '"25

But, as to the meaning of 'takes only the qualificand as its object, ' another opinion is presented. It is as follows :

" If we admit that a mere substance itself is the object of the cognition of the qualificand, then , we should be able to attain the same cognition even when the qualifier should not exist. Besides, even if it is [ possible to consider] that, as the qualifier produces [the cognition of the qualificand ], the cognition of the qualifi.cand would not be produced withou t its existence, this [cognition of the qualificand] would not differ from the cognition of the substance itself.

24 tad api u:J s'idhlyCJ nirb!riigatv(it . yadi jrl anam sabhiigan_1 syat tada ka fci1 asyal!l fo g/;riinc ~w janya:e k as cic cak~L,{i e 'y upopadyate vya rasthii,

25 Inferent ia l co gniiiGn is excluded f •um th is phrase according to

Sri Jha ra . ( pratyuk ~af l'e santi lai;igjkaj'i"ii;mvyoracchediirtham.)

26 vh'adharlhyasitm~ z viie{iyoj::iatzar! r keva!m,ife{i ya!amb:mam. pratya• kl,Jf~·e sati vi.fe~yaj'icaw.'1•at. surabfli candant-m iti j rianarat. Sddbara asserts that we atLaiu the CL'gni t ion of 'This is a sanda l wood with good frag­nn.:e ' in the follov.- ing w~y : "Therefore, a fter good fragrance was perc:cvcd by a s·msc o rgan 0f smell, the cognition o f the quali5caml which takes only th.: qua lific;111 d as its objec t is pro .!uc~d by a visual sense organ assisted l'Y that [fo rmer ] p<='rc~.ption . " tasmad g!zra~:ena gamlh< grhlle pascat tadgraha.~wsah~kii;· i (la cak~uljii' kevalavi§e~y(dambanam e~·edaf!l visen•a­jiianml} janyate.

70 PART II : On Cognition

Because a cognition is not differentiated if its object is not differentiated. ··~•

If the qualificand is regarded as the same as 'a mere substance itself, ' this opinion wouid be reasonable. But Sridhara insists that the object of this cognition ought to be the qualified, not ' a mere substance itself. ' He says :

"Being the qualified is quite different from [a thing] itself. "28

. For example, he says, the object of the cognition 'This is a man with a stick' is neither a mere man nor his mere connection with a stick, but a man different from others owing to his being charac­terized by a stick, and, therefore, the qualifier is said the limitative

_( vyavvacchedaka ).29

Now, taking the above argument into consideration, let's return to the process of the production and destruction of the

number two.

First of all. Prasastapada uses the following compound in l.tage ( 3 ) : ekatl'asiimihya-tatsambandha-j'iiiinebhya[t. go

Sridhara, after mentioning the following :

27 nanu yadi dravyasr•1r 'Jpamii tram eva ,,if e~y;Jjnanasyalambauam, asaty api vise~a~re tatha pratyaya~ syat. atlza vise~afJasya janokatvan na tadabhave vise~;mjiianodaya~, tathapi dravyarupapratyayad asya na vise,w!J. vi~ayavifefam antm·e~:a jiiiinasya vise~iintariibhiivift.

28 visi~{atii ca svarup(itireki~ty eva.

29 [ viSi~(atii ca srarup{direki(ry eva] ya da(;tjlti jii(Jne pratibkiisate na kfla/:1 latra pum~amatrasya pratilir, llapi da~rgasaT!lYOgitanzatrasya. tatha ca 'a~tq!fi prarliav itaravilak~af!a era purw;a~: SOI~JVedyate. l 'ailak~a~ryam

casya da.:rtJopasarjauatmm eva. ata e1•a vise~a~rariJ vyaracchedakam iti glyat~. dando hi sropasatjm:atiipratipatiim puru~e kurvan puru~am itarasmiid vravac­chfn~tti. Hereafter Srid!Jara refers to the discrimin::~tion of vi§e~a(;u and upalak~a~w. which is to come to be an important point at issue for the Navyanaiyayikas, He says : aya;!l cas,vopalak~a(C.d ~·i.fe~ah upa!akfll (:am

api ~·yahlcc !;inalti ;za til svopasa:janatapralltihau~~ nn hi yatha da(ujlli da!Jcfa?asm}:;!wra pz!;·ufe pra!lyate tatha ja{abl!is tapasa iti I lipase ja!opa,ar­jarwta. da(l<jopasa:j.J 'i. lla puru~a:;ya pradlzall)'al!l carfh!lkriyariim upabhog{iti·

- say(matis ay(ipek~a) ·a.

30 Vyomam/1 reads : -tajpii;nebhya!J.

On Number ( Smikhyii ) 71

" The cognition of the qualifier is the ca11Se of the cognition of the qualificand ( ,=, the qualified ). Two number ones

are the qu <: li fkPnd, a nd oCJcness is !l:e qua!ifie ". TLerefore the cognition is thought ( to be produced] of it (oneness)

in the fi rst. " ·~ '

analyzes the compound into the following three components.

( l ) oneness, ( 2) the relation of oneness with qualities, or

two number ones, ( 3 ) the cognirion.

It is clear tbat 'the cognition' is of oneness. Udayana interprets this in rhe same way, and clarifies 'the relation' as inherence.

Vyomasiva also interprets it in almost the same way.

Second, Prasastapiida uses the following compound in stage

( 5) : dvitl'asiimiiny;;;-tatsambal1dha-t:ljjniinebhyo[1' 3•

Srldhara's interpretation is as follows :

( l ) twoness, ( 2) the relation of twoness with a quality, or

the number two, ( 3) the cognitioa of twoness.

Udayana's and Sr)dhara's interpretations are the same as Sndhara•s.

Thirdly, Prasastapada uses the following compound in stage

( 6) : dvitvagu1}a-tajfiiana·sambandhebhya[t P

All the commentators interpret it as follows :

( 1) a quality, or the numbr::r two, ( 2) the cognition of the numb~r two, ( 3) the reb.tic-n [of the number two with

two subjects J. Udayana also mentions the following

"Be::ause the qualifier (the number two, a quality) and

its relation [with the cognition of 'these are two sub-

31 1•i.f ep~wj;f(i '1 :71~1 vi [ e~yajii{r:asya kara ~:am. ekagu~rayof ca vife~ya­yor ekatl'as!nna•ryat!l vi.ffe~ ·?(am . ft'liada;t tatraiva j ii ailnT!l cintyate.

32 Kiral}avall omits - taj-.

33 V vom:n•a/1 and KiraQavall r<Jad : dvitvagu.:wjfianatatsam bandhe· bhya~.

PART II : On Cognition

stances ' ] are a lready established, and there is nothing more necessary. ' ' 3 4

Thus, the causes of the qualificand (strictly sp~aking, the

qualified) can be formula ted under the fo llowing three headings.

( i ) the quali fi er

( ii) the relat ion between the qualifier and the qu alificand

(iii) tbe cognition of the qua lifier

Now, the basis of such for m ula tion, which consists of the

three cames of cognition , can be found in t he Vaise~ikasu tra. The

most important is sutra 8. 9.

"By an inherent white colou r and by the cog nition o f the

white colaur the cogni tion of a v>hite [substance is pro­

duced]. These t\vo [kinds of cognitions ] are in relation

of causality. "

samaviiyinc.b svaityiic ch11uityabuddhe!1 svete buddhis te kiiryakiirmpbhute. 35

The Vrtti jnterprets it as follows:

"By a universal, or wbiteness,;which is inherent in a quality,

or a white colour, and by the cognition of a universal, or

whiteness, the cognition of a quality, or whiteness, is pro4

duced. The relation between a universal and a quality

must be tlken into consideration too. Therefore, tb c cog­nition of the qualifi er is the cause, and the cognition of the qualificand is t he effect. " ~'3

34 [ g ii(Nj,fipu;m e1•a h i carr:r:m d '·av)'ajif(i llasyo tpadak m!l] t•i.fe,Hl •.! atat­sambandhayo!J p!inmiddhat rat ap ekpnl ylintarabha ta l .

35 Vyakl1ra and Upaskara read : - buddhes ca sve-.

36 .f l, :! tagu~~ ,.?~:~Jn !Vti _:-' .' . .'LJ.~r § 'ai tyasG. InG!lrat SraityasQnrG.NyCt .~, ~aitya­

samO.nyaj f.anac ca { ,•Ci:Jf: !l ( ajri"a!l:ll!l j"(zyate. sa rnanyag!t ~wsambandlro 'pj

dra~ravyafz a to vifr.o .:Jc.b:ddhi ~l kO.rapm vife,ryabw'dhi !J ka•·yam. From the context of the Vaife~ikasuira itself, the Vrrtr s interpre t a tion is the most rational. Cf. IL 3.

On Number ( Sankhyii) 73

This interpretation seems to be su itable because, since the resulting cogni tion is of a ~u bs tance, 'svaitya' ought to be a white colour, or a qu C! Iity, not whi teness, or a universal.

The Vyiikhyii in terprets it as follows :

"' By an inherent ' =by the relation between a quality, or a white colour, and a substance, ' by a white colour • =by

a qu ality, or <t whi te colour, and 'by the cognition of the white colour ' = by the cognition of a quality, or the white colour, the cognition of 'a white' = a piece of cloth which is qualified by a quality, or a white colour, is

produced. This way [is applied J to other cases. 'These two ' = the cognition of the qualifier and that of the quali· ficand, or the cognition of the qualifier and that of the qualified, a re ' in relation of causality.' This is ascertained by direct cognition with the help of positive and negative concomitanceY Because the cognition of the qualified is produced when there exist the relation between the quali· fier [and tbe 4ualificand ], the qualified and the cognition [of the qualifier ], and, besides, the fo rmer is not produced when the latter does not exist. "as

Udayana interprets it as follows :

" ...... Thus, in the case of the cognition of a white shell etc.,

it is sa id that the inherence of a white colour, or a quality. a white colour and the cognition of the qualifier. or a white

""Colour, are the causes. Thus, [it is said that] the relation between the qua lifter [and the qua lificand], the qualifier

37 an:-ayavyatircka. This mean s here the method to examine causal concomitc.nce of two mat : ~ rs. Amaya : pr~sencc of A is accompanied by presence of B. Vyati;-da : absence of A is a <: con pan ied hy a bsense of B. If ti'.O matters a re attcs·.ed to be in concorn it:~ n ce , they are said to make causali ty.

38 samavayineti .1: uk!agu~wpa(asambandha t , s vaityad iii fuklagwJ(it S1•aityabilddhcr iii .fuidq:u.wh11d !heh .§ vete f uklag:t (;ari{i~ !e pate buddhir iiiyaie. tad cii nya !rapi, re ;•if .:~.-;~la l'ifen·abuddi:1 vife ~a(wj ii (wa visi~{abuddhl

ca, ka ryakara !Wbhute arn•aru l'''u' irekas!litaprat yak$ ea!J vasite, vi f efaiJaS am bandhm•if e~aw:Fiane.ru sat.m vi ) i.J f,1pratyay odayad asatsu canudayat .

... 10

74 PART II : On Cognition

and the cognition of ·it (the qualifier) are the causes of the right cognition, or the cognition of the qualified.' 39

As was examined above, VaiSe§ikasiitra 8. 9 is understood as expounding the typical VaiSe~ika theory of direct cognition that the so-called ' caus1.l triad ' ( kiira1Jatraya- Vyomasiva) causes the cognition of the qualified.

Prasastapada also quotes VaiSe~ikasutra 8. 9 in discussing two problems which pertain to tbc procuction and destruction of the number two. One of these will be investigated in subsection D. The present problem is stated by an opponent. It is summarized as foJlows :

' Even if the number two is destroyed and does not exist any more. the cognition of two substances is possible to be produced merely by the existence of the cogrition of the number two. ·~o

Before quoting the sutra concerned, Prasastapada states the following :

"Because, as the cogmtton of the qualificand (strictly speaking, the qualified) has similarity [with the qualifier). it cannot exist without its relation with the qual ifier . "u

39 e~·aii ca s ret a~ satikha ityadipra!ltau s vaityasamm ·ayosya s mitya­gu~;~asya s vailyavis e~a (!ajiianasyc. ca kara~ratl'Gm ity uktam tatha ca vi§ e,lm,ra­sambandhavis e~a~latajjt!ananCJ!I vi§ i~ !apratyak.,apramiin;l prat i kara~:ai:!'Jim it i.

40 " [Objection: 1 [The cognition of two substances is possible, ] like inference, [to be produced 1 merely by cognition, [Answer : 1 This should me<Jn : In such a cash as 'that which uici not appear [is the probans 1 of th'lt which appeared' (one ph rase from Vai­fesikasutra 3. 1. 8 ), without probans, the cognition of substances is possible, like inference, to be produced merely by the cognition of a quality even if the quality (the number two) might have been destroyed." laitigikamj jiiii••'Jmatrad iii cet? syan matam, yathabh'i]tar?t bhutasyety atm liJigtibltti ve 'pi jiiiir.llmatrad olltllllana/1} tat ira gur.avinaf e 'pi gu(zabuddhimatrad dravya­

pratyaya!J syad iti.

41 na hi vifen'ajiiii 'ta .~l sarupya·l vifefo!Jasambandham antare~1a bhavilum arhati.

On Number ( Sarikhyii) 75

The word 'similarity' is, according to Udayana, the same as • commonness' or as ' having the same substratum.' According to Sridhara, it indicates that the cognition of the qualificand is characterized by the qualifier, that the qualifier is the nature of the quali.licand, and that the qualifier is the ca•1se which lets us cognize that it is attached to the qualificand.42 Now if the qualifier does not exist, it is not possible for the above mentioned relation to exist. Therefore, since the cognition ' These are two substances' is the cognition of the qualificand, it is needed that the number two which qualifies the two exist when the cognition • These are two substances ' is produced.

Prasastapada quotes the sutra concerned immediately after the above argument. Although he does not present any interpretation of it, it is clear that he quoted it in order to emphasize the theory of ' causal triad ' of direct cognition.

D. Non-simultaneity of cognitions

The theory of the production and destruction of the number two is based on the rule that two cognitions are unable to exist simultaneously in one person. This rule originates from the tradi· tiona! idea that mind, since it is singular in one person and the smallest, is unable to come in contact with many sense organs simultaneously. 43

Now, Prasastapada says that the non-simultaneity or incom• patibility of things can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it means being ' impossible to coexist' ( sahiinavasthiina )1

and, on the other hand, it means the relation between ' a to Qe· killed and a killer' ( vadyaghiitaka ). Let's take two things A and

42 vi§e~a.'JGI~l vife~yasya svarupa1~1 vife~f(ll!uraiijakan.t vise~ye svopa• sarjanatiipratTtihetur iti yii ;•at. na cii vidyama!lasyanuraiijakatva1!1 svopasarja•

11atiipratTtihetutml!1 yuktam ato na vise~yajiianat!l vife~a(tasamba1Ulham ante.• re!Ja bha vitt~m arhat i vise~;:ajiianan:z sadr&yad vile~a(ramtraktatviid viSetaiJa• samba11dham antare~1a bharitum arhati.

43 Cf. Vaife~ikas iitra 3. 2. 3; Nyayasutra 3. 2. 57-60; Prasastapada· bhiina, the Mana!J-nirupar;a .

'76 PART II : On Cognition

B, and assume that A precedes B. In the case of being ' impos­sible to coexist. ' A is destroyed at the moment when B is pro­duced. It is li terally impossible for A and B to coexist But, i!1 the case of being 'a to-be-kil ied and a killer, ' A is destroyed at the moment after 13 is produced. It is possible fo r A and B to coexist for one moment only. Then, what is the relationship between the two cognit ions ? As can be gue5sed from the list ol the stages in the process ( see also figure 1 ), the correct relation­ship is 'a to-be-killed and a killer. ' The reason is as follows :

If the non-simultaneity of cognitions meant impossibility ot coexistence, the Vai5e~i ka theory of number vvould collapse. Tha1 is to say, if it is impossible for two cognitions to coexist, at stagt ( 5) the cognition as efficient cause would be destroyed at th( moment when the cognition of twoness was produced. Then, tb( number two would be about to be destroyed at the moment wher cognition as efficient cause was dest royed. At the next momen when the cogn ition of the number t\vo is produceu the n umbe1 two is destroyed. If so, the number two, which produces the cog nition 'These are two substances, ' would not exist at thi: moment. This leads to the conclusion that the cognitio n • Thesr are two substances' is never produced, For the cogn ition 'Thes. are two substances ' is the cognition of the qualificand ( tb, qualified). I ts production neds the followi11 g ' causal triad' : ( i number two, ( ii) the relation between tbe number two a 111l tw. substances, (iii) the cogn ition of the number t wo. But, at th moment when the cogniti on ' These are two substances' is to b

· produced, ( i ) and ( ii) do not exist. Therefore, the cognitio1

• These are two substances' is never proLluced . This is absunl Therefore, the relationship bet\veeu two cognitio ns is not ' impo~ sible to coexist,' but ' a to-be-killed and a killer. '

3. Conclusion

The theory of H Utll her has been thought to be one of th most difficult of the Vaise~ika theories. But after having invest gated it in detail, we are now able to understand that it is establ

On Number ( Sankhyii) 71

shetl strictly in accordance with the Vaise~ika rules. The key-stone of these rules is the 'causal triacl, ' on which the Vaise~ika theory of direct cognition is based. And it is notable that the idea of 'causal triad' origi,1ates in Vaise~ikasutra 8. 9. The theory of direct cognition in the Vaise~ikasutra is extremely perfect beyond our imagination. This illteresting point \viii be investigated in datail in II. 3.

CHAPTER 2

APEK~ABUDDHI : A SPECIAL COGNITION

The term 'apek~iibuddhi' plays an importa nt role in the througbly realistic (in contrast with nominalistic) Vaise ~ikas.

This term docs not appear in the Vaise~ikasutra, but appears for the first time in the Dasapadiirth[l and then in the Prasastapiida­bhiil!ya. Of these two the latter uses it far more frequently. So we shall investigate the true meaning of the term 'apek~abuddhi • by examining the way it is used in the Prasastapadabha~ya.

Prasastapada succeeded in explaining the production and des­truction of things deeply related to our consciousness. The later Vaise~ikas and Naiyayikas were so satisfied with his explanation that they did not attempt to reinterpret it. Besides the term is apparently a curious compound whose first member is • apekfiii ' and whose second member is 'buddhi. ' This has led many modern scholars to a great deal of confusion, misunderstanding and non­understanding. A list of their translations of the term • apek~ii­buddhi' reveals the extent of the confusion.

* relating cognition (Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism. p. 187 ).

* distinguishing perception ( Apte, The Practical Sanskrit­English Dictionary : Cowell, tr. of the Sarvadarsana­sangraha ).

• fundamental intellection ( Faddegon, Vaic;e[!ika System).

* distinctive notion (G. Jha, tr. of the Padarthadharmasmi­graha of Prasastapiida with the Nyayakandal{ of Srldhara).

• unitary conception ( G. Jha, tr. of the Tattvasailgraha­paiijika ).

* die auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge gerichtete Geistes­haltigkeit ( P W)

1 See the paragraphs ( 13!] and ( 137] lo the Appendix ,

Apek~libuddhi : A Special Cognition 79

* sabetsu suru ishiki [distinguishing consciousness) ( Y. Kanakura, Indo no S!Jizen Tetsugaku [Natural Philosophy of India] ).

* sotai kank c~i no isbiki [consciousness of relativity] (H. Nakamura, Sanko Bunka Kenkyujo Nenpo] Annual of Cultural Institute of Sanko] Vols. 6- ·,, 1973-74 ).

Except Faddegon's tramlation wh ich is too obscure, the others agree in interpreting apek~libuddhi in such a way that the subject of the verbal root apekif· (which means 'to expect,' 'to respect for' etc. ) is buddhi (cognition). This is, however, quite doubtful. Before refuting this, we shall examine in detail the Vaise~ika usage of the term concerned.

1. The fi re cases in which apek~abuddbi functions

The term 'apek~abuddhi' is the key to explaining the produc­tion and destruction of the number two, the separateness of two ( substances ), priority and posteriority.

[ 1 ] The following sentence is found in Gul}a-slidnarmya­vaidharmyanirupa!Ja.

''Priority, posteriority, the number two, separateness of .. two ( substances) etc. are buddhyapekEJii]}. " 2

The commentators offer the following explanations : Priority etc. 'do ' apek~· buddhi when they are to be produced. (Vyomasiva )3 ;

They do not come into exis tence without buddhi. ( Do. )4; Buddhi

is considered the efficient cause of their production. ( Sridhara )5;

This very buddhi is apek~iibuddhi. ( Udaya na ) . '~

That is to say, priority etc. do not exist independently of a cognizer, but are produced only through the process of counting.

2 paratvaparatvadv itvadviP: thaktvudayo buddhyapak~ a/J.

3 Vyomavati, p. 435 l. 20.

4 Ibid. , p. 435 l. 23 .

5 Nyayakandali, p. 116 z. 6.

6 Kiratflivali, p. 108 l. 23.

80 PART II : On Cognition

Take number for example. The number one exists in every substance utterly independently of a cognizer and is cognized by the same process as other external things are cognized. But the number two does not inhere in t\vo substances independently of a cognizer. lt comes to inhere in two substances through the count­ing of a cognizer. Only then, it is directly cognized7 •

[ 2] Apek~iibuddhi which functions in the process of the production of the number two was already examined in H. I.

[ 3] Apek~iibuddhi as concerned with the production of separateness of two ( substances ) etc. functions in the same way as that of the number two.

[ 4] Priority and posteriority are each divided into spatial one and temporal one. Here we shall take spatial priority as an example. It is produced and destroyed through the following process.

( 1) A man looks at two things, A and B, which are located in the same direction. First, the distance between the man and A and between the man and B are divided into parts by using some kind of unit of length. Next, the numbers of connections of each part with its adjoining part which exist in the distance between the man and A and in that between the man and B are counted. If there is cognized a diff~::rence

between two numbers (consider the latter is more), the buddhi • B is further than A' is produced with A as a standard. This buddhi is the apek~abuddhi.

{ 2) Priority is produced by the material cause, namely, B, the non-material cause, namely, a connection qualified by moreness, and the efficient cause, namely, the apek§iibuddhi.

7 Sridhara pre5ents a. syllogism as follows : " [Statement] The number two is produced by cognition, [ Reason] Because : the number two Is] cogcized by only one cognizer. [ Illustration] All that are cognized by only one cogni zer are those which are produced by cognition, like pl easure etc. [Application] The number two is as well cognized by only ooe cognizer. [Conclusion] Therefore, (the number two] is produced by cogniiion. " As for the original te:~~t, see note 14 on II. 1.

(!)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(51

(6)

(1)

Apek[iiibuddhi ; A Special Cognition

dr. dravya

g. gu.t)3

s. samanya

ja. jMna

ap. apek~buddhi

u. utpatti

(Figure 2)

paratva g.jii.v.

v. vinasa

sarp. S31pSkara

( 3 ) The cognition of prioritiness is produced.

81

( 4) The cognition of priority is produced. The apek§l'i·

buddhi is destroyed by the production of the cognition of prioritiness.

( 5 ) The cognition of substances ( ' B is prior to A' ) is produced. Priority is destroyed by the destruction of apek~l'ibuddhi. The cognition of prioritiness is destroyed by the product ion of the cognition of priority.

[ ( 6) The impression is produced. The cognition of priority is destroyed by the production of the cogn ition of substances.

( 7) The cogni tion of substances is destroyed by the produc­tion of the impression . ]""

[ 5] Apek~fibuddhi also appears in the argument on dimen­sion. Non-eternal dimension is produced by number, dimension

8 ( Q) and ( 7) in [ ] is complemented by me from the a~~alogy

to Prasastapada's explanation of dvitr;otpatti .

... 11

82 PART II i On Cognition

and collection. The number of atoms and diads which human beings are unable to cognize is produced by the buddhi of the Lord. This buddhi is apek~ilbuddhi. It functions in the same way as in the case of the number two etc.

2. The usage of the tenn ' apek~abnddbi '

We have looked at aJI of the cases where the term 'apek~ii­

buddhi' appears in the Prasastapadabhii~ya. At this point we are able to understand how it functions, but we need to further examine the use of thr term ' apelqabuddhi' in order to acquaint ourselves with its exact meaning.

Its usage in th.e Prasastapadabhiil}ya is as follows:

[A] In the cases where the object of the apek~iibuddhi is indicated, the term 'apek~abuddhi' is not used. Only the tcrlll ' buddhi ' ( seven times ) is used.

anekavil}aya-vuddhi- (twice)~

anekavi~ayi1Ji buddhi/1 (once )10

sannikr~!ii buddhi!z (once )11

asannikr~~a buddhil). (once )12

viprakrfl!li buddhilJ. (once )13

[ B] In the cases where the effect of the apeks,iibuddhi is indicated, the term 'buddhi • is also used exclusively ( seven times )·

buddhy-apek~ii{l ( once )11

buddhim J tam apekl}ya (six times )15

9 Sankhya-nirftPaua.

10 Loc. cit. 11 Pat'atvaparatva ·niruPa!la,

12 Loc. cit, 13 Loc. cit, 14 Saimhya.niru.pa~la.

15 Once in we. cit. and five times in the Paratva.Pat'atva·ni,.rzPar-a.

Apek~abuddhi ; A Special Cognition 83

( C) On the other hand, in the cases where only its own production and destruction are referred to without any relation to its object or effect, the term 'apekttlibuddhi' is used ( twenty-two times ).16

In later texts, as far as I know, usage [A] is found. almost always. As for [ B ], while in the cases where the buddhi

( = apek~abuddhi) appea rs together with those verbal roots as apa­lk:h ii-rabh-, bhu- ( l'inli na) or with their derivatives the term 'buddhi' is used, in those cases where it is combined with the verbal root jan- or its derivatives both the terms ' buddhi' and ' apek~iibuddhi ' are used optionally17• Furthermore, when combined with the verbal root ut-pad- or its derivatives, the term • apekttiibuddhi ' seems to be used exc!usively18. Usage [ C] is without excep tion. Besides , the term' apektjiibuddhi' is sometimes replaced with the term 'nim ittakarwza ' 19•

From the above examination we can conclude that the Vaise• ~ikas, in using the term' apek:jiibuddhi' in some cases and' buddhi' in other cases, meant the following : The antecedent • apekttii-' is not used at all when the object of the cognition is indicated. Because the meaning of the term ' apektjli- ' and the object the cognition are not related. The effect produced by [ apek~- ] budd!Ji, for example the number two, is the grammatical subject of

the verbal root 'apekf!- ' while the grammatical object is nothing but buddh i.

3. Conclusion

We can summarize the above investigat ion as follows l

16 F or exampl e aPek~abuddhivinasad dvitvagu~tasya vitJasya~fii ( Sankhya-ni,..upmHz ).

17 F or exa mple apek~?ilbuddh ijanyah ( J(iranavali, p. 108 l. 23 )1

dvitvam buddhijam ( J(ira~tO.vali, p. 129 l. 12 ). IS For e xa mple : aPek~libttddllis t tt dvit vasyotpadika ( Kirauavali,

p. 129 l. 10 ), 11a cuPekialmddhi1!t v inotpattih ( Vyomavati, p. 464 l. 29 ). 19 The cases of such a r eplacem ent arc too many to enumerate In

later texts . ' A Pek~abuddhi' i s repl ac ed by ' aPek:(iikara~za' in the Vyoma­vati ( p . 464 l. 20 and l. 28 ). It is mentioned in the Vyomavati ( p. 517 l. 17) that the term • aPek~a ' mean s ' kara~1a '.

84 PART II : On Cognition

[I 1 Priority, posteriority, the number two etc. and separate­ness of two (substances) etc. do no t inhere in substances, in advance, independently of a cognizer, bu t come into existence only through the intellectual activi ty of a cognizer. Aithough priority etc. could be said to be the products of ideas, they are by no means like phantoms, but they are external existents wh ich inhere in substane.::s. Only then, do they become the objects of direct cognition. This is what is postulated in Vaise§ika realism.

[II] The antecedent 'apek~li-' in the compound 'apek~ii­buddhi' indicates the causality between buddhi and its effect, in other words, apektjlibuddhi is the efficient cause of priority etc. Its verbal root 'apek[!- ' is not related with the object of the cognition.

Thus, the term 'apek~abuddhi' etymologically means • expectation [of-something-directed-to-] cognition ' or 'cognition [which is 1 expected [by something (priority etc. ) wh ich is to be produced by it ]. ' and actually means' cognition as efficient cause.' Except for the obscure translation of Faddegon, all of the transla­·tions by modern scholars which were listed in the beginning were due to a completely upside-down undershnding of the grammatical object and subject of the verbal root ' apek~-. '