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Vo
u
m
VII.
July,
1898.
Whole
Number
.
Number
o.
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
THE
METAPHYSIC
OF
ARISTOTLE.
IV
Potential nd
Actual
Reality.
SO
far
Aristotle has
considered the
real
mainlyfrom
stat-
ical point of view,though he has beenincidentallyed
to
point
out that
all
definite
eality
nvolvesa
dynamical
process.
It
is
this
last
aspect
of
things
to which
he
now draws
special
attention,
nd
indeed what s most
distinctivef his
doctrine
s
his
conception
of the
world
as
a
process.
Reality,
s
he has
con-
tended,
s
neither
mere
series
of
changes,
nor
is
it
fixed
and
unchanging.
The former
iew
makes
reality
he
perpetual rise
and
disappearance
f
the
particular,
he
atter ransforms
he
iving
reality
f
things
ntothe
dead
unchanging
being'
of the
Eleatics,
or
the
equally dead 'ideas'
of the
Piatonists. There
is
change
and there
s
permanence,
ut
change
takes
place
in
fixed
nd
un-
alterable
ways,
so that
each
thing
contains within tself
and
is
constituted
y
the
universal nature
which t realizes
under
par-
ticular
conditions. This
universal
nature,however,
s
he
now
goes
on to
maintain,
s
in
finite
things
not
something
which
they
possess,
but
something
which
they
are
in
process
of
realiz-
ing, and therefore
e
are
compelled
to
distinguish
etween
what
they
are
'actually'
(Yvepre
)
and what
they
are
'potentially'
(8ocv&s).
The clear
comprehension
f
the
relationof the
po-
tential to the
'
actual' is
therefore
ndispensable
to
a
true
knowledgeofthe real.
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338 T
HE
PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW
[VOL.
VII.
Now,
the
distinction etween he potential'and the actual,'
betweenwhat a thing s capable of being, and
what t actually s,
was in Aristotle's day, as in ours, ignored or denied. The
Megarians
held that
nothing
can
be said to be
which s not in
activity. A man is a builderwhen he is actually
building,but it
is absurd to speak of a man as having a faculty
which s not in
actual
exercise. To this view Aristotleanswers
that t ignores
theprocess by whichthe art of building s
acquired, onfusing n
original ndowmentwiththe resultof a process
by which the in-
dividual attains power whichhe did not at first ossess. If we
generalize
the
doctrineof the Megarians,we shall be forced o
conclude
that
reality onsists
n
an evanescent
eries of particu-
lars,
since
nothing
s
real
except
in
the actual moment of its
existence. Accordingly, sensible object must
be supposed to
exist
only
at the time
when it
is
apprehended, nd
this
apprehen-
sion itselfmust be held to be a momentary
ensation. Thus the
doctrine f the
Megarians
s at bottom denticalwith hatof Pro-
tagoras,
the
imperfectionf which has alreadybeen
shown.
All
such doctrines
estroy
he
possibility
f real
change, ubstituting
for
t
a
discontinuous
eries of
particulars,
nd
thus
making
both
reality and knowledge impossible. We cannot,
then,deny
the
distinction f
potential' and
'
actual'
reality
without
making
the
factsof
experience nexplicable.'
What, then,
s
the
relation
f
the
potential'
to
the
actual'?
The
answer s to be
found
n the
distinction etween
the
pos-
sible
and
the '
impossible.'
The
'
potential'
must not be con-
fused
with mere
possibility,'
.e.,
with the
'possibility'
of
any-
thing
whatever.
The
only possibility'
hat
we
can admit s
the
'
possibility'
of
the
actual.'
We cannot
say,
to
take
Aristotle's
own
instance,
that it is
'possible'
that
the
diagonal
of the
square
should
be
measured,
nd
yet
never
will be
measured,or,
to
take
a modern
nstance,
withwhich Mill has made
us
familiar,
that t
s
possible
that
+
3 may
be
=
6.
What cannot be
actu-
ally
realized
s
'impossible,'
and
therefore
possibility'
is
deter-
mined
by
'
actuality.' Nothing
s
'
possible'
which, y
the nature
of
things,
annot
become
'
actual;'
so that he
possible'
or
'
po-
I
Met.
0, io46b
29-I047a 2.
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No. 4.] THE
METAPHYSIC
OF
ARIS[O
TLE.
339
tential is not
abstract r unlimitedpossibility,' ut determinate
'
possibility,' .e.,
the
possibility f
realization n a
certaindefinite
way. The 'impossible' is therefore hat whichis incompatible
with he
actual;' the possible' thatwhich
s
compatible
with he
actual.
The
'possible' may
or
may
not become
'actual,'
but
nothing s
'
possible' which underappropriate onditionswill not
become
'
actual.' What Aristotle, hen,
s
contending or,
s
that
the
transition rom
possibility' to 'actuality'
must take
place
incertain
fixed nd unchangingways, n
which the
true
nature
of the real is manifested. Thus we get,as the meaningof the
'potential,' the persistent endency
owards
the
actual.'
1
The
world
s
not a chaos
but
a
cosmos, and there can be no cosmos,
if
reality s
conceived as the infinite
ossibility f any actuality
whatever. The acorn is the
possibility
f
the oak,
but
not of
the
fir; the
child
is
the possibility of
the man, but not of
the horse or
dog; and so in all cases. We can thus under-
stand why, n the case of ' natural' things, moving principle,'
'form,'
and
'
end' become identical. The
principle
which
deter-
mines
the transition rom
potentiality
to
actuality
is
the
end'
or
determinatemode
of
'actuality'
which
a
thing
s
capable
of
becoming, .e.,
ts
form
'
and
the
end
is therefore
nvolved
n
the
'
potentiality.'
The
distinction nd
the correlation f
'
potenti-
ality'
and
'
actuality'
s
therefore fundamental
rinciple
n the
Aristotelian
hilosophy.
In
every
potentiality,'hen,
here is a
tendency
o
pass
into
'actuality.'
This
tendency, owever,
s
not
always realized,
be-
cause it can
be
realized
only
when the external
onditions ermit
of ts
realization;
in
other
words,
when the matter'
s
capable
of
being
acted
upon. Thus,
the
seed tends
to
develop
into the
plant,
but it
cannot do so without avorablesoil, moisture, ir,
and
sunlight,
hich are its
material' conditions.
But, provided
the
'
matter'
permits
f
it,
the
potentiality'
will
pass
over
into
'actuality.'
We
have
therefore o
observe that the
potential'
is
thatwhich
s in
a condition o become
actual.'
Nothing
can
in
the
proper
ense
be
called
'
potential'
which
will
not become act-
ual
under ppropriate onditions,nd thatwithout
irst ndergo-
1
Met. 0,
1047b
3-31I
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340
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
[VOL.
VII.
ing
an internal
hange.
It follows hat
here re
various
tages
or
degrees
of the
'
potential'
and
'
actual.'
Earth is the
potenti-
ality' of which wood is the actuality; but wood again,is the
'
potentiality'
of which
a box
is
the '
actuality.'
And
it will
be observed that,
however far we
carry
back
the
process,
we
never reach
an
unformed
matter,'
ut only that
which
is
'
mat-
ter' relatively
o the '
form' which
s
expressed
s
'actuality.'
In
the process
of
the
world
we therefore ind
hat nothing riginates
from
mere
'matter,'
but
always
from
something
determinate,
which s the matter' relativelyo thatwhich s moredeterminate.
We
may
suppose
a
primary ubstance,
as
the
matter or sub-
strateunderlying
he
whole complex organism
f the
world,
but
we cannot conceive
of a
primitive
r
unformed
matter s the
nucleus of all determinate eality.
This
will
become
obvious
if
we ask whetherthe
'
potential'
is
prior
to the
'
actual,'
or the
'actual' to the potential.'
1
Now,thatwhich s 'prior' must be so either
I)
inknowledge,
or (2) in time,or
(3)
in
'
substance;'
and it may be
shown that
in all these senses the
actual' is
prior
to the
'
potential.'
For
(i)
we
cannot know
in
any
case what
is
'potential'
without
a
knowledge
of the
'actual.'
The 'potential,'
s we have seen, is
not a
bare
'
possibility,' ut the possibility'
of somethingdeter-
minate,
nd
there is
nothingdeterminate
xceptthat
which s in
' actuality.' We could not tell that an objectis capableof being
seen
if
no one had ever seen
it;
that an
animal has
thefaculty
of
seeing,
did
we not
find
hat animals
actually do see;
nor that
a
man
s
capable
of
building,
who
does
not
actually' possess
the art
of
building. Thus,
our
knowledge
f the
potential'
always pre-
supposes
a knowledgeofthe actual.'
(2) It may seem
as ifthe
'potential'
were
'prior'
in time
to the
'actual,'
because in the
case of
any given
individual
t
is
so.
Bricks must
be in
exist-
ence before
they
can be
made
into a
house;
the
'seed-corn'
must
precede
in existence
the
corn;
a man must have the
faculty
of
sight
before he
sees. And
no
doubt
this is
true,
but
we
forget
that the
individual
n
question
presupposes
the
'
actual' existenceof that which n
each case is
'
potential.'
The
'Met. 0, i048b
38-1049b .
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No.
4.]
THE METAPHYSIC OF
ARISTOTLE.
341
house must exist
as an
'
actual' conceptionn the mind of
the
builder before t is
built; the seed-corn
has come from actual
corn, and the man from another man. It must, further, e
observed hat n
all
the rational' faculties,
he actual'
is
always
prior
to
the potential.'
Every 'art' is
a
faculty,which
is ac-
quired only by actual
exercise, nd in
fact he Sophistical argu-
mentthat nothingcan be learned is based
upon this very
fact,
that 'learning' consists n the 'actual'
doing of a thing, s
the
condition of the
'
capacity' to do it
well. (3) It may also
be
shown that the 'actual' is prior in 'substance' to the poten-
tial.'
The
'
substance,'
essential nature,'or 'form' of
anything
is thatwhich t is
as
actualized,
nd the potential' is
merely
hat
phase
of
the actual'
in
which
as
yet
thething annot
be
said
to
have existence
o&aza).
For,
as
the
'potential'
is that which,
under appropriate
onditions,must
become
'actual,' each
thing
has
a certain end,'
without he
realization f
which it
cannotbe
said to exist. As it is this 'end'
(rAo;)
which determineshe
'actual' existence
of the thing, heend
is
also the beginning'
or
'principle'
(dpxy).
ince, herefore,othingan be called
po-
tential'
except
that which
is
capable
of
realizing
ts
'
end,'
it
is
obvious
that
the
'end'
must be the active
principle
determin-
ing
the character
f
the faculty.'
We
have
now reached the
point
where Aristotle enters
upon
the final tage of his enquiry, eeking to determine he ultimate
nature
of the universe rom he
vantage
ground reached by these
preliminary
nvestigations.
In
what follows
an
attempt
will be
made
to
give
as full an
account
as
seems
necessary
of the
con1-
tents
of
the twelfth ook
(A)
of the
Metaphysic,
s
viewed n
the
light
thrown
pon
it
by
what
he
says
elsewhere.
IV.
THE DIVINE REASON.
In
seeking
to
determine
he
ultimate
eality
which
s the
prius
of all
other
reality,
Aristotle
follows,
as
usual,
the
regressive
method
of
starting
with
what
s
'
best
known
to
us,'
and
asking
what
is ' best
known n
itself,'
.e.,
what
must
be
presupposed
as
I
Met.
0, 1049b
4-IO50a
5S
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342
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW
[VOL.
VII.
essential
o
its
existence.
Now,
we
are all familiar ith
sensible
reality, n the form of
particular
hings
which arise
and
perish,
such as plants and animals; and, therefore, e shall startwith
this sensible nd
perishable
reality.
Every sensible
thing
is an
instance
of a
specific
lass,
and
by
itsvery
nature
s
subjectto
change.
As
belonging
o
a
class, it
necessarily
onforms
o the law
of
ts
class;
and,
therefore,
hat-
ever
be
the mode in which t
manifests
ts
changeable
or
perish-
able
nature,
t
cannottranscendthe
limits of its
class. Herein
we see thefinite haracter f all sensiblethings. Changeneces-
sarily nvolves
transition,
ut in
sensible
things
the
transition
s
from
one
contrary
nto
another, .e.,
it takes
place,
not between
all
opposites,but
only
between
opposites
of
the same
genus.
Moreover,
t
is
characteristicf
changeable
things,
hat the con-
trariesare
mutually
xclusive, o thatwhen
the one exists
the
other
ceases,
or
the
change
from
ne
to the
otherconsists
n
the
substitution f the one for the other. If,therefore,eality on-
sisted
n
nothing
ut
change,
we should
have
no individual
ub-
stance
whatever,
ut
merely succession
of
particulars.
Change,
therefore,mplies that there
s
some
underlying
asis,
which
per-
sists
in
the
change,
or
which is
capable of
existing
n
contrary
states,
hough
not
at
the
same
time. This
underlying
asis
or
'matter'
is,
therefore,
he '
permanent
possibility'
of
contrary
states. We can thus see that sensible
things
are
necessarily
finite
r
transitory,ust because
the mode
in
which
theyexistat
any given
time
does not
express
all
that
s
implied
n
them. The
plant
passes
through
succession
of
states,
ut in no one
of them
is
its whole
nature
realized;
in
each
phase,
only
part
of ts
reality
is
'actual,'
and, therefore,ts
'matter'
and its
form,' what
t is
'potentially'
and what it is '
actually,'
do not
coincide.'
This
separation
etweenwhat
a
thing
s
'
potentially'
nd
what
it is
'actually'
may
be shown to
obtain n
all the
ways
in
which a
sensible
thingmay
change.
There
may
be
change
(i)
of
the
'
what
(xara
tb
ti), (2) in
quality
wrotvd),3)
in
quantity
woa0)6,
(4)
in
place
(7ro):
in other
words,
this
particular
ensible
thing
(t-80)
may either
originate'
(Ovsetc)
or
'
perish
(sOopd);
it
may
1
Met.
A,
io69a
i8_ b34.
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No.
4.1
THE METAPHYSIC OF
ARISTOTLE.
343
undergo alteration'
d2Aoiewct)
or change in
its accidentalprop-
erties
(xara
o 7rdt9o3); it
may ncrease'
(av$?tc) or ' decrease'
((peae;);
or it may
'
move' (xara'
r0rov
uszapo2).
In none of
thesemodes of change is
there any absolute
origination ut of
nothing, or is there ny
absolute destruction. (a) When a par-
ticular
hingcomes into being or goes out
of being,there s a
transition rom
potentiality'to 'actuality,' or from actuality'
to
'potentiality,'
ut there
s no creation out
of nothing. The
energy
s a genericprocess
existing prior and subsequentto the
particular hing. (b) After oming ntobeingthe particular hing
mayalter n quality,
passing from ne contrary
o another,but it
can
only exist in the
particular tate which
its
naturepermitst
to
assume. (c) It may
ncreaseor decrease; but only because it
is capable
of quantitative hange. (d) It
may change in place,
but
only because it is in its
nature
capable
of
motion.
It is
thus
evident
hat sensible changes are in all cases the realization
f
what s
'potential,'
.e.,
that there
s a
certain
determinate
ature
which
confines he changes
of each thingwithinmpassable imits.
The
reality f each thing is determined y the
generic energy
which
is
immanent
n
it.
And not only
is
there no absolute
origination, ut the
changes
which finite
ealityundergoes
are
always of a
fixed haracter. This
truth
was
very mperfectlyp-
prehended
by the earlier
thinkers,
who rather
magined
that
'matter'
is
the abstract
possibility
of
any
and
every change.
Were
this
the
case,
it
would be
impossible
o
explain
how
there
should be such
infinite
ariety
n sensible
things,
r how certain
things
are
capable of change only
in
place, while others also
arise and
perish,
nd
undergo changes
of
quality
and
quantity.
From
this
distinction,
n
fact,
rises
the fundamental ifference
between the
celestial
bodies,
which never
arise or
perish,
but
change
only
n the
way
of
motion,
nd terrestrial
hings
which
are
perishable,
nd
change
n
quality
and
quantity
s well
as in
place.
Anaxagoras,
Empedocles,Anaximander,
nd Democritus
saw
that
we must
presuppose
matter'
n
order to
account for
change,
but
they
did not see
that
'
matter'
is not the universal
possibility
of
change,
but
the
possibility
of
certain fixed
and
definitehanges which occur in accordancewiththe specialna-
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THE
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[VOL.
VII.
ture of that which changes, and that each kind of change has
its own law.1
In the case of finite ensiblethings, hen,we find a perpetual
process
of
coming to be and ceasing to be, and a process of
change accordingto a fixed law or principle. It may therefore
seem that there s no eternal nd immutable substance.' If the
changesof theworld are possible only under presupposition f
the existence of particular substances,while these only endure
for
a
limited
imeand
then
pass away, why should not all finite
substancesperish, nd with hem he whole universe It is obvi-
ous
that
f there
is
no reality xcept that which is sensible nd
perishable, here s nothing o hinder us from upposing hatall
realitymay disappear
n
absolute non-entity. We cannot, here-
fore,
dmit
that sensible
reality
s
self-sustainingr complete
n
itself, nless we are preparedto maintain hat there s no distinc-
tion between being and non-being. Let us, therefore,nquire
whether he process of sensible realitydoes not presuppose a
reality
which s
supersensible.
If
finite
hings re the only reality, here mustbe
an
absolute
beginningand cessation of reality, or ach finite hing
as
such
begins
to
be
and
ceases
to
be.
Now,
we have
seen
that no
finite
thing
is
self-originating,ut, on the contrary,s
a
manifestation
of the
activity
which s
immanent
n all
members
f
the
class
to
which tbelongs. It follows hatnothing initeancome intobe-
ing except under
he
presuppositionf something
lse
which con-
tains
t
potentially,nd that
this
potentiality
an
be
realized
only
through
he
generative ctivity f the species. Now,
if
no finite
thingoriginates
r
destroys
tself,
he process
of
the
world
must
be
eternal. Process implies ime,
nd we
cannot
onceive of time
as
beginning, ecause,
n
order o explain
its
beginning,
e should
have to suppose something romwhich
t
proceeded,
nd which
was therefore
prior'
to
it;
in
other
words,
time
would
be
'prior'
to itself.
But
this
s
simply
nother
way
of
saying
that
time
never
began
to
be,
but is
eternal.
As there
an be no
pro-
cess without
ime,
nd
no time without
process,
the
process
of
the
world is
eternal.
It is
also
continuous,
ince
any
break in
I
Met.
A, xo69b
3-26.
2P/zys.
VIII, I, 25lb IO.
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No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC OF ARISTOTLE.
345
the process would mean that therewas an absolute beginning r
end.' We have, therefore,o
ask
what
s
the necessary ondition
of an eternalprocess. The answerto this question leads to the
highestpoint reached by Aristotle. It will be well to quote his
own words: To suppose thatthere s somethingwhich s ca-
pable of producing hange
(xtvrTrtx0)
r
is
originative
roartxodv),
but
that
t does not
actuallyproduce
or
originatechange dvep-
rovp),
oes
not
account
for
change;
for hat
which has
the
power
(86vapct)
to originate change may not actually originate it.
Hence it is no explanationof change whatever, o say that there
are
eternal ubstances, s is done by the advocates of
'
ideas,' so
long as these are not conceived to contain a principle apable of
originating hange.
And even if we did
hold that
'
ideas' con-
tain such
a
principle, r,that there
s
besidesthemanother ub-
stance capable
of
originating hange,
we should not
account for
change
nasmuch
s neithers
conceived
to
be actually productive
ofchange. But, further,ven iftherewerea principlewhichwas
actually productive
of
change,
we
should
not
account
for
the
change being eternal,
f we held that
therewas
any potentiality
in its inner
nature
ovoia),
for
hat
which
s
potentialmay
not
be.
There
must,therefore,
e a
principle
which s
by
its
very
nature
actuality
pvePreoa).
And
such
substances
must
be
free from
'
matter;'
for
if
there
is
anything
t all
eternal,
hese
must
be
eternal, nd, therefore,n 'actuality.'
2
In this pregnantpas-
sage Aristotle rgues
that
he
process
of
the world
s
inexplicable
unless we
suppose
an
originative
r self-active
rinciple.
All
process implies
that
something
comes
to
be
which
before
was
not,
and
nothing
can account
for such
origination xcept
that
which
not
only
has the
capacity
of
origination,
ut
actually
is
originative;
while
again nothing
can
actually originate
ome-
thing lse,
which s notin its
very
nature
riginative
r self-active.
If, therefore,
he
process
of
the
world
s
eternal,
here
must
be an
eternally riginative eality,
.e.,
a
reality
which is free from
all
'matter
or limitation.
The conclusion
to which
we
have been
led
is that there s
an
eternally omplete
or self-active
nergy,
which is manifested
n
I
Phvs.
VIII, 6,
259a i6.
2Met.
A,
107lb
12-22.
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346
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW
[VOL.
VII.
the
eternal process of
the
world. But this
gives
rise to a diffi-
cult
problem. It
is
usually
assumed
that,
whilenothing
an be
'actual ' which is not 'possible,' all that is 'possible ' is not
'
actual.' Must we
not,
herefore,ay
thatthe
possible' is prior
to
the actual ?'
Must we
not, n other
words,
hold
that he uni-
verse as a
whole
develops from the
possible'
to the
actual
?
From
what has
already
been
said as to the
priority fthe
actual
'
as
comparedwith
the
potential,'we can
readily
nticipateAris-
totle's
answer.
It is true that n
finite
hings
the
potential
is
prior to the actual,' and indeed this constitutes heirfinitude;
but
in
reality s
a
whole
therecan be no
separation
f
'potenti-
ality and
'actuality.' For,
if
all
'
actual'
reality
were
referred
back
to
'potential'
reality,
herewould be no
possibility
f tran-
sition
from
he
'
potential'
to the
'
actual.'
That
which is not
cannot
originate hat
which
is, and
thereforehe
actual
would
remain
for
ever
'potential.'
This
assumption
f the
priority f
the potential to the actual' is the fundamentalmistakeof the
early poets
and
philosophers,
who
suppose
the
cosmos to have
developed
out
of a
primitive
haos
or unformed
matter.'
But,
if
reality
s a
whole
is thus
reduced to
inactive
matter,'
whence
is
the active
principle
o come which
is
to
develop this
mat-
ter'
into
actuality' ?
We
do notfind
ricks
forming
hemselves
into
a
house
withoutthe
self-active
principle f
intelligence, r
earthbecoming plantapart from heself-activityresentn the
seed; and
similarly,
he eternal
process
of
theworld
demands
an
eternal nd
self-active
rinciple o
account
for t.
Leucippus
and
Plato,
rightly
olding
that the
process
of the world
is eter-
nal,
ought
to have
seen that
an
eternalprocess
implies an eter-
nal
originative
nergy.
A
glimpse
of this truth
was
obtained
by
Anaxagoras, when
he
made reason
(vova)
the
principle
of
the
world,
forreason s a
pure
energy
or
self-activity.
It is
of
fundamental
mportance
or
he
understanding
f
Aris-
totle
that
his
argument
or
he
existenceof
an
eternal
originative
energy
hould be
properly
nderstood;
and
it
may
therefore e
well
to
restate t
in
a
freer
way.
There are three main
points
which he
seeks
to
establish.
In
the
first
lace,
his
aim s
to
show
'AMet.
A, 1071 b22-1072a 7,
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No. 4.] THE
METAPHYSIC OF
ARISTOTLE.
347
that,while
within he
sphere of the sensible or
transitoryhere
is a continual
rocess, the
process s not
self-explaining. Look-
ing at theperpetualalternation f finitehings, tseems as if we
must
say
that
reality
s
continually riginating nd
ceasing, or,
what s
the same
thing,
hat
things ome into being
without ny
cause. But
such
a
view
owes its
plausibility o the assumption
that
something anoriginate ut of
nothing. The
earlier hinkers
were unaware of the
difficulty,ecause
they simply accepted
change as a
fact which did
not require ny principle
to explain
it,and hencethey saw nothing bsurd in the doctrine f an ab-
solute
origination
f
reality.
But
change
necessarilydemands
some cause, and this cause
cannot be itself
riginated, ecause,
if it
were,we
should
ultimately e forcedupon an
infiniteeries
of causes, i.e., we should
never reach
a true
cause at
all. It
is
thus evident hat, o long
as we confine
urselves to the alterna-
tion of
finite
hings,we have
not reached real explanationof
the
processof theworld. A true ' cause' or ultimate principle s,
therefore,n
Aristotle,
ecessarily
nproduced;
t
cannot have
an
origin
because
then realitywould arise
from
non-entity;
n
short,
it is
self-determining.We may speak of one
finite
hing
as the
'
cause' of
another;
but what we
here call
' cause'
is
merely
a
particular hase
in the
process
of
the
world,
the true
'
cause'
of
which
s
separate
from r
independent
f
everyparticular hase.
Aristotle,
hen,
maintains that the true 'cause' of
anything
s
uncausedor
self-caused.
But,
n
the
second
place,
a
true
cause'
cannot
be
merely
hat which exists
s
self-dependent,
ut
it must
express
tself,
r must
be
actually riginative.
A
'cause' must
be,
as we
may say,
self-separative;
t cannot
be
a
dead,
inactive
being, doing
nothing
nd
enjoying
mere otium
um
dignitate.
If
self-dependent
eality oes not
pass
over into
actuality,'
r
utter
itself,t
is
'as good as
nothing.'
The
process
of the
world
s
not
in
the least
explainedby
the
supposition
f
a self-existent
eality
which
n
no
way affects,
r
expresses
tself
n,
that
process;
and
hence the
Platonists,while
they
see that
the
changes
in finite
things
must be
referred
o
that
whichdoes
not
change,
do not see
that true
reality annot be dead
and
inert,
ut
must
be
actually
causative or originative. Hence the self-dependenteality
must
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348
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
VII.
be
a self-active
r self-manifesting
eality;
it must
be a
real
'cause,'
not
a mere
nactive
being.
But, thirdly,
hile t
is
self-
dependent nd self-active,he truecause mustnot ose its identity
with
tself
n
exercising
its causal
activity;
t
must
express
itself
and yet
remain
equal
to itself
n its expression;
in other
words,
itmust
be eternally
elf-manifesting
nd
yetself-identical.
Thus
we reach
the necessary
onclusion
hat there
mustbe an
eternal
or uncreated
eality,
which
must
eternally xpress
itself
origina-
tively,
nd yet
eternally
reserve
ts
self-identity.
From thepointof viewnow reached we can understand ow
Aristotle
s
led to
maintain
hat
the
process
of the
world
must be
eternal.
If there
were
a cessation
f that
process,
we should
have
to
suppose
that an eternal
self-active
rinciple
eased
to be
self-
active; which
s the same
as saying
that
twould
cease
to exist,
since an inactive rinciple
s
a mere potentiality,'
nd
indeed
the
'potentiality'
of
nothing.
This is
the
fundamental
dea
which
underlies
Aristotle's
contention hat
a
self-active
rinciple
must
manifesttself
n the eternal
circular
movement
of the heavens.
The imperfectstronomical
knowledge
of
his day was
no
doubt
partly
responsible
or
he doctrine
that
the spheres
of the
stars
revolve
n an
absolutely
uniform
way,
but it
should be
observed
that
he
regards
he
argument
or he eternal
process
of the
world
as
independent
f
actual observation,
hough,
as
he
thinks,
on-
firmed
y it.1
Admitting
he
astronomical
rror,
he
contention
that
the
process
of theworld
cannot be
a creation
r
exhaustion
of
the
eternal nergy
of
the
whole
remains
ntact. The
essential
point
is
that a self-active
ause
must
express
itself
n the
pro-
duction
of
change,
and
must
yet
return
nto
itself,
r retain
ts
self-identity,
n this
expression.2
Granting hatthere s an eternal nergy, bsolutely
nexhausti-
ble
in
its
origination
f
change,
there
remains
he
supremely
m-
portant
uestion
as to
its
ultimatenature.
Aristotle
has,
n
vari-
ous
passages,
ntimated
hat
the ultimate
rinciple
f
the
universe
must
be
Reason
(vos),
and
he now
seeks to show
that
an eternal
self-activeeality,
s
already
proved
to
exist,
must be referred
o
an
absolute,
self-originative
eason.
To
understand his
culmi-
1Met.
A,
1072a 21.
2Met.A,
6,
1072a 25.
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No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC OF ARISTOTLE.
349
nationof
his
whole metaphysic,
t will
be
well
to preparethe way
by
a referenceo the
discussion
of
the nature of
reason,
as set
forth n the third ook of the
De
Anima.
Reason, as we find t
in
ourselves,
is
essentiallyself-active.
Reason (ro voscvj), says Aristotle, cannot be passive, but
must be receptive f 'form,'and
'
potentially,' hough
not
'
ac-
tually,'
denticalwith form.' The relation
f reason
vobc)
to
its
object ra' voucd)
will thus be similar o that of the
faculty
f sense
(To
ai'Oizrexov) to the sensible rZ
alord0^q).
1 Reason, in other
words,cannot exist at all except in so far as it is capable of
grasping
he
form,' essence,' or permanent
nature' of
reality,
and
this t cannot
do,
if
it is
merely passive,
or acted
upon
in
a
purely
externalor mechanical
way.
Just as sensible
perception
is
not
the
transference
f
the
sensible
thing into the
sensible
being,
but
the active
apprehensionby
that
being
of the sensible
'form,'
so reason is
capable
of
grasping
the
intelligible form,'
in virtueof its own self-activity. n man reason at first xists
only potentially,'
and it cannot
be
said to exist until
t
is
exer-
cised; but it is, nevertheless,mplicit
n
the
lower
phase
of sen-
sible
perception.
Thus
the
transition rom ensible
perception
o
reason
is
a
development
rom
potentiality'
o
actuality,'
o that
the former
s
related
o
the
latter s
'
matter'
to
'
form.' Sensible
perception,
iewed n
itself,
s
not
mere matter'
or
'potentiality,'
but has its own 'form' or 'actuality;' relativelyo themore de-
veloped stage of reason, however, thas to be viewed s the mat-
ter' to
which reason
gives 'form.' Since
reason
thinks
all
things, roceeds Aristotle, it must be unmixed, s Anaxagoras
says,
n order
hat t
may
master
hings,.e.,knowthem;
or tchecks
and excludes
whatever
s
foreign
o its own
nature.
Hence
rea-
son has no
'
nature' but
this, hat t
is
capable
Juvazdv). 3
Here
Aristotleexplicitly ejectsthe idea of an absolutelimit o intelli-
gence. To supposethat ntelligence as a peculiar naturewhich
prevents
t from
grasping
he real natureof
things,
s
to
deny
the
'De An.
III, 4,
429a I5-I8.
2
The developmentf sensible erceptionnto ctive eason
voiC
7ro1o7rtK6g)
nvolves
the
intermediatetages
of
memory
av'
v),
imagination
Oavraaia)
and
reflection
(taivota).
The wholeof theseconstitutehe passive eason'
(voiw
7raO7rr7K6C).
3,bid.,
429a i8-22.
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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW. [VOL.
VII.
possibility
f
knowledge.
What is distinctive
f reason is that ts
capacity
s not
limitedto the apprehension
of some particular
mode of reality, ut it is the capacityof graspingthe essential
natureof all reality.
It
is
'potentially,'
.e.,
before
t is
actually
exercised,by
its
very
nature
identical
with
reality, nd
when it
becomeswhat
n essence
t
is,
what t thinks
nd what s are
ab-
solutely dentical.
This identity
f thought nd reality,
t will
be
observed,
s not
incompatible
with their
distinction;
but
the
dis-
tinction
s that of
potentiality
nd
actuality,
nd
when the transi-
tion is made fromthe former o the latter he distinctionisap-
pears.
Reason,
therefore,
s
free from 'matter,'
.e.,
there
is
nothing
which
t
cannot
make an
object,
nd thereby ring
within
itself. When,
therefore,
e
speak
of it
as 'potential,'
this
does
not
mean that
it
is
infected
ith a limit
which
it
cannot
tran-
scend,
but
merely hat,
n the
individual
man,
t is
not yet
real-
ized,
or
has not
by
its inherent
elf-activityeveloped
into actu-
ality.
That
reason is different rom
perception
is manifest.
Sense
cannot
perceive
when the sensible
is too
strong; e.g.,
we
cannot
hear after
very
oud
noise,
nor see or smell after
oo
vivid
colors
or too
pungent
odors. Reason,
on
the
other
hand,
when
it thinks hat
which s in
the
highestdegree
intelligible,
s
not
therebyncapacitated
or
hinking
hat
which
s less
ntelligible,
but
it thinks
he
latter better. For sense
is not
independent
f
the
body,
whereas reason
is
separable
(xwpeazc6)
rom
t. 1
In
sensible perception,
ristotle
argues,
the
mind
s
self-active,
ut
its
self-activity
s limited
by
the
condition of
the
bodily
organ,
whereas
reason
is
pure
self-activity,
nd
therefore
t
is
self-de-
veloping.
While,therefore,
eason
s
not
in
union with
ts
object
except
when
t is
actuallydeveloped,
ts
potentiality
s the
poten-
tiality
f
pure
or
independent
elf-activity.
Hence we are told
that
reason
s
'
potentially'
ll that
s
thought,
hough
actually'
it
is
nothing
before
t thinks. ' In other
words,
reason cannot
be said
to
have
any
existence
except
as
self-active;
t is
incapa-
ble
of
being
acted
upon
from
without,
nd its
actuality'
is
there-
fore dentical
with
he
thinking
of its
own
activity.
Reason
is
therefore
potential'
only
n the
sense
that its capacityfor
hink-
1
Ibid.,
429a
29-Jb5
2
Ibid.,
429a
22-24.
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No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC
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ARISTOTLE.
35
1
ing the
real
may
not
be developed
into
the explicit
omprehen-
sion of the real.
It
is
in this sense that it is compared to
a
tabula rasa, not in the sense of Locke, forwhom the mind was
the mere
recipient
f ideas
produced
in it
by
external things.
There
is forAristotle
no
content
of reason
apart from ts self-
activity, nd
when
reason
comes to
an
explicit
knowledge
of
itself r
is
'
active,'
what
t
knows
are
the
forms' of tself, r the
modes
of
its own
self-activity.
Thus man,
when he
reaches the
stage of active
reason
(vov
rotprx6)
grasps
the self-active rin-
ciple which is operative n himself nd which is the source of
the eternal
process
of
the
world.'
We are
now in
a
better
osition
to
understand
he final
iscus-
sion in
the Metaphysic,
n whichAristotle eeks to
determine he
nature
of the Supreme
Reality upon
which the
whole universe
depends.
Turning
o the world
of
finite
hings,
Aristotle
points
out that
there s in
each
being an
effort r
desire
or
striving
owards an
end,
and.that
this
end
is not
changeable
but
is
involved n the
very nature
of the
being
n
which the desire
s
operative.
In
ra-
tional beings,
there
s
also
an
end,
and the whole
of the
rational
life is directed owards
it.
Now,
here we have
a fixed
or un-
changeable principle,
which
s
yet
the
moving principle
n
the
whole lifeof
the
beings
n
which
t is
operative.
It is
not
possi-
ble to
account
for he
persistent
endency
owards certain end
by saying
that an
object
seems
'
good'
because
it is
desired,
or
thiswould
mean that desire
has no definite
nd;
the
onlypossible
explanation
s
that
it is desired because
it seems
'good,'
ie.,
because reason
grasps
the
principle
which satisfies
ts
tendency
towards he
rational-that
which
will
afford
complete
atisfaction
to desire. Everybeingis therefore triving ftercomplete
elf-
realization,
nd the whole
process
of
ts ife
s
a
means to this
end.
Now,
whatever
s in
process
s of
necessity ncomplete,
nd,
there-
fore,
he original
ource
of
all
the
process
of
finite
hings
must
be
the
unchangeable
or
self-complete
Reality,
which admits
of
no
process
of development
rom he
less to themore
complete.
The
Absolute
Reality
s
eternally
omplete,
nd
in
its
free
nd
inde-
1
De An., 4,
429a 3I_430a
2.
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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
VII.
pendent iferealizes
eternally
hat which man
only
realizes
n
his
best
moments.
Being
thus
always
completely
elf-active,
t must
always enjoyabsolutefelicity,or felicitys proportionate o the
realization f
self-activity,nd the
Supreme
Reality
s the
com-
plete
realizationof
self-activity,
nd,
therefore,
bsolute
felicity.
Now,
the essentialnature
f
thought
s
to
grasp that
which
s
real,
and the
supreme
hought
is the
thought
of
that which is
abso-
lutelyreal.
Intelligence,
n
thinking
he
intelligible,
herefore
thinks
hat which
s the
very
essence of
intelligence.
When in-
telligence husgrasps its own nature, t actually s intelligence,
whereas before
t
was
only
the
potentiality
f
intelligence. The
highest
eachof
ntelligences,
therefore,
o
grasp
tself s a
whole,
i.e.,
to
become
conscious of the formsof
its own
self-activity.
When for fewbrief
moments
man
reaches this
stage,
he enjoys
the
greatest
felicity
f
which he is
capable.
But
God
is
always
what
we are
only
at
times; nay,
He
eternally njoys
a
felicity
still more complete. He is thus the self-active,iving, ternal,
best.
Nor has He
any
sensible
nature,
because he would
then
be extendedand
divisible;
He
is,therefore,
purely upersensible
or
incorporeal
Being'
Certain
ropiat
may
be
raised
n
connection
withthis
concep-
tion of
God.
(i)
What is
the
object
of
the Divine
Reason? It
will
be admitted hat Reason
(pour)
s
the
highestfaculty
mani-
festedby a finitebeing. The Supreme Reason musttherefore
think
hat which s in
the
highest
sense real,that which s
most
divine. And this
highest
reality
t must
eternally
think, for
anychange
in
thought
would
be for he
worse,
and would
imply
incompleteness.
(2)
Is
there any'
potentiality'
n
the Divine
Reason ?
Manifestly
not,
for
this
would
imply
that it did
not think
uninterruptedly,
ince that which is not
continually
thinking
hows
that it is
fatigued
by the continuous
activity
f
thinking.
Moreover,
3)
if
n
the
Divine
Reason therewere
any
'potentiality,'
hat
which is
thought
would
be
higher
in
nature
than the
Divine
Reason
itself. For,
since it
would
be depen-
dent
upon
whatever
was
presented,
t
would
exist no
matterwhat
was
thought.
If therefore
he
Divine Reason must think
he
'
Met.
A,
7,
I072
a
26-I073
a
13.
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No. 4.]
THE METAPHISIC
OF ARISTOTLE.
353
highestreality,
t must
think itself, nd thus it
consists in the
thinking f thought
Voweq
vofasrw).
The mode
of its activity
is not perception
ac'vaftO),
opinion
80da)
and externalreflection
(edvoea),
in which the
object of thought
ppears
as distinct rom
thought,
but the totalor
concrete ctivity,
n
which
thought s
at
once subject and object
or thinks tself. Further,
4)
if the
Divine Reason and
its
object
were
different,
ow could it
be the
highest form
of reality?
This difficultyan only
be resolved
when
it is seen that
even
in
human thinking
the essence of
thingss thoughtwithout he ' matter.' This holdsgood both in
the
productive
and the
theoretical ciences,
where
thought nd
its object
are identical.
In the
Supreme
Reason, however, he
object
which
is
thought
must be identical with Reason itself.
(5)
Nor
can the Divine Reason
be
composite.
That which
is
composite
an be thought nly by
a transition rom art to part.
Now human
reason
only grasps
the
meaning
of the universe
when t conceives t as an indivisiblewhole. Hence the Divine
Reason,
which s its own
object,
must be an absolute whole or
individual,
nd this whole it
must
eternally
ontemplate. God,
therefore,
o sum
up
the
result of the
whole
enquiry,
s
eternal,
unchangeable,self-dependent,
elf-originative,
elf-knowing,
nd
immaterial,
he
first nd finalcause of
the whole process of the
universe.
The Divine Reason is thus self-originativend self-knowing.
It
must,
however,
e added that,
while t
is the
primary
ource of
all
energy,
here
s communicated
o the universe n
energy
of its
own.
The
highest
form
f
this
energy
s
exhibited
n
the eternal
substances
of the
stars;
a
less
degree
of
energy
s found
n
those
beings
which arise and
perish,
nd which are
therefore
ubject
to
change
and accident;
but all things
work
harmoniously,
nd thus
the universe s a cosmos.
The
principle
which
in its
perfection
constitutes
he
Divine
Reason
is
immanent
n
each
part,
nd mani-
fests
tself s an effort
fter
ompleteness;
so that
there s a
regu-
lar
gradation
of
existence,beginning
with lifeless
things
and
ascending
through
he intermediate
tages
of
vegetative
nd
sen-
sitive
ife,
o the rational
ifeof
man,
the
highest
form f which
s
1
Met.A, 9,
I074b I5-I075a IO0
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7HE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
[VOL. VII.
speculative nsight
nto the first rinciplesof all reality.
Thus
Aristotle eeks
to
provide
for he self-activity
f each part,
while
he maintains he independence f theDivine Reason and its sep-
arationfrom
he world. The Divine
Reason,
while
it is
the
original ource
of all the process of
the world,does
not act upon
it mechanically,
ut each being,through
the self-activity
om-
municated
o and immanent
n it, strives fter that
completeness
of nature
which onstitutes
he movingprinciple f
all its activity.
There is thus a complete
circle of
reality, heDivine Reason
beingat once thebeginningnd theend ofall existence. Hence
Aristotle compares
the universe as
a whole to a
well-ordered
army
witha
general at
the head, and to an organized
State,
n
which each
member
discharges his
own function, hough
the
function s not in all the same. The
inexhaustible
and rational
Divine
Energycommunicates
tselfto the eternal
substances
of
the stars,
which communicate heir
energy o finite
nd change-
able things,
nd these
ever strive owards heiroriginal
ource
in
virtue
f
the
energy mmanentn
them.'
JOHN
WATSON.
QUEEN'S
UNIVERSITY.
I
Met.
O, 1075 I
I-25.