The Matter of Habit

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The Matter of HabitAuthor(s): Charles CamicSource: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Mar., 1986), pp. 1039-1087Published by: The University of Chicago Press

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The Matter of Habit1

CharlesCamicUniversity f Wisconsin-Madison

This article s a historicalnvestigationf theconceptofhabit nsociology.Beginningwith the claim that historians f sociologyneed to lookbeyond he now-famousdeas that ppear nthe fore-ground ftheworks fthe ociologicalmasters,he rticle xaminestheneglected dea ofhabit o document hat his onceptwas long

stapletermntheconceptual ocabulary fWesternocialtheoristsand that t continued o functions a majorbackground actor nthe substantivewritingsof both Emile Durkheim and MaxWeber-a factorthat previous scholarshipon DurkheimandWeber has almostcompletely verlooked. t is shownthatDur-kheim iewedhabitnotonly s a chief eterminantfhuman ctionin a greatvariety f areas but also as one of theprincipal upportsfor he moralfabric f modern ocieties. imilarly, abit sfound obe significantnWeber'streatmentfmodern conomic nd polit-ical life,Calvinism and the spirit f capitalism, nd theforce f

traditionalism, hich s so central factor n his frameworkorcomparative-historicalnalysis.Althoughhe dea ofhabitwas alsousedextensivelynAmerican ociology own to around1918, nthecourseofthetwo decades that followed heconceptwas purpose-fully xcised from heconceptual tructure f thefield.This dra-matic hange s shown o be a result fthe nterdisciplinaryisputesthat urrounded he nstitutionalizationfsociologys an academic

AUTHOR'S NOTE. -To make it possible to provide the relatively arge amountof pri-

marysource documentationthat appears in this article, two space-savingmeasureshave been employed. First, in a numberof instances, quotations are reportedwithwords or shortphrases enclosedwithinsquare brackets, theenclosed materialrepre-sentingan effort n my part to render concisely yet faithfully oints that are for-mulated n a less abbreviatedway by theoriginal uthors. Second,whenreporting hedates ofthe sources cited, the text gives only the year of originalpublication or theoriginaldate ofdelivery n thecase of ecturecourses). Information bout theparticu-lar editions hat have used is contained nthe ist ofreferences. age citations efer othoseeditions.1I would iketothankWarrenHagstrom,MaureenHallinan,DonaldLevine,HalWinsborough,ndErikWrightor heirnstructivedvice nthis rticle,esearch or

whichwasfacilitatedygrants romheGraduate choolResearch ommitteeftheUniversityfWisconsin-Madison.Requests orreprintshouldbe sent oCharlesCamic, Departmentf Sociology,University f Wisconsin,Madison,Wisconsin53706.

? 1986 by The University fChicago. All rights eserved.0002-9602/86/9105-0001$0150

AJSVolume91 Number5 (March1986):1039-87 1039







AmericanJournal fSociology

discipline,particularly ociology's truggleswith behaviorist sy-chology,whichhad by thenprojected ntoprominence notion f

habit deriving rom19th-centuryiological hought. he analysissuggests hat the conceptof habit was a casualtyof sociology'srevolt gainstbehaviorism-a casualtywhose effectsre still o beseen.

Onits arthlyoursen deaalways ndeverywhereperatesin oppositiono tsoriginalmeaningnd therebyestroyst-self. MaxWeber, s reported yMarianneWeber 1926,p. 337)]

Througha case studyof the changingrole of the conceptof habit in

sociological hought,his rticle xamines hegeneral uestion fhowtheunderlying onceptualstructure f intellectual ields akes shape overtime.The analysis s an effortotrace he dea ofhabitback totheperiodwhen it was a standard and valued itemin the conceptual diomofmodern ocial theorists;o demonstratehatEmile Durkheim nd MaxWeber both used theconcept xtensively henconfrontinghecentralproblems hatorganize heir ociologies; nd then oprovide sociolog-ical explanation orthe demiseof habit n the workof suchAmericansociologistss W. I. Thomas,RobertPark,Ellsworth aris,andTalcottParsons. n the courseof treating hese ssues,theessayseeks as well toillustrate he value of investigatinghehistory f sociologyby lookingbeyondthe particular deas thatoccupythe foregroundf establishedsociological lassics.

The rationale or hoosing he concept f habit s thefocus fthis asestudy s rooted nthevery act hatcontemporaryociology as virtuallydispensedwiththeconcept.There is no article n habit n the nterna-tionalEncyclopediaofthe Social Sciences, no place for t nrecent ndi-ces of the major sociological ournals,and no slot for t in the annualreviews and the standardtextbooks.What prevails nstead insofar sclaimsare made abouthuman conduct nthe social world) s a modelofaction thathas alternatively een called purposive,rational,volunta-ristic, r decisionalbut will here be designated y the ess controvertedterm"reflective." ccording o thiswidely utilized model, action s aprocess arisingfromvarious utilitarian,moral, affectual, r othermo-tives-motives formed fcalculation,belief, ttitude, nd sentiment-that define nds that an actor then ntentionally ursuesby choosing,

frommong vailable alternatives,hemeansthat ppearmost ppropri-ate when udged by normsof efficiency,uty,familiarity,nd so on.Thus, in a recent ttempt o integratework on the generaltheory faction,Alexander ismisses otions f"unreflexivection" nd aversthat"all action . . inherentlynvolvesweighting f means and ends, normsand conditions"; nd thisconception, e approvingly eports,s one that

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Habit

currentlyuffusesociological argumentst every heoreticalevel andof every deological tripe," rom xchange heory o phenomenologyo

neo-Marxism1982a, pp. 67-80). Rangingover similarmaterials, aweis likewisepleased to find road agreement hat ction nvolvespurpose-ful agents reflecting ver "alternative atterns, lternative equences,alternative ossibilities"1978, pp. 379, 413).With esssatisfaction,try-kerobserves n symbolicnteractionisms wellan emphasis n "reflexiv-ity as the essence of thehuman condition, at theexpenseof]a seriousconsideration f habit" 1980, p. 152).A kindred iew has beenadoptedeven by theorists uch as Collins, who combine the insights f eth-nomethodologistsnd sociologists f emotion o criticize ociology or ts

"rationalistmodels of cognition nd decision-making" ut then bringback a less wooden kindof reflectivectionby proposinghat he"struc-tures of the social world" reston "continuousmonitoring"nd "self-interestedmaneuver"byacting ndividuals 1981, pp. 985, 996, 1012).

So obviously ppropriate as the reflective odelcome to appearthatthose who employ t seldom concern hemselveswithproviding rea-soneddefense, reven an explicit ustification,or heir ractice funi-formly astinghuman conduct nto this one mold. That theprocessofactionmight e modeleddifferently,nd was infactmodeleddifferentlyby some of the so-called masters f sociological hought, as generallypassed altogether nnoticed.And forthepersistencef suchparochialinnocence, cholarswritingn sociology's astbear considerable espon-sibility. lacingan overlynarrow nterpretationn thedemandthathis-torical esearch e relevant o thepresent,hese cholarshave channeledtoo much oftheir ffortowardextractingrom he standard lassicsofsociology hose nsights hatareseeminglymostpertinentoquestions fcurrentociological nterest. o do this, however, s simply o endorsecurrentwaysofapproaching hesocial world: t s nottotake ssue withthosewaysand toquestion hepresentbout the imitationsf ts overallapproach.If research n the history f sociology s to contribute o thepresent n this latter and larger sense, it must, as much as possible,bracket he mmediate oncerns fcontemporaryractitionersf sociol-ogyand strive o understand he ideas of thepast in their wn terms,sincethese re theonly ermsnwhich apsed alternativesoentrenchedpresent-day erspectives ctuallydisclose themselves o us. The wholematter fhabit s one suchlapsed alternative.

METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

The suggestion hat thestudent fpast ideas should seek to understandthose deas intheir wn terms snot,ofcourse, n original ne. The samebasic argument as beenforcefullyut forth y scholars n other ields

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(see Gunnell1978; Skinner 969; Stocking 968), nd historians f sociol-ogyhave recentlyounded he ame note n growing umberssee Collini

1978;Jones1977; Simonds 1978),thus ssuing call for "new history fsociology" Jones1983). To date, however, the preachments f thisemerging ieldhave inevitably utrun ts accomplishments,s a result fwhichthe whole approach has come undermounting riticismsee Ger-stein1983; Seidman 1983; Turner 1983).

One wonders, hough,whether he newhistoriographyould notbemore convincing f it worked to carry out its revolt against "pres-entism"-the practice f reading he past through he filter f the pres-ent-in a more thoroughgoing ay. Thus far, too manyof the new

historians' fforts ave been spent traversing he same territorieshattheirmorepresentistdversarieshave charted.One consequence f thishas been theirreluctance o move much beyond the well-established,classic sociological hinkersthe Marxes, the Durkheims, he Webers),eventhough t s by highly resentisttandards hatthese hinkers avebeenelevated ntothe classical pantheon see Camic 1979, 1981).A fur-ther,more subtle consequenceof the ingering resentism as been thetendencywhen dealing with classic figures o concentrate n the ssuesthat are in theforeground f theirwritings-the very ssues that made

thesewritings, ot thoseofothers, tand out to thepresentn the firstplace-rather than on the themes, concepts, and ideas that remainlargely n the backgroundsee Polanyi'sdistinction etween focal" and"subsidiary"wareness 1958, pp. 55-57]).

By narrowing he focus to classic thinkers nd then to foregroundissues, even antipresentist istorians f sociologyhave provideda se-verely runcated icture fsocial theories ast. In these ircumstances,tis not urprisinghatbasic changes ntheconceptual rameworkf ociol-

ogyhave

gone argelynstudied r thathabit n

particularas received

little ttention n previousscholarship n sociology's ast. In fact,notonlyhas thisscholarship eglected lmost ntirelyhoseepisodes n thedevelopment f habit that fall outside theclassics, t has failed to ap-preciate he place of the idea even in the amply tudiedworksofDur-kheim nd Weber. Hence, to take only hemostrecent xample,Alexan-derdeclares hatDurkheimwas donewith henotion fhabitprior o hisfirst ook Alexander 982b,pp. 108-28) and thatforWeber heconceptwas merelya residual ategory,"educible oactionmotivated yaffects

and values (Alexander 1983, p. 152, n. 36). The evidence marshaledbelowmakes suchpronouncementsxtremely oubtful; nd therehavebeena fewscholarswhohave come somewhatnearer hemark,notablyRoth 1968), Wallwork 1972), and Cohen, Hazelrigg, nd Pope (1975).But thefact hat heroleof habit nthethoughtfDurkheim nd Weber

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Habit

has yet to be sufficientlyrought ut offers strikingndication f theextent fthepractice foverlookingamifyingdeas nthebackground f

theirwritingsn the course of going over and over the standardfore-ground opics.What has been missed, s a consequence,s theverykindofdevelopmental rocess hat hehistorianf sociologyeeksto uncover:the change in underlying onceptualstructurehatseparatesus fromthe age ofDurkheimand Weber. It is withthe aim of demonstratingthat such a change occurred, nd not-I shouldemphasize-in the n-terest of further verextending reliance on the classics, that thispaper treatsDurkheim nd Weberat some ength,naddition oconsid-eringcertain mportant nstallmentsn the earlierand laterhistory f

habit that are located outsidethecurrentlyecognized lassicsof sociol-ogy.

It hardlyneed be said, however, hatthestudent f sociology's ast sconcernednotonly with dentifyingow the fieldhas changedbut alsowith xplainingwhy thas doneso. Accordingly,willattempt rieflyoprovide sociological ccountfor heelimination fhabit by Americansociologists f theearly20th century.n doing so, theanalysiswill callattention o the ntellectual onsequences fthe widespread oncern nthepartof thosesociologistswith securely stablishingheir ield s anautonomous isciplinewithin heuniversitiesfthetime. n stressinghesignificancefthe factor finstitutionalization, y arguments simplyfollowing he ead ofresearchnthesociology fscience esp. Ben-David1971),whichhas alreadybeen nstructivelyppliedto thedevelopment fsociology in America and elsewhere (Abrams 1968; Clark 1973;Oberschall1972; Shils 1970). The twist s that,whilemostof thisworkfocuses n how institutionalizationltered the social-structuralspectsof cultureproduction, but] ignor[es] he content f culture" Kuklick1983, p. 300), here the emphasiswill be on how the quest forgenuineacademicautonomy ctually id affect heconceptual abric f ociology.In this regard, especiallywant to urge the mportance f studying otonlywhat was goingon in the sociological iterature ut also what wastaking lace in the iterature f thedisciplines romwhich ociologywasseeking o secure ts autonomy.We have all been taught hat sociologytook hape noppositionofields uch as economics, istory,nd psychol-ogy. But, todate, the real significancefthispointhas been ost becausethere asbeenvirtually o efforto divest urselves four currentmages

ofthesefields nd to investigate ow theywere pecificallyonstitutedtthetime hat ociologywas first cquiringntellectual orm.By examin-ingsomeofthe ubstantive haracteristicsfpsychology uring hisdeci-sive period, hope to take a preliminarytep toward correcting hissituation.

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AmericanJournal f Sociology

CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

At this uncture, omething hould be said about what theconceptofhabit refers o in thisstudy.At first lance, specifyinghismay appearproblematic, iven hat heword habit" or ts French rGerman quiv-alent)has been usedina variety fways by differentocialthinkers romdifferentges. Fortunately, owever, he coremeanings fthe term-asthe OxfordEnglish Dictionary shows-have been fairly onstantformany centuries; he variabilityhas exhibited tself hieflyn differentloadingsonto the common ore.The coremeaning hat s pertinent erestands utmost harplywhen heprevious efinitionfreflectiveonduct

is recalled,for"habit"ordinarily esignates ctionsthat"are relativelyunmotivated" Giddens 1979, p. 218), actions forwhich"means-endsrelations . . are [from heactor's tandpoint]not subject oargument'(Hartmann, 939, p. 91). Sincedefinitions ith uns" and "nots"may berather nsatisfying,t s perhaps ppropriate o restate hesepointsposi-tively:the term"habit" generallydenominates more or less self-actuatingdisposition r tendency o engage n a previouslydoptedoracquiredform faction.2

Within his broaddefinition,ertaindistinctionsan be made. In the

first ncyclopedia of theSocial Sciences, Murphyfound t convenient,fornstance, o differentiateabove the evel of"motor abits") cognitivehabits," emotional abits," nd "moralhabits" 1932, p. 238).Butrather

2 Severalpoints f clarificationreperhapsnorderhere. First, he definitionustoffereds designed o indicate hetypicalway in which hemajorityf thinkersincludednthis tudy ave usedhabit; t snot claim bouthowthe erm hould eused.Second, s thedefinitionndicates,hepresentnalysiss concernedotwith he

vagariesf heword habit" utwith hangingointsfview n thephenomenonhattheworddesignates.t happens, hough,hat nthe ountriesndtheperiod onsid-erednthis tudy, he onventionas been ctuallyo referothephenomenonfhabitbythe ermhabit"or tsFrench r German ounterpart)see Funke1958) othat nonly few caseswill it be necessary ereto take account fother erminologicalpointers.hird,while hedefinitionnd much f he ollowingiscussionrecouchedinterms f thehabits fthe ndividual,tshouldbe noted hatmostwritersn thesubjectmaintain hatmembersf ocialgroupsxhibitmany ommon abits.Weber,in fact, mployedhe separate erm custom" o denote uch"collective ay[s] facting"hat erive rom abit atherhan romelf-interestr hared orms1922a, .319; 1922b,p. 187).But thisparticular sageremainsn idiosyncraticne,for, s

MacIver nceremarked,ustom enerallyefersocollectiveracticeshat rebackedbya social anction,a qualitywhich s inno sensepartof themeaning f . . 'thehabits f the group' (1931,p. 294; see alsoT6nnies1909,pp. 35-36). Fourth, hedefinitioneavesopenthequestion ftheoriginsfhabit, ince pace imits recludetaking p this ssue. tmust ufficeo recordhat hemostwidespreadiewhasbeenthathabit sproduced yrepetition:hat orms f ction hat refrequentlyracticedtend ver ime obecome abitual. pinions avedifferedreatly,owever,s tohowthisprocess fhabitformations actuallyet ntomotion.

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Habit

than place primary mphasishereon thisclassificationccording o thecontent f different abits, t will be helpful orhistorical urposes o

differentiatehe variousempiricalreferentsf the conceptof habit interms of a dimensionthat crosscuts the cognitive/emotional/moralclassification,amely,whether he form faction" hat s being epeatedis simple and circumscribed r generalized nd complex. Since this sobviouslynot a black-and-whitessue, it is probablybest to envisionlongcontinuum fpossibilities. he two endpoints nd the midpoint fthiscontinuummerit eparatecomment.

To begin at thebeginning: abit sometimes efers o the disposition operform ertain relatively lementarynd specific ctivities killfully.

Even in the heyday f theconcept f habit,activities f this yperarelyattracted hesustained nterestfsocial theorists. he situation as longbeenotherwisenpsychology, owever, nd inthevenerable raditionfWilliamJames 1890, p. 107)themodern sychologistquateshabitwith"sequencesof behaviors,usually imple, . . thathave becomevirtuallyautomatic" nd then llustrates henotionwith hepractice fputtingna left ock before right ne (Lefran?ois 983,p. 393). Stillwithin helowerportion f the habitcontinuum, utgetting eyond heminutiae,onemight lso locate habitsofwriting, peaking, erceiving,valuating,taskexecution, roblem olving, nd thelike,to whichsocial thinkershave devotedmoreattention, articularly hendiscussing herequire-ments oror impedimentso reflectivection tself.

But proceeding owhatmaybe looked on as the vast middlerangeofthecontinuum,heform f ctiondesignateds habitbroadens o variousmoreextended ines or more nvolvedpatterns f conduct n the socialworld.Suchphenomenawerefrequentlynevidence nthework f ocialthinkers rom hemid-18th o theearly20thcentury, nd in canvassingthiswork,we will encounter abitsof nterpersonalnteraction; abits feconomic, olitical, eligious, nd domestic ehavior;habits fobedienceto rules nd torulers;habitsofsacrifice, isinterestedness,nd restraint;and so on. This is not to say that those who speak of thesekindsofconduct ropose hat hey reuniformlyabitual.When hehabit abel sapplied, it is generally o suggest hatan action, which may in somesituations ome about as a motivated ctor elects ppropriatemeans tohis or her ends, has-in the instance of the actor beingdescribed-emergedapart fromsuch a reflective rocess. That habitual and

nonhabitual reflective r other)considerationsmay actuallybe mixedtogetherimultaneouslys something o commentatorknowofdenies.Yet it s onlyWeberwhoexplicitlyonceives fhabitual ction s a puretype,whichconcrete ases approach nvarying egrees 1922a, pp. 25-26)-and this s a formulationhat ncourages s to appreciate, nmanyoftheallusionsby past thinkers o economic, olitical, eligious, omes-

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tic, and other habits, an implicit laim for thepreponderance f thehabitualelementn a givenpattern f action.

In the upper reaches ofthe habit continuum, ne can situate still-broaderusage of theterm.According o thisusage,habit s the durableand generalized ispositionhat uffuses person's ction hroughoutnentire omainof ife r, n theextremenstance, hroughoutll of ife-inwhich asethe erm omes omeanthewholemanner, urn, ast,ormoldof thepersonality. oday the word"character" robably omesclosest oevoking his nearlyforgotten eaning fhabit, although ven "charac-ter" ends o suggest systemmade up ofnumerous,more pecific erson-ality ttributes, hereas hepoint f usinghabit n tsbroadest ense sto

denotenota sum ofpartsbuta morenearly ll-encompassing odalityfaction hat ifone mayborrow ut ofcontext vividformulationromheGrundrisse)henassignsrank and influence o other omponentsfthepersonality.3 mongEuropeanthinkers,hisdistinct onceptionf habithas often een denotedbyleaving the word n its Latinform, abitus.This, as we shall see, is a practice hat bothDurkheim nd Weber fol-lowed, and it s a practice hatBourdieuhas madea notablerecent ffortat long astto revive see, e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron1970).

These definitionalreliminarieservetomake onewaryof some com-

monstereotypes.o many, he notion f habit mmediatelyonjuresupbehavior hat onsistsna fixed,mechanical eaction oparticulartimuliand is, as such, devoid ofmeaningfrom he actor'spointof view. Insociology, his mage s one thatbecamefairlywidespread arly n thiscentury, hough t was alreadycurrentn the 1780s seeReid 1788, pp.114-17) and alive during he nterims well. The point o note, hough, sthatthe magehas also met with substantial pposition.n place oftheidea of a fixed,mechanical eaction ostimuli,t has beenheldthathabitcreates

stablenner orethat ffords

mmunityrom xternal ensations

and impetuous ppetites Ferguson1792, p. 225; Hegel 1821, p. 260;1830, p. 144); that t s notby such stimuli s these,butby theego itself,that habit is called intoplay and allowed to proceed,with eewayforsituational daptation Hartmann1939, p. 88; James1890, p. 116;Ton-

3 It may, in fact, be helpful o regardtheconceptionof habitunder discussion hereasthe analogue in thepersonality o thedominant mode ofproduction s seen byMarx:"It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifiestheir

particularity. t is a particular ether which determines he specificgravityof everybeing which has materializedwithin t" (1857, p. 107). The onlyAmericanwriterwellknown among sociologists o make use of such an idea was JohnDewey, who definedhabit as that "orderingor systematization f [themore]minor elements of [human]action, which is projective,dynamicin quality, readyfor overtmanifestation, nd[operative] even when not obviouslydominating ctivity" 1922, pp. 40-41; see alsoKestenbaum 1977; Petras 1968).

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Habit

nies 1909, pp. 32-33); and that,howevermuch habitualactionmayberemovedfrom hesitation nd reflection,"uch action s stillno more

"mechanical"than actionof the same typethatemergesfromwhollyreflectiverocesses Stewart1792-1827, pp. 54, 55-57). Andinplaceofthe claim thathabit s devoid of subjectivemeaning, othphenomenolo-gists nd psychoanalysts ave proposed hathabitual ctiondoes exhibita "meaningfulharacter"-either akenfor ranted ythe ctor r odgedin the unconscious Berger nd Luckmann 1966, p. 53; Hartmann1939,p. 89; Kestenbaum1977, pp. 3-4; Schutz1932, p. 19). I am notsuggest-ing that heseviews be directly ubstituted or hestereotype;pokesper-sons on all sides have been sufficientlyeluctant o specify o which

instances fhabit, nd to whatextent, heir tatementspply hat autionis mandated all around if one is out for a description f some of theauxiliary eatures f habitualaction. fone is concernedwith hehistoryof theconcept fhabit, however, t is bestsimply o setstereotypesndcounterstereotypesside from he start nd to eave them side until heybecomean essentialpartof thestorytself.

HISTORICAL PROLOGUE

To understand he transformationhattheconceptofhabithas under-gone n sociology,t is necessary o take noticeofcertain riordevelop-ments that occurred chieflyoutside the classics of sociology.Theprovenance fhabit s remote. he notionwas already n establishedneamong ncientGreek hinkers,nd itthereafterrovedresilient, layinga consequentialrole in the writings f medievalscholastics, eformedtheologians, nd numerous arlymodernphilosophers nd litterateurs(see Burnham1968a, pp. 8-9; Dubray 1905, pp. 17-23; Fuchs 1952;Funke 1958, pp. 32-344; Passmore 1970, pp. 161-62).

During the 18th century, he concept received till more systematicattentionsee Funke 1958, pp. 345-496), most conspicuously romnumber f the major figures f the Enlightenment.peakingformanythinkers fthe FrenchEnlightenment, elve'tius, or xample,proposedthat habit is a] principle ywhich humans verywhere]re actuated"and that t s alsothegreatwellspringfmorality, othprivate nd public(1758, pp. 57, 108, 180); as well, Rousseau proclaimedmany forms fsocial inequality uniquely he work ofhabit"and held that aw shouldrest n "theforce f habit, rather han on] the force f authority"1755,p. 138; 1762, p. 81); and Condorcet orecast he progressive ransforma-tionof"habits .. adoptedthroughmiscalculation"y "freely ontractedhabits . . inspiredby nature nd acknowledged y reason" 1793, pp.192, 194). In Scotland, nlightenersuch as Hume (1739-40, pp. 104-5,503-4) and Ferguson 1792, pp. 209-34) expressed imilar pinions; nd

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even cerebralGermanAufkldreruch as Kant nsisted ngivinghabit tsdue, ifonly better o master t. In fact, t was Kant's opinion hat "all

acquiredhabits re objectionable," hat virtue s moral trengthnpur-suit of one's duty, dutywhichshould neverbe a matter fhabit,butshould always proceed,fresh nd original, rom ne'smode ofthought"(1798, pp. 32, 34). The idea continued o holditsown, moreover, venwhen reaction o theEnlightenmentet nduring heearly19th entury.Indeed, theconcept emained nactivedutywith hinkersootherwisetodds as Englishutilitariansn the mold ofJamesMill (see Woodcock1980) nd German dealists, ncluding egelhimself, hopostulatedhat"habit s indispensable or he existence f all intellectualife" 1830, p.

143).But far-reachinghangeswereabout to engulf heconcept fhabit.As

thepreceding uotationsmay suggest,when thinkers f the 18th andearly 19thcenturies poke of habit, they poke principallyt a level ofgeneralityhat corresponds o themiddlerange ofthe habit continuumdescribed bove. What ncreasinglyametothefore nthe courseofthe19thcentury, owever,was the practice f equatinghabit moreexclu-sivelywithactivities f a relatively lementaryypeand thentreatingthese n a manner hat ed away from heanalysis faction nthe socialworldaltogether. his transformationas brought n by two develop-ments hatoccurrednear thecenter tage ofEuropean ntellectualife.

The first fthesewas a rapidgrowth fthebiological ciences-chieflythrough he efflorescencef evolutionary heory nd of experimentalphysiology. he well-known istory f evolutionaryheory eed not bedetailed here, save forone basic item.Habit, it emerges,was a termprominentlysed by evolutionists hen theydescribed he elementarybehaviorsof lowerspecies. It was in this sense that Lamarck talked of

giraffes brows[ing] n the leaves of trees"and called this theirhabit,talkedof "snakes .. crawling ntheground" nd calledthis habit oo(citedby Oldroyd1980, p. 31), and itwas in this ensealso thatDarwinspoke freelyn On theOrigin of Species of such things s thefeedinghabitsof "British nsects," he climbing abitsofthe "larger itmouse,"and theflowering abitsof"plantswhentransportedinto] nother" li-mate 1859, pp. 11, 183). This same usage oomed till argerwhen, nhislater writing, arwin hastenedfromhorses'pacinghabits,caterpillars'eatinghabits,and pigeons'flying abitsdirectlyo the habitsof human

beings 1872, pp. 29-31).Here Darwin's workhappenedto linkup with hephysiologicalitera-ture of the time: a noteworthy odyofresearch hat had the effect fconfirminghe equation between habit and elementary ehavior anddriving he phenomenon ntirely ut of the social worldand intotherecessesof the biophysical ciences on thisresearch, ee Liddell 1960;

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Habit

Thomson1968,pp. 37-53; Young 1970).This effect ameabout as physi-ologistsweredrawn, by their nterestn the movements fdecapitated

chickens, eadlessfrogs, ndthe ike,to theexperimentaltudy f"reflexactions," which were conceived as motorresponses ctivatedbynervecellsexcitedby stimuli xternal o a givenorganism see Fearing1930).This is significant,or to view reflex ctions n thisway was also tophysiologize he conceptof habitthoroughlyecause thephysiologicalliterature ad long since adopted habit as the standardsynonym oracquired reflexesBurnham1968a, p. 52; Fearing 1930).More signifi-cantly till,physiologistshowed ittlehesitationn extendingo humanbeingswhatwas said about thechickensndthefrogs.Humans,after ll,

exhibitedcquiredmotor eflexes r habits oo,and much-if not ll-ofhumanactionmight,by extrapolation, e reducedto tendencies f thenervous ystem to grow to the modesin which t has been habituallyexercised"as theEnglishphysiologistarpenter utit in the1870s;seeDanziger 1982, p. 130).

What made this eeminglysoteric sage consequentialwas its coinci-dencewith a secondmajor development: hegradualemergence f thescienceofpsychology, riorto the 19thcentury, sychological pecula-tionwas something enerally arried out by philosophers ngaged nrather nspecialized nquiries.Thereafter,owever, s theera of ntellec-tualdifferentiationet n, students f the mind oughtgreaterutonomyfortheirfield, nd by thelast quarterof the 19thcenturyheir ffortsbegantopay off.Not onlydidpsychologymanage, head ofmanyotherfledglingpecialities f thetime, oestablish tself s a recognized ieldntheuniversities,speciallynGermany seeBen-David and Collins1966;Ross 1967;Woodward 1982),but evenwhen theacademic inkages tillleftmuch to be desired, herewas an impressive utpouring fresearchconcernedwiththe"sensations, magesand feelings . . out ofwhichcomplex tatesofmindwere builtup" (Thomson1968,p. 89; ingeneral,see Boring 1957;Hearnshaw1964;Thomson1968; Watson1968).

This "newpsychology,"s itwas often alled, was onthewhole lmostmilitantlycientistic. erhaps as a resultof a still"low-status ield['s]attempt o upgrade[itself] y borrowing hemethods f a high-statusfield" Ben-David and Collins 1966, p. 460), 19th-centurysychologyleanedheavily nthe chievements fthebiological ciences, articularlyevolutionismnd, above all, physiologicalxperimentalismseeMurphy

and Kovach 1972,pp. 65-75, 126-47;Thomson 1968,pp. 92-124, 168-73).Habitwas depicted ccordingly.Whatreliablyppeared nrecurringpsychological iscussions f thesubjectwas the dea ofhabit as a phe-nomenon elonging mong theprimary rocesses fthe human)organ-ism(see Andrews1903, pp. 122-27; Dubray 1905,pp. 64-73; Fearing1930,p. 239; James 1890, pp. 104-27). It was thusthat Bain equated

1049








habit withreflex ction and a "narrowing f the sphere f nfluence f asensational r active stimulus to] one solitary hannel in] thecerebral

system" 1859, pp. 11-12); and it was thus too that Dumontdiscussedhow "the mpressions f outerobjects fashion or hemselvesn the ner-vous systemmore and more appropriate aths" and thenproposed hatthesewell-fashioned euralpathways re our habits 1876, p. 324; trans-lationby James 1890, p. 106).

This distinctive onceptualization f habit was to be triumphant, utthe triumph till ay abroad in America. n late 19th- nd early 20th-century urope, the new psychologists' iews, widely ired though heywere, never held the intellectual ieldunchallenged, or the fieldwasalready rich n more traditional tatementsbout habit. Hence, whenused in social-scientificiscourse, he concept ended o retain he samebasic character t had had prior o the changes ust enumerated. ne cansee this nwritings s diverse s thoseof Bagehot 1872, p. 9; 1879, pp.141-64) and Bradley nd Bosanquet Collini 1978, pp. 12-14) inBritain(cf. Spencer 1855, pp. 525-30); Comte 1830-54, pp. 235, 253, passim)andLePlay 1855-81, pp. 139, 143,passim) nFrance;andJhering1883,2:239-47), T6nnies 1887, pp. 33-170; 1909), Simmel 1900), Vierkandt(1908, pp. 103-9), and Lederer 1918-19) inGermany.t is true hat nnone ofthisworkdid habitexhaust hedomainofaction.Morereflectivetypes fconductwere consistentlyn the ceneas well. But thesedid notyetstandalone-and this s thepoint. Despitetheeffortsfbiologists,physiologists,nd psychologistso carryhabitoff n otherdirections,tremained standard erm y which ocialtheoristsaptured hoseformsofaction n the social worldthatwereseen tobe less reflectivendmoreself-actuating.t was in this context hat Emile Durkheimand MaxWeberwrote.

HABIT IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Durkheim

Habitwas well exercised y Durkheim, nd it was exercised hroughoutmuch of his career, even as he underwent, ccording o at least somescholars, ertain ar-reachingheoretical hanges.The conceptwas, to besure, rarely t the forefrontf his attentions,nd all thosewho see only

theforefrontave accordingly lossedover it altogether. ut, howeverlittle hetermmaymean to contemporaryommentators,t was nonethe-less a tool n Durkheim's onceptual oolbox, ne thathe brought ut andputtowork on the mostvariedoccasions.

Some scattered llustrationsmay introduce he point. Take, for n-stance,Durkheim's bservations n the mpirical oleofhabit t different

1050







Habit

points n the evolutionary rocess.Primitive eoples, n his udgment,live to a largeextent y the force fhabit" nd under he yoke fhabit"

(1893, p. 159; 1912, p. 103),for"when thingsgo on happening n thesameway, habit . . suffice[s]or onduct" nd moralbehavior tself seasilytransformedinto habitmechanically arried ut" 1898-1900,p.90; 1902-3b, p. 52). Much thesame was true,he claimed, n advancedcities ftheMiddle Ages,where habithas ... dominion verpeopleandoverthingswithout nycounter-balance"1898-1900,p. 38). Neither omodern ocieties ispensewith t. A social orderbased on the division flabor, Durkheim maintained,requires"more and more ntensive ndassiduouswork,and [suchworkbecomes]habitual"-and habitual n aparticularway, since "civilization . . imposes upon manmonotonousand continuousabor, [which] mplies n absoluteregularityn habits"(1893, p. 242; 1902-3b, . 70,m.t.; 1902-3a, p. 80).4Thus, for a worker. . . to take hisplace in society, he mustdevelop]the habit ofexertinghimself"nd other habits ofwork" that weresimply nknown mongthe torpidprimitives1902-3b,pp. 173, 181;thegeneral rgument erebearscomparisonwiththatof E. P. Thompson 1967]).

Habit was a recurrentactor, oo, in Durkheim's nalysisofsuicide:"habitsof passive obedience,of absolutesubmission, f mpersonalism"increasethe suicide rate among military fficers, e asserted,whereas"the habitof domestic olidarity" ecreases he ratewithin ariousotherpopulations 1897b, p. 238; 1888c, p. 234). The conceptwas also inoperationncertain iscussions fthedevelopmentfcollective epresen-tations. n his earliestwritings, urkheimproposedthatreligiontselffirstmerges s a "theory oexplain nd make senseof everyday] abits,"and in subsequentwork he held that the"ideas and reasonswhich de-velop in our consciousness arise, nter lia, from]ngrainedhabits of

whichwe are unaware" 1887a, p. 35; 1897a, p. 168). And his specula-tions on social and culturalchange repeatedlyharked back to habit,whichhe viewedas one of thegreatest mpedimentso progress fanysort. It is always a laborious peration o pull up theroots f habits hattimehas fixed nd organized nus" (1893, p. 241); operating utside he"sphere ftheclearconsciousness, . . habits . . resistny change since]what cannotbe seen is noteasily modified"1898-1900, p. 84). Hence,Durkheim amented,manysocial facts "continue . . to exist merelythrough orce fhabit,"amongthem ntiquatedpenal, educational, nd

4 "M.t." within citationndicateshat have lightly odifiedheEnglish ranslationofthe citedpassage to preserveomethingbouthabit thathas beenlost in thetranslation-and his ery ftensthe oncept fhabittself.nsuch ases, referencetothetranslation illappearfirst, ollowed y a cross-referenceo theforeignan-guage ource.

1051








political nstitutionsnd all manner f unscientificdeas that ndurebe-cause "inveterate abits of hinking]ead us astray"1895b, p. 120, m.t.;1895a, p. 60; 1898-1900,pp. 60,99-100; 1899-1900,p. 180; 1902-3b,p.14; 1909, p. 87).

Nor should heseformulationse discounted s somany lipsof loosepen. For there re sufficientnstances n Durkheim'swritings here hebackground ctuallybreaks othe foregroundo make t clearhow muchthe remarksust quoted correspond ithhis fully onsidered pinions nhabit. n his last new lecture ourse,Durkheimbrought ntothe open afundamental laimthathad longbeen in therecessesofhis work see1887a, p. 34; 1897b, pp. 158-59; 1898-1900, p. 90). This was the deathat,by ts verynature,humanaction,whetherndividual r collective,oscillates etween wo poles, that fconsciousness rreflectionn theoneside, and thatof habiton theother ide, withthe atterpole beingthestronger. urkheimwrotethat as long as "there s an equilibrium e-tweenour dispositions nd the surroundingnvironment,actionoccursby] merely kim[ming] ver [our] consciousness"; consciousness ndreflectiononly awaken] when habit is disrupted,when a process ofnonadaption ccurs" 1913-14, pp. 79-80). In thiseventuality, here

"the[individualor collective] eing s. . .

ata

cross-roads ituation,""faced with a whole rangeofpossible solutions," eflection-which nother ccasions "slows down, overloadsor paralyzes ction"-comes tothefore, hough nlyto "disappear . . when tno longer erves this]purpose" nd "habits f all kinds" ssert hemselves nceagain 1913-14,pp. 38, 79, 83). But to say this s obviously o imply hatmostactorsproceed most of the time under the sway of theirhabits: those "innertendencies" r "internalized orceswhichunfold hemselves],ctivated,as itwere, spontaneously"1895b, p. 54; 1902-3b, p. 28, m.t.; 1902-3a,

p. 32). And this s precisely he position hatDurkheim orthrightlym-braced, declaring hat"it is not enoughto directour attention o thesuperficial ortionof our consciousness; orthe sentiments,he ideaswhichcometo the surface re not, by far,thosewhich have the mostinfluence n our conduct.Whatmustbereached re thehabits"-"theseare therealforceswhichgovern s" (1905-6, p. 152 emphasis dded];seealso 1898-1900, p. 80).

So faithful as Durkheim othisviewpoint hat-quite asidefromhevisiblepartthatheassigned ohabit n histreatmentfprimitiveociety,

modernwork, suicide, and the like-the phenomenonssumeda vitalrole nhis analysis fthe ssuethat,byall recentccounts,was at theverycenter fhis theoreticalndpractical fforts:he ssueofmoralitynd themoralfoundations f modern ocieties on thecentralityf this ssue,seeAlexander1982b; Bellah 1973; LaCapra 1972;Lukes 1973;Marks 1974;Wallwork1972). In overlooking urkheim's ssessment fhabit,what

1052







Habit

theDurkheimian cholarship as sacrificed bove all else,therefore,s amore adequate understanding f Durkheim'swhole approach to the

"alarmingpoverty f morality"n his age (1897b, 387); for goodpart(thoughnotthe whole) of the solution o this predicamentwas seen byhimto lie in the domain of habit.

This becomesparticularlyvident t three unctures.The first ftheseis inTheDivision ofLabor, whereDurkheimmaintained hatthemoralnormsnecessary o end the crisis fanomieactuallywould comedirectlyintobeing withthe development fhabitsof nteractionmongthe spe-cialized partsthatconstituteheworldofdivided abor. "Thereare,"hestated, "certainways in which [differentiatedunctions] eacton one

another,which,beingmore n accordancewith henature fthings, rerepeatedmoreoften nd become habits; hen he habits, s they cquireforce, retransformedntorules fconduct.... In otherwords, certainselection frightsnd duties s made byhabitualpractice nd these ndup bybecoming bligatory"1893, p. 366; retranslationyLukes [1973,p. 164]; see also Durkheim 1886, p. 213; 1887b, p. 275; 1888a, p. 66;1898-1900,pp. 7-9; 1902, pp. 14-15; Durkheim nd Buisson 1911, p.153; cf. thecriticisms f Lukes [1973, p. 164]and Parsons 1937,p. 321]with he rgumentfBerger nd Luckmann1966,pp. 53-67]). In his aterwork on occupationalcorporations, urkheim oncluded hat thisfirstformulationas "incomplete"1902, p. 4), but he mmediately ent n toincorporate abit nto his plans formoral regenerationn a secondway.He urgedhiscelebrated roject o revitalize ccupational roups npartbecause he believed such institutionsble to createand implantmuch-neededhabits fmoral onduct. o long s "thefamilyprovidesheonly]collective ife nwhich specialists] articipate," heywill,Durkheim ea-soned, become nuredto "the habit ofacting ike lone wolves" and ac-quirean "inclination owarda fierce ndividualism"1902-3b, pp. 233-34). He thenposed the problem,"How can we learn the [opposite]habit?"-that of disinterestedness,"self-forgetfulness,"nd"sacrifice"?(1902, p. 4). His proposal foroccupational corporations ollowed m-mediatelyn direct nswer see 1902, pp. 4-31).

Butthiswas not theonly nswer,for thirdwayofpressing abit ntoservicereadilysuggested tself-the prospectof instilling ood moralhabitsfrom arliest hildhood nward nstead fwaiting or ccupationallifeto getunder way. Durkheim eizedupon this possibility ithgreat

enthusiasm, nd hiswritings n education ndeed constituteerhaps hefullest tatementn recordof thehabitualbasis ofsocial morality.t iswellknown hat, nDurkheim's iew,modern ecular ociety equiresmoral code emphasizing a) groupattachment,r devotion o collectiveideals; b)regularity,r "behaving imilarly nder ikecircumstances";c)authority,rdutiful ubmission nd self-restraintn accordwithobliga-

1053








tory ules; nd (d) autonomy, r reflectiveonsciousness oncerningth-ical principles see esp. 1902-3b, pp. 17-126). What has neverbeen

appreciated s the place of habit nthiswhole affair. ut,forDurkheim,certain omponents fmoralityre nherently attersfhabit: obecomeattached to collective deals, "one must have developedthe habitsofacting nd thinkingncommon"; to assureregularity,t sonlynecessarythathabitsbe stronglyounded" 1902-3b, p. 233, 28, m.t.; 1902-3a, p.32). Furthermore, hile somethingmore than habit s required, n hisview, to produce ubmission o rules nd reflectiveonsciousnessas weshall see), even this somethingmore developsfrom he base of earlyhabits, articularlythehabitof elf-controlnd restraint"nd "thehabit

of ucid thought"1902-3b,p. 149; 1904-5, p. 347).Thisfact, longwiththepostulate hat children re "creature[s] f habit," ed Durkheim oarguethat ducational nstitutionsould go far nlaying hegroundworkfor ll elements f hissecularmorality: y offeringheexampleofcom-monclassroom ife,the school could"induc[e] n thechildthehabitsofgroup ife" and attachment; y enforcing regimen f rules and disci-pline, t could "accustom thechild] o regularity"nd "develop . . thehabitof self-control";ndby teaching atural cience, t could encourage"thechild o acquire wholesome ntellectual abits,whichwillstrengthen

his moralconduct"1902-3b, pp. 135, 143, 149, 249, 297; see also 1904-5, pp. 275, 318, 331-48). This argument s, in fact,one of the chiefreasons hat chooling ameto playso indispensable role nDurkheim'scontinual ffortst moral reform.

It should be noted,though, hat when advancingthisposition,Dur-kheim's ocuswas principally n primary ducation see 1902-3b, p. 17).In hisanalysis f secondary ducation, verydifferentpirit eems o beat work. n Durkheim'sudgment, econdary choolingsnot, ndshouldnotbe, a process evolvingbout "the cquisition f certain pecificbili-ties or habits" 1904-5, p. 30). This contentions an outgrowthf twoaspectsofhis moraltheorymentioned, utnotelaborated, bove: first,his nsistenceesp. in his aterwritings) hat nsofar s it nvolvesdutifulconformityo rules,morality ecessarilyranscends abit,since "a rule. . . is not only habitualmeansofacting, t s, above all, an obligatorymeansofacting"-a meansofacting hat s imperative1902, p. 4; 1902-3b, p. 28; see also 1888b,pp. 214-15; 1903-12, p. 649; 1912, p. 482,n.10; 1920, p. 265, n. 1); second,his belief hat,under hedynamic ondi-

tionsof the modern ge, any viable moralityntails as well continualreflectiont the upperreachesof thesocial order1898-1900, pp. 88-94;1911a, p. 84; 1904-5, pp. 315-16).5 It was in hopesoffosteringhese

5 Despite thisbelief, twas Durkheim's udgmentthatevenpersons nprofessional ndmanagerialpositions,which demand constantreflectionnstead of fixedhabits, "be-

1054







Habit

obligatory nd reflectiveeatures fmoral ifethatDurkheim'swritingson secondaryducation et asidethe ssue ofcultivating articular abits

ofconduct.Moral education,nhisview,clearly equiredmore han his.Yet what the requirement urnsout to be comes as a considerablesurprise-particularlyfwe expectDurkheim opropose, ikesociologistsoftoday, hatreflectiveonductnaccordwith bligatoryuleshinges nthetransmissionfmoralbeliefs, alues,and norms.For this s not t allDurkheim's wn position.Making tthe task ofsecondary ducation oimpart a certainnumber f true beliefs and] specific rticles f faith"and to "decorat[e he]mindwithcertain deas [and]certain ormulae"snearly s inappropriate, e argued,as concentratingt this evel on the

"contract[ing f] certain specifichabits" (i904-5, p. 29). Both pos-sibilities,nhisopinion, mount oa reversion o thedubious ducationalobjectives fantiquity,nplaceoftheproper edagogical rogram ftheChristianMiddleAges,where twas recognizedhat ifwe aretrulyo doour ob as educators nd have an effect hichwill be durable,"we mustconcern urselveswithdeveloping n the individual a moreprofoundconditionwhichdeterminesheother specificspectsofpersonality]ndgives hem heir nity, namely,] general ispositionfthemind ndthewill": a "habitus fmoralbeing" 1904-5, pp. 28-29; see also 1902-3b,p.21). Here, as habit nthemostgeneralized ense selevatedoverall morespecificusages, Durkheimvindicatedhis faith n the transformativemoralpowerof educational nstitutions.t was his conviction hat theChristian onception f the missionof educationwas theoreticallyhecorrect ne; weremodern econdary choolsonlyto work to create adutifulndreflectiveecularhabitus oreplace hereligious abitus f hepast,theexactingmoraldemandsof thecontemporaryge might etbewell satisfied1904-5, pp. 30, 317).

If thissprawling ccount by Durkheim f the vital nterplay etweenthehabitual and themoral attestsfurther o the fact that the ancientconceptofhabit was still alive and well in his work, thereremains nilluminatingxception o this conclusion.The concept s all but absentfrom urkheim's requent nd fervent rogrammatictatements n thefield fsociologytselfsee 1888a, 1890,1892, 1895b,1898b,1899,1900a,1900b, 1901, 1901-2, 1908a, 1908b, 1909, 1915). The omissionbearswitness, would suggest, o the subtleways in which the conceptual

have in [nonwork] ontexts s simplepersonsacting byroutine,who neither hinknoract otherwisethan the ignorantpopulace" (1904-5, pp. 315-16; 1905-6, p. 138). Itshould be noted, moreover, that the objective of the type of reflection urkheimadvocated is not to dislodge habits but to "maintain themin the state of necessaryadaptabilityand flexibility"1905-6, p. 137).

1055








structuref sociological hought as beenshaped throughheapparentlyperipheralmovement o institutionalizehediscipline fsociology.

Durkheim's rogrammatictatements ere, after ll, integral o whatLukes has described s a lifelong campaign o win recognitionor ociol-ogy'sscientifictatus" n an ossified cademic environmentxtremelyreluctant o concede he cientificegitimacyfthenew field Lukes 1973,p. 36; see also Clark 1973; Shils 1970). It was Durkheim's onviction,furthermore,hatthe egitimacy f a would-be ciencecouldbe securelygrounded nlywhen "its subject matter s an order f factswhichothersciencesdo not study" 1895b,p. 162).Differentiatingociology rom hemoreestablished ield f individualpsychology hus became an issue ofcardinal concern o him.This, of course, s a pointthat previous om-mentators ave oftenrecorded, lbeit in such general erms hat Dur-kheim's ncounterwithpsychologymerges s a struggle ith n almostfacelessopponent. n fact, however, heenemywas an eminentlyull-bodied one: chiefly,twas the aggressive newpsychology"fthetime.When Durkheim describedpsychology, e spoke of researchon "theorganic nd physical onstitutionf man" (1900a, p. 363); whenhe ad-verted to specificpsychologicalwritings,t was the English, French,German,and Americanrepresentativesf thenew psychologyhatherepeatedly ited see 1898a; 1902-3b; 1913-14), even drawingon Du-mont'spsychophysical iscussion f"I'habitude,"whichwas mentionedabove (see 1898a, p. 5). Operating gainst hisbackdrop nd determinedtoendow sociologywith a subjectmatter eculiarlyts own" 1895b,p.50),Durkheim idnotwait ongtoquestionwhichdisciplinehouldhavecustody f habit, and itdidnot take ongforhimtoanswerby explicitlydeclaring hatthephenomenon elonged opsychologysee, e.g., 1888a,p. 51; 1901,p. 44; 1911b,p. 111).Nevermind hat,byhisowntestimony,

habitsmetthesame criteria s the"socialfacts" hatwereat thecore ofhis sociology: hat theywereexternal o the ndividual n the sense thattheywereamongthe tendencies hat educationhas impressed ponus"(1912, p. 389; see also 1893, p. 320; 1895b,pp. 50-54; 1902-3b, p. 244;1904, p. 127) and thattheywere also constraining,dominat[ing]s andimpos[ing] eliefs nd practices pon us" (1901, p. 44). For all this, heidea of habit remained,nDurkheim'smind, ooclosely ssociatedwithpsychologyo merit nclusionnhissundry ronouncementsbout whatthediscipline f sociology ught o study; omnakeheconcept partof

sociology ould onlyrisk hewhole causebysuggestinghat henew fieldwas not uch an autonomous ne after ll. It is true hatDurkheimmighthave stressed he differenceetween he viewofhabitthat ppearselse-where n his own writings nd thephysiological otioncurrentn thepsychological iterature, ut it was safer to make a clean break andofficiallyoncede hispawntothepsychologists,or ociology adenough

1056







Habit

to do in studyinghose phenomena hatpossessedtheobligatorymoralcharacterhathabitwas nowsaid to ack.And fhabitcould cometothis

end withDurkheim-at the same time thathe employed he conceptthroughout is substantive ork,heldthat tdescribedmost fthe ctionthatgoesoninthe ocialworld, nd made tcentral ohisplansformoralregeneration-itsfate could only be worse at the handsof sociologistsacrossthe ocean who fell hort n muchof this nd who wereembroiledin institutionaltruggles hat appearedmore threateningnd moreur-gent.

WeberBetweenDurkheim nd Weberthere s little ommon round;nterms fassumptions, roblems, nd methods, he two weregreatlyt odds. YetWeberwas easilyas inclined s Durkheim o make serioususe ofhabit,though n doingso he ultimately arried he concept long pathsthatdiverged rom hemoralizing ighroad f his Frenchcontemporary.6

It so happens,however, hatto understandWeber'sposition n habitproperly, ne must ttendnot only ohis explicit eferenceso habitanditscognates ut also to his observationsn custom-in the trictly ebe-rian enseofcollective niformitiesf ctionrooted implyn habit 1913,pp. 170-71; 1922a,pp. 29,319-20, 652; 1922b,p. 187)-as wellas tohisuse of the special termEingestelltheit. his expression, orrowedbyWeber (less its psychophysicalrappings) rompsychologistsuch asKraepelin nd Wundt,was employed y him to designate he phenome-nonhe had inviewwhen speaking fhabit,namely, n unreflective,etdisposition o engage n actionsthathave been long practiced1908-9,pp. 93-94; 1922b,pp. 192, 442). Heretheword"disposition" ill be usedas a shorthand or hiskindof habitualdisposition nd thus s thetrans-lationfor ingestelltheit.7

6 That Weber steeredclear of themoral-reformistath ofDurkheimdoes not meanthathe was withouthis own moral udgments on thevalue ofhabitual action. On thecontrary, heWeberian"ethicofresponsibility,"s Levine has observed,extolled thefreedom f actorsto make theirown decisions" and enjoined individuals"to be con-stant n employing orrectives gainstunthinking abit" (1981, p. 20). The differencebetweenthisestimateof habitand Durkheim'sassessmentofthe same phenomenon snoteworthy, houghan examinationof this evaluative discrepancyfalls outside the

bounds ofthisarticle.7 With one evidentexception(Roth's translationofWeber 1922b, p. 570, in Weber1922a, p. 988),Weber'sEingestelltheithas been rendered attitude," attitude-set," rthe like, presumablybecause of its root in Einstellung,which is a modernGermanequivalent for"attitude." But it is important o recognizethat, in Weber's day, theterm"attitude" had yet to gain wide intellectualcurrency see Fleming 1967; cf.Bendix 1960, p. 272, n. 24). Indeed, in the psychological iterature romwhich he

1057








If these semantic omplications re kept n mind, Weber's views onhabit emerge uite clearly.Consider, o startwith,his declaration f ts

"far-reachingconomic ignificance."n Weber's estimate, the evel ofeconomicneed, which constituteshe basis of all 'economic ctivity,' scomprehensivelyonditioned y mere ustom,"whichplays ts part alsoin determininghe means of exchange nd the utilization f such basic"economic dvantages" as labor and the means of production; urther-more, the patterns f use and of relationshipmong modern] conomicunits are determined y habit" (1922a, pp. 67-68, 78, 89, 320, 335).Work tself,s Weber aw it,rests eavily na habitual oundation.ThesmallPolishpeasant succeeds n agriculture]n acountof he ow evel of

his physical nd intellectual abitsof ife" 1895, p. 434); "Germangirls[work nefficientlyn factories ecause of an inner] tonewall of habit"(1904-5a, p. 62); the "freedmenof antiquity] rospered, ortheyhadacquiredhabits of ndustry nd thrift hileslaves" 1909, p. 59). In themodernworld,a similar ituation btainswithin apitalist actories ndbureaucratic ffices, hese nstitutionseing he"offspring"f discipline,whichWeberdefined s "theprobabilityhatbyvirtue ofhabituation acommandwill receiveprompt nd automatic bedience n stereotypedforms"1922a, pp. 53, 1149, 1156 [emphasis dded]). Accordingly, is

writingsnindustry iscussed tlengthhereplacementf"the habits' fthe old occupation[s]" ydocile habits"in linewiththe demandsof the[factory] orkprocedure"1908b,p. 130; 1922a, p. 1156;see also 1908b;1908-9; 1922a, pp. 731, 1155-56), while his analysisof bureaucracyplaced great weight on officialdom's disposition Eingestelltheit)opainstaking bedience and to the]habitual and virtuosomastery f asinglefunction"1922a, p. 988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).

By Weber's reckoning, abit is also plainly n operation utside thesphereof work and economicactivity. t is thereon the battlefields,where uccesseshave been secured s wellas "forfeitedy variousmar-tial] habits" (1922a, p. 1152); there ikewise amid processesof groupformation, ith "mere custom . . facilitatingntermarriage,"the for-mation ffeelings f ethnic' dentification,"nd"thecreation fcommu-nity" 1922a, p. 320, m.t.; 1922b, p. 187); and there, oo,at thebase ofmodern olitical-legal rders,where the broad mass of the participantsact ina way correspondingo egal norms, ot out ofobedience egardedas a legal obligation, ut [in a greatmany cases] merely s a result f

borrowedheword ingestelltheit,instellungtself asgenerallyithouttsmodernmeaning of "attitude"; e.g., Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology(whichwas compiledncollaboration ith wowell-placed erman cholars,Mun-sterbergnd Groos)officiallyranslatesinstellung s "acquireddisposition"seeBaldwin1901,1:287,2:679-80).

1058







Habit

unreflectiveabit" 1922a, pp. 31, 312, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 16, 182;see also1913, p. 178).

But notonlydoes habitpromote onformityith egal aswellas other)norms, t s also involved nthegenesis f such norms. n a manner hatrecalls the earlyDurkheim,Weber held that "customs re frequentlytransformedntobinding orms,since] hemere act f heregular ecur-rence of certain events somehow confers on them the dignityofoughtness."n otherwords, whatwereoriginally lainhabits fconductowing o psychological ispositionEingestelltheit),ome ater o beexpe-riencedas binding;then,with the awarenessof the diffusion f suchconduct mong pluralityf ndividuals,t comesto be incorporatedin]

'expectations' s to the meaningfullyorrespondingonductof others;[until inallyhese xpectations]cquiretheguarantyfcoercive nforce-ment" (1922a, pp. 326, 754, m.t.; 1922b, pp. 191, 442).

In remarks uchas these,one sees theplace of habit nWeber's reat-ment of processesof change. More typically,however,what Weberstressedwas "the nertia f the habitual" 1922a, p. 321, m.t.; 1922b,p.188). n his udgment, the nner ispositionEingestelltheit)tocontinuealongas one has regularly one]contains n itselfsuch] angiblenhibi-tions gainst innovations,'that t s problematic] owanything ew canever arise n thisworld" 1922a, p. 321, m.t.; 1922b,p. 188).Moreover,he continued, ven where"revolts, anics,or other atastrophes" aveforciblyntroducedhanges, he statusquo ante has often een restoredsimply by an appeal to the conditioned ispositionEingestelltheit)oobedient ompliance" n thepartof ubjects nd officialslike 1922a, p.988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).

That Weber thus adverted to the significancef habit in so manyimportant ontextswas nothappenstance.The examples hat have justbeenmentioned-the

majorityfthem, t anyrate-were not ncidentalcomments ut reasonedformulationsullynaccord withWeber'sdirect

testimony. ot onlydo we discover, ewrote, thefurther e goback inhistory, . . that conduct, and particularly ocial action, is determined nan evermorecomprehensivephere xclusively ythe dispositionEin-gestelltheit)owardthepurelyhabitual" 1922a, p. 320, m.t.; 1922b,p.188),butwe find hat "individuals re stillmarkedly nfluenced y . . .customeven today," so much so that "the greatbulk of all everydayaction [approachesan] almost automatic reactionto habitual stimuli

whichguidebehavior n a coursewhich has beenrepeatedly ollowed"(1922a, pp. 25, 337). Despite such testimony, owever, the habitualundercurrentnWeber'sworkhasyet o be much ppreciated. ixatedonforeground,heburgeoningWeberian cholarship f hepast twodecadeshas gonefar odissectWeber'sviews on rationality,ut-aside from heperceptive eginningsfRoth 1968, pp. xxxv,xc,lxix) nd Cohenet al.

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(1975, pp. 231-33, 239)-habit has been eft ut of the accounting. hisomission s the morepeculiarfor, n the widely ead ntroductoryection

ofEconomy nd Society,Weber himself ointedly potlightedhe realmof the habitual when he placed "traditional ction" among his basic"types f social action,"conceived f thisform f conduct s action de-termined y ingrained abit," and then added to thistheabove-quotedclaim that thegreatbulk of all everyday ction" pproximates his ype(1922a, p. 25, m.t.; 1922b,p. 12). Students f Weber,nonetheless, avefailed o take due heed ofthis; t best, heyhave made noteof heconceptoftraditional ction, recorded tsdefinition,nd then et the matter o(see, e.g., Alexander1983, p. 25; Aron 1967, p. 221; Giddens 1971, p.153).

For Weber himself, owever,traditional ction was by no means aresidual ategory. he fact hatthistypeof action s defined s derivingfrom ingrained abit" serves o unite t directly ith he very spect ofWeber'sworkthathas just beenconsidered,hat s, histreatmentfthemarked ffect f habit on economic nd political ife, ocialstabilityndchange, and a good deal else. WithinEconomyand Society tself, heconcept ftraditionalction s a link, oo,tothedetailed nalysis,whichimmediatelyollows heconcept's ntroduction,fthenature f ocialandeconomic elations, or his analysisreverts epeatedly o the roleofthetraditional-in structuringommunal elationships,stablishingheex-pectations hat underlie table organizations, anking lternative co-nomic nds, canalizingworkeffort,nd so on (1922a, pp. 40-41, 49, 88,129, passim). In fact, unless one is to believe that Weber, at his ter-minologically ostprecise, lteredwithoutwarning is definitionf tra-ditional, heonlyfair onclusions that nall thishe was again observingwhat to himwerebasically heramificationsf habit.

But even more mportant,traditional ction"provides bridge ut-ward toWeber'svastwritingsn "traditionalism."his is a connectionthatParsonswas thefirstand is still mongthefew)to have discerned,thoughhethenbeclouded he ssueby recastingWeber'sformulationsofithis own emphasis on beliefs nd values at theexpenseof habit see1937, pp. 646-47). But, as Webermade clear whendefining isterms,although raditionalismmay become a pattern f belief round whichreflectivection s structured1915e, p. 296; 1922a, p. 25), in the firstinstance t is exactlywhat habit is: "the psychic disposition Einge-

stelltheit)owardhabituated outine" s thebasis of ction 1915e,p. 296,m.t.; 1915a, p. 269). Insofar s Weberwas serious bout this quationoftraditionalism ithhabit,onewouldhave to conclude hathabitwas inoperationwellbeyond hoseportions fhisworkexamined o far; hat twas actually ne ofthe underlyingoundationtones f thecomparative-historical tudies that constitutehe core ofWeberiansociology, ince

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Habit

traditionalisms amongthe central oncepts sed nthese tudies.To seejusthow seriousWeberwas, it s notnecessaryo ook far: orwhether is

subject was the economic, religious,or political dimensionof tradi-tionalism, e continuallytressed hefirminkagebetween raditionalismand habit.

Economic raditionalism,ccording o Weber, s the dherence o ong-practiced conomic forms,particularly to productswhich are stereo-typed n quantity nd qualityor to [an accustomed] evelofearnings, rboth" 1922a, p. 151; 1923b,p. 16). n his udgment, conomic ctivityfthiskind has been extremelyrevalent, ccurring ot only mong peas-ants the world over but also among medievalguildsmen, dventurer-capitalists, ndian artisans,Chinese petitebourgeoisie,nd numbers fmodernwage-laborerssee, e.g., 1904a,pp. 364-65; 1904-5a, pp. 59-76;1906,pp. 321-22; 1915c,pp. 3-20; 1916-17, pp. 111-17).Whendiscuss-ing such examples,Weber freelycknowledged hat certain ctorsmayproceed n traditionalistic ays because doing so is in their conomicinterest r is mandated by theirvalues and beliefs.Yet he explicitlydeniedthatthesereflectiveonsiderationsre theprincipal ases of eco-nomic raditionalism.ndeed, he was very areful o setthe atter part

from atterns f economic ctivity ooted n "self-interest"r "absolutevalues" and to conjoin t instead withhabit, ust as he elsewhere or-trayed raditionalismn economic ffairs s a force hat s virtuallyn-stinctive, ccurs "by nature,"and is "great in itself," ven withoututilitariannd moralsupports1904-5a, p. 60; 1915d,p. 356; 1916-17,pp. 84, 112; 1922a, pp. 150-51; 1923b,p. 16). And,inhis most ystem-atictreatmentfthetopic, conomic raditionalismas depicted rimar-ily as a manifestationf humankind'sgeneral ncapacitynd indisposi-tionto depart fromhabituatedpaths" (1923a, p. 355, m.t.; 1923b, p.

303)-or, inotherwords, s a matter fhabit seealsoMarshall 1980,p.115;Cohen et al. 1975, p. 232).A similaremphasis appears in Weber's writings n religion nd on

domination. hroughout he former, here s muchconcernwithwhat svariously called "the traditionalism f the laity," "magical tradi-tionalism," r "magical stereotyping,"xpressionshatgenerally esig-natetheformerlylmostuniversal endency or magically roved orms"ofactionto be "repeated n the form nceestablished, sometimes ith-out] he lightest eviation" 1915d,p. 341; 1922a, pp. 405, 456; 1923a,p.

161; 1923b,p. 303). Like other ctiontendencies, hisone, Weber held,has often een sustainedby religious onvictions nd by practical nter-ests 1915d, p. 331). Buthaving aid this,he hastened irectly o connectmagicaltraditionalismlso with hehabitual:with the persisting abitsofthemasses" 1922a, p. 467, m.t.; 1922b,p. 285; see also Warner1970,p. 86). In his telling, he magical "habits"of the laity antedatedthe

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development f systematic eligious ctivity nd retained lifeof theirown even afterward,s manyworldreligionseft hevast majoritymired

in its originaltraditionalism1915c, pp. 229-30; 1915e, pp. 275-88;1916-17, p. 342; 1922a, pp. 466, 470, 629, m.t.; 1922b,p. 284; 1923a, p.363). Traditionalism's abitualunderpinningsre clearly rought ut aswell inWeber's treatment f politicaldomination, articularly hen heexamined he natureof traditional uthoritynd sought he foundationfor his oldest nd mostuniversal ype f egitimacy"1922a, p. 37). Hisstatements ere peak for hemselves: traditional structuref domina-tion is based] on the belief nthe nviolabilityfwhat has always been;[thisbelief]derives . . effectivenessrom he nnerdispositionEinge-stelltheit)o theconditioned owerofthepurely abitual"-that is,fromactors'"habitual rientationo conform"nd "general sychologicalnhi-bitions gainst nysortofchange ningrained abits faction" 1918, p.79; 1922a, pp. 37, 1008,m.t.; 1922b,pp. 19, 582).

Atthispoint, t s perhapsworth bserving hat, naddition o ndicat-ingthatWeberretained he ncient oncept fhabit nd put t to work ounderstandwhat he saw as the great,proteanforceof traditionalism,Weber'swritings n traditionalism aybe seen as developing in a waythat, omy knowledge, as nowhere eenmatched) macrosociologicalperspective n habit. f Durkheim's eformisteal propelled im oexam-ine the micro-level evelopment fspecificmoralhabits,Weber's com-parative-historicalrientationed himaway from his ssue and into amore horoughgoingnvestigationf the arger ocial and cultural ondi-tions underwhich general ocietalpatterns f habitual action wax andwane.

It was Weber'sbelief hat habitualaction does not occurat random.While ndividuals verywheremayact out of habitonoccasion, hey re

not ll equally nclinedn thisdirectionn alldomains ftheir ctivity,orthere s a strong ffinityetween heway of ifewithindifferentocialgroups and the propensityf groupmembers oward various sorts ofhabitualor reflectiveonduct.Peasants,for xample, ive a "simple ndorganic xistence" evolvinground recurringcycle" fnatural vents,with the result hat traditionalismypically goeswithout aying"; hesituationwith rtisans s sometimesmuch he ame 1915d,pp. 344, 346;1916-17, pp. 104, 112, 313; 1922a, pp. 468, 1197). n contrast,membersof"civicstrata exhibit ] tendencyowards practical ationalism,for]

theirwhole existenceis]basedupon technologicalnd economic alcula-tions and] themastery f natureand man" (1915e, p. 284). Reflectivetendencies, f this nd other ypes, an be detected, oo, among ayandreligious ntellectuals nd among incumbents f rulershippositions(1915c, pp. 41-44, 142-43; 1922a, pp. 467-518). Yet, as Weber con-tinued,groups hathave been imbuedwith hesenontraditionalenden-

1062







Habit

cies have often erived eal or deal benefitsrom raditionalisticrrange-ments. ndeed, in many past social formations,uch groupsaccrued

tremendousdvantages,botheconomic nd political, rom he unreflect-ing,habitualpractices fthemasses, nd "manifold ested nterests"husalignedthemselves n the side of traditionalism1922a, p. 37), whichreceivedfurther einforcementromreligious nd philosophical reedsopposed to thealteration f establishedmodesofconductsee 1915c,pp.27-28, passim;1916-17, pp. 102-33, passim;1922a, pp. 199, 202, 239,passim; 1923a,pp. 138-41,355-65). In broadhistoricalerms, he resultofsocial and cultural orces fthese ortshas beentheestablishmentf amacro-levelpolitical, conomic, nd ideological tructure"nwhichpre-

dominantly raditional ction has prevailed n place of otherforms fhuman activity1915c, p. 6). This is the sociologicalrationalebehindWeber's ontentionhat o muchofthepastwas "a sea oftraditionalism"(1909, p. 210; seealso 1922a, p. 245). Given,moreover,hat ertainwaysof lifesupportive ftraditionalisms well as various "vested nterests"concernedwith perpetuating his orientationast into modern times(1918, p. 104), one can likewise appreciatehis argument hat tradi-tionalism s a "condition . . transcended nlygradually"; hat even ncases where here s a highdegree frationalizationf ction, heelement

oftraditional rientationemains onsiderable"1923b,p. 16;translationbyShils1981,p. 9;Weber1922a, p. 69). Onemight otice, oo,that hesejudgments bouttheoccurrence f traditionalism-about tsheavy pre-ponderance n previoushistorical eriods nd itspersistenceongafter-ward-directly parallelWeber'sremarks bout thehistoricalncidence fhabitual action,exactly s we should expect n view ofthe close corre-spondencebetween raditionalismnd habit n theWeberian exicon.

Exploring hemacrohistoricalircumstancesonducive o traditionalor habitual actionwas, of course, onlya partofWeber's project. Nottheseconditions, ut the involved sociocultural rocessby which theywere overcome o makeway formodernWestern ationalism nd capi-talismprovides he evidentfocusof much ofWeber'swork. Here, how-ever,we are on terrain ufficientlyamiliar hat t can be largely assedover, except n one respect. t scarcelyneed be emphasized that theCalvinistReformationigures ignificantlynWeber's ccountof thede-velopment fthemodernWesternworld. n describinghis ccount,mostcommentatorssethe tandard erminologyfreflective odels f ction;theyargue thatWeber viewed Calvinist deas as the source of a newcomplex fvalues and normsi.e., the nner-worldlysceticprinciples f"the Protestant thic"), which, n turn,fostered he emergence f therational rientationo conductknown s "thespirit f capitalism" Mar-shall 1980, pp. 14-27). This interpretations quite faithful o Weber'swork,butonlyuptoa point.For ustas Durkheim eldthatmoral ction

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inthe modernworlddepends ess on simply rading ne set of beliefs oranother hanon theformationf n entirelyew moralhabitus, o Weber

maintained hatCalvinism spurred ational conomic ction because itwentbeyondthe articulation f ideas that favoredsuch activity ndproduced, nstead, fundamentallyifferent 'habitus' mong ndivid-uals which prepared them n specificways to live up to the specificdemandsofearlymodern apitalism" 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 242-43).

Weber'sthesishere s of a piecewithhis otherwritingsn religion.nhis view, t has been one ofthehighest ims ofmany alvation eligions oimpart o religious virtuosi" "totalcharacter": "specificallyeligious

habitus" or "charismatichabitus," or "permanenthabitus"-whichtranscends he "ordinaryhabitus" of everyday ife, that is, the oftenunshakablenaturalhabitusofthe majority hat takes ifeas a "miscel-laneous successionof discrete ctions" and thusmakesdo withtradi-tionalistways and an "adherence o thehabitual" 1915c, pp. 231-32,m.t.; 1915b,pp. 517-18; 1922a, pp. 534-40, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 325-28).The exclusively irtuoso ects of Calvinismwent the furthestn thisregard; from heir eligious ife, ut of their eligiouslyonditionedam-ily traditions nd from he religiouslynfluencedife-styleftheir nvi-

ronment" merged "central nnerhabitus"-"a methodically nifieddispositionEingestelltheit)"-which, henchannelednto nner-worldlyactivities, esultedn a historically omentousfflorescencefsustainedrational onduct 1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 240, 244, m.t.; 1915b,pp.527, 531). In this ense,modern ational ction tself ests, orWeber,ona foundation f habit: on a dynamichabitusthatsupplants he statichabitus hatunderlies implehabitual ction. t is true hat hese re notthetermsnwhich heWeberianpositionsordinarilyummarized. heyare, however, he termsnwhichWeberhimselfought o represent isargument. ndeed, Weber notonlydeclaredexplicitly hat,when TheProtestant thic speaks ofthedevelopment f the"capitalist pirit," tmeans "thedevelopment f[a] particular abitus,"he statedunequivo-callythathis controversialtudy intentionallyconcentratedn]the as-pectmostdifficulto graspand 'prove,' the spect]relating othe nnerhabitus" 19lOb, pp. 157, 186,n. 39; latter ranslationyTribe nHennis1983, p. 146; see also Weber 1904-5b, p. 182).

For all thisemphasison thehabitual, here s nonethelessnewayin

which heconcept f habitoccupies n uneasyplace inWeber's hought.To understand his, t s importantorecognize hat,during he ate 19thand early 20th century, he German academic world was, like itscounterpartslsewhere, competitiverena in whichthe advocatesofmany hen-emergingisciplines, ociology ncluded, truggled iercelyor

1064







Habit

a securepositionwithin he universitieslongside he older branches fthenatural nd sociocultural ciences nd suchupstart ields s psychol-

ogy see Ben-David and Collins 1966, pp. 461-63; Eisenstadt nd Cure-laru 1976, pp. 30-34; Oberschall 1965, p. 13). Writing rom distin-guished nd easily won chair of economics,Weber actually xhibitedgood deal more openness regarding heseinterdisciplinaryorderdis-putes thanmany of his contemporariesHennis 1983, p. 161). He, too,however,was an activeparticipantn theMethodenstreit,hecelebratedcontroversyverthenature f cience hatprovided he ntellectual ack-ground o thedisciplinaryquabbles seeBurger1976,pp. 140-53; Cahn-man 1964;Oakes 1975, pp. 16-39).

In positioning imself mid thiscontroversy,Weberset the naturalsciences partfrom hesocioculturalciences,holding hat t s only helatter isciplines-those withwhichhewas allied-that treathumans s"cultural eings"whose action embodies "subjectivemeaning, which]maybe moreor ess clear to the actor,whether onsciously otedornot"(1904b, p. 81; 1913, p. 152).The objectiveof such sciences, herefore,sto understand uman actionby"identify[ing]concretemotive' . . towhichwe can attribute he conduct n question" 1903-6, p. 125). Thenaturalsciences, n contrast, schew this"subjectiveunderstandingfaction andfavor] heexplanation f ndividual acts y applying generalcausal laws]" (1922a, p. 15). Accordingly,twas amongthe natural ci-ences that Weber classifiedmost contemporary sychology,with itssearchfor he"laws of psychophysics"nd itsfragmentationfexperi-ence into such " 'elements' as] 'stimuli,' sensations,' reactions,' and]'automatisms' (1903-6, pp. 136, 140; 1908a, p. 31). In hisopinion, hesocioculturalciences-economics, history,nd also sociology-coulddowithout ll this,for ction "does not . . becomemoreunderstandable'

than t wouldotherwise y the introductionf]psychophysical"oncepts(1908a, p. 29). Yet, as Weber'swide reading ftheEuropean andAmeri-can psychologicaliterature isclosed, hese wereprecisely he conceptsunderwhichthebusinessofhabit was commonlyubsumed see 1908b,pp. 112-34; 1908-9, pp. 64-65, n. 1, 72-106).

For a more sectarianacademic, this circumstancemightwell havesufficedoplace habitaltogether eyond hepurview f thesocioculturalsciences.Weberdidnot succumb othisknee-jerk eaction, owever. ftheworkofpsychologistsrained he ubjectivemeaning ut ofhabit,his

ownresearchesended ntheopposite irection, otonlywhen xaminingsuchgreatvessels ofmeaning s thehabitusof Calvinism nd of othersalvation eligions ut also whenconsidering oremundaneworkhabits,military abits,politicalhabits,magicalhabits,and the ike. For at nopointdid Weber treat suchphenomena, n the mannerof the natural

1065








scientist studying human activity, as "incomprehensive tatisticalprobabilit[ies]"1922a, p. 12);that s, as nonunderstandableehaviors or

which tis impossible o identifyny conscious r nonconsciousmotive.Nevertheless, ven Webercame within he spell of psychological o-

tionsof habit. He thus couchedhis definitionf traditional ction n thepsychophysical rgot of "stimuli"and "automatic reactions," nd hetended ikewise o portray hisform faction s existing by nature" ndantecedent o culture see above, and 1922a, pp. 17, 320-21, 333, 1134).Given the nterdisciplinaryontroversiesfhisage and his commitmentto study culturalbeings" while setting side the natural cientificp-proach of the psychologists,hese views on habit could but raise grave

doubts bout the concept's elevancewithin heWeberian onception fthe sociocultural ciences. Such doubts were codifiedn Economy andSociety, where Weber urged the sociologist o investigatemeaningfulsocial action and then nnounced hattraditionalr habitualconduct-describedhere n psychophysicalerms, ather han n theinterpretivelanguageused in his empirical tudies-"lies very lose to the borderlineofwhatcan ustifiably e calledmeaningfullyrientedction, nd indeedoften n the otherside" (1922a, p. 25). This formulation as a riskycompromise.t left hedoor tothedomainofhabit ufficientlypenthatWeber's sociologycould still incorporatehis own ample analyses ofhabitualaction,but it set thatdoor precariously nough jar thatthosewithother nclinationsmight uickly lose t, and close t forgood.

The American cene

To American ontemporariesf Durkheim nd Weber,the conceptofhabitwas also a familiartem. n the astdecadesofthe19th enturyndthe

earlydecadesof the20th-to gobackno

further-onefindshe

deaall over he ntellectualandscape, nvoked likebypopularreformers,ysolemnHarvard philosophers, y social evolutionists ith Lamarckianleanings, nd by evolutionaryhinkers fa moreDarwinianbent, uchasSumner n theright nd Veblenon the eft see Curti1980, pp. 233-34;Kuklick1977, pp. 74-75, passim; Stocking1968, pp. 238-69; Sumner1906; Veblen 1899, pp. 107-8, passim). Mentionoftheseevolutionarycurrentstself uggests omethingfthebiologisticight nwhichhabitwas seen at this time. But thebest ndication fthis,as well as of the

concept's ontinuing tilization,ppears n theworkof the earlyAmeri-can psychologists. his work is particularlynstructiveince not onlydoes it contain heage's most ystematictatementsbouthabit, t alsorevealsthepointofdeparture or he sociological reatmentsf the sub-ject thatwereproducedduring he same period.

To appreciate hepsychologists'iewsproperly, owever, fewwords

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Habit

about institutionalontext re necessary. n the post-Civil War era,American ntellectualifewas affected eeplybytheemergencefmajor

research-orientedniversitiesnd numerous atellite olleges,whichof-fered, o thosemenand womenfortunatenough oestablish hemselvessecurely n theinside,solid research nd careeropportunitieshathadlong been in notoriouslyhort upply. n this regard,members fdisci-plinesconstituteds separatedepartments ere n an especially avoredposition, ince"departmentaltatus meant] ncreasedrewards n fundsand power, an arrangement hat]provided powerfulmpetus o the[splitting ffof] distinct ubjects" Ross 1979; p. 123). Here, however,therewerecontendersplenty, majority fthemviewed uspiciously y

those who werealreadywithin hevarious nstitutionsfhigher duca-tionand quick, therefore,o demandthat new fieldsustify heir wnentrynto the academy by "constantly rov[ing] nd solidify[ing]heirstatusas sciences" Ross 1979, p. 125). Faced withthisrequirement,twas theyoungdiscipline fpsychologyhatbecame a particularuccessstory, chievingdespite its nd starts) epartmentalank nmany ead-inguniversities yaround heturn fthe century ndspreading utwardto otherhigher ducational nstitutionsytheend ofWorldWar I (seeCamfield 973;Cravens1978,pp. 58-71; Curti1980,pp. 197-203;Wat-son1965).Much ofthereasonfor hiswas preciselyhefact hat,fromtsstart,Americanpsychology ollowed heexampleofthenew Europeanpsychology nd brought o the study of mental ife the concepts ndmethodsof Darwinian biology and experimental hysiology-sciencesthen t thesummit fthe academichierarchyseeBoring1950;Cravens1978,pp. 56-86). Forall thedisputes hat oon emergedwithin cademicpsychology,moreover, his taunch ommitmento build the field longthe lines of the establishedbiophysical ciences was one that actuallygrew all the stronger y the earlydecades of the 20thcentury, s thephilosophicallyrainedpioneers fpsychologyeft he scene to numbersofspecializedresearchers eterminedo push forward he campaign oinstitutionalizeheireminentlycientific iscipline see Camfield 1973,pp. 70-73; Smith1981,pp. 28-29).

The image of habitthat had been incubated n 19th-centuryuropecameinto ts own inthis ituation, orhabitualprocesseswere a topictowhichAmericanpsychologistsrequently urned, nd, whenever heydid,whatemergedwas the dea thathabit s an essentially iophysiolog-

ical phenomenon,most n evidence nthe imple ctivities f human ndotherorganisms.This idea was already presented s a truism n thebroadlyread work ofWilliam James,which, n seeking o show how"mechanical cience . . set[s]herbrandofownership nthematter,"aiditdown that habitbespeaks the factthat "our nervous ystem rows othemodes nwhich thas beenexercised," o much o that ven complex

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habits re "nothing ut concatenated ischargesn thenerve-centers,ueto the presence here f systems f reflex aths" 1890, pp. 107-8, 112).

Congruent iews werewidely xpressed: y theveteran cholarBaldwin,to whom habitswere "lowermotor yntheses"1897, p. 55, n. 2); by therisingyoung experimentalisterkes,who regardedhabit, whether nturtles,frogs,or humans, as "a tendency oward a certainaction[resulting rom hedevelopmentn theorganism] f a track alongwhich]nervous mpulse[s] ass" (1901, p. 545); by the eclectic heoretician n-drews,who concluded nan importantffortt synthesishat habit ..is at bottom physiological henomenoninvolving] euralmodifications[caused] by theneuralexcitations" 1903, pp. 139, 149). Similar tate-

mentswere nscribed ntothetextbooks f the periodby authoritiesuchas Angell,Judd, Pillsbury, nd Swift see Fearing 1930, pp. 242, 247;Watson1914, pp. 252-56).

The complete riumph f this pointofview came whenJohnWatsonlaunched, early n the second decade of this century, he "behavioralmovement"n Americanpsychology. etermined o make psychologyeven moremanifestlycientifichan thad alreadybecome, opurge hefield f all "introspectivelysolableelements such as] sensation, ercep-tion, imagery, tc.," and to "write psychology instead] n termsofstimulus nd response" 1913, pp. 199, 201), Watson adopted a thor-oughly hysiologized onception fhabit nd thenplacedthis oncept tthevery centerof his program orthe analysisof humanconduct. nWatson'sview, habit is simply "system f [acquired]reflexes" r re-sponses, or, in otherwords, part of "the total striped nd unstripedmuscular and glandular changes which follow upon a given[environmental]timulus" 1914, pp. 184-85; 1919, p. 14;see also 1914,pp. 184-276; 1919,pp. 169-347).He contended, urthermore,hat man

is the sum of his instincts nd habits," meaninghereby hat all nonin-stinctivectivitys to be seen as habit nhisparticularense of the term(1917, p. 55; 1919, p. 270). So insistent as Watsonon this ount hatheactually onceivedof thinkingtself-whichhad longbeenregarded stheultimate asis ofreflectiveumanaction-merelyas an operation fthe tongue, hroat, nd laryngealmuscles .. movingnhabitual rains"(1919, p. 11).

Had Watson's pronouncementseen idiosyncratic utpourings, nemight, fcourse, asilywrite hem ff.n fact,however, is behaviorism

notonly representedn integrationf a good deal ofpreviouswork nAmerican sychology,talso became, bythemid-1920s, ne of thegreatintellectual rthodoxiesmongprofessional sychologists, any fwhomwereutterlyelectrifiedy . . Watson's deas,"whichworked o well toconsolidatehe cientifictatus ftheir ising ieldCravens nd Burnham1971,p. 645; see also Baken 1966;Burnham1968b;Curti1980,pp. 373-

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Habit

80; Samuelson 1981). Nor wereWatson ndhisconfederateseluctantoextend heirclaims into the traditional omainsof the social sciences.

Convinced that humangroupings, oth simpleand complex,differedfrom ortuga'sbirds nd whiterats n littlemore han thegreaterntri-cacy of theirhabits,Watsonoffered ispsychologys a master ool "toguide society . . towards the control fgroup as well as] individualbehavior" 1913, p. 202; 1917; 1919, pp. 2-3); and,followinguit,fellowbehaviorists uch as FloydAllportdefined ocial institutionshemselves''merely as] similar nd reciprocalhabitsof individualbehavior" andthenproposed hatthediscipline ppropriate or hestudy fthesocialworld"is not sociology,but psychology,"which derives ts principles

from biology, hemistry,nd the othernatural ciences" 1924, p. 18;1927, pp. 167-68).

As we shall see, sociologists ound laimsof this ortfartoo muchtobear and soon reactedadversely o theentire,physiologicallyontami-natedbusinessof habit. The important oint o appreciate,however, sthatprior o thisdevelopment, merican ociologistslso madereadyuseofthe ge-old oncept, ometimesmployingt nthemanner f 18th- nd19th-centuryuropean social thinkers,houghmore often ctually n-dorsing hepsychologists' iophysiologicalpproach. Such an endorse-mentwillseemremarkable, oo, until t s recognizedhat,from he ate19th century hrough he early years of the 20th century,American"sociology s a whole restedprimarily n [a] psycholog[ical]"oundationand freelydopted the"assumptions fcontemporaryhysiological sy-chology"Petras1970,p. 231; Cravens1978,p. 142;see also Hinkle1980,pp. 69-71; Hinkle and Hinkle1954,pp. 7-9; Lewis and Smith1980,pp.153-80). This was true, at any rate,among thosesociologistswho re-garded heir ield s a bonafide ntellectual iscipline, ormuch hat henwentunderthe name of "sociology"was really motley ssortment fefforts t moral reform nd practical social improvementOberschall1972,p. 203). It was, indeed,under he ppliedbanner hat ociology irstinsinuatedtself nto manyhigher ducational nstitutions, here t ongsurvived hieflys an undergraduate ocational ffering,aught y part-time nstructorsCravens 1978, p. 123; Oberschall 1972,pp. 210-13).The discipline, s a result,was perpetually urrounded by a sea ofacademicdoubterswhoquestioned its] ubstance"-a situation roughthomeby therarity ithwhich ociologywas accordeddepartmentalank

or admitted nto prestigiousuniversitiesother than Columbia andChicago) Ross 1979, p. 117;see also Cravens1978, pp. 123-38; Furner1975,pp. 291-312; Oberschall1972). Under hese ircumstances, ould-be professionalociologists nderstandablyeveloped an obsessive on-cernwith the academic legitimationoftheirdiscipline] s a science"(Oberschall1972, p. 189). It was inparttoachieve this egitimationhat

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these thinkerswidelyand frequently redicated heir nalysesofsociallifeon the findings f the more stablishedcienceofpsychology,ust as

psychology ad in its turn ppealed tothedistinguishediological ields(Cravens 1978, p. 141).

Accordingly,mong sociologists f the time, he concept f habitcon-tinued o function-alongside erms ncompassing he reflectiveide ofhuman conduct-as an active partnern the enterprise f social theory.Examples are plentiful:Giddings ccepting he notion hat habit s anaffair f the "nervous pparatus" and then making t the verytask ofsociology o study "the nature of the soci[al man], his habits and hisactivities"1900, pp. 11,72); Cooleynodding ikewise oward hephysio-

logical usage of habit and concerning imselfwithhow "habit exerts ]fixing nd consolidating ction n the growth f the self,"with hedevel-opment f the "habit of conscience,"withthe way the modern conomygenerates a whole system f restless] abits," nd so on (1902, pp. 187,368, 370, 379; 1909, pp. 328-29); Ross attendingn detail to "habitsofconsumption"nd "habitsofproduction"1908, pp. 262-66); theyoungW. I. Thomasassertinghat all sociologicalmanifestationsroceed romphysiological onditions" nd placing thehabitsof the group" nd theirvagaries mong heprimarynterestsfthe ocial theorist1905, pp. 446-47, 449-51; Stocking1968, p. 260); Hayes (a decade later till)defininghabits s "established erebroneuralendencies"nd describing hem sdecisivemolders f the human personality1915, pp. 297-98, 394); andEllwood adopting neurophysiologicaliewof habitand thendeclaringthat"for he ndividual nd for ocietyhabit s ofsupreme mportance,[since t s]themaincarrier fall thoseforms f ssociation . . which iseabove themerelynstinctiveevel, andis thus] hechief aw material nwhichcultural volutionmust act. The higher tagesof human culture

[have actually] een builtup by thegradualdevelopmentof]higher ypesofhabit, [and] the social orderof even thevery highest ivilization salmost ntirelymadeup of habitual ypes f individual] eaction"1912,p. 107; 1917, pp. 62-63). Even RobertPark, ust embarking pon hisacademiccareer, umpedon thebandwagon, xuberantlyaudingworkon "thephysiologyfthenervous ystem," efiningcharacteras]noth-ingmore han he um .. ofthosemechanisms hichwe callhabit," ndannouncingthat ducation ndsocial controlre argely ependent ponourability o establish abits nourselves ndinothers"1915, pp. 82, 84;

see also 1904, p. 39).Despite all this,theconcept'sdays werenumbered.As behaviorismgrewnstrengthmongpsychologistsnthedecade or so afterWorldWarI and made its advances into sociological erritories,ociologists efen-sivelyrecoiledfrom heconceptual rameworkfphysiological sychol-ogy. That they eacted n thisway,moreover,s more commentaryn

1070







Habit

the tate f ociologytself hanonbehaviorism,or hebetter-establishedsocial sciencesof the timewere generally nruffledy the behaviorist

challenge see Curti1980, pp. 395-98). Sociology, owever, emained na vulnerable osition, aggingbehind nterms f academic nstitutional-ization s late as the arly1920s,when hediscipline till onsistedmainlyofa scatteringfundergraduateourses aught romwithin ther epart-ments see Cravens 1978, pp. 129-30; Ross 1979, pp. 124-25). Com-mitted pokesmen or hefield husbecameever morepassionatelyon-cernedwith the vigorous assertion f [the]disciplinary utonomy" fsociology Matthews1977, p. 149; Cravens 1978, pp. 121-22, 147-53)and respondedwithalarmat thebehaviorists' ncroachments.ndeed,

formanypractitionersf ociology,hewholepostwar eriod tood ut asan age when "extreme ehaviorismhreatened o dominate hesociolog-ical scene" Odum 1951, p. 450).

Fearfulof ust suchan outcome, ociologistsmoved withdispatch ostemtheapparent ide ofbehaviorism,nd it was in so doingthattheypurposefullybandoned the venerableconceptof habit. There are, ofcourse, exceptions o the rule-Bernard (1926),who sought compro-misewiththe behaviorists hatpreserved abit n itsphysiological rap-pings;Maclver (1931), who was steeped na traditionf Europeansocialtheory ntedatingbehaviorism nd continued o speak ofmoral,reli-gious,political, nd economichabits cf. Sorokin1947,pp. 43-51). But,increasingly,hesewereminorityoices. n theview ofmany ociologists,habitwas thebehavioristdea of habit: o countenancehiswas to acceptbehaviorism'shysiologicallyeductionistccount fhuman ction nthesocial world ndtoruleoutall those nstances freflectivection hathadlong heldan important lace inAmerican ociology longwithhabitualaction. That broaderconceptualizationsf habitmighthave been sub-stituted or hebehaviorist ormulationnd wereactually vailableinsoready sourceas Dewey (1922; see n. 3 above) matteredittle.Dewey'sstatementsn habit wereread butnot seized as an alternativeAllport1954, p. 59), for n an intellectual ettingwherehabit was so closelyassociatedwithpsychology,ny useoftheconcept eemed o exhibitustthekindof rel[iance] nconcepts orrowed rom nother iscipline" hatjeopardizedthe autonomy f sociology Matthews1977, p. 149)8 It istrue,as sociologists rankly dmitted, hat breakingwithpsychologymeant hat ociology ould no longer nhance ts scientificredentials y

leaning on the "reputation f thephysical ciences" Ellwood 1930, p.

8 Mead's "socialbehaviorism,"owever,was palatablebecause t concentratedn"the ctivity f ndividualsnsofars they reacting s self-consciousembers fasocialgroup," venthoughMead himselfsaw most actsas habituated esponsesproceeding ithoutelf-consciouseflection"LewisandSmith 980,pp. 144,160).

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187);but bythispoint ucha sacrificeppearedpreferableoremainingnthe"intellectualhralldom" fpsychology nd automaticallyelinquish-

ing the argergoal of nstitutionalndependenceCravens1978, p. 191).Whateludedsociological hinkers erewas that heyweremerelynvert-ing theapproachthey ejected: hat ust as Watsonmadehabitvirtuallyeverythingnsocial ife, o incasting heconcept side,sociologists ere,in effect,llotting abit no role n the socialworldworth ven speakingof. The once-accepted ropositionhathabit mbraces artoftheprocessof social action thus met ts opposite n two extreme irections,s thequest for cademic autonomy rodedtheprospects or ontinuingn themiddleway.

Thissweeping hift way from abitfoundtsearliest xpressionn thework fThomas.In the mmediate ftermathfhisownearly xposure oWatsonian ehaviorismseeJenningst al. 1917),Thomasunequivocallyreversed isonce-positivetancetowardphysiologynd likewise owardhabit. Now, deeming nacceptable theprinciples ecentlyevelopedbythebehavioristic chool,"particularlyts"indistinctapplication] fthetermhabit' to [all] uniformitiesf behavior,"he bluntly eclared that" 'habit' . . shouldbe restrictedo thebiological ield; for t] nvolvesnoconscious, urposeful egulation f conduct], utmerely .. is unreflec-tive.... The uniformityf behavior that onstitutesocial ife] s not auniformityforganichabitsbut ofconsciously ollowed ules" Thomasand Znaniecki1918,2:1849-52). Situatedwithin he acclaimedvolumesof ThePolishPeasant, thispronouncement as an extremelymportantone, not least because it was conjoinedwith a proposalto instate heconcept f attitude" t thecenter f ocialtheory1918,1:22-35,2:1831-63). Indeed, thasbeenargued hat hisproposalbyThomas was actuallythewatershedn theprocessbywhichtheterm attitude" ook on its

modernmeaning nd was projectedntoprominencesee Fleming1967,pp. 322-31). This is notto saythatThomasoffered is newconcept s aninoffensiveynonym orhabit; on the contrary, e conceptualized t-titude s an aspectof "individual onsciousnesswhichdetermines" orereflectiveypes f action 1918, 1:22, 2:1853;Fleming1967,pp. 326-27).But itwas not ongbeforenonreflectiverocesseswerewholly clipsed,as it became commonplace o use attitude o describe"tendencies faction"thatmightotherwisehave been called habits Faris 1928, pp.276-77).

As thispractice ook hold, thecampaignagainsthabit that had com-mencedwithThe Polish Peasant enlisted ubstantialupport.Thus, Ell-wood,whohadpreviouslyeen habit s theessence fcultural volution,was soonconvinced hat toexpress man's] ultural volutionnterms fstimulusnd habit s . . . inadequate, since] t formulates hat s distinc-tiveofman in terms f what is common o bothman and theanimals

1072







Habit

belowhim" 1918, p. 789). Increasinglyritical fthewhole dea ofhabitand of"theBehaviorist whoneglects verything]xcept hemodification

ofhabitsor reflexes," llwood devotedmuch of his later workto thereflectiveintellectual lements" ywhichhumans ranscend hehabitual(1927, p. 65, 75; 1930, p. 204). In due course,Park, too, cameto arguethatwhatwe do "whenwe behavemost ikehumanbeings is]prettyureto escape thebehavioristswho focus n]habits"; hathuman haractersneither instinctive or . . habitudinal," utan outgrowth f "presentattitudes," hich he ociologistan studywithout ecourse othe physi-ologicalterm . . habit" 1930, p. 98; 1931, pp. 17-32; cf. Park andBurgess 1921, pp. 438-39; Park and Miller 1921, pp. 82-83). Faris

sounded imilar hemes, ashing utagainst he physiological sychologyandneurological sychology"fthebehaviorists, isdainingheir defec-tivetheoryfhabit"and concludingtheword habit' s quiteunsatisfac-tory" o capture all the "thinkingnd striving"hat constitute umansocialconduct; orhim lso, attitudewas thepreferableoncept 1921, p.194; 1924, p. 41; ca. 1930a, p. 236; ca. 1930b,pp. 244-46).9In fact, oreadilydid thisgeneralpointofview make its markthat,bytheearly1930s,Queencould approvingly eport hat inrecent ears .. studentsof human relationshave talked less about habits and more about at-titudes" 1931, p. 209), while histories fAmerican ociology rom hesame periodcould identify o contemporaryociological reatmentsfhabitsave for hose of Bernard nd Dewey and digressed nstead o thetopicofattitudeBogardus 1929, pp. 518-19; Karpf 1932, pp. 334-42,408-9). Anda fewyears ater,whenZnaniecki ssuedhismassive reatiseSocial Actions,he could confidentlyeiteratehepoint,made yearsbe-forewithThomas,that 'habit' is an expression hat ociologists] refernotto use," since t denominates "biologicalbehavioral' atternthat] sof no importance or he

studyf

social] ctions" 1936, pp. 40-42) and,withthat, et the matter rop altogether.In thefollowing ear, a youngTalcottParsons added to the chorus.

One often-overlookedeitmotif f The Structure f Social Action s, infact, what Parsons later described s its "vigorous . . polemicizing"against behaviorism 1978a, p. 1353). Attacking"the behavioristicscheme" for reducing the individual to a "biophysical unit" and

9Likemany naturalcientist hohaspracticednder neparadigmndcannever

entirelyhiftoanothernthewake of scientificevolutionseeKuhn1962, p. 144-59), Thomas,Ellwood,Park, ndFarisallhadmoments hen heyapsedback ntotalkabouthabit, venafter heyhad formallyenied hesociological alue oftheconcept see, e.g., Thomas 1927,pp. 143-47; Ellwood 1925, pp. 88-93; Park 1930, p.96;Faris1937,p. 182).Only nthegenerationhat ucceededhese ioneers as theirconceptual reakwith hepastfullyarriedhrough-again,much s inthecase ofscientificevolutions.

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"exclud[ing he] subjective spect" of human conduct,Parsonswas led,like his early ontemporaries,o equate habit directly ith the psycho-

logical oncept fhabit"or, n otherwords,with hebehaviorists'ndlesstalkabout organically conditioned eflexes r habits" 1937,pp. 76-78,116, 380, n. 3, 647; see also 1934, pp. 437-40)-an equation he was toretain ormuch of his career 1959, p. 687; 1975, pp. 667-68; 1978b,p.389; cf. Parsons and Shils 1951, pp. 78, 89, 125). But suchan equationcould onlyprove nimical o habit since, when writing he Structure fSocial Action,Parsonswas as eager as othersnthesociological ommu-nity o differentiatehe sociologist's pproach from hebehaviorist p-proach,for he atter eemedto imply hattherewas "no place" for heyoung ield f sociology 1937, pp. 115-17, 773-74). He accordingly ro-posed to establish ociology s one of a handful f"independent"ciencesofaction, ach of whichwould have as its domainone ofthefour emer-gentproperties"f action ystems-with thehereditaryasisofperson-ality"falling o psychology, economic ationality"o economics, coer-civerationality"opolitical cience, nd "common-valuentegration"osociology1937, pp. 760-73). Forpresent urposes,what s most trikingaboutthis eeminglyncompassingcheme sthat,beyond he residuum... referable o heredity"1937, p. 769), t s a mappingwhollyimited othe provinces f reflective ction, a limitation hat accordswell withParsons's premise hat action consists f a reasonedselection f meansandendsbytheapplication f"guiding orms"1937, pp. 26,44-45, 48).Twist and turnhis groundplan for he sciences f action s much s welike, t yieldsno nichewithin ociology, r even within llieddisciplines,for he tudy fhabitualforms fhuman ocial action.ForParsons, s forother ociological pponents f behaviorism uring he1920sand 1930s,habithad abruptly eased to be an acceptable,going oncern fthe ocial

theorist.There are, however, factors hat make Parsons'sown treatment fhabit in The Structure f Social Action especially ignificant. or onething, histreatment as presentedn conjunctionwith lengthy-andultimately ery nfluential-accountof the development f Europeansocial thought,which,aside from fewdismissive emarks1937, pp.321, 646), wrotehabitoutof the whole historyf modern ocialtheory,even whenconsidering urkheim nd Weber.This was so despitethefactthat, throughouthe actual courseof thishistory, abit had often

referredo innerdispositions nd tendencies hatwereverymuchpartofthesubjective ideofhumanconduct hatParsonsnowcounterposedohabit.Parsons's analysis tands out, in addition,because it articulated,farmore explicitly han the work of Thomas, Ellwood, Park, and theothers addone,theunderlyingonceptionfaction t which ne arrivesonce the dea ofhabit s setaside. This conception,s clearly tatedby

1074







Habit

Parsons,postulates hat all action exhibits "common tructure":hatactionprocesses o not vary ntheir orms, nly ntheir ubstance-that

is, only n terms fthe particularmeans, ends, and normswithwhichgiven ctors re concerned 1937, pp. 733-34; see also Warner1978,pp.1321-22; Zaret 1980, p. 1194). And here ies theproblem.

* * *

If we take a largerhistorical erspective n thematter f habit thanthat adopted by those who dispensed with the concept, then tohomogenize ctionprocesses n the way thatParsons'swork llustrateso

well s, I submit, nsatisfactoryor hree easons.First, hehomogenizedviewofaction ffectivelylocksoutconsiderationftheempirical oleofhabit n the socialworld. For thinkersike Durkheim nd Weber,habitwas of significantonsequencein economic,political, religious, ndmoral ife, nd elsewhere s well; but ts consequences re notsomethingone s at all prompted o nvestigate,reven tonotice,whenoneassumesthat action always takes the form f a reflective eighing, y variousnormativetandards, f means to ends. Parsonshas, it s true, cknowl-edged that "the adequate understandingfmanyconcrete henomenamayrequire heemploymentf nalytical ategories rawnfrom" utsidethe ciences faction 1937, p. 757). Butthisdeclaration asproved obea dead letter oth n his own later work and in mostcontemporaneouslinesof sociological esearch, orhabitualphenomena imply o not con-geal as salient mpirical ealities or hosewho operatewith modelofactionthat allotsno place to habit.

A secondproblemwith hismodel s itsneglect fthe heoreticalmpli-cationsofhabitual ction, ncluding hose hatrelatedirectly o the cen-tral askthatParsons etsfor theory f ction-the taskof account[ing]for he element forder n social relationships"1937, p. 102). In accordwithhisreflectiveonceptualizationf action,Parsonsholds inMunch's[1982, p. 776]useful ummary) hat ocial orderderives rom the recip-rocal penetrationf nstrumental. . andnormativelybligated ction."Neitherhe nor critics f his positionon thispointraise any questionwhatever bout the extent o which social regularitiesbtain becausehumans also act in more nonreflective,abitualways. Nowhere doesParsons confronthe Durkheimian hesis about the place of habit in

moral educationand consider he degreeto whichthe reflectivemoralactionthat he finds o necessary o sustain social ordermay reston afoundation fhabits mplanted arly on and maythereafterrystallizeonly insofar as there are numbers of activitiesthat remain largelyhabitual. Even less does the Parsonsianmodel ofaction ccommodatemoreWeberianmacrosociological erspective n the ssue: thepossibility

1075








that ome actorsmayderivereal or deal advantagesbecause other ctorsproceed in some areas) in habitualways, with he result hat he advan-

taged ctorsmaypursue ourses fconduct hat erve o perpetuate, r torefashion,hesehabitualways and theorder hey mply cf.Bourdieu ndPasseron 1970).

The thirddifficulty ith homogenizingction as Parsons does lies intheresulting onception fthe relationship etween hehumanpersonal-ity nd the social world. n his famous ttack n theutilitarianradition,Parsonsdeclares hat themostfundamental riticism f utilitarianismsthat t has had a wrongconception fthe concrete umanpersonality"(1937, p. 387). What he does not perceive,however, s the marked imi-larity between the alternativehe develops and the formulation ecriticizes. orwhetherction s depicted s thepursuit feconomic ndsvia normsof efficiency,r whethermore sublimeends and obligatorymoralnorms re also taken nto onsideration,heunderlyingssumptionis thatthe human personalitys essentially he aggregate f variousendpreferencesnd normative rientations-attributes hose content ar-sons sees as varyingndifferentocial groups nd constitutinghebasicsubstance f thesocializationprocess.Missingaltogether ere s an ap-preciation or he point hatDurkheim nd Weberurgedwhenadoptingtheconcept fhabitus,namely, hatpersonalitys a gooddeal more hanthe tidy sum of attributes ike these; that the implications or actualconduct fany particular orms, eliefs, nd ideas arehighly ontingentonthe basic cast or form fthe wholepersonalityfwhich hese ompo-nents are parts-on a generalizeddispositionwhose very shape maydiffer ithvariationsn the ocialization ractices fdifferentroups ndmay undergomajor reorganizations social formationshangehistori-cally.Thiswayof eeingpersonality as lost ight f, oo,as thehomoge-

nized view of action proposed by Parsonscodified he outcomeof thecampaign gainsthabit hatheandhisolder ontemporarieserewagingon behalf fthe cause ofsociology.

CONCLUSIONFor the present, here s no need to carry his historical nvestigationforwardn time. t is enoughto record hat, s habit was progressivelydiscarded romhe anguageof ociology, ew cohorts f ociologists holearned his anguage fresh nevitably ameto couchtheir wnthoughts

and theoriesn terms ther hanhabit,whether rnottheywereat allcognizant f therejection f theconceptbythe ikesofThomas, Park,Faris, Znaniecki, r the ncreasingly rominent arsons.Since the termsthat were current mbracedactiononlyto the extent hat t was of areflective ariety, he work of these cohorts ended neluctablythoughoftenunwittingly)o recapitulate arsons's course n The Structure f

1076







Habit

Social Action:to portrayll social actionas possessing common truc-ture nd then ooverlookboththeempirical nd theoreticalignificance

of habitual conductand the role of habitus n theorganization f thehuman personality.

One might rgue,to be sure,that ociology s a wholebenefited,n avery angibleway,fromeavingthesematters side and gettingnwithother usiness: hatthe excision f habiteffectivelybetted nstitutional-izationof the discipline s well as the varioussubstantive chievementsthat nstitutionalizationade possible.But thesebenefits ave ong incebeensecured;theyhave ceased to afford rounds or ramplingn con-ceptualresources hatwereblightedntheheatof ong-forgottenircum-

stances.By uncovering hese ircumstancesnd thusbringingo ight hehistorical rocess hroughwhich heconceptual tructuref ociology ascometo haveitsdelimited ocus, esearch nsociology's astconstitutesclear invitation o those who currently orkwithin hatstructurendtake tsfocus orgranted t last to ook without nd considereriouslyhebroader lternativeshat are in fact vailable to them.

In undertaking o examine the history f the alternative hat s theconcept fhabit,this rticlehas proposed hatrecent ffortso overcomepresentistpproaches o the study f sociology's ast be expanded o thatworks ther hanacknowledged ociological lassics nd ideasother hanthoseoccupying heforegroundftheclassicscome to be recognized sintegral o understandinghehistory f sociological hought.t hasmain-tained, furthermore,hat to appreciate how the conceptualfabric ofsociology nitially cquired certain f ts basicproperties,t s instructiveto investigate he intellectual onsequences fthe interdisciplinaryis-putes hat ccompanied heestablishmentfsociologys an independentacademic discipline and, in so doing, to examine the conceptualframework f thosefields romwhich sociologists f earliergenerationswereseeking odifferentiateheir wn discipline.Applyinghese ugges-tions, his tudy asfound hat heconcept fhabitwas long staple temin the idiom of Western ocial thinkers; hat t served as a ramifyingbackground orce n the work of both Durkheim nd Weber,exertingdecisive effectven as theycame to termswith the central ociologicalissuesposed in theirwritings; ut that,during heearlydecades of the20th entury,he ermwas intentionallyxpunged rom hevocabulary fsociologys American ociologists ttempted oestablish he utonomyf

theirdisciplineby severing ts ties with the fieldofpsychology, here(esp. in connectionwith hegrowth fbehavioralism) restricted otionof habit had come into very widespread usage. As struggles o, thisparticularonfrontationithpsychology as onethat ndedquickly ndwas soonforgotten-though orgottentthe ame time hat t eft erma-nenteffects n the nner onceptual tructure fsociological hought.

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The Matter of Habit

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