The Maritime Tiger: Exploring South Korea’s Interests and Role in the Arctic

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The Maritime Tiger: Exploring SouthKorea’s Interests and Role in the ArcticMia M. BennettPublished online: 18 Nov 2014.

To cite this article: Mia M. Bennett (2014) The Maritime Tiger: Exploring South Korea’s Interestsand Role in the Arctic, Strategic Analysis, 38:6, 886-903, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2014.952935

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The Maritime Tiger: Exploring South Korea’s Interests and Role inthe Arctic

Mia M. Bennett

Abstract: South Korea is not a traditional Arctic state, but it has several keyinterests in the region. This article explores the sources of those interests and thecountry’s commercial activities in the Arctic in the areas of shipping, shipbuildingand hydrocarbons. Since the country’s polar interests transcend commerce, however,attention is also paid to the importance of science and research and development inKorean culture. The article examines South Korea’s regional role in the Arctic,arguing that the country fits into an expanded area of Arctic destinational shippingcentred on the Northern Sea Route. Arctic states have generally welcomed thecountry as a partner in the region, and South Korea’s rise in the north appears likelyto continue as part of its broader effort to transform into a globally important politicaland economic actor.

Introduction

By virtue of its geography, South Korea is not an Arctic state, but it has diverseinterests in the circumpolar north. Cut off from land routes to Eurasia by North

Korea, the peninsular country of South Korea has historically relied on maritimeshipping for 99.8 per cent of its imports and exports by volume.1 South Korea’sinterests in the Arctic, broadly concerning shipping, hydrocarbons and science andresearch, are connected by their ability to allow the country to project maritime powerfrom afar through the key industrial technologies of transport and energy. Out ofnecessity, South Korea has strived to develop a heavy industry manufacturing base tosupport the production of large-scale maritime infrastructure and long-distance ship-ping technologies. As such, the country’s interests in the Arctic appear primarilycommercial, a perception shared by much of the existing small body of literaturecommenting on South Korean Arctic interests.2 Yet such analysis overlooks thecomplex interplay between South Korean commercial interests and the state’s desireto produce scientifically competent citizens while investing in research and develop-ment (R&D), factors which this article identifies as motivating South Korea’s Arcticactivities. Moreover, South Korea’s polar pursuits reflect a new, global outlook in itsforeign policy coloured both by economic nationalism and a desire to be seen by theinternational community as a responsible citizen concerned with issues like climatechange.

South Korea has become one of the most successful new actors in Arctic affairsbecause it is able to offer the infrastructure, technology and investments that Arcticstates require. This has resulted in numerous agreements between the South Korean

Mia M. Bennett is pursuing a PhD in the Department of Geography at the University of California,Los Angeles and is manager of the Cryopolitics blog.

Strategic Analysis, 2014Vol. 38, No. 6, 886–903, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952935

© 2014 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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government and corporations and their Arctic counterparts. Moreover, South Korea isbetter equipped to formulate a coherent Arctic strategy than actors such as theEuropean Union and the United States, which struggle to manage competing interestsfrom a wide range of sectors. In fact, it was the first Asian country to produce acomprehensive Arctic strategy: the First Pan-Government Arctic Policy Master Plan,announced in June 2013. South Korea, with its relatively strong state, preponderanceof heavy industry and maritime trade, and its need to import hydrocarbons, is able tomould secondary interests like concerns about climate change to fit its dominanteconomic and security needs.

The country has also succeeded in earning recognition of its significance as aneconomic and scientific contributor to the Arctic. The May 2013 accession of SouthKorea, along with Japan, China, India, Singapore and Italy, to observer status in theArctic Council legitimised the roles of Asian countries in the Arctic while enhancingthe legitimacy of the Arctic Council itself. South Korea’s activities in the ArcticCouncil epitomise the country’s efforts to become ‘a Korea that shares more deeplythe travails of others while also contributing to the resolution of key global issues’, asPresident Park Geun-hye affirmed in her inaugural speech.3 Her country’s rise in theArctic demonstrates that countries outside the region can have complex intereststranscending economics, suggesting that to craft an appropriate circumpolar govern-ance structure, assignment of legitimacy to stakeholders should continue to surmountpurely geographic determination.

This article seeks to explore the origins, interplay and consequences of the threemain areas in which South Korea is engaged in the Arctic: shipbuilding and shipping,hydrocarbons, and science and technology. First, an analysis of the economic andpolitical origins of South Korea’s activities in the Arctic is given, followed by a briefoverview of some of the key South Korean stakeholders with Arctic interests. Second,the article focuses on three specific South Korean interest areas in the Arctic: maritimeactivities, oil and gas, and science and R&D. Third, the article assesses South Korea’slegitimacy in the Arctic while also arguing that the accession of the Asian states to theArctic Council has helped to bolster the legitimacy of the multilateral organisationitself. Throughout, the argument is made that South Korea is becoming increasinglylinked to an economic area stretching from northern Scandinavia to the Russian FarEast along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and even beyond to Alaska and BritishColumbia. This development suggests that the time may be ripe for a more expansiveconception of destinational shipping in the Arctic, and, more broadly, the region itself.Such an expanded conception would not be based on territorial proximity andarbitrary geographical features such as the Arctic Circle, but rather on economicand political networks that more accurately reflect northern circumpolar dynamicsin the 21st century.

Economic origins of South Korea’s activities in the Arctic

Connections between the Korean peninsula and other parts of the Arctic and sub-Arctic, like Siberia, are older than commonly perceived, constituting a history ofencounters thousands of years long. Archaeologist Kim Won-yong hypothesises thatthe Neolithic inhabitants of the Korean peninsula were ‘Palæo-Siberians’.4 Reversingthe trend, in the mid-19th century, Koreans began migrating to Primorsky Krai, in theRussian Far East.5 Blade technology used in the Korean peninsula in 35,000 BP likelycame from Siberia, whose populations were moving into the peninsula6—a very early

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precursor to the technology transfer now making its way from South Korea back tothe Russian Far East in places like the Zvezda shipyard near Vladivostok, which theKorean company Daewoo is helping to construct.

Since South Korea ended its centuries-long isolation from the rest of the world in1873,7 its leaders have largely embraced modernisation and industrialisation.Syngman Rhee, the nationalist ruler of South Korea for much of the first half of the20th century and the country’s first president, advocated defending national sover-eignty while remaining receptive to Western science and technology. In 1904, hepresciently stated:

When the foreigners come inside our country, they do not intend to harm people or steal fromus; they are interested in trading for mutual benefit with all nations around the world. Wecannot stop it, and have no reason to do so. Our people should understand this, work ahundred times more diligently than before, and learn and follow the methods of foreigners sothat we can benefit from them and become like them.8

This striving for modernisation and integration into the world economy even-tually culminated in President Park Chung-hee’s launch of the Heavy and ChemicalIndustrialisation (HCI) strategy. This programme of export-oriented industrial devel-opment lasted from 1972 to 1979.9 After experiencing Japanese colonial rule andAmerican occupation, a fear of overdependence on any one country sparked SouthKorea’s drive for self-sufficiency in heavy industries. A special committee in thepresident’s office determined the six industries to be created, essentially fromscratch:10 shipbuilding, chemicals, automobiles, machine tools, electronics andsteel.11 Chaebols, or family-owned corporations, were the primary beneficiaries ofthe HCI programme, as the government essentially chose to support just a few keyfirms due to the high capital requirements and risks associated with forming theseindustries.12 Although these family-run firms have by now transformed into globalconglomerates, many of the chaebols that entered into industrial production in the1960s and 1970s—like Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo—are the ones expandingtheir activities into the Arctic today. The close communion between the state andcorporations diminished following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, with corporategovernance strengthened and the state now allowing chaebols to fail, for instance.13

Yet the continuation of state–corporate linkages facilitates an alignment of politicaland commercial interests in the Arctic, allowing South Korea to readily projecttechnological and logistical power in the region.

During the enactment of HCI, many politicians in South Korea adhered to theideology that states are viewed as superior or inferior based on their level ofindustrialisation, so the process of industrialisation itself became a ‘nationalobligation’.14 The government harnessed Confucian values, namely diligence andcollectivism, to inculcate in the working class a belief that their labour would benefitthe nation.15 Economist Tae-Kyu Park argues that Confucianism has benefitedKorea’s economic development through its influence on government, business andlabour.16 Furthermore, the government underscored the linkages between industriali-sation and national security by stressing three additional factors: small size, resourcescarcity and military threats.17 These traits still exist and partly fuel South Korea’seconomic interests in the Arctic. The domestic economy, with approximately 50million consumers, is not large enough to absorb all of the manufactured goods itproduces, so the country must find export markets. Possessing few natural resources

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of its own, South Korea must look elsewhere for raw materials and instead employ itsmain resource, labour, to produce secondary goods. Military threats, whether fromNorth Korea or elsewhere, and the essentially island-like nature of South Korea, cutoff from the rest of the Eurasian landmass by the Korean Demilitarised Zone, meanthat shipping is particularly vital for trade in peacetime and combat in wartime.18

Although South Korea has embraced globalisation in the 21st century, an under-current of economic nationalism still undergirds much of its state policy. Throughoutthe 1960s and 1970s, the government discouraged foreign direct investment andimports and maintained a nationalist attitude towards the outside world.19 SouthKorea’s industrialisation was ‘a grand success and a declaration of Koreanindependence’,20 unifying economic growth and sovereignty. Policies begun in themid-1960s undervalued the currency, favouring exports.21 However, a policyof dirigiste development precariously based on the success of just a few industrialexporters, referred to as ‘Korea, Inc.’,22 was not to last. In 1997, the Asian financialcrisis sent South Korea from ‘industrial powerhouse’ to ‘seemingly total collapse’.23

The government moved to liberalise and diversify the economy with investments inhigh-tech industries and R&D,24 of which today’s polar-related projects are an out-growth. Nationalistic ideology began to be articulated through neoliberalism and nowsits comfortably with the free market and global competition,25 while industrialstrength still reflects national success. In 2008, former president Lee Myung-bak’svision of a ‘Global Korea’ replaced ‘Korea, Inc.’. Translated from Korean, the ‘GlobalKorea’ strategy states that the country ‘adopts a more open and enterprising posturethat sees the world stage as the appropriate platform for its foreign policy and nationalinterest’.26 South Korea’s new foreign policy, internationalist in outlook, still partlyderives from national interests in shipbuilding, hydrocarbon access, and science. Thisglobalist presentation facilitates the country’s reception as a partner in various arenasincluding the Arctic, as illustrated later in this article.

Key Korean stakeholders with Arctic interests

South Korea has numerous stakeholders with Arctic interests. Albeit outside the scopeof this article, it would be useful to examine the competing interests of thesestakeholders, much as Aki Tonami and Stewart Watters do in the case of Japan.27

For the purposes of this article, the key South Korean government agencies of concernare the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, which is overseeing the design of thecountry’s Arctic policy,28 the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI), a state-run thinktank, and the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), the national polar researchbody established in 1985 with activities and research stations in both the Arctic andAntarctic. KOPRI is affiliated with the Korea Institute of Ocean Science andTechnology (KIOST), an agency with nearly 1,000 employees that leads research inbasic and applied maritime science with the goal of turning South Korea into a‘prosperous ocean nation’.29 The watery spaces of the Arctic form part of that thrust.

The First Pan-Government Arctic Policy Master Plan aims to comprehensivelymanage South Korea’s activities in the circumpolar north and bring together thevarious agencies with stakes in the Arctic. The plan has four parts: ‘Strengtheningcooperative relations with Arctic countries, expanding Arctic research activities,developing a new Arctic business model, and improving legal and institutionalinfrastructure’.30 Most germane to this article is the third point, as the state is onceagain formulating policy with commercial interests in mind. In the Arctic, the main

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Korean corporate players are the major shipbuilding companies, namely Samsung,Hyundai, Daewoo and STX, along with oil and gas majors like the state-owned KoreaGas Corporation (KOGAS), which has considered investing in the Arctic. Thegovernment’s master plan for the Arctic strives to strengthen ties with Arctic statesin the areas of fishing, offshore and energy technologies and, as the next sectionexplores in more detail, shipping, shipbuilding and developing ports and the NSR.31

Shipbuilding and shipping

The role South Korea seeks to play as a leader in Arctic shipping and shipbuilding tiesinto national interests in economic growth and security. From the first sale of20 tuna-fishing boats to Taiwan in 196932 to today’s chart-topping production ofliquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, which are some of the world’s most technolo-gically sophisticated ships,33 South Korea’s shipbuilding industry has grown tobecome the world’s largest. While the HCI programme was indisputably responsiblefor laying the foundations of South Korea’s shipbuilding industry, at the same time aneconomic downturn beginning in 1967 created an opportunity for mature technologiesand industries normally at the core,34 such as shipbuilding, to shift to lower-wageareas of production. Although wages in South Korea have crept upwards, the countryhas managed to remain at the forefront of shipping technology. Industrial chaebolssuch as STX Corporation have outcompeted former European powerhouses likeNorway’s Aker Yards ASA, of which STX became the biggest shareholder in 2008.35

As both the maritime and extractive industries advance in the Arctic, SouthKorea’s shipbuilders are poised to build the carriers needed to transport the region’sLNG. Since 2009, South Korea has built 100 of the 134 LNG tankers orderedworldwide; second-place China has built 20, and Japan only 13.36 Moreover, SouthKorean shipbuilders have the technology to build ice-capable ships for navigatingnorthern waters. Samsung Heavy Industries, for instance, developed and built threeice-class ships for the Russian shipping company Sovcomflot to transport oil withouticebreaker assistance between the Varandey oil terminal and Murmansk. Samsungprojects that it will receive 20 orders for Arctic shuttle tankers by 2015.37 Apart fromthe business of shipping oil and gas, South Korea’s state-of-the-art shipbuilders likeSamsung, Hyundai and Daewoo will likely be at the vanguard of the new technologyneeded to navigate the Arctic’s changing seas, too. Sea ice will remain in much of theArctic for the foreseeable future, likely in a thinner but more free-flowing form. Thispresents a new set of hazards that the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment(AMSA) concludes shipping technology will have to take into account.

The more South Korea enhances its shipbuilding technologies, the more capableits navy becomes, for the technology, skills and infrastructure are mutually transfer-able. Once merely a coastal force, the navy, with the new motto, ‘To the Sea, to theWorld’,38 is becoming a blue-water fleet able to help secure the shipping lanes aroundthe world39 that are crucial to the Korean economy and national security. A growingdependency on imports, particularly oil and gas, means that maintaining safelynavigable shipping lanes free from disturbances is vital to state security. TheKorean navy has deployed ships to faraway places like Somalia, where they joinedthe Combined Task Force 151 in 2009 to help combat piracy.

South Korea is likely even more interested than China and Japan in the opening ofnew Arctic shipping lanes due to its high trade dependency. The country stillgenerally adheres to a policy of trade-oriented industrialisation.40 Under this policy,

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which was initiated in the 1960s, raw materials are imported to produce finishedproducts like ships and automobiles, which are in turn exported. In the 1980s, SouthKorea relied more on foreign trade than many other countries, and this‘ultradependence’41 has remained high to the present day. To illustrate, in 2009,South Korea’s ratio of trade to GDP was 95.9 per cent, while China’s was 49.1 percent and Japan’s 24.8 per cent.42 AMSA identifies the potential transformation ofthese three states into Arctic maritime nations as one of the most important develop-ments by 2050.43 Indeed, South Korea, China and Japan are the world’s three largestshipbuilders and rank amongst the world’s top four importers and exporters ofcontainerised cargo.44 Yet the connection between South Korea’s extreme dependencyon imports and exports combined with the preponderance of the shipbuilding industrymeans that the country stands to gain proportionally more than China and Japan fromArctic development, particularly in the maritime sector. The Ministry of Oceans andFisheries (MOF) website announces, ‘Reinforcing Korea’s maritime presence acrossthe globe. Going beyond the boundaries! We work hard to expand Korea’s economicmight across the five oceans and six continents’.45 In this spatial imagining, althoughSouth Korea does not possess sovereignty over distant lands, it is still able to exertcommercial strength on and across the high seas. Specifically, the MOF mentions‘commercializing the North Pole route’46 as one of its aims—a project that must becarried out in cooperation with Arctic states, as the route stretches beyond SouthKorea’s maritime boundaries.

Of the possible Arctic shipping routes, the NSR (often referred to as the NorthPole Route, or 북극항로 in Korean) is the most appealing to South Korea. The sealane shortens the distance between East Asian and Northern European ports likeRotterdam by up to 40 per cent.47 Although the NSR has been open to internationalshipping for two decades,48 cargo volume has only recently begun to expand sig-nificantly—up to 1.35 million tons in 2013,49 but still short of its peak during theSoviet era. In 2012, while on a visit to Norway, former president Lee remarked that ifArctic routes are created, ‘[e]conomic exchanges between Europe and Asia willbecome very brisk. In particular, if Norway cooperates with us, Asian routes will beestablished, which will be very good for its future’.50 South Korean corporations canimport goods such as hydrocarbons and metals needed to produce the goods likeoffshore equipment that it can export back along the route. In 2012, two tankers sailedfrom Russia to South Korea with 60 tons of gas condensate,51 while a tanker fromFinland delivered kerosene. That same year, Norwegian exports to South Koreaincreased by 75.9 per cent from the year before.52 Still, there remains plenty ofroom to grow. Russia, for instance—South Korea’s nearest neighbour that is anArctic Council member state—only accounts for six per cent of South Korean LNGimports,53 although the KOGAS-Gazprom Memorandum of Understanding, signed in2008, envisions that deliveries of gas from Vladivostok will begin in 2015.54

This present and potential future trade reveals how destinational shipping to andfrom the Arctic is important for South Korea, which fits into an expanded conception ofArctic destinational trade between Northeast Asia, Russia and northern Scandinavia.Hyundai Glovis’s maiden pilot voyage of the NSR in October 2013 using an oil tankerchartered from Swedish company Stena Bulk exemplifies the activities along this newnorthern thoroughfare. Carrying 44,000 tons of naphtha, MV Stena Polaris sailed fromUst-Luga, Russia to Gwangyang, South Korea55—two nodes in the expanded Arcticeconomic region. Ties between South Korea and Russia are actually building onhistorical precedents, for companies from the two countries have entered into joint

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ventures since 1990.56 For instance, in 1991, Hyundai Shipping and Chun KyungShipping established a joint venture with the Russian companies SOVFRACHT andFESCO for two main purposes. First, they wished to use the Trans-Siberian Railwayto connect with cargoes coming in and out of Europe. Second, they sought newopportunities for shipbuilding, ship repair, port construction and the import of naturalresources from Siberia,57 presaging the northern-based trade and knowledge transferbetween the two neighbouring countries today.

Essentially, South Korea can be seen as part of an enlarged zone of Arcticdestinational trade that includes areas beyond the Arctic Ocean’s littoral, stretchingfrom the ports of northern Scandinavia, around the coast of the Russian Far East andSakhalin, and down into the ports of Northeast Asia (Figure 1). At present, mostshipping in the Arctic is actually destinational, centred on moving goods into theregion and natural resources out of it.58 As Captain David Snider, a discussant at the2013 Busan International Port Conference noted, ‘Busan could very possibly place

Figure 1. South Korea and the Arctic Council member states in relation to the expanded zone ofArctic destinational shipping.

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itself in the position of trans-shipment or staging area for destinational voyages intoand exiting the polar region’.59 In fact, four ports in South Korea sent out to orreceived vessels from the NSR in 2013: Busan, Daesan, Ulsan and Yeosu.60 YoungKil Park, the director of the International Marine Affairs and Territory ResearchCenter at KMI, recommends the development of a ‘strategic plan connecting theEast Sea,61 Sea of Ohkotsk and the Arctic Ocean’, while also advocating a ‘regionalintegration approach … to connect inland areas close to the East Sea, such as theRussian Far East, Northeastern China, and Mongolia’.62 Park’s views encapsulate thedesire in some Korean policy circles to further integrate the country into its regionalneighbourhood by sea and on land as a means of building a foothold into the nearbyArctic, the problem of North Korea notwithstanding.

Hydrocarbons

The combination of a dearth of natural resources and a large, energy-intensivemanufacturing sector means that South Korea must import large amounts of oil andgas. The country is the world’s fifth largest importer of crude oil and second largestimporter of LNG.63 With 80 per cent of South Korea’s oil imports shipped through theStrait of Hormuz,64 the economy could be significantly disrupted if anything hap-pened in transit—another reason the NSR holds promise. Furthermore, global energytrade is regionalising due to countries’ increasing reluctance to rely solely on theMiddle East and a growing belief between neighbouring exporters and importers inmutual economic and political interests.65 This is causing South Korea to trade withboth its northern and southern neighbours for energy. Almost 20 years ago, East Asiaand Australasia were hypothesised to be gradually forming one new region in theglobal oil market.66 This forecast has been somewhat validated by increasing LNGexports from countries like Australia and Indonesia to China and Japan. Morerecently, Central Asia has been identified as the logical provider of oil to EastAsia.67 Yet in the past five years, the move towards hydrocarbon production in theArctic has been promising enough to push China, and particularly South Korea andJapan due to their lack of land-based gas pipeline connections with Central Asia, tolook north to diversify their energy baskets. Russia has reciprocated, as it seeks toincrease exports to Asia in order to counter sluggish demand for oil and gas inEurope68—as illustrated by the signing of a landmark gas deal between Gazpromand China National Petroleum Corporation in May 2014.

The Arctic, which the United States Geological Survey estimates holds 90 billionbarrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas,69 promises a separatesource of hydrocarbons relatively free from the geopolitical tensions that plague theMiddle East. Countries developing their Arctic offshore oil deposits—like Norway,Russia and the US—could supply the resource to South Korea, adding a new northerndimension to its hydrocarbon portfolio to increase energy security. South Korea is alsoalready well equipped to import Arctic LNG, as the country has a large fleet of LNGtankers to compensate for its lack of pipeline connections. KOGAS, the country’smain gas importer, sent a delegation to the Northwest Territories, Canada in 2011 toresearch constructing an LNG terminal. Developments in natural resources andtransportation thus stand to reshape the economic geography and regional geopoliticsof the Arctic, connecting two areas in a way unfathomable a mere decade ago. AsJohnson and Derrick remind us in their study of pipelines and networked energyinfrastructure, classical geopolitics’ focus on territorial proximity overlooks

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the importance of connectivity.70 Viewing the Arctic in a more topological, network-based manner rather than privileging territorial proximity provides a more robust wayof understanding the region’s new dynamics in the energy trade.

South Korea has also expressed interest in Arctic energy aside from oil and gas,primarily with regard to the unconventional energy source of methane hydrates.Research into this ice-like substance is still in its infancy. Found in permafrost andin the seabed underlying outer continental margins,71 methane hydrates equalan estimated 53 per cent of all of the planet’s fossil fuel reserves.72 In September2013, as part of the Canada–Korea–USA Beaufort Sea Geoscience Research Survey,South Korea’s Araon icebreaker set sail from Barrow, Alaska with its AS-350helicopter on board to research methane hydrates in Canada’s exclusive economiczone. With South Korea providing the infrastructure and technology needed toresearch this much-hyped resource, cooperation on the energy frontier betweenSouth Korea and the Arctic states stands to deepen in the near term.

Science, education and research and development

Technologically, South Korea is highly advanced. It has some of the world’s highestsubscriptions of wireless broadband and was the first country in the world to offerfourth-generation services.73 Much of this technology was built thanks to the coun-try’s impressive human capital. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD)’s Programme for International Student Assessment surveyfinds that South Korea is consistently one of the top performers among the countriessurveyed, scoring fifth in maths and reading and eleventh in science.74 When thegovernment launched its HCI programme in 1972, it also created vocational schoolsas part of the ‘movement to scientificize the whole people’.75 Before 1948, theKorean vocabulary did not even possess all of the requisite words to discuss scienceand maths.76 By the time high rates of economic growth began, Korea already had awell-educated labour force, allowing it to transition into sectors that were moreadvanced in terms of technology and organisation.77 These very sectors, such asshipbuilding and offshore technologies, represent the leading edges of Korea’s eco-nomic activities in the Arctic today.

The state’s interest in science and R&D as a route towards economic advancementis therefore a major driver of the country’s northern interests. As President Park notedin her inaugural speech, ‘At the very heart of a creative economy lie sciencetechnology and the IT industry, areas that I have earmarked as key priorities’.78

South Korea invested the equivalent of 3.36 per cent of GDP in R&D —the fifthhighest proportion in the world.79 On KOPRI’s website in 2012 (since updated), thegreeting from the institute’s president, Hong Kum Lee, stated:

Antarctic is the sole part of the earth that can help us secure national interests throughscientific research while arctic [sic] is special in light of the fact that the region requires jointdevelopment through joint research with neighbouring countries … Expanding researchactivities on a continuous basis in these earth’s last undeveloped and non-polluted regionswould be the only way to secure national interests for the country.80

While KOPRI connects research at both poles to national interests, it sees the Arcticas unique in that development requires international cooperation. The high barriersto entry, namely cost and technology, mean that it is easier for countries to develop

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their natural resources through joint partnerships even if profits must ultimately beshared.

Agencies like KOPRI and KIOST and companies in the shipbuilding and offshoresectors view the Arctic as an arena in which national interest in science can beengineered into commercial opportunities. Tellingly, KOPRI, even though it hastraditionally focused on science, claims it ‘moved into the knowledge based economyR&D’ in 2013.81 The country’s icebreaker, Araon, a modern vessel built in 2009, hasconducted research for both scientific and commercial purposes, such as with theaforementioned methane hydrates study. In 2012, the government announced a planto invest $3.16 billion in the country’s offshore and Arctic sectors by 2020 toincrease their global competitiveness. While it is unclear exactly how much of thisinvestment is specifically earmarked for Arctic activities, the sum still represents alarge amount of money for a country that has limited offshore and, of course, noArctic developments within its own territory. The greeting on the website of theKorea Institute of Science and Marine Technology, a state agency that evaluates andprovides funding to marine science research, declares that green technologies andindustries will ‘play the pivotal role in aiding Korea to become a wealthy nation inmarine resource and technology’.82 This message typifies a view common in SouthKorea that scientific research—especially if its results can be materialised, monetisedand exported—is critical to economic growth. Deepwater technologies for mineralextraction are one area of investment,83 and with few oil and gas resourcesof its own, South Korean companies will likely export the technologies they developto countries like Russia. Carbon capture and storage forms a second important area ofinvestment, as South Korea is concerned about climate change for two reasons. First,it has experienced extreme weather events such as flooding in Seoul. Second, it seeksto build an identity as a responsible global citizen: it was the first Asian country topass cap-and-trade legislation,84 and in 2012 it was announced that the headquartersof the United Nations Green Climate Fund to assist developing countries in dealingwith climate change would be located in Seoul.85 With heightened visibility in globalenvironmental policy circles, South Korea is able to situate its activities in the Arcticas part of a broader national attempt to promote sustainable development on a globalscale.

Arctic legitimacy

Arctic states have largely welcomed South Korea’s attempts to play an importantregional economic role. This is unusual given that the region is home to countries likeCanada and Russia, which have traditionally ascribed legitimacy to Arctic actorsbased on possession of northern territory. Despite this view, South Korea has managedto turn commercial ties with Arctic states into political linkages. In fact, bilateralismhas become a means for South Korea to pursue strategic national interests. In 2007,former president Lee (also former CEO of Hyundai Group, the world’s largestshipbuilding company) discussed the possibility of developing natural gas depositsin East Siberia. He said: ‘As Russia has energy resources South Korea needs, andthere are other mutually necessary projects, I want to forge cooperative relations withRussia’.86 Russia is one of South Korea’s most important partners in the Arctic andsub-Arctic, with energy forming an important area of cooperation. Attempts atbilateral cooperation on energy projects have occurred in both the Russian Far Eastand eastern Siberia.87 Norway is another valuable partner, with former president Lee

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and former prime minister Jens Stoltenberg signing memoranda of understanding ongreen shipbuilding and promoting shipping along the NSR in September 2012.

Arctic states are readily collaborating with South Korea rather than viewing itsendeavours as incursive or self-interested. The reciprocal nature of South Korean andArctic states’ interests means that many in the Arctic perceive the country to be amore legitimate stakeholder than China, which arouses consternation in the Westernmedia. Dodds and Hemmings have termed the overall suspicion with which Asianactors in the Arctic are treated ‘Polar Orientalism’.88 Despite any such misgivings ordistrust, Arctic states seek cooperation with South Korea for three main reasons. First,it can provide equipment crucial to northern R&D, such as ice-class ships, oil tankersand search and rescue (SAR) equipment. Unlike China, which has not developed icetechnology,89 South Korean shipbuilding companies can and do build numerous ice-class vessels and LNG carriers. In 2014, Daewoo won an order to build the nine ice-class tankers that will be needed to export LNG from the Port of Sabetta on the YamalPeninsula, should the project come online as planned in 2017.90 Daewoo is alsoworking with Rosneft, SovComFlot and Gazprombank to construct a shipyard inZvezda, near Vladivostok, illustrating how Korean companies not only providetechnologies needed in the Arctic, but also provide the region with crucial capital.

Second, as a major oil and gas importer without pipelines to hydrocarbon-richareas,91 South Korea is willing to provide much-needed investments in offshoreresource extraction while also looking into unconventional resources. The previouslydiscussed Araon expedition to study methane hydrates in the Beaufort Sea, forinstance, involved KOPRI scientists performing research that could benefit thenation’s energy security—constituting yet another example of the coalescence ofscientific and commercial interests in South Korea. Third, South Korea is a promisingexport market for many Arctic countries, as they can capitalise on existing demand forcommodities like Russian oil and gas, Norwegian seafood92 and Canadian wheat.93

South Korea has sought to legitimise its role in the region by securing observerstatus in the Arctic Council. In 2008, after participating in an Arctic Council meetingfor the first time,94 South Korea applied for the status. Explaining his country’smotivations, a South Korean ministry official remarked:

Being an observer of the Arctic Council will help us enter the discussion among the Arcticnations over preservation and development of the area. That will also help our governmentbrainstorm policies on development of marine transportation.95

Although observer status limits a country’s ability to engage in decision-makingwithin the council, especially since an observer’s economic contributions cannot belarger than those of any one permanent member,96 South Korea can now participatemore actively in working groups and propose projects. This will help to cement itsrole as a critical partner in areas ranging from climate change research to SARpreparedness.

The Arctic Council has still shied away from making any significant changes toits membership structure,97 which is composed of eight Arctic states and six indi-genous peoples’ organisations, to reflect new regional dynamics. Yet opening obser-ver status to the Asian countries legitimised the Arctic Council by revealing thatrather than being an exclusive club restricted by geography, it also includes non-Arctic states outside of Europe with political, commercial and scientific interests inthe region. The Arctic Council is unusual among the world’s multilateral

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organisations in that it gives important roles to indigenous peoples’ organisations,which has actually enhanced its legitimacy.98 Further pushing norms in multilateralgovernance by including non-local states helps to enhance the body’s legitimacy, too.Although there is still a gap between the Arctic Council’s geographically baseddecision-making and the actuality of an Arctic region with many state and non-state stakeholders from around the world, the awarding of observer status to stateslike South Korea helps to close that divide, which is already narrowing in certainareas of concern to the council, such as SAR.

South Korea currently assists in SAR and enforcement efforts in the nearby NorthPacific, Bering and Chukchi Seas. SAR is not just about responding during emergen-cies. It also requires constant monitoring using state-of-the art science and technology,which South Korea has. Certainly, SAR has recently been a contentious issue withinthe country in the wake of the sinking of the ferry MV Sewol on its way from Incheonto Jeju Island. The poorly managed response led President Park to dissolve the KoreaCoast Guard (KCG) in May 2014, announcing that ‘[t]he coast guard continued to getbigger in size but did not have enough personnel and budget allocated for maritimesafety, and training for rescue was very much insufficient’.99 As the country’smaritime activities increase in Arctic waters, which are more hazardous than theocean surrounding South Korea, appropriate training and funding for safe shippingis even more crucial. Relatedly, the First Pan-Government Arctic Policy Master Plandoes not specifically mention the KCG, as it falls under the MOF, which is one of theincluded ministries. Yet should reorganisation entail its separation from the MOF, adeliberate incorporation of the coast guard into the country’s Arctic plan may facilitateimproved direction of polar SAR. The KCG is a member of the North Pacific CoastGuard Forum, along with the coast guards of China, Japan, Russia, the US andCanada. The forum ensures maritime governance in the area, combating activitiessuch as illegal fishing, for instance, through patrols and exercises.100 Whateverincarnation the KCG takes, including its SAR division in the country’s Arctic strategywould dovetail with the agency’s existing activities in the North Pacific, from whichships enter and exit the Arctic Ocean via the Bering Strait. This inclusion would alsounderscore the country’s commitment to safe shipping in the Arctic, helping to buildSouth Korea’s identity as a responsible Arctic stakeholder.

In 1996, South Korea joined the OECD, an occasion that led former president KimYoung-sam to ‘proudly [announce] that South Korea had come of age as an advancedeconomy’.101 Now, South Korea is seeking to come of age as a full member of theinternational community. Having hosted the G-20 Summit and a South Korea–Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in recent years,102 the country hasmade significant headway in multiple diplomatic communities. The Arctic representsyet another frontier in which the country can exert its influence as part of its largerquest to join the core of states at the centre of global economic production andpolitical power. As Jin Dong-min, head of KOPRI’s Polar Logistics Division, repliedto a Russian interviewer who asked why South Korea wants to be involved in Arcticaffairs:

One reason is national pride and national privilege in global society. As you know, fifty yearsago Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Having gained economic prosperity,the Korean people want their government to take a more active part in internationalrelations.103

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Former president Lee’s visit to Norway and Greenland in 2012 marked animportant step in his country’s search for acceptance among Arctic Council memberstates as an actor with valid, multifaceted interests in the region. At the same time, hisphoto-ops holding chunks of ice in Greenland on a boat with former prime ministerKuupik Kleist were also prestige-building events, portraying South Korea as a countrywith fully fledged foreign policy endeavours and even an interest in indigenouspeoples. Now, South Korean leaders must demonstrate that they deserve their newlyelevated status within the Arctic Council. In May 2013, remarking on the positivedecision in Kiruna, President Park stated:

In a situation where the strategic and economic values of the Arctic increase, we will be ableto take direct part in the decision-making process …We have to put spurs to efforts to expandArctic development, such as opening Arctic routes.104

While the allusion to direct participation in decision-making is overblown, SouthKorea will be able to build upon the Arctic Council’s legitimisation of its northernactivities. As Norway’s former foreign minister Espen Barth Eide contended, ‘To thenew observers of the Arctic Council, there is no such thing as a free lunch’.105 SouthKorea and the other new observers will have to contribute to the workings of theArctic Council to retain their status, but at the same time they must make sure thatthe permanent members do not perceive their contributions as overstepping the mark.

Conclusion

South Korea seeks involvement in the Arctic to strengthen its shipbuilding industry,promote new trade routes and find new sources of energy imports. Simultaneously,its polar activities reinforce its traditions of strong education and R&D. AlthoughSouth Korea possesses nationalist aspirations in the Arctic, they are closelyenmeshed with, and almost even concealed by, its economic, political and scientificendeavours. Arctic states have generally welcomed bilateral relations with SouthKorea, as the country can offer the necessary equipment for the development oftheir northern economies, investments for resource extraction, and a growingmarket for exports. South Korea has also demonstrated its seriousness as anArctic stakeholder by becoming the first Asian country to develop an integrated‘master plan’ for its regional activities that lays out political, commercial andscientific goals.

Although South Korea has gained observer status in the Arctic Council, it is thetrust that the member states place in the country on a bilateral level to help researchand develop their northern regions that is driving its rising profile in Arctic affairs. Inessence, South Korea can be envisioned as part of an expanded Arctic region thatextends beyond the typical bounding line of the Arctic Circle. Instead, this region isbased upon economic and political ties, specifically along the destinational shippingzone and energy corridor of the NSR stretching to the coasts of Northeast Asia. TheArctic Council’s recognition of this new dynamic in the Arctic enhances the legiti-macy of both itself and the new Asian entrants. Should the South Korean state,chaebols and scientific agencies continue to succeed in the Arctic, the seafaringnation will view it as testifying to its strength and ability to compete on the worldstage—no matter the geographic arena.

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AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank her former supervisor, Dr. Michael Bravo, at the Scott PolarResearch Institute, University of Cambridge, for his invaluable support and feedback during thewriting of this article. She would also like to thank 김종덕 Kim Jong-Deog (Justin) of the KoreaMaritime Institute for his guidance in researching his country’s Arctic policies.

Notes1. K. Cullinane and D. Song, ‘Container Terminals in South Korea: Problems and Panaceas’,

Maritime Policy and Management, 25(1), 1998, pp. 63–80.2. See, for example, P.E. Solli, E. Wilson Rowe and W.Y. Lindgren, ‘Coming into the Cold:

Asia’s Arctic Interests’, Polar Geography, 36(4), 2013, pp. 253–270; L. Jakobson and S.H.Lee, ‘The North East Asian States’ Interests in the Arctic and Possible Cooperation with theKingdom of Denmark’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 2013,pp. 1–52; M. Blunden, ‘Geopolitics of the Northern Sea Route’, International Affairs, 88(1),2012, pp. 115–129.

3. Park Geun-hye, ‘Opening of a New Era of Hope’, Inaugural Speech, Seoul, South Korea,February 25, 2013, at http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/02/25/95/0301000000AEN20130225001500315F.HTML (Accessed February 28, 2014).

4. Wonyong Kim, Recent Archaelogical Discoveries in the Republic of Korea, UNESCO, 1983,discussed in Sarah M. Nelson, ‘The Politics of Ethnicity in Prehistoric Korea’, in Robert W.Preucel and Stephen A. Mrozowski (eds), Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice ofArchaeology, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2010, pp. 290–300.

5. I.J. Yoon, ‘Migration and the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative Description of Five Cases’,Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(3), 2012, pp. 413–435.

6. K. Bae, ‘Origin and Patterns of the Upper Paleolithic Industries in the Korean Peninsula andMovement of Modern Humans in East Asia’, Quaternary International, 211(1), 2010, pp.103–112.

7. C. Sorenson, ‘Success and Education in South Korea’, Comparative Education Review,38(1), 1994, pp. 10–35.

8. Yongho Ch’oe, Peter H. Lee and William T. De Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition, VolumeTwo: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, Columbia University Press, New York,2000, p. 301.

9. Barry Eichengreen, Dwight H. Perkins and Kwanho Shin, From Miracle to Maturity: TheGrowth of the Korean Economy, Harvard East Asian Monographs, Cambridge, MA, 2012, p.78.

10. Ibid.11. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, Norton, New York, 2005.12. O. Yul. Kwon, The Korean Economy in Transition: An Institutional Perspective, Edward

Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 217.13. Sung Wook Joh and Sang Dai Ryoo, ‘Evaluation of Changes in the Corporate Governance

System of South Korean Chaebols’, in Kyung Tae Lee (ed.), Globalization and the AsiaPacific Economy, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, pp. 261–280.

14. A.E. Kim and G. Park, ‘Nationalism, Confucianism, Work Ethic and Industrialization inSouth Korea’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 33(1), 2003, pp. 37–49.

15. Ibid.16. Tae-Kyu Park, ‘Confucian Values and Contemporary Economic Development’, in Timothy

Brook and Hy V. Luong (eds), Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in EasternAsia, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1997, pp. 125–136.

17. A.E. Kim and G. Park, no. 14.18. Tae-Woo Lee, Shipping Developments in Far East Asia: The Korean Experience, Avebury,

Aldershot, UK, 1996.19. Mauro F. Guillén, The Limits of Convergence: Globalization and Organizational Change in

Argentina, South Korea, and Spain, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2001.20. Bruce Cumings, no. 11, p. 325.21. Barry Eichengreen, Dwight H. Perkins and Kwanho Shin, no. 9.

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22. H. Lim and J. Jang, ‘Neo-Liberalism in Post-Crisis South Korea: Social Conditions andOutcomes’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, (36)4, 2006, pp. 442–463.

23. J. Bae and C. Rowley, ‘The Impact of Globalization on HRM: The Case of South Korea’,Journal of World Business, 36(4), 2001, p. 410.

24. G. Tearse, ‘Why Science is Golden for South Korea’, CNRS International Magazine, Tokyo,at www2.cnrs.fr/en/1171.html (Accessed February 28, 2014).

25. Y. Cho, ‘The National Crisis and De/reconstructing Nationalism in South Korea during theIMF Intervention’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 9(1), 2008, pp. 82–96.

26. W. Konishi and M. Manyin, ‘South Korea: Its Domestic Politics and Foreign PolicyOutlook’, Congressional Research Service, 7(5700), 2009, p. 2.

27. A. Tonami and S. Watters, ‘Japan’s Arctic Policy: The Sum of Many Parts’, Arctic Yearbook2012, 1, 2012, pp. 93–103.

28. Y.K. Park, ‘East Asia–Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics’, TheCenter for Governance and Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, December 2013, pp. 1–14.

29. ‘Functions and Introduction’, Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology, at eng.kiost.ac/kordi_eng/?sub_num=322 (Accessed February 28, 2014).

30. Russian International Affairs Council, ‘South Korea is Driven to the Arctic by National Prideand Business Opportunities’, November 13, 2013, at www.russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=2674#top (Accessed February 28, 2014).

31. Y.K. Park, no. 28.32. Hwasook Nam, Building Ships, Building a Nation: Korea’s Democratic Unionism under

Park Chung Hee, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2009.33. Michael Tamvakis, ‘International Seaborne Trade’, in W. Talley (ed.), The Blackwell

Companion to Maritime Economics, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2012, pp. 52–86.34. M. Mahutga and D. Smith, ‘Globalization, the Structure of the World Economy and

Economic Development’, Social Science Research, 40, 2011, pp. 257–272.35. Robert Anderson and Song Jung-a, ‘Korea’s STX Takes Control of Aker Yards’, Financial

Times, August 18, 2008, at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/129d2ee2-6d75-11dd-857b-0000779fd18c.html#axzz2uGX0NqKJ (Accessed February 28, 2014).

36. Simon Hall, ‘Asian LNG Tanker Builders Vie for Market Share’, Wall Street Journal,December 13, 2013, at online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304866904579269290895618508 (Accessed February 28, 2014).

37. Samsung, ‘Arctic Shuttle Tanker’, at www.shi.samsung.co.kr/Eng/etc/6.swf (AccessedFebruary 28, 2014).

38. Republic of Korea Navy, ‘Welcome to Republic of KOREA Navy’, at navy.mil.kr/english/main/main.jsp (Accessed November 2, 2012).

39. Terence Roehrig, ‘South Korean Navy: “To the Sea, to the World”’, Council on ForeignRelations, November 1, 2012, at blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/11/01/south-korean-navy-to-the-sea-to-the-world (Accessed February 28, 2014).

40. K. Cullinane and D. Song, no. 1.41. Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, Oxford University

Press, New York and Oxford, 1989, p. 70.42. Yonhap, ‘Trade Dependency Ratio Shoots Up to Pre-Crisis Level’, The Korea Times, August

14, 2011, at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/08/123_92736.html (AccessedFebruary 28, 2014).

43. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, Arctic Council NorwegianChairmanship, Oslo, 2009.

44. World Shipping Council, ‘About the Industry: Trade Statistics’, 2012, at www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-statistics (Accessed February 28, 2014).

45. Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, ‘Reinforcing Korea’s Maritime Presence across the Globe’,2014, at http://www.mof.go.kr/portal/eng/EgovReinforcing_front.do (Accessed June 5,2014).

46. Ibid.47. N. Hong, ‘The Melting Arctic and Its Impact on China’s Maritime Transport’, Research in

Transportation Economics, 35(1), 2012, pp. 50–57.48. Arctic Council, no. 43.

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49. Trude Pettersen, ‘Fifty Per Cent Increase on Northern Sea Route’, Barents Observer,December 3, 2012, at http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/12/fifty-percent-increase-northern-sea-route-03-12 (Accessed February 24, 2014).

50. Yonhap, ‘Lee Calls for Close Cooperation with Norway on Arctic Shipping Routes’, TheKorea Times, September 12, 2012, at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/116_119713.html (Accessed February 28, 2014).

51. Mary Lochner, ‘Arctic Oil Rush: The New Global Petroleum Race will Shape Alaska’sFuture’, Anchorage Press, Anchorage, AK, September 20, 2012, at www.anchoragepress.com/news/arctic-oil-rush-the-new-global-petroleum-race-will-shape/article_9bb7680e-0390-11e2-b68a-001a4bcf887a.html (Accessed February 28, 2014).

52. Norsk Industri, Konjunkturrapport 2013, Oslo, Norway, February 1, 2013, at www.norskindustri.no/siteassets/dokumenter/konjunkturrapporten_2013.pdf (Accessed September 8, 2014).

53. MAREX, ‘Russia to Order 13 LNG Tankers from South Korea’, The Maritime Executive,Fort Lauderdale, FL, November 13, 2013, at www.maritime-executive.com/article/Russia-to-Order-13-LNG-Tankers-from-South-Korea-2013-11-13 (Accessed February 28, 2014).

54. US Energy Information Administration, ‘Analysis Briefs: South Korea’, January 17, 2013, athttp://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_Korea/south_korea.pdf (Accessed February28, 2014).

55. Kwang-tae Kim, ‘South Korea Successfully Completes Pilot Service on Arctic ShippingRoute’, Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, at english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2013/10/22/17/0501000000AEN20131022010900320F.html (Accessed February 28, 2014).

56. Tae-Woo Lee, no. 18.57. Ibid.58. Arctic Council, no. 43, p. 91.59. Captain David Snider, ‘Busan, and Emerging Opportunities in the Arctic’, Ship & Bunker,

Vancouver, Canada, November 15, 2013, at shipandbunker.com/news/features/industry-insight/119767-busan-and-emerging-opportunities-in-the-arctic (Accessed February 28,2014).

60. Northern Sea Route Administration, ‘NSR Transit 2013 (as of September 30th)’, at http://www.arctic-lio.com/docs/nsr/transits/Transits_2013_30Sept.pdf (Accessed June 5, 2014).

61. Also known as the Sea of Japan; the name is an issue of contention between Japan and SouthKorea.

62. Y.K. Park, no. 28.63. US Energy Information Administration, no. 54.64. Philip Iglauer, ‘US Presidential Politics Plays into Anti-Iran Sanctions’, The Korea Times,

January 18, 2012, at koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/113_103133.html(Accessed February 28, 2014).

65. P.R. Odell, ‘The Global Oil Industry: The Location of Production—Middle East Dominationor Regionalization?’, Regional Studies, 31(3), 1997, pp. 311–322.

66. Ibid.67. Michael Wesley, Energy Security in Asia: Vol. 4, Routledge, London, 2007.68. M. Bradshaw, ‘A New Energy Age in Pacific Russia: Lessons from the Sakhalin Oil and Gas

Projects’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 51(3), 2010, pp. 330–359.69. US Geological Survey, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil

and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, US Department of the Interior, Washington, DC, 2008.70. C. Johnson and M. Derrick, ‘A Splintered Heartland: Russia, Europe, and the Geopolitics of

Networked Energy Infrastructure’, Geopolitics, 17(3), 2012, pp. 482–501.71. K. Kvenvolden, ‘Methane Hydrate: A Major Reservoir of Carbon in the Shallow

Geosphere?’, Chemical Geology, 71, 1988, pp. 41–51.72. S.Y. Lee and G.D. Holder, ‘Methane Hydrates Potential as a Future Energy Source’, Fuel

Processing Technology, 71(1), 2001, pp. 181–186.73. Jyoti Choudrie, ‘Lessons Learnt from South Korea’s LTE Broadband Development: A

Descriptive Case Study’, in Jyoti Choudrie and Catheron Middleton (eds), Management ofBroadband Technology Innovation: Policy Deployment and Use, Routledge, New York andAbingdon, UK, 2014, pp. 62–80.

74. OECD, PISA 2012 Results: What Students Know and Can Do—Student Performance inMathematics, Reading and Science (Volume I, Revised Edition, February 2014), PISA,OECD Publishing, 2014, p. 65.

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75. C. Sorenson, no. 7, p. 11.76. Ibid.77. Barry Eichengreen, Dwight H. Perkins and Kwanho Shin, no. 9, pp. 21–22.78. Park Geun-hye, no. 3.79. ‘2012 Global R&D Funding Forecast’, Battelle and R&D Magazine, December 2011, p. 5.80. Korea Polar Research Institute, ‘Korea Polar Research Institute: Greetings’, at www.kopri.re.

kr/exclude/userIndex/engIndex.do (Accessed October 27, 2012).81. Korea Polar Research Institute, ‘History’, at eng.kopri.re.kr/home_e/contents/e_1300000/

view.cms (Accessed February 28, 2014).82. Korea Institute of Marine Science and Technology, ‘Greeting: Global R&D Hub Creating

Future Marine Values, KIMST’, at www.kimst.re.kr/eng/N_e01.jsp (Accessed February 28,2014).

83. Asiasis, ‘Korea Invests in Offshore/Arctic’, Eshiptrading, Shanghai, July 19, 2012, at en.eshiptrading.com/news/d/223/2766 (Accessed February 28, 2014).

84. Jennifer Andreassen, ‘South Korea’s New Climate Law Signals Growing Global Momentumto Curb Climate Change’, Environmental Defense Fund, May 2, 2012, at blogs.edf.org/climatetalks/2012/05/02/south-koreas-new-climate-law-signals-growing-global-momentum-to-curb-climate-change/ (Accessed February 28, 2014).

85. Ewa Krukowska, ‘UN’s Green Climate Fund Plans Headquarters in South Korea’,Bloomberg, October 20, 2012 at www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-20/un-s-green-climate-fund-plans-headquarters-in-south-korea.html (Accessed February 28, 2014).

86. Associated Press, ‘S. Korean President-Elect Eyes Energy Deal with Russia’, USA Today,December 21, 2007, at usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-12-21-s-korea-russia_N.htm (Accessed July 22, 2014).

87. S.H. Ahn, ‘Framing Energy Security between Russia and South Korea: Progress, Problems,and Prospects’, Asian Survey, 50(3), 2010, pp. 591–614.

88. K. Dodds and A.D. Hemmings, ‘Britain and the British Antarctic Territory in the WiderGeopolitics of the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean’, International Affairs, 89(6), 2013, pp.1429–1444.

89. N. Hong, no. 47.90. Kyunghee Park, Anna Shiryaevskaya and Chou Hui Hong, ‘Daewoo Shipbuilding Wins $2.8

Bn Order for Yamal LNG’, World Oil, Houston, TX, July 9, 2014, at www.worldoil.com/Daewoo-Shipbuilding-wins-2-8-bn-order-for-Yamal-LNG.html (Accessed July 22, 2014).

91. President Park Geun-hye has called for reconnecting South Korean infrastructure to themainland, announcing in November 2013 that ‘[a] new era must be opened by once againconnecting Eurasia as a single continent’ (C. He-suk, ‘Park Seeks “Eurasia Initiative” toBuild Energy, Logistics Links’, The Korea Herald, October 18, 2013). Though still hypothe-tical, the proposed Eurasia Initiative and ‘Silk Road Express’ would connect infrastructure inSouth Korea, such as railways, pipelines and electricity grids, to the rest of the Eurasiancontinent. As this infrastructure would have to transit North Korea, there remain a vastnumber of obstacles to the project’s realisation.

92. US Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, ‘Republic of Korea:2013 Seafood Products Market Brief’, Global Agricultural Information Network,April 17, 2013, at http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/2013%20Seafood%20Products%20Market%20Brief_Seoul%20ATO_Korea%20-%20Republic%20of_4-17-2013.pdf (Accessed February 28, 2014).

93. ‘South Korean Flour Millers Buy Canadian, US Milling Wheat’, Reuters, Seoul, October 23,2013, at www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/wheat-korea-idUSL3N0ID1LZ20131023(Accessed February 28, 2014).

94. Philip Burgess, ‘Kautokeino Ready for Senior Arctic Officials Meeting’, International Centrefor Reindeer Husbandry, November 14, 2008, at icr.arcticportal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=117%3Aguovdageaidnu-kautokeino-ready-for-senior-arctic-officials-meeting-&catid=1%3Anews-2008&Itemid=4&lang=en (Accessed February 28,2014).

95. Se-jeong Kim, ‘Korea Wants to Join in on Arctic Projects’, The Korea Times, Seoul, August24, 2012, at www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2011/04/176_29902.html (AccessedFebruary 28, 2014).

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96. P. Graczyk and T. Koivurova, ‘A New Era in the Arctic Council’s External Relations?Broader Consequences of the Nuuk Observer Rules for Arctic Governance’, Polar Record,50(3), 2014, pp. 225–236.

97. Ibid.98. T. Koivurova, ‘Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of

Arctic Governance’, Polar Record, 46(2), 2010, pp. 146–156.99. Jack Kim, ‘South Korea’s Park, Sorry over Ferry Disaster, Breaks up Coast Guard’, Reuters,

May 18, 2014, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-southkorea-ferry-idUSBREA4I00720140519 (Accessed June 5, 2014).

100. Admiral Bob Papp, ‘The Korea Coast Guard Partnership’, Coast Guard Compass, September20, 2013, at http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2013/09/the-korea-coast-guard-partnership/(Accessed June 5, 2014)

101. Bruce Cumings, no. 11, p. 334.102. C. Moon, ‘South Korea in 2009: From Setbacks to Reversal’, Asian Survey, 50(1), 2010, pp.

56–64.103. Russian International Affairs Council, no. 30.104. J.S. Chang, ‘Park Calls for Comprehensive Blueprint of Arctic Policies’, Yonhap News

Agency, Seoul, May 20, 2013, at english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/05/20/74/0301000000AEN20130520009800315F.HTML (Accessed February 28, 2014).

105. Richard Milne, ‘China Wins Observer Status in the Arctic Council’, The Financial Times,May 15, 2013, at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b665723c-bd3e-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html#axzz2uamqAeCx (Accessed February 28, 2014).

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