The Marcos’ and Corazon Aquino’s Agrarian …...2005/03/15  · But in a society like the Philippines where class stratification is highly pronounced, agrarian reform is an attempt

TheMarcos’andCorazonAquino’sAgrarianReforms:FittingSquarelyintheNeoliberalMold

ByGil“Jake”I.Espenido

I. Introduction

As in any territory and more importantly, for the country, land remains central to theproduction and reproduction of our society and economy. Land has proven to be a criticalresourceonthecoreofanymodeofproduction(Kumar,2011).

Land supports all forms of lives and other factors of production (Kiita, 2010). An Americaneconomist and philosopher, emphasized the importance of land and remarked “soman notonlylivesoff land,levyingonitforitsmaterialsandforces,buthealsolivesonland.Hisverylifedependsonland.Landisthehabitationofman,thestore-houseuponwhichhemustdrawfor all his needs, thematerial to which his labourmust be applied for the supply of all hisdesires;foreventheproductsoftheseacannotbetaken,thelightofthesunenjoyed,oranyoftheforcesofnatureutilized,withouttheuseoflandoritsproducts.Onthelandweareborn,fromitwelive,toitwereturnagain-childrenofthesoilastrulyasisthebladeofgrassortheflowerofthefield.Takeawayfrommanallthatbelongsto landandheisbutadisembodiedspirit”(Henry,1871).Andyet,thelandquestionisnotsimplyaneconomicquestion.AccordingtoNikitaSud,landisa metaphor for power, wealth and status. More importantly, the land question is also apolitical question. In the Philippines, an archipelagic country with a nature-based economy,land and natural resources are highly politicized. Thus, control over land and resources isalways a strategy for maintaining political control; traditional politics are oriented towardmaintainingelitecontroloverthenation’slandandotherresources(USAIDpaper).

Agrarianreformispopularlydefinedas“thedistributionofpublicandprivateagriculturallands,regardlessofproduceandtenurialarrangement,tolandlessfarmersandregularfarmworkers,to include support services” (AFA & AsiaDHRRA, 2005). But in a society like the Philippineswhereclassstratification ishighlypronounced,agrarianreform isanattempt tochangeclassrelationswithin the confinementofasystemdominatedbytherulingclass.That iswhy it iscalledanagrarianreformprogramandcanneverbearevolutionaryprogram.

Thecurrentdiscourseonagrarianreformcan furtherbe understood if it iscontextualized inthecharacterandoperationofthecountry’spoliticaleconomy.

Asitisnow,thePhilippinesocietyisasemi-feudalandneo-colonialsociety.Itisasynthesisoftheoperationofimperialistcontroloffinancetoextractsuperprofitsfromthewholeeconomy;monopoly of a few on the land, capital and other means of production, production andcirculation of commodity and capital; and widespread backwardness and petty commodityproductionandservicesofnumeroussmallproducerswhichare the basis fortheexistenceandflowofoperationofthecommercialcapitalandusury.

Specifically, theagrarianquestionhighlightsthebackwardconditionoftheeconomy. Solvingtheagrarianproblem(issueslikemonopolyontheland,backwardagriculturalproductionandliberating the peasantry, principally the poor peasants and the whole working class (semi-proletariat and the proletariat) from the countryside, is fundamentally significant in theresolutionofsuchsynthesis.

While the neo-colonial character is the basic condition for the operation of the system, theagrarian character is essential to the semi-feudal character of the society. The operation ofagricultureinthecountrycannotneverbeproperlysituatedwithoutdefiningandestablishingthe role of the Philippines as a neo-colony under an imperialist power, theUnited States ofAmerica,andwithalltheunequaltraderelationsandtreaties.

There are three interrelated aspects of the agrarian question.One is the land question. Thenaturalstateofthelandislimitedrelativetotheuseanditsaccruingbenefitstothepeople.

There is a trend that the average farm size is continually decreasing amidst the increasingnumberof farmsand the limitation on theexpansionof land tobecultivated.Theaveragefarmsizein1971was3.61hectares,2.16in1991and2hectaresin2002.

TableI.Distributionoffarmsandtheiraveragesizes,1971Region NumberofFarms Scope(Hectares) AverageSize(Hectares)

Philippines 2,354,469 8,493,735 3.61

NCR 2,787 6,243 2.24

CAR 67,036 161,451 1.44

Ilocos 175,668 297,200 1.77

CagayanValley 144,827 502,431 3.38

CentralLuzon 168,162 538,946 3.20

SouthernLuzon 268,240 1,068,455 3.98

Bicol 223,023 921,278 4.13

WesternVisayas 190,704 781,954 4.10

CentralVisayas 221,742 479,135 2.16

EasternVisayas 200,147 674,136 3.37

WesternMindanao 131,546 552,870 4.14

NorthernMindanao 109,650 475,486 4.34

SouthernMindanao 157,420 789,584 5.02

CentralMindanao 102,724 449,030 4.16

CARAGA 79,348 359,750 4.53

ARMM 111,805 435,784 3.34

Source:NationalStatisticsOffice.1991CensusofAgriculture,SpecialReportNo.1.

Table2.Distributionoffarmsandtheirsizes,1991Region NumberofFarms Scope(Hectares) AverageSize(Hectares)

Philippines 4,610,041 9,974,871 2.16

NCR 15,136 53,646 3.4

CAR 108,251 155,579 1.14

Ilocos 311,758 324,502 1.04

CagayanValley 285,721 530,143 1.85

CentralLuzon 335,270 594,266 1.77

SouthernLuzon 544,628 1,311,747 2.41

Bicol 377,791 936,175 2.48

WesternVisayas 411,572 754,386 1.83

CentralVisayas 424,825 549,895 1.29

EasternVisayas 321,455 695,711 2.16

WesternMindanao 251,811 751,097 2.98

NorthernMindanao 229,023 619,342 2.70

SouthernMindanao 366,496 1,081,953 2.95

CentralMindanao 225,268 609,590 2.71

CARAGA 189,600 517,446 2.73

ARMM 207,468 477,927 2.30

Source:NationalStatisticsOffice.1991CensusofAgriculture,SpecialReportNo.1.

Table3.Distributionoffarmsandtheirsizes,2002Region NumberofFarms Scope(Hectares) AverageSize(Hectares)

Philippines 4,822,739 9,670,793 2.00

NCR 22,820 71,632 3.14

CAR 120,104 177,839 1.48

IlocosRegion 276,766 270,664 0.97

CagayanValley 321,755 540,812 1.68

CentralLuzon 341,466 552,104 1.61

CALABARZON 282,746 588,516 2.08

MIMAROPA 220,967 542,218 2.45

Bicol 384,801 891,955 2.32

WesternVisayas 429,456 666,917 1.55

CentralVisayas 430,043 522,433 1.21

EasternVisayas 330,750 723,048 2.18

ZamboangaPeninsula 252,659 785,294 3.10

NorthernMindanao 319,157 746,901 2.34

DavaoRegion 299,966 758,335 2.52

SOCCSKSARGEN 330,571 775,309 2.34

CARAGA 210,184 523,407 2.49

ARMM 248,528 533,410 2.14

Source:NationalStatisticsOffice,2002CensusofAgriculture;pagelastupdated–March15,2005

Table4.

Year NumberofFarms

Increasedsince1971

PercentageofGrowth(%)since1971

Totallandarea

(hectarage)

Increased(hectaragesince1971)

%ofIncreasesince1971

1971 2,354,469 8,493.735

1991 4,610,041 2,255,572 95.79% 9,974,871 1,481,136 17.43%

2002 4,822,739 2,468,270 104.83% 9,670,793 1,177,058 13.85%

From 1971 until 2002, the number of farms increased to 2,468,270 or 104.84%. While thecultivatedlandareaincreasedonlyto1,177,058hectaresor13.85%.

Thedistributionoffarmsbasedontheirsizesfortheyears1980,1991,and2002isshownonthereportoftheBureauofAgriculturalStatistics(BAS)in2006,

Table5.Distributionbynumberoffarms.

Year 1980 1991 2002

Numberoffarms(000)

Total 3,420 4,610 4,823

Lessthanonehectare 776 1,685 1,936

1-2.99hectares 1,578 1,968 1,975

3-4.99hectares 588 523 508

5-9.99hectares 360 325 303

10-24.99hectares 104 96 89

25hectaresormore 15 13 12

Source:BAS-DA,2006;Numbersarerounded

Table6.Distributionoffarmsbysize.

Year 1980 1991 2002

Totalareaoffarms(000)

Total 9,725 9,975 9,671

Lessthanonehectare 369 728 827

1-2.99hectares 2,522 3,038 3,002

3-4.99hectares 2,067 1,835 1,778

5-9.99hectares 2,243 2,046 1,914

10-24.99hectares 1,406 1,293 1,192

25hectaresormore 1,118 1,034 957

Source:BAS-DA,2006;Numbersarerounded

Itslimitationisfurtheraccentuatedbytheprivatecontrolandmonopolyofthelandbythefew.In sugarcane lands, for example, TheNational Federation of SugarWorkers (NFSW), claimedthatthereistotalof389biglandownersatthenationallevel.

Table7.Spreadofbiglandholdings

Province/Region/Island NumberofBigLandlords

CentralLuzon 33

NorthLuzon 3

SouthernLuzon 17

NorthNegros 140

SouthNegros 125

Leyte 11

Cebu 12

Panay 19

Mindanao 29

Total 389

Thesecondaspectis theagricultureortheagriculturalproductionandtheconditionsoftheFilipinosthatareinvolvedintheagriculturalproduction.

The landand its cultivation areboth themeans and conditionof agricultural production.Onearlierconditionswhereintheproductionwassufficientorforone’sconsumption,thelandsizecultivated was relative to the needs of the producer and his family. For the commercialagricultural production, it needs large lands for the large-scale production. The commercialagriculturalproductionhasalreadyoutpacedthesmall-scaleproductioninsmallfarmsizes.Yetthesesmallfarmsizesarebeingsustainedbymerchantcapitalandusuryinawidespreadscale.Inthesesmallfarmsizes,wefindtheordinarypeasant,thetenants,thesettlers,andthesmallproducers.

Agricultural production is affected by climate and weather, the type of land as well as itsnaturalfertility,pests,qualityoftheseedsandageofplantsinthecaseofpermanentcropsandother requirements like enough irrigation. And since the production is for themarket or toearn income and profit, it is affected by the consumption needs of the people and theindustriesthatrelyontheconsumptionoftheagriculturalproducts.

Thus,theproductionshouldbewidespreadandnumerous.Asidefromthelargetracksoflandsto be cultivated, there is a real need for mechanization, relative advance technology forproduction, irrigation and post-harvest facilities and more importantly, research anddevelopment that hinge on high capitalization. Yet despite the relative mechanization andadvanced technology, the commercial agricultural production in general is labor intensiveespeciallyonplantingandharvestingaspects.

Thethirdaspect is thepeasantquestionandtheirownershiporcontrolover the land, in theproductionandpartoftheproductfromtheland.Fromindependentstudiesaswellasinourown study, from the latterhalfof1970s to theearlypartof1980s, theappropriationof theaverage income surfaced. Theportion thatwent to thepeasant and farmworkersdipped to16%from39%,theshareof the landlords (landrent)alsodecreasedfrom15%to30%whichthemerchant-usurer’sshareincreasedfrom15%to45%.Thecombinedshareofthelandlordandthemerchant-usurer is57%oftheaverage income.Theother16%willbesharedamongthepeasantandthefarmworker(Kilusan,2006).

II. ThePlaceofNon-reformSectorintheLandReformWithinaNeo-liberalSetting

Thecountry’shistoryand its integrativesystemhaveestablished that the sanctityofprivatepropertyisinviolate.ItisevenenshrinedinthePhilippineconstitution.Itssacrednessshouldneverbechallengednorundermined.Whereasignificantportionoftherulingclassistiedupto the land (especially in the Philippines), any attack on any form of property might castconsiderable doubt on the other form. And the other form is ownership of the means ofproductionfromwhichcapitalderivesitsownlegalstandingandlegitimacy(Harvey,2006).

Thepreservation,andeventheenhancement,ofprivatepropertyinlandthereforeperformsanideologicalandlegitimizingfunctionforallformsofprivateproperty;hence,somewouldargue,the importance of conferring privileges of home ownership (possession of the means ofconsumption)upontheworkingclass(Harvey,2006).Fromthisstandpoint,wecanregardrentasaside-paymentallowedtolandownersinordertopreservethesanctityandinviolabilityofprivatepropertyingeneral(Harvey,2006).

TheNon-ReformSector

De Janvry asserted the two sectors of any land reform in a Thirdworld country. The reformsector iscomposedof landsappropriated(usuallyexpropriated)fromtheformer landlordstothe beneficiaries of the reform. The non-reform sector includes the unexpropriated lands

retained or sold privately by their former owners, the lands that are subdivided by theirownerstoavoidexpropriationthrougharestrictiononthemaximumsize.

Land reforms have been analyzed in terms of creation of a reform sector. But most landreformshavethisasbeingthesecondaryaspectoflandreform,whilethenon-reformsectorisoftentheprincipalaspect(deJanvry).

Thisdistinctionisnecessarysincethereisafloodofdataregardingthesuccessorfailureofthelandreformprogram.Somesectorshaveadmittedthattherereportsare“overlyquantitativelyorientedatthenationallevelandromanticizedorcondemnedatthelocallevel.”Griffin,et.alhave defined land reform as being about redistributing “land ownership from large privatelandownerstosmallpeasantfarmersandlandlessagriculturalworkers,,emphasizingthatitisconcerned with redistribution of wealth. A land reform that confiscates lands withoutcompensation to landlords and distributes such lands to peasants and workers withoutpayment clearly constitutes redistributive reform. Similarly, a land reform that expropriateslands with compensation to landlords at below market price and distributes such lands topeasantsandworkersatreducedorsubsidizedcostisalsoredistributive.

Borras further clarified that a land transfer scheme does not constitute redistributive landreformwhere the landlord is paid 100 percent spot-cash for 100 percent (or higher) of the“market value” of the land and where the buyer shoulders 100 percent of the land costincludingthesaletransactioncosts.Suchisasimplecapitalistreal-estatetransaction,which,ofitself,ishighlyunlikelytofavorthelandlessruralpoor(Borras,2008).

BasedontheDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR)1972-2013report,only326,140hectaresor7%havebeendistributedthroughcompulsoryacquisitionmodeamongtheprivatelands.Mostofthelandsdistributed,werepubliclandsandlandsthatwerepaidfororbought(settlement)comprising2,047,111hectaresor44%oflandsdistributed.Thevoluntarylandtransfer(VLT)covered826,937hectaresor18%ofthetotallanddistributedandvoluntaryoffertosell(VOS)covered639,252hectaresor14%ofthetotallanddistributed.Indeed,“theimplementationofthe VLT and VOS modes were designed largely to lessen landowner resistance to CARP byprovidingincentivestoprivatelandownersforvoluntarycompliancewiththeprogram.”

Thethreecategorieshaveacumulativetotalof3,516,300hectaresorequivalentto78%ofthetotallanddistributed.Obviously,theseconstitutetheestablishmentofsecurityoftenurerightswhich readily fall into the“willingbuyer-willing seller” transaction. The transactionover idlelandsistomaketheseproductivethroughtheoperationofforeigncapital.ThebiggerportionsofpubliclandsandVLT-VOSlandsareinuplandareasareidlelandsandarenotreadilyfitforfarming.

Source:DAR,2014Thetacticofsubdividingthelandforfamilymembersanddeclaresuchas incompliancewiththe law ismost common. According to former DAR undersecretary Conrado Navarro, ‘ themajorityofVLT-basedlandtransfers ,maybeasmuchas70percent,wereresortedtobythelandlords….toevadecoverage”(Borras,2005). AnotherformerDARundersecretary,GerardoBulatao,explained that “VLT isoftena transactionbetween familymembers” (Borras,2005).Lorenzo Reyes, a member of the national DAR Adjudication Board, puts it, “You will haveseriousdoubtsbecause theseVLT schemesaremostlyoncashbasis.Howcanapoor tenantafford to pay 100 percent spot-cash for the land? It ismost likely that these are just stage-managed, especially where the landowners are politically strong enough to control theirtenants(Borras,2005).

TheLimitedCoverageofCARP

Eventhenon-reformsectorofRA6657hasexcludedalonglistoflandtypes.Inthecontextofthis law, thenon-reformsectorcouldbedivided intocategories: the first comprisedofareasused for non-profit activities whereas the second included arable and privately-ownedagricultural lands that are used for profit-oriented ventures. The first category consisted of

areaswhichareusedfortheprovisionofpublicgoods(e.g.,nationaldefense)andservices(e.g.,education), those engaged in religious as well as research and developmental undertakings(e.g.,experimentalfarms)andthosereservedforecologicalandenvironmentalconsiderations(e.g., wildlife parks), (Adriano, 1991). Land types belonging to the second category includedcorporate/commercial farmswhich either practice corporate stock sharing or are collectivelyownedby itsworkers, non-tenanted rice and com landswhose sizes are sevenhectares andbelow, other croplands whose areas are equal to or less than five hectares and homesteadlands.Itisestimatedthatabout16.7millionhabelongtothefirstcategoryofthenon-reformsector(Adriano,1991).The definition of ‘agrarian reform’ offered in the law reduced the centrality of landredistribution, defining reform as either the ‘redistribution of lands’ or production or profitsharing, labor administration, and distribution of stock’ (Putzel, 1992). With these differentmechanisms,theneteffectwouldbethatthenon-reformsectorwouldstillpredominateoverthe reform sector even if the law had excluded some areas in the non-reform sector asarticulatedbyAdriano.

Indeed, the Philippine society where foreign capital and landlords enjoy the “commandingheights”,thenon-reformsectorhasproventobetheprincipalaspectofallthelandreformsinthecountry.

III. TheNeo-liberalState

The term “neoliberalism” refers to a set of economic policies emphasizing free trade,privatization,deregulation,andtheretreatof thestate frommattersofwealthredistributionand social serviceprovision (WardandEngland,2007). “Neoliberalism” is a theoryproposingtheadvancementofhumanwelfarethroughtheliberationofentrepreneurialfreedomswithin“an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and freetrade”(Harvey,2005).

Therearefivemainpointsofneo-liberalism(Martinez&Garcia):theseinclude;

a. The rule of themarket. Liberating "free" enterprise or private enterprise from any bondsimposedbythegovernment(thestate)nomatterhowmuchsocialdamagethiscauses.Reducewagesbyde-unionizingworkersandeliminatingworkers'rightsthathadbeenwonovermanyyears of struggle. Nomore price controls. All in all, total freedom ofmovement for capital,goodsandservices.Toconvinceusthisisgoodforus,theysay"anunregulatedmarketisthebest way to increase economic growth, which will ultimately benefit everyone." It's likeReagan's"supply-side"and"trickle-down"economics--butsomehowthewealthdidn'ttrickledownverymuch.

b.Cuttingpublic expenditure for social services likeeducationandhealth care.Reducing thesafety-net for thepoor, andevenmaintenanceof roads,bridges,water supply --again in the

nameofreducinggovernment'srole.Onthecontrary,theydon'topposegovernmentsubsidiesandtaxbenefitsforbusiness.

c. Deregulation. Reduce government regulation of everything that could diminish profits,includingprotectingtheenvironment(includingtheland)andsafetyonthejob.

d. Privatization. Sell state-owned enterprises, goods and services to private investors. Thisincludesbanks,key industries, railroads, tollhighways,electricity,schools,hospitalsandevenfreshwater.Althoughusuallydone in thenameofgreaterefficiency,which isoftenneeded,privatizationhasmainlyhadtheeffectofconcentratingwealthevenmoreinafewhandsandmakingthepublicpayevenmoreforitsneeds.

e.Eliminatingtheconceptof"thepublicgood"or"community"andreplacingitwith"individualresponsibility." Pressuring the poorest people in a society to find solutions to their lack ofhealthcare,educationandsocialsecurityallbythemselves--thenblamingthem,iftheyfail,as"lazy."

Theneoliberalstatelikeinourcountry“favorsstrongindividualprivatepropertyrights,theruleof law,and the institutionsof freely functioningmarkets and free trade (Harvey,2005).Thelegal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridicalindividualsinthemarketplace.Thestategivesprotectiontothesanctityofcontractsandtheindividualrighttofreedomofaction,expression,andchoice.Thestatemustthereforeuseitsmonopolyofthemeansofviolencetopreservethesefreedomsatallcosts.Byextension,thefreedomofbusinessesandcorporations(legallyregardedasindividuals)tooperatewithinthisinstitutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good.Privateenterpriseandentrepreneurialinitiativeareseenasthekeystoinnovationsandwealthcreation(Harvey,2005).

Thestatehasbeenandwillalwaysbethepromoterandguardianofthemarket.ThePhilippinestate has emerged as the final arbiter in behalf of the forces of neoliberal globalization,enactingandenforcing laws that facilitate theirpenetration into thedomesticeconomy,andeasingtheircontrolanddominationoverthecountry’svaluedresources(Bauzon,2008).

IV. TheMythicalDichotomyBetweenState-ledLandReform(SLAR)andMarket-ledLandReform (MLAR) and Community-led/managed LandReformas anAlternative to theFailuresofbothSLARandMLAR

The currentmainstreamdiscourse on agrarian reformhave developed various typologies oflandreform.Itrangesfromstate-ledlandreform,market-ledlandreformandcommunity-ledlandreform. Itssystematicarticulationpainstakinglyexplainwhy each isessentiallydifferentfromother.Twoareevenincontradictorytoeachother(theSLARandtheMLAR).

In their parlance, Presidential Decree (PD) 27 of the Marcos dictatorship and theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) are both state-led land reform (SLAR)

program.Theonlydifferencewasthattheformerlandreformwasunderanautocraticruleandthelatterlandreformprogram(underfivepresidents)wasunderathrivingdemocraticsystem.

In its1996Philippinecountryreport“AStrategytoFightPoverty”, theWorldBankobserved,“comprehensive rural land reform, as currently structured, is bound to remain contentious,expensive, and administratively complex” and concluded, “the administrative complexity oflandreformprobablycannotberesolvedinthecontextofagovernment-administeredprogramexecutedinthedemocraticsociety.”

Consequently,WorldBankrepresentativesfirstattemptedtorecruitthePhilippinegovernmenttotheMLARmodel,aftersuggestingthatthePhilippinesoughttohaltCARPlanddistributionimplementation because itwas ‘distorting’ the landmarket and financially expensive (WorldBank, 1996). This was rejected. In 1999, the World Bank came back again and this time itsucceededinpressuringtheanewDARleadershiptoagreetoasmallpilotprojecttoexplorea“complementary land reform approach” (Franco, 1999). The study produced an operationalmanualandrenamedtheproject,Community-ManagedAgrarianReformProgram(CMARP).In2003, it became Community-Managed Agrarian Reform and Poverty Reduction Program(CMARPRP).

CMARPRPaimed to (a) empower [beneficiaries] so that theymay actively participate in landmarkettransactionsand(b)contributetopovertyreductioninruralareasbyintroducinglandtenure improvementmodalities in agrarian reform that are faster (DAR-ARCPD 2, 2006). Toachieve these goals, CMARPRP adopted the following MLAR principles: a negotiated willingseller-willingbuyer scheme;ademand-drivenapproach; integrated land transferandsupportservices delivery; and centrality of income generation goals via farm productivity and creditfinancing(DAR-ARCPD2,2006).ByApril2007,CMARPRPhadreached972hectaresofland,650beneficiaries,68landowners,and17villages(Borras,et.al,2007.

The first stage of these projects was to bring land systems into an increasing globalmarketplace,which requires formal andwritten systems, legal instruments, private propertyand landmarkets.The secondstage involved thedevelopmentof formalized landmarkets inwhichlandcouldeasilybeleased,purchased,sold,orgiftedtoachievemoreefficientlanduse.The third stage was the use of land and property as collateral for accessing credit (Quizon,2014).

Asit is,theCARPwherethenon-reformsectorisdominanthasrenderedthecharacteristicofCARPas alreadyamarket friendly landreform.Not tobecontentedwith thischaracter, theCMARPRPisbasicallyanattemptto finetunefortheCARPtoadheremorerigorouslytotheWorldBankmodel.

Irrespective of any land reform model, the neo-colonial status of the country will alwaysfacilitatetheinflowofforeigncapitalintoanylucrativesectorincludingtheagriculturalsectoraswellas the landreformprogram. Capitalwillcontinuetooperateand in fact, the logicofcapitalisnothingbuttheexpressionofthecontentingforceswithinasociety(DeJanvry).InthePhilippines, thecontendingalignmentof forces isbetweenthe rulingclassembedded inthestatearrayedagainstthebroadmassofFilipinopeople.

Thereshouldbenoconfusionnorjudgmentthatthereis polaritybetweenthestate-ledlandreformandthemarket-led landreform. Bothareessentiallypursuedan implementedwherethestateandthemarketareintrinsicallylinkedtoeachother.Acommunityled/managedlandreformisanemergingvariancewherefailuresbothfortheSLARandtheMLARareestablishedandpromoted.

TheStatevis-a-vistheMarket

In a critique of the ‘market socialists’, Marx argued that even if society started with anequalization of property, market processes would necessarily give rise to inequality and apolarizationofwealthandpovertyasmoneyaccumulatedinthehandsoftheminority,whilethe majority lost the means to earn their own living and were forced to labor for others(Clarke). Themarketisaninstrumentof‘naturalselection’thatjudgesnotonthebasisofanindividual’s ability to contribute to society, but on the basis of the individual’s ability tocontributetotheproductionofsurplusvalueandtheaccumulationofcapital.Thisisthemorallawthatisexpressedintheplatitudesofneo-liberalism(Clarke).

Thefashionableviewthatstatesandmarketsaresomehowintrinsicallyopposedtoeachotherhas been proven to be amyth. The “freemarket” needs the protection of the states and itneedstheirpowersofenforcement.The1997WorldDevelopmentReport’scentralcallfor“aneffectivestate”simplymeansaneffectivestate for theunhamperedoperationofcapital inamarket without a national territory. Indeed, the development thrusts and programs of thePhilippine state (its Philippine Medium Term Development Plans and the sectoral plansemanating from these medium term development plans ) are the best expressions of itsplatitudesandadherencetoneo-liberalism.

Neo-liberalismtreatsmarketsasartefactswhicharedependentonconstantlegalandtechnicalintervention by state agencies. For the neoliberal, state, society and economy are allinstitutionallyandontologicallyintegrated(Davies,2010).

The current Philippine state is again, unmistakably creating and protecting the market(includingthelandreformprogram)fortheunhamperedflowofcapitalandcommoditiesintoagriculture.

TheStatevis-à-vistheCivilSociety

TheconfusiononSLARandMLARisbuttressedbyfullyaccommodatingthecivilsocietyinthelandreformimplementation.

The ideologicaloperationsand the forces in theagrarian reformmovementhavebeenusingthecivilsociety-stateframeworkinpursuingitsprogramandintheprocess,gettrappedinthebourgeoistheoryofthestate.Theyassertthattherulingclassdonothavehegemonyoverthewhole stateapparatusall the time.Thepeoplemay sharewith theexploiting classes controloverthestatemachinerydependingontheaccumulatedstrengthofthecontendingclassesororganizedcivilsocietytoinfluencethestateinternally(CPPPeasantBureau,1998).Thismeansthatthestate,itselfbeingsharedorinternallystructuredbycontendingclassesactaccordingly

andatcertaintimesmayactcontrarytothe interestof therulingclass.Moreover,atcertain“conjunctures”thestatemaygive“decisiveconcessions”evenifcontrarytotheinterestoftherulingclassifonlytopreserveitself(CPPPeasantBureau,1998).

Theypushedtheideathatthestateandcivilsocietyare“relativelyindependent”ofeachother.Asidefromtheassertionthatthestatedoesnothavetoactatalltimesasaninstrumentoftheruling class, they also assert that this relative independence between the state through“popularstruggles”,institutequantitativeandqualitativechanges(relativetransformation),putup parallel structures of governance of influence structures of the state machinery (CPPPeasant Bureau, 1998) As one study stated, “civil society organizations are best and oftenunderstoodasorganizationsautonomousfromthestate(Ferrer,2005).

CARPwasseenbysomequartersas moderatelysuccessfulduring theyears1992-2000.Thisrelativesuccesswasduetotheway inwhichcurrentsofpro-reforminsociety linkedupwithpocketsofpro-reformistswithintheagrarianreformbureaucracy(Borras,2001).OnenarrativethatisworthmentioningiswhenthentheDARleadershiprejectedtheproposaloftheWorldBanktohaltCARPimplementation.ItsresistancederiveditssuccessfromDAR’sjoiningforceswith rural social movements to launch protests to defend CARP and discredit the Bank’sinitiative(Borras,2001).

Sikor and Muller (2009) even calls for a state that is more reactive to political demandsoriginating “frombelow”andmoreresponsivetovariation in local institutionsandpractices.WiththelimitsandfailureofSLARandMLAR,theyarepushingforacommunity-led/managedland reform. This concept of community forwards the significance of actual land tenurearrangementsandauthorityrelationsaswellas“bottom-up”politicalinitiatives.

Thispositiondeniestheessentialnatureofthestateasacoerciveinstrumentoftheclassrule–specialbodyofmenstandingabovesocietybywhichoneclassviolentlysuppressesanother.Italsodeniesthatthestateisaproduct,andanadmissionoftheirreconcilabilityofclasses;thatthisstateisnecessarytocontaintheclassantagonismsothatsocietywillnotconsumeitselfinintermittentandendlessstruggles(CPPPeasantBureau,1998).

Civilsocietyadherentsalsotoywiththepropositionthat“thetraditionalleft’sstruggleforstatepoweriscorruptingandleadstoauthoritarianregimeswhichthensubordinatecivilsocietytoits control. Local struggles over local issues by local organizations are the only democraticmeans of change, along with petition/pressure on national and international authorities(Petras).

These kinds of initiatives below are touted as the celebration of civil society. Yet,fundamentally it has offered a comfortable space for the neoliberal experiments across thecapitalist world. These are seen as processes where themasses are empowered andwherepeoples are the centre. Here, the transformation of the state is to be achieved through thetransformationofcivilsociety(Seethi).

V. TheInterplayofLandReformintotheNeo-liberalMold

Thehegemonyofneo-liberalismasthedominant ideologysincethe1970s iscomplete. Ithasremained unchallenged and has pervaded practically all facets of Philippine society. In thePhilippines,neoliberalismfirstcameintheformofthestructuraladjustmentprogramimposedby the World Bank in the early 1980’s, in the latter’s effort to strengthen the economy’scapacitytoserviceitsmassiveexternaldebt(Bello,2009).

LandReformUnderMarcos

PresidentialDecree(PD)27waspursuedintheperiodwhereStructuralAdjustmentProgram(SAPs) were vigorously implemented. The SAP was essentially instituting the guidelines forinvestmentflowsandnatureoftheresultingtradepattern.EconomistRobinHandelassertedthat one of its features is financial liberalization even in agriculture. Essentially, it was formarketexpansion.

PD 27 was directed only against the tenancy relations, principally sharecropping, whichAmerican agricultural consultants as early as the 1930s considered as a drag to agriculturalmodernization.Forthisreason,therewasapreoccupationtoliquidatesharecroppingrelations.Hence, even if the results in land transfer were meager, the land reform program wasnonethelesssuccessfulintransformingthousandsoftenantsinto"independent"lesseesandininducing many landowners to shift to the wage system in order to be exempted from thecoverageoflandreform(Ofreneo,1981).Tomake sure that a shift to newagricultural practiceswould indeedoccur, the governmentevenmade the adoptionof theGreenRevolution as oneof the requirements for tenants toqualifyforthelandreformprogram(Ofreneo,1981).Astothefewlandlordswhoselandswereexpropriated, thegovernmentcameoutwithanelaboratesystemofcompensationaimedattransformingthemintofull-pledgedcapitalists(Ofreneo,1981).InMay27,1974,MarcosissuedCorporateFarmingProgram(CFP)throughGeneralOrderNo.47,whichgavelocalandforeigncorporationstherighttopurchaseorleaseagriculturallandtobeplantedwithriceandcorn.Theorderresultedtotheaccumulationofvasttractsoflandbyagribusinessfirmsandthedisplacementofmanyfarmersfromthelands.By1980,corporationscontrolled 4,978 farms covering 1,673 hectares nationwide. Of this area, over 90% or 1,511hectareswere concentrated in 372 corporate-run farms (1980 CensusofAgricultureof theNSO).Overall, the combined effects of land reform, Green Revolution, infrastructure developmentand corporate farming are: the commercialization of rice and com production, thetransformation of small landowners and lessees into petty capitalists, the dominance of bigcorporations in rice production, the greater dependence of rice farming on the agribusinesstransnationals, and the fuller integration of the rice and corn areas into international trade(Ofreneo,1981).

OneoftheeffectsofstructuraladjustmentisthatcountrieslikethePhilippinesmustincreasetheirexports.Usuallycommoditiesandrawmaterialsareexported.Thepoorcountryloseoutwhen they export commodities which are cheaper than finished products, are denied oreffectively blocked from industrial capital and real technology transfer, and import finishedproductswhicharemoreexpensiveduetotheaddedlabortomaketheproduct.

Agriculture was historically a net foreign exchange earner, contributing nearly two-thirds oftotal exports and accounting for only about 20% of total imports (including imports ofmanufacturesagriculturalinputssuchasfertilizers)inthe1960s(BalisacanandHill,2003).

Table8.Agriculture’sShareinTotalImportsandExports,RatioofAgriculturalImportstoExports,andMeasuresofTradeOpenness,1960-2000(%)a

Year Share in Total Ratio of Imports to

Exports

Trade Openness

Imports Exports Agricultural Imports/GVA

Agricultural Exports/GVA

Agricultural Imports plus Exports/GVA

1960 19 64 31 9

(9) 33 (9)

42 (18)

1965 21 63 36 16

(16) 37

(14) 52

(30)

1970 14 44 34 12

(19) 44

(17) 56

(36)

1975 10 54 26 14

(25) 28

(15) 42

(41)

1980 8 35 31 12

(26) 26

(18) 38

(43)

1985 9 26 46 12

(18) 18

(15) 30

(33)

1990 10 15 96 15

(29) 14

(18) 30

(48)

1995 9 11 126 19

(38) 15

(23) 34

(61)

1996 9 9 159 20

(42) 12

(25) 32

(67)

1997 8 8 161 24

(47) 15

(31) 38

(78)

1998 10 7 151 29

(48) 20

(45) 49

(94)

1999 9 5 185 24

(42) 13

(46) 36

(88)

2000 9 5 168 26

(45) 15

(51) 41

(96)

a Agricultural imports include inputs such as agricultural chemical, machinery, and fertilizer. Figures inparenthesesrefertothetradeopennessofthewholeeconomy.

Sources:FoodandAgricultureOrganization(variousissues),FAOTradeYearbook;NationalStatisticalCoordinationBoard

Theagriculturalsector’sshare intotalexportsdecreasedmuchmorerapidlythan itsshare intotal imports, and by the early 1990s it had ceased to be a net earner of foreign exchange.Agricultural imports rose from about 30% of agricultural exports in the 1960s tomore than150%bythelate1990s(BalisacanandHill,2003).

TheComprehensiveAgrarianReformProgram(CARP)

TheCARPwas compromised from the start. In its enactment, theneoliberaldesignalreadywas in full swing. Its implementation coincidedwith the full liberalization of the economy,tradeandfinancialsystem,ofcultureandeducation.OneyearbeforeitpassedCARP,Congressenacted the Omnibus Investment Act, followed by the Foreign Investment Act of 1991. Thefundamentalsof theneoliberaldesignwere setunder theFidelRamos regime just fiveyearssincetheenactmentofCARP.Theseprimarilyincludetheliberalizationofthefinancialsystemthatimmediatelybroughtaboutthefurtherliberalizationoftheexport-importtrading.

“Co-existenceofTwoModesofProductiveOrganizations”

RA6657thusseemstopromotethecoexistenceoftwoextrememodesofagrarianstructures,i.e.,smallfarmsproducingfoodandothercashcrops,ononehand,andlarge-sizedgribusiness-operated farms cultivatingessentiallyexport crops,on theother (Adriano,1991). Small-sizedfarms,especiallyinthegrainscropsubsector,willbedevelopedpartlybecausetheirexistenceis especially important during the initial stages of growth in ensuring cheap labor and low-pricedwagegoodsforboththeplantationsandindustry,andpartlyduetothefactthattheirpresence serves as a political concession for resolving the problem of rural unrest (Adriano,1991).Whilestaplecropproductionmaybesuitedtosmall-sizedfarmunits,thedesignofCARLpresumes that export crop production, a major source of foreign exchange earnings of thecountry,isbestproducedinlarge-sizedfarmswhichenjoyeconomiesofscalearisingfromtheemploymentofcapital-intensivemethodsofproduction.It isonthebasisofthispremisethatlarge-sizedagribusiness-runfarmsarepreferredtothehaciendasandtenantedfarms.Theplantationownerswouldbenefitfromtheexistenceofsmallfarmssincethelatterensuresfor the large farms a reserve army of cheap labor, or what Harris (1982) called "disguisedproletarians"(Adriano,1991).Thus,thesmallfarmsprovidethehouseholdownersaportionoftheirsubsistenceandproductionrequirementswhiletheirwageearningsfromtheplantations

fill the financial gap. (haciendaowners use their profits largely for consumption and not forproductionexpenditures),thenitwouldbeeconomicallyadvantageousforthecountrysidetominimize the redistributive effects of the reform on these agribusiness plantations (Adriano,1991).RA 6657 thus promoted a selective redistributive schemewherein itwould expropriate andredistributelargelandscultivatingstaplecropsaswellasfeudalisticagrarianstructuresbutwillnottouchcapitalistfarmenterprises.Itwasnotdesignedtobringaboutinter-ruralequalizationbyhomogenizingthelandownershipstructureinthissector,butrather,wasaimedatinducingtheestablishmentofprofit-motivatedagribusinessplantations supportedat theperipherybysmall-sizedfarmswhichsupplytheformerenterpriseswithcheaplabor(Adriano,1991).Promoting a bi-modal agrarian structure has implications on equity and efficiency (Adriano,1991).First,theco-existenceoflargeandsmall-sizedfarmswouldseverelylimittheimpactofagrarianreforms inachievingequity.Withskewed landownershipdistributionbeingamajorsourceofinequality in the country, an agrarian reform that does not ensure a more homogenouslandownershipstructurewouldonlyaggravatetheproblemofinequality(Adriano,1991).Second,abi-modalagrarianstructureisaninefficientorganizationalarrangementforacountrycharacterized by a highly inelastic land supply. Large-sized farms tend to exploit this scarceresource extensively and employ more capital - another scarce factor of production in thecountry-intensively.Incontrast,small-sizedfarmscultivatelandmoreintensivelyandemploymorelabor,anabundantresourceinthecountry(Adriano,1991).

Lastly, a bi-modal agrarian structure has implications on the nature and pace of country’sdevelopmentLike in theMarcos regime, thismodeofproductiveorganizationpresumes thatagribusiness plantations can serve as the engines for rural growth. But, as the country hasexperienced,suchagrowth-biasisnotbasedontheefficientallocationanduseofthecountry’sresourcesandisnotaccompaniedbyamoreequitableincomestructure.Thegrowthprospectemploying this strategy is limitedbecause itdoesnotdevelopabroaddomesticbase for theplantation’s produce and is not sustainable because resources are mismanaged (Adriano,1991).

TailoringARCs into theKey ProductionApproachUnderRamos’Medium-TermAgriculturalDevelopmentPlan(MTADP)

With the government’s continued promotion of high-value crops for export, the AgrarianReformCommunities (ARCs)were fitted into theoperationof agri-business.Majority of theARCsespeciallyinMindanaowerepartoftheimplementingmechanismfortheKeyProductionApproach (KPA) that the Ramos government designed under its Medium-Term AgriculturalDevelopmentPlan(MTADP).

Through the KPA, around 5million hectares of rice and corn landswould be reduced to 1.9millionhectareswhiletheremaining3.1millionhectareswouldbeconvertedtotheso-called“exportwinners”,thelivestockandpoultryindustryandcommercialcrops(Ibon,1996).From1996to2002,theDARreportedthatthereareabout1,059marketingtie-upssetupbetweenthe ARC and around 394 agribusiness firms (Ibon, 2003). These arrangements fall into theleasebackandcontractgrowingschemespursuedbytheagribusiness.

AgribusinessTakingtheLeadinAgriculturalProduction

Intermsof landholdings,RepublicActNo.7900,otherwiseknownas“AnActtoPromotetheProduction, Processing, Marketing and Distribution of High-Value Crops, Providing FundsTherefore, and for other Purposes”, allows farmer-cooperatives to lease out up to 1,000hectaresoftheirlandforaperiodof25years.Thisgivesmuchleewaytoagribusinessventurestodealwithcooperativesratherthanindividualfarmers(Manahan,2011).

This Act is further supported by the DAR Administrative Order No. 9 series of 2006, whichguides the investments on agricultural lands covered by the CARP. The DAR AO identifies anumberofagribusinessventureagreementsfromwhichtheagrarianreformbeneficiariescanchoose,suchas;(a)jointventureagreements,(b)production/contractgrowing/growership,(c)marketingcontracts,(d)leaseagreements,(e)managementcontracts,(f)servicecontract,and(g)build-operatetransfer.

Tostreamlinetheireffortsforexpansion,fivegovernmentcorporationsaretaskedtoincreasetheir involvement in the agribusiness sector. The Philippine Agricultural Development andCommercial Corporation (PADCC) is responsible for agribusiness investment, promotion,facilitation,andprojectdevelopment(PulhinandRamirez).Itistheleadagencyinagribusinesstobothlocalandforeignclientsbywayofinvestmentmatchingthroughlandidentificationandconsolidationofidle/underutilizedland(PulhinandRamirez).

The Philforest Corporation, is a government-controlled corporation and wholly-ownedsubsidiaryoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(DENR),isresponsibleforforginginvestmentsinpubliclandsparticularlythosecategorizedas“untenured”andidlelands.Untenuredlandsarelandsthatarenotcoveredbyanytenureinstrumentsbutareneverthelessoccupiedbypeople(PulhinandRamirez).

The Philippine National Oil Company-Alternative Fuel Corporation (PNOC-AFC) also initiatesbiofuels feedstock production while the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and theDevelopmentBankofthePhilippines(DBP)serveasthefinancialarmsfortheseprojects.

According to government statistics, around 1.83 million hectares were developed intoagribusiness and agroforestry areas during the period 2005-2010. The last two years alone(2009-2010) account for 22% of the total areas developed by the government for theseventures(NEDA,2011).

In Mindanao, the Department of Agriculture registered at least 310,00 hectares of landsdeveloped for agro-fuel cultivation under eight companies in 2009 (AFRIM 2010). This

constitutedaround82%oflanddevelopedforagribusinessinthatyearfortheentirecountry.StillinMindanao,around54,748hectaresoflandwereclearedforoilpalmplantationsin2011anditisprojectedthatanadditionalonemillionwillbeneededforoilpalmfrom2011-2022atthecountrylevelofwhichhalfwillbelocatedinMindanao(Villanueva,2012).

TheCommodificationofWater

InthemiddleofCARPimplementationthegovernmentstartedprivatizingitsassetsincludingservicecorporationssuchaspotablewaterservicethatsourcewaterfromdamsthatarealsodesigned for both hydro- electric generation and irrigation. Soon the dams for both powergenerationandirrigationwerealsosoldtoprivateelectricpowergeneratingcorporations.

While privatization of infrastructure development in the water sector is a relatively recentpolicy,privatecontrolofwaterresources intheformofwaterrights isanage-oldpractice inthe Philippines. Section I Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution mentioned “water rights forirrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower.” Theexactphrasewas retained in Section8ArticleXIVof the1973ConstitutionandSection IArticleXIIof the1987Constitution.Water right is fundamentallydifferent fromtheright to water. The former allows private and profit-oriented monopoly control of waterresources while the latter essentially means human right to access and use water (WPNA,2004).

Angat dam's privatization planwill threatenwater access to of 28,000 farmers of PampangaandBulacan.AngatDamcurrentlyservestheirrigationneedsofmorethan31,000hectaresoffarmlandsinthetwoprovinces(GMANews.TV,2010).

TwoofthesubprojectsoftheADB-fundedSouthernPhilippinesIrrigationSectorProject(SPISP)showedprivatizationwasn’tbenefitingfarmers(Wakefield,2010).Thetwosubprojectsofthe$60-millionloanaretheGibongNationalIrrigationSystem(NIS)inProsperidadandSanFranciscotownsofAgusandelSur,andtheCalayagonCommunityIrrigationSystem(CIS)inBuenavista,AgusandelNorte.

The subprojects also caused decreasing productivity and lesser income among the farmersInstead of increasing their yield, these incomplete and malfunctioning subprojects havedecreased the farmers’ yield to 30-40 sacks per hectare from 80-90 sacks per hectare(Wakefield, 2010). For five cropping seasons now, farmers have consistently losing income(Wakefield,2010).

For a long time until presently, the number of irrigated farms under the National IrrigationAdministration did not increase and the irrigation systems are left in disrepair. In suchconditionof thepublic irrigationsystem,privatelyowned irrigationsystems increasedaddingfurthercosttofarming.

LandUseConversion

With the concept of Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs) and Strategic Agriculture andFisheriesDevelopmentZones(SAFDzs),the1990swascharacterizedbymassiveconversionofagriculturallandsforotherpurposes.RamosissuedExecutiveOrder(EO)124onSeptember8,1993which identifiedpriorityareasfor landuseconversion(LUC) includingregionalandagri-industrial centers (RAICs)/regional industrial centers (RICs); tourism development areas; andsocializedhousing.

In1995,CongresspassedRepublicAct(RA)No.7881thatamendedCARL.Thesaidamendmentdid not only exempt fishpond and prawn farms from CARP coverage but also allowed theconversionofagriculturallandsintocommercial/large-scalefishpondandprawnfarmsaslongassuchconversion is“moreeconomically feasibleandsound.”Furthermore, theamendmentclassified that crop conversion (or the change of crops to commercial or high-value crops)shouldnotbeconsideredasaconversionintheuseornatureoftheland(Halim,2006).

Specifically, the Ramos government adopted land-use conversion, among the mostcontroversialpolicies,toattractinvestmentsinrealestateandcommercialtourismbusinesses.The result is a reworking of the social and economic, as well as the physical, landscape offormerly“rural”areas,suchthatevenwithinthesamehouseholdtheurban-industrialeconomymightco-existwithagriculturalproduction(Kelly,1998).

Atthenationallevel,specificpolicyframeworksexistthatregulatethelandconversionprocessbut they are frequently circumvented and undermined by developmental strategies gearedtowardsindustrializationratherthanagriculturalmodernization.Attheleveloflocalmunicipalgovernments, legislation allows considerable flexibility in interpreting zoning by-laws andthereforedetermining landuses (Kelly,1998).More importantly, this flexibility isapplied inacontext where the boundaries between public and private roles, and between regulatoryresponsibilitiesandvestedinterests,arefrequentlyblurred(Kelly,1998).

Finally, the “everyday politics” of relations between landlords, tenant and other local powerbrokerscreatesacontextinwhichtenantfarmersfinditdifficulteventoasserttheirlegalrighstoadequatecompensationorlandredistributionthroughagrarianreform(Kelly,1998).

Inaneo-colony,landasaresourcemustbeefficientlyexploitedforrelentlessprofitmakingforthe ruling class. Land in this case, is an economic resource, a commodity to be used in theserviceofcapitalaccumulation(Kumar,2011).

Land use conversion has reasserted with vengeance. Land, which has long been the mostimportant reservoir of money and power in Philippine society, has reemerged as thecornerstone of Philippine capital’s strategy for the 21st century. But instead of tobacco,sugarcane and coconuts, the new cash crops are condominiums, office towers and malls.(Cardenas, 2014). The newPhilippine economy is seeing billions of dollars churned into thelandbyoverseas Filipinosbuyingnewhomes, servicesoutsourcing firms rentingoffice spaceand mall operators cashing in on the newfound consuming power of the globalized middleclasses(Cardenas,2014).

Overthepastdecade,realestatehasconsistentlybeenoneofthebest-performingsubsectorsof the economy. Data from the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) show that, ifconsidered separately from ownership of dwellings, the gross value added of real estateexpandedataclipof141percentfrom2000to2010.Thiswasmorethandoublethepaceofgross domestic product growth in this period and was second only to mining among thesubsectorstrackedbytheNSCB(Cardenas,2014).

Includedalsointhelanduseconversionistheestablishmentofspecialeconomiczones(SEZs).AccordingtodatafromthePhilippineEconomicZoneAuthority,thenumberofPhilippineSEZsaloneroseby80.7percentfromJune2008(166officialSEZs)toDecember2013(300SEZs).

Thegovernmenthasbecomea“landbrokerstate”(Levien,2012).Thestatehasbecomeamereland broker for increasingly real-estate driven private capital in order to achieve theexpropriation of land from small farmers and transferring them to large, and sometimes,foreigncorporationsforincreasinglyrealestate-drivenprojects(Levien,2012).

LiberalizationofRuralBanks

From 1953 to 1979, the government encouraged the growth of rural banking to service thecredit needs of small rural businessmen and small farmers. From1971 to 1981,many ruralbankershaveemergedasthenewusurers,thenewmiddlemen,thefarminputandappliancedealers, the rice millers and trades, and given these varied roles, the new land buyers andspeculators.(Ofreneo,1981).

To further promote the market orientation of government’s land reform, The ArroyoadministrationsoughttoenacttheFarmlandAsCollateralBillandlatertheAgriculturalCreditBill which provides that agricultural lands shall be accepted as collateral by any lendinginstitutions,bankornon-bank, includingsavingsandcreditcooperatives for loanssecuredbythe registeredowners as appearing in theCertificatesof LandOwnershipAward (CLOA), theEmancipation Patent (EP), Homestead Patent, Free Patent, Original Certificate of Title orTransferCertificateofTitles(HouseofRepresentatives,2005).

Now that it has numbered to more than a thousand, the government is arranging thetransformationofthesebanksintogiantmonopoliesoradjunctofbigcommercialbanks.

PresidentNoynoyAquinorecentlysignedRepublicActNo.10574,allowingforeignerstoownup 60 percent of rural banks. The ramification of this law is detrimental to the farmers.Foreclosed agricultural lands can nowbe controlled by foreigners. They can landgrabon thepretextoftechnicalityondefaultson loanpayments.Theycanacquirecontinuous landsonalarge scale, to covert farmlands that give subsistence tomarginal rural folks into tax-exemptindustrialzonesthatgiveminimumlaborwages(Lopez,2014).RA10574hadthegalltoincludeCARPlandsforforeclosure,contradictingtheCARPlawandthenationalpatrimonyprovisionofthe1987Constitution,whichwasaffirmedbytheSupremeCourtin1997(Lopez,2014).

RANo.10574findsitsrootsfromtheForeignInvestmentsActof1991(amendedbyRA8179in1996)whichliberalizedtheentryofforeigninvestmentsintothecountrybyrelaxingrestrictionsontheparticipationofforeignersasequityinlocalfirms.Asaresultofthislaw,thecountryhasopened up its doors to joint ventures between Philippine-owned corporations and foreignentities.

ModernizingtheAgricultureandFisheriesSectors

OnDecember22,1997,thetenthCongresspassedtheAgricultureandFisheriesModernizationAct (AFMA) or Republic Act No. 8435. AFMAmandates the government to use the “marketapproach” in assisting the agriculture and fisheries sectors and promote “market-oriented”policies in agricultural production to encourage farmers to shift to more profitable crops(Halim,2006).

Inreality,AFMAisnotaboutagriculturemodernizationtoimprovetheplightofFilipinofarmersbut more about the systematization and acceleration of land use and crop conversion andcorporatetakeoveroffarmsthroughtheestablishmentofso-calledNetworkofProtectedAreasfor Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Development (NPAAAD) and Strategic Agriculture andFisheriesDevelopmentZones(SAFDZ)(Halim,2006).

ZAFDZsareactuallybuiltinontheconceptofARCs.AccordingtoAFMA,oneofthecriteriatoestablish a SAFDZ is the dominant presence of ARCs and/or small-owner cultivators andamortizingowners/agrarianreformbeneficiariesandothersmallfisherfolkinthearea(Section6 of AFMA). These ARCS within ZAFDZs will serve as “model farms’ which the governmentwould encourage to sign amanagement agreementwith corporations for the production ofhighvaluecropsforexports(Section7ofAFMA).

Arroyo’sfirstMedium-TermPhilippineDevelopmentPlan(MTPDP2001-2004)reportedthatatotal of 1.07 hectares of key and emerging SAFDZ areas have already been identified by theDepartmentofAgriculture(DA)andlocalgovernmentunits(LGUs)

Table9.SAFDZConvergenceAreascumInvestmentPrograms,ByRegion,asofApril2000

RegionSAFDZArea/InvestmentProgram

CARTemperateVegetable,Rootcrop&FruitDevelopmentZoneReservoirAgro-FisheriesDevelopment&ManagementZoneIIlocosGarlic-Onion-GingerConvergenceZoneBeef-Chevron-CornConvergenceZoneMetroSanFernandoAgro-Industrial&TourismConvergenceZoneBrackishWaterAquacultureIrrigationSystemsIIIsabelaIntegratedCorn,Livestock,Poultry&FisheryInvestmentProgram

IIINuevaEcijaRice-OnionBasedDevelopmentAreaPampanga-Bataan-BulacanWetlandDevelopmentConvergenceZoneIVSeaweedsProduction&Processing

VPhilRegionalDevelopmentProgramOperationofMaricultureProjectsonMilkfish&SeaweedVIBucariAgriculturalDevelopmentProjectWesternVisayasStrategicAgricultureDevelopmentProgramAntiqueFisheries&AquacultureCenterCapizWetlands-RiceDevelopmentConvergenceZoneBonateBayResourceManagementProjectTobosoFoodSecurity:TheCoastalResourceModernizationPlanVIIRice-BasedDevelopmentZoneCelebosoleGrowthZoneFisheriesDevelopmentProgramDairyProgramExpansion&DevelopmentinCebuConvergenceZoneMangoIndustryDevelopmentinCentralVisayasVIIISanJuancitoFisheriesEconomicZoneLeyte2RiceCommercializationProjectSeaweedsIndustrializationProjectIXSibugayValley&AdjacentMunicipalitiesConvergenceZoneTitay&AdjacentMunicipalitiesConvergenceZoneSalugValleyConvergenceZoneSAFDZIntegratedAgro-FisheriesInvestmentProjectsDDKRMIndustrialCorridor&AdjacentMunicipalitiesConvergenceProjectZamboangaCityConvergenceZoneIntegratedFisheriesInvestmentProgramBasilanSAFDZFisheryInvestmentAreas5-YearSAFDZFisheriesInvestment&DevelopmentProgramXHighlandPlateauDevelopmentProject

XISeaweedsProductionDurianDevelopmentProgramundertheConvergenceDevelopmentofSouthMindanaoXIIModelFarmforAquacultureSystemsMulti-Story/MultipleCroppingofHVCCinCoconutFarmsBaiSerapinangMultipurposeCooperativeModelFarmDevelopment(Corn-BasedIntegratedFarmingSystem)FederationofSmallFarmersAssociationofM’land(IntegratedRiceProductionModelFarm)MidpapanI&IIFarmersAssociationModelFarmDevelopment(Rice-BasedFarmingSystems)

CARAGASeaweedsFarming(SurigaodelNorte)CARAGADevelopmentZoneCattleFatteningARMMLivestockDevelopment(Sulu)LivestockDevelopment(Tawi-tawi)CrabmeatProcessing

Off-shoreDevelopmentProjectLivestockDevelopment(Maguindanao)CornProcessingDevelopmentIntegratedFisheryDevelopmentProjectLivestockDevelopment(LanaodelSur)FishPreservationDevelopmentSulu-Tawi-tawiFisheryDevelopmentConvergenceZoneSource: National SAFDX Committee Secretariat, Bureau of Soils and Water Management-DepartmentofAgriculture

LandGrabs

The term land grab refers to thepurchaseor leaseof vast tracts of landbywealthier, food-insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order toproducecropsforexports(DanielandMittal,2009).

Thelandgrabphenomenonistheresultofacomplexcombinationoffactorsmotivatedbypricevolatilityinglobalmarkets,theglobalfoodcrisis,andhighlevelsofspeculativeactivity.(DanielandMittal,2009).

Skyrocketing food prices in 2008 that increase import bills and inflation rates, harsh climaticconditions, and poor soils and scarce land and water combined with economic anddemographic growth had led many nations (inside the European Union, the Middle EastcountriesandAsia)toreexaminedomesticfoodsecuritypolicies.Manyarelookingtostabilizesuppliesby acquiring foreign lands foodproduction in thehopesofavertingdomestic socialunrestandpoliticalstabilityoverfoodpriceandsupply(DanielandMittal,2009).

A surging demand for agrofuels (biofuel produced from ethanol and sugarcane, as well asbiodiesel)andaccesstonewsourcesofrawmaterials formanufacturinggoods isalsodrivinglandpurchases.Ontopofthetworeasonsisthehungerofinvestors,whoviewfarmlandasaninvestment poised to produce significant returns. This includeWall Street banks, investmentfunds, finance companies, and wealthy individuals, who have turned their attention toagriculturalacquisitionsduringthelasttwoyears(DanielandMittal,2009).

Internationalfinancial institutions, suchastheWorldBank,arealsodriversofthe“resourcesrestructuring”inmanycountries.TheInternationalFinancialCorporation((IFC)andtheForeignInvestment Advisory Services (FIAS), both part of the World Bank group, provide advisoryservicesandtechnicalassistanceoninvestmentsinland(Manahan,2011).

FIAS helps shape the generation of investment in land through one of its products, the“Investment and Policy Promotion.” In the Philippines, from 2008 to 2009, FIAS with thePhilippineBureauofInvestment(BOI)identifiedapipelineofpotentialinvestmentsinlandthatamounted to USD one billion, with two hundred new expansion opportunities (Manahan,2011).

Somelandtargetedhadpreviouslybeenearmarkedforagrarianreform.Thenewcommercialinterests asserted over these lands have undermined the redistribution process of CARP.Insiders intheDARandDAadmitthatthelandstheyhaveidentifiedareupforredistributionunder CARP. Specifically, these lease agreements involve agrofuel production arrangements.There are also reports from the ground that some lease agreements are already negotiatedprior to the issuanceof landownershipawardsor land titlesawardedby theDARunder thegovernment’s agrarian reform program or are even sometimes used as a condition for theissuanceoftitles(Manahan,2011).

In July 2008, a memorandum of understanding between the United Arab Emirates and thePhilippinegovernmentwassigned.ThedealinvolvedaUSD50millionprojecttodevelop3,000hectares of banana plantation in Mindanao, fish and cereal farms in Luzon, and pineapplecanneryinCamarinesNorte.TheSaudiArabiagovernmenthasaninvestmentagreementwithour government involving food for export production of bananas, pineapple, mango, andpapayatoRiyadh(Manahan,2011).

The Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has established a USD 4 million jobtrainingcentertoteachfarmershowtoplantandharvestlargervolumesofcrops,butinreturnthePhilippinegovernmenthastoidentifyandmakeavailablesome100,000hectaresofprimeagricultural landwhere investors fromKoreawill be invited tooperate (PulhinandRamirez).This is included inthememorandumofunderstandingfortheMultiple IndustryCluster (MIC)signedbythePhilippineandKoreangovernments(PulhinandRamirez).

VI. TheCommodificationof Landand theEver IncreasingPenetrationof Foreign capitalintotheCountryside

The landquestion isalwaysbeyond theagrarianquestion. It isa sovereigntyquestionof thepeopleanchoredontheprinciplesofnationalpatrimony.

Withtheneoliberalparadigm,thesovereigntyquestionisunderminedbythephenomenonofcommodification.Commodificationpresumestheexistenceofpropertyrightsoverprocesses,things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be tradedsubjecttolegalcontract(Harvey,2005).

Withthecommodificationoflandcomestherisingroleofcapital.Thelongstandinglandlord-tenantdichotomybegan tobe seriouslyunderminedby; (a) the increased roleof tradersassource of credit andmarketing outlet for produce, and (b) farmers assumingmore voice inproduction asmany farmers became leaseholders (Reyes, 1998). A national survey of ruralhouseholddonebythePhilippinein1998showedthatfarminginputs(mostlytransactedwithtraders)asacostofproductioninriceandcornwerebiggerthanthelandrentthatwaspaidtothelandlord(Reyes,2005)

Table10.CostofProduction,%byFactorInput

CostItem Rice Corn Coconut

LandRent 18.83 16.32 31.98

Labor 30.00 41.48 48.13

MaterialInputs 35.11 32.32 1.70

Seeds 13.62 18.24 0.90

Fertilizers 13.90 12.81 0.82

Pesticides 7.59 1.17 0.08

MachineRental/Irrigation 13.28 4.25 2.17

Tax 0.51 0.45 1.30

OtherCosts 2.26 4.81 14.62

Source:PPI1998surveyof4.483farmerrespondentsnationwide

Theprecedingdataconstituteabreakfromthetraditionallandlord-tenantnexusthatdefinedsmall farming andmost of agriculture in thepast. Farmingproduction and incomes are nowdeterminedmorebyaccesstoinputandcreditandpricingratherthantheeconomicandextra-economicholdoflandownership(Reyes,2005).

Theroleofmerchant-usurers(mostofwhomcomefromthelandlordclass)isinstitutionalizingfeudalandsemi-feudalexploitationhassignificantlyincreasedinthepastthreedecades.Theiroperations spanned a vast network (cut across provinces, cities, and towns) that efficientlysqueezeprofitfromthepeasantryandotherproducersintheruralareasthroughcontroloverthe supply of loans, farm implements, farm inputs, consumption commodities, andpurchaseanddistributionofthefarmers’produce.

The operation of imperialist control of finance to extract superprofits is facilitated throughintegrationofdifferentoperations.Inthecaseofrice,milling,tradingofpalayandfarminputs,creditandrentingoutofmachineriesareinterlinked(Pascual,1994).Grantofcredittofarmersisconditionedonsaleoffarmproductsatpredeterminedprices,oruseofmachineries,oranycombinationoftheabove.

Thesituationisnotmuchdifferent inothercroplinessuchascoconutandvegetables. In landplantedwithcoconut,merchantprofit isextractedontopofthe landrent. Invegetablesandother crops suchaspeanuts, credit forpurchaseof seedsand for landpreparationgives themerchant-usurer the right to share in the net product, together with the right to buy theproduceatpredeterminedprices.(Pascual,1994).

Manyindependentfarmersortheso-calledamortizingownersendupinbankruptcyundertheweight of usury,merchantmonopolies andmonopsony. There is now amovement towardsreconcentrationoflandinthehandsofthelandlords-merchants-usurersandrichpeasants.Duetoheavyindebtedness,thefarmerendsupagainasatenantoralaboreraftermortgaginghisland to the former. (Pascual,1994). According toaDARofficial,80%of the CARPawardeeswithintheHaciendaLuisitahavemortgagedtheirlandstosugarmillersatP5,000perhectareperyear.

Formostpartofthetwentiethcentury,therealmoneyintheagriculturalsystemwasnottobefoundonthelandandinfarming,butratherinthenon-farmingagriculturalindustries.Andthelast threeor fourdecadeshasbeena timeofheightenedconcentrationandcontrolof theseindustries – the input (including the seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery), output(purchasing and trading of agricultural products), and final processing sectors of the worldagriculturalsystem(Magdoff,2013).

Finally, the greater profit is extracted from land speculation and real estate. Based onPhilippineStatisticalAuthoritydata,while thecountry’sgrossdomesticproductexpandedby21.9percentbetweenthesecondquartersof2011and2014,thoseofrealestate,construction,and financial intermediation grew even further by 27.4 percent, 33.5 percent and by 24.9percentrespectively.Bycontrast,theagriculturesectoronlygrewbyameasly4.9percent.

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