The making of the EU Global Strategy · It does not take two years to write 20,000 words. Yet it did take almost two years for the EU to produce two documents, which together amounted

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Contemporary Security Policy

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The making of the EU Global Strategy

Nathalie Tocci

To cite this article: Nathalie Tocci (2016) The making of the EU Global Strategy, ContemporarySecurity Policy, 37:3, 461-472, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2016.1232559

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The making of the EU Global StrategyNathalie Tocci

Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, Italy

ABSTRACTThis article traces the evolution of the EU strategic reflection which culminatedin the publication of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016. It explains thechoices made by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini over this timeperiod—including both the initial strategic assessment and the final EUGS. Itprovides a behind the scenes view on the players, the organization and themethods of work used to produce a strategic vision for the EU’s role in the world.

KEYWORDS European Union; EU Global Strategy; security; Foreign Policy; member states

It does not take two years to write 20,000 words.Yet it did take almost two years for the EU to produce two documents,

which together amounted to around that word length: the strategic assess-ment presented to the European Council in June 2015,1 and the EU GlobalStrategy (EUGS) for foreign and security policy, welcomed by the same inJune 2016.2

Back in September 2014 during her hearing at the European Parliament,Federica Mogherini, signalled her intention, if appointed High Representativefor Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the EuropeanCommission (HRVP), to engage in a process of strategic reflection.3

Twenty-two months later, the European Council welcomed the HRVP’s pres-entation of the EUGS for foreign and security policy. What happened in thosealmost two years?

I distinctly remember Federica Mogherini complaining when she wasItalian foreign minister, and I worked as her advisor, about the tendency ofpolitical leaders in Europe to constantly jump from one crisis to the next.There are indeed plenty of crises in and around Europe, and they have farfrom peaked. Reacting to them is a hard and unavoidable fact of politicallife. But is tactic and reaction the only way forward? To paraphrase SunTzu, while a strategy bereft of tactic is the slowest route to victory inforeign policy, foreign policy tactic without strategy is just the noise before

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Nathalie Tocci [email protected] Istituto Affari Internazionali, Via Angelo Brunetti 9, Rome00186, Italy

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, 2016VOL. 37, NO. 3, 461–472http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1232559

defeat. Unlike her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, who believed that a strategywas not worth the paper it was written on, Sun Tzu’s dictum resonated withMogherini. And while at the outset of her mandate she insisted that an EUstrategy should not be an action plan, it should nonetheless provide the EUand its Member States with a common sense of strategic direction.

The aim was clear from the start. The process was not. What was obviouswas that a process of strategic reflection for the EU in 2015–2016 could looknothing like what it did back in 2003. We live in a different Union, a differentworld. As the strategic assessment put it, it is a far more connected, contestedand complex world; and a far more connected, contested and complex Union.In 2003 High Representative Javier Solana set up a small team, which workedon a draft over the course of several weeks, organised a handful of seminars indifferent European capitals, and discussed the draft European Security Strat-egy (ESS) with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) before the docu-ment was adopted by the European Council. The ESS provided the Unionwith its first strategic vision, which helped mend the intra-European andtransatlantic rift over the 2003 war in Iraq. It did not, however, indicate themeans to achieve this vision.

In 2016, a radically different approach was necessary. On the one hand, theUnion did need a new vision that would heal divisions regarding its role in theworld. But there is not one single cleavage which a shared narrative had toreconcile: there are several and overlapping rifts between Member Statesand EU institutions, be these over migration, Russia or the role of Europeandefence, to mention a few. On the other hand, a vision alone, while sufficientin 2003 at a time when Europe had never been ‘so prosperous, so secure, norso free’,4 would have been woefully inadequate in 2016. The EU is undergoingits deepest existential crisis. In order to exit such crisis and fight back againstthe centrifugal forces gripping the Union, action is of the essence. Foreignpolicy is unlikely to be the action area that will re-enamour European citizenswith the EU project.

At the same time, foreign policy remains the area in which European citi-zens demand more Europe. A recent Pew survey found that 74 per cent ofEuropeans would like to see a stronger EU role in the world. This includedBritish citizens, 55 per cent of whom supported the proposition.5 Moreover,while foreign policy remains at the margins of the European public space,issues that touch the daily lives of Europeans actually have external origins,be it terrorism or energy insecurity, climate change, uncontrolled migrationor the economic insecurity unleashed by globalisation. The short-termresponses sought to these challenges are local, national or European. But toaddress them effectively, the Union and its Member States must lift theirgaze and engage the wider world. An EUGS therefore had to be actionable:it could not limit itself to the vision, but had to point the way forward regard-ing the action.

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A two phased process of strategic reflection

The HRVP began with what she had: a mandate from the December 2013European Council inviting the High Representative to produce an assess-ment of the changing global environment and the challenges and opportu-nities this implied for the EU.6 That mandate was not, strictly speaking, amandate for a new ESS. Some believed that its interpretation could havebeen stretched to that point, but the HRVP thought that neither was itpossible, nor, more importantly, was it desirable. In the fall of 2014 therewere at least three good reasons not to push the accelerator full speed onthe EUGS.

Federica Mogherini had only been recently appointed, and her appoint-ment had not been uncontested. At the nadir of relations between the EUand Russia, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the destabilisation ofeastern Ukraine, and the downing of MH17, as a former Italian Foreign Min-ister, Mogherini was suspected by several Member States, notably in centraland eastern Europe, of being too soft on Russia. On top came the criticismsconcerning her relative youth and inexperience, shared at the time by manyestablished political elites across the Union. In such a context, stretching—and to some extent twisting—a mandate to produce a mere assessment ofthe strategic environment into one developing a new EU security strategywould have been a step too far.

And Federica Mogherini was in no hurry. To her, the process was alwayssupposed to be as if not more important than the product itself, a point thatshe repeatedly made in her public speeches. Thorough thought and work wasnecessary to get that process right. Those first eight months to produce thestrategic assessment, a far less politically sensitive document than the strategyitself, gave her and her team the time to test a working method, understandwhat was necessary and what was not, do a trial run before the real thingbegan. And indeed that is precisely what happened. When producing the stra-tegic assessment, we set up a small working group consisting of officials fromthe European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission and theCouncil. We organised several meetings with policy planners from EUMember States, and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) organiseda large outreach event.

As weeks went by we understood what worked and what did not. The stra-tegic planning division within the EEAS was a key asset in this process, as wasthe input of the top management of the EEAS. The EUISS played a critical roleand was the natural hub to coordinate the public outreach and consultationdimension of the strategic reflection. By contrast, we learnt that MemberStates had to be included in the process in a far more systematic way inorder to ensure their buy-into the document, although this did not necessarilymean engaging with the existing working bodies of the Council. Member State

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buy-in required very regular and lengthy meetings, and neither the Commit-tee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) nor the PSC would have hadsufficient time for this exercise.

We also understood that the Commission’s input, while coordinated by theSecretariat General, required direct input from the various DirectoratesGeneral (DGs). Federica Mogherini wanted a ‘global’ rather than just a ‘secur-ity’ strategy. And the most important interpretation of what ‘global’ meantwas thematic rather than geographic. This was to be a ‘whole of EU’ strategyfor foreign and security policy: a strategic reflection led by Mogherini by usingboth her HR and VP hats. We therefore needed the substantive input of a widerange of Commission DGs, beginning with those falling under the Commis-sioners’ Group on External Action—that is, trade, development, humanitar-ian assistance, enlargement and neighbourhood policy—and movingbeyond it to include mobility, transport, migration, energy, climate, research,education, growth and employment among others.

Finally, dividing the process of strategic reflection in two phases madesense analytically. An assessment of the strategic environment is the groundzero of a strategy. It is the snapshot of the world, and how it is expected toevolve, that informs ensuing policy action: it is the diagnosis that precedesthe prognosis. The picture painted by the assessment is of a fundamentallychanged strategic environment. In 2003 the international liberal orderseemed unchallenged—9/11 notwithstanding—and EU soft power was at itspeak with the eastern enlargement approaching the finishing line and theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy about to be launched.

In 2015 that world was gone. The strategic assessment described the worldas more connected, contested and complex. The world has become more con-nected, with greater connectivity bringing about both challenges and oppor-tunities. The world has become more contested and conflictual, notablywithin the EU and its surrounding regions to the east and south. And theworld has become more complex, with power shifting from west to east butalso diffusing beyond state boundaries.7 An assessment of these fundamentalchanges was the necessary baseline for the EUGS. By getting the assessmentout, we aimed to clear the ground of all description that would have otherwisefound its way into the strategy proper. Having cleared that ground, the globalstrategy could be just that: a strategy.

Towards a common narrative

The work began in September 2015 and was designed to have two principaldimensions: a public outreach and consultation, and an official and insti-tutional dimension. When it came to the former, we were particularly inspiredby the 2014 German review: a review of German foreign policy which, whilenot having a national security strategy as its final outcome, had led to an

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extremely rich and innovative process of self-reflection. And while in the EU’scase the output was a strategy, Mogherini had always placed as much empha-sis on the process of strategic reflection as on its final product. If one of thebasic purposes of the EUGS was to forge a common narrative on foreignand security policy among Europeans, it could not be a strategy cooked upin a room by one or two people. It had to be the product of a collectiveeffort, which would place Member States and EU institutions at the centre,but which aimed to reach out way beyond them, including universities andstudents, think tanks and civil society organisations, social actors and theprivate sector, as well as partners beyond the EU’s borders.

Public outreach and consultation

The advice and prediction of a diplomat who had been at the forefront of theGerman review was well received and turned out to be correct. He suggestedthat so long as we put in place a basic skeleton of activities, many more wouldbe tagged on as the process acquired momentum. And that is precisely whathappened. Back in the summer of 2015 we had started planning approxi-mately six to eight conferences in different capitals on different themes con-nected to the strategy. These would be co-organised by the EUISS inpartnership with different national think tanks and with the support of aprivate foundation. Following the EUISS’s opening conference of the outreachand consultation process in October 2015, the fall of 2015 saw the organis-ation of the first handful of such events.

Between then and the end of the consultation process in April 2016, the listballooned. In the end, over 50 events were organised across the EU on theEUGS.8 All Member State foreign ministries co-organised at least one suchevent, which normally saw the participation of that Member State’s foreignminister and was carried out together with a national think tank or university.Several think tanks and NGOs organised their events independently, be it inBrussels or elsewhere. Alongside we organised a smaller number of eventsbeyond the EU’s borders. We travelled to the United States, Japan, Brazil,Norway, Georgia and Serbia, seeking to balance the emphasis between theEU’s global and regional roles. We also arranged several meetings with UNand NATO officials over the course of the consultation.

Beyond these events, we received a wealth of written contributions andestablished a dedicated website for the process.9 The EUISS invited 50experts, 30 of which were from the EU and 20 from elsewhere to provideopinion pieces.10 Alongside, we organised a student essay competition andthe HRVP personally engaged with a group of Erasmus alumni over thethemes of the EUGS. A host of different actors made their voice heard:from human rights NGOs to defence industry associations, from tradeunions to the Catholic church. I was personally surprised by the degree of

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interest this process solicited from very different walks of European politicallife.

Member states and EU institutions

The core of the work regarded the official institutions. As mentioned above,a genuine buy-in from Member States required their substantive and sus-tained input over months. Neither COREPER nor PSC were likely tocommit in practice. We therefore chose a different method, askingMember States to appoint points of contact (POC) with whom we wouldengage in monthly meetings over the EUGS. Alongside, the SecretariatGeneral of the Commission established a task force of officials representingthe external dimensions of their respective DGs. Almost all DGs wereinvolved in the taskforce.

Together with the POCs and the Commission taskforce we discussed,chapter by chapter, the EUGS over the course of nine months. Havingagreed on a broad outline of the document by December 2015, we distributeda set of questionnaires to the Member States and the Commission. We did sobecause a number of non-papers particularly fromMember States was alreadybeginning to flow in. If left undirected, the risk was that this input would havebeen of limited use. We therefore chose to steer the input by providing specificquestions to the Member States and the Commission. When explaining theworking method, we invited the Member States and the Commission to beas innovative as possible: to imagine what the EU could and should do nottoday or tomorrow, but in five, six or seven years.

On occasions, I was baffled by the response. In some cases, rather thanresponding to questions, I received track changes to the formulation of ques-tions themselves: officials have an unexplainable passion for track changes.On other occasions the invitation to be creative left my institutional interlo-cutors feeling uneasy. One day during a meeting, upon my invitation to ‘thinkoutside the box’, one participant replied ‘Nathalie, we cannot think outside thebox. We are the box!’. I was not quite sure whether to laugh or cry… .

Yet to be fair the response from both the Member States and the Commis-sion was extremely rich and rewarding. While the skeleton of the strategy andits driving philosophy came from the HRVP and her team, the flesh on thebones came from Member States and the Commission, alongside the inputfrom the wider foreign policy community through the public outreach andconsultation. When drafting the strategy, I relied on a few simple criteria todecide what to insert and what not. I tried to discern those areas in whichthere was a critical mass of support from the Member States and the Commis-sion. A strong stance on security and defence was one such example. I selectedother ideas from individual Member States, which seemed original and wouldnot meet the opposition of the others. Specific issues such as ocean

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governance, strategic communications, cyber security, post-conflict stabilis-ation or the reform of multilateral institutions are all cases in point.

When I could, I tried to stick to the actual wording in the input sent to us.This was a good piece of advice I received from one of the drafters of the 2015US National Security Strategy. When I asked him for some tips on how tomanage the process he suggested that when possible I should try to use theprecise bits of wording I received from the contributions. Those who contrib-uted would read themselves somewhere in the Strategy and this would likelyincrease their support for it. I am 100 per cent sure that all those who contrib-uted to the strategic reflection, both from within and outside the official insti-tutions, will find themselves reflected somewhere in the EUGS.

I learnt, however, that Member State buy-in required more than the regularinteraction with the POCs, not least for reasons related to institutional hier-archy. As the weeks went by, others wanted to have a say, and the Dutch EUPresidency, one of the key allies in this process, was eager to arrange suchopportunities. In early 2016, the EUGS was discussed with Member Statesat different levels: political directors, security directors, defence directors, sec-retaries general of ministries of foreign affairs, the PSC, the EUMilitary Com-mittee, the permanent military group, as well as by the Foreign AffairsCouncil, the informal Defence Council and the Development Council. TheEUGS was also subject of debate by the European Parliament, which producedits own report on the strategy,11 and was discussed by the inter-parliamentaryconference with delegates from Member States’ national parliaments. Severalnational parliaments also passed dedicated resolutions as their own input intothe process.

In full honesty the purpose of this plethora of meetings was less to contrib-ute to the content of the EUGS and more to ensure the widest possibleinclusion from Member States and EU institutions. My main interlocutorsfrom the Member States were the POCs alongside the Commission taskforce with whom I had the opportunity to meet regularly and thereforeengage in detailed discussion on substance. But while content was key, politi-cal and institutional support required this much broader effort.

Debating content

The HRVP did not, however, want to circulate the text too soon.First, this is because by circulating a draft we would have started negotiat-

ing the text too early. Months of negotiations on the text would have led to anEUGS looking like an unwieldy Christmas tree: a long shopping list withoutmuch analytical clarity, prioritisation and strategic intent. No matter howmuch Member States and EU institutions agreed in principle on the needto avoid such outcome, in practice their input tended to lengthen ratherthan shorten, add rather than subtract. Instead we wanted to concentrate

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on the content, flesh out the ideas, and iron out disagreements, rather thangetting immediately bogged down on the fine wording of the text. As Ibegan drafting each chapter of the Strategy, a colleague would work on a sub-stantive summary of the draft, and these summaries were the basis for discus-sion in meetings with the Member States and the Commission. Ourinterlocutors knew that what they received was not a draft of the text itself,so there was little point in quibbling over words and commas. This facilitateddetailed discussion on content rather than on form.

Most crucially, this allowed for meaningful discussions on the hardest nutsto crack in the process: Russia, defence and migration. On Russia the disagree-ments were well known between those Member States feeling the heat ofRussia’s assertiveness in the east and those wishing to reset the clock topre-2014 normality. Had the EUGS been written in 2014 this would havebeen by far the most complicated issue to resolve. In early 2016 those differ-ences were still there. But we all knew and understood where each playerstood, what the real red lines are, and what therefore is possible to agree onand what is not. On Russia, the blanket is simply too short: if you pull toomuch one side the other is left uncovered, and everyone is well aware. AllMember States accept that the best possible solution is therefore that of main-taining unity, with each side feeling equally reassured and equally unsatisfiedwith the outcome.

On defence, the dynamic was different. There was a critical mass ofMember States that were keen to press the accelerator on European securityand defence. This was complemented by the security and defence commu-nity within and beyond official institutions, which, having seen to theirdismay a ESS being ‘diluted’ into a broader EUGS, wanted to make suretheir baby was not entirely stolen from them. They wanted to make surethe EUGS would have strong hooks on defence. The Commission, tra-ditionally reluctant to name the ‘D’ word was also on board, partly dueto the personal views of Commission President Juncker on Europeandefence and the broader evolution of the defence debate within the Com-mission as a whole.

This, however, had to be reconciled with a set of dissenting voices. SomeMember States, while keen on security and defence in general, wanted toensure that in no way would the EUGS challenge NATO’s supremacy on col-lective defence, nor would it question the national sovereignty of MemberStates on defence matters. Other Member States, notably some of the non-NATO Member States, felt uneasy about a strong NATO focus in theEUGS and wanted to make sure that their status and autonomy as non-NATO members was fully respected and reflected in the Strategy. OtherMember States along with segments of the EEAS, the Commission, the Euro-pean Parliament, as well as human rights organisations, cautioned against an

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excessive security focus in the EUGS. They felt that this would have made theEU appear as excessively defensive.

Migration was the third contentious area, in which the most visceral dis-agreements came to the fore. Some Member States, notably from the east,were sceptical about making references to the internal dimensions ofmigration, notably asylum. Yet for a Strategy that made the internal–externalnexus the silver thread running across the document, neglecting the internaldimension of the policy area—migration—where the internal–external nexusis most evident would have been paradoxical at best. By covering only theexternal dimension of migration, the Strategy would have given theimpression that the EU’s approach to migration is exclusively centred onkeeping migrants outside EU borders. While, unfortunately, this is close topractice, the HRVP did not want to legitimise such an approach in the EUGS.

The confessionals, in the run-up to the UK referendum

The second reason why we did not want to distribute the text too early was toavoid the risk of leaks. The final stretch of the strategic reflection coincidedwith the increasingly heated UK referendum campaign on Brexit. Themyths and lies sold in that campaign are subject of a different article.Suffice it to say here that of the many lies told, there was also an allegedly‘top secret plan’—that is, the EUGS—to set up a EU army.12 Whereas theEUGS made no such claims, a leaked quote could have easily been twistedto that effect.

At the same time, we knew that having kept the EUGS close to our chestsup until late April, we had to start discussing the text itself with the MemberStates. We also had to discuss the text with the Secretariat General of theCommission, with the Cabinets of several Commissioners, including that ofthe President himself, as well as the Cabinet of the President of the EuropeanCouncil, the body to which the EUGS had to be presented. We thereforeorganised what we jokingly called ‘confessionals’, that is, reading sessionswith groups of Member States and the Commission in which they couldread and provide comments on the text, but could not take back homeeither electronic or hard copies of the document so as to protect it andavoid leaks. Despite all the precautions, we were not completely successfulin preventing leaks and ensuing front page headlines on an upcoming Euro-pean army.13 But the damage was limited and thankfully did not harm the textand the process.

The two rounds of confessionals were exhausting. The three major issues ofcontention—Russia, migration and defence—were subject to unending toingand froing between Member States. On top came other issues: from oneMember State’s insistence to reference Turkey’s occupation of northernCyprus, to debates between one large and one small Member State over the

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criteria governing diplomatic contact groups. These discussions went on untilthe evening of 25 June, minutes before the EUGS was formally circulated tothe Member States. I recall the nonchalant way in which Member States atthe beginning of the process had conscientiously agreed that the EUGSshould not be subject to a negotiation. In retrospect I wonder what itwould have been like had they advanced such a demand at the outset, consid-ering that we ended up poring over every word and comma of the text.

A dramatic finale: a post-Brexit EUGS

In the months leading to the UK referendum, our understanding was that inthe event of a Remain vote in the UK on 23 June 2016 we would have circu-lated officially the EUGS the following day in order for it to be formally pre-sented by the HRVP to the European Council on 28 June 2016. If instead theBritish public would have voted Leave, we would have held back, postponingthe EUGS to a later date. When the devastating news of Brexit hit homearound 5 am on the 24th, I assumed it would all be called off. Indeed, thiswas the HRVP’s first inclination that day. Yet as the hours went by, itbecame increasingly clear that presenting the EUGS in September was notan option as the European Council would have informally debated Brexit at27 Member States on that occasion. The alternative would have beenOctober or December 2016. But the magnitude of the Brexit earthquakerisked being so great that in all likelihood the project would have beendropped altogether.

The HRVP felt that dropping the EUGS would have done injustice to theUnion. As detailed above, the EUGS had been the outcome of almost twoyears of an EU-wide strategic reflection, a deliberation which had seen theactive involvement of all Member States and the broader foreign policy com-munity. All 28 Member States and EU institutions were satisfied with theresult. As the HRVP put it to me ‘The work is done’. So why did the documenthave to be shelved? Is not it precisely at such times of crisis that signalling thatEuropean unity is still possible is a due act of political responsibility, preciselythat responsibility which the EUGS advocates for the Union as a whole? True,in June 2016 the EUGS would not have received the attention that some felt itdeserved by the European Council or by the media. But arguably believingthat a long term strategic document of such kind would have ever madethe headlines or been subject to detailed deliberation by the EuropeanCouncil—which at least since 2008 has been the EU’s short-term crisis man-agement body par excellence—was naïve. And in any case, it was not the pointof the exercise.

As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of the EUGS was two-fold. Thefirst was precisely the process of strategic reflection which culminated inthe strategy, an extensive and intensive process that succeeded in achieving

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considerable convergence among all players, an achievement that all my inter-locutors from the Member States acknowledged. As this article has sought todocument that first goal was accomplished. The EUGS had to see light of day.

The second aim is what comes after the strategic reflection: the commonaction. The EUGS had to be published in order to start the engines on theimplementation and do so in the areas where it matters most as Smith andBiscop argue in this issue.14 In many ways, this is when the real work starts.

Notes

1. EU HR/VP, The European Union in a Changing Global Environment a MoreConnected, Contested and Complex World, https://eeas.europa.eu/docs/strategic_review/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf (accessed June2015).

2. EU HR/VP, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strat-egy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed June2016).

3. Hearing at the European Parliament, Federica Mogherini, 6 October 2014,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/06-10-2014/federica-mogherini (accessed July 2016).

4. EU High Representative, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European SecurityStrategy, December 2003, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/a-secure-europe-in-a-better-world-european-security-strategy/ (accessed July2016).

5. Pew, Europeans Face the World Divided, June 2016, p. 5, file:///C:/Users/Tocci/Downloads/Pew-Research-Center-EPW-Report-FINAL-June-13-2016.pdf(accessed July 2016).

6. European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 19–20 December 2013http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140245.pdf (accessed July 2016).

7. On this theme see Jolyon Howorth, ‘EU Global Strategy in a Changing World:Brussels’ Approach to the Emerging Powers’, Contemporary Security Policy,Vol. 37, No. 3 (2016), this issue.

8. For reports of these meetings, and of the public outreach of the strategic reflec-tion see http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/.

9. See www.europa.eu/globalstrategy.10. Antonio Missiroli, Towards an EU Global Strategy: Consulting the Experts,

April 2016, EUISS, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/towards-an-eu-global-strategy-consulting-the-experts/ (accessed July 2016).

11. European Parliament, ‘On the EU in a Changing Global Environment—AMore Connected, Contested and Complex World’, Motion for a Resolution,April 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2016-0069&language=EN (accessed July 2016).

12. Bruno Waterfield, ‘EU Army Plans Kept Secret from Voters’, The Times, 27May, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eu-army-plans-kept-secret-from-voters-3j3kg3zwj (accessed May 2016).

13. Ibid.

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14. Michael Smith, ‘Implementing the Global Strategy Where It Matters Most: TheEU’s Credibility Deficit and the European Neighbourhood’, ContemporarySecurity Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2016), this issue; Sven Biscop, ‘All orNothing? The EU Global Strategy and Defence Policy after the Brexit’, Contem-porary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2016), this issue.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the Editor and the anonymous reviewers of Contemporary SecurityPolicy for their comments and queries.

Disclosure statement

The author is a Special Advisor to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the EuropeanCommission. In this position, she coordinated the work on and drafted the EUGlobal Strategy. This article reflects her personal views on the making of the EUGlobal Strategy.

Notes on contributor

Nathalie Tocci is Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Honorary Pro-fessor at the University of Tubingen and Special Advisor to Federica Mogherini, theHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. On behalf of the EU HRVP she draftedthe EU Global Strategy and is part of the steering committee on its implementation.Previously she held research positions at the Centre for European Policy Studies,Brussels, the Transatlantic Academy, Washington, DC and the Robert SchumanCentre for Advanced Studies, Florence. Her major publications include Turkey andthe European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Multilateralism in the 21stCentury, Routledge, 2013; Turkey’s European Future: Behind the Scenes of America’sInfluence on EU-Turkey Relations, New York University Press, 2011; The EU and Con-flict Resolution, Routledge, 2007 and EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution,Ashgate, 2004. Nathalie Tocci is the 2008 winner of the Anna Lindh award for thestudy of European Foreign Policy.

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