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The making of public Islam: piety, agency,and commodification on
the landscape of the Indonesianpublic sphere
Noorhaidi Hasan
Published online: 24 October 2009# Springer Science + Business
Media B.V. 2009
Abstract Over the last three decades, Islam has demonstrated its
vitality as a systemof symbolic and collective identity that
informs the social and political dynamics ofIndonesian society. It
has increasingly served as the most important frame ofreference for
many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political and
culturalsystem they imagined capable of bringing about justice and
attaining veritabledevelopment. Keeping pace with the growing
influence of Islam among theemerging Indonesian Muslim middle
class, it has even gradually emerged as asymbol of elitism,
associated with the road to success. Its strength lies in the fact
thatit has developed into some sort of network that enables large
numbers of peoplefrom different social backgrounds to share and
make contacts, both real and virtual.Through this network, the
Islamic revival messages have resonated loudly,influencing multiple
social and political fields. The network, in turn, providescredible
paths for upward mobility and also a market for commercial
products.
Keywords Islam . Indonesia . Identity . Network .
Commodification
Introduction
The fact that Islam has become more publicly visible and
articulate as Indonesiawent through a process of modernization and
globalization constitutes one of themost remarkable developments
currently occurring in the worlds largest populousMuslim country
(Hefner 2000; Lukens-Bull 2005; Azra 2004). Over the last three
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250DOI 10.1007/s11562-009-0096-9
N. Hasan (*)Post-Graduate Faculty, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic
University,Jl. Marsda Adisucipto, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
55281e-mail: [email protected]
-
decades, it has demonstrated its vitality as a system of
symbolic and collectiveidentity that informs the social and
political dynamics of the Indonesian society,more than 80 per cent
of whom are adherents of Islam. In tandem with the seeminglyrising
consciousness of Indonesian Muslims to demonstrate their religious
self in thepublic sphere, Islam has increasingly moved to the
centre and become part ofpolitical expressions, legal transactions,
economic activities, as well as social andcultural practices. It
has even emerged as a rallying cry behind the major social
andpolitical changes in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Suharto-led New Orderregime in May 1998, marked by mounting demands
for the comprehensiveimplementation of the sharia (Islamic law)
(Hasan 2006; Abuza 2007). The callsfor the sharia which function as
the discursive medium for envisioning Islam as analternative to the
existing systems have to some extent materialized with theenactment
of sharia bylaws (perda) in several provinces and districts in
Indonesia,including Aceh, Solok, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Maros, Gowa,
Bulukumba, andMartapura (Salim 2007; Bush 2008).
The rising tide of Islamic militancy in the Indonesian public
sphere hascorresponded with the accentuation of religious symbols
and the proliferation ofIslamic institutions and new life-styles.
Marvellous mosques with new styles ofarchitecture have been
constructedand they are full of congregations attendingcollective
daily and Friday prayers as well as Quranic reading sessions
(pengajian).More and more people are performing the hajj,
pilgrimage to Mecca, some of whomtravel on expensive tour packages
offering five-star services. Typical Muslimfashions, such as jilbab
(headscarf) for women and baju koko (Muslim shirts) formen with
their trendy and colourful styles, have sprung up and begun to
dominatethe cultural landscape of every corner of the country.
Special makeup and skinproducts with the halal label are largely
advertised and sold both in traditionalmarkets and in the Muslim
section of luxury goods department stores.1 Comple-menting the more
traditional Islamic qashida music, nashid has gone to the top ofthe
national popular music charts. It is a form of religious singing to
praise God andthe Prophet Muhammad, whose style can vary from pop
music, using drums andelectric guitars, to reggae music.
Islamic print media, such as magazines, bulletins, pamphlets,
books, and novels,have achieved prominence.2 Radio and television
channels have competed tobroadcast dawa (Islamic proselytizing)
programmes, including Islamic soap operaseries. New dawa genres,
such as cyber dawa and cellular dawa, have offeredinstant religious
messages through the SMS and web-based services, which serve
tobring Islam into the everyday life and personal convenience,
accessibility andimmediacy (Fealy 2008). The so-called integrated
and quality Islamic schools haveexpanded with full-time and
boarding school system. Side-by-side with institutionsfor
collecting an increasingly large sum of religious alms and
donations, Islamicfinancial institutions, including Islamic banks
(also known as Sharia banks), Islamicinsurance (Takaful), Islamic
peoples credit unions (Bank Perkreditan RakyatSyariah), and Islamic
houses of treasury (Bait al-Mal wa al-Tamwil), have
1 Halal is an Arabic term meaning "permissible". It refers to
anything that is permissible under Islam.2 Dawa is derived from the
Arabic root daa, to call, which generally refers to the
proselytizing that isincumbent upon every Muslim.
230 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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flourished across the country, reaching remote areas of villages
in the countryside(Juoro 2008; Sakai 2008).
The development of an Islamic pop culture has taken place in
Indonesia whereIslam has become part of an extensive consumer
culture and served as much animportant identity marker as a sign of
social status and political affiliation. It haseven gradually
emerged as a symbol of elitism, associated with the road to
success.Its strength lies in the fact that it has developed into
some sort of network thatenables large numbers of people from
different social backgrounds to share andmake contacts, both real
and virtual. Through this network, the global Islamicrevival
messages have resonated loudly, influencing multiple social and
politicalfields and encouraging a collective identity. Purchasing a
cheap pamphlet from astreet vendor on proper Islamic dress for
women, watching an Islamic soap opera,veiling, attending study
circles with popular preachers, or making the pilgrimage toMecca
link an individual, indirectly perhaps, to a larger social group
and umma(global Muslim community) in a general sense. The network,
in turn, providescredible paths for upward mobility and also a
market for commercial products.
This paper examines the transformation of Indonesian Islam
towards the creationof new Islamic public spaces and markets that
open up a realm of opportunities foremerging Muslim youth,
intellectuals, middle classes, and professional groups toseek the
visibility and legitimacy in the national public sphere. Through a
study ofrelevant literature, observations and in-depth interviews,
it discusses the way Islamcarves out a public space of its own, in
conformity with the requirements of Muslimfaith and embodied in new
Islamic language styles, corporeal rituals as well asspatial and
bodily practices. It also examines the cultural process of
religiouscommodification, occurring through an intensive
commercialization of symbolicreligious goods.
Islamic resurgence
Despite Suhartos New Order steadfast determination to
marginalize potentialsources of Islamic political power, Islam has
begun to gain a spectacular presencein the public lives and debates
of Indonesian Muslim society in the mid-1970s. Inthe states attempt
to maintain a delicate balance and eradicate the remaining forcesof
alleged communists, it acknowledged and to some extent encouraged
theproselytizing of Islamic moral and the promotion of personal
piety among thepopulation (Pranowo 1994). Within this context it
accommodated Islamic interestsby supporting a wide variety of
Islamic institutions. As Islam was seen as the key tomaintaining an
ethical and disciplined society, the policy to enhance dawa was
alsodeemed crucial to mobilize peoples support for the accelerated
process ofdevelopment (Hefner 1993; Brenner 1996). In fact, it is
intensifying as Indonesiabecomes increasingly integrated into the
rest of the Muslim world, which haswitnessed the failure of its
ruling regimes to cope with widespread poverty,unemployment and
corruption. Amid the growing resentment toward the
blatantopportunism of government functionaries and elites unabashed
displays of wealthand power, various forms of religious activity,
including halqas (Islamic studycircle) and dauras (workshop),
flourished across the country and provided an
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 231231
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opportunity for a younger generation of Muslims to learn and
discuss Islamic textsso as to better comprehend their meaning and
their relevance to daily life. Theactivities were prominently
visible and assertive among university students, whowere looking
for a viable alternative to deal with current challenges and
difficulties.3
This so-called Campus-Islam phenomenon started with mosque-based
dawaactivities pioneered by youth activists of the Salman Mosque of
the Institute ofTechnology in Bandung. Under the leadership of
Imaduddin Abdurrachim, who hadbeen appointed the general secretary
of the Kuwait-based International IslamicFederation of Student
Organizations (IIFSO), they introduced the programme of theLatihan
Mujahid Dakwah (Training of Dawa Strivers), which was aimed at
trainingnew cadres among university students prepared to undertake
dawa activities (Husin1988; Rosyad 2006). Thanks to the support of
Muhammad Natsir, the programmedeveloped very fast. He was the
leader of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia(Indonesian Council
for Islamic Propagation), a dawa organization which served asthe
local representative of the Saudi Arabia-based Rabitat al-Alam
al-Islami (theMuslim World League) responsible for the
institutionalization of the kingdomsinfluence in cultural and
religious activities all over the Muslim world.4 The DewanDakwah
not only provided a model for Islamic activism on college campuses,
butalso facilitated the popularity of a variety of programmes for
the study of Islamorganized by religious activity units. These
include Mentoring Islam (IslamicCourses) and Studi Islam Terpadu
(Integrated Study of Islam) (Aziz et al. 1989;Rosyad 2006).
Suhartos depoliticization of university campuses through the
implementation of arestrictive policy known as the Normalization of
Campus Life (NormalisasiKehidupan Kampus) in 1978 prohibited
university students from playing an activepart in politics. This
policy stimulated growing numbers of students to turn towardIslamic
dawa activities. In tandem with the efflorescence of the so-called
campusIslam phenomenon, the slogan Islam is the solution began to
gain ground amongIndonesian Muslims. This vague call puts an
emphasis on the need to return to themodel of the Prophet Muhammad
and the example of the first generation of Muslims(Salaf al-Salih),
considered to be the purist form of Islam. In this context Islam
isunderscored as a complete system governing all religious, social,
political, culturaland economic orders and encompassing all things
material, spiritual, societal,individual, and personal. Battles
over dress, morality, marriage, celebrations,entertainment,
sexuality, and faith as well as conflicts over governance and law
arethus at the centre of the call (Ayubi 1991; Eickelman and
Piscatori 1996; Azra 1996and Kepel 2002).
The growth of the Islamic activism among university students
reached its pinnaclefollowing the Iranian Revolution in 1979. There
can be little doubt that the spirit andeuphoria inspired by the
success of the revolution affected Muslims around theworld. The
revolution provided not only an inspiration, but also a blueprint
for
3 Halqa, literally meaning circle, is a forum for the study of
Islamic sciences, in which an ustadh, ateacher or preacher, gives
lessons based on certain books and his participants sit around him
to hear andscrutinize his lessons. It is distinct from daura,
literally meaning turn, which is a type of workshop heldfor a
period ranging from one week to one month, during which its
participants gather and stay in oneplace and follow all the
designed programs.4 On the Rabitat, see Schulze (1990: 215-216) and
Kepel (2002: 46).
232 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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Muslims to struggle for the creation of Islamic states. In the
years that followed, theysaw the so-called Islamic resurgence,
marked by an increasing prominence andpoliticization of Islamic
ideologies and symbols in Muslim societies and in thepublic life of
Muslim individuals (Dessouki 1982: 4; Esposito 1983: 1720).
Theimpact of the revolution affected Indonesia too. More and more
people are becomingso keen in their endeavours to cleanse and
purify society from the alleged vicesand evils of modernity and to
lead their lives according to Islamic ideological andsocial values
(Naipaul 1981: 350). The revolution convinced many youngIndonesian
Muslims, especially university students, about the strength of
Islam asan ideology that could challenge established world orders
(Jones 1980). Admirationtoward Khomeini as the leader of the
revolution was remarkably widespread and hisclose-up photos were
hung on the wall of young Muslim activists rooms and
youthorganizations offices. Some female activists did not hesitate
to adopt envelopingblack clothes popular among Iranian women.
The spread of the Iranian influence was reinforced by the
distribution of books byShiite authors, including Ayatollah
Khomeini, Murtada Mutahhari, and Ali Shariati.Their ideas of a
revolutionary Islam, defending the rights of the weak and
oppressed(mustad`afin) and recognizing women as subjects and
political actors, and theallegorical interpretations of the Quran
and other scriptures became a source ofadmiration among many young
people. Thousands of them reportedly converted tobecome the
followers of the Shii movement (Bruinessen 2002; see also
Zainuddinand Basyar 2000). Interestingly the ideas of the Shii
thinkers spread side-by-sidewith those by Sunni Islamist
ideologues, such as Hasan al-Banna, Abul Alaal-Mawdudi, Sayyid
Qutb, and Mustafa al-Shibai (Aziz 1995; Rosyad 2006;Damanik, 2002).
This situation undoubtedly provided a precondition for the
growinginfluence of a new variant of Islam imbued with the zeal to
set up a society ofupright, moral, pious individuals who have a
thorough understanding of Islam and adesire to live according to
its principles.
The campus variant of the orthodox Islam emphasizes the
formalization ofreligious expressions and the need to establish an
exclusive moral ordercharacterized by a strong commitment to
Islamic beliefs, rituals, religious devotionand experiential
religiosity.5 Concern with the basic faith (tawhid) was expressed
asthe most important aspect of Islam and the foundation of all
Muslim thoughts andactivities. It constitutes a complete system of
life on the basis of which behaviour,language, and dress codes are
ideally regulated. The concept of the totality of Islamin turn
required young Muslim activists to make their religious difference
visible inpublic through micro-practices. Not only did they prefer
to wear Muslim dress, asindicated before. They also began to
address their fellow activists with Arabic terms,such as akhi-ukhti
(brother-sister), or ana-antum (me-you). The emphasis on
Arabicsymbols manifested in the current of the campus Islam
provoked reactions frommoderate Muslim leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid,
the former leader of the NahdlatulUlama and Indonesian president,
for instance, has actively campaigned for what hecalls pribumisasi
(indigenisation) of Islam since the 1980s. In his opinion, Islam
hasspread to Indonesia not to destroy the wealth of traditions and
local cultures ofIndonesians and the minority rights. But it
appears to be the part of the traditions and
5 On the definition and discussion of religious orthodoxy, see
Hassan (2007).
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 233233
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cultures, which together function to strengthen the national
identity of Indonesians(Wahid 1998).
Despite this criticism, the campus variant of the orthodox Islam
has continued tospread. Based on the concept of the totality of
Islam, it insists that to be Muslimalone is not enough to guarantee
success in dealing with future challenges. There isno choice for
any Muslim but to become a Muslim kaffah (total Muslim)
thatpractices and applies Islam in all aspects of his life. The
identity as a total Muslim isquite crucial, in a sense a Muslim
cannot be considered a (faithful) Muslim withoutbelieving in and
applying the totality of Islam. A total Muslim is in turn required
toshow his commitment to uphold the principle of amar maruf nahy
munkar, aQuranic phrase meaning enjoining good and opposing vice
and become the mostcommitted defender of Islam.6 Unlike the earlier
reformist Muslim organizationssuch as the Muhammadiyah and the
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), the campusvariant of the orthodox
Islam not only emphasizes an internal Muslim transformationin
response to the challenges of the globalizing world. It also
requires Muslimscommitment to the sharia as a holistic, totalizing
system whose prescriptionspermeate every aspect of daily life. It
is believed that this commitment is badlyneeded in a situation when
Islam is under attack by the Western world, glossedvariously as
secularism, a Jewish conspiracy, communism, Christianization,
andAmerican domination. This variant of the orthodox Islam is
indeed indubitablyassociated with the mounting significance of
Islamism which calls for theestablishment of an Islamic political
order and reinforces the notion of a singleMuslim community (the
umma).
The governments attempts to accelerate the process of
modernization andglobalization which paved the way for mass
education and urbanization may helpexplain the appeal for such a
strictly ordered life. Even though this process hasopened up
social, economic, and cultural possibilities, it has simultaneously
usheredin a plethora of problems and uncertainties that were
previously undreamed of andinsurmountable by individuals or even
communities (Giddens 1990). No doubt, ithas created a risk society
facing the problem of dysfunctional, dangerous, andsometimes
life-threatening environments.7 Especially for youth who live in a
phaseof in-between and have to be mobile, ready to reap
opportunities, living in such acondition is often frustrating. The
core of the problems lies in the fact that thehorizon for upward
mobility is quite limited (Leccardi and Ruspini 2006).
Thegovernment has seemingly failed to balance the supply of and
demand for workers,engendering rising competition in job markets.
Exacerbating the feeling ofdispossession afflicting many people is
the climate of widespread corruption,economic stagnation, and
bureaucratic incompetence.
Within this context youth appeared to be the pioneers that
played a pivotal role inintensifying dawa activities, either in
mosques or other religious venues. Under theauspices of various
mosque-based youth associations, they developed mosquesfunction, no
longer simply as places to pray, but also as centres for a diverse
set ofreligious-social activities, including Quran learning
sessions, seminars, workshops,discussions, religious festivals, and
various associations. Those participating in these
6 For this term, see Cook (2001).7 On the concept of risk
society see Beck (1992).
234 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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activities have been provided with updates of the latest issues
around the Muslimworld, especially conflict in the Middle East,
plus various religious texts andpamphlets distributed free of
charge, and this resulted in an increase in anti-Christianization
and Zionist sentiments (Bruinessen 1994; Siegel 2000). The
DewanDakwah, which enjoyed generous financial support from the
Rabitat al-Alamal-Islami, facilitated the dispatching of young
talented Muslim preachers to study inthe Middle East, who were upon
return expected to spearhead the expansion ofdawa activities to
reach remote areas in the countryside.8 This attempt acceleratedthe
process of Islamization in the hinterlands of Java and other
Indonesian islands,believed to be the bastions of the abangan
(nominal Muslim) culture.9 There,mosques have also been
constructed, complete with madrasas (Islamic school)teaching
exclusively Islamic subjects, often under the sponsorship of Middle
Easternfunding foundations (Hasan 2006).
It was not until the shift of state policy towards political
Islam, however, that theinfluence of the Arabised version of the
orthodox Islam reached a large segment ofIndonesians and
facilitated a significant greening (Islamicizing) of the country.
Atthe end of the 1980s Suharto introduced an Islamisation strategy
focusingparticularly on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in
public discourse andaccommodating religious socio-political powers.
In this context, the DirectorateGeneral of Elementary and Secondary
Education, for instance, issued a newregulation on student
uniforms, allowing female students to wear jilbab whileattending
school. This regulation automatically overturned the state ban on
veiling inpublic school. Over the first two decades of Suhartos
rule, veiling was linked withforms of Islam deemed threatening to
political stability of the state (Brenner 1996:676). Interestingly,
Suharto himself and his family went to Mecca to perform the
hajjpilgrimage in 1991. Upon return from Mecca, Mbak Tutut,
Suhartos eldest daughterand a popular figure, began to demonstrate
her piety publicly by wearing colourful,elegant jilbab. The model
and the way she was wearing her jilbab provided theultimate example
for the whole nation (Marcoes-Natsir 2004). Since then
cabinetmembers and high ranking officials have no longer hesitated
to declare the Islamicgreeting, assalamualaikum, in the opening
passage of their speeches and thisgreeting is becoming increasingly
popular. They also sought to demonstrate theirconcern with various
Islamic affairs by, for instance, participating in
religiousfestivals and celebrations. During the Ramadan month, they
even competed to
8 Interview with Misbach Malim, the head of secretariat bureau
of DDII, February 2003.9 I use the term santri and abangan in
reference to the concept introduced by the American
anthropologistClifford Geertz, who divides Javanese societythe
majority of Indonesian Muslimsinto santri,abangan, and priyayi. In
a simple way, the term santri is applied to puritanical Muslims
committed to amore or less normative profession of the faith, as
opposed to the abangan, nominal Muslims, who feltcomfortable with
local customs influenced by Animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. See
Geertz (1960).Despite some criticisms, I consider this concept
still relevant to understand Indonesian Islam. Theopposing concepts
santri and abangan can be used to look at two competing extremes in
the religiousunderstanding and praxis of Indonesians. Although the
current of Islamization has increasingly forcedIndonesians to
identify themselves as santri and its religios symbols, resistences
against the on-goingpenetration of an orthodox version of Islam
that is puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of
othercultures and faith, rejecting of local culture and opposed to
mysticism continue to take place. As Ricklefs(2008) points out,
between these two extremes we can see multiple combinations and
permutations ofthem.
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 235235
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conduct the so-called Safari Ramadan, a tour of mosques and
participation incollective prayers across the country utilizing the
heightened religious atmosphere ofthe fasting month of Muslims.
A number of organizations and institutions that made use of
Islamic symbolsappeared on the scene, including the Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesian(Indonesian Muslim Intellectual
Association, ICMI), which was established underSuhartos patronage
(Hefner 1993). The ruling party, Golkar, began to align its
cloakwith Islam as more and more Muslim intellectuals and
bureaucrats were absorbedinto its body. While thousands of mosques
were built under the sponsorship of thestate, the Islamic Court
Bill was introduced, followed by the Presidential Decree onthe
Compilation of Islamic Law.10 The Bank Muamalat Indonesia which
holds as itsslogan the words pertama sesuai syariah, or the first
[bank in Indonesia] inaccordance with the sharia was set up and its
establishment initiated themushrooming of sharia banks and
insurance companies (Liddle 1996; Bruinessen1996; Mller 2005).
Public Islam
Suhartos openness towards Islam provided the opportunity for an
emerginggeneration of Muslim middle class to exhibit Islamic
symbols and languages moreexplicitly in the Indonesian public
sphere. They were educated Muslims from thesantri (devout Muslim)
background who enjoyed upward mobility owing to themass education
initiated by Suharto in 1969. Some of them were no doubt
Campus-Islam products, who had been spread into various sectors of
governmental servicesand modern business structures (Mahasin 1990).
Witnessing the shift of the stateattitude towards Islam, they
initiated various activities aimed at demonstrating thevictory of
Islam as the solution to all current problems. As they believed
that religioncould play a significant role in the public arena,
they were highly assertive in theirefforts to implement various
Islamic visions in the educational, social, economic,and political
spheres. They were also concerned with expanding
economicdevelopment, adopting high technology, and using new media
as a means tocommunicate their visions and messages.
Sociologist Jose Casanova (1994) was the first to note the
revival of religions inthe public life of the modern world. He
challenged the secularization thesis,indicating how religions have
undergone a process of repoliticisation anddeprivatisation and
played a concrete role in directing the transition
fromauthoritarianism to democracy and in intervening in the public
debates, and thuscontributing to the growth of civil society.
Despite its focus on Spain, Poland, Brazil,and the United States,
this observation is certainly not confined to Catholicism
andProtestantism. Its horizons can be widened to include other
parts of the world livingwith other religious traditions, such as
Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism. Salvatore andEickelman (2004), for
instance, observe the appearance of so called public Islamin the
Muslim world, an Islamic public sphere which enables a large
segment of
10 The passing of this bill reinforced the existence of the
Islamic courts within the Indonesian legal system.Previously, it
ranked the second class court after the public, military, and
administrative courts.
236 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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diverse Muslims to make their voices heard in civic debate and
public life, thusfacilitating modern and distinctively open senses
of political and religious identity.
In a changing socio-political atmosphere at that time
intellectuals like NurcholishMadjid and AbdurrahmanWahid, to
mention but a few names, sought to contextualizeIslam by adopting a
more inclusive approach, particularly evident in the way
theyexpressed their socio-political ideas and endeavours to realize
the socio-politicalobjectives of Islam. They were at the forefront
of proposing interpretations of Islamwhich did not necessarily
clash with the interests of the Indonesian nation-state, insuch a
way that they assured a relatively easy relationship between
Islamic-ness andIndonesia-ness. They translated Islamic teachings
into several agendas pertinent to theinterests of Indonesian
society in general, covering a number of broader issues such
asdemocratization, religious and political tolerance,
socio-economic egalitarianism, andpolitical emancipation (Abdillah
1997; Effendy 2003).
The pioneering efforts of both intellectuals to contextualize
Islamic teachings havehad a direct impact on the societal discourse
of the Indonesian Muslims. Debates anddiscussions on Islam and its
relatedness with various aspects of life have abounded inmosques,
markets, offices, universities, schools, as well as newspapers,
magazines,and televisions, and involved (retired) high-ranking
officials, executives, profes-sionals, artists and other members of
the middle class. Unlike religious discussionsheld in traditional
Islamic school (pesantren), which constitutes a typical
Islamicboarding school run and often owned by an individual
religious teacher (kyai), thedebates rarely made a reference to
classical Islamic discourses. While the pesantrenrequires its
students to master Islamic subjects using the kitab kuning (yellow
books,referring to classical Arabic texts) (Bruinessen 1990;
Dhofier 1999; Lukens-Bull2005), new centres of Islamic teaching
that thrived among urban middle class areinclined to offer a sort
of instant Islam and practical guide much needed byparticipants for
their everyday life.11 Relying on any accessible texts, the
debateswere yet assertive in an attempt to objectify religious
messages. What Eickelman(1992; 1999) calls objectification process
signifies the emergence of a distinctivestyle of religious activism
oriented to a broad, mass educated (national) publicrather than a
narrow circle of religious adepts (Hefner 1997).
The rising consciousness of the new Muslim middle class to
engage in debatingand objectifying their religion entailed the
availability of religious spaces in theurban landscape of
metropolitan and big cities. In view of the growing demands forsuch
spaces, governmental and business offices built mosques and
musallas, smallplaces to pray. Elite housing complexes and shopping
centres provided meetingplaces for listening to public lectures on
Islam (majlis talim). Convention centresand five star hotels
advertised venues for religious programmes and Islamic
studypackages. Luxury Islamic centres, with a big mosque as the
main building andsurrounded by training and educational buildings,
shops, and a hotel, have been builton huge pieces of land in big
cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makassar. In thosesites the new
Muslim middle class came to engage in reciting the Quran,
chantingdhikr (confession of the faith), and the like, while
discussing various aspects ofIslam. In this way Indonesian Islam
has experienced a process of gentrification in
11 Observation in Paramadinas executive Islamic class, September
2006, and interviews with M. Rahmatand Bambang Isnanto,
participants of the class, September 2006.
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 237237
-
favour of global high-technology and consumerist Islamic
appetites (Abaza 2004).While dawa has somehow become urbanized, new
creative agents and young,popular preachers emerged and worked in
both public and private settings. Theyoffered a variety of
innovative dawa programmes in the interests of the new Muslimmiddle
class.
One remarkable effect of these developments is the proliferation
of forms of pietythat seem congruous with the principle of
individual freedom and democracy, andapart from their traditional
religious mooring. Islam in presented in a way that
issophisticated, fresh and hybrid in order to make it an appealing
alternative to urban,capitalist cultures. A sense of personalized
Muslimhood has arisen out of thiscontext and allows an individual
to demonstrate his religious identity through bodilypurchased
practices and goods (White 2005; Bayat 2007). The Muslimhood
modelprovides both a challenge and an opportunity to rethink the
established boundariesbetween the private and the public. Now
individual can choose a widened range ofoptions among a wide
assortment of religious representations, both the traditionaland
the secular, manufactured, packaged, and sold by specialized
service agencies.The free choice, in turn, provides the individuals
an opportunity to patch together thereligious fragments into a
subjectively meaningful whole and transform them into apowerful
symbol to act in public. It is worth noting that the spread of such
forms ofpiety have apparently never been pervasive as it is, if not
bolstered by the developmentof mass media. As Habermas put it, mass
media, publicity, and spectacle constitute theforms that drive the
culture-consuming public that has significantly displaced
theculture-debating publics of earlier periods (Habermas 1991).
Piety and agency
The pioneer that offered the means for cosmopolitan Muslims to
explore and enjoy themagnificence of their faith was Paramadina, an
Islamic non-governmentalorganization established by the prominent
theologian Nurcholish Madjid and a numberof other progressiveMuslim
intellectuals in collaboration withMuslim entrepreneurs.12
An independent organization, Paramadina is culturally oriented
and committed toopenness, in the sense that it is not inclined to
politics, but rather asserts Islam as acultural power that can
provide alternatives and answers to contemporary challenges,without
falling into the trap of exclusivity. It maintains an approach that
can becharacterized as nationalistic-Islamic, promoting Islamic
revivalism within thecontext of Indonesia where Islam has been
accepted and practiced broadly as aprimary source of building
common values. Islam is thus presented as a main sourcefor
Indonesian values, yet also as a culturally productive force that
can aid thedevelopment of constructive alternatives for the nation
(Hasan 2000; Bakti 2004).
Located in the prestigious middle-class suburb of Pondok Indah
in the southernpart of Jakarta, Paramadina has launched the
so-called Paramadina Eksekutif,intensive Islamic courses
specifically designed for executives, professionals,practitioners,
functionaries and other members of the upper-middle class. The
12 These include Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, Abdul Latief,
and Fahmi Idris, all of whom camefrom the HMI, Indonesian Muslim
Student Association, background.
238 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
-
courses resemble university lectures or workshops and take place
in prestigiousvenues, such as five-star hotels and convention
centres. A limited number ofparticipants are required to register
and they pay a significant amount of money.Paramadina has also
offered short courses and public lectures on various aspects
ofclassical Islam, the relation between Islam and politics, Islam
and gender issues, andinter-religious harmony. Interestingly
perhaps, it has accommodated elements ofSufism, which is frequently
associated with traditional Islam, into its curriculum(Howell
2001). One particular course of Sufism comprising six lectures on
Sufithought and practices has even been offered and this course
attracted a large numberof participants. This kind of phenomenon
exemplifies the growing popularity ofwhat Bayat (2002) refers to as
post-Islamist piety. Being marked and framed by thetaste and style
of the rich and kept away from the traditional mosques located in
thelower class area, it enables the upper middle class to be pious
while maintaining theirpower and prestige.
The success of Paramadina inspired the emergence of similar
foundations, such asTazkiya Sejati, IIMAN (Indonesian Islamic Media
Network), and ICNIS (IntensiveCourse and Networking for Islamic
Sciences). Tazkiya Sejati has specificallydeveloped contemplative
reading circles and religious sessions oriented to membersof the
upper middle class in Jakarta. Set up in 1997 by Jalaluddin Rahmat,
anAustralian university graduate and celebrated lecturer of
communication at thePadjadjaran University of Bandung, this
foundation focuses on the introduction ofIslam by offering a series
of Islamic courses, with a particular emphasis on Sufism(Howell
2001). Based in Patra Kuningan, an elite area in Jakarta, it has
been closelyassociated with the Shiite-inclined Muthahhari
Foundation, which exposes the themeFor the Enlightenment of Islamic
Thought. IIMAN and ICNIS, which also offerbroadly based courses on
Islam with a component on Sufism and programmes ofinstruction in
devotional exercises, are slightly different in nature. Both do not
relyon particular figures, but mainly act as the facilitator making
their own choices ofwhom they will invite to lecture and how they
adapt materials of interest to them(Howell 2001).
Complementing the proliferation of the new dawa institutions
that provide anoutlet for urban Muslim middle class who felt a sort
of spiritual void, many youngpreachers came to the centre stage to
engrave themselves as the most rising religiousactors and
celebrities whose faces often appear on Indonesian TV screens.
Byperforming in interactive communication skills on TV screens,
they have become themarketing agent through which Islamic symbols
and messages are offered andtransmitted for mass consumption. This
so-called Islamic televangelism has madereligion more acceptable to
a larger audiences, and hence has become more popular(Muzakki 2008;
Howell 2008). It is worth noting that unlike the previous
popularpreachers who were academically trained in the traditional
Islamic school(pesantren), they studied economics, political
sciences and communication, amongother disciplines, in secular
universities. But no doubt, they have the capability inmass
communication and this allows them to move from the lower or middle
class tothe upper in socio-religious hierarchy and thus become a
new group of religious elite(Howell 2008; Muzakki 2008).
One such example is Abdullah Gymnastiar, more commonly referred
to as AaGym, who played a crucial role in intensifying the
expansion of urban dawa
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 239239
-
activities by utilizing a new political climate in the aftermath
of the fall of Suharto in1998. A far-reaching process of
democratization and liberalization that followedfacilitated a
sudden flowering of the press and new television channels. With
hismasterful command of the media and the availability of new
technology he hasorganized religious lectures and sessions, and,
thus, marketed the beauty of Islam(Watson 2005). Aa Gym is the
founder of the Darut Tauhid pesantren in Bandung,West Java, in
1987, and a young talented preacher trained in economics
andtechnical courses at the Padjadjaran University and Ahmad Yani
Universityrespectively, both in Bandung. Being more interested in
Islamic knowledge,however, he never finished his degree. Instead,
he studied Islam with a number oftraditional ulama (Gymnastiar
2006). Aa Gym claims that the Darut Tauhidsprimary mission is to
facilitate the development of Islamic educational, economic,social,
and cultural activities. It aspires to become a miniature of
society whereIslamic teachings can be practiced and enriched by
education, training, management,art and culture, economy and
technology initiatives and its benefits can be felt by theMuslim
umma (Darut Tauhid 2000).
The basic doctrine of Darut Tauhid includes dhikr (confession of
faith), fikr(thinking), and ikhtiyar (free choice). Among the Darut
Tauhid members dhikr is theprimary principle on which Muslims
should rely, in the sense that God is the onlyfocus and target in
Muslim activities. Aa Gym, however, argues dhikr alone is
notenough; Muslims should also think and optimize Muslim
initiatives and efforts tocompete in a challenging era. Dhikr,
fikr, and ikhtiyar are thus the three keyprinciples that should be
taken into account by all members of the Darut Tauhidscommunity.
This method is called by Aa Gym Manajemen Qalbu (themanagement of
heart). The basic notion is to manage and maintain purity of
heartin the way of knowing God (Gymnastiar 2005a, b). With his
characteristic stylebaju koko, sarong and typical (Aa Gym)
turbanand admirable rhetoric, he delivershis sermons, which are
rather emotional and frequently move people to tears. Hebelieves
that spiritual values such as patience, generosity, resignation and
honesty,once nurtured, will pour out of peoples hearts (Gymnastiar
2005a, b). Only recentlyhas Aa Gyms fame been shaken and with that,
his business empire started tocrumble, as a result of his decision
to take a second wife (Hoesterey 2008).
Muhammad Arifin Ilham followed in the footsteps Aa Gym had
initiated andsurpassed his predecessor as the most rising celebrity
preacher. He engraved hisname in the Indonesian media as a
charismatic, young preacher who furtherpopularized dhikr, claimed
to be the only effective way to purify Muslims hearts,and thus the
solution to the spiritual, moral, cultural, and social backwardness
of theumma. Dhikr is considered the foundation of any struggle of
Muslims. Ilham arguesthat whatever Muslims attempt to do will be
fruitless unless it is based on the purityof their hearts (Ilham
2004). Under the auspices of the Majlis al-Dhikra (dhikrcouncil)
set up in 1997, he organized mass dhikr programmes (dhikr
akbar)throughout Indonesia. In those programmes thousands of people
gather in one bigmosque and sit together to recite certain formulas
of dhikr led by Ilham himself.These programmes were also aired
broadly by several private television channels.On one occasion he
led such a programme with the presence of the then VicePresident of
Indonesia, Hamzah Haz, and a number of other high-ranking
officials.This programme was entitled Reciting Dhikr for My Country
and taken place in
240 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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Indonesias largest mosque, Istiqlal, in August 2003 (Ilham and
Yakin 2004). Overthe last three years Ilham has regularly appeared
on various national televisionchannels presenting short lectures on
Islam. He also has been the host of Saturdaysmorning lecture at
TPI, a private television channel that belongs to Mbak Tutut, andof
several radio programmes. Ilham is a graduate of political science
at the NationalUniversity of Jakarta. His insights into Islam were
forged when he enrolled in amodern Islamic boarding school in
Jakarta. His name skyrocketed, as he himselfclaimed, after he
recovered from a ten-day coma after being bitten by his
ownpoisonous snake (Yakin 2003).
Another young, popular preacher, Jeffry al-Buchori, began his
career just recentlybut succeeded in putting himself on the map of
the most popular Indonesianreligious figures. With his outstanding
rhetoric and ability to recite the Quranfluently he mesmerizes
congregations of Islamic sessions and religious gatheringsheld on
various occasions and aired by different national television
channels. He isknown as a friendly religious teacher (ustadh gaul),
who prefers to address hiscongregation not only with
assalamualaikum but also with friendly greetingspopular among urban
youth, such as Hello Friends! or Hello Choy! Wearing hisdistinctive
baju koko motifs and white cap, he also appears on television
screensalmost every day, delivering short religious lectures full
of improvisations.Sometimes he sings and laughs and another time he
cries. He works with theslogan have fun with religious wisdom.
Under the auspices of the Majlis Mim, heserves as the host of
numerous religious programmes on television, including I likeMonday
aired every Monday (Bakri et al. 2005). It is important to note
that he grewup as a delinquent youth addicted to drugs. Having
completed his primary andsecondary education in an Islamic school
in Tangerang, he went to a privatecommunication school in Jakarta
to study broadcasting. Here he became acquaintedwith night-club
life spending most of his time in discotheques, casinos and
otherreputed dens of iniquity. In 2000 he claimed a new reborn and
decided to return to anormal life. He made his debut on television
in 2003 after having delivered religiouslectures from one mosque to
another (Samantha 2005).
Commodifying Islam
The emergence of a new breed of young, celebrity preachers
engaged in the productionof various religious programmes on TV has
significantly changed the face of Islam inthe Indonesian public
sphere. Islam appears to be no longer simply a set of
rituals,beliefs and doctrines, but it is also a symbolic commodity
relevant to social classdemands for lifestyle, modesty and
enjoyment. In sociological debates on this sort ofphenomenon,
consumption in the modern age is conceptualized as one of the
mostcrucial, defining experiences of the class. It is also an
expression of identity andrepresentation of the self. This is
related to the notion of embodiment which suggeststhat all the
fundamental processes of conception, perception, evaluation
andjudgement are connected to the fact that human beings are
embodied social agents(Turner 1994). Since religion has even
gradually emerged as a symbol of elitismassociated with the road to
success, a statement of ones personal identity can involvethe use
and consumption of religious symbols, as happened in the Indonesian
public
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 241241
-
sphere friendly to Islam. Through the diverse creative agents of
the urban dawa thesymbols have become commodified in conformity
with ones social status. Miller(2004) suggested that commodifying
religion has reduced religious beliefs, symbols,and values into
free-floating signifiers to be consumed like anything else. As
such, ittakes them from their original contexts and throws them
into a cultural marketplacewhere they can be embraced in a shallow
fashion but not put into practice.
Here my concern is not with the impurity or in-authenticity of
commodifyingIslam as presented by the new dawa agents. Religious
commodification should notbe confused with commercialization. It is
not a phenomenon that exists solely tomake money. Religious
commodification entails ideologization of commodities
andcommoditization of religion, as it is as much about selling
ideology as it is aboutselling products (Lukens-Bull 2008).
Religious commodification has in fact verymuchto do with the way
religion, in this case Islam, is packaged and offered to a
broaderaudience and how this has served to produce a framework for
the moral order of societythrough the objectification and
systematization of Islamic values and practices as anormative
model. Through the process of commodification dawa appears to be
moreimpressive and, at the same time, modern, progressive, and
inclusive. It is no longerdominated by long homilies on religious
doctrines and the life in the hereafter, or callsfor a return to
true Islam which nurtures some hatred of global popular culture
trends,which is claimed to have led to the moral decline of Muslims
and threatened Islamiccultural values, and which is thus
conventional, rigid, and exclusive in character. Inother words,
dawa is now imbued with practical messages about the way to live
inharmony delivered through Islamic study programmes packaged in
interactivediscussions or features in newspaper and Islamic soap
operas on TV.
The growing interest of the upper middle class in the current
wave of urban dawaactivities has radiated into a large segment of
diverse Indonesian Muslims, and thismeans market opportunities for
commercial products related to these activities. It islogical that
while the new dawa agents are continuously challenged to
developinnovative models for their religious sessions, Indonesian
fashion designers, thegarment industry and other business players
are geared up to launch variousproducts. If Paramadina limited
itself to publishing quality books and readingmaterials or
anthologies of Nurcholish Madjids speeches and lectures, Darut
Tauhid,which announced that economic development is the primary
pillar of devotion toGod, made a step further by systematically
developing economic activities. Theseactivities gradually expanded
into such fields as garment production, supermarket,publishing, and
Islamic banking. Since 1997, the area of Gegerkalong, where
DarutTauhids headquarters is located, has changed to become a Darut
Tauhid village; fullof Islamic business symbols, including
supermarket and Islamic cottage namedDarul Jannah, the House of
Paradise, which offers a sort of spiritual vacation forexecutives
(Darut Tauhid 2000).13
Concern with the growth of market demands for so-called Islamic
products aswell as economic empowerment for the Indonesian Muslims
encouraged AtengKusnadi, a Chinese convert and former banker, to
establish Ahad-Net, the firstSharia-based multi-level marketing in
Indonesia, in 1997. The headquarters of thisinstitution is located
in the area of Atrium Senen Business Center in Central Jakarta.
13 See Darut Tauhids Profile; for the updates see
www.cybermq.com.
242 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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It has served as the national distributor of different kinds of
Islamic products namedlike Zahra, Wardah, Fairuz, Nazhif, al-Syifa,
and Habbatussauda. These includehalal foods, skin, body and mouth
care products, cosmetics, perfumes, herbals,reading materials,
comics and novels, toys, and VCDs (Ahad-Net 2005). Utilizing
itshuge network, comprising 300 distributors and 220 thousand
members acting asconsumers and retailers altogether, Ahad-Net could
reach almost all parts ofIndonesia, from Aceh in Sumatra to Sorong
in Papua, with more than 4 billionrupiah cash-flow every month
(Ahad-Net 2003).
Ahad-Net is an example of how the global multi-level marketing
system inventedin the United States has been localized and somehow
Islamized. It is claimed to bethe abbreviation of Al-Quran, Hadith
(Prophetic Traditions), Akhirat (Hereafter),Dunia (this world), and
Network, indicating the mission of the institution to achievethe
balance between the life in this world and that in the hereafter,
based on theguidance of the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet
Muhammad (Kusnadi 2004).Ahad also means one, which is associated
with the principle of tawhid (the Oneness)in Islam, the first
pillar of Muslim belief. With the slogan Economic Jihad for
theProsperity of the Umma, Ahad-Net has operated to realize the
five primary visionsthat include: (1) conducting jihad or the
ultimate struggle to revive the victoriousbelief, economy, and
politics of the Muslim umma; (2) emphasizing ukhuwwa orsolidarity
to unite the Muslim umma; (3) taking al-Quran and the Hadith as
thebasis of Muslims thought and praxis; (4) building the community
concerned withhalal and tayyib (good) products; and (5)
facilitating attempts to empower theeconomy, behavior, and
professionalism of the Muslim umma (Kusnadi 2004).14
The very existence of commercial agents for Islamic products has
facilitated, forinstance, the transformation of jilbab into a new
uniform for Indonesian Muslimwomen. Various kinds of jilbab
designed elegantly are available in commercialmarkets. A sense of
newness distinguishes this popular jilbab with the traditionalone
which is often perceived by Western feminists as a symbol of womens
oppressionespecially in the context of a patriarchal society
prioritising male interests ingovernment, law and the economy
(Ingham and Dirgantoro 2007). Worn frequentlyin combination with a
long grey skirt or jeans, the new veil appears to be a symbol
ofmodern Muslim womanhood as expressed in varied modern
environments. In helpswomen deal with their own insecurities while
moving into what were, just a few yearsago, predominantly male
social spaces (Smith-Hefner 2007).
Islam on the new media
The intimate relationship between commodification and
consumption require themediator that can act as the bridge that
communicates and interlocks the interest ofboth producers and
consumers. To introduce their products to a broad market,producers
need to use the media, whereby consumers become aware of
theirproducts. Frequently, media plays a crucial role in dictating
market tendencies, bymainstreaming certain fashion and lifestyle
trends. The media itself has a directeffect, i.e., the increase of
audiences that need fresh references to the latest and most
14 Ibid; see also http://www.ahadnet.com.
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 243243
-
popular fashions and lifestyles. The significance of Islamic
(print and electronic)media lies in its capacity to accelerate the
process of distributing and consumingIslamic products, thus, the
burgeoning of public Islam.
Print media that advertises Islamic pop culture began
proliferating in Indonesia inthe mid-1980s. Its forerunner was
perhaps the monthly Amanah, from the Arabicword meaning trust,
which has appeared regularly since its first edition in 1987and
contested the only pop culture magazine hitherto available in
Indonesia, Kartini.Unlike Kartini, however, Amanah displays
beautiful female models wearing jilbabon its covers, complete with
features about the life experiences of young women ormodels
themselves when they decided to wear jilbab and left behind their
previouslifestyles.15 It also contains fiction around the
psychological struggle of the womenwhen they acquired enlightenment
and were born again as devoted Muslims. Thismagazine targets women
as its main audience, as it has special features on women,family
and children, plus consultation with specialists in the matters
concerned. Theso-called true story is another permanent feature in
Amanah, reporting primarily thelife experiences of Muslim converts
and those atoning from their previous dark lives.At the same time,
Amanah serves as a window for its readers to get to know thelatest
Islamic products. In addition to diverse advertisements, ranging
fromcosmetics to housing and apartments with veiled women as
models, it containsspecial features, such as fashions, lifestyles,
celebrities, Islamic soap operas, spiritualexperiences, and Islamic
books. Choosing pop culture with luxury and expensiveperformances,
Amanah has succeeded in attracting a relatively established
urbanMuslim middle class, and this has become the key to its
continued existence amidstthe influx of new similar magazines.
In 1990 Annida, an Arabic word literally meaning call, appeared
to deliberatelytarget the segment of Muslim teen girls hitherto
untouched by any otherpublications. Initially this magazine
belonged almost exclusively to its founders,Dadi Kusradi and Dwi
Septiawati, who happened to be a couple, working with theassistance
of their staff, before it became associated with PT. Ummi Group
Media,which publishes the monthly Ummi. Annida has very much
focused on fictionsexploring the life experiences of Muslim teen
girls in the face of the hurly-burly andtemptations of modern urban
life. Supportive in nature, these fictions attempt tofoster the
piety of Muslim teen girls so that such good characteristics as
honesty,perseverance, and consistency are embedded in their daily
life.16 Annida claims tohave five main missions that indicate its
attempt to assist Muslim teen girls tomaintain their religious
identity, on the one hand, and draw upon global popularculture
trends, on the other hand.17 It has become an example of how a
synthesis iscreated through cultural hybrid practices.18
15 For the profile of Amanah, see www.amanah.or.id.16 For the
profile of Annida,see www.ummigroup.co.id/annida.17 These include
(1) to introduce Muslim teen girls into Islamic values and provide
readers with religiousinsights; (2) to highlight the image of
quality Islamic media and serve as the means for young,
creativetalents to express themselves; (3) to provide standards of
good conduct for Muslim teen girls; (4) tofacilitate the need of
Muslim teen girls for good and healthy entertainment; and (5) to
contribute to thedevelopment of Indonesian literature, especially
Islamic literature.18 On complex hybridity of Indonesian Muslim
youth cultures, see Nilan (2006: 91110).
244 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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The corporate sister of Annida, Ummi, also from Arabic word
which literallymeans my mother, has targeted Muslim women and
household wives as itsaudiences and upheld the slogan the Identity
of Muslim Women. Besides theregular headlines discussing current
(heated) issues related to Muslim woman affairs,Ummi has special
features called Islamic Jewelry (Mutiara Islam), which consists
ofdetailed discussions on Fiqh Wanita (Islamic Jurisprudence for
Women), MarahShalihah (Pious Women), Mutiara Dakwah (Jewelry of
Islamic Dawa), QuranicExegesis and Prophetic Traditions, and the
Exemplary of the Prophet Muhammad. Italso covers miscellaneous
articles and features on the Muslim world as well asregular
features on halal foods, health, psychology, family, and household
financialmanagement, plus features on beauty and Muslim fashions.
The magazine includesshort stories and novel series as
supplements.19 The popularity of Ummi is equal tothat of Sabili,
the most prominent of Indonesias Islamist magazines. Its
distributionreaches 80,000 copies per edition (Muhammad 2005).
Recently, similar magazines have emerged with smaller scales and
differentfocuses of coverage. Noor, Paras, and Anggun are three
examples of this categoryoffering alternative readings on Islamic
pop culture. Noor has some similarities withAmanah, in terms of
lay-out, content, and coverage, while Paras with Ummi, as amagazine
specifically concerned with Muslim women. Anggun constitutes
anIslamic wedding party magazine, advertising the latest and trendy
Muslim weddingcostumes characterized by colorful jilbab and other
Islamic accessories. It alsocontains articles and features on the
wisdom of marriage according to Islam and howto be prepared before
one decides to get married. It also advertises wedding
partypackages in luxury hotels. Paras and Anggun are under the same
umbrella, PTVariapop Group, which also publishes the monthly
Hidayah (Intisari Islam). Thelatter focuses its coverage on stories
about death and harsh punishments for thosecommitting big sins.
Surprisingly perhaps, in the first quarter of 2006, this
magazinewas ranked the top, according to the Nielsen Media Research
rating survey, leavingbehind its competitors in this particular
segment, especially Hikayat, Ghaib, andTaubah (Cakram 2006).
The expansion of new communication technologies such as radio
and televisionhas accelerated the process of commodifying Islam
through the production andappropriation of religious goods, and
thus opening up new spaces for themushrooming of Islamic pop
culture. The strength of communication technology inboosting
religious commodification has become increasingly visible after the
fall ofSuharto in 1998, when new players of media business have
arisen and contributed toa further expansion of private television
channels, whose number has multiplied overthe last ten years.20 In
their race to book rating ranking and thus advertisementportions,
the channels seek to offer various kinds of pro-market
broadcasts,including religious programmes. New religious programmes
are introduced and theexisting ones have creatively been modified
in order to attract broader audience.
19 For the online version of this magazine, see
www.ummigroup.co.id/annida.20 Television was introduced to
Indonesia in 1962, and the state television foundation TVRI was
placedunder direct control of the President. Towards the late 1980s
TVRI monopoly ended with the introductionof commercial television.
The dissolution of the Ministry of Information by Abdurrachman
Wahid spurredtelevision potential for expanding its public role in
civil society (see Kitley 2003: 97114).
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 245245
-
Owing to the mushrooming of private TV channels, the so-called
Islamic soapoperas (sinetron Islami) which explore religious themes
have achieved a promi-nence. TPI began the phenomenon by airing the
series of Rahasia Ilahi (Secrets ofGod). This series immediately
skyrocketed, being watched by between 40 and 50percent viewers,
surpassing the popularity of any other television soap
operas,including the popular Latino and Bollywood productions
(Herfanda 2005). Otherprivate television channels followed in TPIs
footsteps. SCTV aired Astaghfirullah(God, Please Forgive Me) and
Kuasa Ilahi (Gods Will); Trans-TV Taubat(Forgiveness), Insyaf
(Return), and Istighfar (Asking Forgiveness); Lativi AzabIlahi
(Gods Punishment), Pada-Mu Ya Rabb (Upon You, Oh Lord), and
SebuahKesaksian (One Witness). RCTI aired Tuhan Ada di Mana-mana
(God isomnipresent); ANTV Azab Dunia (Punishment of this World) and
Jalan ke Surga(Path to Heaven); and TV7 Titik Nadir (Zenith). TPI
itself intensified its religioussoap operas by airing Takdir Ilahi
(Destiny), Allah Maha Besar (Almighty God), andKehendak-Mu (Your
Will). Involving big productions houses, such as MultivisionPlus,
MD Entertainment, and SinemArt, the making of these programmes has
evenchanged the ratings ranking of the private television channels
(Nurdiansyah 2005).
Some of these soap operas dig up features in the Islamic
magazines as the sourcesfor their stories. Rahasia Ilahi, for
instance, is almost a visualization of the stories inthe monthly
Hidayah (Intisari Islam). Astaghfirullah presents the so-called
truestories in the monthly Ghaib and Taubat explores the stories in
the monthly Insting(Furkon 2005). It is not surprising then that
these soap operas are full of dreadfulscenes about curses and
punishments plummeted onto those committing big sins,such as
murder, adultery, robbery, gambling, and corruption. Other operas
presentthe stories taken from the classical Islamic sources,
especially the collections of theProphetic Traditions. Takdir Ilahi
belongs to this category as it claims that it exploresthe
collections of Prophetic Traditions compiled by Muhammad Amin
Al-JundiAl-Muttaqin in his Miah Qissah wa Qissah fi Anis al-Salihin
wa Samir al-Muttaqinand by Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah in his Madarij
al-Salikin (Ruslani 2005). It isinteresting to note that every
episode of almost all the soap operas closes with asummary and a
kind of short lecture by popular preachers about the lessons
andwisdom Muslims can learn from the stories.
In tandem with the increasing popularity of Islamic soap operas,
religious musicalbums have flourished and added some nuance to the
existing atmosphere ofpopular piety. Ungu Pop Band, known for their
powerful love songs, has recentlyreleased a new album, Surgamu
(Your Heaven), containing religious songs withlyrics expressing the
blessings on the Prophet Muhammad. Chrisye, an almostlegendary
Indonesian pop singer, did the same, releasing Damai BersamaMu
(Peacewith You), which contains traditional blessing songs on the
Prophet. Gigi, anotherpop band group known for their modern rock
music, released Raihlah Kemenangan(Grab the Victory) and Pintu
Sorga (the Gate of Heaven). Having been awardedplatinum status for
his first and second religious albums, Tombo Ati (Heart Cure)
andIstighfar (Forgiveness) respectively, Opick (Aunur Rofil Lil
Firdaus) produced athird album, Semesta Bertasbih (Universes
Remembrance of God), which has alsoreceived wide currency in the
Indonesian song market. There are also religiousalbums with jazz
and blues characters, such as those released by Tompi
(TeukuAidilfitrian), Trio Sakha, Bintang Indrianto, Idang Rasjidi,
Arief Setiadi, Mates, and
246 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
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Soegeng Sarjadi (Ivvaty and Sartono 2006). No less important are
religious albumsreleased by the popular preachers mentioned above,
including Aa Gym, ArifinIlham, and Jeffry al-Buchori.
Television has not been the only medium for the widespread
distribution ofreligious programmes, however. Video cassettes,
compact discs and digitalvideo discs came to furnish the Islamic
media market with handy religioushomilies, religious preaching,
music, and soap operas. For those who prefer tospend time browsing
in the cyberspace, they do not need to collect all thematerials;
they can simply go to thousands of Islamic websites
offeringdifferent, often competing, versions of Islam The
interactive natures of theInternet affirms new senses of
interpretive freedom to go beyond previousforms and responsibility
to speak for Islam in a civic public (Anderson 2003:50).
Facilitated by the advancement of mobile phone technology, the
so-calledCellular Quran recently came to offer a service for
customers to listen to therecitation of certain Quranic verses and
explanations. There is also a mobiledictionary of Islam called
Islamic pocket, which provides its users withpractical information
about Islam.
Conclusion
It has been argued that the burgeoning of public Islam cannot be
disassociated withthe wave of Islamic revival which has engulfed
the Muslim world since the mid-1970s and the development of mass
education and communication. This phenom-enon provided the
opportunity for a large segment of diverse Muslims to
becomeinvolved in public debates and, thus, express their political
and religious identity.One consequence of this is that popular
piety has achieved a prominence to theextent that it has become a
new symbol of elitism. Like many other Muslimcountries, Indonesia
has also witnessed a wave of Islamic revival marked by
theaccentuation of religious symbols and the proliferation of
Islamic institutions as wellas new life-styles. Jilbab, for
instance, has developed into an indispensable part ofIndonesian
Muslim fashion. Its use as part of ones outfit has permeated,
forinstance, other costumes that had previously not included a
veil, such as some of theregional and other traditional Indonesian
costumes.
The increase in popular piety has certainly involved a certain
kind of agency.Herein lies the importance of new dawa agents which
creatively translate andpackage Islamic messages for mass
consumption. Owing to their creative efforts,Islam has emerged in
the Indonesian public sphere with a novel face, which istolerant,
inclusive, modern and progressive as well. The success of these new
dawaagents in popularizing a new type of sympathetic Islam has
opened up marketopportunities for so-called Islamic products. As a
response to the mounting demandfor such products, Islamic business
institutions have proliferated, includingIslamized American-style
multi-level marketing.
Commodification which occurs in tandem with rising market
demands for Islamicproducts does not primarily mean
commercialization. It is more an attempt to offerand package Islam
so that it can be accepted by a broader market. This attempt
hasbeen interpreted by the players in this business as form of
packaging dawa in such a
Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250 247247
-
way that dawa might resonate more loudly to reach a much broader
audience, andthus contributing to the proselytizing of Islam. In
addition to Quranic readingsessions and religious study programmes
held in five-star hotels and luxuryconvention centres, dawa
messages have diffused through advertisement pages ofIslamic
magazines, novels, Islamic soap opera series, and religious
songs.
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250 Cont Islam (2009) 3:229250
The making of public Islam: piety, agency, and commodification
on the landscape of the Indonesian public
sphereAbstractIntroductionIslamic resurgencePublic IslamPiety and
agencyCommodifying IslamIslam on the new
mediaConclusionReferences
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