The Lived Experiences of Progressive Muslims: Exploring the Limits of Individualisation Lisa Worthington The Religion and Society Research Centre, The University of Western Sydney. Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy degree, The Religion and Society Research Centre, The University of Western Sydney, 2015.
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TheLivedExperiencesofProgressiveMuslims:Exploringthe
LimitsofIndividualisation
Lisa Worthington
The Religion and Society Research Centre, The University of Western Sydney.
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Doctor of Philosophy degree, The Religion and Society Research Centre, The University of Western
Sydney, 2015.
ii
Declaration
This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any another
degree or diploma at any other university or tertiary institution, and to the best of my
knowledge and belief contains no material previously published or written by
another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.
Two articles have been published in peer review journals as a result of the research
undertaken for this PhD thesis. These are:
Worthington, L. (2016) “Progressive Islam and Women’s Religious Leadership:
Analysing the Emergence of New Models of Shared Authority,” Journal of the
Academic Study of Religion Vol. 29 No. 2 pp. 167-181.
Worthington, L. (2016) “Working Towards Gender Equality: Resistance in
Progressive Muslim Movements in North America,” SeaChanges. Vol. 7 pp. 1-28.
http://media.wix.com/ugd/cd26e8_8c87e8cd43e7436390361786dd46053d.pdf
(accessed 28 May 2016).
I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited into the university library,
being available for loan or photocopying.
SIGNED: DATE:
iii
Abstract
Since September 11 2001 popular discourse on Islam has come to focus on issues of
fanaticism and violence. Consequently the need to present examples of a ‘moderate’
or ‘liberal’ Islam has emerged and this thesis is a response to this imperative. It is
clear that progressive Islamic thought and practice has been formed as a reaction to
events, religious norms, liberalism and human rights discourses. It has been argued
by Abdullahi An-Na’im (2006) that following the attacks there was a need for many
Muslims to seek and craft an Islam that they believed was compatible with Western
values of pluralism and human rights. This thesis will investigate the lived
experiences of progressive Muslim communities and organisations in North
America, by exploring how their identities are presented, how and why progressive
Muslim communities are formed, how authority is exercised, and how gender
activism is articulated. To date there is no sociological research that investigates the
social implications of progressive Islamic thought, much less its implications for
social justice and equality in Muslim societies and communities. Although there is
considerable literature on progressive Islamic thought and theology (Esack 1997;
Safi 2003a; Duderija 2011; Wadud 2006) not much is known about its social
manifestations and the implications of these materials. This thesis will focus on two
organisations: Muslims for Progressive Values and El-Tawhid Juma Circle.
Fieldwork was conducted though twenty in-depth interviews and observations in the
United States in 2013. The data collected for this research will be used to evaluate
the broader concerns of social justice, human rights, and pluralism in these two
progressive Muslim movements. An important feature of most progressive Islamic
movements in North America is the focus on social equality and ultimately on
gender parity. The varied forms of progressive Islam all endeavour to realise social
justice and equality through a critical engagement with Islamic sources and an
inquiry into dominant contemporary Islamic practices. This thesis will test the extent
to which progressive Muslim practice can be described as an individualised form of
Islam. In connection with this it also analyses progressive Muslim practice with
reference to theories of individualisation, pluralism, cosmopolitanism and everyday
religion.
iv
Acknowledgments
Firstly, special thanks are due to my supervisors Professor Adam Possamai, Doctor
Kate Huppatz and Professor Bryan Turner for their valuable advice, support and
guidance on this project.
Thanks are also due to colleagues at the Committee on Religion at the Graduate
Centre at the City University of New York for their stimulating discussion during the
time I spent there as a visiting scholar while completing my fieldwork.
Thanks to Eva Garcia, Nutan Muckle and Vicki Fox for administrative support
during my thesis and assistance with fieldwork and conference travel. I also
appreciate the assistance of Carolla Belle in finding accommodation in New York
City during my fieldwork.
Thanks to my Religion and Society Research Centre colleagues Farjana Mahbuba,
Alan Nixon, John McGuire, Ashleigh Barbe-Winter, Firdaus Wajdi, Juni Alfiah,
Vlad Iouchkov, and Kathleen Openshaw for their friendship and discussion.
Early versions of some of my chapters were presented at the XVIII International
Congress of Sociology, and the Australian Association for the Study of Religion
Annual Conference. Thanks are due to those who made valuable comments and
suggestions on these papers.
I am indebted to my participants who gave so willingly of their time to contribute to
this project and welcomed me into their communities.
Lastly, thanks to a few dear friends who have read drafts and provided feedback and
proofreading assistance: Safdar Ahmed, Imran Ahmed, and Zeinab El-Haris.
v
TableofContentsDeclaration...........................................................................................................ii
Abstract..............................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgments...............................................................................................iv
TableofContents.................................................................................................v
GlossaryofNon-EnglishTerms...........................................................................viii
Abbreviations.....................................................................................................xiii
Figures...............................................................................................................xiv
ChapterOne:Introduction....................................................................................1Background:EventsandSocialManifestations..................................................................................4DefinitionofTerms.........................................................................................................................................7SignificanceoftheResearch........................................................................................................................9ResearchAims................................................................................................................................................11ResearchQuestions......................................................................................................................................11ThesisOverview............................................................................................................................................11
ChapterTwo:LiteratureReview.........................................................................14CaseStudy-Joyah.........................................................................................................................................14IslaminNorthAmerica..............................................................................................................................17LiteratureonGenderinIslam.................................................................................................................23IslamicFeminismandGenderRightsinIslam.................................................................................26OverviewofTheoreticalTextsonProgressiveIslam....................................................................28TextsAboutProgressiveMuslims.........................................................................................................32ChapterSummary.........................................................................................................................................33
ChapterThree:TheoreticalBackground..............................................................34SecularisationandModernity.................................................................................................................34EverydayandLivedReligion...................................................................................................................38IndividualisationofReligion....................................................................................................................41TacticalandStrategicReligion................................................................................................................45Cosmopolitanism..........................................................................................................................................46IslamandCosmopolitanism.....................................................................................................................49CosmopolitanismandtheIndividualisationofReligion..............................................................51ReligiousPluralism......................................................................................................................................53IslamandPluralism.....................................................................................................................................54ChapterSummary.........................................................................................................................................55
ChapterFour:Methodology...............................................................................57ResearchDesign............................................................................................................................................57InternetBasedSocialResearch..............................................................................................................57Investigator.....................................................................................................................................................59DataCollection...............................................................................................................................................62Interviews........................................................................................................................................................62OnlineInterviewing.....................................................................................................................................63IssuesDuringDataCollection.................................................................................................................64Limitations.......................................................................................................................................................65TargetOrganisations...................................................................................................................................66El-TawhidJumaCircle(ETJC)..................................................................................................................66MuslimsforProgressiveValues(MPV)................................................................................................67
vi
NewYorkCommunityofProgressives(NYComp).........................................................................67Qur’an Discussion Group Manhattan (QDG) ........................................................ 68
BackgroundonParticipants.....................................................................................................................68ParticipantBreakdown..............................................................................................................................72Figure1:InformationonParticipants.................................................................................................72
DataAnalysisandPresentation..............................................................................................................73ChapterSummary.........................................................................................................................................75ChapterFive:ProgressiveMuslimIdentity..........................................................76CaseStudy:ProgressiveMuslimIdentity– Aarish ..................................................... 77IssuesinMuslimIdentity..........................................................................................................................84Self-Identification.........................................................................................................................................88ExperiencewithNormativeIslam.........................................................................................................90ReactionstoProgressiveIslam...............................................................................................................91September11andMuslimIdentity:ComingOutMuslim...........................................................96BeingMuslimandLGBTQ.........................................................................................................................98SocialActivistIdentity..............................................................................................................................100Discussion:ConstructingProgressiveMuslimIdentities..........................................................102Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................105
ChapterSix:ReinterpretingtheQur’an and Hadith ....................................... 109CaseStudy:ReinterpretingtheQur’an and Hadith - Yohanes ................................ 111LearningAboutIslam................................................................................................................................115QuestioningIslam.......................................................................................................................................116RereadingtheQur’an and Hadith ........................................................................... 119ReinterpretingIslam.................................................................................................................................123DevelopinganIndividualUnderstandingofIslam.......................................................................125TheImportanceofHistoricalContext................................................................................................127Discussion:PluralInterpretationsofIslam.....................................................................................129Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................133ChapterSeven:CreatingaPluralMuslimCommunity.......................................135CaseStudy:CreatingaUnityMosque– Michelle ..................................................... 135InterandIntra-ReligiousPluralism....................................................................................................141WhatisProgressiveCommunity?........................................................................................................145OnlineCommunity.....................................................................................................................................148ProgressiveIslamOnline.........................................................................................................................150ProgressiveIslaminPractice................................................................................................................151ProgressiveMuslimDiversity...............................................................................................................155MuslimsforProgressiveValues...........................................................................................................157El-TawhidJumaCircle..............................................................................................................................161Discussion:CreatingPluralCommunities........................................................................................163Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................166
ChapterEight:ReligiousAuthorityinProgressiveIslam....................................169CaseStudy:SharedAuthority-Ali......................................................................................................171SharedAuthority.........................................................................................................................................177ScholarsQualifications.............................................................................................................................179ProgressiveLeadership............................................................................................................................181ReasonsforNotQualifyingtoSpeakAboutIslam........................................................................182ReformVersusTradition.........................................................................................................................184WorkingforSocialandCulturalChange...........................................................................................186Discussion:ThePluralCharismatic‘Shared’ Concept of Authority .......................... 189Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................194
vii
ChapterNine:ExaminingGenderActivisminProgressiveIslam........................196GenderandIslam........................................................................................................................................196CaseStudy:GenderActivisminProgressiveIslam– Zaynab ................................... 201AttitudestoGender....................................................................................................................................207Women’s Roles in Islam ........................................................................................ 208ViewsonGenderSegregationinMuslimSettings........................................................................212AwrahanditsConnectionwithGenderSegregationinPrayer..............................................216HowDoesProgressiveIslamRemedyGenderInequality?.......................................................218ChoiceandEquality...................................................................................................................................220FeminismandProgressiveIslam.........................................................................................................222Discussion:GenderPluralismandGenderActivism...................................................................227Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................230
ChapterTen:Conclusion...................................................................................233ThesisSummary..........................................................................................................................................233ProgressiveMuslimsBetweenPluralismandCosmopolitanism...........................................235ProgressiveMuslimPluralism..............................................................................................................236TwoTypesofPluralism...........................................................................................................................237TheLimitsofPluralisminProgressiveCommunities.................................................................238ProgressiveCosmopolitans?..................................................................................................................239ProgressiveMuslimIdentity..................................................................................................................240ReinterpretingtheQur’an and the Hadith .............................................................. 241CreatingaPluralMuslimCommunity................................................................................................242ReligiousAuthorityinProgressiveIslam.........................................................................................243ExaminingGenderActivisminProgressiveIslam........................................................................244Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................244
References.......................................................................................................249
AppendixA:MPVPrinciples............................................................................266
AppendixB:InterviewQuestions.....................................................................268
AppendixC:InformationSheet.........................................................................270
AppendixD:ConsentForms.............................................................................272
AppendixE:AdditionalTables..........................................................................276
viii
GlossaryofNon-EnglishTerms
Adhan - The Islamic call to prayer, recited by the muezzin at prescribed times of the
day.
Aqidah - A religious belief system or creed.
Awrah - Derives from the root ‘a-w-r which means defectiveness, imperfection,
blemish or weakness. However, the most common English translation is naked.
Ayah - Literally meaning evidence or sign. In the context of Islam's principal
scripture, the Qur’an, ayah is used to mean a verse. The plural is ayat.
Baraka - Is a beneficent force from God that flows through the physical and
spiritual spheres as prosperity, protection, and happiness.
Bid’a - Any innovation in religious matters. Considered to be a negative thing to be
avoided.
Burqa - A garment that covers the whole body including the face and eyes, worn for
modesty purposes.
Daraba - Translated differently by different scholars. Some believe daraba means to
turn away from while others claim it means to beat physically.
Deen - The term is sometimes translated as religion, but as used in the Qur’an, it
refers to the path along which righteous Muslims travel in order to comply with
divine law.
Dhikr - The name of devotional acts in Islam in which short phrases or prayers are
repeatedly recited silently within the heart or aloud.
Fiqh - Is Islamic jurisprudence; the human understanding of the Shari’a.
ix
Fitna - Meaning temptation, trial; sedition, civil strife with extensive connotations of
trial, affliction, or distress.
Ghira - Sexual honour and jealousy.
Hadith - in Islamic religious use is often translated as “prophetic traditions”,
meaning the corpus of the reports of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Islamic
prophet Muhammad.
Hafiz - Someone who has memorised the Qur’an in its entirety.
Halal - Permissible in Islam.
Halaqas - A religious gathering or meeting for the primary purpose of learning
about Islam.
Haram - Not permitted in Islam.
Haya - Modesty and shyness.
Hijab - A veil that covers the head and chest.
Iftar - The evening meal when Muslims break their fast during Ramadan.
Ijaza - The grant of permission or authority usually represented by a certificate used
primarily by Sunni Muslims to indicate that one has been authorised by a higher
authority to transmit a certain subject or text of Islamic knowledge.
Ijtihad - An Islamic legal term that means independent reasoning.
Imam - Is an Islamic leadership position. It is most commonly used in the context of
a worship leader of a mosque and Muslim community by Sunni Muslims.
x
Isnad - The chain of transmission by which Hadith are transmitted.
Jilbab - Refers to any long and loose-fit coat or garment worn by some Muslim
women.
Jihad Akbar - Greater struggle.
Jumma - Friday.
Kafir – A term used by Muslims to describe a subset of society who have read,
understood and rejected the message of the Qur’an.
Kayd - Translated as master or leader, also refers to power.
Khatib - The person who delivers the sermon on Friday and on Eid.
Khutbah - Sermon.
Magrib - Sunset prayer.
Masjid - A place of worship for Muslims.
Mawlana - Is a title, mostly in Central Asia and in the Indian subcontinent,
preceding the name of respected Muslim religious leaders, in particular graduates of
religious institutions.
Muezzin - The person appointed at a mosque to recite the call to prayer.
Mustad‘ifun - Weak.
Nikah - A term by which marriage is referred to in the Qur’an.
Qibla - The direction that should be faced when Muslims perform ritual prayers.
xi
Qur’an - The central religious text of Islam.
Ramadan - Ninth month of the Islamic calendar during which Muslims observe a
fast.
Rasul - Messenger.
Rasulallah - Messenger of Allah.
Sahaba - Refers to the companions, disciples, scribes and family of the prophet
Muhammad.
Salafi - Salafism takes its name from the term salaf (“predecessors”, “ancestors”)
used to identify the earliest Muslims, who, its adherents believe, provide the epitome
of Islamic practice. A Salafi is one who practices Salafism.
Salawat - Sending blessings on the Prophet, often by reciting, “May God honour
him and grant him peace”.
Shafi - One of the four schools of legal thought in Sunni Islam.
Shahada - The Muslim testament of faith declaring, “there is no god but God,
Muhammad is the messenger of God”.
Sheikh - An honorific title that sometimes refers to a male leader.
Shirk – Polytheism, disbelief.
Sunna - A way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims based on the teachings
and practices of the prophet Muhammad.
Surah - A chapter of the Qur’an.
Tafsir - Meaning exegesis, usually of the Qur’an.
xii
Takfir - Refers to the process of excommunication, of declaring someone an
apostate or unbeliever.
Taqleed - To follow or imitate someone, usually a religious scholar.
Tarawih - Refers to extra prayers performed by Sunni Muslims at night in
Ramadan.
Ulama - In contemporary usage by Muslims refers to the religious elite of scholars
at the top of the sectarian hierarchy.
‘Urf - term referring to the custom, or knowledge of a given society. To be
recognised in an Islamic society, ʿurf must be compatible with the Sharia law.
Usul al deen - Principles of religion (Islam).
Wahabi - Adherents often object to the term Wahhabi or Wahhabism as derogatory,
and prefer to be called Salafi.
Wudu - Ritual ablution using water.
Zulm - Injustice, wrongdoing, oppression.
xiii
Abbreviations
ETJC – El-Tawhid Juma Circle
FGM – Female genital mutilation
ISNA – Islamic Society of North America
LGBTQ – Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer
LIN - Liberal Islam Network
MPV – Muslims for Progressive Values
MRO – Muslim Reform Organisation
MSA – Muslim Student’s Association
NRM – New religious movement
NYCP – New York Community of Progressives
QDG – Qur’an Discussion Group
xiv
Figures
Figure 1: Information on Participants………………………………………………72
Figure 2: Methods of Interviewing………………………………………………...272
1
ChapterOne:Introduction
Progressive Islam strives to realise a plural and just society through a critical
engagement with Islam and the ideals of social and gender justice (Safi 2003a). One
of the most distinctive characteristics of many progressive Muslim movements is the
strong emphasis on equality. Progressive Muslims begin with the stance that the
Muslim community cannot collectively strive for justice unless the equal rights of
Muslim women are first guaranteed (Safi 2003a). Omid Safi, who is acknowledged by
some as the chief organiser of the specific ‘Progressive Muslim’ movement (Jones
2008: 224) asserts that, “…there can be no progressive interpretation of Islam without
gender justice” (2003a: 1). Furthermore, it is noted by Safi (2003b) that any future
interpretations of Islam would be evaluated by the extent to which they are able to
affect gender justice in the wider community.
Apart from social and gender justice, progressive Muslims also place a strong
emphasis on pluralism. This takes several forms including ethnic, and inter and intra-
religious pluralism. Progressive congregations aim to be free of any ethnic divides
and to be open to a variety of religious or irreligious opinions. This includes a
multiplicity of Muslim interpretations and also an acceptance of the views of other
monotheistic religions (Jewish and Christians). At times progressive Muslims also
include other religions in this plurality, however this is not mentioned specifically in
the literature. Academic Amir Hussein promotes pluralism in the community,
indicating that American progressive Muslims can instigate dialogue to encourage
diversity, “North Americans can also be an example to other Muslims by taking the
lead in dialogue among various Muslim groups” (Hussein in Safi 2003: 266).
Progressive Islam has frequently been associated with a number of prominent
academic figures including Abdolkarim Soroush, Omid Safi, Fatima Mernissi, Amina
Wadud, Asma Barlas Abdullahi an-Na’im, Farid Esack, Ebrahim Moosa and Khaled
Abou El-Fadl, to name a few. The majority of those associated with the movement
tend towards an academic discourse in their work that restricts their readership to only
the most highly educated (Mandaville 2003). However, it can be argued that these
writers are “representative - not generative” (Mandaville 2003: 1) of ideas and groups
that already permeate Muslim communities in a non-organised fashion. By diverging
2
from popular notions of Muslim culture, evidence suggests that pragmatism and
globalisation have led many Muslims to engage in a critical reformulation of their
faith (Mandaville 2003: 1).
Progressive Muslims often rely on a method of contextual hermeneutical
interpretation to arrive at a more equal and inclusive reading of the Qur’an. This
method of interpretation takes into consideration the historical and social context
behind each verse as well as factoring in the holistic themes of the Qur’an (see Fazlur
Rahman 2009). However, progressives do acknowledge that there is no final and
conclusive Qur’anic perspective (Duderija 2011). With regards to gender it is
believed that the Qur’an does not determine gender roles or make commentary on
these, but refers to male and female bodies or moral personalities. This means “There
is no metaphysical, ontological, religious or ethical primacy for the male over female”
(al-Hibri 2000: 210).
Although some progressive Muslim actors focus mainly on producing an
academic discourse or an alternate theology, a number of significant public events
have also been organised to further the agenda of this collective. In 2003 Asra
Nomani became the first woman at her West Virginia mosque to assert her right to
pray in the male-only main prayer hall.1 Beyond this, the most remarkable event was
a mixed-gender prayer and sermon officiated by a female imam, Professor Amina
Wadud and organised by the Progressive Muslim Union (PMU). The 2005 prayer
event was co-sponsored by the now defunct progressive online magazine Muslim
WakeUp! and Asra Nomani's Muslim Women's Freedom Tour. The occasion, which
drew about 150 worshipers at a New York City church2 and was covered by the
international media in-depth, sparked an intense debate, drawing both supporters and
critics from around the globe.3
Much of the publicised activity of progressive Muslims takes place in the
United States (Safi 2003a). The geography of this activity might indicate that
progressive/liberal/inclusive movements are a move towards an American or Western
Islam. However, while progressive Islam is said to exist predominantly in Western
contexts, it must be noted that most progressive movements are profoundly sceptical 1 See http://www.themosqueinmorgantown.com (last accessed 8/07/2015). 2 The prayer could not be held in a mosque, there was no mosque willing to host it. It was to be held at SoHo gallery New York City but bomb threats were received. Instead the prayer was held at St. John the Divine Cathedral in Morningside Heights in Manhattan. The prayer still attracted a number of protesters. Protestors held signs saying “Mixed gender prayer today: Hellfire tomorrow”. 3 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4361931.stm (last accessed 8/07/2015) and http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/18/nyregion/muslim-group-is-urging-women-to-lead-prayers.html (last accessed 8/07/2015).
3
of nationalism (Safi 2003a). They prefer to foster worship spaces with no nationalistic
or ethnic emphasis. There are also fledgling movements in alternative national
contexts. According to one of the founders of Muslims for Progressive Values
(MPV), the first known progressive Muslim movement in Australia was formed by
MPV in 2012. At this point it reportedly only had one active member but it now has a
chapter in Melbourne and is in the process of starting a chapter in Sydney. There are
also burgeoning progressive and inclusive movements and NGOs in Southeast Asia.
These include the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE), Sisters
in Islam, Aisyiah, Liberal Islam Network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws and
Musawah. 4 In many ways America is not leading but drawing inspiration from
progress made in Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa and Iran. The most prominent
international movements focus strongly on obtaining and maintaining gender equality
in an Islamic context, on a general sense of social justice and in some cases seek to
reform Muslim laws, especially family law.
The concept of gender in Muslim societies and communities is certainly
shaped by, and works within, a patriarchal framework. Part of this patriarchal power
is exercised through the concepts of honour and shame and it is closely associated
with the regulation of behaviour of women in Muslim societies and communities.
Interestingly, one of the most unique features of the progressive Muslim movement is
the high concentration of female participation coupled with the move to emphasise
the need for gender equality as an important element in the broader commitment to
human rights and equality (Safi in Duderija 2008a: 412). As such, part of this thesis
will explore how progressive Muslims perceive and deal with gender inequality. This
will be done with reference to cosmopolitan, plural worldviews, individualisation and
everyday religion (see Chapter Three).
It should be noted that gendered experiences are conditioned by a variety of
cultural, political and geographical factors. For example, the practice of Islam in
Jordan will vary widely from the Islamic practices prevalent in Indonesia. This
diversity is also reflected in the practice of gender and particularly in the status of
women in particular societies or communities. A diversity of experiences are present
among those unwilling to compromise in the fight for social and gender justice. Some
working for gender justice readily define themselves as feminists while others are not
4 See http://www.aware.org.sg http://www.sistersinislam.org.my http://www.mampu.or.id/en/partner/aisyiyah http://islamlib.com http://www.wluml.org http://www.musawah.org (last accessed 8/07/2015).
4
comfortable with such an identification given its political implications. Perceptions of
feminism in Arab and Muslim societies are coupled with colonialist stereotypes and
fears around the loss of culture and tradition. Hence adherence to traditional gender
roles and hierarchical social structures becomes a symbol of cultural and religious
loyalty (Shaikh in Safi 2003a: 63). Thus broadly there is some resistance to social
change, especially concerning gender roles.
Background:EventsandSocialManifestations
Although there are a few progressive Muslim organisations operating in Malaysia, the
United States was chosen as a location for this research due to the high number of
progressive congregations, events and social manifestations in North America. If
Malaysia was included as a fieldwork location this may also have created language
issues. Prior to the formation of the existing organisation MPV in the United States
and El-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) in Canada, there was the Progressive Muslim
Union (PMU). The PMU was formed in November 2004 by Omid Safi, Sarah El-
Tantawi, Ahmed Nassef, and Hussein Ibish. The PMU played an important role in
shaping progressive Islam in North America. As mentioned previously the PMU had a
role in orchestrating the woman-led prayer of March 2005. However, even following
the success of their e-zine Muslim Wakeup! the group disbanded in December 2006
due to an internal schism. The division was the result of disagreements regarding the
level to which the organisation should engage with more orthodox groups and
mainstream scholars. This spilt was fairly public due to prominent members like
Michael Muhammad Knight speaking publicly about the issues he saw within the
organisation. Knight, a novelist, essayist, journalist, visiting assistant professor at
Kenyon College and former member of PMU, has earned a reputation in the Muslim
community and beyond as a cultural provocateur. His view of progressive Islam is
now quite critical:
For me, the scene just comes off as a lame attempt to reframe the Prophet
within modern liberalism, stretch the traditions and make Islam a little
more slack, softer, more huggable. That’s not my game. I can endorse
woman-led prayer without the need of a scholar telling me that it’s okay
5
and has precedents from the Prophet’s life (Knight personal blog 2005).5
For many Muslims, both in the PMU and outside of the organisation, the term
“progressive” was a problematic inclusion in the organisation’s title because the word
progressive can connote that normative Muslims are not progressive or that they are
backwards. There was also concern regarding the level of commitment to and
religious identification with Islam within the PMU. The fact that many members
identified only as agnostic, atheist or “cultural Muslims” was concerning for some
(see Chapter Five on progressive Muslim identity).
The impact of the 2005 woman-led prayer was guaranteed through the
presence of the international media. This was not the first time a woman had led a
mixed gender congregation in prayer and will certainly not be the last, but this
particular event has provoked much debate, commentary and additional scholarship.
Michael Muhammad Knight recalls that there were as many cameras and reporters
present as there were worshipers. The imamah (female prayer leader), Amina Wadud,
was reported to be flustered and distracted by the flashes of the many cameras and
stumbled through the portion of the Qur’an she was reciting (Knight 2009: 209).
Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamid Ali of Zaytuna College in California reproached the
organisers of the prayer as following in the “footsteps of Satan” and raised the
possibility that the prayer constituted an act of apostasy and said participants should
not call themselves Muslims (Hammer 2012: 43).
Along with organising the 2005 woman-led prayer, Asra Nomani produced the
documents, The Islamic Bill of Rights for Women in the Mosque, The Islamic Bill of
rights for Women in the Bedroom and, 99 Precepts for Opening Hearts Minds and
Doors in the Muslim World. These were circulated during what she dubbed the
Muslim Women's Freedom Tour. She posted these documents on the door of her
mosque. She then created a further stir and gained the attention of the New York
Times (Goodstein 2004) when she entered her Morgantown mosque through the door
nominated for exclusive male use and then refused to leave the men’s (main) section
during Friday congregational prayers. Her actions did generate some changes but also
gained her a great deal of criticism, some men even petitioned for her to be banned
from attending the mosque.
5 His blog has been taken offline but is catalogued here http://livingtradition.blogspot.com.au/2005/08/michael-knight-leaves-pmuna.html (last accessed 8/07/2015).
6
At the end of February in 2010, a women’s “pray-in” led by Fatima Thompson
at the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. attracted media attention. A small group of
women decided to pray at the rear of the main prayer area, rather than use the separate
women’s section upstairs. Mosque leaders proceeded to call the police after
unsuccessfully asking the women to move to the small women’s “area off to the side
and gated off by a solid seven foot partition.” The protesters were eventually asked to
leave the premises. Asra Nomani commented, “What unfolded that day inside the
mosque underscores a growing agitation inside the American-Muslim community by
women frustrated by separate-and-unequal status” (2010).6 Thompson and “pray-in”
members believe that every woman has the right to stand with the congregation.7
In 2013 the work of Imam Daayiee Abdullah of MPV, an openly gay imam
(prayer leader), was featured on Al Jazeera America. He converted to Islam at the age
of 33 and has studied Islam in Syria, Egypt and Jordan. He came to recognise that gay
and lesbian Muslims had unfulfilled spiritual needs and decided that he could help.
His first act as an imam was performing funeral rites for a gay Muslim who had died
of AIDS. Abdullah has officiated at over 50 weddings including quite a few gay
weddings.8 Abdullah is thought to be the first openly gay imam in North America and
as such provides a safe and understanding space for LGBTQ Muslims to worship.
These are recent events but it is important to note that there was much earlier
activity of this kind both in America and elsewhere. For example, although the 2005
Amina Wadud woman-led prayer received attention as the first occurrence of women
led prayer, in 1995 The Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) of South Africa started an
alternate congregation which also featured woman-led prayers. This congregation
operated for two years, running both Friday prayers and tarawih prayer (extra prayer)
during Ramadan and featured both male and female imams (Hammer 2008: 38).
These events and social manifestations of progressive Islam are some of the
documented actions towards a so-called Islamic reform. The actions have provoked
change and served as inspiration for some around the globe and, most importantly,
have laid the foundations for present day progressive Muslim organisations.
6 See http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/02/27/let-these-women-pray.html (last accessed 8/07/2015). 7 See http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2010/s2906485.htm (last accessed 8/07/2015) and http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704682604575369472168848914 (last accessed 8/07/2015) and http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/21/AR2010052104253.html (last accessed 8/07/2015). 8 http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/12/20/meet-america-s-firstopenlygayimam.html (last accessed 8/07/2015).
7
DefinitionofTerms
Some of the terms used in this research are ambiguous in meaning and as such require
explanation. When undertaking research on Islam or social factors pertaining to Islam
it is important to define what is meant by the term Islam. Islam is understood to hold a
multitude of meanings and undertake a variety of functions depending on who
determines the definition. Some popular definitions listed by Amina Wadud include:
Islam is a way of life, Islam means following the shari’a (Islamic law) and fiqh
(theory of Islamic law), Islam is a reflection of its primary sources (Qur’an and
hadith), Islam is an other, and Islam is a culture. Islam is also considered by some to
be peace and by others to constitute terrorism (Wadud 2006: 17-18). For the purpose
of this research Islam will be defined as a monotheistic religion that takes Muhammed
as its final prophet. A Muslim will be classified as any person who self-identifies as
such.
One of the major themes of the Islamist or revivalist movements present in
modernity is for Muslims to return to an “original Islam” and an “authentic
indigenous culture” (Rozario 1998: 651). This need to return to an “authentic” Islam
stems partly from the colonial period when many Muslim countries were occupied
and the culture of the coloniser introduced. It is assumed by many Muslims that the
Islamic scriptures and the Tradition (hadith) “are unambiguous and precise” (Ahmed
1993: 145). Yet, the writings of progressive scholars and Muslim feminists have
demonstrated the problematic nature of this statement.9 Scholars have documented
that in the past different interest groups have taken advantage of the obscure nature of
the Islamic scriptures and used them to their advantage. Some progressive Muslims
consider this to be a deliberate misinterpretation of Islamic texts for political
purposes, particularly in relation to the definition of a woman’s position in Islam.
Here there is possibly a division between what Leila Ahmed (1993) has
articulated as an ‘establishment Islam’ well-known to be compatible with the
constructions of male power and a ‘lay Islam’, which has the potential to be more
favourable to women’s interests (Ahmed 1993) and also to LGBTQ Muslims. While
earlier generations of Arab feminists, such as Nawal El Saadawi, had spoken about
their disapproval of the ‘Islam of the establishment’, a younger generation, whether
from personal belief or for strategic reasons, chose to assert their adherence to a ‘lay
9 See Mernissi (1987) and (1993), Ahmed (1993), Wadud (1999), Barlas (2002).
8
Islam’ within which women might have a constructive and productive role. For them,
the Qur’an and Islam are “the source of an ethical teaching that affirms and supports
rather than undermines “the position of women” (Rozario 1998: 651).
The use of the word ‘progressive’ here in relation to Islam refers collectively
to those who seek open-minded or reformist interpretations of Islam. More recently
some academics working in the field have resisted using the term ‘liberal Islam’ (see
Kurzman 1998) due to its attached meaning of ‘loose not strict’, as only laxly Muslim
and possibly closely aligned with European and American interests (Safi 2003a). The
term ‘reformist Muslim’ also brings with it unwanted connotations of other religious
reform movements such as Protestantism where a departure from the previous
practices of the religion were undertaken; much of progressive Islam does not intend
this and many progressive Muslims do not believe their actions amount to a reform of
Islam but a reinterpretation (see Chapter Six). Speaking of what some refer to, as
‘critical Islam’ is also an insufficient term in this case as it implies pontificating and
complaining about Islam without any attempt to take action to change or improve it.
The progressive Islam I refer to here denotes a form of communitarianism and seeks
to bring about ‘multiple critiques’ at both an academic and activist level (Esack in
Safi 2003a and Safi 2003b).
Gender is also a term that requires qualification. Here I refer not just to
women, as is often the case in many studies on gender in Muslim societies and
communities, but also to men, and the relationships between men and women. When I
refer to the performance of gender I also do not refer exclusively to insignificant outer
garments such as the hijab (head covering). The hijab is both a marker of personal
identity and a signal of social regulation between the genders but does not embody all
the characteristics of gender practice and difference in Muslim societies and
communities. However, the hijab and other physical religious symbols are not
important in progressive Muslim communities (see Chapter Nine on gender activism).
The term normative Muslim will be used in this thesis to refer to non-
progressive Muslims. Choosing a term to refer to this group presents some issues. Of
course calling Muslims non-progressives denotes that they are in some way
backwards and stagnant. Referring to this group as mainstream Muslims as some
participants did is also problematic as this would require there to be an agreed
mainstream of Muslim thought and practice. Unlike Catholicism, Islam does not have
a central religious authority that regulates interpretation and practice. I have therefore
9
employed the term normative for want of a more fitting term.
Pluralism is a term that is widely used but is not often precisely defined and
will be featured prominently in this thesis (see chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight).
James Beckford categorises three different uses of the term. According to Beckford,
pluralism is used to refer to: diversity in religion, public acceptance or recognition of
religion, and pluralism as a value (2003: 74). Pluralism can be defined as an active
engagement with diversity that is not merely tolerant but seeks an understanding of
difference through dialogue. Pluralism does not simply equate to relativism and
requires a frank engagement with difference (Eck in Safi 2003a: 252). Within this
thesis pluralism will by understood as the active practice of understanding, engaging,
and cultivating diversity.
SignificanceoftheResearch
To date there is little social research that investigates the social implications of
progressive Islamic thought, much less its implications for gender roles and equality
in Muslim societies and communities. Pedziwiatr (2011) has a written an article about
‘progressive’ Muslims in Europe but the Muslims he refers to do not have the same
liberal tendencies and social justice agenda as progressive Muslims from North
America and perhaps other parts of the world.
Although there is considerable literature on progressive Islamic theology
(Esack 1997 and Safi 2003a), little is known about its social manifestations bought
about by these texts. Much of the disagreement in relations to progressive Islamic
discourse seems to stem from the inability to understand what its level of social
impact is, if any. Texts on progressive Islam promulgate notions of social equality and
pluralism but as yet it is not understood how these work in practice. It is evident that
there is a body of literature that outlines progressive Muslim ideals (Safi 2003a; Esack
1997, 2003; Duderija 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013; Jones
2008; Mandaville 2003; Moosa 2003, 2007), however, not much is known about how
the discourse translates into practice.
The concept of progressive Islam itself presents us with some problems. Is
progressive Islam simply a Western or American interpretation of Islam? Secondly,
how does it relate to social theory? How do progressive Muslim values translate into
10
practice? Why are gender rights such a prominent part of progressive ideology or
theology? Lastly, are progressive Muslims as individualised as they claim to be?
Since September 11 and the London bombings, we have seen the development
of what Peter Mandaville describes as the “new imperatives” for progressive Islam
(2003). Unfortunately politicised fears in the context of the so-called ‘war against
terrorism’ led many critics of Islam to focus solely on issues of fanaticism and
violence within the religion. It is clear that progressive Islamic thought and practice
has been formed in part in reaction to this criticism as well as other political, religious
and cultural events. It has been stated by Abdullahi An-Na’im that, following the
attacks, there has been a need for many Muslims to seek and craft an Islam that they
believe is compatible with Western values of pluralism and human rights (An-Na’im
2006).
One paradigm through which this response can be interpreted is Ulrich Beck’s
(2002) ‘risk society’ theory. The overall increase in terrorist attacks and 9/11 in
particular presents societies with a new level of risk. Ulrich Beck saw terrorism as
another manifestation of ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 2002). Muslims are also exposed
to this risk but try to mitigate their perceived responsibility for it through forming
moderate, progressive, or cosmopolitan interpretations of Islam. These interpretations
are often inclusive, social justice and equality orientated. In trying to distance
themselves from these attacks and the ideologies that underpin them some Muslims
try to craft a more cosmopolitan form of Islam that is sensitive to liberal human rights
discourses (An-Na’im 2006). Practitioners seek an Islam that is geared toward ideals
of social equality and liberal values. These liberal values often extend into ideas of
pluralism and respect for the Other.
However, this presents a point of friction. Perhaps one of the most cited concerns
and objections to progressive or reformist interpretations of Islam is the view that it
seeks to align Islam with the West, if only to please Western secular-liberal
sensibilities. Some see the two categories of Islam and the West as dichotomous and
feel that Islam would be compromised if an alignment with Western values occurred
(Hunter 1998; Wiktorowicz 2005). This has led many to question if there is in fact an
American Islam and if Islamic practice changes greatly in a minority context.
11
ResearchAims
Broadly, this research undertakes a sociological study of the lived experiences of self
identified progressive Muslims. Specifically it aims to investigate the extent to which
progressive Muslim practice can be described as an individualised form of Islam In
connection to this it also compares progressive Muslim practice with Ulrich Beck’s
ideas on the individualisation of religion. Beck (2010) rightly indicates that the
dynamics of individualisation, globalisation and cosmopolitanism disturb
conventional types of sociality and then insert new formations; this may also be the
case for progressive Muslims.
ResearchQuestions
Progressive Islam is accused by its critics of being scholar-centric and mostly
academically situated with little social impact (Mandaville 2003). This thesis explores
the lived experiences of self-identified progressive Muslims. More specifically, this
thesis asks:
a) Who are progressive Muslims?
b) How and why are progressive Muslim communities formed?
c) How is authority exercised in progressive Muslim communities?
d) How is gender activism articulated and experienced in progressive Muslim
communities?
e) How are progressive values translated into practice?
These questions allow for a sociologically based inquiry informed by the data.
Although the data collected for this thesis adequately answers the research questions
above, the data analysis also revealed a propensity towards both cosmopolitan and
plural thought in the participants (see Chapters Five and Six).
ThesisOverview
This thesis will be organised into ten chapters. The next three chapters, Chapter Two,
Chapter Three and Chapter Four will be devoted to the literature review, theoretical
overview and the research methodology respectively. Chapter Two gives an overview
of the literature relating to progressive Islam, gender in Islam and Muslims in North
12
America. Chapter Three presents a theoretical background to this thesis including
theories of individualisation, everyday and lived religion, cosmopolitanism and
pluralism. Chapter Four outlines the research design and methodology used to
conduct the data for this research. The data chapters will be structured thematically
around the central research themes.. Chapter Five, will examine progressive Muslim
identity and illustrate how retaining such an identity is required for progressive
Muslims to be able to change Muslim discourse from within. This chapter will also
outline the diversity of progressive Muslim identity including those who describe
themselves as agnostic or atheist Muslims, LGBTQ Muslims and some converts who
still attend Christian church. It is argued that instead of clinging to family and
institutional traditions, modern individuals are the inventors of personalised
alternatives that meld biographical experiences and faith values, as is proposed by
Ulrich Beck (2010).
Chapter Six will focus on the reinterpretation of the Qur’an and hadith to
reflect plural progressive values. The chapter outlines the process of questioning and
relearning Islam that many progressive Muslims enter into. Drawing on the research
data it will argue that progressive Muslims insist on the possibility of multiple
acceptable interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith. The chapter also indicates that
progressive Muslims are entering into a more individualised engagement with religion
by interpreting texts and making moral religious decisions independently of religious
leaders and scholars.
Chapter Seven will examine how and why progressive communities are
formed. This chapter will argue that pluralism is essential to the practice of
progressive Islam. Progressive worship spaces take their pluralism to its furthest
extent by welcoming non-Muslims into their congregations and also allowing them to
offer the sermon. In order to ensure the inclusivity of their congregation progressive
Muslims from this research instituted a ‘no talkback rule’ on theology, meaning that
no one was allowed to say that another’s interpretation or understanding of Islam was
wrong. This will present a case for the individualisation of progressive Muslims.
However, there are limits to their pluralism, individualisation and inclusivity.
Chapter Eight will examine the progressive reformulation of Islamic authority
structures. The reformulation of traditional Islamic authority is crucial to creating the
equal, inclusive space that progressive Muslims desire. Their concept of ‘shared
authority’ allows authority to be shared with more people in the congregation and
13
most importantly opens up leadership positions to women and LGBTQ people. The
chapter will argue that progressive Muslims rely on a type of ‘shared authority’ that
does not require a traditional Islamic education and instead requires that the leaders
possess “a special gift”. This reformulation of shared authority also encourages a
move toward the individualisation of Islam (Beck 2010) because the traditional
hierarchy of Islamic authority is deconstructed and placed in the hands of many and in
turn supports progressive Muslims to make their own moral and religions decisions.
The final data chapter, Chapter Nine assesses the ways in which participants
challenge unequal gender practices in Muslim communities. A great deal of
progressive Muslim texts focus on ensuring gender equality and it is an important
element in progressive practice. The chapter will discuss the gender segregation and
the gender activism of progressive Muslims. It will also argue that progressive
Muslims view gender in a variety of ways and that choice and agency are essential to
their views on gender equality, perhaps connecting with their individualised nature.
Chapter Nine will then be followed by a conclusion chapter, which will offer final
conclusions and recommendations for further research.
This thesis will employ a descriptive-type case study that aims to describe a
phenomenon and the real-life context in which it transpired (Yin 2003: 548) along
with a thematic analysis of the data. It will use propositions to test a question or
statement. Using a proposition allows the researcher to test a question or a statement
in order to discover patterns in the data. Where textual responses from participants are
included in the results they are coded in the following manner: age the participant
turned in 2013/sex/organisation. So, a thirty-year old female who is a member for
Muslims for Progressive Values would be coded as: (30y/F/MPV).
14
ChapterTwo:LiteratureReview
The introductory chapter of my thesis provided some background on progressive
Islam and particular events that have contributed to its emergence and development in
North America. It also set out the aims, research questions and located the parameters
of this study. In this chapter, I examine the relevant literature on and connected to
progressive Islam. The literature examined here is quite diverse due to the lack of
specific studies examining the social aspects of progressive Islam. Even theoretical
and theological texts on progressive Islam are few in number. The next chapter will
outline the approaches and theories that will be used to analyse and interpret the data
chapters of this thesis.
Due to the absence of traditional leadership figures in progressive Islam, the texts that
outline progressive Islamic thought occupy the role of a teacher, or a religious scholar
for many progressive Muslims. Nakia Jackson illustrates this in her chapter in
Progressive Muslim Identities where she explains, “I’ve become “unmosqued”. When
people ask who “my imam” is, or where “my mosque” is, I can but shrug, or perhaps
direct them to the works of people like Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Omid Safi and
Khaled Abou El Fadl” (Karam, Samad and Zonneveld 2011: 147). As these texts are
so central to the movement, this chapter will highlight the texts which inform the
lived experience of progressive Muslims. However, prior to doing so, this chapter will
present a case study that will illustrate some of the issues present in the data which
will be explored through the literature and theory in the next two chapters.
CaseStudy-Joyah
This case study focuses on one of the participant’s interview narratives and has been
included in this chapter as it shows how the literature that will be explored in this
chapter and the next links to the data. I spoke to Joyah via Skype from her South
California home early one morning. She is a 52-year-old self described cultural
innovator, activist, singer and songwriter. She is also the founder of Muslims for
Progressive Values (MPV) and a former member of the Progressive Muslim Union
(PMU). She conducts Muslim marriage ceremonies, including those of LGBTQ
Muslims and Muslim women who wish to marry outside the faith. During our
interview she revealed that she acts as an imam for her Los Angeles congregation but
15
labelled herself a, “reluctant imam” and only acts in this capacity following the
request of the congregation. Her activism in regards to women’s rights connects with
the literature on gender in Islam.
Joyah described going through a questioning process regarding her Muslim
identity. She re-examined Islam and explained that she was ready to leave Islam if it
did not suit her. However, what happened during that process was the opposite,
“What I found is that I came even closer to Islam and I loved Islam” [52y/F/MPV].
She described discovering an emotional and intellectual connection with Islam that
was absent previously. Joyah had uncovered a more liberating forms of Islam, “So
then I found Islam to be so much more liberating than the Islam I was raised on”
[52y/F/MPV]. She was surprised to discover that there are other Muslims who shared
similar views to hers. Joyah explained that she feels that Muslims need to relearn
Islam, “They need to reinterpret it and be more critical of what they’re reading”
[52y/F/MPV]. She believes that the Qur’an is very clear that individuals should read it
for themselves and be critical of what they are reading and how they live their lives.
This sentiment links to everyday religion and to theories of individualisation that will
be discussed in the next chapter because these theories link directly to progressive
Muslim practice. Here Joyah describes a more individualised way of interpreting
Islam. This also links with everyday religion which emphasises personal experience
and autonomy, inclusivity, and pluralism.
Previous to the creation of MPV Joyah wanted to be part of an inclusive
community. Speaking about the formation of this community she called it a re-
creation of tradition rather than the creation of something completely new: “We are
not creating something new we are re-creating something that has been in our
tradition that has been thrown out because of patriarchy, so that's really, really
important” [52y/F/MPV]. She described MPV as a “cultural revolution” and “an
American, a Western interpretation - lived out expression of Islam” [52y/F/MPV].
She qualifies this by explaining that living in a Western society provides her and other
congregants with the freedom to return to centuries old traditions, which represents an
argument against individualisation and secularisation. The idea of an American or
Western interpretation of Islam calls for an examination of modernity and
secularisation. Specifically, do processes like modernity and secularisation have
different effects on a variety of religious communities? Joyah stated: “So I wanted to
create a Muslim community that was accepting of the arts, of gender issues, of
16
sexuality, real social justice and no holds barred” [52y/F/MPV]. This prompts an
analysis of progressive Muslim literature. Joyah said that the most important thing
about MPV – both in physical congregations and online – is that “it’s a space where
you can be yourself and be Muslim” [52y/F/MPV].
After her re-examination of Islam Joyah developed a belief that there are many
varied paths to the creator. She did not see Islam as an exclusive path to God but one
of the many paths to God. A plural outlook made it possible for her to stay in Islam,
“what makes me still a Muslim is that the Qur’an acknowledges the different paths to
the creator and… that the intension of the creator is to create us differently so we can
learn from each other” [52y/F/MPV]. Here Joyah’s comments link to theories of
pluralism which will be covered in this chapter. This also provided Joyah with a basis
for the inclusivity that is important to most progressive Muslims. These themes can
also be associated with everyday religion, particularly with elements which emphasise
individuality, inclusivity, personal experiences and autonomy, and the morals and
values of each practitioner. She explained that their congregation was generally very
accepting and linked this to the belief that Islam has equal value in comparison to
other religions. Her congregation has been working to develop the equivalent of a
Sunday school curriculum that would be suitable for children who come from mixed
faith families. They wanted to create an environment that would not belittle other faith
traditions and treat all religions as equal.
Gender equality was also central to Joyah’s inclusive interpretation of Islam.
She was concerned about the unequal role of women in Muslim communities. She
illustrated this by explaining the difference between women’s roles in wider society
and their treatment in mosques. She described Muslim women as educated – doctors,
engineers and architects – and mentioned that they play an equal role in society.
However, when they enter the mosque they need to do so through the backdoor,
which she depicted as contradictory. She was particularly concerned with widespread
gender segregation, “…all those segregation policies they have in place. It's very
demeaning for a lot of the Muslim women who are successful and they are not stupid”
[52y/F/MPV]. She explained, “You step in the mosque and all of a sudden you are
second class citizen” [52y/F/MPV]. As such, she believes that there are a lot of
Muslim women who are disenchanted and have given up on Islam or are
“unmosqued”. She also views this as being compounded by a reduced choice in
marriage partners because in traditional interpretations of Islam Muslim women may
17
only marry Muslim men while Muslim men can also marry Christian or Jewish
women. To remedy some of this inequality MPV does not gender segregate their
prayers. They call this Mecca style prayer – as prayer at the Prophet’s mosque in
Mecca is not gender segregated. A review of literature on Islamic feminism is
required due to the presence of gender issues and the mention of feminism in the data.
Many of the themes present in the interview with Joyah are also present in the
literature. She approaches Islam in an individualistic way, leading to the need to
review literature on the individualisation of religion and everyday religion. Joyah also
takes a plural approach to Islam which requires a review of the literature on pluralism
and cosmopolitanism. The strong emphasis on gender equality also necessitates an
evaluation of the literature on gender in Islam, patriarchy and feminism. This chapter
will answer the aims of the thesis by presenting a review of the literature that deals
with progressive Islam so as to locate gaps in the existing literature
IslaminNorthAmerica
A number of studies on Muslims in America concentrate on immigration (Haddad and
Esposito 2000; Haddad and Smith 2002). Others focus on the political and civic
contribution of Muslims (Bukhari et al. 2004; Cesari 2004; Bagby 2001). Popular
topics for the study of American Muslims include media representations of Islam and
Muslims (Shaheen 2001; Bilici 2005), radicalisation and stereotyping (Jamal and
Naber 2008), gender issues (Read 2004), and community formation and dynamics
(Schmidt 2004; Abraham and Shryock 2000). However, few studies focus on the
insecurity that Muslims experience in the United States. Mucahit Bilici points out that
Muslim immigrants experience America long before they arrive in the country
because they first experience America in their minds as a phenomenon (2011: 605).
All Muslims are involved in questioning and interpreting the values of America and
what they mean to them.
Although religion is not asked about on the U.S. census, according to research
conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2010) Islam is followed by 0.9% of the
American population, compared to 70.6% who follow Christianity, 22.8% unaffiliated,
1.9% Judaism, 0.7% Buddhism, and 0.7% Hinduism. According to a new estimate in
2016, there are 3.3 million Muslims living in the United States, about 1% of the total
18
U.S. population.10 A 2011 Gallup Poll survey of Muslim Americans conducted in
English as well as Arabic, Farsi and Urdu, estimated that there were 1.8 million
Muslim adults (and 2.75 million Muslims of all ages) in the country. That survey also
found that a majority of U.S. Muslims (63%) are immigrants. American Muslims
come from a variety of backgrounds and, according to a 2009 Gallup poll, are one of
the most ethnically diverse religious groups in the United States.11 According to Pew
Research in 2014, 38% of Muslims were non-Hispanic white (including Arabs and
Iranians, up from 32% in 2007), 28% were Asian (mostly Indians, Pakistanis, and
Bangladeshis, up from 20% in 2007), 28% were black (down from 32%), 4% Hispanic
(down from 7%), and 3% of mixed or other race (down from 7%). Since 2007, the
black Muslim population had shrunk, while the white and Asian proportions had
grown, mainly due to immigration as most black Muslims were native U.S. blacks.12
According to a 2014 religious survey by Pew Research, 64% of Muslims
believe religion is very important, compared to 58% of Catholics who believe so. The
frequency of receiving answers to prayers among Muslims was, 31% at least once a
week and 12% once or twice a month.13 The survey also confirms that although many
Muslims are relative newcomers to the U.S., they are highly assimilated into
American society. On balance, they believe that Muslims coming to the U.S. should
try and adopt American customs, rather than attempting to remain distinct from the
larger society. And by nearly two-to-one (63%-32%) Muslim Americans do not see a
conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.
When compared to non-Muslims, more Muslims in the United States describe
their political views as moderate (38%) rather than liberal14 (24%); and only 19%
define themselves as conservatives. Amongst the general public, self-described
conservatives outnumber liberals by a margin of 34% to 19%. However, the political
attitudes of Muslims in the U.S. are not consistently liberal in all areas. On key social
issues U.S. Muslims are in fact much more conservative than the general public. For
example, regarding homosexuality, most say that homosexuality is a way of life that
should be discouraged rather than accepted. A sizeable majority of Muslims (59%)
also say that government should do more to safeguard morality in society.
Muslim Americans also express disapproval at current U.S. foreign policy. 10 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-population/ 11 http://www.gallup.com/poll/116260/Muslim-Americans-Exemplify-Diversity-Potential.aspx 12 http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/13 http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ 14 A broad political philosophy focused on the inalienable rights of the individual.
19
Many do not agree with the decision to use force against Iraq. At the same time,
Muslims in the U.S. are broadly concerned about Islamic extremism and voice strong
disapproval of terrorist activity. About three quarters (76%) say they are very or
somewhat concerned about the increase of Islamic extremism worldwide, and 61%
report being concerned about the possible rise of Islamic extremism in the U.S. More
than three out of four U.S. Muslims say that suicide bombing in the name of Islam is
never warranted and only 5% express positive views of al Qaeda.
For a number of American Muslims the “melting pot” of American
multiculturalism has not functioned to embrace them (Smith 2010). During the early
part of the twentieth century many Muslim immigrants endeavored to conceal their
ethnic and religious backgrounds. Often they would change their names and avoid
clothes that would link them with Islam (Smith 2010). Events like the 1967 war
between Israel and Arab nations have been named as a cause of a more conservative
Islam in the Muslim world and abroad (Smith 2010). In the twenty-first century there
is evidence of an increasing “Islamic consciousness” due to U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East (Smith 2010: 32). It is more probable that recent immigrants to the U.S.
will have a clear Muslim identity. Although they may disagree with the foreign
policies of the government the majority of Muslims want to be engaged U.S. citizens
in a country that guarantees religious freedom. However, some American Muslims
worry that they will be unable to practice this freedom because of discrimination and
the chance of a policy change at the government level (Smith 2010).
In terms of Islamic practice, a number of Americans have been drawn to Islam
via Sufism, both its newer and more traditional forms. Today some Sufi tariqas (path
of spiritual learning) in the U.S. have direct links to overseas orders that are hundreds
of years old. Smith points out that there is an increased interest in Sufism among
Muslim youth who are seeking a more “moderate version of Islam” (Smith 2010: 31).
American Muslims position themselves everywhere on a continuum from secular or
‘unmosqued’ to observant. Secular American Muslims have featured significantly in
fields of education, science and economics. However, they may not be identified by
other Americans as being Muslim or having any association with Islam (Smith 2010).
Recent studies of Islam in the U.S show that sizable numbers of Muslims do not
actively practice the religion, do not attend mosques, and do not practice prescribed
rituals like prayer and fasting. For those who do practice Islam there are growing
concerns about the presentation and public practice of Islam (Smith 2010).
20
Since 9/11 the American public have become more aware of the presence of
Islam and Muslims in the U.S. This has raised questions as to who should speak for
Islam or on behalf of Muslims. Muslims from professional, academic and religious
backgrounds have all gained public status and have endeavoured to distance Islam
from terrorism and present contemporary interpretations of Islam (Smith 2010). The
United States government has also bestowed leadership on certain individuals by
hosting them at the White House and inviting them to speak at state events. In other
cases leaders of American Muslim organisations also feature in the media to speak on
behalf of Muslims. One of the first prominent Muslim organisations to be founded in
the U.S. was the Muslim Student Association (MSA) in the USA and Canada. This
organisation now has chapters on most university campuses. Currently the largest
Muslim organisation in the U.S. is the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and
elected its first female president in 2006. Some Muslims are also involved in
promoting civil rights rather than purely religious values. For example, the Muslim
Women Lawyers for Human Rights, known as KARAMAH, who advocate for
women’s rights in an American context (Smith 2010).
One of the main points of debate in the public defense of Islam in the U.S.
today is the status of women in Islam. A major argument presented by Muslim
advocates is that Muslim women are active in their communities and in society at
large. They also mention that women played an active role in the Prophet’s
community to reinforce the fact that Islam encourages women’s participation in
society (Smith 2010). Since 9/11 Muslim women have taken on leadership and
advocacy roles and have worked to articulate that Islam is fundamentally peaceful and
therefore should be welcome in America. However, the reality of violence committed
in the name of Islam is constantly in the minds of American Muslims whether they
are observant or non-observant or born in the U.S. or abroad. American Muslims are
now being compelled to interpret Islam for practice in the U.S. Simply stating that,
“Islam is a religion of peace” is no longer satisfactory (Smith 2010: 41).
According to Canada’s 2011 National Household Survey, there were
1,053,945 Muslims in Canada or about 3.2% of the total population, making them the
second largest religion after Christianity. As the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees freedom of religious expression, Canadian Muslims face no
official religious discrimination. Most (83%) Muslims feel very proud to be Canadian.
This feeling has intensified since 2006 (especially in Quebec). In comparison, 73
21
percent of non-Muslims feel comparably proud to be Canadian. Frequently minority
groups are perceived by the mainstream as making a deliberate effort to differentiate
themselves from wider society, which can be understood as a calculated act of
refusing to participate fully as citizens. Regarding Canada’s Muslims, the survey
shows that they are much more likely to believe that other Muslims desire to adopt
Canadian customs (53%) than to be separate from the wider Canadian society (17%).
The rest believe that both goals are similarly present (16%) and 14 percent did not
offer an opinion. These statistics are mostly similar to those collected in 2006,
although fewer now believe that Muslims wish to separate themselves from wider
Canadian society.
The survey also asked participants to identify unprompted the values they
believe are most important for immigrants to learn and adopt when they move to
Canada. A variety of responses were offered but the most commonly mentioned
include language fluency (English or French) (23%), tolerance and respect for others
(19%), and respect for Canadian history and culture (17%), followed by respect for
the law, respect for other religions and cultures, general civility and mutual respect,
the need to assimilate generally, and respect for human rights and freedoms. Few
(7%) did not identify at least one such value that immigrants were expected to adopt.
Responses to this question are largely similar across the Muslim population. When
asked the same question, non-Muslim Canadians offered a notably similar list of
responses in roughly the same order of priority. Most Muslims (84%) believe
Muslims in Canada are treated better than Muslims in other western countries, and
this view has strengthened since 2006 (when it was 77%). An increasing majority also
thinks that non-Muslim opinions of Islam are mostly positive (54%) rather than
negative (32%).15
Almost half of Canadian Muslims (48%) now report they attend a mosque at
least once a week, and this proportion has increased modestly since 2006 when 41%
reported this frequency. Another one in six (17%) visits a mosque several times a
month or year, while around one-quarter (24%) say they attend only on religious
holidays. Only one in ten (9%) says he or she visits a mosque never or almost never,
down from 15 percent in 2006.
Very few Canadian Muslims think that more than a small number of Muslims
15 http://www.environicsinstitute.org/uploads/institute-projects/survey%20of%20muslims%20in%20canada%202016%20-%20final%20report.pdf
22
support violent extremists like the Islamic State and this proportion has reduced since
2006. Only one percent now maintains that “many” or “most” Muslims in Canada
support violent extremism. The majority estimate that this view is held by “very few”
or “none” in their community and the “none” category leaping from 11 percent to 44
percent in the last ten years. The non-Muslim Canadian population is more likely to
suppose that there is domestic support for violent extremism overseas, though this
view has also reduced over the last decade. Less than one in ten (7%) non-Muslim
Canadians presently feels that many or most Canadian Muslims support violent
extremism, compared with more than six in ten (63%) who believe it is very few or
none (up 10 points since 2006). This downward movement in perceptions of Canadian
support for violent extremism is present across the country.
There have been subjective reports that local mosques are operating as
recruiting grounds for extremist groups abroad. Only three percent of Muslims
surveyed report that they have ever witnessed anything linked with violent extremism
being endorsed in a mosque in Canada. Almost nine in ten Canadian Muslims say it is
“very” (79%) or “somewhat” (9%) important for Canadian Muslim communities to
enthusiastically cooperate with government agencies to address activities that may
lead to radicalisation and violent extremism domestically or internationally. This
feeling is similar across the population. Those in the top income bracket are most
likely to voice this sentiment followed by those born in Canada (87%).
Canada hosts quite a few liberal and progressive groups including the Muslim
Canadian Congress (MCC),16 the Canadian Muslim Union17 another liberal group
which split from the MCC, Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV), 18 also the
Coalition for Progressive Canadian Muslim Organizations (CPCMO),19 composed of
the following groups: Canadian Thinkers’ Forum,20 Forum for Learning,21 Islamic
Council for Interfaith Harmony, Muslim Committee Against Anti-Semitism, 22
Progressive Muslims Institute Canada,23 Project Ijtihad, The Council for Muslims
Facing Tomorrow,24 Western Canadian Muslims for Democracy.
16 http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org 17 http://www.muslimunion.ca 18 http://universalistmuslims.tumblr.com 19 http://cpcmo.org 20 http://canadianthinkersforum.com 21 http://www.forumforlearning.org/home.html 22 https://www.facebook.com/MuslimCommitteeAgainstAntisemitism/?fref=nf 23 https://www.facebook.com/Progressive-Muslims-Institute-Canada-532732110118067/ 24 http://muslimsfacingtomorrow.com
23
LiteratureonGenderinIslam
The contemporary sociological enquiry into gender relations in Islamic societies
began with the work of Fatima Mernissi (1987 and 1991). The main body of
Mernissi's scholarship investigates the connection between sexuality, ideology,
gender identity, sociopolitical organisation, the status of women in Islam and Muslim
societies. From the publication of her earliest book, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female
Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society (1975), Mernissi sought to release the discourse
on gender and sexuality from the strong hold of Islamic patriarchy. She critically
examines the classical Islamic texts, including the hadith, and reinterprets and
critiques them from a feminist standpoint. In her analysis, the Muslim ideal of the
“silent, passive, obedient woman” has no connection with the genuine meaning of
Islam (Mernissi 1975). Rather, she claims it is the construction of male jurist-
theologians who manipulated religious texts in order to maintain patriarchal power.
This has specific implications for this research, as progressive Islamic thought owes
much to the identification and criticism of unequal and patriarchal social systems.
Patriarchy is often described as a system of male dominance. It literally means
“rule of the fathers or the father principle” and is understood as a society in which
power is held by males or by elite males and where wealth and power is transferred
from father to son (Christ 2016: 215). The key to the perpetuation of classic
patriarchy is connected to the extended patrilocal household. Under patriarchy girls
are given in marriage at a young age into households headed by their husband’s father
(Kandiyoti 1988). In this household they are subordinate to senior women, especially
their mother in-law along with all the men. The patrilineage appropriates both
women’s labour, and the labour of offspring, and makes their contribution to
production invisible. In classic patriarchy, subordination to men is offset by the
control older women gain over younger women in the family system as they age
(Kandiyoti 1988). The anticipation that women will one day inherit this authority is
argued by Kandiyoti (1988) to result in the internalisation of patriarchy within
women. Christ states that it is more helpful to view patriarchy as an integral system.
In this way it is possible to recognise that seemingly unconnected issues – for
example, rape, war, racism, environment, family violence, birth control, abortion, gay
marriage, gun control, redistributing wealth, and the sex of God – are in fact related.
Each of these seemingly unrelated issues represents an interrogation of the
24
components of “the integral system of patriarchy which was created at the intersection
of the control of women, private property, and war.” (Christ 2016: 224).
Islam and patriarchy have a strong relationship. Islam ended matrilineal
practices and society became strictly patriarchal. After the arrival of Islam a man
owed his wife food and maintenance and in return she would be sexually available
only to him. To guarantee this women’s movements were restricted and the home
became women’s space while all other areas and places were men’s domain (Crandall
2011). Women could only have one husband until his death or their divorce, yet he
was allowed four wives simultaneously. In other ways Islam improved women’s lives,
especially morally and spiritually. They were subject to the same religious laws as
men and would earn their salvation or punishment in the same way as men. Property,
money or jewelry owned by her before marriage would remain hers during the
marriage and in the event of their divorce or his death, as did any gifts to her from her
family (Crandall 2011).
In more recent years Amina Wadud’s work has tried to reimagine women’s
position in Muslim societies and communities. Her book, Qur’an and Woman:
Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (1999) as well as her
subsequent text Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (2006) have
informed progressive Islamic discourse on gender. Central to her thesis is the concept
of the Tawhidic paradigm. According to the Tawhidic paradigm, “God is unique and
above human beings who are on the same plane” and are “all equal to each other”
(Wadud 2006: 26). A human being’s multiple relationships revolve around tawhid
(notion of the oneness of God). Tawhid is the concept of the oneness of God and by
extension implies that only God alone is worthy of worship. Wadud challenges the
normative Islamic family structure by pointing out that according to the concept of
tawhid, a husband cannot be placed on a level that is higher than that of his wife.
However, some interpretations given importance in normative Muslim groups say that
women must obey their husbands in order to enter heaven.25
Juliane Hammer reports a significant pattern in literature written by Muslim
women. More recent literature seems to present a triangle of “self understanding, and
textual production” (2012: 68). They write primarily for the sake of formulating their
ideas, negotiating their position and at times to save their faith and religious identities. 25AbuHurairahreportedthatAllah’sMessengersaid,“Ifawomanpraysherfive(daily)prayersandkeepsherprivatepartschasteandobeysherhusband,shewillenterParadisefromanyofthedoorsofParadiseshewishes.”[ReportedbyIbnHibbaaninhisSaheehinBukhari]
25
They address Muslim communities from within to bring about discussion surrounding
normative gender discourses and practices. Lastly they are acutely aware of, and are
usually directly engaged in, media representation of Muslims and Islam.
The literature supplies specific information regarding the historical context of
gender roles and assumptions (Esack 1997). The most universal stance is that it is not
religion that places women in a position of inferiority but historical patriarchal
interpretations of religion. Asma Barlas (2002) continues on this trajectory by
carefully outlining the Qur’an’s emphasis on gender equality before God. She states
that the Qur’anic dress code is not exclusively for women but also extends to men.
She posits that the Qur’an does not specify gender roles but merely speaks about male
and female bodies, which is distinctly separate from moral personality (Barlas 2002).
Both Barlas (2002) and Khaled Abou El-Fadl (2001) assert that the hijab (head
covering) or jilbab’s (loose fitting outer garment) original purpose was more
functional than religiously symbolic. According to these scholars, the emphasis on
women’s covering once served to identify believing women from non-believers, and
also constituted a call for safe conduct in society, but was never meant to reflect an
unchanging feminine essence or moral quality (Barlas 2002 and Abou El-Fadl 2001).
Gender segregation also receives much attention from progressive Muslim
scholars and practitioners and here historical context is vitally important. Many note
that at the time of the Prophet women were very socially engaged, citing this as a
precedent for contemporary Muslim women who wish to seek education, employment
and take on leadership roles. Furthermore, many describe a time when it was common
practice for women to attend the mosque, suggesting a more equal treatment of
women. The origins of gender segregation stems from the belief that women are
highly sexual beings whose access to the public sphere and worship spaces must
therefore be controlled to maintain morality. Mernissi (1987) indicates that attempts
by medieval scholars to control women’s access to the public sphere stemmed from
the idea that women are a source of fitna (temptation) or social chaos within the male
public domain. It is in reaction to these ideas of female allurement and control that
many discourses of male power have been produced (Shaikh 1997: 13).
Juliane Hammer’s book American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and
Activism: More Than a Prayer (2012) examines women’s segregation and paths to
religious leadership. Centered on the controversial woman-led prayer of 2005 her
research explores that event and reactions to it. It also addresses the meaning and
26
importance of religious community and public opinion about the event. Hammer
surveys the work of an impressive list of American authors, including Amina Wadud,
Leila Ahmed, Mohja Kahf, Azizah al-Hibri, Asma Barlas, Riffat Hassan, Asra
Normani, and Asma Gull Hasan in order to understand the current condition of so-
called American Islam.
Meena Sharify-Funk and Munira Kassam Haddad (2012) also discuss the
diverse responses to woman led prayer. They ask, “Can Islamic texts and
communities accommodate female religious leaders? Is it in the interest of Muslim
women to seek empowerment within a domain of communal life in which male
authority has traditionally been dominant?” (Sharify-Funk and Kassam Haddad 2012:
45). From these questions and following these themes this research investigates how
progressive Muslims deal with social inequality and how they might create the
conditions that allow women a stronger role in religious leadership.
IslamicFeminismandGenderRightsinIslam
Given the focus on gender in this research, it is necessary to examine the term
“Islamic feminism”. Although some authors attempt to do so, it is complicated and
perhaps pointless to try to place the emerging feminist voices in Islam into orderly
categories, and to try to produce a definition that replicates all the conflicting
positions and methods of so-called ‘Islamic feminists’, or those who campaign for
gender justice or for equity/ equality. Margot Badran explains that, “like other
feminists, their positions are local, diverse, multiple and evolving. Many have
difficulty with the label, and object to being called either ‘Islamic’ or ‘feminist’”
(2011: 10). They are all said to seek “gender justice” and “equality for women”, while
they do not always concur on what ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ constitutes or the best ways
of achieving them (Badran 2001: 73).
The concept of Islamic feminism appeared globally in the late twentieth
century as a “religiously framed discourse of gender equality” (Badran 2011: 82).
Iranian legal anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini was one of the first to report what she
labeled “a feminist reading of the shariah” (Mir-Hosseini 1996) – that some secular
feminists would label Islamic feminism (Badran 1999). This discourse of gender
equality has provided two potentially useful developments. Firstly, it dismantles the
idea that the family is a private space that is separate from the public space. Secondly,
27
it refutes the idea that Islam decrees a patriarchal organisation of the family unit
(Badran 2011: 1). The final obstacle currently faced by feminist activists in
predominantly Muslim countries is to achieve equality in the family (Badran 2011: 1).
In 1990, twenty years after the appearance of the term Islamic feminism,
‘Muslim holistic feminism’ emerged. This new categorisation of feminism draws on a
variety of discourses including Islamic discourse (Badran 2011). Unlike secular forms
of feminism, holistic feminism is communally based while still being globally
applicable. It is for and by Muslims. In using Islamic feminism’s interpretations of
egalitarianism and justice extracted from primary religious texts concurrently with
secular discourses of human rights, pluralism and democracy, the new Muslim
holistic feminism “echoes the multi-stranded discursive approach” (Badran 2011: 84).
Much of the literature on Islamic feminism points towards the terms ‘secular’ and
‘holistic’ being used as two interchangeable terms (Badran 2011). This new holistic
feminism is driven in an era when Western powers are attempting to create moderate
Muslims or moderate Muslim conduct. This move can be understood in the context of
political and security concerns in which Muslim women are seen as the perfect
vehicles for change (Abu-Lughod 2010).
In Badran’s words Islamic feminism, “transcends and destroys old binaries
that have been constructed. These included polarities between religious and secular
and between ‘East’ and ‘West’” (2008). It is often assumed by Muslims that feminism
is a Western concept and that because Islam belongs in an Eastern category, the two
must be incompatible. Such binaries are also featured prominently in the work of
polemicists like Bernard Lewis (1993 and 2002). Despite some support for the
academic discourse, there is a lot of conjecture surrounding the practical use and
definition of the term. Haideh Moghissi asserts that, “There is no self-identified or
easily identifiable Islamic feminist ideology operating in the bounds of Islamic
societies” (2011: 11). This shows that the discourse does not hold a great deal of
importance in everyday social relations.
It also must be mentioned that according to Sadiyaa Shaikh the relationship
between Islam and feminism are conditioned by a number of factors: globalisation,
orientalist scholarship, neo-colonial configurations of power, nationalist responses to
colonisation, the history of political conflict between Islam and Christianity,
Islamophobia/xenophobia (Shaikh in Safi 2003a: 64). Any discussion of the
intellectual construction of Islamic feminism must address two concurrent projects:
28
the critique of hegemonic “Western” feminism and the formation of feminist concerns
that are geographically, culturally and religiously grounded. The first component is
comprised of the deconstruction and dismantling of terms; the second is one of
building and reconstruction (Shaikh in Safi 2003a: 65). Like many other types of
knowledge production it also encompasses a directly political purpose that is
ideological in nature. This purpose is the demonstration of the equal status of women
in Islam due to Western scrutiny of the treatment of Muslim women. Scholarly
practices are not thought to have much of an effect on social manifestations. Yet, it is
important for progressive Muslim communities that their interpretations have a social
impact.
This thesis investigates the lived experiences of progressive Muslims, their
conceptions and how they deal with social inequalities, especially with regard to
gender. For this purpose, the work of Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi (1987) is
particularly important. As mentioned previously, Mernissi attempts to identify and
deconstruct the patriarchal elements of Islamic societies and their relationship with
Islam’s primary texts. Although she takes what many would consider to be a feminist
approach she does not identify as a feminist herself. Much like Shirin Ebadi26, her
work refers to the notion of universal human rights and standards of equality, which
fits well with the discourse of equality within progressive Islam.
OverviewofTheoreticalTextsonProgressiveIslam
It is important to understand and examine the literature that outlines progressive
Islamic thought, which I will later compare with the data gathered for this research.
Current progressive Muslim thought stems from the inspiration of the works of many
earlier Muslim scholars (including Qasim Amin, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-Din
Al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh). The ideas from many of these works can be
seen in the aspirations and actions of today’s progressive Muslims.
Progressive Islam, as it exists today, owes many of its core ideas and
frameworks to the work of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) and Sayyid Jamal al-
Din Al-Afghani (1838-97). The term ‘progressive Islam’ was popularised in 1983 by
Suroosh Irfani with his work Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or
26 A former Iranian judge and a Noble Peace Prize recipient Shrin Ebadi has cached her activism for women’s rights in a human rights paradigm rather than using the term feminism.
29
Dictatorship? The work of Iranian sociologist Ali Shari’arti (1987) is also
foundational within the discourse of progressive Islam. His ideas have been compared
to those of the Catholic Liberation Theology by Leonardo Boff (1978) and Gustavo
Gutierrez (1998) (South America).
Ali Shariati’s liberation theology deemed humanism to be an unworkable
category without the spiritual component that defines humans. “Real humanism is a
set of divine values at the core of man that form his moral, cultural and religious
heritage” (Shariati 1981). The relationship of men with a single God is said to
establish an essential equality upon which Muslim liberation theologians ought to
assemble their egalitarian political discourse. For Shariati, this involved a project of
retrieval, reaching into Islamic history to reinvigorate and re-examine old concepts
and narratives, to speak about present historical struggles through the reconstructed
stories of heroes of the past. This effort is analogous to Gustavo Gutierrez’s (1998)
attempt to articulate a Christian theology and spirituality authentically rooted in Latin
American historical experiences.
Liberation theologies of diverse kinds are central to the principles of
progressive, liberal and reformist Islam (Safi 2003a). Omid Safi’s work on
progressive Muslims has relied heavily on the work of Leonardo Boff (1978). Farid
Esack’s book Qur’an Liberation and Pluralism discusses liberation theology and
inter-religious dialogue from a progressive Muslim point of view. Hamid Dabashi’s
The Islamic Liberation Theology (2008) attempts to consider and highlight the
practice of the faith-based commitment to rid society of injustice and to work to
create equality in religious communities and societies. This theology depends on an
active commitment to work towards such ideals and to struggle in all spheres for the
full establishment of human rights for all. Whilst these authors are not central to the
progressive communities featured in this thesis they have inspired or informed their
organisations in some way. Several different liberation theologies impact different
progressive movements, although some reject their authority and theological position.
Safi highlights these influences:
The methodological fluidity of progressive Muslims is apparent in their
pluralistic epistemology, which freely and openly draws from sources
outside of Islamic tradition, so long as nontraditional sources serve as
useful tools in the global pursuit of justice. These external sources
30
include the liberation theologies of Leonardo Boff, Gustavo Gutierrez,
and Rebecca Chopp as well as the secular humanism of Edward Said,
Noam Chomsky, and others. Progressive Muslims are likely to combine
a Qur’anic call for serving as “witnesses for God in justice” (Qur’an
42:15) with the task of a social critic to “speak truth to the powers” (Safi
2007: xxiii-xxiv).
It is interesting that non-religious humanistic figures are included in the list of sources
of progressive Islam, because their work is not religious in nature. This means that
progressive Islam takes inspiration for secular sources.
The work of Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush has also been influential
on progressive Islamic thought. His argument is based on the thesis that Muslims
must differentiate between their knowledge of Islam (which is entirely human based)
and the Islam intended by Allah. Because the human understanding of Islam is prone
to misinterpretation, the original message of Islam may be easily misunderstood or
understood in a variety of ways. He emphasises the “difference between religion and
our understanding of religion” and also “the difference between personal knowledge
of religion and religious knowledge” (Soroush 2002: 34). He explains, “[T]hus
everywhere we are confronted with religious knowledge that concerns and observes
religion, but it is not religion” (2002: 32). Using this idea he is then able to discount
understandings of Islam that do not suit his worldview.
This thesis focuses on many of the themes present in Omid Safi’s edited
volume Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism (2003a) including
pluralism in Islam, gender equality, social justice, and religious authority structures.
The main thrust of Safi’s argument involves ensuring social justice, and by extension,
human rights through an Islamic framework. Safi (2003b) explains that gender
equality plays an important role in this process, as full social justice cannot be
achieved without equality being extended to all. The volume not only campaigns for
gender equality but also points to the need for an inclusive Islam devoid of both
racism and other types of discrimination. Special attention is also paid to the status of
LGBTQ identifying people within Islam. Safi’s (2003a) book is an excellent example
of progressive Muslim scholarship that aims to produce social change.
Generally, progressive Muslims employ similar context-relevant methods of
interpretation and understanding when studying their primary religious texts. Unlike
31
the lack of literature on social implications, there is ample literature on progressive
Islamic theology. The most universal is the concept of “contextual hermeneutics”
(Esack 1997). This method of interpreting texts takes into consideration how ethical,
social, intellectual and historical contexts affect approaches to the text. This technique
outlines general attitudes present in the Qur’an and tests all other religious statements
against these criteria. It also takes into consideration the overall historical contexts at
the time of revelation. They see the Qur’an as inclusive and universal however they
do not believe there is any conclusive Qur’anic perspective. They also see pluralism
as intrinsic to the Qur’anic worldview (Duderija 2011).
Duderija outlines the specific features of progressive Muslim thought in his
book Constructing a Religiously Ideal ‘Believer’ and ‘Woman’ in Islam (2011).
According to Duderija, progressive Muslims take the overall historical context of the
Qur’an into consideration while undertaking interpretation and as such for them the
Qur’an presents a constant marriage of ideas of social justice and issues of dogma. In
this sense they attempt to take a thematic or holistic approach to the Qur’an.
Interestingly, progressives state that some hadith contradict the (spirit of) sunna (way
of life following the example of the Prophet) as a whole and often do not consult the
hadith or are very selective on those they rely upon. Thus, Duderija argues that
progressive Muslims approach history and historical inquiry from a “Foucaultian
genealogical perspective” according to which “ideas institutions and practices are
regarded as unique products of specific historical confluences, perfect in and of
themselves without reference to extra-historical values or ideals in relation to which
they either succeed or fail to conform” (Azam 2007: 12 cited in Duderija 2008a: 412).
Further to this, Duderija in his article, The Interpretational Implications of
Progressive Muslims’ Qur’an and Sunna Manhaj in Relation to Their Formulation of
a Normative Muslima Construct (2008a) goes on to argue that progressive Islam is
not, “a ready made ideology or an off-the-shelf creed, movement or pack of
doctrines” (Duderija 2008a: 412). This accords with Moosa’s observation that it is
less a school of thought, than a systematic theory of interpretation which encompasses
the whole of Muslim law, theology, ethics and politics: “It is at best, a practice, a
package of loyalties and commitments, a work in progress” (Moosa 2007: 115).
According to Moosa, the progressive Muslims’ worldview is based on more than
“identity, texts, practices and history” (Moosa 2007: 118), it encompasses an
32
undefined element that “involves all the elements of community that make one feel
that you belong” (Moosa 2007: 126).
Safdar Ahmed’s book, Reform and Modernity in Islam (2013), outlines the
intellectual history and philosophy of many Muslim reformers including Qasim Amin
and Muhammad Abduh. He seeks to look past the widely held notion that Muslim
reformers have either simply replicated or responded to Western ideas. Instead, he
contends that they have recreated and appropriated Western ideas, which is to say
there is a modern thread running through Islamic thought, particularly in the areas of
sovereignty, femininity, and gender. He observes that progressive Muslim reformers
provide us with examples of how religion draws upon contemporary resources to
mark its place in the modern world, noting that, “Reformism cannot be understood
unless it is related to changing power relationships” (2013: 83).
TextsAboutProgressiveMuslims
There is a distinct lack of texts that focus on the lived experiences and practices of
progressive Muslims, particularly those in North America. Muslims for Progressive
Values (MPV) published an anthology in 2011 called Progressive Muslim Identities
that outlines the personal stories of some progressive Muslims. However, it is not a
sociological study and does not attempt to generalise or produce meaning from the
stories. The book features personal narratives, interviews and poems from eighteen
progressive Muslims. Nakia Jackson and Dizery Salim shed their conservative
upbringings and struggle with being “Muslim enough”. Patricia Dunn finds that Islam
confirms her strong feminist ideals. Sahira Trabrand and Ameera Saleem describe
how their search for authenticity led them to have contact with other religions and
have a more pluralist view of Islam. Olivia Samad’s poems deal with the effect that
religious and cultural norms have on women and how they relegate women to the rear
of the mosque. Jack Fertig describes how he converted to Islam in a gay-friendly
space and Daayiee Abdullah tells his story of conversion to Islam in China and
vocation as the only openly gay imam in America. Finally, in their contributions,
Shahla Khan Salter and Yarekh Hernandez both discuss the Salafi and Wahabi
discourses that have influenced communities in the US and Canada (Karam, Samad,
Zonneveld 2011). Many of these themes echo the sentiments of the participants
33
presented in the data chapters, particularly in chapters Five and Seven where
participants share their stories and reasons for their progressive belief and activism.
ChapterSummary
This chapter has provided an overview on the literature concerning, gender equality in
a Muslim context, Muslims in North America and progressive Islam. Progressive
Muslim thought draws inspiration from a wide variety of sources including Islamic
texts, liberation theologies, notions of pluralism, and may correspond with Beck’s
notion of ‘do-it-yourself religion’ (see Chapter Three). The literature review reveals a
large gap in the literature concerning the social practices of progressive Muslims. No
similar studies can be located. Literature on progressive Islam focuses almost
exclusively on theological and theoretical issues and does not provide a social
analysis of the movement. Literature on gender in Islam also does not directly address
gender activism and progressive Muslim communities nor does literature on Muslims
in North America deal with progressive Muslims. This thesis intends to broadly fill
those gaps by providing a sociological analysis of progressive Islam and specifically
by examining the levels of individualisation displayed by progressive Muslims. In the
case study above it was revealed that Joyah approaches Islam in an individualistic
way, takes a plural approach to Islam (see Chapter Three), and places a strong
emphasis on gender equality. The next chapter will outline the theories employed to
explain the data in this research. Specifically it will discuss secularisation and
modernity, lived and everyday religion, tactical and strategic religion, the
individualisation of religion, cosmopolitanism, and pluralism linking with themes in
Joyah’s case study.
34
ChapterThree:TheoreticalBackground
The previous chapter outlined the literature on Muslims in North America,
progressive Islam and gender in Islam. This chapter will continue on from the
literature review and outline the theories relevant to the themes present in the data. It
is difficult to undertake a sociological study of religion without first examining the
secularisation thesis and its relation to processes of modernity as these theories and
processes have deeply affected how religion is understood by sociologists. A
contemporary analysis of an Islamic movement requires a survey of the literature on
everyday lived religion and the individualisation of religion, as these modes of
religion seem to share commonalities with progressive Islam. This chapter will form
the theoretical background for this thesis discussing secularisation and modernity,
lived and everyday religion, tactical and strategic religion, the individualisation of
religion, cosmopolitanism, and pluralism.
SecularisationandModernity
For almost three hundred years social scientists and a mixture of Western intellectuals
have been predicting the end of religion. Each successive generation of scholars has
been confident that within decades or slightly longer, humans will outgrow the need
for religion (Stark 1999). Rodney Stark reports that Thomas Woolston was the first to
set a date by which modernity would have prevailed over faith (Stark 1999). Writing
around 1710 he predicted with certainty that Christianity would not exist by 1900
(Woolston 1733). In France Auguste Comte proclaimed that society was maturing
past the need for theology as a direct result of modernisation. He claimed that
sociology would replace religion as the foundation of moral judgments. Frederich
Engels also maintained that the socialist revolution would cause the demise of
religion, but only mentioned that it would happen soon. Years after Max Weber
delineated why modernisation would bring about the disenchantment of the world and
Sigmund Freud comforted his followers by maintaining that religion, the greatest of
all delusions, would meet its end on the therapist’s couch, although neither of these
thinkers offer a specific timeframe.
In the following generation of thinkers “soon” became “underway” or
“ongoing” (Stark 1999: 250). Anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace taught tens of
35
thousands of American undergraduates that, “the evolutionary future of religion is
extinction” (1966: 264-265). In 1968 Peter Berger told the New York Times that, in
“the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects,
huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture” (1968: 3).
Casanova is careful to differentiate between the meaning of secularism and
secularisation. He understands that secularism denotes a range of secular ideologies
and worldviews that may be developed into state projects, projects of modernity,
cultural projects, or philosophies of history and importantly are consciously held. On
the other hand, it might be viewed as an epistemic knowledge system that may be un-
reflexively held and presumed to be the normal arrangement of modern reality, “as a
modern doxa” (Casanova 2009: 1051). In contrast, secularisation typically refers to
“empirical-historical patterns” of demarcation between institutional bodies of religion
(churches, religious institutions) and the secular (economy, health, welfare, state, art,
science). Theories of secularisation generally describe a process of “human and
societal development from the primitive “sacred” to the modern “secular”” (Casanova
2009: 1050). This leads to assumptions that to be secular is to be modern and
consequently implies that to be religious means to be in someway not entirely modern
(Casanova 2009).
The normalisation of unbelief, or the absence of religion in modern societies,
links closely to the suppositions of the prevailing theories of secularisation, which
have proclaimed a gradual decline in religious beliefs and practices following growing
modernisation. In other words, the more modern a society becomes the more secular it
becomes, or the less religious it is meant to become. However, Casanova indicates that
there are some modern societies, like the United States, that are completely secular in
their governance, yet their populations are noticeably religious (Casanova 2009). He
also argues that modernisation in many non-Western societies is also joined by
developments of religious revival and as such puts into question the idea that the
deterioration of religious practices and beliefs is an expected natural outcome of
modernisation processes (Casanova 2009). Casanova argues that if modernisation does
not directly cause the eventual decline of religion, then there needs to be an improved
explanation for what he describes as the “widespread secularity” present among
populations in Europe (Casanova 2009: 1053).
Casanova has also identified three models of secularisation: delineation of
various parts of the social structure (religion, state and the market); secularisation as a
36
deterioration in the levels of religious practice and belief; and lastly the relegation of
religion to the private sphere (Turner 2010). From this Turner argues that, in the
debate on secularisation it is important to draw a distinction between ‘political
secularisation’ (the delineation of the religious and other spheres of society) and
‘social secularisation’ (the secularisation of everyday life) (Turner 2010: 12). Political
secularisation relates to the historical separation around church and state and also the
differentiation of sub-systems in society like culture, politics, religion and the
economy and so on. On the other hand, social secularisation refers to issues of
religious belief and practice in everyday life (Turner 2010). Further, he argues that the
way to advance out of the limited secularisation thesis of the 1960s is to study the
interaction between public regulation and private piety (Turner 2010). When
examining the secularisation thesis, the comparison between Europe and America is
very useful. Berger explains that the comparison makes the connection between
modernisation and secularisation very hard to sustain. America is much more religious
than Europe but cannot be considered less modern (Berger 2001).
Rodney Stark argues that there are five points that are important to note
regarding the secularisation thesis. Firstly, there is widespread agreement that
modernisation is the direct cause of secularisation, despite Berger’s argument to the
contrary. Secularisation has always sat within a broader theoretical framework of
modernisation theories and as such it is often suggested that as rationalisation,
industrialisation and urbanisation grow, that religiosity must reduce (Hadden 1987;
Finke 1992). Secondly, Stark (1999) points out that secularisation predictions are
primarily concerned with individual piety and personal belief, not merely with a
decline in institutionalised religion. Thirdly, he argues that implicit or explicit in all
versions of the secularisation thesis is the assertion that science is the most damaging
agent on religion (Stark 1999). Fourthly, secularisation is viewed as an all engrossing
state and once achieved is seen as being permanent (Stark 1999). Although Stark
argues that this is not supported by trends and events in Eastern Europe. Finally,
while the majority of arguments on secularisation focus on Christianity, prominent
advocates of the thesis tend to apply it worldwide, so will Islam disappear along with
Christianity? (Stark 1999). Stark argues this is not the case. In a direct contradiction
to the secularisation thesis, there is a reported compatibility between Islam and
modernisation. Several studies suggest that Muslim faith increases with
modernisation (Tamney 1979, 1980, 1992 and Ahmad 1991).
37
David Martin was the first contemporary sociologist to reject the
secularisation thesis completely in 1965, even suggesting that it be removed from
social science discourse because it did not serve any real theoretical function and was
primarily polemical and ideological. This was also because Martin saw no evidence of
a “shift from a religious period in human affairs to a secular period” (Martin 1991:
465). Grace Davie took a different approach to the changes in the religious landscape.
She did not ask why people no longer believe but why they “persist in believing but
see no need to participate with even minimal regularity in their religious institutions?”
(1990: 395). Michael Winter and Christopher Short argue: “What is clear is that most
surveys of religious belief in northern Europe demonstrate continuing high levels of
belief in God and some of the more general tenets of the Christian faith but rather low
levels of church attendance.” (1993: 635).
One of the prevailing strands of secularisation theory has argued that religion
could survive the modern world as a form of individual consciousness (Berger 1969).
This is Luckmann’s ‘invisible religion’ (1967). Functionalists rationalise the dilemma
of modern religion by hypothesising that “meaning” and “worldview” are quasi-
religious human universals that exists in individual consciousness (Parsons 1964).
What these functionalist theories were not able to explain is how an individual
religious consciousness could take shape in a social world that is assumed to be
progressively lacking in religious institutions and shared religious symbols
(Ammerman 2014).
Assumptions about the end of religion are particularly problematic when
studying gender. Some scholars claimed that in modernity religion might still be
present in less modern sectors including the rural, the poor, immigrants, racial
minorities, immigrants and among women (Neitz 2014). Survey research from Europe
and North America demonstrates that women are more likely than men to be
participants in religious groups. Women employ religion as a resource for acting
autonomously (Gilkes 2000; Taylor 2007), and women’s behaviour is also more
commonly regulated through religions (Neitz 2014). Interestingly the twentieth
century could be understood as a time when women in many places fought for access
to the very religious roles that men purportedly were leaving (Braude 1997).
Linda Woodhead (2008) contends that secularisation, as a narrative, is a story
told by men and not women. These narratives tell a story of a rural labourer who
leaves behind the farm and the comforts of village life and arrives in the modern city.
38
Here he enters the iron cage of the factory or the office and community is exchanged
for impersonal structures and rational efficiency (Woodhead 2008). How women
experienced industrialisation is much different. In some instances women were still
excluded from the public sphere and confined to the home doing domestic work or
piecework. Thus women remain urban villagers carrying tradition into the modern
context (Woodhead 2008). Neitz argues that examining people’s relative privilege
creates a more nuanced understanding of the secularisation process (2014). She
describes three patterns. Firstly, women who see their identities as linked mainly to
care and domestic work will probably find that their identity is respected and
supported in conservative forms of religion. Secondly, those women who are career
focused and are more likely to follow men’s patterns in the secularisation thesis and
leave traditional religions and thirdly, women who are managing both work and home
commitments. Neitz indicates that in her work she found that similar sets of rules and
beliefs had different outcomes when applied to persons in different situations and that
men and women in these groups often began their journeys in different places and in
turn had diverse experiences of religion (Neitz 2014). This diversity will be examined
in more detail in the next section through everyday and lived religion.
EverydayandLivedReligion
The study of lived religion involves paying attention to how people dress, how and
what they eat, how they deal with birth, death and sexuality and how they think about
nature. It can even include how people modify their bodies through piercings and
tattoos (Ammerman 2014). It also includes physical, artistic and ritualistic things that
people do together such as dancing, singing, folk or community traditions that create
transcendence and a sense of social solidarity. Some of these rituals or practices are
commonly recognised as religion, while others are not thought of as religious
activities by outsiders but are viewed as such by those who practice them
(Ammerman 2014). Lived religion also encompasses the spaces that people inhabit as
well as homes and other public places where worship occurs:
“Looking for lived religion does mean that we look for the material,
embodied aspects of religion as they occur in everyday life, in addition to
listening for how people explain themselves. It includes both the
39
experiences of the body and the mind” (Ammerman 2014: 190).
Lived religion is helpful for recognising the genuine experiences of religious actors
and separating them from institutionally demarcated practices and beliefs (McGuire
2008). This way of viewing religion is especially suited to sociological investigation
because it represents an individually based potentially creative space to analyse
religious experience. One benefit of employing the general framework of everyday
lived religion is that it demonstrates how minority agency works on a micro-level: the
everyday practices, and identity negotiations can be viewed as expressions of
minority identities, which can provide a viewpoint on what it means to be Muslim
(Jeldtoft 2011). It should be noted that although lived religion relates primarily to the
individual it is not purely personal. McGuire explains, “people construct their
religious worlds together, often sharing vivid experiences of that inter-subjective
reality” (McGuire 2008: 12). She also notes that it is problematic to begin any
investigation of religion with the supposition that individuals either commit, or refuse
to commit to an entire package of religious beliefs and practices of an official
religion. This could lead to a misinterpretation of the religious beliefs and practices of
individuals (McGuire 2008). Practitioners may dispense with practices and beliefs
that no longer seem effective or useful but retain and modify others. At the level of
the individual, “religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (McGuire 2008: 12).
It should be anticipated that the religious practices of all people are continuously
modifying, changing and developing along with the stories they use to make sense of
their lives (McGuire 2008). Each individual’s life story is not a replica of the larger
narrative of an official religion.
Peter Berger argues that religious belief is not just an activity of a person’s
mind but that it requires complex social support or “plausibility structures” (McGuire
2008: 13). Ammerman contends that these social supports determine the practices by
which religious acts are personified: “Its building blocks are shared meanings and
experiences, learned practices, borrowed imagery, and imparted insights” (McGuire
2008: 13). Religion as lived is not based so much on religious ideas or beliefs as it is
established on religious practices. It needs applied consistency in order to “work”. It
must make sense in an individual’s everyday life to achieve some sort of goal or
desire, for example improving a relationship with a loved one, or achieving healing
(McGuire 2008).
40
The concept of everyday religion has been categorised by some researchers as
privatised religion and spirituality (Bellah et al. 1996; Heelas and Woodhead 2005;
Hamberg 2009). In this case spirituality is perceived as individualistic and pragmatic
with a strong emphasis on personal experience and autonomy. This is in direct
opposition to static traditions and religious authority (Jeldtoft 2011: 1137). Jeldtoft
explains that everyday lived religion has “also been described as ‘un-churched’,
privatized and also quite pluralistic and inclusive in relation to the boundaries of the
more established traditions” (2011: 1137). Nancy Ammerman asserts that “everyday
implies the activity that happens outside the organized religious events and
institutions… Everyday religion may happen in both public and private life” (2007:
5). She emphasises that everyday religion is not the same as private religion and that
what happens inside religious organisations also counts. Furthermore, privatised
religiosity can also involve some form of attachment to religious institutions. Jeldtoft
(2011) explains that the reconfiguration and internalisation of religious practices can
make them appear private because they are detached from the public sphere. A
reduction in religious practice and a rise in “individualization-as-pragmatism” are also
linked to attitudes on tradition, dogma and authority (Jeldtoft 2011: 1144).
Lived Religion also shares similarities with what Robert Wuthnow called,
‘patchwork religion’. In many studies in America by Robert Wuthnow, Nancy
Ammerman, and Wade Clark Roof one discovers people who compose an
individualised religion by taking parts from different religious traditions and creating
a religious profile that does not fit clearly into any organised religion. Some of these
people report that they are not ‘religious’ but are pursuing ‘spirituality’ (Berger 2001:
448). Similar data was found in European research and Hervieu-Léger uses Claude
Levi-Strauss’ term ‘bricolage’ to describe this type of religiosity, “people putting
together a religion of their own like children tinkering with a lego-set, picking and
choosing from the available religious ‘material’” (Berger 2001: 448).
Woodhead (2016) argues that everyday religion is a lens that prompts
important questions. For instance she asks, what formations of power are hidden?
Which identity formations are not being examined? Whose lives and experiences are
overlooked by the dominant gaze? Also, what other forms of political, domestic,
economic, cultural and ritual practice might be worthy of study under the category of
religion? (Woodhead 2016). Woodhead adds that in usual academic use the concept
of ‘religion’ is overly restrictive as per a number of critiques (Cantwell Smith 1962;
41
Asad 1993). In a Western colonial context religion has become synonymous with
hierarchical, male-led, church like institutions featuring priestly and scriptural
authority, charismatic male founders and alliances with nation-states. Other cultural
presentations could be squeezed into these formations or dismissed (Woodhead 2016).
These reconfigured religious practices can illustrate how some Muslims
restructure and reformulate their religious views in an inclusive, individualistic and
pragmatic way (Jeldtoft 2011). These Muslims need to ensure that Muslim rituals
make sense for them on a personal level. In her study of non-institutionalised
Muslims Jeldtoft (2011) explains that to understand everyday lived Islam, is that for
many Muslims, being a Muslim is merely a process of self-identifying and belonging
to a community that you and others understand to be Islamic. This type of lived Islam
becomes about morals and values, about what is fundamentally good and bad
according to each individual practitioner. The boundaries of Islam are rather loose in
this interpretation. Here “Being Muslim and living as a Muslim is not dependent on
certain practices or interpretations” (Jeldtoft 2011: 1146). Ammerman (2014)
confirms that lived religion does often occur on the margins between innovative
religious experience and orthodoxy. Studies of everyday forms of religion made by
Bellah et al. (1996) also highlight individualism and autonomy as significant elements
of this type of religiosity.
IndividualisationofReligion
Individualisation is an important component in everyday religion. Wilke identifies
two distinct versions of individualisation theory in regards to religion. The first sees
individualisation as corrective and a fix for secularisation (Luckmann 1967;
Knoblauch 2008). The second is understood as being an “expression of secularised
culture” (Wilke 2015: 264 and Beck 2010). While the first type is inclined to make
secularising trends invisible, the second tends to deny full religious status to
individualised religion, “particularly in the form of postmodern creeds and practices”
(Wilke 2015: 275).
Luckmann’s Invisible Religion (1967) argued that secularisation was a
“modern myth” that relied on a limited definition of religion. According to Luckmann
what was being observed was not a complete loss of religious values, but instead a
deterioration of the relevance of institutionalised religion. In this way he explained
42
that religion changed its social configuration from institutionalised to privatised, or
individualised religion, which was not an agreed upon norm but a free choice and
individual decision (Wilke 2015). Through this process of privatisation, religion
became invisible and transcendence was minimised from “great” otherworldly
transcendencies to this world “middle” and “small” transcendencies in everyday life.
Despite their divergences, the more contemporary theories try to overcome the
emphasis on privatisation in Luckmann’s earlier theory by maintaining that the central
strength of individualised religion is being able to form the social and the collective.
Knoblauch (2008) sees individualisation as capable of creating a new spiritual
society, or in Beck’s (2010) view a new peaceful world (Wilke 2015). The theory of
religious individualisation encompassed a number of different phenomena from
“invisible” religion, “functional religion” like science or sports to the phenomena of
“believing without belonging” (Davie 1994). These identities continued to be
Christian even through decreasing religious practice and church attendance.
The individualisation of religion thesis gained additional support through
Ulrich Beck’s 1986 thesis that described an encompassing process of
individualisation which was understood to impact the social structure as a whole. This
macro-perspective process was seen to be linked to the functional differentiation of
society. Beck’s proclamation of a “second” “reflexive” modernity aided the
acceptance of the theory of religious individualisation from the 1990s (Wilke 2015).
He envisioned a peaceful world where individualised religion performed an important
role. Beck believed that secularisation had caused the deterioration of religion, but
had also liberated religion to be “nothing but religion,” meaning the cultivation of a
spirituality that lends itself to a cosmopolitan public engagement that pushes existing
religious boundaries (Beck 2010: 113). He understood that secularisation did not lead
to a loss of faith, but rather to a separation of religion and faith (i.e., institutional
religion versus religiosity) (Wilke 2015). Beck argued that the process of
modernisation in fact invigorated religiosity precisely because of the growing
insecurities of modern life. “Individualistic syncretistic religiosity” offers a model for
cosmopolitanism because of the inclusive openness of individuals towards a variety of
faiths, which they view as enriching rather than threatening (Beck 2010: 43).
Following this line of thought, Beck argues that world religions must become
“impure” and individualistic by rising above the universalisation of their own truth
claims.
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Fuchs states that individualisation as a social phenomena has to exhibit
religious agency which is evident in the ways actors view themselves and their
practices (Fuchs 2015). He argues that ideas of individualisation have the ability to
capture the social imagination shared by groups of individuals. This is how ideas
develop into a social force (Fuchs 2015). The concept of social imaginaries was
proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1987, 1997), and after him by Charles Taylor
(2002). This concept references the unspoken nature of the basic meanings that people
share. These meanings include underlying suppositions about social existence, values
and norms and as well as the conclusions of individual and social life (Castoriadis
1997). These are frequently expressed through stories, images, legends and are not
merely formulated in theoretical terms (Taylor 2002 in Fuchs 2015). Individualisation
can be seen in two ways. Firstly, individualisation can be understood as being
introduced through approaches and attitudes that social actors bring to the religious
sphere. This view sees processes of individualisation via the human position in
regards to God. These expressions can open dialogue and according to Fuchs, “thus
call aspects of existing religious traditions and imaginaries into question” (Fuchs
2015: 334). On the other hand, individualisation can also relate to ideas and notions
emerging from existing religious thought and practice. In this case individualisation
can be viewed as an outcome of new contextual understandings of religious texts or
traditions. This is especially the case for religions that already place responsibility on
individuals and emphasise the importance of individual commitment (Fuchs 2015).
Fuchs argues that both dimensions of individualisation may jointly reinforce each
other as their interaction creates new dynamics of examination and analysis and a
reconfiguration of social practices via the social imagination (Fuchs 2015).
Fuchs’ approach leads to the discovery of a variety of forms and modes of
individualisation. These include forms of self-realisation, self-transcendence, self-
affirmation, self-searching, and self-surrender. As well as forms of inwardness, of
individual responsibility for moral decision-making, rebellious selves, radical
skepticism, self-transformation, and of love of God (Fuchs 2015). Frequently
individualisation embodies an effort by social actors to contest circumstances that
limit them with regard to their spiritual and political wants and needs, their inclusion
and participation in communal life, or their search for self-realisation. Tensions
present in highly structured and ritualised religions seem to contribute to many
instances of individualisation (Fuchs 2015). Fuchs also suggests that the process of
44
individualisation may accelerate religious change (Fuchs 2015). He argues that “the
individualising moment” (Fuchs 2015: 339) can be located within the religious
message itself, in the intellectual freedom of the person who critically examines the
religious options available and also in the individual search for truth. It can also be
present in the liberation someone feels being freed from a restrictive religious
formation, or the joining of different elements of various religious traditions. Fuchs
points out that philosophical thought leaves a question unanswered,
to what extent do the conceptualisations of self that emerge in a particular
cultural and historical context reflect and/or inform the social ideas of the
time during which they have been developed and stand for societal
processes of individualisation (Fuchs 2015: 341).
Cases of individualisation cannot be viewed on their own. It requires investigation of
respective cultural, social and historical contexts of processes of individualisation,
including the opponents thereof. Fuchs points out that it is important not to see such
processes as “developmental tendencies”, or a “positive process category” typical of
“Ulrich Beck's thesis on individualisation as part of the current phase of reflexive
modernization” (Fuchs 2015: 336-337).
In terms of Islam, some argue that religious individualisation and the
displacement of religious authority are creating the, “liberalization and modernization
of Islam” and the emergence of a “progressive Islam” in Europe (Mandaville, 2001).
Others however assert that the current situation illustrates the relative stability of
Islamic dogmas and not a liberalisation of Islam (Wiktorowicz 2005; Pedziwiatr
2011). Muslim terrorism developed as a global risk while cosmopolitanisation and
individualisation are understood by some as possessing the possibility to build a
peaceful world society (Beck 2010: 107). Both cosmopolitanisation and
individualisation relate to the deterritorialisation and denationalisation of religion.
Specifically, individualisation connects to the idea that God is no longer the collective
God of tradition, but a chosen personal God grounded in individual faith (Wilke
2015).
In research by Pedziwiatr (2011), young British and Belgian Muslims
corroborate the central theses of Giddens (1991), Bauman (1995), Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2002) and other sociologists who theorise around ‘ready-made’ and ‘do-
45
it-yourself’ identities. They agree that ‘ready-made’ identities are a thing of the past
and that we now exist in a world of ‘do-it-yourself’ identities, even when referring to
religious identities (Pedziwiatr 2011). Luckmann (1973) argued decades ago that
sociologists were mistaken if they attempted to describe personal religiosity by
considering similarities with typical practices and beliefs of official religions. He
maintained that official religious teachings and practices did not incorporate all
resources available to individuals to construct their personal beliefs and rituals.
TacticalandStrategicReligion
Along with everyday and individualised religion, tactical and strategic religion can
also be useful in understanding progressive Islam. Linda Woodhead (2016) argues
that ‘religion’ is not a neutral category but sees it as a socially constructed
phenomenon with a propensity to mirror and strengthen dominant interests, as well as
having the ability to create alternatives to them. The notion of ‘everyday’ or ‘lived’
religion can be useful in examining this category by recognising its preference
towards socially established, elite and state based forms of religion and instead focus
on methods which seek to understand previously invisible or unexamined dimensions
of religious life (Woodhead 2016). In order to strengthen and increase its power
strategic religion is continuously involved in processes to guard and demarcate its
sacred spaces. It is invested in creating sacred places and spaces and objects which are
clearly delineated from the mundane or the profane; churches, mosques, sacraments,
scriptures, temples, and so on (Knott 2005). Generally speaking, the privileges of
dominant ethnicity, whiteness, masculinity, heterosexuality, able-bodiedness and class
reinforce and are reinforced by strategic religion: “Strategic religion typically seeks
symbiotic alliances with political power and social elites, but pays the price of
independence” (Woodhead 2016: 18).
Tactical religion on the other hand “carries out” forms of the sacred and
enjoys the portable - books, amulets, prayer mats, beards, turbans, headscarves and
fortune cards (Woodhead 2016: 16). In tactical religion individuals have the freedom
to combine and practice parts of strategic religion alongside other beliefs, practices,
sacred objects and rituals following the needs and desires of their own lives rather
than the reason of the elites (Woodhead 2016). Tactical religion does not always shun
the spaces and coordinated attractions of the strategic but it does try to enter them, to
46
appropriate characteristics of them, to put them to new uses, to gain some sort of
control of them and also enhance them (Woodhead 2016). More simply, Michel de
Certeau identifies strategy as the privilege of the powerful. Conversely, de Certeau
says a tactic “is determined by the absence of power just as a strategy is organized by
the postulation of power” (1984: 38).
To provide an example of this, second and third generation Muslims living in
Western countries are sometimes skeptical of the authority of mosque leaders and
parents. Instead they look directly to the Qur’an, which they interpret themselves, or
do so in discussion with likeminded peers. The principal intention here is a tactical
one: to appropriate religious truths in ways that match the identities and lives of
specific individuals. This development is labeled as an ‘individualisation’ of Islam
(Fadil 2005; Peter 2006). However, it cannot be denied that there have also been some
‘strategic’ developments in Islam (Woodhead 2016: 18), which are often discernable
as efforts to purify the religion by offering a single ‘true’ interpretation of the law and
scripture along with deriving from these preferred behaviours. In doing this they also
restrict the boundaries of belonging and within these limits they also tightly control
access to leadership (Husain 2009). This resistance to pluralism, diversity and a
narrowed criterion for belonging increases the need for a new cosmopolitan way of
viewing religion.
Cosmopolitanism
Of recent times there has been a great deal of scholarly debate concerning who or
what can correctly be identified as ‘cosmopolitan’ (Roudometof, 2005). The
‘empirical turn’ or sociological turn in analyses of cosmopolitanism has involved both
qualitative (Szerszynski and Urry, 2006; Skrbis and Woodward, 2007; and West
2008) and quantitative approaches (Phillips and Smith, 2008; Haller and Roudometof,
2010), all with their own distinguishing operationalisations of the concept.
David Inglis describes cosmopolitanism as having, “A focus on ‘openness’ to
‘otherness’” and he argues that “a defining feature of cosmopolitanism is a key
concern running through most of the empirical literature” (2000: 102). The area of
cosmopolitanism studies currently incorporates a number of particular bodies of
literature. According to Inglis these are split into four categories: (1) the historical; (2)
the political-philosophical; (3) the political-scientific; (4) the sociological and
47
anthropological. The latter category encompasses, “‘really existing’ (Robbins, 1992)
forms of cosmopolitan orientations and practices among concrete individuals and
groups” (2000: 101). Pratap Mehta also echoes this stating, “these proliferating
cosmopolitanisms have many valences—aesthetic, existential, moral and legal—but
at the very least they express a “suspicion of closed horizons . . . a willingness to
engage with the ‘Other’ . . . [and] an aesthetic and intellectual openness to diverse
strivings, cultures, and forms of reasoning” (2000: 621–22). Anthony Appiah
simplifies cosmopolitanism as, “Everybody matters: that is our central idea” (Appiah
2006: 144). Cosmopolitanism now includes a wider range of concerns such as justice,
social responsibility, ethics, and cultural affiliations, “all considered within social
conditions of complex globality” (Ossewaarde 2007 and Roudometof 2005 cited in
Inglis 2012: 100). Cosmopolitanism views all human beings as belonging to one
community, regardless of nationality or faith, based on a shared morality (Appiah
2006). Anthony Appiah defines cosmopolitans as “moral universalists” who believe
that all humans, and not merely fellow-citizens, come under uniform ethical
principles. (Appiah 2006: 21). The divisions between nations, cultures or societies are
therefore seen as ethically immaterial.
Justin Neuman argues that cosmopolitanism can provide a wider approach to
diversity, including religious diversity. He defines religious cosmopolitanism as,
“…an ethos of individual engagement and voluntary affiliation, one that aims to
cultivate inter-epistemic fluencies, establish systems of mediation, and explore spaces
of encounter that promote mutual recognition, respect, and nonviolent contention”
(2011: 145). Interestingly, he differentiates concepts like pluralism from
cosmopolitanism while Appiah (2006) and others link the two. Neuman explains that
pluralism and also interfaith dialogue emphasise the equal truth of all religions and,
“uphold tolerant coexistence while tending to reify existing identity formations”
(2011: 145). However, he explains that cosmopolitanism suggests a distinctive
approach, “one that highlights affinities, decision making, and imaginative
investment” (2011: 145). So in other words, pluralism concerns itself more with
universal truth claims while cosmopolitanism focuses on connections and
commonalities.
Ulrich Beck argues that because global risks reach across borders there is a
growing need for global society to collectively assess risks and their causes thus
minimising future risks and contending with existing risks (Halafoff 2010). Following
48
this line of thought, the cosmopolitan condition is predominantly one of “public
security” established on the principle of “cosmopolitan rights” that Kant described as
equal rights for all (Kant 1983 in Halafoff 2010: 718). Beck explained
cosmopolitanism as “re-education... in openness to the world,” with an emphasis on
equal rights and respect for diversity, and equated a cosmopolitan outlook with a
global “sense of boundarylessness and reflexivity”. (Halafoff 2010: 720). Beck argues
that an increased awareness of global risks creates, “an unavoidable pressure to
cooperate” and “serves as a source of new commonalities and interaction networks”
(Beck 2006 in Halafoff 2010: 720). “Cosmopolitan competence,” states Beck, thereby
rests on “the art of translation and bridge-building” between multiple diverse actors
(Beck 2006 in Halafoff: 720).
Munck contends that social movements that work through cosmopolitan ideas
are united in their commitment to social inclusion and of course their rejection of
social exclusion (Halafoff 2010). Munck (2005) also offers a critique of
cosmopolitanism. Although cosmopolitanism seems like an appealing substitute to all
forms of racism, xenophobia and discrimination, cosmopolitanism is permeated with
ideals of Western liberalism and “therefore are constrained in their ability to offer a
planetary solution” (in Halafoff 2010: 722). Munck, making use of a Foucauldian
argument, suggests that “contesting globalization and social exclusion requires
building an epistemology more in tune with postcolonial, gender and race inequalities
and perspectives” (Munck in Halafoff 2010: 722).
Following on from this Ulrich Beck hypothesises that two distinct faith types
are present in the second modernity.27 The first is a closed hierarchical system based
on inflexible doctrines and the second is an open model that is motivated by personal
choice and individualisation. Beck argues that the use of exclusionary labels like
‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’ within monotheistic religions is socially divisive.
Despite asserting that they strive for peace, by highlighting difference monotheistic
religions find themselves “suspended between tolerance and violence” (Beck 2010:
51). However, Beck (2010: 62) nonetheless believes that the individualisation of
religion is a tool that can encourage peace and social harmony (Mythen 2013: 116).
Beck’s cosmopolitan imagination posits that just as employment histories, intimate
27 Second modernity is Beck’s word for the period after modernity. Modernity collapsed agricultural society in favour of industrial society. Second modernity transforms industrial society into a new and more reflexive network society or information society. Second modernity is marked by a new awareness of the risks — risks to all forms of life, plant, animal and human — created by the success of modernity.
49
relationships and family are subject to individual decisions and choices, so religion
can also become a part of what he terms the ‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010: 49).
IslamandCosmopolitanism
Inglis cites Cicero (1972: 155, 189) to point out that religion may contain a blueprint
for global moral concern, “The gods treat the world ‘as though it were a single state
or city’, and thus ‘have care for all men [sic] everywhere, on every shore and in every
country of the earth, however far from our own homeland”. Inglis explains, “Thus the
object of moral concern is the ‘whole world’, and all persons possessed of reason are
members of a world-spanning moral entity” (2012: 104). In this sense religion is not
seen as divisive force but a uniting force. Specifically on Islam Tariq Ramadan
argued that European Muslims do not inhabit “Dar al-Harb (Abode of War) but rather
Dar al-Shahadah (Abode of Testimony), a “space of responsibility” requiring
“permanent involvement and an infinite self-sacrifice for social justice, the welfare of
mankind, the environment… good and equity through human brotherhood”…”
(Ramadan in Euben 2013: 325). Here Ramadan presents a view of ideal Islamic
practice that could be considered to fit with a cosmopolitan worldview.
Since the year 2000 and more significantly since 2012 quite a number of
works have been devoted to various forms of Muslim cosmopolitanism (Diouf &
Rendall 2000; Zaman 2005; Hanley 2008; Marsden 2008; Karim 2011; Bhimji 2012;
Mihelj; Leichtman, & Schulz 2012; Eisenlohr 2012; Schielke 2012; Hoesterey 2012;
Hill 2012; Euben 2013; Davids 2014). There has been a focus on Muslim
cosmopolitanism in connection with fashion (Tarlo 2007 and Buggenhagen 2012).
However, these works do not adequately describe a lived cosmopolitanism that goes
further than shallow engagements with diverse types of fashion or toleration of the
‘other’.
Far from applying notions of cosmopolitanism, research on Muslim
communities and societies has often attributed division to adversarial groupings,
particularly of those belonging to the East and West, or according to notions of
tradition and modernity. It was only in 1995 that David Hollinger linked
cosmopolitanism to religion, making it a noteworthy term for analysing the limits of
pluralism and multiculturalism (Lawrence 2001). Vertovec and Cohen (2003) then
argued that increased travel and immigration as a result of globalisation, have led to a
50
greater acceptance of multiculturalism and general diversity, contributing to the
existence of a type of “everyday” or “ordinary” lived cosmopolitanism. The
‘empirical turn’ or sociological turn in analyses of cosmopolitanism has involved
qualitative studies of ‘real’ cosmopolitanisms (e.g. Szerszynski and Urry 2006; Skrbis
and Woodward, 2007; and West 2008).
Roxanne Euben argues that the Islamic emphasis on the search for knowledge,
even if that search should take one to China, could be considered a cosmopolitan
directive. She also highlights the emphasis on the diversity of the Qur’an as a proof of
the cosmopolitan nature of Islam, “It also includes the emphasis on the moral
significance of the diversity of mankind in the Qur’an exemplified in verse 5:48–
49…” (2013: 315). However, both of these examples could also be considered under
the banner of pluralism and this verse has also been cited to indicate the pluralist
potential of the Qur’an.
Appiah includes pluralism within the cosmopolitan commitment:
One distinctively cosmopolitan commitment is to pluralism.
Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living by and that
you cannot live by all of them. So we hope and expect that different
people and different societies will embody different values (Appiah in
Neuman 2011: 150).
Neuman explains that pluralism and interfaith dialogue emphasise the equal truth of
all religions and, “uphold tolerant coexistence while tending to reify existing identity
formations” (2011: 145). However, he explains that cosmopolitanism suggests a
distinctive approach, “one that highlights affinities, decision making, and imaginative
investment” (2011: 145). For the purpose of this chapter it will be assumed that
pluralism is a category within cosmopolitanism.
Although the progressive Islamic movement has not set out to create an
‘Islamic revolution’ (see Chapter Eight) it does seek to create a wider sense of social
justice through inclusion and the attempted abolition of forms of social stratification
like class, nationalism, racism and sexism. It could be argued that progressive Islam is
developing into a plural and cosmopolitan Islam. The pluralistic and equality based
51
ideals of progressive Islam lend themselves well to the notion of cosmopolitanism as
will be demonstrated in the data chapters.
CosmopolitanismandtheIndividualisationofReligion
It is not possible to examine cosmopolitanism in connection to religion without
consulting the work of Ulrich Beck. In A God of One’s Own he positions himself as a
“sociological secularist” (Mythen 2013: 115) and aims to assess the impacts of
individualisation on religious beliefs in order to consider the capacity for peace within
religion. The noun ‘religion’ is excluded from his argument and he instead uses the
adjective ‘religious’ which is able to produce ‘both/and’ categories instead of
‘either/or’ categories (Beck 2010: 49). By avoiding the rigidity of monotheistic faiths
Beck considers that individuals are occupied in the creation of multiple belief
structures (Mythen 2013: 115). Beck explains that a ‘God of one’s own’ does not
refer to a God who has been allocated to us by our families. He is not the collective
God venerated by members of major religions. “He is a God one can choose, a
personal God who has a firm place and a clear voice in the intimate heart of one’s
own life” (Beck, 2010: 139).
Beck argues that the use of exclusionary labels like ‘believers’ and ‘non-
believers’ within monotheistic religions is socially divisive. Despite asserting that
they work for harmony, by highlighting difference monotheistic religions find
themselves “suspended between tolerance and violence” (Beck 2010: 51). However,
he believes that the individualisation of religion is a tool that can encourage peace and
social harmony (2010: 62). While some religious leaders are supporting isolationism,
religious practices are being restated by individuals from a grassroots level as they
pursue religious solutions that correlate well with their individual spiritual compasses.
Instead of clinging to family traditions, modern individuals are revealed to be the
inventors of personalised “alternatives that meld biographical experiences” and faith
values (Beck 2010: 50). Beck explains that, “the age of individualization is also the
age of do-it-yourself religions” (Beck, 2010: 49). Beck builds on Durkheim’s (1912)
work and highlights the unifying nature of religious rituals and the ways that the
“sacredness of religion” can be reassigned to the “sacredness of the individual”
(Mythen 2013: 120).
52
Instead of diminishing, Beck sees religion as establishing itself in new and
complex ways and also as being more closely aligned with self-identities (Mythen
2013: 118). However, he does see a conflict between those that advocate for a single
obligation to one faith and those who desire to create their own gods, “the door that
opens here swings in two opposing directions: a fundamentalist anti-modernity on the
one hand, postmodern religious diversity on the other” (Beck 2010: 133). In
opposition to the dogmatic views promoted by monotheistic religious leaders,
religious cosmopolitanism recognises ‘non-believers’ who resist doctrine and
participate in the assembly of multiple gods. Reclassifying religion like this permits
Beck to ask controversial questions that bypass the disputes over religious ‘truths’
(Mythen 2013: 119).
The dynamics of cosmopolitanism, globalisation and individualisation are said
to disturb conventional formations of sociality and insert new configurations. The
choices driven by individualisation are strengthened by the mobility of people and the
ease of sharing information and ideas, which Beck argues cultivates
cosmopolitanisation, “as individuals are forced to confront preconceptions of others
and develop global sensibilities” (Beck, 2010: 48). He remains steadfast that the
individualisation of religion should not be conflated with the privatisation or
marketisation of religion. Instead individuals are uninhibited and able to establish
links between religious ethics and non-religious based morals, encouraging a
cosmopolitan perspective that opposes prejudice and violence, where believers are
receptive and accepting of the cultural and religious outlooks of others.
Nevertheless, religious leaders seek to protect the veracity of particular
religious narratives in order to maintain the traditions and also to protect their
privileges. Mythen rightly points out that although the individualisation of religion
may be a bottom-up progression, it still requires ultimate validation from religious
leaders, from the top down (2013: 121). Here Beck’s route to peace is in direct
contradiction to the universalist ambitions of Christianity or Islam. While he
acknowledges that distinctive modernities will construct ‘multiple secularisations’
(Beck 2010: 39), the focus is on the West and also largely on Christianity. Although
Beck (2010: 158) believes that a “universal world ethos” is foreseeable, Mythen
indicates that history suggests otherwise, “the uncomfortable counsel of history
indicates that religious outsiders have acted as chastised folk devils, reinforcing the
identity of the ‘us’ and pushing ‘them’ to the margins” (2013: 123).
53
In Beck’s cosmopolitan imagination he posits that just as employment
histories, intimate relationships and family are subject to individual decisions and
choices, religion also becomes a part of what he terms the ‘do-it-yourself’ identity
(Beck 2010: 49). Nevertheless religion retains an incomparable importance in which
the conservation of tradition is privileged (Mythen 2013: 123). There are opposing
ways of viewing people’s religious identity needs. Some will remain atheists or
agnostics, while the religious will continue to attempt to preserve their religious
‘truth’. Conversely, by surrendering to the supremacy and all-knowing nature of one
God the individual is briefly released from the weight of choice (Mythen 2013: 123).
In connection with Beck’s cosmopolitan view of religion, the potential of the
individualisation of religion is focused on the advancement of respect, reciprocity,
and compassion (Mythen 2013: 124). However, the continuance of historical clashes
between Muslims and Jews, or Hindus and Sikhs directly contradicts the future
predicted by Beck. It should be noted that these conflicts are not exclusively religious
and are also embedded in territory, culture, caste, and power.
ReligiousPluralism
Pluralism can be defined as an active engagement with diversity that is not merely
tolerant but seeks an energetic participation in and understanding of difference
through dialogue (Eck in Safi 2003a: 252). In terms of religious pluralism James
Beckford sets out four categories of religious pluralism:
(a) Empirical religious diversity.
(b) Normative ideas about the positive value of religious diversity.
(c) The frameworks of public policy, law and social practices which recognize,
accommodate, regulate and facilitate religious diversity.
(d) The social relational contexts of everyday interactions between individuals
and groups in settings where religious differences are considered relevant
(2014: 21).
For the purposes of this research Beckford’s classification of types of empirical
diversity is particularly helpful:
(i) First, religious diversity refers to the variety of distinct faith traditions to
be found in any region, country or continent.
54
(ii) Second, diversity within distinct faith traditions has long been a feature of
all religions.
(iii) Third, individual religious believers and practitioners differ in terms of (a)
the extent to which their beliefs, practices and emotions reflect different
faith traditions and (b) the extent to which they accord salience to religion
at different stages of their life and in different situations (2014: 21).
Although religious diversity is often viewed as a beneficial and noble state (Beckford
2003) scholars point out that pluralism may cause its own set of problems. According
to religious historian W.C. Smith, “religious diversity poses a general human problem
because it disrupts community” (Smith 2001: 351). As I will argue in Chapter Eight it
would appear that religious diversity or some level of pluralism helps to create and
sustain progressive Muslim communities. It should also be noted that pluralism
receives strong criticism from at least three sources. Firstly, regarding racism and
intolerance. Secondly, from feminists who object to religion on the basis that all
religions discriminate against women. Lastly, it is critiqued from a philosophical
stance regarding the possible reifying and essentialising of religious and ethnic
categories (Beckford 2003: 101). It is also important to emphasise the issues with
speaking about pluralism in a generic sense and instead work with the specific
categories outlined above. Beckford also reminds us that the automatic positive value
often afforded to pluralism can make the “inequalities and power struggles” of
religious life ambiguous (Beckford 2003: 101). Finally, it must be kept in mind that
the definition of pluralism is highly contextual with different models of pluralism
present in different parts of the world.
IslamandPluralism
Pluralism as an empirical category and a normative idea is not viewed as something
foreign to Islam. Scholars have outlined several places where the Qur’an advocates
for a pluralist position regarding the three major Abrahamic religions only. Amir
Hussein explains, “There is an understanding in the Qur’an of a peaceful co-existence
that comes from a common revelation and common God” (Hussein in Safi 2003:
246). This quote could also be understood to point to a shared morality vis-à-vis
cosmopolitanism. “If God had so willed, God would have made you one community,
55
but God wanted to test you through that which God has given you, so race to do good:
you will all return to God and God will make clear to you the matters you differed
about” (Qur’an 5:48, excerpt).
Hussein turns back to the Qur’an in order to call Muslims to engage in two
way dialogue with other religious groups, “It is important for progressive Muslims
and Muslim communities in general to return the pluralistic vision of the Qur’an, and
establish cooperative relations with other religious communities, particularly at this
time” (Hussein in Safi 2003: 267). Here he refers to the current situation of Muslims
in the West (particularly after September 11) who feel the need to counter extreme
interpretations of Islam with interfaith dialogue. In the writing of many progressive
Muslims we see a call for the denunciation of a dialectical conception of the Other.
Farish Noor clarifies, “We call for the rejection of a dialectical approach to the Other
which can only frame the other in negative terms as an enemy (or potential enemy)
that has to be greeted with suspicion and fear” (Noor in Safi 2003: 332).
Adis Duderija reiterates that writings on progressive Muslim thought place a
strong emphasis on religious and ethnic pluralism, “…PM [progressive Muslim]
thought places a strong emphasis on irreducible religious and ethnic pluralism where
plurality of interpretations of religious texts and religious experiences is considered a
norm and the Will of the Creator of all humanity” (Duderija 2010b: 5). Duderija also
provides examples of religious freedom in Muslim history that point to an indigenous
Muslim pluralism. He cites documents such as: The Constitution of Medina; the
Prophet’s pact with the Christians of Najran (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad granting a
Charter of Privileges to the monks of St. Catherine Monastery in Mt. Sinai); the Pact
of Umar with the Christians of Syria (Duderija 2013: 77). Progressive Muslims
exhibit two types of pluralism: Islamic and Western liberal. Progressive Muslims
from this research draw the majority of their plural ideas from a Western liberal
model (see Chapter Six).
ChapterSummary
Broadly, this chapter discussed the processes of secularisation and modernity, tactical
and strategic religion, cosmopolitanism, pluralism and the individualisation of
religion, everyday and lived religion. This thesis aims to test the levels of
individualisation present in progressive Muslim communities and the extent to which
56
their practice can be described as an individualised form of Islam. It examines
everyday and lived religions which entail viewing religious practices and beliefs in a
different way - focusing on experiences and not always on properties equated with
traditional religions:
People talk about going to the doctor and pray for healing, exchange
babysitting services and thank God for their families, pray over the
injustices in the world and mobilize petition drives. That mixture is part of
what makes those conversations portable and powerful. It is not just that
people take religion into everyday life; they also take everyday life into
religion (Ammerman 2014: 201).
Everyday religion also links to theories of individualisation and to strategic and
tactical religions. These theories help to explain progressive Islam which includes
preferences for inclusivity, pluralism, personal morals and autonomy and an emphasis
on participation. Individualisation is an important component in everyday religion.
Individualisation can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, individualisation can be
understood as being introduced by social actors to the religious sphere. This view sees
processes of individualisation via the human position in regards to God (Fuchs 2015).
Conversely, individualisation can also relate to ideas emerging from existing religious
thought and practice.
This chapter has provided a theoretical background to the individualisation of
religion, pluralism, cosmopolitanism, secularisation and modernity, lived and
everyday religion, and tactical and strategic religion which will help to unpack the
data in the analysis. The next chapter will outline the methodology and research
design of this thesis.
57
ChapterFour:Methodology
ResearchDesign
This research takes a micro-qualitative approach and was conducted via fieldwork in
the United States (US) and worldwide via Skype, and is comprised of descriptive
ethnographic observations and interviews. North America was chosen as the most
suitable physical research location as it contains particularly visible groupings of
progressive Muslims. Participants were sourced through contact with progressive
Muslim associations such as Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) in Los Angeles,
New York and Washington D.C., and Qur’an Discussion Group (QDG) in New York
as well as El-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) in Canada. Founding and former members
of these progressive movements were interviewed and also included in the research as
case studies.
The US and Canada were selected as a research location due to their high
proliferation of progressive Muslim communities, movements and mosques. The
ability to compare different movements and groupings was invaluable during the data
gathering process. Communities in North America present a particularly interesting
case and allow for exploration of issues of religious pluralism, secularism, and the
impact of minority status on religious teachings and practice. Unfortunately the
absence of any well established progressive movements prevent this research from
being carried out in Australia. Due to the strong online presence of progressive Islam
across the globe a substantial portion of the research for this thesis was undertaken
online.
InternetBasedSocialResearch
Progressive Muslims utilise the Internet to network, disseminate information, and
organise. Because of this it is important to understand the ways in which religion
functions online and more specifically to analyse the web-presence of progressive
Muslim groups. Religion functions online in a number of ways. Online communities
are slowly restructuring and reforming religious leadership (Campbell 2007). As a
primary mechanism of globalisation, the Internet spreads new social, political and
cultural values across geographical boundaries. The boundaries between physical
58
locations are no longer as important; the concepts of ‘here’ and ‘there’ become
blurred and eroded. The Internet permits a wider range of voices to enter the public
sphere and to articulate different interpretations of religion. Participation online can
be identity-less allowing people to express their views anonymously. Futhermore,
webmasters and online moderators have started to behave as new vehicles of
authority. A movement towards change of religious establishments in the offline
world is possible. Campbell reports that, “The Internet plays a role in the shaping of
religious identity and construction of meaning online, in ways that may influence
offline religiosity” (2005: 313). Through electronic text, ideas can be disseminated
among thousands, if not millions, of people without the need for face-to-face contact.
The Internet provides a democratising space especially where religion is concerned.
Many have categorised the Internet as a democratic space. This statement however
needs some qualification. The Internet cannot be considered truly democratic because
a large percentage of the world’s citizens do not have Internet access. A more useful
term may be anarchic. Online lay people can act as religious leaders or authorities.
They are able to disseminate their ideas without the restrictions of location or usual
conventions of authority.
There are two distinctions regarding the way religion can be viewed on the
Internet, “religion on cyberspace” and “religion in cyberspace” (Karaflogka 2002:
284). Karaflogka describes the two categories as being firstly, information uploaded
by a religious group that also exists in the offline world, and secondly, “religious,
spiritual or metaphysical expression which is created in and exists exclusively in
cyberspace” (Karaflogka 2002: 285). For alternative religious movements, the
Internet is not just a tool, but also a defining feature that affects the organisation of
religious practice. It could be argued that the Internet is beginning to decentralise
religion with the undermining of traditional forms of religious authority through
providing lay people with a platform to espouse their own religious interpretations.
This is exemplified through the web presence of MPV. In their main Facebook group
alone they have over 18,000 members as of August 2016 This does not include those
members who are only active in the groups designated for each specific chapter.
Through their online presence they have succeeded in bypassing many official
channels for disseminating religious information such as publication companies or
established religious institutions. Their online presence is not isolated from reality or
self-contained. The online presence of both MPV and ETJC work to inform and
59
organise their offline activities. This is illustrated through the organisation’s crowd
funding campaign, “Allah Loves Us All” that raised funds to run an advertisement on
buses in San Francisco and New York City proclaiming, “Whether gay or straight,
Allah loves us all”.
Gary Bunt, in his book iMuslims (2009) has questioned if there is in fact a
digital umma (Muslim community). If so, are all members active online participants?
Do Islamic online environments speak to a loss of the traditional centres of
scholarship? In what ways do cyber Islamic environments reflect tradition, orthodoxy,
and individualism? These questions prompt one to ask who can speak on behalf of, or
about, Islam. The use of the Internet is initiating the rise of new Islamic authority
figures. Online discussion boards are serving as “powerful mechanisms for generating
new understandings or formulations of old problems and/or new situations or
problems facing the umma” (el-Nawawy and Khamis 2009: 116). In this sense
moderators and webmasters are the new authority figures. Perhaps the Internet is able
to destroy some hierarchical positions thus creating an equalising environment. In the
data participants indicated that they seek information about Islam on the Internet and
use this to bypass traditional methods of learning (see Chapters Six and Eight).
The Internet presence of MPV has features that are not usually available
through offline religion or normative Islam. It offers online worship via Skype and the
opportunity to network with other like-minded people from all over the world. MPV
heavily utilises social media (crowd funding, Meetup.com, Facebook, YouTube) to
conduct outreach. They also offer international marriage services for LGBTQ
Muslims and Muslim women wishing to marry non-Muslim men. It proposes an
alternate Islamic theology and bypasses traditional ways of spreading Islamic
knowledge. This translates to regular offline interactions in their worship spaces and
also at the yearly LGBTQ retreat. Chama describes logging into the Internet as a
transformative act. “It is a vast cathedral of the mind, a place where ideas about God
and religion can resonate, where faith can be shaped and defined by a collective
spirit” (Chama in Campbell 2005: 311).
Investigator
I became interested in progressive Islam through news articles (Kaleem 2011, 2012;
Catholic Online 2011, Huus 2011, Kiley 2012). There suddenly seemed to be
60
considerable attention being paid to progressive Muslim groups and organisations in
North America, particularly in the U.S. These organisations were putting into practice
some of the ideas advanced by a number of progressive scholars (Safi 2003; Esack
1997 and 2003; Moosa 2003 and 2007) and as a sociologist that was particularly
interesting for me.
In terms of my own religious beliefs and upbringing I was dedicated as a
Baptist as an infant following my father’s family’s religion and traditions. My parents
are both religious Christians and have attended an Anglican church regularly for the
last twenty-six years. At my father’s insistence I attended a Christian school for some
of my primary school years and in high school from years seven to ten. I resented the
pressure that was placed on me by both my family and school to be ‘saved’ and
stopped attending church when I was sixteen years old. I then completed the rest of
my high school education at a public school. During this time I was introduced to
Islam and converted at the age of eighteen, just three months after September 11.
Before embarking on this research I did not know any members of progressive
Muslim groups and knew very little about their practices and organisation. At the
outset of this research I thought that my beliefs were possibly very close to those
belonging to these organisations, at the completion of this research I recognise that
although I share some values with progressive Muslims I’m not sure that I can call
myself one of them. During the completion of this research project my own religious
commitment has diminished and borders on agnosticism. I can’t remember the last
time I entered a mosque for worship purposes. Strangely I socially still identify as a
Muslim and see myself as part of the Muslim community.
By declaring my diminishing religious belief, disinterest, or agnosticism I am
aware that this may place me as an ‘outsider’ which some would consider problematic
in terms of studying a minority religion in the U.S. like Islam. However, Jose Ignacio
Cabezon in the edited volume titled Identity and the Politics of Scholarship in the
Study of Religion (2004), insists that while religious, political and individual identities
shape research agendas, particular religious identities should not be the deciding
factor for the qualification of a scholar to study a particular religion. In other words,
“religious or other self-identification does not privilege or authorise scholarship”
(Cabezon 2004: 50). Muslims are not more capable of doing research on Islam.
Research on Islam has become more politicised than research on any other religion,
and, therefore attracts public scrutiny and adds an amplified importance to the
61
insider/outsider researcher debate (Cabezon 2004). This in combination with a focus
on social equality and gender issues puts scholars at the centre of several
methodological debates.
What Gisela Webb, on the other hand, argues in the introduction to Windows
of Faith, fittingly titled “May Muslim women speak for themselves, please?” could be
taken as a response and simultaneous challenge this perspective (Webb 2000). Webb
writes: “These women’s writings can be seen as the product of the gradual but steady
emergence of a movement among many Muslim women who insist that their religious
self-identity not be dismissed” (Webb 2000: xi). The female scholars featured in
Webb’s inquiry discuss their identities as “confessional scholars” and the implications
for their “scholarly authority” in an assortment of ways. For them and progressive
Muslims alike, Muslim identity is an important gatekeeper to doing research on
Muslim communities.
Broadly speaking, according to Noble Ross Reat, information regarding
religions can be transmitted through four channels: insider-to-insider, insider-to-
outsider, outsider-to-outsider, and outsider-to-insider (Ross Reat 1983). He notes that
no single channel of understanding is sufficient to create an understanding of religion
in the general, or an understanding of a single religion. Alternatively, he argues that
one must be able to participate in each of the channels of information mentioned
above (Ross Reat 1983). He also interrogates the terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ with
reference to religion. While one might be an insider in terms of a broader affiliation
with Islam one might also be an outsider by not belong to a particular type of Islam.
For example, being Muslim but not a progressive Muslim or an Isma’li Muslim. In
this case, one is both an insider and an outsider depending on the broadness of the
designated insider category. Finally, if one were to pursue this paradigm to its furthest
extent to also include non-religious worldviews, everyone will be an insider at some
point (Ross Reat 1983).
As the investigator, being a Muslim convert, I was able to establish a sense of
trust and affinity with the informants. I also had an understanding of the social norms
and could identify with some of the stereotypical behaviour of Muslims, particularly
the norms of progressive Muslims, to assist access. It was also very useful that I was
familiar with the meaning of Islamic terms in Arabic so that participants did not have
to keep explaining themselves. I believe it was also an advantage that I do not wear a
hijab (headscarf) and do not look conventionally Muslim. Progressive Muslims seem
62
to be suspicious of religious symbols. On the other hand, I still retained ‘outsider’
(Ross Reat 1983) status because I do not belong to any progressive Muslim
organisations and am not an observant Muslim. This allowed some participants to
comment on certain elements of progressive Islam, the organisations, or Islam
generally, without fear that other members may find out.
DataCollection
During my fieldwork I was a visiting scholar at the Graduate Centre at the City
University of New York and due to this I applied for ethics clearance at both
universities. Data collection was conducted in the United States in 2013 focusing on
specific progressive organisations in New York and Washington D.C., Muslims for
Progressive Values, Qur’an Discussion Group and El-Tawhid Juma Circle in Canada.
Recruitment for interviews was carried out primarily through email and social
media. Participants were recruited through a network sampling technique.
Interestingly, fieldwork recruitment requests were much more successful via
Facebook than via email. This may be due to the participants wishing to be able to
screen the researcher before agreeing to an interview. Through Facebook potential
participants can check the background of the researcher, see their university
affiliations, and view any mutual friendships. Some interviews were carried out via
Skype and telephone to allow participants to contribute regardless of their
geographical location or Internet connection. This also reduced fieldwork costs. As
such this thesis takes a blended ethnography/netnography approach (Kozinets 2012:
110) and uses both face-to-face and online methods to gather data.
Interviews
James Spickard (2007) outlines two types of interviewing. Firstly, a hermeneutic style
of interviewing that seeks to capture people’s own understanding of their lives and to
portray people’s worlds from the inside. This type of interviewing relies on the
participants’ affirmations that they can see themselves in the data (Spickard in
Beckford and Demerath 2007: 130). Its goal is the representation of other people’s
lives (Spickard in Beckford and Demerath 2007: 127). Interviews may also do more
than this; a second type of interviewing outlined by Spickard (2007) seeks to uncover
63
patterns in the interviews that may reveal greater meaning regarding why people think
in a particular way. This type of interviewing seeks more than just an understanding
of the research participant but also aims to explain why people think the way they do.
This thesis takes a semi-hermeneutic approach to interviewing; meaning that while
the interviews seek to ascertain how participants understand their own religious lives,
they also pursue an understanding of why participants think the way they do.
Hermeneutic research enables the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the
researched phenomenon. It emphasises subjective interpretations in the research of
meanings of art, texts, thinking and social phenomena. This research strategy presents
an opposite view to those research strategies, which emphasise objectivity and
independence of interpretation in the formation of knowledge.
Twenty interviews were undertaken, including six with group leaders and
committee members. Interviews were conducted via Skype or face-to-face and tape
recorded to ensure an accurate account of the interviews and transcribed by me. The
interviews were semi-structured and qualitative in nature. The use of semi-structured
interviews provided adequate flexibility to employ diverse approaches with different
participants while still ensuring the same areas of data collection were covered. The
interviews began by asking what Islam means to the participants. In many cases
follow up questions were not required as participants spoke freely about most of the
themes set out in the interview questions. If participants needed prompting a question
would be asked from the list of interview themes (see Appendix B).
OnlineInterviewing
Face-to-face interviewing has become a ‘gold standard’ in terms of validity and rigour
in qualitative research (McCoyd and Kerson, 2006: 390). Online interviews are often
presented as a second choice or substitute when face-to-face interviewing is not
achievable (Deakin and Wakefield 2013: 2). There is little literature on the use of
online synchronous interviews (Deakin and Wakefield 2013: 2) and most of the
literature on Internet research focuses on email interviewing. Literature is also scarce
on using multiple interview techniques in a single research project. Deakin and
Wakefield report that the only difference between face-to-face interviews and Skype
interviews are geographical proximity (2013: 5). Conversely, a major disparity
present between Skype and face-to-face interviews is the ability to determine the
64
location and environment of the participant during the interview (Deakin and
Wakefield 2013: 7).
Skype interviews allow for more flexibility for both the researcher and the
participant. For instance, online interviews can take place in the evening which may
be more convenient for participants in full-time employment (Deakin and Wakefield
2013: 6). However, both work and home can be distracting environments for an
interview. Finding the ideal time and location to conduct the interview relies on the
participant choosing an appropriate location. Interruptions can affect the flow of an
interview and can also impede the participant’s concentration, thus the data collected
may be compromised. Technology also presents some constraints in terms of ‘drop
outs’ where the conversation would have to stop because the video froze or the other
person was unable to hear (Deakin and Wakefield 2013: 9). This occurs more often
when video is used.
In this research a combination of online and face-to-face interviewing were
used. This allowed me to interview participants in a variety of locations. When using
Skype interviewing video was used whenever it was possible. At times using audio
only during interviews improved the quality of the interviews when the Internet
connection was poor. Participants were asked prior to the interview whether they
wanted to use video or just audio. In a few cases where participants did not have an
adequate Internet connection to sustain a Skype conversation questions were asked
through a Skype text chat or email. Other participants did not have access to a
computer so requested a telephone interview. In total I undertook seven Skype
interviews with video, four Skype interviews with audio only, four face-to-face
interviews, three text interviews, and two telephone interviews. A table (Appendix E)
shows the methods of interviewing used with each participant and also records any
connection issues. Only five participants had connection issues, three of those were
recognised before beginning the interview. In only one case did Skype have to be
abandoned for a different method of interviewing (telephone).
IssuesDuringDataCollection
It was originally planned that I would collect data at two sites in the US, New York
City and Washington D.C.. On my first visit to Muslims for Progressive Values in
Washington D.C. the social event I was scheduled to attend was cancelled. The next
65
weekend I planned to join their fortnightly religious service. I arrived at the venue at
the appointed time but after forty minutes no one had arrived. After forty-five minutes
the imam (prayer leader) arrived along with a documentarian who was making a
documentary about his life and work. One other person joined who was a journalist.
The entire class was taken up by a media session including questions from the
journalist and filming and photographing by the documentarian. Following this I
contacted the imam several times for an interview but was ignored. Being unable to
meet congregants to interview or have contact with the imam the possibility of
conducting interviews in D.C. was abandoned. In total only one interview was
collected from the Washington D.C. chapter via Skype after I returned from the US. I
had also hoped to conduct interviews and or observations with the New York
Community of Progressives but after attending several of the events and contacting
the leadership of the organisation it became clear that they were not interested in
participating in the research. It may have been possible to gain access to the group if
there was more time to build trust but due to the fact I was only in the US for two
months there was not enough time for this to occur.
These issues caused me to reconsider the way I was thinking about collecting
data. Due to the common lack of a reliable physical presence of progressive Muslims
in some places it became easier to recruit participants online, as this is one of their
main ways of performing community. People with similar progressive beliefs gather
online on Facebook groups to find and connect with likeminded people. This also
allowed me to interview participants via Skype who were not in my immediate
location, including those from El-Tawhid Juma Circle in Canada and those in other
states in the U.S.
Limitations
As mentioned in the previous section spending only two months in the US was an
impediment to collecting more data. To try and limit this issue I also conducted
interviews on Skype with participants I had met or made contact with while in New
York City. I attended Qur’an Discussion Group meetings, MPV Washington D.C.
chapter gatherings, and the MPV national fundraiser in Washington D.C. I had
originally hoped to collect more interviews, but due to some issues with access
outlined above this was not possible. Also, after twenty interviews were collected data
66
saturation point had been reached. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) found through
their study that involved 60 interviews that theme saturation was achieved after 12
interviews. Meaning that repeated themes and observations were found in the data and
no new findings emerged. Spickard also states that during the last thirty years the
methodologies used in the sociology of religion have experienced some modification
and development. Previously, major studies were developed using large-scale
quantitative survey methodologies. Now most sociologists acknowledge the benefits
of smaller qualitative studies and view them as a regular part of the discipline
(Beckford and Demerath 2007: 21).
It should also be mentioned that due to the unknown, small and often
fluctuating number of members of progressive organisations (reported by group
leaders not to exceed 20 people), that it was impossible to ascertain exactly how many
people are involved in each organisation and chapter. Also, the fact that many
progressive Muslims do not attend a physical worship space makes it difficult to
know how many others congregate online and self-identify as being a progressive
Muslim. As such the data cannot be seen as a representative sample of progressive
Muslims.
TargetOrganisations
The following organisations were selected for research due to their size and proximity
to New York City where I was a visiting scholar at the City University of New York
while I collected data. Some organisations were excluded from this research due to
time and cost constraints and also because some organisations like the New York
Community of Progressives were not interested in taking part because they want to
remain more private about their beliefs. Muslims for Progressive Values and El-
Tawhid Juma Circle are the largest and most established progressive Muslim
organisations in North America and as such will be featured in this thesis.
El-TawhidJumaCircle(ETJC)
El-Tawhid Juma Circle mosques identify themselves as being ‘human positive’. They
begin with the understanding that men and women are equal in all aspects of religious
life and ritual practice regardless of their age, class, race, gender identity, sexual
67
orientation, dis/ability, HIV status or on any other grounds. ETJC started in Toronto
in 2009 in the form of a Toronto Unity Mosque with the intention of creating an
‘inclusive tawhidic’ worship space where diversity would be celebrated. The service
format embodies the notion of ‘shared authority’ and congregation members take
turns in giving the adhan (call to prayer), delivering the sermon and leading the
prayer. The service is accessible worldwide via Skype. ETJC now has locations in
Vancouver, Montreal, London (Canada) and Boston as well as Toronto.
MuslimsforProgressiveValues(MPV)
Muslims for Progressive Values is a progressive Islamic organisation based in the
Unites States. It operates communities and mosques in Washington D.C., Atlanta, Los
Angeles, Chicago, and Columbus in the United States and international chapters in
Canada, Australia, France, The Netherlands, Malaysia, Chile and South Africa. The
worship spaces are referred to as ‘unity mosques’ and are intended to be inclusive
spaces where no party is excluded from participation. The athan (call to prayer) and
khutbah (sermon) can be performed by a male or female and the congregation is
seated and performs prayer without physical gender segregation. Muslims who
identify as LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) and those in
mixed-faith relationships are welcomed and the mosques also offer a marriage
celebrant service. MPV makes for a particularly interesting case study due to its
model of ‘unity mosques’. Making international headlines after the opening of one of
their mosques in Washington D.C. (Kaleem 2005) it appears to be the first of its kind
in the world. Their emphasis on social equality in leadership is integral to this
research.
NewYorkCommunityofProgressives(NYComp)
Founded in 2005 this community of self-identifying progressive Muslims meets
weekly to discuss and build on shared ideals of social and economic justice. NY
Comp encourages critical and dynamic readings of the Qur’an and prevailing Islamic
practices that lead to diverse practices of Islam. As part of their mission statement, the
organisation aims to embrace the concepts of spiritual and physical non-violence and
the ideals of pluralism. This group is particularly meaningful for research as it is not a
68
formal religious community or worship meeting, but a discussion and meet-up group
to converse about issues of relevance to those who seek to align their faith in Islam
with their progressive values and identities.
Qur’anDiscussionGroupManhattan(QDG)
The Qur’an Discussion Group is an activity of the Muslim Reform Movement
Organisation (MRMO) held weekly in both Manhattan and Long Island. The Qur’an
is read and discussed in an ‘open-minded fashion’. MRMO seeks to revitalise Islam
as a dynamic and viable religion. They plan to do this by extrapolating the ‘universal
truths’ of the Qur’an and studying the Qur’anic principles in a contemporary context.
The group utilises the book called The Qur’an and the Life of Excellence by Sultan
Abdulhameed to ponder on the lessons the Qur’an can teach readers about life in the
“postmodern world” (Abdulhameed 2010).
BackgroundonParticipants
Pseudonyms have been used to protect the anonymity of participants, and also
identifying information has been removed. Participants were sourced through contacts
made with progressive organisations, firstly through Facebook groups and online
forums, through personal contacts and also through attendance at progressive events
while conducting fieldwork.
Aarish is a 26-year-old business consultant from New York City and comes from a
Bengali background. He is on the organising committee for the Muslims for
Progressive Values New York chapter. After seeking to understand Islam on his own
terms he describes himself as an agnostic or atheist Muslim.
Afreen is a 26-year-old law student of Pakistani origins. She is a member of the
Washington D.C. Muslims for Progressive Values unity mosque (Masjid Nur al
Islah). While in college she started the chapter of a group called Project Nur through
the American Islamic Congress. It is a civic group of college students that seek to
promote human rights through an Islamic lens.
69
Ali is a 50-year-old immigration lawyer from Tanzania living in Toronto Canada. He
identifies as gay and often works as a legal advocate for LGBTQ people seeking
refuge in Canada due to discriminatory laws regarding their sexual orientation in their
countries of origin. He is also one of the founding members of a unity mosque in
Toronto and sometimes acts as the imam.
Ayman is a 72-year old professor of science of Pakistani decent who works at an
university in New York. He also runs the reformist Qur’an discussion group in
Manhattan and on Long Island and seeks to share the universal wisdom of the Qur’an.
Burak is an 18-year-old student from Germany of Turkish origins. He is involved
with the Muslims for Progressive Values Facebook discussion group in an online only
capacity. He does not attend a physical progressive congregation. He became a
progressive Muslim after researching Islam on the Internet and reading Amina Wadud
and other progressive scholars.
Bushra is a 26-year-old student residing in New York City. She identifies with many
progressive values especially in regard to gender and LGBTQ rights, but hesitates to
label herself as progressive. She doesn’t attend a physical religious congregation
because she finds the mosques around her area too conservative, “rather than being
frustrated or having questions about your faith because of the way the people are I’d
rather stay home”.
Emma is a 42-year-old Caucasian convert living in Atlantic City. She is a stay at
home mum, an active member of the Muslim for Progressive Values discussion
boards, and occasionally attends the Atlanta chapter of Muslims for Progressive
Values. She also attends a normative mosque with her husband’s family for Eid
celebrations.
Fahim is a 35-year-old property developer and hotel manager from Somalia. He has
lived in London for 23 years but recently returned to live in Mogadishu. He is an
online only member of Muslims for Progressive Values and interacts online with
members of physical congregations in the U.S.
70
Francisco is a 40-year-old government official from Jakarta who is affiliated with
Liberal Islam Network of Indonesia. He also interacts with those on the Muslims for
Progressive Values Facebook group.
Ghadeer is a 40-year old Caucasian Muslim convert who holds a PhD in instructional
technologies and currently works at a university in Indiana. She participates in
Muslims for Progressive Values in an online context, interacting online with those
who are members of the physical congregations in the U.S. She still attends a
conservative mosque and occasionally still attends a church but identifies as Muslim.
Ivy is a 36-year-old student living in Houston. She is a convert from an Irish-English
background. She is an online only member of Muslims for Progressive Values and
she still occasionally attends a normative mosque.
James is a 51-year-old factory cleaner living in Melbourne Australia. He is originally
from the Philippines and is a convert to Islam. He is a member of Muslims for
Progressive Values in an online only capacity, but is a regular contributor to the
Facebook discussions.
Joyah is a 52-year-old activist who currently resides in Los Angeles. She was born in
Malaysia but has also lived in Germany, Egypt and India. Apart from her activist
activities she is an award winning singer-songwriter. She is a female imam and the
leader of Muslims for Progressive Values in Los Angeles. She also conducts
marriages for LGBTQ Muslim couples and Muslim women wishing to marry non-
Muslim men.
Lemzo is a 25-year-old from Mauritania living in New York City. He is trained as a
geologist but is currently unemployed. He identifies as a progressive Muslim and is
part of Muslims for Progressive Values in an online only capacity.
Madeline is a 35-year-old IT engineer living in Atlanta. She is a Caucasian convert
and a female imam at the Muslims for Progressive Values Atlanta chapter. She also
conducts marriages for LGBTQ Muslim couples and Muslim women wishing to
marry non-Muslim men.
71
Maria is a 31-year-old private school administrator residing in New York. She is a
convert of Arab and Caucasian origins and grew up in Dearborn Michigan. She is
affiliated with the reformist Qur’an Discussion Group that meets weekly in Manhattan
and also takes part in the MPV online discussion boards.
Michelle is a 52-year-old adjunct professor at a university in Canada. She converted
to Islam at the age of 25 and for at least 15 years adhered to a conservative form of
Islam that she describes as a “sort of a Zaytuna kind of conservatism”. 28 After
becoming a progressive Muslim she was instrumental in starting a unity mosque in
Canada and is now a prayer leader and regularly delivers the sermon at Friday
prayers.
Trent is a 44-year-old musician and African-Canadian convert to Islam living in
Toronto. He is also one of the co-founders of El-Tawhid Juma Circle in Canada. He
was driven to create the space so that he and other gay people and women could have
a welcoming inclusive place to worship.
Yohanes is a 42-year-old visual artist residing in Virginia. He was born in Indonesia
and is affiliated with Muslims for Progressive Values in an online only capacity. He
attends a non-progressive mosque occasionally. He understands Islam through
consulting the Qur’an and excluding the hadith and as such is a Qur’anist.
Zaynab is a 47-year old convert Caucasian and Native American activist who is a
former board member of Muslims for Progressive Values International. She currently
resides in Seattle. She gained media attention in 2010 after she joined protests in a
Washington D.C. mosque designed to draw attention to the inadequate spaces
provided for women. Her protests focused on the right of women to pray in the main
section of the mosque with no partition.
28 Zaytuna College is a Muslim liberal arts college located in Berkeley California founded by Hamza Yusuf, Zaid Shakir and Hesham.Alalusi.
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ParticipantBreakdown
In terms of progressive organisational affiliation I collected data from five members
of Muslims for Progressive Values, three members of El-Tawhid Juma Circle, two
members of the Qur’an Discussion Group, one member of the Liberal Islam Network,
and from nine participants who only participate in progressive Muslim communities
online. Of these nine online participants seven reported visiting MPVs Facebook
groups. Sixteen participants were located in North America, thirteen in the United
States and three in Canada. Other participants were located in Australia, Britain,
Germany and Indonesia, meaning the research was undertaken worldwide. Ten
female and ten male participants were interviewed. Two participants identified as gay
and one as bisexual, the rest of the participants did not comment on their sexuality.
Interestingly, nine participants had converted to Islam and 11 grew up in Muslim
families. In terms of educational level three participants had PhDs, five held masters
degrees, seven had bachelors degrees, three had some college education, and two had
a high school education. Six participants self-identified as Caucasian, three as
Pakistani, two as Indonesian and others as Bengali, Tanzanian, African-Canadian,
Turkish, Mauritanian, Malaysian, Filipino, Caucasian-Native American, and Somali-
Arab. In terms of age groups one participant was in their teens, four in their twenties,
four in their thirties, six in their forties, four in their fifties, and one in their seventies.
Broadly speaking eighteen participants identified as middle class, one as working
class and one as “no class”. This information was collected during interviews by
asking participants about their organisational affiliation, location, age, ethnicity, level
of education and class background.
Figure1:InformationonParticipants
Name Location Age Sex Ethnicity Affiliation Education Occupation
Michelle Toronto, Canada 51 F Caucasian ETJC PhD Adjunct Professor
Maria New York City, US
31 F Caucasian QDG NY Masters School administrator
Joyah Los Angeles, US 52 F Malaysian MPV LA Bachelors Musician/ activist
Emma Atlanta, US 42 F Caucasian MPV Atlanta Bachelors Stay at home mum
Zaynab Seattle, US 47 F Caucasian/Native American
Ex MPV/online only Some college
Unemployed
Ghadeer Oregon, US 40 F Caucasian Online only (MPV) PhD Assessment and data analyst
73
Bushra New York City, US
26 F Pakistani Online only Bachelors Student
Madeline Atlanta, US 35 F Caucasian MPV Atlanta Bachelors Engineer
Afreen Washington D.C., US
26 F Pakistani MPV DC Law School Student
Ivy Houston, US 36 F Caucasian Online only (MPV) Bachelors (in progress)
Student
Burak Germany 18 M Turkish Online only (MPV) High School Student
Lemzo New York City, US
25 M Mauritanian Online only (MPV) Bachelors Unemployed geologist
Ayman New York City, US
72 M Pakistani QDG NY PhD Professor
Yohanes Virginia, US 42 M Indonesian Online only (MPV)/
Bachelors Visual artist
Ali Toronto Canada 50 M Tanzanian ETJC Masters Law School
Immigration lawyer
Trent Toronto Canada 44 M Black Canadian ETJC Some college
Musician
James Melbourne, Australia
51 M Filipino Online only (MPV) High School Factory cleaner
Franciso Jakarta, Indonesia 40 M Indonesian Liberal Islam Network (Indonesia)
Masters Government official
Fahim London, UK. 35 M African/Arab Online only (MPV) Bachelors Property developer
Aarish New York City, US
26 M Bengali MPV NYC Masters Management consultant
DataAnalysisandPresentation
There are several ways of approaching data analysis. Robert Yin, who has done
extensive research on sociological methods, briefly describes “five techniques for
analysis: pattern matching, linking data to propositions, explanation building, time-
series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis” (Baxter and Jack 2008: 554).
Expanding on these techniques, pattern matching compares an empirically based
pattern with a predicted one to strengthen validity. Using a proposition allows the
researcher to test a question or a statement in order to discover patterns in the data.
Explanation building shapes explanations through a number of cases. Time-series
analysis uses chronologies to trace events in a detailed manner. Logic models attempt
to analyse a series of complex events over time and cross-case synthesis employs
pattern matching using word based tables. This thesis will use propositions to test a
question or statement.
Following the collection and transcription of data, the fieldwork was coded to
themes (nodes) using the qualitative data software Nvivo. This thesis will compare
data so that theoretical categories may emerge (Glaser 1978). After an analysis of the
interviews the following themes developed from the majority of the interviews:
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inclusivity, pluralism, gender equality, social justice, interpretation and religious
authority.
This research will employ a case study method, selecting five case studies, one
per chapter, in order to explore the themes that emerged from the interviews. One of
the benefits of the case study method is that it allows participants to tell their own
stories and results in a close association between the researcher and the participant
(Crabtree and Miller 1999). Through these stories the participants are able to describe
their experiences and realities. As such this thesis will employ a descriptive-type case
study that aims to describe a phenomenon and the real-life context in which it
transpired (Yin 2003: 548) along with a thematic analysis of the data. The use of such
case studies is particularly useful for explaining how and why a phenomenon exists.
However, the use of case studies has been criticised by some for a lack of scientific
rigor and reliability (Mohd Noor 2008: 1603). Mohd Noor points out that case studies
have two strengths. Firstly, they allow the researcher to gain a holistic view of a
certain social phenomena. Secondly, case studies allow for generalisations and can
lead to some form of replication (Mohd Noor 2008: 1603). However, one concern
commonly expressed in relation to the case study method is about scientific
generalisation. Specifically, how can we generalise or gain consensus from a very
small number of cases? Here the goal of employing a case study is theoretical
generalisations, rather than statistical generalisations or general representations or
assumptions.
The goal of employing multiple cases in this research is theoretical replication.
That is, this research may find contrasting results in different cases, but relevant
theory will be employed to explain variations in findings. Thus in selecting cases it is
important that they vary on a number of key dimensions. Selection of case studies for
this research was made on the basis of the themes that emerged from the data that
now form the results chapters in this thesis and the participants who best exemplified
that theme. These participants are not generally representative of all the participants in
the data. Yin proposes six approaches for presenting a case study. “These include:
linear, comparative, chronological, theory building, suspense, and un-sequenced”
(Yin in Baxter and Jack 2008: 555). The case studies in this thesis will employ
propositions in order to test statements and theories through the case studies. The
propositions operate firstly to focus the data and to set the aim and scope of the
75
research. Together these propositions provide the basis for a conceptual
structure/framework (Stake 1995).
Where textual responses from participants are included in the results they are
coded in the following manner: age the participant turned in 2013/sex/organisation.
So, a thirty-year old female who is a member for Muslims for Progressive Values
would be coded as: (30y/F/MPV).
ChapterSummary
This chapter has outlined the research design for this thesis. This research is based on
grounded theory, which will be used to analyse twenty semi-structured interviews, the
results of which will be presented thematically in the next five chapters. The next
chapter will examine progressive Muslim identity in order to understand how
progressive Muslims perceive themselves and their religiosity, what Islam means to
them, and on what basis their identities are formed. This chapter also presents cases of
diverse identities such as progressive Muslims who also identify as agnostic or
atheist.
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ChapterFive:ProgressiveMuslimIdentity
Identity is constructed on the binary of sameness and difference (Marranci 2009).
According to Gabriele Marranci, identity has two functions. Firstly, it allows humans
to make sense of the autobiographical self. On the other hand it allows them to
express the autobiographical self through symbols (Marranci 2009). “It is what we
feel to be that determines our personal identity” (Marranci 2009: 97). Progressive
Muslims from this research often display diverse and sometimes contradictory
identities. Interestingly, three participants identified as agnostic or atheist, yet still
identified as a progressive Muslim and took part in religious rituals. Participants also
constructed their identities in opposition to some of the beliefs and practices of
normative Muslims which they do not agree with.
This thesis aims to explore the lived experiences of progressive Muslims. To
meet this aim it is important to examine the ways in which progressive Muslim
identity is formed and understood. In short this chapter tests what it means to be a
progressive Muslim. Progressive Islam claims to work for social justice and human
rights and gender equality. Progressive Muslims are working for improvement within
Muslim societies and other communities, however what progression means is unclear.
Their approach is outwardly “inclusive” yet of course they are unable to welcome
those who disagree with them into their spaces. By working for social ‘progression’
through inclusive spaces and contextual interpretations of religious texts, progressive
Islam becomes a method of social activism (see chapters Six and Nine).
Defining a progressive Muslim becomes problematic as participants exhibit
different levels and types of ‘progressiveness’, a variety of diverse opinions, and use
different methods to reason through their practices and beliefs. Even considering their
emphasis on ‘progressiveness’ many progressive Muslims consider their identity to be
‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’. This throws into question what traditional, authentic
Islam is. Adis Duderija explains that, “Progressive Muslims consider their religious
identity to be traditionally authentic and derived from a particular interpretation of the
normative sources of Islam, namely the Qur’an and sunna (traditions of the Prophet).”
(Duderija 2011: 151). Here we see this kind of identity formation relies on the
specific choice of religious interpretation and the freedom to make that interpretation.
A great deal of debate about authentic Muslim identity occurs within Muslim
communities. After the release of her book Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred
77
Text from a Woman's Perspective (1999) Amina Wadud received a great deal of
opposition to her arguments and also personal attacks on her identity as a Muslim.
She recalls in her second book:
Those who oppose my analysis boisterously hurled their opposition directly in my face, claimed certain of my comments were blasphemous, according to their interpretations of Islam, and eventually labeled me as a ‘devil in hijab’ (head-covering). At the time I was utterly stunned by the presence of such insolence from other Muslims. Since that experience, however, I have moved towards a new albeit uncomfortable, reflection: neither their ‘Islam’ nor my ‘Islam’ has the ultimate privilege. We are all part of a complex whole, in constant motion and manifestation throughout the history of multifaceted but totally human constructions of ‘Islam’ (Wadud 2006: 221).
This chapter aims to explore progressive Muslim identities. First the chapter presents
a case study based on an interview with Aarish in order to understand the evolving
identities of progressive Muslims. By hearing a complete account from Aarish we can
better understand the larger picture of progressive Muslim identity formation. Aarish
has not been selected not only because he illustrates a general case from the data, but
also because he strongly exemplifies the phenomena of Ulrich Beck’s ‘do-it-yourself’
identity (2010). Beck also describes ‘do-it-yourself identity’ as a need to discover a
variety of spiritual practices and symbols beneficial to one’s individual happiness,
wellbeing and life (Beck 2010: 136). Following the case study, data will be discussed
via subthemes exploring the importance of self-identification and the opposition to
normative Islam in regards to progressive Muslim identity. This chapter then
examines the interplay of religious and cultural identity with LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender and Queer) and atheist or agnostic identities. It continues by
examining the importance of Muslim identity to social activism. These subthemes
were selected through a thematic analysis of the data.
CaseStudy:ProgressiveMuslimIdentity–Aarish
Aarish is a 26-year-old management consultant in the banking sector. He was born
and lives in Manhattan, New York. He holds a bachelors degree in economics with a
minor in philosophy. He also has a masters degree in accounting and he is currently
78
studying for his CPA. We met at a Midtown cafe and spoke about what Islam means
to him. He described it as a kind of ‘cultural heritage’:
I can’t say theologically that I would be considered a Muslim but I believe in something, in what I call God. I don’t know if that’s necessarily what Muslims or Christians would call God. As far as Islam I take a critical stance. So I could say I’m an atheist, but it’s definitely more of an exploration that I’m going through though. On my best days I’m a theist and on my worst days I’m an atheist [26y/M/MPV].
Here Aarish is displaying a departure from orthodox Islam. The type of belief he
describes has loose boundaries and relates much more to lived Islam (Jeldtoft 2011)
than to more institutionalised, more traditional versions of Islam.
Progressive Muslims display a variety of individual beliefs with three
participants identifying as atheist or agnostic. This was not always the case with
Aarish. He recalled that when he was about fifteen, he attended religious services and
gatherings much more frequently. Now his religious experiences are much more
deinstitutionalised:
I would study the talks from the seminary. I did that for about six years. I was pretty orthodox. I was a Sunday Muslim, more along the lines of the Salafi movement [26y/M/MPV].
He reports that his mother and father are not very religious but that they do pray and
celebrate Eid. Here when Aarish speaks about the absence of religion he refers to a
departure from institutionalised, textual Islam, but not about disbelief in Islam itself.
“They don’t want me getting too involved with things [Islam] just because there’s
still that mentality that if it’s Muslim related it’s going to lead you to gaol”
[26y/M/MPV].
Later on in life Aarish had misgivings about fundamental issues linked to faith
that transcend all religious traditions in his opinion. He spoke about questioning the
rational basis of Islam and religion in general and wondered about the moral value of
religions that perpetuate social inequalities. He grew up in a predominantly white
neighbourhood and did not have much experience with Muslims, but “Islam was
something that was prescribed for me growing up” [26y/M/MPV]. He explained that
he still has a very good connection with the mainstream Muslim community; that he
attends a normative mosque in Ramadan. He also used to work with normative
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Muslim organisations and was part of the MSA (Muslim Students Association) in
college. “It was good, I mean I don’t think that I’m traumatised by Islam”
[26y/M/MPV]. He said previously he was always active in the community and taught
Sunday school at his local mosque:
It was good. I mean I have no bad emotions towards it. I don’t agree with a lot of it and that’s just because of the person that I have progressed into. I feel like a lot of progressive Muslims have a lot of pain in their past with mainstream Islam, but I don’t have that. I fully embrace it [26y/M/MPV].
Instead of clinging to family traditions, modern individuals are revealed by Ulrich
Beck (2010) to be the inventors of personalised alternatives that meld biographical
experiences and faith values. Interestingly Beck argues that Muslims in Europe are
steadily disconnecting themselves from holy places, religious authorities, and
traditional religious organisations, and are “turning to a new spirituality characterized
by a process of searching, selecting and combining that is carried out under the aegis
of individual faith” (Beck 2010: 34). Here Aarish demonstrates the beginnings of
crafting his own individualised or ‘do-it-yourself religion’ (Beck 2010) that fits with
his own biographical experiences. The first realisation for Aarish that he was
questioning normative Islam was that it became increasingly difficult for him to
accept that everything was a test from Allah, but worse that he had not asked to take
the test to begin with:
It didn’t make me angry, but it just didn’t make sense to me. I don’t have anger towards it, but I thought it was kind of absurd. I mean he [God] already knows the answer, like he knows what it is already. It seems really futile if he already knows the result. It’s like a whole Olympics but the result is already known [26y/M/MPV].
His disagreements with normative Islam began with issues of gay rights. He
increasingly started to wonder about issues of inequality, like gay rights, that he could
not rationalise away. He explained that he had a couple of teachers in high school
who were gay that he was fairly close with. This caused a moral quandary for him:
I was close with all my teachers, but these two I met them at the peak of my religiosity and in my head I kept saying, I’m supposed to hate these
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people, I’m supposed to hate these people, but in my heart I had no malice towards them. It seemed so unnatural to hate them [26y/M/MPV].
What followed was that a lot of the normative Qur'anic teachings started to feel
unnatural, “where I was forcing myself to hate certain types of people”
[26y/M/MPV]. He was also pushing himself to act a certain way around women that
did not feel natural to him:
The whole gender separation didn’t really make sense to me. One of the things that I really find difficult to this day is that if women are supposed to cover themselves because of men’s weakness then men should be the ones that go through all the trouble of being in the back of the room or whatever [26y/M/MPV].
When asked what progressive Islam means to him he described progressive Islam as a
type of humanism:
We took very humanistic principles as Muslims because we are practicing those principles they obviously become Islamic. Islam is what we practice right? If we call it Islam it will be Islam. I don’t think it’s anything profound or revolutionary, it’s just humanist. I’m much more comfortable with being considered a Muslim humanist than considering myself a progressive Muslim [26y/M/MPV].
Here, principles of equality and social justice take precedence over some traditional
texts and interpretation methods. This links directly to the theory of lived religion
which is about the morals, and values of each practitioner, rather than the
institutionalised expressions of faith. It also helps individuals to fulfill some sort of
personal goal (McGuire 2008: 15). Humanist values and the quest for social justice
are an aspiration for Aarish.
Much of Muslim identity relies on self-identification: “We live in this world
as Muslims as much as we say we’re Muslim, right?” [26y/M/MPV]. Aarish tells me
about a friend and former roommate who is an atheist, “He considers himself a
straight out atheist, but he still calls himself a cultural Muslim. He has a side business
that creates Islamic art and that's part of his identity” [26y/M/MPV]. He explains that
it’s part of how he grew up, that the stories of the Qur’an and Rasullah (messenger of
Allah) have been as integral to his identity growing up American and Muslim. Again
this matches with features of everyday religion:
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The thing is we are going to claim our Muslim identity irrespective of what orthodox or conservative positions are on what a Muslim is… I think for a lot atheistic and agnostic Muslims, being a Muslim is a social state, it’s a cultural state, it’s not a theological state [26y/M/MPV].
Just like the properties of everyday religion, Aarish’s practice of Islam relies on
personal experience and autonomy. It is more social than ritualistic.
One’s theological stance is much more negotiable for many progressive
Muslims. Aarish spoke about progressive Muslims and atheism:
I see a lot more ideas about pantheism amongst Muslims. I know a handful of atheists who are Muslims, who consider themselves Muslims culturally, but mostly progressive Muslims believe in somewhat of a pantheistic God. If you want to say atheist because they don’t believe in an omnipresent God, then yeah they are atheist [26y/M/MPV].
He explained that by being progressive he is starting from the position that a
monotheistic God doesn’t make sense. “We can’t believe in a God that has the power
to stop terrible things from happening but doesn’t” [26y/M/MPV]. The fact that
Muslims are supposed to be agreeable to being tested by God is problematic for many
progressive Muslims. Aarish questioned, “How can you worship a God like that?”
[26y/M/MPV].
Our conversation turned to apostasy, specifically if there is any action or belief
that can exclude you from being a Muslim. “Your identity as a Muslim has given you
everything you need, if you say that you’re a Muslim, then you’re a Muslim. If you
start creating conditions that if you go against them you leave Islam, that’s against the
first (MPV) principle [collective identity]” [26y/M/MPV]. He used the example of
Muslim terrorists and explained that even though he does not agree with their actions,
their beliefs are not something that anyone else can determine. “There are some
positions in Sunni theology about takfir (excommunication) that say not to make
takfir of the people of the Qibla (Muslims)” [26y/M/MPV]. Self-identification is most
important here and has similarities with facets of everyday religion, particularly the
importance of individualisation, inclusiveness, and personal autonomy and
experiences.
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I think we shouldn’t make takfir at all. If you say that you’re a Muslim that means you’re a Muslim. Whether you’re progressive or an orthodox that’s a different issue. There aren’t too many positions within progressive Islam that would allow an individual to stay within the orthodox understanding of Islam, of what a Muslim is [26y/M/MPV].
To demonstrate the diversity of Islamic practices he pointed to the fatwas (legal
rulings) that were given in medieval Spain. This fiqh (theory of Islamic law) was
designated specifically for Muslims living in a non-Muslim country.
They were allowed to eat pork if they needed to and they were allowed to drink
alcohol if that was all that was available. He clarifies that if you claim to be Muslim
then there’s something that binds believers and in turn creates that brotherhood:
So they weren’t practicing the Islam that was practiced at the Rasullah’s time but they were practicing something deeper. There was something deeper that made them Muslim and I think that’s at the heart of progressive Islam. There is something deeper than what we subscribe to. We can subscribe to whatever you want, or none of it [26y/M/MPV].
The idea here that following prescribed rituals is not the most important aspect of
being a Muslim is also associated with aspects of everyday religion. It often refers to
experiences instead of rituals and is not always equated with traditional religion. It
also is more likely to be ‘un-churched’ or un-mosqued and more pluralistic (Jeldtoft
2011). Aarish’s example above indicates the importance of the morals and values of
each believer above traditional practice.
Unlike some of the participants Aarish has been able to maintain friendships
with friends who are not progressive Muslims. He said many of his close friends are
Salafis. He explained that they know his position on Islam and that they are still
friends but that it did become an issue when he started teaching Sunday School. He
revealed that the children that he was teaching and the other teachers were
“fundamentalists”, that they were very strict but they were all able to get along. “I
think there were certain friends who really took offence to my views. From one of
them I got a twenty-page email telling me about hell and those kinds of things. We
have since made up” [26y/M/MPV]. He said he was able to sit down with most
people and talk to them about why he does not agree with their theology, that they are
not opinions that they hold or would entertain themselves but they can understand
why he holds those views or where they come from:
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If I was being malicious it might be a different story but they have known me they have grown up with me and they know where my affiliations lie. They understand that okay he has these reasons for being the way he is. I mean I don’t think anyone wants to behead me as far as I know [26y/M/MPV].
On the question of Muslim identity he also commented, “I think the Muslims
community is the only community in America trying to reduce their numbers by
arguing who is Muslim or not. I think the defining factor concerning whether you’re
Muslim or not for a lot of scholars is orthopraxy” [26y/M/MPV]. This is also usually
the standard by which many people evaluate what can be considered truly Islamic.
In his last comments he wanted to make me aware of his positionality:
I think you should probably take everything I say with the understanding that as far as Muslims go, in the sense that, I’m Sunni, I’m male, I’m light skinned, I’m not gay, in every way of the term I’m mainstream; so my positions are not going to be anger driven I guess [26y/M/MPV].
This case study has indicated that Aarish has gone through a process of assessing,
questioning and reconstructing his identity. He felt that he was no longer tied to the
identity of his family, thus moving away from collective ways of perceiving and
performing identity. In some cases there were opinions he held that he felt were not
Islamic, especially in the case of LGBTQ people; in this sense he needed to reconcile
his faith with his identity, or as Beck describes, his beliefs with his own biographical
experiences. This finding links with Beck’s notion of ‘do-it-yourself’ identity and by
extension ‘do-it-yourself’ religion where Beck explains that, “the age of
individualization is also the age of do-it-yourself religions” (Beck, 2010: 49). Here
Aarish appears to be moving from a more collective sense of identity to a more
individualised view of identity. Again, the data indicates a more individualised,
deinstitutionalised approach to religion and religious identity, which can be linked to
the phenomena of everyday religion. It focuses more on personal experiences, morals
and values rather than traditional religious practices. Here the boundaries of religion
are not so clear. The next section will examine Muslim identity more broadly
including issues of claiming Muslim identity.
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IssuesinMuslimIdentity
One of the central principles of progressive Islam is connected to a self-identified
notion of identity. This means that identities should be individually decided and
determined. In other words, one’s relationship with God is between the individual and
God and that any person who calls himself or herself a Muslim must be accepted as
such. However, this raises difficult questions about fundamentalist Muslims at the
opposite end of the spectrum who also self-identify as Muslim. Progressive Muslims
tend to discount normative interpretations as irrelevant or outdated. Therefore, can
both progressives and jihadists be identified as Muslim?
Ali: My father was a very interesting man… I was visiting and we were watching some show. It was maybe something on the Taliban or some crap like that. He said to me, “If they are Muslim then we are not. You know?” Either we’re Muslim and they’re not, or if they are the ones that are Muslim, we’re not. This is a man who prayed five times a day and had done his pilgrimage… This was somebody for whom being Muslim was very very important [50y/M/ETJC].
Participants identified an internal struggle amongst Muslims regarding what
constitutes authentic Islam and therefore a real Muslim. Liberals, progressives and
fundamentalists have wide ranging interpretations of the Islamic texts. This will be
discussed in more depth in Chapter Six. Burak spoke about the phenomena of takfir
(excommunication):
Burak: They [Muslims] are attacking themselves. Some are saying you are too fundamentalist and the other side is saying you are too liberal, you are a heretic and a kaffir (unbeliever), and you want to destroy Islam. You want to destroy Islam, but what is Islam? That is the question now [18y/M/online].
All progressives reported that they were raised to see anyone who pronounces the
shahada (testament of faith) as Muslim and were surprised that others do not think
the same way. This echoes elements of everyday religion where the boundaries of
religion are not so stringent (Jeldtoft 2011):
Lemzo: For me the way I was raised whoever take (sic) the shahada is Muslim no matter his background, but now I’m seeing a different thing, some people are saying Shi’a people are not Muslim [25y/M/online].
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Participants also discussed the relationship between being Muslim and from a
Western background. There has been in-depth debate regarding the ability of Islam to
be compatible with Western ideals and vice versa and if it is undergoing a process of
Westernisation. Safi explains:
There is no doubt that the encounter with Western institutions and thought has had a profound impact on Islamic modernism both positively (emphasis on human rights, constitutional forms of government, adoption of science, and so on) and negatively (colonialism, support for autocratic regimes) (2007: xviii).
Here Ivy explains that she believes anyone can be a Muslim if they wish. Further to
this, a diversity of religious opinion and practice was expected and accepted:
Ivy: Anyone can be Muslim, it doesn’t have anything to do with being Western, you believe in Allah, that’s it… I don't have the rights to tell anyone who can be Muslim or not… It’s okay to have a different set of laws. It’s okay to have a different set of beliefs, when we realise that and when we can meet in the middle with certain human rights and laws, then yes [36y/F/online].
Others spoke of the cultural biases that have been introduced to Islamic practice over
the years. These reflected a preference for some cultures and ethnicities over others.
Zaynab explained that in her opinion Islam would change according to where it is
practiced. As a convert she felt for many years that as an American she must be
‘bad’:
Zaynab: So much of the cultural biases are woven into what they [Muslims] say about Islam. While it works for them and that’s how they see it, it’s not something I want to incorporate in my life as far as how I live it. If you think about it as Islam goes along it will change flavours according to where it was being established, well why can’t that be true about people here in America or anywhere? Through the years I had this thought that I am somehow bad because I came from America, that America is bad and horrible. That Americans are bad and of course that led to some level of self-hate, well who is supposed to live with that? [47y/F/MPV].
Some convert participants explained that at times their Muslim identity was in
question because of their European ethnic background. Emma said that often people
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assumed that she was not really a Muslim and was only claiming to be Muslim
because she was married to a Muslim man. For this reason she felt socially isolated in
many normative Muslim communities and that at times her opinion was not taken
seriously:
Emma: I have not been able to get myself to any other mosque [apart from a progressive one] on a regular basis. I am looked at I think, because I’m Caucasian and you know married to my husband. I just look like I’m not really Muslim. I get that also from my husband’s family and friends, not so much that they don’t think I’m Muslim but if I ever try to have a discussion that is outside of the box then I automatically get shutdown, “You don’t know enough, you don’t know enough” you know? [42y/F/MPV].
Other converts said that sometimes they were unwelcome at interfaith events because
their appearance and beliefs were not stereotypical enough. This mostly applies to
those who do not wear a hijab (head covering). Madeline felt that she did not look
Muslim enough. This raises questions about authentic Muslim identity:
Madeline: Oh that’s my favourite. When people are like, “oh you don’t follow this checklist that I personally have so you can’t be that” [Muslim]. It’s just... I find the people that are most upset with me are not Muslims they are non-Muslims. I’m asked to speak at things and I come in and I’m not what people expect… It makes them not ask me back, they say, “We need someone who is more traditional because people are going to want to see a Muslim”… I’m not stereotypical enough for them [35y/F/MPV].
Three participants decided to keep their religious identity private from some friends
and colleagues. Ghadeer explained that she is still quite private about her progressive
Muslim identity especially among non-progressive Muslims and feels it is her duty to
present her beliefs in a way that is not offensive to others. She also mentioned that
even though she has converted to Islam she still attends church services:
Ghadeer: I am a closeted progressive whenever I go to the [non-progressive] masjid (mosque) - I hide it to a point… Coming into the progressive world being Muslim is something that I will dance around all the time. Wherever I am it’s about what part of my identity do I want to put in someone’s face? For me it’s if I’m around a bunch of progressives I’ll be out, but if I’m not, as a pacifist it is my duty to stand for what I
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believe in a way that doesn’t offend them… So at the masjid I’ve told the American sisters that I still go to church [40y/F/online].
For some participants their religious identity was something they wanted to keep
private as much as possible and they did not usually identify themselves as Muslim
unless in a professional or worship context. It is unclear in the data whether this is
due to fear of Islamophobia or other factors:
Trent: I took my shahada - people kept asking me are you Muslim, I said I’m a believer and left it at that right - I took my shahada because I needed to get my Muslim papers to go to Mecca and Medina. I wouldn’t have done that publicly because I’m always very adamant that that’s between you and God. I had always had this idea that what is between me and God is private. Even though I’m the co-founder of an LGBTQ, gender, female affirming mosque space, I mean I’m public in that way but I don’t really talk about it in other ways unless I’m being interviewed [44y/M/ETJC].
For some of the participants religion, and by extension Islam, was seen as a social
structure.
Zaynab: Yeah see religion is a structure; people need structure right? When I came to Islam I was really at a time in my life when I needed structure. Okay these are the rules, these are the parameters, this is how things are going to work under this condition of being a Muslim… I was like okay I need structure; everything will be fine as long as I do the right thing as I’m told. I think religion is a structure for people; it’s a story that helps guide our lives and make it run more smoothly [47y/F/MPV].
However, other participants spoke of seeing past that idea and rethinking the role that
religion played in their lives and decision-making process. All participants agreed that
identification as a Muslim should be up to each individual and that whoever claims a
Muslim identity should be treated as a Muslim. However, this raised some important
questions when considering jihadist groups like the Taliban, whom many progressive
Muslims would prefer to regard as non-Muslim or not following the correct
interpretation of Islam. This points to an internal struggle constantly in motion within
Islam in an attempt to identify the authentic or correct interpretation of Islam. No one
correct interpretation or way of practicing can be identified, there is simply a plurality
of interpretations and practices, all of which can be considered Islamic (see Chapter
Six). This allows for a diverse range of identities and communities (discussed in detail
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in Chapter Seven). Convert participants reported having a particularly difficult time
gaining acceptance as a Muslim in normative Muslim settings and this may account
for the high number of converts in the data (nine out of twenty participants). Another
explanation is that this could be because of my own status as a Muslim convert –
where other converts may feel more comfortable talking to someone similar to
themselves.
Self-Identification
Eighteen progressive Muslims interviewed for this research felt that one’s status as a
Muslim relied on the action of self-identification, that anyone who said they were
Muslim had to be accepted as a Muslim. This ties into the principle of ‘collective
identity’ held by MPV. Interestingly, there was not much difference between converts
and born Muslims on matters of identity. This theme also connects to the increased
sense of individuality present amongst progressive Muslims. Participants also
mentioned that good or bad deeds should not have any bearing on a person’s
identification as a Muslim:
Ivy: I don’t think of Islam as a club I think of it as a kind of self-identification. I’m a Muslim that’s it. I didn’t know about the shahada until someone told me about it. When I converted I fell on my knees and asked for God or Allah or whoever. It’s not a club; no one’s accepting me [36y/F/online].
Above Ivy indicates the importance of the individual in her concept of religion. Her
view of religion here is individualised. Many theorists view the individualisation of
religion in a positive light. Knoblauch (2008) sees individualisation as capable of
creating a new spiritual society, or in Beck’s (2010) view a new more peaceful world.
Trent also thought Muslim identity should be self-identified and not able to be
judged by others, no matter their position or their own beliefs. He was uncomfortable
making those inferences about others and glad that he was not in the position to have
power or station over others:
Trent: I think it’s [Muslim identity] self-identified… Also, wasn’t it the Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him that said we are all born Muslim right? So basically we are all a part of one big community… I don’t have
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lordship over anyone, I’m thankful for that. I don’t really believe in that type of thing [44y/M/ETJC].
Madeline also felt that the decision of someone to identify themselves as Muslim
should be respected. She also pointed out that good or bad actions did not have any
impact on that identification:
Madeline: If someone identifies as Muslim, saying yeah they’re Muslim, even if they do crappy things or they do great things. Just being respectful of that [35y/F/MPV].
Seventeen participants echoed the idea that the practice of Islam was between the
individual and God and that it could be manifested on an individual basis, meaning
that Muslims could exist on their own without a community if necessary. Some of the
research regarding the strong individualisation of religion, especially in relation to
authority and identity formation, is similar to findings in the literature on revivalist
Islam with activist Muslims and institutionalised forms of Islam. But some of the
findings differ from the findings regarding revivalist movements: Islam is not a
‘primary identity’ (Jeldtoft 2011: 1136). Again this links with the theory of everyday
religion, which suggests that individuals who partake in everyday religion place
importance on individual autonomy, morals and values, and experiences. Jeldtoft
argues that the emphasis on the everyday can present us with expressions of the de-
territorialisation of Islam in which ritual religious practices are not associated with
good, Islamic moral behavior by progressive Muslims. “These types of ritual practice
emphasize individualism-as-pragmatism: Islam is seen as a something that can be
shaped into fitting to your life and not the other way around” (Jeldtoft 2011: 1141):
James: Islam… to me it’s a way of being with God, with no human intermediaries in between. Not Jesus, not Muhammed, not Abraham, not anyone; certainly, not any imam (prayer leader) out there who professes to know all. I haven’t been to any Muslim service or gathering for some time now [51y/M/online].
Religious self-identification was an important factor for progressive Muslims from
this research in feeling that they are important as an individual. The choice to identify
as a Muslim was very important for progressive Muslims who felt they were not
accepted in the mainstream Muslim community. Amongst progressive Muslims a
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more individualistic approach to religion is welcome. Thomas Luckmann (1973)
argued decades ago that sociologists were mistaken if they attempted to describe
personal religiosity by considering similarities with typical practices and beliefs of
official religions. He maintained that official religious teachings and practices did not
incorporate all resources available to individuals to construct their personal beliefs
and rituals.
ExperiencewithNormativeIslam
In particular, experiences with normative forms of Islam informed the development of
personal practices and beliefs. For several progressive Muslims their experiences with
normative Islam shape their religious identification. Many participants understand
more orthodox interpretations of Islam as the antithesis to their beliefs and
understandings of Islam. James had experienced difficulties fitting into a variety of
conservative Islamic groups, and was very disillusioned with what he called,
“mainstream, conservative Islam”. He also tried to learn from different groups
including the Ishmailis and the Sufis, but was not welcome because he would not
submit to an unequal relationship between teacher and student:
James: Experience with mainstream, conservative Islam - absolute pains in the arse (sic). No more, and no thanks. It’s basically a life of rules with no sense of anything Godly, or at least [nothing] inspiring. I’ve got OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder), and being with these lot makes my condition worse (sic)... None of the Sufis or Ishmailis will touch me with a 10-foot pole let alone teach me anything unless I’m willing to be the good son to their imams... and it’s that sort of thinking just as I experienced within mainstream, conservative Islam [51y/M/online].
Emma explained that sometimes she was required to attend a normative mosque with
her in-laws but that it was difficult for her to do so. She felt angry because of the state
of the women’s space in the mosque and because she was not permitted to join the
main part of the congregation as she would do at a progressive unity mosque:
Emma: When I go to a [normative] mosque like that, and I do because where my mother in-law goes, we have to go. I have a hard time opening up and praying because I’m so angry and I have a hard time letting go of that in that kind of situation [42y/F/MPV].
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Like three other women who participated in this research, Ivy is married to a non-
Muslim man and this makes the matter of her acceptance much more challenging in
normative Muslim worship spaces. In her view normative Islam is too rigid. As she
does not have a progressive space nearby she prefers to attend a variety of mosques
instead of becoming imbedded in just one:
Ivy: When I go to a mosque and they know I am a convert they are very accepting but when they find out I’m married and I’m not married to a Muslim man, that’s an issue… That’s my experience with mainstream Islam – it’s too rigid [36y/F/online].
Like the other participants Fahim felt that he was not accepted in normative Islam
and that many Muslims would not consider him as Muslim because of his unorthodox
beliefs. Unlike others he said he tries to establish a dialogue about diverse practices
in Islam but that it has not always been successful:
Fahim: Yes, I do [distance myself from], mainstream Islam, in my view they perceive me as being a not real Muslim (sic), because of my views. But I do try and establish a dialogue to narrow our gap in terms of views [on] how to practice Islam, which is not always fruitful to say the least [35y/M/online].
Many participants recognised that normative Islam was not to their liking and if there
was an absence of progressive spaces or communities where they are located they
formed or joined an online community through social media. This accounts for the
high number of participants (eight out of twenty) that report that they do not attend a
physical progressive Muslim community and instead participate in an online
community only, often in progressive Facebook groups. Ghadeer reported that much
of her religious interaction was online, “Mainstream Islam is not my thing - my own
experience has been mostly through social media” [40y/F/online]. Some participants
said that they have stopped interacting with non-progressive Muslims and seem to
mix in circles where there are more progressive Muslims.
ReactionstoProgressiveIslam
Progressive Muslims reported a variety of reactions to their beliefs from others. Most
participants had received negative reactions from conservative Muslims. Others had
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their opinions explained away as ignorance of the correct Islam by others because of
their status as a convert or non-Arabic speaker. A small few had been threatened with
or experienced physical violence because of their beliefs. Due to this, many
progressive Muslims craft their identities in opposition to normative Muslim
identities. For Afreen she felt that her support of Muslim LGBTQ rights garnered her
the most negative reactions:
Afreen: So usually [from] non-Muslims I get a very positive yet surprised response. From a lot of [Muslim] conservatives I’ve got very very negative responses. People who don’t want to hear about it [progressive Islam] and think it’s not acceptable. I’m sure you’ve seen this across the board, all sorts of hateful responses directly at me but any kind of cause that I might be supporting; particularly with LGBTQ rights they find that totally unacceptable [26y/F/MPV].
Emma had members of her husband’s family try to explain her progressive beliefs
through a lack of religious knowledge. This was made easier for them as she is a
convert and converts are sometimes presented as unknowledgeable about Islam no
matter how long they have been Muslim. For them it was too difficult to accept her
beliefs as the result of a critical study of Islam:
Emma: Most people, when they react to my progressive stance - well my brother in-law, his reaction is that he thinks that I don’t understand Islam. He thinks that the things I believe in are so far against Islam that my soul is in jeopardy, but he loves me and thinks I am a really good sister in-law, but my soul is in jeopardy [42y/F/MPV].
The single participant residing in a Muslim majority country said they had received a
mixed reaction to their beliefs but reported that they were aware of progressive
Muslims who had experienced physical violence because of their beliefs:
Fransico: My group, the Liberal Islam Network, has been praised by some, but condemned by others. It’s enough to say that some Muslims accepts our ideas, some does not accept (sic) but tolerate our ideas and some actively condemn our ideas, both philosophically and physically. One of our friends got beat up by Islamists thugs several years ago. Yes, they are that violent [40y/M/LIN].
Joyah also felt that a lot of normative Muslims would disagree with her progressive
stance. She realises that a lot of people think Muslims for Progressive Values is a
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fringe group but she counters that she was invited to the White House for the
president’s iftar (breaking fast). She did report that she now spends a lot of time with
other progressives, which would shield her from the reactions of more conservative
Muslims:
Joyah: You know actually now I don’t really hang out with people that aren’t progressive. It doesn’t matter what religion they are - I tend to attract a lot of progressives and like-minded people. Because we have been active out there for so many years the type of caliber of people we are receiving are really fantastic you know… That comes from putting yourself out there, there was a lot of scorn from traditional Muslims, “these people are fringe, “they are a joke” kind of thing, but now we’re seven years in and we have international chapters. We are very visible. I’m at the White House for dinner at iftar [52y/F/MPV].
Michelle described the method she uses when she finds herself in a confrontation
with normative Muslims about her progressive beliefs. She explained that she could
diffuse any tension by affirming their beliefs and clarifying that progressive mosques
were only attracting Muslims that were not attending normative mosques anyhow. In
this way it was understood that her interpretations of Islam were not in competition
with the interpretations of normative Muslims:
Michelle: Well one of the things that we have found that works is you know affirming their path and affirming what they say and saying, “You know, we don’t think that, so we’re going to come over here. We’re not going to come into your space and argue with you and try and change your ideas”… We’re really only here for the people who aren’t coming to your mosque, they already don’t agree with you. And so we’re not taking anything from you… We’re just making space for people who are probably not praying at all because they don’t want to come to the mosque… Some of them really understand your position, we’ve gotten good at saying to people, “we affirm you”, who are really people who are human rights abusers as far as we are concerned [51y/F/ETJC].
Joyah also said she used a similar method when dealing with normative or non-
progressive Muslims. She reported she was careful not to criticise groups by name, so
as to avoid the death threats received by other activists, but instead promotes
progressive values of social justice. It is interesting to note that here Joyah refers to
others like her as activists substantiating the notion of progressive Islam as a form of
social activism. Here she asserts that it is not progressive Muslim groups that position
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Wahabis or Salafis as their opposite or other but that journalists seeking a variety of
opinions on an issue perpetrate this division:
Joyah: I don’t do that by way of criticising them [non-progressives] in name, I do that by promoting our values in name, so I think it’s very important. One thing I don’t get is the death threats like other activists get. It’s because of the way we frame our work. We are for inclusivity, we are for social justice, and this is how we do (sic). When we get interviewed by secular reporters and mainstream reporters they always ask, “How come you have woman led prayer? [Or] LGBT rights as one of your principles?” We describe to them that this is how we believe… Then when they go and interview the conservative mosques and representatives… A lot of times it’s actually done for us, we don’t need to do anything about that [52y/F/MPV].
Madeline received some mixed reactions to her progressive beliefs. She mentioned
that some non-Muslims think that she is not serious about Islam because she does not
take on normative Islamic interpretations and practices. From Muslims she receives
worried comments that she is trying to destroy Islam by introducing new incorrect
interpretations. On the whole she feels that most people just ignore her and do not
engage with her. These negative reactions from both normative Muslims and non-
Muslims indicate the fact the progressive Muslims are caught in between
Islamophobes and normative Muslims. They are not fully accepted by either party:
Madeline: You get a mixed reaction in the US, lot of people are like, “oh okay”. I get a lot of white people who think I’m playing at being a Muslim. It’s like no this has been going on for like ten years. That’s a lot of playing. Sometimes I get, “oh my gosh you are destroying Islam, you can’t just practice what you want”. I used to be like okay whatever. Usually once you talk to people and explain to them that you’re not there to destroy their faith you’re just there to make it a larger spectrum then people are pretty nice about it. Or they ignore you; most people ignore me I would say [35y/F/MPV].
Trent relayed a negative experience he had when returning home from the airport in a
taxi with his partner. They were discussing an article on Islam and the driver took
exception to the nature of their conversation and threatened to drop them off in the
middle of the highway. The driver felt he had the right to dictate what was and was
not Islam:
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Trent: We were driving back from a progressive Muslim, MPV USA thing outside of New York. We were coming back and we had Illume magazine, which is a Muslim magazine. There was an article there and we were discussing it in the back of our cab coming back from the airport in Canada… I guess this guy was a Wahabi dude and he was like, “that's not Islam”. We were having another conversation and he jumped in and said, “Stop talking about my religion. If you don’t stop talking about it like that I’m going to drop you off in the middle of the highway here,” or that he would take us back to the airport and that kind of stuff. So Ali had to scream at him because I was scared. I was like looking down at the floor. He’s like, “We are paying for this ride. If you are giving us a free ride by any means you can dictate what conversation we can have in your car but we are paying for a service here and we are having a private conversation here. So shut up and get us home”. So he drove us home. That’s one harsher example [44y/M/ETJC].
Aarish explained that often correction on issues of Islamic practice or interpretation
often sprung from a specific culture or worldview. In his experience and contrary to
the experiences of other participants he did not feel that any of the responses to his
beliefs were hurtful or meant in a derogatory way:
Aarish: I’ve never had a brother come and say to me something derogatory hurtful or mean I think - in my experience - that they always do it with the best of intention. They do it through their culture and the way they view the world. It’s very different when you’re raised somewhere that’s more of a patrilineal society and then you come here where it’s gender equal I guess [26y/M/MPV].
Most participants reported disagreement between themselves and non-progressive
Muslims and some non-Muslims. Those participants who are converts to Islam had
their progressive beliefs rationalised away as a lack of proper Islamic knowledge.
Both Michelle and Joyah had particular ways to deal with those that opposed the
organisations they were active in and their progressive ideas and practice. They did
this by affirming their path and explaining that they were simply providing a space
for those who do not attend a normative mosque to worship and that they were not
trying to take away their congregations. In this way, progressive Muslim identity is
often formed in opposition to normative Islam.
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September11andMuslimIdentity:ComingOutMuslim
Following the September 11 2001 attacks President George W. Bush invoked a
political narrative based on a series of binary social constructions that divided the
people of the world into two groups; those who are civilised and those who are
uncivilised; those who support democracy and those who seek to disrupt it; and those
who defend freedom and those who would attack America’s way of life (Kwan
2008: 654). This narrative saw the category of the ‘uncivilised’ extended not just to
the perpetrators of 9/11 but also to all members of the Muslim faith. This discourse
portrayed all Muslims as outsiders:
Biased statements like ‘Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him’ (by Attorney General John Ashcroft), ‘Islam is an evil and wicked religion’ (by Christian evangelist Franklin Graham), or ‘Muslims are worse than the Nazis’ (by televangelist Pat Robertson) were broadcast through televised programs (Kwan 2008: 654).
This of course has an effect on the lives of Muslims in the United States but also
elsewhere. For some Muslims around the world and particularly those in North
America the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11 created an impetus
for action. There was and still is a need to present Islam as a peaceful religion that is
not at odds with democracy. Some participants reported that their Muslim identities
were largely hidden before September 11. However, after the attacks they felt
compelled to show a more liberal side of Islam that was more familiar to them:
Joyah: So here in the US after 9/11 - 9/11 was a real marker for me too in that I used to be very private about my Islam and I never really shared it with people. Being in the music business I never shared with people what my faith is, but after 9/11 I felt like okay, I really have to come out of the closet as a Muslim, so I did. As a songwriter-producer I felt the best way to introduce American society to a better understanding of Islam was to do that through music. So I created an Islamic pop CD [52y/F/MPV].
Ali also said he became more active in his religious and LGBTQ activism after
September 11. Before that he had retreated from a lot of his LGBTQ/Muslim
activism citing activist fatigue and death threats:
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Ali: I sorted of retreated [from religious/LGBTQ activism] and I retreated until 9/11 happened. I think 9/11 brought a lot of people out of their Muslim closet. It was 9/11 that sort of brought me out and I ended up on a TV show about 9/11 and that was a really popular TV show and there was a lot of coverage and so forth [50y/M/ETJC].
After restudying Islam after the September 11 attacks Joyah found that her
purportedly progressive mosque was not progressive enough for what she was
looking for. She decided to create her own community that was sensitive to gender
and sexuality issues and based on social justice. The principal intention here is a
tactical one (see Chapter Three), to appropriate religious truths in a fashion that suits
the identities and lives of specific individuals:
Joyah: I felt like restudying Islam after 9/11, the mosque that I was attending, even though it was supposedly progressive, in the scheme of things, it was just still short. It was just not good enough. So I just decided I’m going to branch off and do my own thing. I was really hoping that there were other Muslims like me and I was surprised that there were a lot of other Muslims like me, so that was reassuring… I wanted to create a Muslim community that was accepting of the arts, of gender issues, of sexuality, really social justice and no holds barred (sic) [52y/F/MPV].
Maria described being motivated to learn about Islam and eventually converting after
9/11.
Maria: So after 9/11 happened it was something that was very fresh in my mind having known people in 9/11 and watching the towers go down. There was a lot of fear at the time. I was in New York when it happened and I literally saw the towers come down. Every time I see it I have that terror but having grown up in the Mid-West with two million Muslims surrounding me and going to school with lots of Muslim families I didn’t want fear to motivate me… I was motivated to learn more about it from the Muslim Student Association at my campus. It was mostly through there that I learned about it [31y/F/QDG].
September 11 was an important marker for many progressive Muslims as it prompted
them to be more public with their religious identity and also to become involved in
more religious activism in order to speak out against extremist depictions of Islam. It
led them to inquire deeply into what Islam really teaches and caused them to
question existing binaries like East and West, modern and traditional. This may
indicate that progressive Muslims are not as individualised as they claim to be.
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Participants see this event as a motivator to be more public but also to be more
involved in their communities.
BeingMuslimandLGBTQ
Homosexuality is met with fierce opposition in many normative Muslim
communities forcing Muslims who identify as LGBTQ to either deny their sexuality
or their faith (Rosser 1992, Rey 1997 in Minwalla et al. 2005: 113). However, the
experience of being ostracised from family, religion and mainstream society can
sometimes foster a greater “sense of spirituality” (Fortunato 1982, Rey 1997 in
Minwalla et al. 2005: 113). Although this research touches on experiences of
LGBTQ Muslims focusing on this would move the thesis away from its main point
of inquiry which asks if progressive Islam is an individualised form of Islam. It was
also impractical to focus on LGBTQ progressive Muslims because only two
participants identified as homosexual and one as bisexual. Nevertheless, here it is
important to mention as part of progressive Muslim identity.
Amongst the participants, there were two self-identified gay participants and
one bisexual participant. There is not much difference in opinions on issues of
equality and religion between LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ participants. To change
negative perceptions progressive Muslim groups try to create an affirmative space for
LGBTQ Muslims so they do not have to deny any part of their identity and can still
openly practice their religion. Joyah explained that apart from being LGBTQ
affirming MPV also mixes with other non-religious LGBTQ groups because they are
sometimes anti-religion:
Joyah: With LGBTQ, it’s sort of a natural thing. We mix with LGBTQ groups for two reasons. Firstly because a lot of LGBT groups are very anti-religion and understandably so and because a lot of the rhetoric against LGBTs are religious based… It’s important that they know that we support their rights. It’s also important to nudge the Muslims out there that are very quiet about LGBT rights, even though they support it, they understand it, but they would never come out openly and say it [52y/F/MPV].
Ali commented that his long-term association with the Muslim community had been
challenging for some members because they had to deal simultaneously with his
Muslim and gay identity:
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Ali: I’ve known people in the Muslim community for a very long time right? I mean I’ve met scholars and academics and I know some of the people from ISNA (Islamic Society of North America) and like all of these big names that have been around, I’ve met them. Some of them are my aunties and uncles right? Some of them have stopped talking to me but some of them have had to deal with knowing me, loving me, respecting me, acknowledging my Muslimness and then having to be okay with my gayness [50y/M/ETJC].
Trent described taking strong precautions when going to Saudi Arabia for Umrah
(lesser pilgrimage) with his partner. They had to lie about their relationship and who
they were travelling with in order to remain safe. Ordinarily he said he would not go
into ultra-conservative spaces as they make him uncomfortable. Here religious
traditions still maintain some importance:
Trent: Well when we went to Mecca and Medina on our Umrah that was a pretty full on intense experience. We were two of 800,000 people that were there. We had our Facebook profiles on high privacy settings, we were very careful. If people asked who I was travelling with I would say my family. So my parents, my mother and father in-law, I was their nephew sort of stuff. You know what I mean? I don’t really like - the spaces and places that I purposely go into they haven’t been that ultra conservative type of Muslim spaces. I wouldn’t go there anyway [44y/M/ETJC].
The way Ali understood Islam changed throughout his journey to reconcile his
sexuality with his faith. Although he has become much more confident in his gay-
Muslim identity he is still careful about revealing his gay identity at conservative
Muslim gatherings:
Ali: When I started out to deal with my sexuality at one point Islam had to make sense to me as a gay feminist man, right? That’s how I talk, right? Again it has to be a question of safety, I’m not going to go into a mass of reviving the Islamic spirit with 10,000 people and come out as being gay because I may not leave there [50y/M/ETJC].
MPV faces a lot of opposition from normative and orthodox Muslims and has been
condemned by Al Azhar University in Egypt for being LGBTQ affirming:
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Joyah: Even the head of Al Azhar University actually condemned us for being LGBT affirming and that all Muslim LGBTs and their allies are condemned to hell. So he actually said that, so we MPV international did a statement together. We’ve been doing more of that. [A] press release arguing back point-by-point with Qur’anic and hadith passages. So we now, we’re being noticed at the level [52y/F/MPV].
Progressive Muslims are endeavoring to offer an affirming space to LGBTQ
Muslims so they can explore their faith and sexuality in a safe, supportive
environment and to remedy one of the many inequalities they see being perpetuated
by normative Islam. In progressive settings participants were able to work toward a
holistic vision of their identities instead of hiding parts of who they are, thus creating
a ‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010). For progressive Muslims this means not
adhering strictly to a package of religious beliefs and personal attributes but instead
they build a religious identity and set of practices that is constructed around their
own experiences, morals and values. It is not the direct focus of this thesis to
investigate the experiences of LGBTQ Muslims as this thesis aims to examine the
lived experiences of all progressive Muslims. Also, within this sample only two
participants identified as homosexual. However, eleven participants spoke about
LGBTQ issues when asked about social inequalities. This may provide an interesting
future avenue of research.
SocialActivistIdentity
Social activism, or to see oneself as an activist, is central to progressive Muslim
identity. For many progressive Muslims their progressive beliefs translate into social
activism in an attempt to remedy some of the inequalities they perceive to be present
in normative Islam. “Progressives measure their success not in developing new
theologies, but rather by the amount of ground-level change for good that they can
produce in Muslim and non-Muslim societies.” (Safi 2007: xxiii). For this to occur
participants pointed out that it was important to frame these changes in an Islamic
framework and using Islamic language:
Joyah: The only way for Muslim women’s rights to be achieved is through Islam because that’s a language that Muslims understand. The thing about it - I have this conversation with secularists, feminists, human rights organisations all the time. They spend millions of dollars in the
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Muslim world trying to improve Muslim women’s rights… and they are talking the most secular language there is. You’re not talking the language of Islam. Why would they even bother to listen to them? and they don’t. That’s why you plonk (sic) in these millions of dollars each year and you don’t get anywhere. So you need people like us to speak that language to help you speak the language that they will listen to right?... It has to be under the framework of Islam, you have to use the Qur'anic language and all the key buzzwords [52y/F/MPV].
Social activism is inherent to the progressive Muslim identity. Omid Safi explains
that progressive Muslims perceive themselves as the advocates of those who live in,
“situations of poverty, pollution, oppression, and marginalization.” Aarish saw his
own activism as seeking to remove Muslims from the margins and creating a more
cosmopolitan community that was also interested in American issues not just Muslim
issues:
Aarish: My own thing is that I want to get Muslims out of the margins, that’s my personal perspective and maybe a New York perspective. In traditional Islam whether it be Sunni, Shia or Sufi whatever it is I just want Muslims to start caring about issues that affect all Americans and not just their own. I’ll work with anyone; I just want to deconstruct it [26y/M/MPV].
Trent explained that social activism was important because inclusive spaces gave
people who have had negative experiences with religion a place to heal and re-
explore religion and spirituality:
Trent: Yeah it’s important [social activism]. It’s important because I mean... most religions they traumatise so many of us, right? Some people say well why bother? Well why not? If it gives somebody solace or healing then why not?... Our place is for people that have hiked up their skirts and run for the hills that have come down the hill a bit, that have come in and sat down to see what we are all about [44y/M/ETJC].
Many progressive Muslims view their progressive practice as social activism,
particularly providing an inclusive space where equality is encouraged and seeking to
promote a more progressive interpretation of Islam (explored in Chapter Six). Omid
Safi confirms this activist stance in his book Progressive Muslims:
This informed social activism is visible in the many progressive Muslim organizations and movements, including the work of Chandra Muzaffar
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with the International Movement for a Just World in Malaysia, the efforts of Farid Esack with HIV-positive Muslims in South Africa, and the work of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi with groups such as the Iranian Children’s Rights Society (Safi 2007: xxiv).
The activism of the participants also extended to LGBTQ and gender activism. This
thesis will examine specific gender activism in Chapter Nine.
Discussion:ConstructingProgressiveMuslimIdentities
Little is known about the link between progressive Islamic texts and theology and
progressive Muslim practice. Here I will examine some of these texts and their
connection with the data. Progressive Muslims display a diverse variety of religious
and other identities including atheist or agnostic Muslim. Participants took a
pluralistic approach to their identities endeavoring to integrate all aspects of their
identities with their faith. This melding of diverse identities with a plural view of
identity encourages and celebrates diversity. One participant also revealed that after
converting to Islam she still attends church and has told congregants at her mosque
that she does so.
Progressive Muslim scholars come from a variety of backgrounds. Some are
born in North America or are naturalised citizens whose communities are located in
North America. Others work in the United States but their primary social experiences
come from communities in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia (Moosa 2007: 120).
Progressive Muslims are diverse and according to Ebrahim Moosa “will propose
different practices and accompanying methodologies to verify and justify the content
of the ethical propositions, philosophical visions, and contestations of history they
hold” (Moosa 2007: 116). This matches with the data collected. Participants
presented a variety of identity configurations and lines of reasoning to validate their
religious and political views. Roughly the term “progressive” is used to describe a
loosely connected group of activists and scholars supporting an alternate vision of
Islam from the dominant form and seeking an Islam that is compatible with their
ideas of social justice and equality (Moosa 2007: 116-117).
Participants also reported holding views that depart from some traditional
Muslim beliefs and that those views are also attuned to their values of equality.
Moosa describes progressive as an oppositional term and pinpoints a “discomfort”
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with the term itself. It has been indicated that the term positions non-progressive
Muslims as backwards and as “uncritical traditionalists”. However Moosa argues
that, “In reality one is trying to assert the element that distinguishes one’s intellectual
agenda from those of others” (Moosa 2007: 118). Moosa reiterates the thoughts of
the participants, particularly of Aarish, who pointed out that progressive Islam is not
a sophisticated doctrine or ideology but more a practice, a desire and an identity:
Those who think that “progressive” Islam is a ready-made ideology or an off the shelf creed, movement, or pack of doctrines will be sorely disappointed. It is not even a carefully calibrated theory or interpretation of Muslim law, theology, ethics, and politics. Neither is it a school of thought. Instead, I would argue that progressive Islam is a wish-list, a desire, and, if at all something, then it is literally, accumulated action, as the word “progress” in the phrase “a work-in progress” suggests. At best it is a practice (2007: 115).
This poses a question as to why progressive Muslims feel the need to question and
reconstruct their religious identities.
Participants derived their identities from their opposition to normative or
Salafi Muslim identities. When speaking about their progressive Muslim identities
participants often highlighted normative Muslim practices as undesirable and
something that they are actively seeking to avoid. In some instances participants were
crafting their identities in the negative, not being conservative, not supporting
patriarchy, not being homophobic or trans-phobic, not supporting terrorism, not
thinking Islam is the only religious truth. Due to their emphasis on their opposition to
some normative Muslim practices participants were very aware that their beliefs and
practices were not widely accepted in non-progressive Muslim communities.
However, this was not a great concern for them as a plural understanding of religion
allowed for a multitude of interpretations and identifications with Islam.
The idea of plural identities, and also by extension plural families, was
particularly important for participants as three female participants were married to
non-Muslim men and more than half had families with mixed religious backgrounds
(mostly due to their conversion). This created the need for Islam to be seen as one of
many ‘true’ religions and in the case of Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) they
created a plural Sunday School curriculum that represented all faiths as equal. This
allowed for acceptance for all parts of the family regardless of their faith.
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The need to accommodate inter-religious families is particularly important for
convert participants who have family members of different religions. The identities of
convert participants are interesting due to the fact that they have grown up outside of
Islam. Often they bring parts of their old identities and even religious practices into
their new religious identities. Emma, Ghadeer, Madeline and Ivy transferred some of
their religious assumptions from Christianity, particularly their views women’s
participation within worship spaces and attitudes to gender segregation. The plural
progressive view regarding the validity of other religions makes progressive Islam
attractive for converts because they are not presented with negative material regarding
their non-Muslim family’s religious and moral standing.
Three participants identified as agnostic or atheist while still practicing some
of the religious rituals of Islam like prayer. Interestingly, Ahmad Yousif argues that
pluralism may lead to disbelief or agnosticism, “While societal pluralism allows for
and can even encourage the existence of a wide range of permissible attitudes, beliefs,
lifestyles and values, it often leads to a general overall agnosticism or disbelief”
(2000: 33-34). Mark Chaves and Phillip Gorski (2001) also support this view in their
research on religious pluralism and religious participation, which found that religious
pluralism did not positively impact religious participation. This may go some way to
explaining the presence of agnostic and atheist Muslims in the data who have also
self-identified as a progressive Muslim. Progressive Islam allows for a diverse range
of beliefs and identities and in turn may create space for the acceptability of disbelief,
even within a religious based community.
In terms of identity formation Adis Duderija argues that Western-born
Muslims, “did not inherit a set of well-defined Islamic social and cultural values and
symbols and thus are unable to reproduce the ethno-religious identity of their parents
but have to reconstruct their own, thereby re-evaluating Islam in the new
sociocultural context” (Duderija 2007a: 146). In the data we can observe a
questioning and reconstruction of participant’s religious identities. Often they are
perceived to be combining Western liberal values of social justice and equality with
Islamic principles. Or perhaps more precisely, they are seeking out these themes in
Islamic texts and traditions. Interestingly Duderija contends that progressive
Muslims view their religious identity as “traditionally authentic” and that it is,
“derived from a particular interpretation of the normative sources of Islam, namely
the Qur’an and sunna” (Duderija 2007a: 151). Furthermore, Duderija claims that
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progressive Muslim scholars do not subscribe to commonly used dichotomies like
secularism versus religion, East versus West and tradition versus modernity
(Duderija 2011). “Instead, they engage in a multi-headed approach based on a
simultaneous critique of the many communities and discourses in which they are
situated.” (Duderija 2013: 73). Ebrahim Moosa outlines the most important aspect of
progressive Islam, a sense of belonging. “…[I]t is more than identity, more than texts
and practices, more than history. It is all that, plus more: the additional element
remains undefined, but it involves all those things that make one feel that you
belong” (Moosa 2007: 126).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have learned that one of the central principles of progressive Islam
is the idea of self-identified religious identity. The case study outlined the changing
nature of identity experienced by many progressive Muslims and a move from
collective to more individual conceptions of identity. The case study also illustrated a
‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010) through which Aarish combined his beliefs with
elements of his individual experiences. Although Aarish is unusual in the data
because he labels himself as a Muslim atheist he is still exemplary of the majority of
the participants in terms of illustrating a ‘do-it-yourself’ identity and religious
practice. In Beck’s cosmopolitan view he argues that just as intimate relationships
and family are subject to individual decisions and choices, religion also becomes
subject to this choice as part of what he calls ‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010:
49). Here Aarish’s identity is constructed from the collection of all his previous
decisions and actions and so also his religious beliefs are formed from his all his past
experiences including his intimate relationships, family and friendships. For
progressive Muslims in this research, this means that one’s relationship with God is
between the individual and God and that no one else has the right to judge another’s
religious commitment. This also follows the element of individualisation present in
everyday religion. Luckmann’s early theory maintains that the main strength of
individualised religion is being able to create both the social and the collective. This
collective will be explored further in Chapter Seven. Participants explained that
one’s status as a Muslim should rely solely on the act of self-identification. In saying
this, participants received negative reactions from conservative Muslims about their
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beliefs. Some participants had their opinions rationalised as ignorance of the correct
Islam by others because of their status as a convert or non-Arabic speaker.
For many progressive Muslims their negative experiences with normative
Islam have helped to shape and build their religious identity. Many participants see
more normative interpretations of Islam as standing in opposition to their beliefs and
interpretations of Islam and work to build an alternate identity that suits their own
experiences. For example, Aarish saw the ways in which dominant interpretations of
Islam perceive homosexuals as oppositional to his own beliefs, morals and
experiences with gay people he knew. Here he constructed his own interpretation of
what Islam says about homosexuality and in turn created a progressive Muslim
identity that suits his beliefs and experiences. Progressive beliefs often translate into
social or religious activism for many progressive Muslims in an attempt to remedy
some of the inequalities they perceive to be present in normative Islam. Safi
describes this in terms of a humanistic approach:
In this global humanistic framework, progressives conceive of a way of being Muslim that engages and affirms the full humanity of all human beings, that actively holds all responsible for a fair and just distribution of God-given natural resources, and that seeks to live in harmony with the natural world. (Safi 2007: xxv).
Participants also presented some aspects of everyday religion in their practices and
beliefs. These include individualised approaches to belief and practice, and an
emphasis on personal experience and autonomy. This type of religion is often un-
churched (un-mosqued), pluralistic and inclusive. Participants spoke about the
importance of a plural and inclusive version of Islam. It focuses on experiences and
must help individuals fulfill some sort of goal. Amongst progressive Muslims this
goal is often the achievement of equality and social justice. Here the boundaries of
Islam are undefined and Islam becomes more about the morals and values of each
practitioner than about a set of rules and customs. Progressive Islam can be described
as a pragmatic type of Islam.
In attempting to create harmony and social justice progressive Muslims place
an importance on retaining and honouring their Muslim and other identities and
experiences. This melding of diverse identities fits well with a plural worldview,
which encourages and celebrates diversity. Here the individualisation of religion also
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makes way for more diversity of religious identity and experience allowing
progressive Muslims to construct diverse identities. This plural worldview also fits
well with the concept of everyday religion as participants are forming individual
views and practices of Islam which are pragmatic, emphasise participation, and focus
on personal experience and autonomy. Following on from this chapter on identity the
next chapter will outline how progressive Muslims reinterpret the Qur’an and
Tradition in light of their diverse identities, goals, and humanistic beliefs in order to
create social change.
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ChapterSix:ReinterpretingtheQur’anandHadith
The re-interpretation of the Qur’an and the Tradition is a very important factor in
progressive Muslim thought and practice. The inspiration for the progressive Muslim
movement started as a series of scholarly reinterpretations and calls for social justice
to be introduced into Islamic practice in the early 2000s (Mandaville 2003). These
interpretations were constructed outside orthodox Islam but still have an impact on
what is perceived to be traditional because new or alternate interpretations can
strengthen the notion of orthodoxy.
Interpretations of Islam that are conducted outside these frameworks of orthodoxy impact on the Islamic landscape at large in ways that affect general views on what constitutes an orthodox doctrine or tenet, as well as the notion of orthodoxy itself (Kersten and Olsson 2013: 7).
This chapter describes the methods that progressive Muslims undertake in order to re-
contextualise and reinterpret the Qur’an and the Tradition in light of their beliefs on
social and gender justice and tests if these methods of interpretation are individualistic
in nature. Adis Duderija identifies four different methods of interpreting the Qur’an.
The first sees the interpreter engaging with texts through, “established legal theories
rather than directly” (2012: 183). The second method mostly avoids the taqlidi (to
follow a scholar without asking for explanation) method of interpretation and engages
with the Qur’an and hadith directly, “in addition to the (supposed interpretational)
consensus of the early generations of Muslims” (2012: 183). The third interpretational
method discards the hadith completely, but not necessarily the concept of the sunna
(oral transmissions of the sayings and actions of prophet Muhammed), and bases
Islamic law exclusively on the Qur’an (2012: 183). The fourth and final method
combines the first and second methods in addition to interpreting the Qur’an and
sunna, “in light of contemporary knowledge in humanities and social sciences. We
refer to this approach as critical-progressive” (2012: 183). This is the approach largely
favoured by progressive Muslims (2012). Duderija reminds readers that it is important
to keep in mind that the first three approaches are entirely pre-modern; “in terms of
their sources of knowledge and the manner of authenticating of knowledge” they rely
solely on “pre-modern traditional sciences developed by Muslim scholars” (2012:
183).
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Speaking more specifically, in terms of describing a basis for a progressive
interpretation of Islam Duderija describes what he calls the “contextual hermeneutic
for religious diversity liberation” (Duderija 2011: 10). This method attempts first to
outline the general attitudes present in the Qur’an and then takes into consideration
the overall historical contexts. Progressive Muslims see the Qur’an as both inclusive
and universal and identify pluralism as intrinsic to the Qur’anic worldview.
Progressives accept that there is no final and conclusive Qur’anic perspective and that
the Qur’an presents a constant marriage of ideas of social justice and issues of dogma.
In summation, they take a thematic or holistic approach to understanding the Qur’an
(Duderija 2011: 8).
Progressive Muslims from the data often indicated that they undertook their
own interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith to suit their individual circumstances.
Currently many Muslim intellectuals are functioning outside of the established
authority circles and are developing more open alternative hermeneutical methods to
re-interpret the Islamic message. Kersten and Olsson explain that:
This conceptualization of heritage, or turath, in the postcolonial and postmodern Muslim world is grounded in a notion of Islam as a civilization, rather than the narrower conventional understandings of religion as a set of doctrines, tenets, imperatives and prohibitions (2013: 2).
This relates to the more social and individualised view of Islam held by progressive
Muslims and paves the way for more pluralist understandings of Islam. These are also
facets of everyday religion.
This chapter outlines one of the ways that progressive Muslims deal with
social inequalities in their religious practices and understandings. Chapter Six begins
with a case study from Yohanes on the way he views the Qur’an and hadith and how
he has revisited and reinterpreted the Qur’an in light of other aspects of his identity.
Yohanes’ case provides a particularly clear illustration of the process of questioning
and reinterpretation that most progressive Muslims experience, although in different
ways, on their journey to reconcile their diverse identities with their beliefs.
Progressive Muslims are individualising and personalising their faith by creating what
Ulrich Beck refers to as personalised religious alternatives that combine their personal
experiences with religious values. Following the case study, data will be discussed via
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subthemes (questioning Islam, reinterpreting Islam, developing an individual
understanding of Islam and plural interpretations of Islam) and compared to data
presented in the case study. This chapter will demonstrate that participants employ a
variety of interpretational techniques in order to bring about social change and
equality. It will also argue that progressive Muslims are engaging in a form of
individualisation of faith in which they cultivate their own understandings of their
religious texts rather than seeking knowledge through an imam (prayer leader) or a
scholar. This also links to everyday religion particularly its emphasis on personal
experience and autonomy, as explained in Chapter Three.
CaseStudy:ReinterpretingtheQur’anandHadith-Yohanes
This case study presents several important themes including the reinterpreting of the
Qur’an, omitting the hadith, and the importance of studying and understanding Islam
on one’s own, pointing to the individualisation of faith. Moreover this case study will
show that the progressive Muslim practice of reinterpreting their religious texts in
order to instigate social change exhibits facets of Beck’s notion of ‘do-it-yourself
religion’. Yohanes is a 42-year-old visual artist residing in Virginia. Originally he is
from Aceh, Indonesia and is affiliated with Muslims for Progressive Values in an
online-only capacity. He also attends a non-progressive mosque occasionally. He
understands Islam through consulting the Qur’an and excluding the hadith and as such
is a Qur’anist. Yohanes described the way he learnt about Islam in his younger years:
So basically for the most part I learn (sic) Islam on my own. I kind of picked up a few things here and there. I went to the mosque a little bit, I would go to Jumma (Friday prayer). I read a little bit myself. My father taught me a little bit [42y/M/Online].
He spoke about trying hard in his younger years to do extra worship and find favour
with God. However, he felt like these practices were not genuine:
I did practice, I did pray five times a day. I also did extra prayer and then I did extra fasting. I also did extra salawat, you know sending blessings to the prophet Muhammed, but there’s this one thing that never diminishes from my mind. I always felt like it was not real [42y/M/Online].
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He said that he had been taking Qur’an class at a local mosque in Virginia on Sunday
for about six years. He felt that the message of the class was hard to grasp:
So until three months ago I noticed that the class was a little… it’s very hard to grasp. The class is like somebody trying to explain to you what a tree is but only showing you the trunk of the tree, you know? They kind of walk you close to the trees and you can smell the leaves a little bit and then they pull you away so that’s how I felt like (sic) [42y/M/Online].
He noticed that the teacher tended to answer the student’s questions through hadiths
and not focus as much on the Qur’an as he would like. This led him to question the
teacher’s way of interpreting the message of Islam:
He doesn’t mention hadiths specifically because he believes most of the hadith that Muslims practice (sic). He doesn’t say [in] black and white this is what the Qur’an is saying and it’s up to you how you digest it [42y/M/Online].
Yohanes explained that at that time he did not read the Qur’an by himself. He only
accessed the text when a teacher or religious scholar was leading him through it.
Slowly he began reading the Qur’an himself to gain his own understanding of the text
and checking his beliefs against the Qur’an:
Until the last three months I took my time and I checked everything that I do to make sure that the Qur’an says so, if not I don’t worry about it [42y/M/Online].
He identified a significant change in his faith when he began to interpret Islam
through the Qur’an alone. Combining the study of the Qur’an with personal moral
insights allowed him to reach a new understanding of Islam. The importance of the
Qur’an here points to the continued importance of some aspects of tradition. This
interpretative approach may be interpreted with Beck’s (2010) ideas on the
individualisation of religion - he suggests that individuals craft their own ‘do-it-
yourself’ religion and also Meredith McGuire’s lived religion. In this thesis no
differences will be made between lived and everyday religion. Yohanes is in effect
creating a version of Islam that best suits his values and personal experiences which
fits with facets of everyday religion. Everyday religion prioritises the morals and
values of each practitioner above traditional boundaries of religion and emphasises
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personal experience and autonomy (Bellah et al. 1996). Ammerman also confirms that
lived religion does often occur on the margins between innovative religious
experience and orthodoxy (2014: 190). By abandoning the hadith he was able to
disregard many of the parts of Islam he was uncomfortable with:
There was a big change on (sic) my faith when I found out that the Qur’an rejects all the hadiths that was a big thing for me. That was a great burden lifted because I had a problem with the hadith to begin with. The Qur’an rejects the hadith point blank29 in very strong terms. There was confusion in my mind and that was a huge relief [42y/M/Online].
Yohanes realised that the traditional approach to Islam was no longer sustainable for
him. Due to the use of the Internet, people have access to a wide range of opinions
and sources which encourages people to form their own religious opinions. This
allows some Muslims to cultivate a more individualistic view of Islam and
circumvents traditional authority structures (discussed further in chapters Eight and
Nine). The choices driven by individualisation are strengthened by the geographical
mobility of people and the ease of sharing information and ideas, which Beck argues
cultivates cosmopolitanisation, “as individuals are forced to confront preconceptions
of others and develop global sensibilities” (Mythen 2013: 119). Specifically,
individualisation relates to the idea that God is no longer the collective God of
tradition, but a chosen personal God grounded in individual faith (Wilke 2015: 267):
The traditional approach to Islam is no longer sustainable. With technology everything changed quickly and very fast. The young people now have access to very broad opinions. It used to be a very strong opinion and they didn’t hear much [else] and now they can go and check themselves without having to go through a bureaucracy [42y/M/Online].
Yohanes described what he saw as the solution – for Muslims to read the Qur’an
themselves and be critical about what they are reading. Here, he is advocating for an
individualist perspective on religion:
Yeah I think Muslims - if you can stress somewhere - that Muslims should read the Qur’an and use their brains. Here’s what happened Lisa, probably you noticed this. They read the Qur’an, they memorise a few
29 See Qur’an 45:6 “These are the verses of Allah which We recite to you in truth. Then in what statement after Allah and His verses will they believe?” and also Qur’an 7:185, 39:23, 77:50, 6:38.
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surah (chapters) and that’s it, the Qur’an goes to the shelf (sic). They don’t read the Qur’an with intense thinking. I think this is very important… They are reluctant to return to the Qur’an and check for themselves and then go from there. I have realised many Muslims don’t have an interest in relying on their own personal intellect and checking what the Qur’an is saying [42y/M/Online].
When it came to interpreting the Qur’an he felt that it was illogical to have only one
legitimate interpretation. He recognised the need for a diversity of interpretations, a
preference lending itself to pluralism:
Why is that with all the ranges of people out there that there can only be this one strict interpretation of religion? That blows my mind to think that people really believe that there is only one interpretation [42y/M/Online].
Yohanes described his practice of Islam and interpretation thereof to be flexible
according to current social conditions. He saw Islam as a way of life and not merely a
religion designating Islam as flexible and open to varied, plural interpretations.
McGuire reports that religious practitioners may dispense with practices that no
longer seem effective or useful but retain and modify others. At the level of the
individual, “religion is not fixed, unitary, or even coherent” (2008: 12):
I think Islam is really flexible about a lot of things. It’s really about each to their own, whatever interpretation you take out of that. A lot of people will tell you, a lot of conservatives will tell you, Islam is a lifestyle and it’s not just a rulebook. I always tell them if it is a lifestyle why does it make it so hard for you to live in this day and age, in this modern era? Why is your lifestyle so incompatible if it’s meant to be a religion for all times? [42y/M/Online].
After a re-exploration of Islam, Yohanes regarded Islam as a flexible religion with
many acceptable varied interpretations. He decided that focusing only on the Qur’an
would allow him to better ascertain the message of Allah. For him, the hadith
confused matters, as it was difficult for him to ensure their validity and relevance. The
hadith also contained elements that encouraged social inequality, which made him
uncomfortable. Totally discounting the hadith is not the norm among other
participants or non-progressive Muslims. However, like other participants, Yohanes
went through a process of re-examining and relearning Islam before he found an
interpretation that fit with his biographical experiences and plural worldview (Beck
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2010; Jeldtoft 2011). This re-examination and reconstruction of a personal Islam fits
with Beck’s notion of ‘a God of one’s own’ and illustrates an individualised practice
of Islam in which texts are understood individually. Beck envisioned a peaceful world
where individualised religion performed an important role. This emphasis on the
individual is also present in everyday religion. In the next sections, data will be
explored from a variety of participants and grouped by sub-theme in order to gain a
larger perspective from a number of participants. Broadly, these sections will discuss
the process of learning about and questioning Islam, leading participants to the
rereading of the Qur’an and hadith and eventually reinterpreting Islam to suit their
individual experiences echoing the practice of everyday religion. It will also discuss
the importance of gaining an individual understanding of Islam for progressive
Muslims featured in this thesis.
LearningAboutIslam
Often the way participants learnt about Islam changed throughout their life. Like
Yohanes, some participants gained knowledge about Islam in a traditional mosque
setting or from their parents. Later in their lives they were more likely to look for
information on their own. Participants described how they learnt Islam earlier in life:
Ayman: Well, I gained my religious knowledge throughout my life. I grew up in a Muslim family and I learned to read the Qur’an in a mosque in Karachi Pakistan. Ever since that time I have pursued an exploration and understanding of Islam and the Qur’an and the hadith, throughout my life I have always had intense interest as to what does it mean and to dig deeper [72y/M/QDG].
Like most participants Burak now likes to read the Qur’an and books about Islam on
his own. He also preferred searching for information on the Internet about Islam
rather than asking his parents:
Burak: Well I read books about Islam, so I like to read the Qur’an and I also like to visit groups like the group… Muslims for Progressive Values also on the Internet, so yes. I really like reading on the Internet and also learning from books, so I don’t take my knowledge from my parents because they don’t know much about Islam [18y/M/online].
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Participants changed the way that they learnt about Islam from a communal family or
mosque setting to a more individual search for meaning in which they read books and
looked for information online. This indicates that progressives are encountering an
individualisation of Islam. Instead of clinging to family traditions, Beck argues that
modern individuals become the inventors of personalised alternatives that combine
biographical experiences and faith values (Beck 2010). Furthermore, instead of
diminishing, Beck sees religion as establishing itself in new and complex ways and
also as being more closely aligned with self-identities (2010). He clarifies that the era
of individualisation is correspondingly the era of ‘do-it-yourself’ religions (Beck,
2010). He also describes a personalised and individualised religion in which
individuals construct their own Gods or multiple Gods or choose from various
elements of different religions. This could mean that individuals could be combining
features from Islam and Buddhism for example. However, it is difficult to argue that
this is the case for progressive Muslims. They are not choosing elements from
religions other than Islam but instead choose different viewpoints from within a
variety of scholarship and religious texts on Islam and weaving these with secular
values of human rights and liberalism. It could then be argued that they are instead
selecting ideas from ideologies like liberalism and combining these with elements of
Islam.
QuestioningIslam
As outlined in the previous chapter progressive Muslims are keen to retain
aspects of their Muslim identity. Some participants went through a process of
questioning and reexamining Islam and through this journey found a new way
to understand and identify with Islam. Two participants also identified as
agnostic Muslims, and another as a borderline atheist also saying that they pray
regularly and or lead prayers in Muslim congregations, but that they are still
unsure about the existence of God. Safi expands on this:
Among Muslims today, one also finds a variety of secular tendencies. Some Muslims come from a traditional heritage but are essentially agnostic in their outlook (often combined with the most antireligious interpretations of Marxism), whereas others interpret secularism as a call to keep the state powers out of the religious game. I have come to realize
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that in our desire to establish the widest possible ground for a “big tent” in some progressive Muslim organizations, we have left ourselves open to the problem of not having enough of a common ground (Safi 2007: xxx).
Progressive Islam presents a large variety of opinions and practices. The process of
identifying common ground amongst progressive Muslims can be challenging. As we
will see, progressive Muslims display a diversity of practices and beliefs.
Michelle was not sure what her own values were after leaving her marriage. She
had to start again and ascertain what her values were as she had spent a long time
being told what her opinions should be:
Michelle: I mean then a friend introduced me to the Progressive Muslim Union; this is before, just before Amina Wadud did her prayer. That was sort of the beginning, I mean well, for me. I didn’t know what it all meant. I just knew that all that I had was the stuff that I had learned with my ex because we converted pretty much at the same time so I needed to find something of my own that reflected my own values. I mean I wasn’t even sure what my own values were; I had to find that again as well [51y/F/ETJC].
Joyah felt that her reexamining of Islam might lead her to leave Islam altogether.
Instead she discovered a more liberating Islam that she could emotionally and
intellectually connect with:
Joyah: I really actually said this to myself that dear God I’m going to go through this learning process if I leave Islam so be it. If I come closer to Islam, then so be it. What I found is that I came even closer to Islam and I loved Islam. Before as a child you just go through the ritual process, it didn’t emotionally connect with me, now it emotionally connects with me, and intellectually because I find Islam to be quite intellectual, for me it has to be mental, not just the heart… So then I found Islam to be so much more liberating than the Islam I was raised on. I actually relearnt again [52y/F/MPV].
Aarish found himself trying to rationalise his belief in God – particularly in
conjunction with the idea that life is supposed to be a test from God, yet God already
knows the outcome of said test. He said this did not make sense to him:
Aarish: It became increasingly difficult for me to accept that everything was a test but worse I hadn’t even asked to take the test. It didn’t make me angry but it just didn’t make sense to me. I don’t have an anger
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towards it but I thought it was kind of absurd. I mean he [God] already knows the answer… It seems really futile if he already knows the result. It’s like a whole Olympics but the result is already known [26y/M/MPV].
Eighteen out of twenty participants said that they had become dissatisfied with, or
disconnected from normative Islam. They were particularly disillusioned with strict
interpretations of Islam and pursued what they described as more holistic and
balanced and sustainable. The other two participants did not comment on normative
Islam. Michelle described her experience of that type of blind following as sick and
unhealthy:
Michelle: It’s [normative Islam] really really controlling and really sick on a whole bunch of levels… There’s a lot of cognitive dissonance in dealing with them [normative Muslims]. And so it was an extremely unhealthy thing and it got me to a really unhealthy place [51y/F/ETJC].
Through questioning her faith Madeline came to the conclusion that she was Muslim
but also borderline agnostic and that she does not share similar beliefs with the
majority of Muslims. Here she is aware that she is constructing an individual version
of Islam:
Madeline: It is [complicated], it is, because my own personal faith is borderline agnostic for the most part. So people are like, “What does Islam think about this?” I’m like, “You probably don’t want to know what I think Islam says about this. It’s not the textbook answer so... not sorry” [35y/F/MPV].
Many progressive Muslims entered into a period of questioning and restudying Islam
before identifying as progressive. Progressive Muslims are aware that social changes
are more easily enacted if leveraged with evidence from the Qur’an and the Tradition,
or from an Islamic framework.. Some participants reported being agnostic or atheist
but still Muslim perhaps placing the Muslim label in a cultural, social, as well as
religious category. This also indicates an inclination toward an individualised Islam, or
an everyday Islam, that caters to the experiences, values and preferences of each
individual.
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RereadingtheQur’anandHadith
After a period of questioning Islam, progressive Muslims set about rereading and
reinterpreting the Qur’an and hadith with their ideals of social and gender justice in
mind. Again a critical individual standpoint was important:
Joyah: Muslims need to relearn Islam. They need to reinterpret it and be more critical of what they’re reading. So it’s really foggy because the Qur’an is really adamant about us as individuals reading and being critical of what we read and our lives - how we live our lives. What we tend to do is that we continue along and we say, “oh imam what should I do?” You know people are sheeps (sic) and the Qur’an is - if anything - is so much more - it teaches us to be contrary to the way we are wired. We are wired to be sheeps there’s no ifs or buts about that. The Qur’an is teaching us not to be sheeps. That’s a problem with Muslims they are sheeps [52y/F/MPV].
Other participants also pointed to a discrepancy between the Qur’an and hadith. Burak
felt that Islam was progressive for its time as it tried to prevent the infanticide of
young girls and gave women a right to some inheritance when previously they had no
right to any inheritance. However, he recognises that the unequal inheritance laws
under shari’a law could be seen as unequal and problematic in contemporary
societies:
Burak: Men and women are treated different in the Islamic shari’a, why does the Qur’an say such and such and the hadith says something else? You can look at this in the fact that women do not get so much money if for example if the father dies the son gets more than the daughter. How can this be? It always depends on the historic situation, so for example Islam is really misogynistic, but in the pre-Islamic Arabic people would bury their [newborn] daughters…. Also [after Islam] women had the right to have something from the money of the father or the mother [inheritance]. In fact it was progressive in that time [18y/M/online].
Michelle explained that in her understanding there is no one interpretation of Islam
because for her the Qur’an does not exist outside our own interpretation of it. Here the
lens through which people choose to read and interpret the Qur’an is important:
Michelle: The Qur’an doesn’t exist outside of our interpretation of it, so I don’t think it has anything expect for what we say is in it so whatever lens we're going to use is how we are going to get what we want [51y/F/ETJC].
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For Aarish a lot of the traditional interpretations of the Qur’an felt unnatural and he
started to question the way he was expected to think and act. This act of questioning
was the first step towards a ‘do-it-yourself’ everyday Islam. Gender separation did not
make logical sense to him:
Aarish: With a lot of Qur’anic teachings things just started to feel unnatural, where I was forcing myself to hate certain types of people [LGBTQ]. When I was forcing myself to act a certain way around women that didn’t feel natural. The whole gender separation didn’t make sense to me [26y/M/MPV].
Ayman explained that a large part of the misunderstanding about Islam was the
method the majority of Muslims employ to read the Qur’an. He believes the Qur’an
should be read ayah (verse) by ayah not as an essay:
Ayman: A great deal of misunderstanding - actually most of the misunderstanding of Islam about the Qur’an among Muslims and non-Muslims and I include the scholars, even a professor of Islamic studies in an American university and I know several of them, I include the Muslim scholars. When they read the Qur’an they ignore the basic fact about its structure, it is not an essay. It does not consist of stories it consists of discreet insights [72y/M/QDG].
Michelle pointed out that if read literally the Qur’an does not provide for human
rights. In her opinion there are many way to read the Qur’an and many different
interpretations can be derived from it:
Michelle: You know you look at the Qur’an straight up and it doesn’t even provide human rights. You know? I mean for God’s sake. I mean slavery, sex slavery and all that other kind of stuff. It’s all right there. If you were to read it literally and historically you’ve got some serious problems. They’re reading it in their own way, right? So you know they’re [normative Muslims] reading it through the tradition, for the tradition to say particular things and that’s how they’re getting their answers, just like everybody else, thinks that they’re reading it properly [51y/F/ETJC].
Contrary to Michelle, Aarish felt that social justice and equality was spelled out
clearly in the Qur’an but that over the years it had been misinterpreted by people in
order to gain power:
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Aarish: I think it’s [equality] very black and white spelled out in the Qur’an and they think that over the years it has been misinterpreted as any religious book can be, for the gains of men [26y/M/MPV].
Like Yohanes, Lemzo is also a Qur’anist and does not place much emphasis on the
hadith when trying to reexamine Islam:
Lemzo: Also, I don’t understand why people take the hadith so seriously. The Prophet Muhammad said that nothing he says should be written down except the Qur’an [25y/M/online].
Due to the issues of inequality in literal interpretations of the Qur’an, Ali decided that
he wanted to work on a liberationist Muslim theology stemming from the Qur’an. He
sees Islam and its embodiment in the Prophet as intrinsically liberationist:
Ali: I actually want to be working on and helping to develop a liberational theology from the Qur’an and from within Qur’anic exegesis. I suspect a lot of that will come through Sufism and through Sufi teachings. I think the notion of liberation is intrinsic and innate to Islam and the teachings and the Prophet. Has that always been manifest? No and other visions of Islam that exclude vision of liberation absolutely. So again speaking of the dualisms of Islam. My own sense is that the inherent teachings of the Prophet as embodied in the Qur’an and in the authentic examples of the Prophet are liberational if we understand them - if we understand them [50y/M/ETJC].
Afreen raised the issue of a language barrier when accessing the message of the
Qur’an. Traditionally it has been taught and read in Arabic even if that is not a
language that the reader understands. For her the important part is that people look
into diverse plural interpretations and implement what they discover:
Afreen: Especially if you have grown up learning in a certain language, learning the Qur’an while it may be great it’s not really helpful if Arabic isn’t your first language and the Qur’an isn’t in the type of Arabic that’s being spoken today. If you are going to learn it you really need to take it on and learn different interpretations and be open to that [26y/F/MPV].
Ayman also mentioned that one of the issues that Muslims face when trying to
understand and interpret the Qur’an is the practice of attempting to access the Qur’an
through sound or intonation. Using this method it is impossible to understand the
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meaning and the recitation becomes more like music. This raises questions for Ayman
about if or how people understand the message of Islam:
Ayman: So the current practice in the Muslim culture in the US or in any other country is that they are trying to access the Qur’an through intonation - through sound and even without having any vague ambition to understand what it says [72y/M/QDG].
Interestingly even amongst progressives who usually favour varied and plural
interpretations of the Qur’an and Traditions there is still a sense that there is a specific
way that the Qur’an was intended to be read and that not all interpretations are good
or equal:
Michelle: I mean Amina Wadud thinks that [there are different interpretations], she reads it as it was intended. Right? So I like to think how I do is with one intention (sic). I think she would also say that too. That it is a way of reading, an authentic way of reading. A lot of ‘authentic’ ways of reading really suck [51y/F/ETJC].
Ayman also explained that he believes that many Muslims do not make an effort to
read and understand the Qur’an and that by trying to access its wisdom through its
mere presence. He sees this as one of the causes for problems in the Muslim world:
Ayman: I think if you want to understand and you want to access the deep wisdom in the Qur’an we have to think about it… The Muslim world at this stage, through the centuries, is in a state of denial about the Qur’an, they just pay homage to it. You may not be aware of it, but in large parts of the Muslim world the people believe that it’s not even necessary to understand the Qur’an because it has baraka (blessings) just because it is there and so you listen to it and it’s like a sing-song and so it’s something so simple but it’s a huge factor in a lot of the problems that Muslims have [72y/M/QDG].
His solution to this is to modify the way he reads the Qur’an. Instead of reading it like
an essay he suggested instead that one should focus on an ayah or verse that appeals
to them. Furthermore, that it should be read and pondered upon and also discussed
with friends to gain multiple perspectives and interpretations:
Ayman: Actually the Qur’an if to be read vertically that is you take one ayah that appeals to you right? Then you think through it and spend as
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much time as you like to think about it and discuss it with your friends and see what they say about it. If you read it, the Qur’an, you will discover meaning and insights that you did not initially suspect [72y/M/QDG].
At least three of the participants described themselves as Qur’anists and had
completely forsaken the incorporation of hadith in their interpretation of Islam. The
majority of participants placed more emphasis on the message of the Qur’an than on
that of the hadith. Here we observe that progressive Muslims view the Qur’an and its
message in a plurality of different ways. Some see its message as inherently equal but
ultimately misinterpreted by humans. Others object to it being read literally and
explain that the Qur’an must be reinterpreted to suit the current social conditions and
read through a lens of social equality with the intention to manifest social justice.
There is a marked difference between progressive Muslims who see the possibility of
multiple acceptable interpretations of the Qur’an and between normative Muslims
who see only one valid interpretation. Beck (2010) identifies two faith types: one
closed and hierarchical and the other open and based on individual choice. This model
is useful for describing progressive Muslims as they clearly fit into the open
individual model while normative Islam could be regarded as belonging to the former
category.
ReinterpretingIslam
After rereading the Qur’an and hadith, participants rationalised that with the diversity
of people and societies that there could not possibly be only one correct interpretation
of the Qur’an and hadith:
Emma: When people read the Qur’an they see different things. I think people should be free to do that, just as I don’t want somebody telling me what to believe, I don’t want to do that to others. I think that there is a way for us to be accepting of each other and I’m not saying different sects [of Islam] because I think we are all one but to have more liberal type avenues to work with [42y/F/MPV].
Zaynab explained that in her view there is a great deal of latitude provided for
Muslims to pair their understanding of religion with local customs and to interpret the
Qur’an accordingly:
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Zaynab: Well I think that we have a great tool with a lot of latitude given to us that in its purest form gives us much more than we take nowadays in my community. The latitude I believe comes from a concept called ‘urf, ‘Urf refers to local habits and traditions, it’s a minor aspect of deciding rulings about things, but it is a factor. The reality is that locally there might be a preference for one thing or another and it could be allowed for in Islam [47y/F/online].
For Trent, plural interpretations and personal inclinations were important in his
relationship with God. He felt that one’s understanding of Islam had to evolve with
the times. This indicates the preference for an individualised everyday Islam:
Trent: Also through the khutbahs (sermons) with Michelle and Ali, it’s all about interpretation. If you want to interpret something 1400 years ago it’s like you’re cutting yourself off from so many things. Also, if we are made in God’s image, we do evolve, we do learn, we don’t just stay in this linear way. For me, it’s always been about that, what’s your interpretation and what’s your feeling? [44y/M/ETJC].
The unchanging nature of the Qur’an and the Tradition was an important point for
many respondents. Often their solution to this was to change their view of the text and
its implementation:
Burak: It [Islam] has to change, it has to. The main problem with religion is that religion says that so and so you have to live your life, so if you took the Bible and the Qur’an there are words that stand there they don’t change, they can’t change. You can change your view. For example, you can also talk about slavery in the Qur’an; I think there is no Islamic country that allows slavery [now] is there? [18y/M/online].
Aarish explains he does not struggle with misogynistic hadith because he understands
that following these sorts of hadith is against progressive Muslim principles and the
dominant themes of the Qur’an as interpreted by progressive Muslims. The principles
of MPV that he mentions cover social, gender and sexual equality, universal human
rights, the separation of religion and state authorities, freedom of speech, diversity,
and critical analysis and interpretation:
Aarish: So for me it’s the realisation of the [progressive] principles and using that as a lens to follow Islam. Anything that disagrees with that perspective I don’t agree with there’s a reason. Like that hadith about
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women being individuals of the hellfire, I don’t need to go through usul al deen (principles of religion) to reject hadith, or even I don’t need to reject that hadith in and of itself. It doesn’t require me to, that it’s against the principles of Islam [26y/M/MPV].
Progressive Muslims agreed that there should be a plurality of possible interpretations
of the Qur’an and that an understanding of Islam should move with the times. They
also indicated a preference for a more individualised approach to Islam. This excluded
literal, conservative interpretations of the Qur’an from the variety of preferred or
accepted interpretations of Islam. This may point to a limit in the pluralism of
progressive Muslims as their acceptance of a variety of interpretations of the Qur’an
and hadith only extends to interpretations that they find acceptable and that reflect
their principles and values. Individualised ways of viewing religion and ritual
practices echo an orientation towards an individual’s capacity to employ personal
reasoning, which are often constructed on self-formulated conception of Islam as
pragmatic and functional. The individual has the authority to reinterpret, pick and
choose from a variety of Islamic traditions. Conventional forms of religious tradition
and authority are regarded as less important. What is more important is one’s own
relationship to God, whatever form that might take (Jeldtoft 2011).
DevelopinganIndividualUnderstandingofIslam
Pre-modern approaches to interpretation are founded on the assumption that to
distinguish what is ethically correct that, “humans must always rely only on revelation
and revelation derived sources and can never know what is ethically right by
independent reason” (Duderija 2012: 188). This is still the most prevalent stance
among Muslims and using independent reasoning is frowned upon. However,
“critical-progressive” interpretative stances highlight the significance of independent
reason. They imagine that they can autonomously make decisions about what is
morally and ethically right and that, “the function of revelation in that regard is to
merely ‘remind’ humanity of their ethical obligations” (2012: 189). For many
progressive Muslims developing an individual understanding and interpretation of the
Qur’an and hadith was important. This demonstrates a move toward the
individualisation of Islam. In Beck’s cosmopolitan imagination he suggests that just
as employment histories, intimate relationships and family are subject to individual
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decisions and choices, religion also becomes a part of what he terms the ‘do-it-
yourself’ identity (Beck 2010: 49). This ‘do-it-yourself’ approach to religion is made
possible through the dynamics of cosmopolitanism, globalisation and
individualisation, which are said to interrupt conventional formations of sociality and
introduce new social formations (Beck 2010). Like Yohanes who introduced this
chapter, James is also a Qur’anist and constructs an individual ‘do-it-yourself’
understanding of Islam:
James: I’m a free spirit and I interpret the Qur’an as I see fit, and as it sees to my condition… as goes the Quaker saying. I do not read the hadith nor do I follow all these ‘Islam’ books circulating everywhere, where they even tell you how to be in the toilet. It’s crazy [51y/M/online].
Being required to defer moral decision making and interpretation to a religious leader
or scholar was considered undesirable for progressive Muslims and they preferred a
more individual approach:
Aarish: If we have to go and check with someone else if it’s permissible to do a certain act we’re doing it wrong. If you need to go to a religious body [in order to] to get that answer, that seems very alarming. That should be a rational emotion to know that that’s wrong. It should be self-evident. The fact that we need to go to the scholars for an opinion on that is just very very strange. We defer so much of our thought process to the ulama (religious scholars). That bothers me a lot [26y/M/MPV].
Many progressive Muslims are moving away from a collective view of the practice of
Islam and are instead taking up an individualistic view. Trent highlighted the fact that
Muslims will face God individually on the Day of Judgment:
Trent: So for me also when you meet your maker you will have that conversation on your own. It’s not me, it’s not your mother… It’s not the imam, it’s not some sheikh in Saudi Arabia with his fatwa (legal ruling); he’s not going to be there. It’s going to be you and God. That’s it, so it doesn’t really matter what anybody else thinks [44y/M/ETJC].
The process of rationalising religious rulings and the consideration of historical
context amongst progressive Muslims in their interpretations extends broadly across
all areas of Islamic jurisprudence, but is particularly prevalent around the topics
involving social, gender, and sexual equality. Aarish went as far as to say that he
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could not worship a God who created inequalities or who punished people due to the
way they were created or their natural state:
Aarish: It’s like okay I agree with these higher objectives because these are pretty humanistic rules and they protect life and family and all these other things. The laws I don’t think they are necessarily relevant anymore - rules about hitting slaves are not relevant anymore because we don’t have any slaves. There’s a moral behind them, but we don’t need to follow them. I think we need a few more Islamic governments to understand how shitty that whole thing is. It’s all fun and games until there is an Islamic revolution [26y/M/MPV].
Ayman said that he sensed that a lot of Muslims feel uncomfortable about reading and
interpreting the Qur’an on their own and that doing so was highly disapproved of in
normative Muslim circles:
Ayman: Most people feel uncomfortable about it [individual interpretation] – it’s confronting. They have steeped you in conformity where dissent or deviation from accepted thinking is highly disapproved [72y/M/QDG].
Developing an individual understanding of the Qur’an was important to progressive
Muslims and directly informs their practice. All participants believed that Muslims
will face Allah alone on the Day of Judgment and that they will be individually
responsible for their decisions and actions. Therefore, they believe they should
develop an individual understanding of Islam so they can be prepared to answer for
their choices. Developing an individual ‘do-it-yourself’ Islam also allows participants
the opportunity to craft an Islam that suits their own personal experiences, hence
connecting biographical experience with faith (Beck 2010). This individualisation
also connects with everyday religion which is concentrated on experiences and not
always equated with traditional religion and also helps individuals to fulfill some sort
of goal in their lives (Jeldtoft 2011).
TheImportanceofHistoricalContext
In conducting an interpretation of the Qur’an historical context was significant for
participants. Participants identified the peculiar task of trying to interpret a 1400-year-
old text to make sense in today’s world and conversely identified issues with viewing
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the Western world through an ahistorical lens. The answer to these issues was often to
look at the trajectory of the Prophet’s message and then visualise where that trajectory
would go according to today’s social conditions:
Aarish: I think there are a lot of things about life here [New York] that seem strange to someone who was born and raised a Muslim. It’s also weird the age difference between Muhammad and Aisha right? Also like the slaughter of animals. Even with the rationalisation process it’s still kind of strange. My thing is that it would be unfair of me to see what the rasul (messenger) was like and judge him according to 21st century standards or American morality or Western morality. That goes both ways it doesn’t make any sense for me to live my life by seventh century Arab mentality or temporally based mentality [26y/M/MPV].
Progressive Muslims exhibit a pattern of seeking historical precedents in order to
label a practice as halal (permissible), even if there are only one or two cases of an
action being performed. This stems from the dislike of introducing anything new into
Islam called bidah (innovation in religious matters). For normative Muslims
praiseworthy actions must have precedence in the time of the Prophet or the Salaf
(pious ancestors). “The critical-progressive approach therefore strongly emphasises
the role of historical context in the formulation of the revelatory content and the
nature of its legal injunctions and employ this in their interpretation of the texts”
(Duderija 2012: 187). However, for some progressive Muslims this is at the crux of
what they would like to change about Islamic practice:
Aarish: The Salafis need evidence for everything to make it haram (unlawful) or halal (permissible) but I’m not interested in that. I want to go one step further and ask for evidence that any of this is real. They break the taqleed (to imitate or follow without question) with fiqh (theory of Islamic law) and I break the taqleed with aqidah (creed). I can’t believe something that I can’t see; I need evidence [26y/M/MPV].
Burak felt that Islam should change with the times and be interpreted to suit
contemporary conditions:
Burak: Yes, I consider myself a progressive Muslim because I think the Islam which was lived 1400 years ago is meant to be lived right now like this [progressive]. People change and the message of our Prophet can be in this time, but they have to be interpreted another way. So contemporary... [18y/M/online].
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Aarish explained that the search for authenticity that many Muslims undertake when
interpreting Islam is not needed to make it a valid opinion at the current time:
Aarish: Let’s not kid ourselves that our positions about homosexuality, our positions about female prayer leadership, let’s not kid ourselves, it [historical precedent] doesn’t exist. People grasp at straws… We don’t need to have it exist 500 years ago, 1000 years ago for this opinion to be legitimate. The fundamental thing with people who want reform or change is this idea of authenticity being that if you can find anywhere in the history where someone has done it – it’s okay [26y/M/MPV].
There is a diversity of opinion amongst progressive Muslims on the importance of
historical context. While many progressive Muslims find knowing the historical
context behind certain revelations liberating in terms of ascertaining their real
meaning others find the need to seek historical precedence for an action to be
considered halal as unreasonable.
Discussion:PluralInterpretationsofIslam
Participants employed similar hermeneutical methods to interpret the Qur’an and the
hadith but often arrived at slightly different conclusions. Hermeneutics is the theory
and methodology of interpretation, especially the interpretation of religious texts.
Hermeneutics in Islam relies on a long tradition of tafsir, the exegesis of the Qur’an.
Although progressive Muslims who participated in this research largely agreed on
interpretations of the Qur’an that supported their views on social justice, their
preferred position was that there are many acceptable readings of the Qur’an and the
Tradition. Put simply this means that they advocate for a plurality of interpretations of
Islam and do not recognise one ‘true’ understanding of Islam. ETJC extend this goal
of pluralism even further and have a “no talkback rule on theology” which means that
no one is permitted to criticise another’s interpretation of the Qur’an or hadith or their
way of practicing. This allows members of the congregation the freedom to develop
an individual understanding of Islam without the fear of judgment or exclusion.
Adis Duderija (2012) describes three primary methods of Qur’anic
interpretation and one critical-progressive method used by progressives. The first two
interpretative methods were developed in the pre-modern period and are
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philologically driven (2012: 184). There are some implications of these
interpretational assumptions. Duderija rightly argues that these assumptions
contribute to the notion that there is an inherent fixed meaning in the texts and also
that these methods of interpretation marginalise the historical nature of the Qur’an
and hadith and discount their context (2012). On the other hand, the critical
progressive approach upholds the idea that meaning is not simply retrieved from the
texts and that the reader is not in a position to discern the meaning intended by the
author in an objective way (2012: 186). Critical progressives highlight that the reader
brings, “his or her socio-cultural background, education, sense of morality etc., in
helping produce or create meaning…” (2012: 186). They suppose that the reader can
only estimate the meaning intended by the author but never objectively capture it.
This assumption means that while a text can be static regarding its wording it can
sustain a wide variety of valid interpretations (2012: 186). Interpretative context is
important. It ensures pluralism inside and outside of Islam. “By allowing the
interpretation and practice of Islam to be context-driven one also ensures a robust
diversity and pluralism” (Moosa 2007: 127). Pluralism is central to the findings of
this thesis and is also embedded within the framework of everyday religion.
Participants described interpreting the Qur’an and hadith in a variety of ways
including omitting the hadith completely but they all read and interpreted the texts
with social equality in mind. This is supported by the writing of Omid Safi, “At the
heart of a progressive Muslim interpretation is a simple yet radical idea: every human
life, female and male, Muslim and non-Muslim, rich or poor, “Northern” or
“Southern,” has exactly the same intrinsic worth” (2003a: 3).
Regarding equality Meena Sharify-Funk (2008) sets out the importance of
reevaluating and reinterpreting the Qur’an and hadith in order to achieve gender
justice. She analysed hermeneutical methods of interpretation and analysis and found
that: firstly that different interpretations lead interpreters to diverse conclusions; and
secondly, she argues that these varied methods of interpretation, “have real
consequences for social practice towards Muslim women” (Sharify-Funk 2008: 22).
They attach religious discourse to political issues that engage intellectuals, activists,
and society at large. Thirdly she argues that reformist thinkers encourage Muslims to
seek out essential Muslim values and principles in the Qur’an and hadith and
reformulate new understandings of the texts. She implores readers to seek different
ways of applying Muslim precepts in order to increase gender justice in all spheres of
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life, “intellectually, socially, politically, economically, etc.” (Sharify-Funk 2008: 22).
However, Hilary Kalmbach indicates that those who “attempt to reinterpret the
Qur’an to justify lifestyles and laws closer to the values of secular liberalism are not
authoritative in the eyes of the religious mainstream” (2012: 51). The eighth chapter
in this thesis will discuss progressive Muslim gender activism and women’s
leadership in more detail.
As presented in this chapter, Ebrahim Moosa argues that there is a major
difference between progressive Muslims and their detractors, “that the latter are either
wedded to dated methodologies or committed to doctrines and interpretations that
have lost their rationales and relevance over time” (2007: 117). Many of these
differences originate from differences in interpretative methods and assumptions. In
critical-progressive Muslim thought the role of the interpreter holds more importance.
The Qur’an itself is understood to accommodate multiple interpretative methods
resulting in plural readings of the same text (Duderija 2008a: 416). Here it also
important to highlight that progressive Muslims recognise an important difference
between divine and human understandings of religious texts (Soroush 2002). They
believe that the Qur’an and sunna are, “subject to humanly constructed
interpretational processes and that [there is] a distinction between ‘religion and
religious knowledge’” (Duderija 2007b: 355-356). To put it simply, progressive
Muslims perceive and insist on a distinction between shari’a (divine worldview) and
fiqh (the human understanding of shari’a).
Participants also relied on contextualising verses of the Qur’an in order to
attempt to understand their true or preferred meaning. For example, regarding the
story of the prophet Lut, which is often used to prohibit homosexuality, progressive
Muslims interpret the story to be representative and prohibitive of rape and not of
homosexuality. However, other participants (Aarish) felt historical precedents were
not important and called for a total rationalisation of religious reasoning that would
include the ability to introduce new religious interpretations and practices without it
ever being done in Muslim communities previously. This is the opposite view of the
normative Islamic principle that requires that there be no innovations in Islamic
understanding and practice.
Differences can be identified between participants regarding which texts are
examined and which are ignored. Three participants described themselves as
Qur’anists, meaning that in their efforts to understand and interpret what Islam means
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they consult the Qur’an exclusively and completely dismiss the hadith. A total
rejection of the hadith is not common amongst the rest of the participants with other
participants selecting or rejecting hadith on the basis of their rationality or
irrationality and also their compatibility with their liberal views on social justice and
equality. However, it should be noted that the data shows that progressive Muslims do
not place as much importance on religious texts as normative Muslims. They rarely
quote them and primarily do so when in discussion with other non-progressive
Muslims.
Progressive Muslims privilege the moral over the legal in the Qur’anic text.
Lower order principles should be subservient to higher order values of justice,
equality, dignity and mercy. These values can be traced back to the Qur’anic concept
of tawhid (the unity of God) that is considered an important theme running through
the Qur’an (Duderija 2008a: 416-417). This is exemplified through the data with
participants seeking to interpret the Qur’an and the Tradition in light of principles of
social justice and righteous conduct. Participants also ignored parts of the Qur’an and
hadith that they felt had lower values, such as verses that can be seen to promote
social inequality, particularly misogyny. These interpretations are feasible and match
the underpinning of the Qur’an. Duderija contends that these progressive
interpretations of Muslim religious texts are conceptually feasible but are, in his
estimations, said to carry more, “religiously normative justification than illiberal
interpretations, as they are seen to be in harmony with the moral and ethical
foundations underpinning the Qur’an and Sunna” (Duderija 2013: 77).
Developing socially just interpretations of the Qur’an and the Tradition has
been labeled as “hermeneutic activism” (Duderija 2013: 70). This textual form of
activism is said to be the basis of social change. Duderija describes participants in this
type of activism as “scholar-activists” who, “engage in textual or hermeneutic
activism which entails a “multiple critique,” i.e. they simultaneously challenge both
(1) ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim hegemonic discourse on issues such as
modernity, human rights, gender, justice, and democracy, and (2)
mainstream Western socio-political and legal theories, and certain secular
Enlightenment assumptions that underpin them” (Duderija 2013: 70).
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Similar to the participants, these scholar-activists seek social change from within “a
faith-based framework” (Duderija 2014: 434). This suggests that religious knowledge,
“can act as a basis for social transformation, revolution and collective political
activism” (Duderija 2014: 434). Critical-progressive social hermeneutics also
contribute to the development of a discourse of social and gender justice, equality,
democracy and human rights (Abou El Fadl 2009; Moosa 2007; and Duderija 2014).
This is also the case among the participants putting progressive, socially just and
gender equal interpretations of Islam into practice to instigate social change. There are
two types of progressive Muslim pluralism in the data: Islamic and Western liberal.
Progressive Muslims from this research draw the majority of their plural ideas from a
Western liberal model. However, there are limits to progressive pluralism. Although
they claim to be inclusive of all, progressive Muslims do not welcome debate in their
spaces and as such do not welcome more conservative Muslims who disagree with
their views (see Chapter Seven).
Conclusion
In the case study Yohanes underwent a process of re-examining and re-learning Islam
before he found an interpretation that fit with his biographical experiences and plural
worldview (Beck 2010). This reconstruction of an individual Islam fits with Beck’s
notion of ‘a God of one’s own’ and illustrates an individualised practice of Islam in
which texts are understood individually. Other participants also indicated a preference
for an individualised Islam. Progressive Muslims from the data described the
difference between learning about Islam earlier in their lives and how they approach it
now. For most they employ an individual stance towards learning about Islam and
sought out information from books and the Internet (see Varisco 2004) rather than
from a normative mosque or scholars.
Progressive Muslims often go through a process of questioning Islam and
rereading the Qur’an and hadith on their journey to reconcile different elements of
their identities with their faith. Progressive Muslims then go about reinterpreting
Islam with a plural worldview while taking into consideration the historical context so
as to gain a greater understanding about the reasons for revelation. Reinterpretation is
also particularly important to the social formation of progressive Islam. It serves as
the inspiration for the progressive Muslim movement through scholarly
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reexaminations and reinterpretations of the Qur’an and the Tradition and through calls
for social justice to be emphasised in Islamic practice. These reinterpretations create
the possibility of social change and prompt progressive Muslims to create inclusive
worship spaces according to their understanding of Islam as pro-social justice. This
call for individual reinterpretations of Islam represents what Beck calls ‘do-it-
yourself’ religion and indicates that progressive Islam is an individualised version of
Islam and also links to elements of everyday religion in that it is pragmatic and places
emphasis on personal experience and autonomy and also is largely concerned with the
morals and values of each individual practitioner.
This chapter has examined the importance of the reinterpretation of the Qur’an
and hadith for progressive Muslims and its relation to the individualisation of religion.
Here participants present an individualised way of understanding Islam. This chapter
has answered the aim of the thesis by examining the levels of individualisation
present in progressive interpretations of religious texts. Following on from this the
next chapter will explore the social manifestation of these interpretations, exploring
how and why progressive Muslims create plural, inclusive worship spaces.
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ChapterSeven:CreatingaPluralMuslimCommunity
Although progressive Muslim communities do exist in physical forms, large numbers
of progressive Muslims also seek community in online forums and discussion boards
with eight out of twenty participants reporting that they do not attend a physical
progressive worship space or normative mosque. Instead many of them congregate on
the Facebook pages of MPV or ETJC, using these as a discussion forum and a place
to share, connect and discuss ideas. As of August 2016 the main MPV Facebook has
well over 18,000 members. Members use these discussion forums in quite a personal
way to gain support sometimes asking, “Is anyone I know online now? Please inbox
me”. These discussion forums are also used to publise the chapters and their events.
Participants explain that their organisations would not exist without the Internet
becoming a tool to organise socially and to disseminate information free from the
bounds of normative religious authority. The online environment also provides a
space to discuss religious opinions freely.
This chapter aims to describe why and how inclusive progressive Muslim
communities are formed. One of the ways that progressive Muslims deal with
inequality is to start their own worship spaces that reflect their values of pluralism and
social and gender justice. This chapter will outline the organisational vision of both
Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) and El-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC). To begin
this chapter presents a case study about creating an inclusive mosque from Michelle
of ETJC. This is an important case because it describes the motivations and processes
of starting a space from conception, to growing and maintaining the space. Michelle is
not representative of the majority of the participants, because not all participants
formed their own unity mosques, but provides an excellent example of what is
involved in creating an inclusive worship space and the motivations behind doing so
because she describes this process in detail in her interview. Following the case study
the data will be examined via subthemes (progressive communities, online
communities, and progressive Islam in practice) in order to determine the nature of
progressive communities and the importance of individualism to their members.
CaseStudy:CreatingaUnityMosque–Michelle
This case study presents themes of inter and intra-religious pluralism and outlines the
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importance of community belonging. Nancy Ammerman argues that those who find
spiritual solidarity form a spiritual tribe. “Wherever a spiritually inclined person finds
another person who is at least open to talking about the world in terms that include
religious dimensions, what I call a ‘spiritual tribe’ has formed” (2014: 199). This
could be true of the way that progressive Muslims find community both on and
offline. She also asserts that institutional spiritual tribes and those without official
organisation are both locations where religion should be sought out by sociologists
(Ammerman 2014). It also details the reasons for opening the unity mosque and how
it was started. The case study will illustrate that progressive Muslims are putting
activism into practice by creating a type of ‘do-it-yourself religion’ or ‘everyday
religion’ that crafts personalised alternatives that combine biographical experiences
with religious values (Beck 2010). Michelle resides in Toronto, Canada and is a
Caucasian convert to Islam from a Jewish background. She is one of the co-founders
of ETJC Unity Mosque in Toronto. She also holds a PhD in Islamic studies. When we
talked she shared with me the process of starting and maintaining a progressive or
inclusive Muslim community. ETJC is an umbrella organisation and has a few
different chapters. Michelle explained:
The idea of it is to help communities where they need it to start their own prayer spaces and so we provide resources for them to start with their own mosques and you know we have come up with a formula with… the easiest possible way to do it [51y/F/ETJC].
Michelle and the other co-founders (Ali and Trent) have created information packs on
how to lead prayer, how to format the sermon and also talk to people about the
problems of organising, “we are trying to encourage people through it” [51y/F/ETJC].
As a group they have helped to start some communities by providing practical advice
and support that are associated with different progressive groups. Their Toronto unity
mosque has an estimated 150 members and about 10 of those are people that are
always regular mosque goers. Then there are others who are constantly shifting in and
out, “Maybe someone will come for a month and then people won’t see them for three
months or maybe they’ll come like four times a year” [51y/F/ETJC]. Michelle
reported that they have around 25 people attend every week including 10 regulars.
Michelle and her fellow co-founders had been attending a liberal mosque before
starting ETJC. Liberal mosques are different from progressive mosques in that they
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usually do not welcome women to take up leadership roles and usually practice some
form of gender segregation. They are more ‘progressive’ and open than normative
mosques but not as ‘progressive’ and social justice friendly as unity mosques when it
comes to issues of sexual and gender equality. For a few reasons, including gender
and sexual based discrimination, Michelle and her co-founders did not feel included:
So at that time there’s no way in hell that they were going to let a woman lead the prayer. They weren’t going to let a woman give the khutbah (sermon) and they weren’t going to let a gay man give the khutbah or lead the prayer either. And so he [Ali] and I were just like look, we’re sick of being walked on… So this other guy that I know who’s an academic, I know he’s no different from me in anyway whatsoever - but he can give the khutbah and I can’t just because I don’t have a penis… So I used to get so pissed off about this [not being able to give the khutbah] and so Ali’s partner Trent had been furious about coming there anyway. He said, “look I’m not going to come some place that doesn’t see me as fully acceptable”. There was the feeling that LGBTQ people were tolerated instead of affirmed [51y/F/ETJC].
She clarifies that starting a worship space is not very difficult. That all it requires is to
be present every week. So if someone can commit to showing up for two hours each
week it is possible. She explains that there should be at least three people in case
somebody has a vacation coming up or are unable to attend and the three just have to
be fully committed to showing up every week: “You’re going to be alone a lot of the
time. It’s just going to be the three of you a lot of the time. You just have to keep
going and not worry about it” [51y/F/ETJC].
Having an inclusive, plural and equal space was important to Michelle and the
other organisers at ETJC. Traditional authority is not employed in their space and all
congregants are encouraged to develop an individual understanding of Islam:
We don’t want to disenfranchise somebody or make somebody feel like they have to listen to us. It’s very disturbing that somebody feels they have to listen to us. We want people to make their own judgments, their own interpretations, their own understandings. ETJC has a no talk back rule for theology [51y/F/ETJC].
Interestingly here Michelle mentions idol worshiping which may indicate that ETJC is
open to non-monotheistic faiths illustrating a high level of pluralism. She explains
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that nobody in their congregation is permitted to say that somebody else’s theological
perspective is wrong, no matter what they say:
If they’re like, you know, if they’re idol worshiping they are open to non-monotheistic faiths, you can’t say that they are wrong. You have to say, “for me I kind of approach that this way” but you can’t, you can’t show any disapproval. People have got to feel safe in that space [51y/F/ETJC].
She said that they also needed to be able to allow members of the mosque to explore
their own judgments on matters of belief. Plural and diverse understandings of Islam
are encouraged. This also indicates a leaning toward an individualised view of religion
where individuals can develop their own ‘do-it-yourself’ version of Islam (Beck 2010)
and also connects with the individualised elements of everyday religion which see an
emphasis on the morals and values of each practitioner in which religion must function
in order to help individuals to fulfill some sort of goal.
The co-founders try to encourage everybody who attends to give the sermon.
“We’re imams (prayer leaders) in the sense that you know, we’re the named leaders of
the mosque but we think that authority should be shared”. They prefer not to call
themselves the imams of the mosque because that is not the mission of the mosque,
“The mission of the mosque is not for there to be an imam but more of a shared
community, which I understand to be very much like the Prophetic community”
[51y/F/ETJC]. It also appears that ETJC has a plural or shared notion of authority
(detailed in Chapter Eight) that cannot be completely explained through Weber’s
notion of charismatic authority.
Michelle now leads prayer all the time but that was not always the case. She
tries to get everybody to take turns; she attempts to teach people how to lead prayer.
“So if they know how to pray they know how to lead prayer and we just talk through
the stylistic things” [51y/F/ETJC]. Michelle has been trying to organise woman led
prayer since 2005 with Zia. “You know we did two. The first one I don’t even
remember how many people showed up, maybe there were like ten people. The
second one nobody showed up” [51y/F/ETJC]. She described it as a little difficult to
do and also very difficult to get people to come. At that time they were not using
Facebook and Michele pointed out that Facebook is really important for organising.
They had no real way to organise and so they stopped trying.
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At that time Michelle still did not want to lead prayer and was not totally
comfortable with herself as a Muslim and was conditioned by previous experiences;
including not seeing herself as a ‘good Muslim’ especially since she is a convert, and
the enforcement of strict gender roles in worship spaces. Here she alludes to taking an
individual approach in order to re-conceptualise what it means to be a good Muslim:
I just didn’t feel that at that time that I had the character, the proper character to lead prayer. I didn’t think that I was a good enough Muslim to do it. And so yeah the first time I led prayers I led [redacted] because he and I are very close friends and I knew that he knew everything about me. So he knew exactly what he was getting himself into by praying behind me… I had to come to understand that I’m a good Muslim. So it’s a long process. So I’ve been living all these years thinking I’m a bad Muslim because of things that my conscience told me, yeah the systematic humiliation. So when you have been humiliated for that long it’s really difficult for you to understand that you have value [51y/F/ETJC].
Michelle pointed out that their mosque is very different from most others; unity
mosques are quite different from normative mosques. Unity mosques do not practice
gender segregation and are also free of ethnic divisions. They aim to be as inclusive
as possible aiming to involve LGBTQ people and also disabled people. Here the
organisers employ hermeneutic activism, social activism which stems from
interpretative methods, in order to understand the needs of the congregation:
We are just so not what a regular mosque is like. Nobody could wander in to us and say, “Oh it’s a mosque, just like I’ve always been used to”. It’s already very different, just in the way that people dress, they way that they socialise and the way that we sit. We sit in a circle for the khutbah, sometimes we even have discussion during the khutbah [51y/F/ETJC].
Michelle makes it clear that their mosque is not a space in which the appropriateness
or rightness of what they are doing is going to be debated; “If you come here it’s
because you believe this is appropriate, then you agree to it and the debate is over in
this space” [51y/F/ETJC]. She explains that many Muslims in Canada are not aware
of ETJC and points out that they are fairly low profile yet their work is having an
impact:
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We thought the work we were doing would have an effect with our grandchildren. We really didn’t think any of this would be happening as quickly as it is… But stuff really has happened so much faster than we thought. The Internet is part of that. You know little by little people’s values are shifting. Little by little people are becoming a little bit more open. We do have some kids right? These kids are growing up and they just don’t think that anybody is not equal to somebody else. It’s really powerful when you see the kids you think, wow they’re not going to grow up thinking that. It’s not something that you’re going to have to work through, that’s really something [51y/F/ETJC].
She mentioned that a lot of new progressive Muslim groups wanted to affiliate
themselves officially with ETJC, but that it was not a simple process:
If they want to do that one of the things they need to agree to do is be LGBTQ affirming, not just welcoming… people have to be able to come in wearing whatever the hell they want. They actually have to really take our principles to heart, people can fully be themselves no matter what that means and that we have to make a space for them. So, it’s like actually kind of heavy to take on our rules [51y/F/ETJC].
This case study explored how and why ETJC was started. It also described the values
that the organisers want to foster in their worship space including pluralism,
inclusivity and a sense of belonging. It also suggested that Michelle and ETJC exhibit
facets of Beck’s individualisation of religion in which they use social hermeneutics
(interpretation methods or understanding of religious texts applied socially) to create a
‘do-it-yourself’ type of religion that caters to their personal experiences (2010). Beck
(2010) understands the reduced incidence of collective worship as an indication that
individuals prefer to engage with religion on their personal terms rather than adhering
to a pre-existing formula. In Beck’s opinion, individualisation is facilitating the
gathering of varied sets of religious and non-religious beliefs that cannot be
understood by quantitative methods (Beck 2010). In the next sections data will be
explored from a variety of participants and grouped by the subthemes on pluralism
and community building and will discuss the differences between Muslims for
Progressive Values and El-Tawhid Juma Circle; as well as inter and intra-religious
pluralism. It also seeks to analyse the extent of progressive Muslim diversity and the
level of individualism in progressive Muslim communities.
Amongst progressive Muslims there is an emphasis on creating inclusive,
welcoming, safe spaces for congregants to worship in. They place particular
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importance on the inclusion of women and LGBTQ people. They also place a strong
emphasis on building a community where people can feel comfortable to be
completely themselves. Sixteen participants reported that they did not feel
comfortable or accepted in normative worship spaces and hence sought out alternate
communities. This is illustrated in their organisational principles and values (see
Appendix A). Furthermore, as a result of this vision, an importance is placed on
encouraging inter and intra-religious pluralism and as part of this an acceptance of a
diversity of Islamic beliefs and practices that directly link to a plural worldview. This
standpoint allows non-Muslims to give the sermon and also prohibits arguments and
exclusion over theology. Adis Duderija rightly describes progressive Muslim
movements as able to endorse “a more inclusive, pluralist, vibrant civil society that
rejects false essentialisms such as modernity vs. tradition, Islam vs. human rights,
Islam vs. feminism, etc.” (Duderija 2014: 434). He also affirms that because of this
focus on pluralism progressives are able to increase the engagement and participation
of Muslim women (Duderija 2014).
InterandIntra-ReligiousPluralism
Pluralism is an important factor in the inclusive vision of progressive Muslim groups
(Safi 2003a and Esack 1997). A great importance is placed on respecting the beliefs
of others both within Islam and also outside of it. The ETJC unity mosque welcomes
both Muslims and non-Muslims to their services and tries to accommodate Muslims
from different denominations:
Ali: It is an intra-faith mosque as well so if you are Shia and you are leading prayer and you lead prayer in your way and everybody follows along. If you are Sunni from a particular school of law that prays a particular way we follow you regardless of what you might be familiar with and so on. There’s people that come to the mosque regularly. One guy is Jewish, is not Muslim, but he comes every Friday and he gives sermons. He identifies as an Arab Jew so his family is from North Africa. He is a gay man. His sermons are awesome, he not only uses Qur’an and the hadith but he also uses Old Testament and Torah and so on. One of the women who comes identifies as a universalist Sufi. She doesn’t identify with being Muslim per se. She comes on Fridays and she leads part of the dhikr (verbal remembrance) [50y/M/ETJC].
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Both ETJC and MPV also takes the stance that other religions are not inferior to
Islam. To try and instill a sense of pluralism they have created a Sunday School
curriculum that presents Islam as equal to other religions. This is especially important
to many congregation members of MPV that have inter-religious marriages:
Joyah: Yeah I think our congregation is made up as such that we’re really accepting so we don’t actually see other religions as inferior to Islam; we really see Islam as the equal to other religions and I’ve been developing an education curriculum for kids because we have Sunday school which is equivalent to Islamic schools. The problem is like all religions… there’s this sense that Islam is superior and it starts young… If you’re a kid that’s of mixed heritage and you have a parent that is not Muslim and you have families who are non-Muslims what kind of a school environment would you send your children to? One that’s not going to belittle other faith traditions that are going to treat other faith traditions as equal [52y/F/MPV].
All participants recognised that Islam was not the only religion with merit and
explained that they did not believe non-Muslims were condemned to hell. These
beliefs helped foster respect for other faiths:
Bushra: Personally I don’t believe that if you’re not Muslim that you’re going to hell. I think that most Muslims probably believe that. Having studied religious studies as a major I was able to find beauty in every religion that I studied and yet still feel like Islam was my truth. I also feel like there are like people like Zakir Naik whose whole mission in life is to prove other religions false. He’s memorised Hindu texts and all this crazy stuff but it’s just such a waste of time. What do you get out of that? Even if they are all wrong, how does that prove your religion to be right? [26y/F/online]. Michelle: You know, I’m meant to think as a Muslim that Islam is best but I don’t really feel that. I have no conception at all that Islam is best. I’m not sure it’s even necessary to believe in God. So I’m totally fine with everything [51y/F/ETJC].
Not understanding and accepting the beliefs of others was considered a key downfall
of many normative Muslims by progressive Muslims. Participants also identified
some Muslims as being particularly judgmental, even amongst themselves:
James: Not being understanding of other people’s beliefs is going to be the downfall of any Muslim. It’s not a question of whether they
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[Muslims] accept other people and their different beliefs...or not. They [Muslims] have to accept such with no buts or ifs [51y/M/online]. Lemzo: The problem with Muslims is that they are very hypocritical. Most of them they pretend to be tolerant and to be tolerant to others but at the same time they believe Islam is the only correct religion. They keep that mindset and they take care of their interests first. They see themselves as different and better [25y/M/online].
The idea of epistemological pluralism also resonates in the works of the Iranian
modernist intellectual Abdolkarim Soroush, a professor of philosophy, who states: “I
believe that truths everywhere are compatible; no truth clashes with any other truth. .
. . Thus, in my search for the truth, I became oblivious to whether an idea originated
in the East, or West, or whether it had ancient or modern origins.” (Safi 2007: xx).
Soroush’s ideas on truth are drawn on indirectly by progressive Muslims to
legitimise a range of available of truths. Here Ivy advocates for more understanding:
Ivy: This idea that we are right and everyone else is wrong needs to go. The degree of that negativity - Muslims are just more judgmental. We are even more judgmental amongst ourselves. The fact that we judge each other’s lives and deem someone as going to hell, I just can’t, the fact that anyone would deem themselves worthy to do that… I would say Muslims need to be more accepting, I would say on a whole the people in our religion are more judgmental [36y/F/online].
Aarish explained that in his opinion the main reason normative Muslims are not
getting anywhere as a community was due to their refusal to understand and respect
the religious beliefs of others. He believes that some normative Muslims are in fact
trying hard to stay in the margins. Here he promotes a more pluralist view:
Aarish: That’s probably one of the main reasons why Muslims are not getting anywhere as a community. They can’t seem to understand that other people can also feel strongly about their religions even if they have a different idea of God. They think that all you have to do is remind them and they will turn to Islam. It’s really not that simple, they were raised with a religion and you hold it very dearly… I don’t think Muslims understand that, like they will play lip service to other people having the right to practice their religion, but everyone is just a Muslim in waiting [26y/M/MPV].
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Others identified Islam as being one part of a diverse civilisation where people from
all religions could live side by side with dignity. Here acceptance of differences is
key. Yohanes draws attention to perceived contradictions in the hadith:
Yohanes: Yes [we should be accepting] because at the end of the day we have to live with each other and we can’t rid the world of every non-Muslim and why should we? If you really get down to the essence of Islam we aren’t meant to convert everybody, we are meant to live side by side… People love pointing out hadiths that say the opposite, but when you look at other hadiths about how the Prophet treated people of other faiths, but in practical relations in the real world they forget about these stories and events. I think we are meant to be a very very diverse civilisation [42y/M/online].
Many participants felt that religion should be used as a tool to connect people, not to
create further division. For some participants the solution was not to see Islam as the
only true religion but equal to others:
Burak: Yes, we have to work with them [non-Muslims]. Christians say this and we have to do the same. So you can’t say for yourself, “We have the true religion, all other people are burning in hell and are infidels”, you can’t say that, but some people are believing this. Other human beings are also believing this. We have to have friendship. Religion should be there to be connected, not to fight each other [18y/M/online].
Participants all felt that Muslims needed to be more understanding and accepting of
the beliefs of others in line with plural values. Madeline also highlighted that
Muslims need to be more accepting of diverse beliefs among Muslims but also move
toward accepting that some people do not believe in God at all:
Madeline: Yes [more understanding], both within the religion and outside of the religion. Particularly with people who are agnostic or atheist… If we believe in God an all-loving type God then that doesn’t matter, then God will know why somebody believes that way [35y/F/MPV].
For progressive Muslims, pluralism was often achieved by taking an individualist
stance to religious practice, by viewing Islam as one of many religions with equal
value, and by recognising that non-Muslims would not necessarily go to hell for not
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believing in the Islamic teachings. This relates closely to a plural outlook that accepts
a diversity of beliefs and cultural identities.
WhatisProgressiveCommunity?
A strong emphasis is placed on community and belonging in progressive Muslim
movements. Some of those who felt they did not belong in other Muslim communities
decided to create their own communities. Others decided not being part of a physical
community was the only way to retain their faith and instead have contact with other
likeminded Muslims online. Here progressive Muslims illustrate how differently they
perceive themselves from normative Muslims. This also suggests that progressive
Muslims are seeking new and innovative ways to engage with likeminded Muslims:
Bushra: You know I wish I could have a community. Rather than being frustrated or having questions about your faith because of the way the people are I’d rather stay home [26y/F/online].
Burak: Well, I do not have so much in common with Muslims, so like I don’t go to mosque and I have no connections to them. I live in a village and there are no Muslims, so I don’t have many contacts with Muslims. I think progressive Islam is more important for our society, for every society [18y/M/online]. Michelle: Yeah they’re [Muslims] losing their community and community is at the heart of this whole thing [51y/F/ETJC].
For others it was essential for them to attend a worship space where they felt fully
supported and accepted and also that other minority groups like women were fully
included. Here choice is also significant and Trent indicates a preference for a ‘do-it-
yourself’ (Beck 2010) style of religious space:
Trent: Even though we were into a more progressive space that I actually took my shahada (declaration of faith) at - there were women on one side and men on the other side. At that particular time in that space women were not giving the khutbah. It gnawed at me, because for me I choose purposely – I’m 44 I’ve been around a little bit - I care about where I choose to go. If I don’t feel like everybody’s welcome in this space then why am I there too? I don’t really like to support those [non-inclusive] spaces [44y/M/ETJC].
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However, for many progressive Muslims they do not join a religious congregation on a
regular basis. Some go to the mosque that their extended family go to in order to
celebrate Eid with them:
Joyah: There are also a lot of progressives that don’t join us on a regular basis… like for example the Eid prayer, they go and pray with their parents you know, which is the tradition and they would go to the mosque where they grew up. We have that working against us currently [52y/F/MPV].
MPV organisers in New York felt that their community also wanted events where
they can socialise as well as attend religious classes. This raises a question around
the religious nature of the groups and if they are in fact more social than religious.
The social nature of these groups can be connected with everyday religion, which
sees faith associated with acts, or activities not normally thought of as religious in
nature. Everyday religion takes into consideration how people dress, how and what
they eat, how they deal with birth, death and sexuality and how they think about
nature (Ammerman 2014: 190). It also includes physical, artistic and ritualistic things
that people do together such as dancing, singing, folk or community traditions that
create transcendence and a sense of social solidarity (Ammerman 2014: 190). The
emphasis on social events and gatherings may also indicate an emphasis on the
social, moral, individual, and plural for progressive Muslims:
Aarish: People do want to have events where they can socialise but a lot want to have Islamic classes as well. We are in the beginning stages completely [in New York], so I can’t say one-way or the other [26y/M/MPV].
Joyah also identified the failure of the now defunct Progressive Muslim Union
(PMU)30 as linked to the lack of actual physical community among the group. They
did not have any worship spaces or regular social meetings outside the board
meetings they conducted to make decisions and media releases on behalf of the
organisation:
30 The PMU was a liberal organisation that operated from November 2004 and December 2006. The organisation was highly controversial basing their definition of a Muslim on social and cultural commitments. Some members of MPV and ETJC were former board members.
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Joyah: So PMU (Progressive Muslim Union) was out there to organise, to say, “Hey we’re progressive Muslims in America and there is such a thing as a progressive Muslim,” but what they did was it became more of a board in a room making decisions or making statements with really no grassroots behind it… They don’t really have a community to back that up. They became irrelevant as did the orthodox organisations out there that claim to represent all Muslims in America right? So that’s why when I started MPV I was aware of those mistakes and the first thing that I did was start a progressive Muslim community in Los Angeles and because at the end of the day it was going to be my backbone [52y/F/MPV].
A strong emphasis was placed on choice when it came to which community to
worship with. Seven participants said that if there is not a community in existence
that suits the wants or needs of an individual they should start their own space even if
that is in their home or at a coffee shop with a few friends. This presents what is
perhaps a deinstitutionalisation of religion:
Trent: There’s so much choice and for me it’s well if there’s not choice you build it and then there will be people that come. Usually there are other people that feel the same way [44y/M/ETJC]. Zaynab: So go out and make your community even if you’re making it in a coffee shop or somebody’s living room once a month of something and have that experience [47y/F/MPV].
Ali did just this after he was inspired by the Friday sermon of a friend at an LGBTQ
conference. After hearing her speak he started organising iftars (breaking the fast) in
Ramadan and having Friday prayers at his office, which later expanded into being
held at its own worship space:
Ali: On Friday, on the first day of the conference we had jumma (Friday) prayers and Khadija was the only woman who I could find that was willing to come and lead prayer… I thought that she would pick this highfalutin knock-them-dead kind of topic and she didn’t - it was very simple. [She said] you should start jumma (Friday Prayer). It resonated so after the conference ended there were two things that continued. A couple of months later I had my first iftar. Which is still continued and we have gone from 130 people to 260 people [50y/M/ETJC].
Many progressive communities began because of an individual or a couple of
individuals who felt they were not fully welcomed at their place of worship. For many
of the participants they felt choice was essential in where and how to worship. For the
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most part the kind of communities they envisioned did not exist around them and they
then set out to create their own in a move toward activism. Here a feeling of
belonging and acceptance is very important. For those who could not find an inclusive
space they preferred not to attend normative worship spaces. These spaces are very
much plural in nature as they create a space that is inclusive of a diversity of identities
and beliefs. This is demonstrated in their willingness to welcome non-Muslims into
their communities and accommodate a wide variety of interpretations of Islam.
OnlineCommunity
Online community is also an important part of the religious life of many progressive
Muslims. It allows them to seek religious information that may not be widely
available offline and also gives them the opportunity to connect with likeminded
Muslims across the world. Furthermore, Adam Possamai and Bryan Turner (2014)
reflect on the potential of the Internet to help individuals reflexively create their own
religious identities, “In this new cyber-territory people are, according to sociologists
such as Ulrich Beck (Beck et al. 1994), reflexive individuals creating their own
religious identities and fashioning their own cosmologies.” (2014: 203). This takes the
notion of Beck’s ‘do-it-yourself’ religion a step further by utilising the Internet to
access and disseminate alternative religious materials and also to network and
construct their own individual religious identities. Ali and Michelle highlighted the
importance of social media for social organising and networking and the way in
which it eliminates distance:
Ali: I think one of the most phenomenal things since we started is the outreach that we have been able to do through Facebook and social media because my attempts before have been unsustainable because how else would I be talking to somebody in Australia? How else would you have known about MPV, or ETJC, or you know anything else for that matter? [50y/M/ETJC]. Michelle: Ali had tried to start a mosque like this, maybe ten years earlier but again there was just no way to organise. So long before Amina Wadud did her stuff, there was just no way to organise it. We decided to do our thing, when it was possible to use Facebook to organise and so that really helped us to get in touch with people and connect [51y/F/ETJC].
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Joyah said that a lot of her learning and reexamining of Islam was done on the
Internet, in particular through the now defunct website Muslim Wake Up!:
Joyah: A lot [of learning] was from the Internet. Thank God for the Internet and thank God there was a website called Muslim Wake Up! and I was exposed through that website to a lot of progressive Muslim scholars, so I was reading their books and reading the Qur’an from more of a social background to it rather than just sacred word [52y/F/MPV].
Like MPV, ETJC also had a lot of positive feedback from members who were
delighted to find a space where they would feel, and be welcome, especially
members of the LGBTQ community:
Michelle: People in Toronto were like, “I was just Googling ‘gay Islam’ to see if I could meet another gay Muslim and I will be in Toronto and you have a mosque, yay!” [51y/F/ETJC].
Madeline also used the Internet coupled with a combination of other methods to learn
about Islam and particularly to read more progressive ideas about Islam that are not
widely available through other channels:
Madeline: When I first learned about it [Islam] and wondered about it was at the university. After 9/11 I was curious to find out more about Islam and I took some college courses on Islam and the Middle East. I also learned about it on the Internet. I also learnt about Islam during my time in Yemen. Now I mean I read a lot on the Internet. Three ways I learn about it [35y/F/MPV].
Michelle explained that when she was first beginning to organise woman-led prayer
events and trying to set up a progressive congregation, it was very difficult to do and
they did not get a lot of attendance. She felt that social networking was very important
for organising of this kind:
Michelle: So you know we were like okay this is a little difficult to do [in the beginning] and very difficult to get people to come. We didn’t really, you know, Facebook didn’t really exist at that time. Like I don’t know if it did exist but it didn’t exist for us. Facebook is really important for organising [51y/F/ETJC].
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The importance of the Internet for disseminating new ideas and organising cannot be
understated. Religious groups use the Internet in varied ways that are able to alter
traditional religious interpretations and practices. The Internet more readily allows for
new ideas and values, bridges geographical boundaries, as well as social, political and
cultural values. It permits a broader cross-section of voices to enter the public sphere
and to communicate varied understandings of Islam (el Nawawy and Khamis 2009).
For some progressive Muslims their online communities are restructuring religious
leadership. It allows those without a traditional religious education to circulate their
ideas and to assume leadership roles (Campbell 2005). Furthermore, the
transformation of religious establishments in the offline world becomes a possibility.
The Internet has a function in influencing the religious identity and
construction of meaning online in ways that can shape offline religiosity (Campbell
2005). For progressive Muslims the Internet provides a tool to organise, seek
information and subvert Islamic authority structures. Pew’s Faith Online study
(Hoover et al., 2004) observed that along with increased Internet use the religious
purposes (64 percent of the American online user population) might come the
reshaping of what it means to be religious or spiritual. The Pew Internet & American
Life Project reports 28 million Americans, 3 million a day, 25 percent of all Internet
users, have gone online for religious purposes (Larsen 2001). That is more than those
who use web auction sites, gamble online, traded stocks online, used Internet banking,
placed a phone call on the internet, or used online dating services (Larsen 2001). The
Pew Research Centre (2014) also reported that 20% of Americans said they had
shared their religious faith on social networking websites or apps (such as Facebook
and Twitter) in the past week, and 46% said they had seen someone else share
“something about their religious faith” online. Progressive Muslims are very active
online with seventeen out of twenty using the internet to post about or access
information about Islam.
ProgressiveIslamOnline
Due to the newness of many of the progressive Islamic movements much of the
description of specific movements and their aims, activities and objectives only exist
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on their Internet sites.31 MPV lists their aims and objectives on their website along
with YouTube videos and press releases.32 MPV and to a lesser extent ETJC utilise
press releases to present their views on topical issues. Included amongst these issues
are misogyny, honour killings, domestic violence, freedom of speech, marriage
equality and woman led prayer. Broadly, press releases fall under the categories of
gender and sexual equality, U.S. foreign policy, and freedom of speech. MPV titles
include, two releases on freedom of speech: MPV Condemns Sentencing of Raif
Badawi, MPV Condemns the Attack on Diplomatic Installations and Rioting Over
Video Depicting a Negative View of the Prophet Mohammed. Also two press releases
on U.S foreign policy: MPV Supports the Closing of Guantanamo, and MPV Decries
NYPD Monitoring of Muslims in NYC. Finally three documents on gender and sexual
equality: Our Stance About Domestic Violence, Acid Attacks, Honour Killing, Female
Genital Mutilation and Forced Marriage, MPV Supports Marriage Equality and an
End to DOMA, and Woman Imam to lead Prayer Service to Commemorate
International Woman’s Day
El-Tawhid Juma Circle’s releases only cover issues of gender and include only
two press releases, A Statement in Solidarity with Those Harmed by Abu Eesa
Niamatullah’s Misogynistic Language and Shaykh Ali Goma Approves of Woman-led
Prayer. It can be observe that although MPV comments on a wider range of issues
they place a major focus on gender. Examining the press releases shows that MPV
sometimes chooses to comment publicly outside of the bounds of religious matters
and criticises US foreign policy and makes political statements but that ETJC does not
utilise press releases as much as MPV but when they do they focus solely on gender
equality. These press releases serve to publicise and highlight each organisations’
values.
ProgressiveIslaminPractice
Progressive groups often function as a way to network socially. Many groups run to
cater for both those who want to participate in religious rituals and also those who are
not interested in religious rituals, but are instead more invested in social events. Their
Islamic identity is retained even in the absence of everyday Muslim rituals like prayer.
31 http://www.mpvusa.org and http://jumacircle.com (last accessed 8/07/2015). 32 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KX2PDOE4yz8&list=PLE3saqAXcc3ZsuL_2kDP-BoWegpwoj8n-#action=share (last accessed 8/07/2015).
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Defining what it means to be a progressive Muslim in practice is not an easy task. In
practice the religious rituals and the social organisation of progressive Muslims are as
diverse as their opinions. As seen in the following two sections, progressive Muslims
vary in the type of gathering they prefer, either social or religious. They modify their
religious services for the congregation with some MPV chapters offering singing as
part of the service and ETJC offering dhikr. For Ayman taking on a more
individualised stance regarding Islam helped him to implement the values he feels
Islam stands for like compassion, mercy and universal wisdom. Here individual values
and morals, as per everyday religion are important:
Ayman: So my understanding of Islam, the Qur’an promotes values of universal wisdom, of human upliftment, of compassion and mercy and you can make a long list of things that you think Islam stands for. So in my experience it is not very useful to think what Islam stands for. What is more useful is to think how can I understand Islam more so I can live with these values. It’s very easy to speak of ideas as theoretical constructs as to how it should be as if it is a theoretical problem that somebody else should implement. Actually religion and spirituality is about my own personal development. It’s not about anybody else [72y/M/QD].
For Afreen being a truly progressive Muslim was about being accepting of everyone,
whether that is of his or her religious, political beliefs, or their sexuality. This idea
links directly with the concept of inclusivity that appears in much of the theological
and theoretical work on progressive Islam and fits closely with the idea of pluralism
(Esack 1997 and Safi 2003a):
Afreen: That’s right for me to be truly progressive really - it means being accepting of everyone and at whatever stage they are or however they choose to practice their religion or their sexuality. I don’t think there should be any kind of restrictions or any kind of judgments if you were truly progressive, but I understand that people have different interpretations of that. I just wish that they would come more to this [progressive] side [26y/F/MPV].
Aarish felt that progressive Islam was primarily a reaction to Western values and that
it had taken on very humanistic principles. He felt that through their practice and
through progressive Muslims labeling these values Islamic that they in fact become
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Islamic through social practice. It could also be seen to be taking on a pluralistic
tone:
Aarish: I think that kind of Islam [progressive] is fundamentally tied to - I mean it’s a reaction to Western values it’s not like we created a profound progressive philosophy. We took very humanistic principles as Muslims because we are practicing those principles they obviously become Islamic. Islam is what we practice right? If we call it Islam it will be Islam. I don’t think it's anything profound or revolutionary it’s just humanist [26y/M/MPV].
Some progressive Muslim scholars, especially Omid Safi have expressed their
concern about the direction of progressive Islam:
My serious concern at this point is that some of the organizations that have adopted the rubric “progressive Muslims” today are dangerously close (if not already there) to falling into the trap of providing an “Islamic veneer” for many positions without seriously taking on the challenge of engaging the traditions of Islam (Safi 2007: xxxi).
Here Safi is concerned that perhaps progressive Islam is used as a facade for a
variety of social and political positions without actually engaging with the Islamic
Traditions and texts. His concern could mean that some progressive Muslims are in
fact disengaging with the core of religion.
According to Madeline, progressive Islam is pro-social justice and pro-human
rights and does not exist to create division in the wider Muslim community but to
prompt conversations about important issues of equality and espouse plural values:
Madeline: I think it’s important to note that progressive Muslims are not there to put a wedge in the Islamic community or take over, but they are really there to open up conversations in certain communities… It’s just another expression of Islam, but we interpret Islam to be pro-social justice and pro-human rights and people being able to live within [the community] as themselves, whatever that means. Those are the types of things that we are going to be pro and sometimes that is seen as anti-Islam because for so long a specific group has been in charge so now we’re challenging that [35y/F/MPV].
Progressive practices varied greatly by location and group affiliation. Yohanes
described a progressive group in Washington D.C. who hire a restaurant to create an
inclusive worship space for themselves:
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Yohanes: Well, the progressives here are not the kind of progressives that you and I talk about. It’s not to that level yet. The only place that I see a green light, at least some kind of fresh air is the Afghan community here [Make Space] that are trying to regroup a mosque open to everybody instead of just being traditional and backward… They just regrouped and held the prayer at a restaurant. They rent a restaurant, a huge restaurant… I thought it was quite brave that they did that because no other group had done like that you know (sic) [42y/M/online].
Others had concerns about the development of progressive Muslim movements. Some
participants felt that Salafi (one who follows the pious predecessors) or Wahabi
(derogatory term: follower of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) Muslims were
positioned as ‘the other’ or seen in a negative light by some progressive Muslims.
Omid Safi reminds us that interestingly while both Salafis and progressive Muslims
promote new interpretations of the Qur’an, the progressives often involve modernity
unambiguously, “while many Salafis couched their language in terms of the
“righteous forefathers” (alsalaf al-salih), the generation of Muslims living with and
immediately after the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century” (Safi 2007: xvii).
Safdar Ahmed points out that there is actually a similarity between the Islamist
methods of Qur’anic interpretation and the progressive approach of the modernists.
Both parties assume the truth of the text lies within the text itself and that it is the job
of the interpreter to rationally discern the truth (2012: 78). Aarish wanted to change
the negative or oppositional attitude towards Salafis and Wahabis:
Aarish: This is my pet project within the progressive movement - we need to stop looking at the Salafis or the Wahabis as the bad ones. All the madhabs (Sunni schools of legal thought) do that [favour certain extreme interpretations] whether it be Jafari Shia or one of the four Sunni madhabs. Salafis are just an easy target. Something being a religious action is tied to the actions of the Rasul (messenger) or the Sahaba (pious ancestors) [26y/M/MPV].
Omid Safi echoed this sentiment in his volume Progressive Muslims: “I am very
concerned about some statements from some progressive Muslims in North America
that repeatedly characterise the mainstream Muslim community as Islamist, Salafi, or
Wahhabi.” (Safi 2007: xxix). Perhaps this points to an inclination to see all
mainstream Muslims as possessing extremist tendencies. Safi confirms this in his
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writings: “It is in opposition to both Wahhabism and Salafism that many Muslim
progressives define themselves.” (Safi 2007: xxviii). This is also true in the data, as
illustrated in Chapter Five on progressive Muslim identity.
ProgressiveMuslimDiversity
Zaynab drew attention to some tensions and differences between various progressive
Muslim groups and explained that personal biases may come into community
decisions and interactions. Here we see that progressive organisations do not all hold
the same agenda. There is a diversity of opinion amongst progressives:
Zaynab: I’ve met with their group [New York Community of Progressives] a couple of times. I was very carefully placed that some political situations develop among individuals or among organisations. That seemed to put them in opposition. Even though they are working for the same ends. Think carefully about what you are seeing or hearing from individuals that may betray personal biases based on personal disagreements, rather than larger ideas or larger projects, larger tools [47y/F/MPV].
Participants identified certain ethnic groups that they felt were more likely to subscribe
to progressive values for cultural reasons. Maria also attributed this phenomenon to
more rigid interpretations of Islam in different regions. This is somewhat reflected in
the sample with eight participants reporting that they come from South-Asia..
However seven participants identified as being Caucasian, which is not mentioned
here:
Maria: So, I think that this progressive movement if you’re talking about what’s going on with [MPV] and all that. It’s mostly South-Asian people who have been raised in a very conservative environment and then they grow up here and think wait a second, I can’t reconcile myself to that kind of fundamentalist interpretation of Islam because they have been taught to read and write and study the Qur’an, it’s a different way. Everybody [in progressive Islam] is South-Asian [31y/F/QDG].
Aarish also agreed that many progressive Muslims he knew were of Southeast Asian
origin and that he felt culture also had a bearing on their agreement with progressive
values. However, in terms of the data only four participants reported as coming from
South-Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and East Timor):
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Aarish: Well there aren’t too many Arabs [progressive Muslims]. Arabs might not be religious but they are still very conservative. They have very backwards ideas when it comes to honour and pride and so forth. They say they are secular and so forth but when it comes to homosexuality and things like that it’s a different story. I mean there are Arabs that are progressives, but those divides do exist. The South-Asian experience with Islam is much different. I think it’s much easier for them to accept equality for women and that’s why you’ll see a lot of progressive Muslims who are Southeast Asian and [or] converts [26y/M/MPV].
Thirteen participants questioned what Islam is and how it can be defined. They asked
can one be truly progressive and yet a Muslim? Do progressive values make you an
infidel?:
Burak: At the end I question myself, so what is Islam today? What is important today? Can we say we have progressive values and can also be Muslim? Other people don’t say that, you’re an infidel because you said that; that you are going to hell and something like that. It’s a problem. Like Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, this is a totally strange cultural variant of Islam. You have to ask yourself, can you be progressive and be a real Muslim? Because there are so many fundamentalists that say you’re a heretic and so on if you have those opinions [18y/M/online].
Aarish mentioned that he does not believe in a monotheistic personal God, so he sees
Islam very differently to a lot of normative Muslims and many other progressive
Muslims:
Aarish: If we believed in that [a monotheistic God] we wouldn’t need a progressive Muslim movement, we would be embedded within mainstream theology. We would be like Tariq Ramadan. He accepts a personal God that meets these traditional notions of monotheism. He lives his life according to the law revealed by that God. That’s internally logical, that’s internally consistent. For us being progressive, we are starting from the position that that monotheistic God doesn’t make sense to us. We can’t believe in a God that has the power to stop terrible things from happening but doesn’t, but somehow we are meant to be okay with the fact that all of this is a test. How can you worship a God like that? [26y/M/MPV].
Progressive Islamic practice is diverse and varies by location and by progressive
movement or organisation, although individuals in organisations vary too. Participants
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agreed that progressive Islam is pro-human rights, pro-social justice and pro-gender
equality; although they sometimes disagree about what equality may look like.
Progressive Islam could also be seen as embodying plural values. This raises the
question of how far their pluralism extends. In the next sections both Muslims for
Progressive Values and El-Tawhid Juma Circle’s communities will be examined to
determine how their communities form and what form they take. This will reveal the
nature of their religious practices and perhaps shed light on how individualistic
progressive Muslims are.
MuslimsforProgressiveValues
Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) is a progressive organisation that spans the
US and also has chapters in Chile, France, South Africa, The Netherlands and
Australia. Their chapters vary widely in the events they hold, the classes that they run,
and their philosophy on how to expand and build a community. Joyah, founder of
MPV talked about creating a cultural revolution and a “Western interpretation” of
Islam. She explains that she is not attempting to reinvent Islam but to recreate it. That
progressive practice is not new but a recreation of what existed previously in terms of
Islamic practice:
Joyah: We are creating a cultural revolution. We are creating an American, a Western interpretation - lived out expression of Islam. So by that I mean taking... we are not reinventing it. Living in a Western society we are free enough to do what we want to do and free enough to go back to our traditions from centuries back… Whereas if you live in a Muslim society - even in Malaysia – there’s no way a woman can lead prayer. There’s no way an openly gay man can do the khutbah for Eid, right? Which is what we do. For us that’s the norm… Why don’t we have that open community? [52y/F/MPV].
Joyah explained that a lot of members of her MPV chapter were not into religious
rituals and that some preferred to attend social events only and would not join the
congregation for prayer. She said that this was because progressives tended to be more
spiritual and inclined toward social activism. This points to questions about the
religious status of the group but may point to the presence of elements of everyday
religion in progressive Islam. Everyday religion presents a type of religion whose
boundaries are lose, not strict, and whose practitioners are focused on experiences that
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are not always equated with traditional religion. The fieldwork showed that there are
two ideal types of progressive Muslims, those more interested in religious rituals and
those who practice a more social Islam:
Joyah: You’ve got the larger group that come – they’re not into rituals, they’re not into dhikr but they’re into partying so they will come to social events or they wouldn’t come [at all]... So I would layout the program in such a way that if we’re going to pray then we pray first and if we’re going to eat we would adjust our time. That means people can come at a time when they are comfortable… We throw the net pretty broad and pretty wide. Progressive Muslims don’t tend to be very ritualistic. I’ve analysed that - they tend to be more spiritual and they tend to be more social activists, social justice driven [52y/F/MPV].
These two ideal types represent two major types in the data. Firstly, those who are
more interested in individual religious rituals and spirituality and those who are
interested in practicing a more social, community driven type of Islam. This may
indicate that some participants are more engaged in a type of everyday religion than
others. The first type focuses on an individualised form of Islam, the morals and
values of each practitioner and emphasises personal experience and autonomy. The
second type emphasises community and religious rituals and practice.
Ten participants belonged to the individualised type while nine belonged to
the more community minded type. One participant did not fit into either ideal type,
finding her religious commitment to be neither strongly individual or community
orientated and quite minimal. Of the ten participants belonging to the individualised
ideal type six participants were men and four participants were women. Eight were
primarily part of the online community and did not regularly meet with a progressive
Muslim congregation. Eight of those in the individual type are affiliated with MPV.
Among the community orientated type six participants were women and three were
men. Only one belonged to an online community. Three were affiliated with ETJC,
four with physical MPV congregations and one with the Qur’an Discussion Group.
From this it could be argued that progressive women are more community orientated
with six women versus three men belonging to the community ideal type and six men
and four women to the individualised type. It is also important to note the strong
presence of those in online communities in the individualised type. This could signal
the role of the Internet in religious individualisation, allowing adherents a space to
develop and discuss their understandings of religion while also allowing for an
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emphasis on the individual. MPV also seems to be much more individualised than
ETJC or the Qur’an Discussion group.
Here Joyah is indicating that progressive Muslims are diverse and that they
could be described in a variety of ways. Beck (2010) explains that religious practices
are being restated by individuals from a grassroots level as they pursue religious
solutions that correlate well with their individual spiritual compasses. Perhaps for the
progressives that Joyah refers to their needs are more social and spiritual than
religious. Joyah also describes elements of everyday religion here. The focus of
progressive Muslims on a social type of Islam is similar to facets of everyday religion
(which focuses on personal experience and autonomy) and may point to progressive
Islam as a type of everyday religion rather than a group that is becoming
individualised and deinstitutionalised.
Even considering their inclusive policies some things are not acceptable at
MPV. Their unity mosques and their online discussion boards are safe spaces. This
could reveal a limit to their pluralism and inclusiveness:
Emma: Yeah it’s the one thing you can’t do; you can’t come in and say horrible things about gays or women. Well, I don’t think you would actually go to one [a progressive mosque] if you were like that. Yeah you can’t be intolerant [42y/F/MPV].
Each MPV chapter has its own way of organising and running their community.
When I visited New York in September of 2013 the New York chapter of MPV was
only just forming. As such I was not able to observe the congregation. Many of the
members just want a space where they can feel comfortable and be themselves, both
socially and in religious worship:
Aarish: So, we actually got a space which is nice. Our aim until next year is to have one on one conversations with progressive individuals and really get an understanding of what Islam meant to them when they were younger and what Islam means to them right now and what future do they see with Islam… One of the things that keeps coming up in conversation is that they just want a mosque they can feel comfortable in. A space that they won’t feel judged or whatever. So that’s one of our goals to have a permanent space to hold halaqas (religious meetings) on the ten [MPV] principles, basically all the functions that a mosque would provide [26y/M/MPV].
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MPV in Los Angles has added singing into their worship program in order to create a
type of ‘American Islam’. These are created in the spirit of Western hymns with
Islamic words and indicate the creation of a ‘do-it-yourself’ Islam:
Joyah: The one important aspect we add to our ritual is the singing. So after we finish praying we actually sing a couple of hymns that I wrote and I did that in the spirit of like you know Christian Hymns, where you have choir pieces right? We don’t have anything that is really American Western based. I just wrote melodies and then put Islamic lyrical content to it that are based from [the] Tradition… The favourite one of everyone’s is ‘prayer of light’ which is supposedly Prophet Muhammad’s favourite prayer [52y/F/MPV].
MPV New York reported having three organisers and a membership of around
fifteen to twenty people. They were also trying to grow their Facebook group. Aarish
felt that the high-powered lifestyle of many members could mean that attendance
numbers would be smaller than other chapters. MPV Atlanta reported that they
regularly have about five people at their Friday prayer services and sometimes as
many as twenty to thirty people on religious holidays making it a small congregation:
Madeline: I would say probably around five, sometimes as many as ten. On the holidays it would be more like twenty to thirty. I would say five was probably average [35y/F/MPV].
Maria believes that progressive Muslim congregations counted for a very small
minority of people. She also made reference to the fact that many members of
MPV’s Facebook groups appeared to be non-Muslim. It should be noted that she is
measuring this only on her personal experience:
Maria: Of course everyone seems to know each other. It’s a very small minority. Do I think it’s a big movement? If you look at the people that are on that website [Facebook group], half of them aren’t even Muslim [31y/F/QDG].
As mentioned previously, diversity in practices and opinions exist between different
progressive Muslim groups. Here Ali explains that he disagrees with MPV Los
Angeles in their addition of singing and a choir to their religious rituals. He does not
want to introduce new services or rituals linking back to the idea of instituting
religious reform or seeing it as one of many varied interpretations of Islam:
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Ali: I think that’s also my sense of MPV USA is that it is a bit of a political response to political America. American Islam or Canadian Islam is something that’s going to happen naturally and not something that needs to be created or pushed… To go to mosque and have a choir at the mosque, it doesn’t mean that we can’t have a choir or that we shouldn’t have a choir, but I’m not interested in changing the service or the ritual to introduce new rituals and new services [50y/M/ETJC].
Even considering the vocal opposition faced by MPV from other normative Muslims
and Islamophobes alike, many members express that they may not still be Muslim, or
at least part of a religious community if they did not attend an MPV unity mosque.
Unity mosques often provide a space for those who were previously un-mosqued:
Afreen: Yeah, I don’t know what I would have done without them here. I don’t think I could fit into a regular mosque or that kind of environment, so I would have been floating around. Just the reactions that we get from new members and others are fantastic. Some people have said, “You know I’ve been looking for this group my whole life” [26y/F/MPV].
Muslims for progressive values sees itself as creating a cultural revolution, a Western
interpretation of Islam and possibly an American version of Islam. They have also
appropriated elements of Christian worship like singing into their services. The
attendance at their services and social events varies widely by chapter and occasion
with events drawing from five to thirty people. Despite being a relatively small
movement some members say having contact with MPV has been life changing for
them.
El-TawhidJumaCircle
El-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) was formed in 2009 to create, “a truly inclusive
Muslim worship space” in Toronto. They currently have five communities: Toronto,
Montreal, London (Canada), Vancouver and Boston. Their website describes their
mosques as a place of spiritual healing for all, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Ali
explained their intention behind this:
Ali: The idea of the space was not only queer affirming and gender welcoming, also a space that was inviting because I think religion has traumatised many people. Whether that’s Islam, or Christianity or
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whatever, it can be very healing and all that soft gushy stuff, but it can also be very harsh in terms of people’s experiences. That’s sort of how the mosque started to come together. What became clear shortly after we started people were like, “oh we wish there was a space like this or a mosque like this in my community”. We’re like but that can be, ideally you need three or four people… You need a space and you need a commitment [50y/M/ETJC].
Michelle explained that the attendance numbers at ETJC vary from week to week
with a mixture of regular members and visitors or infrequent attendees. These are
roughly comparable with the reported attendance numbers at many MPV chapters,
even concerning low Eid turnout:
Michelle: Maybe someone will come for a month and then people won’t see them for three months or maybe they’ll come like four times a year. We have a very low Eid turn out. [51y/F/ETJC].
El-Tawhid Juma Circle varies from the organisational style of many other
progressive groups. MPV runs both social and religious events while ETJC offers
only religious services and gatherings. Ali felt the social group model was
ineffective. For him the tradition of attending a worship service was an important
part of his week. Here tradition is being maintained:
Ali: I don’t think the social group works. You have your friends; you’ve got your buddies that you hang out with, that you party with. What you’re missing is interaction as a Muslim with other like-minded Muslims. The centrality of that interaction that we don’t have is how we are invalidated in congregation… now for me, wow, my week is not the same if I don’t go to mosque every Friday. My day is just not right, my week is not right. It’s become so integral to my routine and to my person and my life [50y/M/ETJC].
Trent said that their motivation for starting their own space was mainly about
achieving total gender equality but that he and his partner also wanted to feel
affirmed as gay men. He wanted to learn from the most qualified person at the
mosque, whether that person is a male or female, a desire that drove him and his
partner to start an inclusive gender worship space:
Trent: We were like listen, I want to learn from the doctor I don’t want to learn from the guy that’s giving me milk toast khutbah, you know what I
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mean? And if the doctor happens to be a woman, I want the best person in the room. I feel like the khutbah for me anyway is where I am learning… We just did (sic) our own space because we wanted gender equality but also because we didn’t just want to be tolerated in the space for being gay [44y/M/ETJC].
Although ETJC and MPV have some differing values and ideas their reasons for
starting and maintaining their organisations are quite similar. They both want to
foster plural, inclusive worship spaces that allow for gender and sexual equality.
Discussion:CreatingPluralCommunities
After revisiting and reinterpreting the Qur’an and the Tradition, participants would
seek or create a plural inclusive worship space. In many cases a suitable space was
not available in their local area so participants started their own groups and
congregations. For some this meant beginning with an informal gathering in their
homes and then building on this. Plural communities are important to participants as
they allow a space in which all congregants are seen as equal and where a diverse
range of beliefs are encouraged, not merely tolerated. This is especially important to
women and those who are LGBTQ. In normative mosques they are often completely
excluded and certainly not permitted to take up leadership positions. This is one of the
main things progressive Muslims seek to change.
ETJC takes the notion of a plural worship space to its furthest extent and
invites non-Muslims into their congregations and also welcomes them to give the
sermon. Ali explained that they have a gay Jewish man that attends and often gives
the sermon and that he refers to both the Torah and the Qur’an. Their sense of
pluralism also extends to their ritual practice where they encourage a diversity of
ways of leading the prayer according to the preferences of the person leading the
prayer at the time. MPV is involved in interfaith activism, which sees a genuine
engagement of members with members of other religious faiths. In line with this they
created a multi-faith Sunday school.
Progressive Muslims focus strongly on interpersonal ethics. This emphasis
links strongly to notions pluralism. Safi (2003a) argues that Muslims have long been
members of a “pluralisic civilization” that stressed the importance of generosity,
kindness, and civility. However he fears that Muslims are losing their manners. For
Safi a loss of manners holds significant implications, “I firmly hold that one of the
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most important measuring sticks of pluralism for us Muslims is the way that we treat
each other” (Safi 2003a: 13). Nineteen participants agree with this statement as they
call for inclusive spaces and respect for all members of the congregation. They do
not allow actions that are becoming quite common in some Muslim communities:
branding someone as a kafir (disbeliever), accusing someone of shirk (polytheism) or
bid’a (heretical innovation) (Safi 2003a: 13). Safi indicates that pluralism equals
openness and compassion, “Part of pluralism is measured by openness to engage
sources of compassion and wisdom, no matter where they originate” (Safi 2003a:
14). This opens the way for the consultation of alternate Western types of knowledge
to inspire equality and compassion.
In line with pluralism progressive communities also approach their
programming from a diverse perspective. MPV offers both social and religious
gatherings to cater for a wider range of congregants. Joyah explained that in her LA
community they run prayer or worship events first and social events later in the day so
that those who do not want to take part in the worship rituals can still join in with
social events and be part of the community. This points to an acceptance of agnostic,
atheist or cultural Muslims who do not wish to take part in religious rituals. Here
there is recognition that there are a variety of different ways of being a Muslim,
including a more socially based variant of Islam, or an everyday lived Islam, that
largely excludes religious practice and identifies more strongly with liberal values.
Progressive Muslim communities also present an interesting example of ethnic
diversity in their congregations. In the United States (and elsewhere in the West)
mosques are often set up to cater for Muslims from a certain country or region
grouped around the dominant language used. However, ETJC and MPV report a
diversity of ethnicities at their unity mosques. This is made easier by the fact that
unity mosques use English as their primary language, sometimes even during ritual
prayers. Participants come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds including Caucasian,
Pakistani, Bengali, African, Indonesian, Filipino, Turkish, Tanzanian, Mauritanian,
and African-Canadian.
Both MPV and ETJC are inclusive and affirming of LGBTQ people. LGBTQ
participants reported not being welcome to attend some normative mosques and that
they even felt uncomfortable in some liberal mosques as they were tolerated but not
fully affirmed and accepted. After these experiences LGBTQ progressives set about
creating truly plural spaces where gay and transgender people could completely
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belong and feel that they were equal members of the community. The progressive
model of unity mosques sees LGBTQ people given access to the pulpit and
encouraged to lead prayer if they wish. In this sense unity mosques also encourage a
plurality of sexualities and gender expressions.
Progressive Muslim communities are based on ideals of social justice and a
need to create an inclusive worship space. Some of this need for new religious spaces
arises from the difference present between the two divergent types of Islam. Cesari
describes a polarisation of Muslim communities in the West “…one reformist and
open to change, the other, radical and closed on itself which continue to polarize the
Muslim communities in the West” (Cesari in Duderija 2007a: 150). Progressive
Muslims form communities in part to have dialogue with others, to question
dominant discourses, and change unequal practices that portray Islam as violent and
regressive. They try to dismantle negative stereotypes through dialogue, “There are a
great many negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslims, and it is only through
dialogue that these will slowly be dismantled” (Hussein in Safi 2003: 267). In order
to dismantle these negative assumptions, progressive Muslims practice a form of
social activism and put pluralism into action in creating worship spaces that present a
more liberal type of Islam. Progressive Muslims do not perceive a conflict in their
Western-Muslim identities; they view Western lifestyles, norms, and popular culture
as predominantly compatible with Islamic values (Mandaville in Duderija 2007a:
151).
Interestingly, Safi calls for progressive Muslims to study other forms of
knowledge apart from the Qur’an and hadith. He names many Muslim philosophers
along with public academics, poets and songwriters:
In addition to those essential founts of wisdom [Qur’an and hadith], we need to be conversant with Rumi, Ibn al-‘Arabi, Plato and Ibn Sina, Ghazzali and Hazrat ‘Ali, Noam Chomky and Abu Dharr, Gandhi and Arundhati Roy, Rabi’a and Maya Angelou, Robert Fisk and Edward Said, His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Elie Wiesel, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, Sa’di and Hafez, Qawwals of South Asia and Eqbal Ahmed, and of course Bob Dylan and Bob Marley (Safi 2003a: 15).
His plural vision also extends to seeking knowledge from non-Muslim texts and in
turn inspires alternate forms of Muslim community, which are plural, inclusive and
equal.
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Belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling “at home” and—as
Michael Ignatieff (2001) points out—about feeling “safe”.” (Yuval-Davis 2009: 8).
The politics of belonging however focus on political projects and often tend to
construct differences “between “us” and “them”, civilised or moral “us” versus an
uncivilised or immoral “them”” (Yuval-Davis 2009: 9). For progressive Muslims their
emphasis is on emotional attachment between members of their communities. In order
to cultivate this there is a need for participants to feel safe. For progressive women
this often requires absence of physical segregation amongst the congregation along
with the absence of misogynist preaching. Furthermore, they feel that they belong in
the space because leadership positions are available to them. For gay members to feel
safe they require the absence of homophobic speech and the removal of fear from
persecution or non-acceptance from other members. Progressive congregations
provide an affirming “safe” space for both women and LGBTQ people that ultimately
allows members to develop an emotional attachment to the congregation that was
often impossible for them in normative Muslim settings.
Conclusion
The case study suggested that Michelle and ETJC exhibit facets of Beck’s
individualisation of religion in which they use hermeneutic activism to create a ‘do-
it-yourself’ type of religion that caters to their personal experiences. This allows
them to combine their biographical experiences with their faith. It also described the
values that the organisers of ETJC want to foster in their worship space including
pluralism, inclusivity and a sense of belonging. The themes of pluralism and
individualisation were also echoed in the rest of the data.
Amongst a variety of progressive Muslim groups building an inclusive plural
community was central to each of their philosophies and social activism. Mary Jo
Neitz observed “communities of choice” among Catholic Charismatics whose belief
was not destroyed by the existence of a plurality of religions (Neitz 2014). This is
also true for progressive Muslims, particularly for those who invited non-Muslims to
give the sermon at their unity mosques. Their individual belief in Islam remained
strong. For both MPV and ETJC this began with fostering a sense of pluralism in
member’s personal outlooks and also in their worship services. This resulted in a
move towards intra-religious tolerance, seeing Shia, Sunni and Sufi Muslims
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worshiping in the same space and in some cases non-Muslims joining the
congregation and the religious rituals.
Members also took a more individualist stance in relation to their faith,
identifying what was right for them was not necessarily the right choice for others
hence their “no talkback rule on theology”. By employing an individualist standpoint
progressive Muslims from this research were able to agree that progressive Islam is
pluralistic, pro-human rights, pro-social justice and pro-gender equality. As noted
above, progressive Islam displays the characteristics of an everyday religion
including being individualised, placing an emphasis on the social aspects of Islam,
and focusing on the values and morals of each practitioner. However, progressive
Islamic practice is varied and evolves by location and also by progressive movement
or organisation. This is exemplified in the coordination of diverse organisations and
chapters within each group to be geared more towards offering religious or social
events or both.
The majority of progressive Muslim communities begin because an individual
or a small group of people do not feel they are welcome in their current religious
community, because they are un-mosqued, or because they do not see their values
reflected in their teachings and practices (everyday religion). The kind of inclusive
communities they envisioned did not exist around them and so they then set out to
create their own spaces where they could belong and feel valued. Some progressives,
who do not have physical access to an inclusive community, often make their
community online in discussion groups and on Facebook where they can interact
with likeminded Muslims and find support. What occurs in these religious
communities is not just a matter of religious rituals and the teaching of doctrine but
also the establishment of a conversational space. This could be during social events
and potluck33 dinners or during the meeting of a women’s group (Ammerman 2014).
Muslims for Progressive Values and El-Tawhid Juma Circle share many
similarities including an emphasis on gender equality, intra and inter-religious
pluralism and a commitment to inclusiveness. However, they vary in how they run
their programs, with an emphasis on either social or religious gatherings and also
whether or not their ultimate goal is the reform of Islam. MPV is open about calling
for Islamic reform and social change whereas ETJC sees their practice as one of the
33 A potluck is a gathering where each guest contributes a dish of food, often homemade, to be shared.
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many varied traditional interpretations of Islam. The emphasis on not introducing
anything new to the religion is central for some in the recognition of authentic Islam.
Although some participants claim to be unattached to religious rituals it seems that
many participants still place importance on religious rituals that have personal
meaning for them. Furthermore, some candidates seem individualised and describe
themselves as such but still place value on some religious rituals. This chapter has
answered the aims of this thesis by examining the types of communities formed by
progressive Muslims and their levels of individualisation. Religious authority and
reform will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter in order to gain a
deeper understanding of the nature of progressive Islam and to what extent its
practitioners are individualised.
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ChapterEight:ReligiousAuthorityinProgressiveIslam
Distinct Muslim reform movements have emerged over the last ten years in a number
of countries including the USA, Canada, Indonesia and Malaysia as a response to
Islamic orthodoxy including the Progressive Muslim Union, Muslims for Progressive
Values, New York Community of Progressives, El-Tawhid Juma Circle, Qur’an
Discussion Group, Musawah, Sisters in Islam. Kersten and Olsson explain,
“Although, to a large extent these have been coloured by local, national, and regional
contexts, they also share certain commonalities, such as challenging existing
interpretive authority” (2013: 1). A characteristic that is common among many
Muslim reformists is a, “perceived need to return to Islam’s key sources of the Qur’an
and the Traditions of the Prophet (Sunna)” (Kersten and Olsson 2013: 2). For
progressive Muslims this has meant reinterpreting the Tradition to be pro-equality and
also pro-human rights. “Progressive Muslim reformers provide us with further
examples of how religion draws upon contemporary resources to mark its place in the
modern world” (Ahmed 2013: 83).
When considering alternate Islamic discourses and interpretations it is
important to consider the influence of orthodoxy or normative Islam. Although
traditionally it has been reified, orthodoxy is not a thing in itself but an abstraction.
…[O]rthodoxy was constructed by religious scholars, the ulama (body of
Muslim scholars), in different social circumstances and institutional
contexts. These, in turn, influenced the scholars’ views of authenticity
and authority (Kersten and Olsson 2013: 7).
Barzegar and Martin (2013) argue that orthodoxy is more about power structures
rather than the intellectual value of concepts and ideas. Grounding their argument in
critical theory, they suggest that orthodoxy is, “The exercise of power through the
production of knowledge in interpretative institutions, in book publishing, and in local
communities that remain connected to the larger Muslim world through specific
means of communication” (Kersten and Olsson 2013: 7). However, the long
established religious authority of traditionally-educated males who collectively
formed the pre-modern Islamic tradition, “has been seriously disrupted and contested
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by a number of actors, among the most influential of whom are apologists, puritan-
fundamentalists, intellectuals and scholar-activists” (Duderija 2014: 433). Progressive
Muslims are among those who seek to interrupt this traditional religious authority and
the hierarchical arrangements of power.
The development of various modernist and revivalist Muslim movements
including Salafism and Tablighi Jamat has resulted in the creation of competing
religious discourses. Often there is considerable friction apparent between moderate
or progressive Muslims and those belonging to Salafi or Wahabi movements. These
disagreements revolve around who has the right to speak on behalf of authentic Islam
and take place online, in mosques and in Islamic literature. Kersten and Olsson clarify
that, “The resulting competing discourses on what it means to be Muslim in the
contemporary world has, in turn, led to an increasingly intense contestation of
authority, that is: holding to account; questioning; challenging; or even rejecting
outright the institutions and individuals invested with or claiming the (exclusive) right
to determine what is truly Islamic and what is not” (2013: 2-3). Regarding this, Omid
Safi also reminds us that there has been a propensity among Western journalists and
even some scholars to, “look at the more conservative articulations of Islam (such as
some traditional religious scholars) and even Muslim extremists as somehow
representing ‘real’ “Islam” (Safi 2007: xviii).
For progressive Muslims, gender and sexual inequality is a key reason for
seeking to challenge and subvert the normative religious authority structures. It is
important for progressive Muslims that new interpretations are manifested socially.
Juliane Hammer explains, “For new and gender-conscious interpretations to be
relevant, women scholars and activists have to translate their exegetical projects into
efforts at interpretive community building, a process that has taken place with
differing success, including through the woman-led prayer itself” (Hammer 2012:
101). In the data these social manifestations include introducing the concept of
‘shared authority’ (which is not present in the literature) into the worship space,
opening leadership positions to all including non-Muslims, and introducing the
concept fatwa (an Islamic legal ruling) of the heart. These changes allow individuals
to make their own religious decisions and most importantly allow women and those
who identify as LGBTQ to assume leadership roles. This type of authority means that
in theory power is shared more equally amongst the members of the congregation. It
is the intention of this chapter to focus on religious authority, not other types of
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authority, in order to fulfill the aim of this thesis and establish the level of
individualisation present in progressive congregations.
When we speak of authority we can broadly define authority as ‘legitimate
power’ or ‘formal power’. Max Weber divides authority into three distinct types
according to legitimacy: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic (Weber 1962).
Traditional authority is based on established practices and social structures, which
may be hereditary or tribal. Legal-rational authority is founded on rules and legal
practice. Finally, charismatic authority is established on the captivating character of
the leader (Weber 1968). Guenther Roth and Hans Joas see charisma as a possibly
disruptive “revolutionary” human force that “is capable of transforming seemingly
rigid social structures” (Riesebrodt 1999: 2). However, Edward Shils’ reading of
Weber equates charisma not with change or with the periphery but with the centre or
the sacred (Riesebrodt 1999: 2).
This chapter sets out to outline progressive Muslims’ approach to religious
authority. This is one of the main ways that progressive Muslims in the data deal with
social inequalities and move towards a more plural vision of Islam. First this chapter
utilises a case study in order to gain a comprehensive picture of how one progressive
Muslim, and by extension one progressive organisation, deals with issues of authority
in their worship space. Ali has been selected not because he is representative of the
majority of participants, but because his case exemplifies how progressive Muslims
attempt to remove social inequalities and deconstruct normative Muslim authority
structures through creating plural and inclusive worship spaces with shared authority.
Following the case study, the data will be discussed and grouped by subthemes and
compared and contrasted along with theory with the data in the case study in order to
understand the way authority is exercised in progressive Muslim communities and to
what extent progressive Muslims are individualised.
CaseStudy:SharedAuthority-Ali
This case study will present the themes of shared authority, power, individual
understanding and Islamic reform. This case study will explain the progressive view
of ‘shared authority’ and suggest that this is a move toward a more individualised
form of religion that introduces a new form of charismatic shared authority. Ali is a
fifty-year-old lawyer born in Tanzania. He is also working toward a masters degree in
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pastoral studies. He has been involved in Muslim, race and LGBTQ activism for over
twenty years:
At the beginning my activism was about racial justice and Muslim visibility or Muslim representation. As I came into my sexuality it was kind of a strange thing, I was used to being public and being an activist and proud about being Muslim, proud about being a racialised person and so on and so forth. It didn’t kind of translate into the queer stuff [50y/M/ETJC].
Before starting ETJC Ali and the other co-founders attended another liberal mosque.
They all felt frustrated that they were not truly affirmed in the space. As outlined in
Chapter Seven belonging is very important to progressive Muslims. Here Ali alludes
to the need to create a personalised form of Islam, which is dependent on the personal
experiences of the practitioners. This matches the focus on the individual, their
experiences and their morals and values present in everyday religion:
So Michelle came to me with this kind of sense of frustration about when are we going to be in a space when we are all being affirmed? Let’s start this. The idea of the space [ETJC] was not only queer affirming and gender welcoming also a space that was inviting because I think religion has traumatised many people. Whether that’s Islam, or Christianity or whatever, it can be very healing and all that soft gushy stuff, but it can also be very harsh in terms of people’s experiences [50y/M/ETJC].
The inclusive nature of the space was the most important element in creating a new
space, particularly regarding gender and sexual equality.
At their previous mosque Ali felt like his acceptance was hesitant and not
given wholly. This was a key reason for the creation of ETJC:
Our equality is not entrenched, it’s recognised, we are welcome and so forth, but it’s not manifest in ways that is affirming (sic). You know, brown woman walks in with white man who is not Muslim and they will do a nikah (contract of marriage), but what about me and Trent? We are both Muslim and we attend your congregation but you won’t do a nikah for us. Is that zulm (injustice)? Is that injustice? Right? I actually said this at one point, in a conversation, in an email exchange I was having with Aisha. I said you’re perpetuating zulm. This is injustice [50y/M/ETJC].
The leadership structure in their unity mosque varies greatly from those observed at
most normative mosques. ETJC welcomes anyone from the congregation to give the
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call to prayer, lead the prayer, or give the sermon. They call this shared authority. Ali
felt that Islamic authority had been usurped by some religious leaders for political
reasons and he sought to remove this power hierarchy from the ETJC worship space.
This is a new type of authority:
On some level when you study Islam and Islamic history you see how in Islam authority has been used or usurped by the ulama and the mullahs (religious scholars) and the sheikhs (community leaders) and the rulers and so on and so forth and how fatwas have been bought and exegesis and tafsir (interpretation) were created to meet particular political goals or social goals or whatever. So this notion of usurped authority and that some people like you and like me will never be in authority, in that particular paradigm. We need to rewrite the paradigm. Because we can’t work within that system so you have to, on some level, thrash that system down so the notion that anybody, that anybody can come and lead the prayer, that anybody can come and lead the sermon. Anybody can give the call to prayer. That anybody can come together to start a mosque. It breaks down the elitism of authority and makes us as a community responsible for living a social Islam [50y/M/ETJC].
For Ali living social Islam meant being socially aware, being social justice minded
and to live manifesting social equality. This also means taking an individual, ‘do-it-
yourself’ ‘everyday’ stance toward Islam and recognising the existence of a plurality
of acceptable interpretations.
It was important for the founders of ETJC to create a welcoming space where
everyone had a certain amount of authority regardless of what tasks he or she
undertook at the mosque. Here there is an emphasis on the individual as opposed to
the collective:
We are talking about creating a welcoming space where everybody has a certain amount of authority regardless of what you do or don’t do because you have the fatwa of the heart. Like what fits? What feels right? What enables you to be the best that you can be? [50y/M/ETJC].
The concept of fatwa of the heart was also important in the formation of an inclusive
mosque space, meaning that whatever an individual felt was right in their heart was
the right thing for them to do, there was no need to seek a fatwa from a sheikh. This
indicates a move by progressives toward a more individualised ‘do-it-yourself’ Islam
(Beck 2010). Beck explains how the reduced influence of traditional authority relates
to individualisation and cosmopolitanism as a “…sense of religion uncoupling from
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its traditional forms of authority generates a situation where individualisation relates
to the interior and the cosmopolitan to the exterior.” (Beck 2010: 85-90).
Ali sees his role as a coordinating imam (prayer leader) and as a mentor rather
than a leader. The intention of ETJC is to create a space where everybody has some
sort of authority. This is an example of a new type of shared plural type of authority:
Everybody is an imam, everybody is a khatib (giver of the sermon) and everybody is a muezzin (caller to prayer). Unlike a lot of other spaces we call ourselves coordinating imams, so we are just coordinating others and mentoring and bringing them up to speed. So for example, if somebody says, I want to lead prayer, but I’ve never led prayer before and I’m really nervous, either Michelle or myself or somebody who is more familiar and more comfortable will stand next to them so that if they falter or hitch they can be nudged along for example. Right? Similarly somebody giving the khutbah (sermon) for the first time, Michelle and I will be sitting at hand to guide them through and to steer them if they need direction [50y/M/ETJC].
The performance of equality is important for the founders of ETJC. They wish each
member in the congregation an opportunity to lead the prayer, or give the sermon if
they wish.
Ali explained that a lot of these practices were based on the notion of tawhid
(doctrine of the oneness of God):
Some of it is based on the notion of God is closer to you than your jugular vein and the notion of tawhid, like Amina Wadud when she talks about tawhid and horizontal reciprocity.34 That is imbedded in the jugular vein because the nature of intimacy that we each have with the divine, or potentially have with the divine is exactly the same, right? So our potential dignity is the same, so everybody, in my opinion, should have access to the same resources to actualise their fullest potential as khalifa (representative of God) [50y/M/ETJC].
In this sense the potential dignity of each human being is recognised as equal,
therefore each person should have access to the same spiritual and social resources in
order to realise their true potential. Here the emphasis is on the individual both
morally and ethically, rather than the collective. 34 According to the notion of tawhid, two persons will always be in a relationship of horizontal reciprocity. This logically derives from two aspects of tawhid. Firstly, Islam understands Allah as supreme. Therefore nothing else can be superior to any one individual. Secondly, the Qur’an makes it clear that whenever two persons are together, Allah makes the third, or when three are together, Allah makes the fourth and so on (Al- Mujadalah 58:7). Since Allah is always present, and always the greatest, then no one can hold the upper level without violating tawhid. Patriarchy on the other hand places men as superior to women and violates the requirement that only Allah is supreme.
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I asked Ali about his stance on calling ETJC a reform movement. He was not
keen on describing the group as a reform or progressive movement, unlike Muslims
for Progressive Values (MPV). He draws on an important element of progressive
Islamic thought that sees not a singular monolithic Islam but many Islams:
I don’t see El-Tawhid Juma Circle as a reform movement. I see it as a movement of essence that we’re actually going back to the spirit, to the intent, to the heart. I’m not trying to change Islam. I think this is Islam. I think there are many Islams. I think there have been many Islams. Sometimes when I publicly speak or when I write I actually write Islam in the plural. Right? So I don’t see us as being a reform movement. I see us as being an authentic movement, a movement back to authenticity. I’m not trying to reform anything; I’m not trying to change anything [50y/M/ETJC].
Ali’s use of the term ‘Islams’ as a plural denotes the possibility of many individual
Islams, perhaps developed via Beck’s concept of ‘do-it-yourself’ religion that
combines biographical experiences with faith. Moreover, this idea of returning to an
authentic Islam is also reflected in many of the Islamic revival movements of the last
two centuries. However, the concept of what is considered ‘authentic’ varies from
movement to movement and from person to person; for many non-progressives
authenticity equals taking the most extreme interpretation possible (Safi 2007). For
example, the Taliban and groups like ISIS are frequently portrayed in the media as the
most authentic and textually derived form of Islam.
Like many progressive or inclusive Muslims, Ali sees Islam as a liberatory
framework in the same vein as Catholic Liberation Theology. He also hints at the
potential of cosmopolitan forms of religion to promote harmony (Beck 2010); he adds
that it should be a vehicle for humans to create equality and reach their full potential:
So I do see it [Islam] as being inherently liberatory, if I didn’t I couldn’t be Muslim. I honestly don’t think that you need religion or you don’t even need God to be an ethical person and I see religion and faith as a way of enabling dignity. If it does not enable dignity why do you need it? Why would you even want it? If we are the highest of God’s creation and if we have capacities greater than angels and jinn (creatures made by Allah of smokeless fire) then we have to create a society that allows people to reach that potential. If religion is actually going to stymie that then why do we need that? I don’t think we actually need religion [50y/M/ETJC].
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Here the issue is not seen as intended by God but caused by humans being forgetful
and having negative intentions.
Ali expands on this idea and reveals that many agnostics and atheists cannot
understand why he would choose to be Muslim. This illustrates the double bind that
progressive Muslims are in; they are not accepted by some normative Muslims or by
some non-Muslims and Islamophobes. Beck (2010) also touches on this idea and
outlines two opposing ways of viewing people’s religious identity needs. Some will
remain atheists or agnostics, while the religious will continue to attempt to preserve
their religious ‘truth’:
I think religion has been made into something bad. At the same time I don’t think it’s going to go away. I often have these discussions with Iranians who have a very ambivalent notion of Islam and even some of the Arabs that I know that are Agnostics or Atheists that come from Muslim backgrounds. They say to me, “How can you be Muslim, how can you be religious?” It ain’t going to go away. You can hate religion you can hate Islam all you want, it’s not going to go away. You gotta go in there and you gotta sort of open it up (sic). You gotta soften it up (sic). Otherwise if we all leave, who are we leaving it to (sic)? Who are we leaving it to and do we actually think, for those of us who are believers, do we believe that that is what God meant the message of mercy to be? [50y/M/ETJC].
Ali takes the act of defining Islam into his own hands. Ali gave an example of a
member of his ETJC congregation that also takes this stance. She is not religious but
still wants to learn how to interpret Islam in a more egalitarian individual way:
A woman has started coming to the mosque recently. She’s from a Muslim background, she identifies as being Muslim, and she says she’s not religious. She comes to mosque on Fridays… She doesn’t pray but she just participates in the discussions and listens to the sermons and stuff. She says she’s there to expand her knowledge. Okay fabulous! She gets it. She gets it you know? It’s [Islam] not going to go away. Christianity is not going to go away, Catholicism is not going to go away. It might become evangelical Christianity, it might become something else, but it’s not going to go away. So if it’s not going to go away what can we do to make it something that is reflective or our aspirations and our interpretations? [50y/M/ETJC].
This case study illustrated the progressive view of ‘shared authority’ and suggests that
progressive Islam is a move toward a more individualised form of religion and a new
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form of shared authority. Ali and ETJC are working to make sure their interpretation
of Islam is reflective of their values, aspirations and goals. Through this method they
feel more empowered and are not simply leaving Islam for those who prefer
normative or extreme interpretations. Progressive Muslims work to create an Islam
that is reflective of their objectives and goals and is more plural. In this case study Ali
explained that in his view Islamic religious authority has been used to gain power and
that that structure needs to be deconstructed in order to encourage and facilitate
social, gender and sexual equality.
In the next sections data will be explored from a variety of participants and
grouped by subtheme and will discuss the concept of shared charismatic authority and
how it helps to shape progressive Muslim leadership. This chapter will also examine
the participants’ views on scholar’s qualifications and who has the right to speak on
behalf of Islam. These views illuminate their reasons for employing a shared form of
authority and highlight some evidence of an individualised form of Islam. Lastly, this
chapter will present a discussion of the possible reform of Islam and will contrast
reform versus tradition and outlines a call for social and cultural change rather than
religious reform. This change takes on an individual character, as participants
perceive reform and social change in a variety of ways.
SharedAuthority
The concept of shared authority was coined at ETJC to allow for a more inclusive
worship space.35 This allowed congregation members to distribute the religious duties
of giving the call to prayer, giving the sermon, or leading the prayer among the
congregation. The mosque organisers simply referred to themselves as “coordinating
imams” and shared the majority of leadership duties with anyone in the congregation
that wanted to participate. This type of authority is best described as shared authority:
Michelle: Like we’re imams in the sense that you know we’re the named leaders of the mosque but we think that authority should be shared, so we don’t... We think that everybody has some kind of special gift to share in someway and so like Ali is really good as a leader and he’s really good at pastoral work and I’ve got this academic thing... so we all have these
35 Nakia Jackson coined the term ‘shared authority’ http://www.naplesnews.com/community/bonitabanner/islams_gender_boundaries_being_pushed and https://www.facebook.com/pages/Masjid-el-Tawhid-Toronto-Unity-Mosque/300967203268830?sk=info&tab=page_info (last accessed 16/07/2015).
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things that we give and we want everybody to be able to give as much as possible but it’s not always realistic but yes we don’t like to call ourselves, like oh we’re the imams of the mosque because we don’t want to see ourselves that way, that’s not the mission of the mosque. The mission of the mosque is not for there to be an imam but more of a shared community, which I understand to be very much like the Prophetic community [51y/F/ETJC].
ETJC has created a new type of authority that lends itself to creating a more equitable
worship space.
During my interview with one of the coordinating imams at ETJC he explained
that if I happened to visit their mosque and I wanted to give the sermon I would be
welcome to do so. I would need to follow their guidelines that would make it a proper
Friday sermon or khutbah:
Trent: Shared authority means anyone coming to our mosque has access to the pulpit. So if you were to come to our mosque space and wanted to give the khutbah we would say that is great we would give you a format - we want it to be done in a traditional format. Anybody can give the call to prayer, anybody can join in, any type of function in the mosque space is open to anyone. It was really important for us to break down that hierarchy, the pastor, the imam, the reverence to the imam because after all, the imam is just a person like you and me. Like a lot of women that haven’t lead before - they say, “Wow it’s such a powerful experience” because they thought they would never have the chance to do this [44y/M/ETJC].
Emma explained that even though MPV Atlanta does have someone who organises
the group that she shares the leading of religious rituals like prayers or giving sermons
with those in the congregation who would like to participate:
Emma: In Atlanta there is definitely someone that is there more often and that is in control of the group, she runs the group, but she shares it. If anyone wants to give the khutbah or lead the prayers she shares it with everyone. Sometimes we do the athan (call to prayer) together as a group instead of one person; sometimes we will do the athan as a whole group [42y/M/MPV].
Michelle raised questions around the problematic nature of authority, explaining that
it creates a power hierarchy that excludes or prioritises some people or texts over
others. She also hints at the fact that everyone is “cherry-picking” his or her
application of Islamic knowledge but not everyone acknowledges this fact:
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Michelle: This is the nature of tradition right? It’s [that] you give authority to some people over others and some texts over others. Everybody does it. They like to think that they don’t do it [51y/F/ETJC].
This individualist standpoint towards authority varies greatly from the usual collective
outlook present in many Eastern and Muslim societies. This is the direct result of
exposure to Western Cultures, particularly those of North America and specifically to
secular liberal ideas of social equality. Here a difference between progressive and
normative groups can be ascertained – progressive Muslims come from a place of
individualism while the normative Muslims come from a collectivist stance.
Concerning authority progressive Muslims privilege the rights of individuals before
the collective rights of the group. As discussed in Chapter Six, progressive Muslims
are also much more likely to interpret the Qur’an on their own and make their own
moral decisions instead of consulting a scholar.
Beck (2010) identifies two faith types: one closed and hierarchical and the
other open and based on individual choice. This model is useful for describing
progressive Muslims as they clearly fit into the open individual model while
normative Islam could be regarded as belonging to the former category. In Beck’s
cosmopolitan imagination he suggests that just as intimate relationships, employment
histories, and family are subject to individual decisions and choices, religion also
becomes a part of what he terms the ‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010: 49).
Furthermore, Beck indicates that the dynamics of individualisation, globalisation and
cosmopolitanism interrupt conventional varieties of sociality and then create new
social arrangements. Progressive Muslims have illustrated new varieties of social
formations through their concept of shared authority, which attempts to remove the
hierarchy from progressive Muslim spaces and thought. The choices driven by
individualisation are strengthened by the mobility of people and the ease of sharing
information and ideas.
ScholarsQualifications
Participants commented extensively on the qualifications required to become an imam
or a religious scholar in Islam and questioned the basis for authority. Many were
concerned that the requirements were not stringent enough or that certain groups or
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organisations were focusing on the wrong types of qualifications. Burak explained the
process of being examined by particular organisations to obtain the right to teach
Islam:
Burak: They [future imams] have to go to these organisations and take ijaza (a license to teach Islamic knowledge) from them. They look at your lifestyle, if it’s Islamic enough, so if you are fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, are you praying five times a day? They want to look at your life [18y/M/online].
Thirteen participants were concerned that the qualifications of their local normative
imams were not more freely divulged. They wanted to know what kind of degrees
they held and from where. In this sense qualifications were held to a more Western
standard than perhaps they would be in the Middle East or other parts of the Muslim
world. In this case the authenticity of traditional leadership was in question:
Ivy: Imams - they go and get their certifications and they have these titles like doctor and these religious titles. I like to know when I join a mosque if you call yourself doctor or some other title where did you get that? It doesn’t have to be from Oxford, I’m not a snob… Is that out of a Cracker Jack box? Did you really earn something? I think that’s a legitimate question [36y/F/online].
Trent is working from an alternate view of authority that does not privilege traditional
methods of acquiring authority:
Trent: And you know some people that are in the know, I would actually like to know where their education comes from. There are a lot of imams that don’t have as much education as you and I. So excuse me, I’m not going to actually take their reasoning if they haven’t travelled beyond their own village in Saudi Arabia. If they haven’t... if they are from Africa in a small village and they haven’t got beyond there then no. I want somebody who’s actually been around the world and talked to a bunch of different people [44y/M/ETJC].
Other participants pointed out that for many Muslims the scholars that they consulted
were more important to them than the information they gained from consulting with
them. Here Yohanes is explaining the importance of isnad (chain of narration or
knowledge transmission) for many normative Muslims. The reverence for certain
scholars and their teachers and their teacher’s teachers shares parallels with tribalism:
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Yohanes: So they have very different interests in studying the Qur’an let alone to contemplate, not only that I saw that in the mainstream they are so obsessed about their scholars. So before they get a chance to hear what I said they are more interested from whom I studied… They were more concerned about from whom I get the knowledge but they were not as concerned about the subject matter that I tell them. So they are so obsessed about the scholars they are so kind of - they are very pleased with who they know and how they know them, they praise each other [42y/M/online].
Yohanes went on to pinpoint what he views as the main issue with Islamic authority;
that Muslims would rather be told what to do and follow scholars blindly, rather than
to examine the Qur’an themselves. The act of interpreting the Qur’an without the help
of a scholar is frowned upon in normative Islam (Duderija 2008a):
Yohanes: I respect the scholars, the imams and the sheikhs. The thing is people get so caught up with their scholar’s opinion even though in their heart they know it cannot be true but because the scholars say so, they buy into this idea. They are reluctant to return to the Qur’an and check for themselves and then go from there. I have realised many Muslims don’t have an interest in relying on their own personal intellect and check what the Qur’an is saying [42y/M/online].
In terms of Islam, some argue that religious individualisation and the fragmentation of
religious authority are leading to, “liberalization and modernization of Islam” and the
emergence of a “progressive Islam” in Europe (Mandaville, 2001). This could also be
the case for progressive Muslims in North America and elsewhere in the world. In the
data progressive Muslims are arriving at their own religious interpretations and as
such the authority of religious leaders and scholars is reduced.
In questioning the qualifications held by many normative Muslim scholars
participants understood that there was not much difference between themselves and
some Islamic leaders. This led them to think that perhaps they could make their own
religious and moral decisions and even assume positions of leadership themselves,
leading to a form of shared authority
ProgressiveLeadership
Progressive Islam is attempting to move away from traditional structures of Islamic
authority. If progressive Muslims change the nature of religious leadership and
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hierarchy in their communities what will their leadership look like in coming years?
As detailed in the case study above the leadership structure could be much more
organic by allowing those with leadership talents or aspirations to occupy leadership
roles. In this model multiple people would share the leadership within the space
letting leaders come forward organically and allowing them to be coached on how to
perform religious rituals within the worship space. This allows the worship spaces to
function autonomously and to structure themselves as they see fit. This links with
Beck’s concept of ‘do-it-yourself’ religion as progressive Muslims are creating
authority structures and spaces that fit with their own life experiences. Progressive
Muslims do vary widely regarding the form this new leadership would take. Here
Aarish sees deinstitutionalised progressive Islam as moving towards an
institutionalised form in the future:
Aarish: I think that eventually progressive Islam will have the same kind of leadership structures as progressive synagogues or progressive Christian churches. If you have someone in the congregation who is just more learned then it’s much more organic and much more inclusive, so I think we will eventually start creating our own clergy. We need imams we need progressive imams… I think that’s what we need to change through progressive Islam and through progressive imams. We don’t need to reinvent the wheel [26y/M/MPV].
Interestingly Aarish believes that the future for progressive Islam is in creating a new
set of progressive clergy, although these clergy would rely more on shared authority
than on traditional forms of leadership. This new type of authority is more widely
available to more members of the congregation in order to foster a more equitable
inclusive space.
ReasonsforNotQualifyingtoSpeakAboutIslam
Sixteen participants felt that they were not qualified to speak about Islam for various
reasons. As a result their feelings of belonging as a Muslim were reduced, only in
normative Muslim circles. For some their inability to speak Arabic was used to
exclude them from discussion about Islam. For others it was their gender, sexuality,
or status as a convert or revert that excluded them from religious discussions:
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Ivy: Well first it’s you haven’t read this, or you haven’t read the Qur’an. You get the argument that oh it’s because you’re reading it in English especially from people in the Middle East. It’s like well I actually took Arabic and Arabic linguistics. I know enough of the linguistics to know what it says. Don’t lie to me, I know what it says. Don’t tell me what it’s saying because I can do that much… I also get, “but you’re a woman” [36y/F/online].
Reading the Qur’an without proper guidance and explanation from a qualified teacher
or scholar was considered dangerous by some normative Muslims and an action to be
avoided. Studying or obtaining information on Islam from the Internet is particularly
frowned upon. However, for progressive Muslims this is a praiseworthy way to
understand Islam in a critical individualistic way:
Yohanes: The way I learned and where I grew up this is even more pronounced and I heard this from a teacher. He said you should not read the Qur’an on your own you have to go through scholars and let them walk you through. I thought it was quite strange. He said don’t study these things on the Internet you will get confused. You have to have a scholar if you want to understand - this is the right way to do it. So that’s the kind of mentality that people are being taught… With all respect to the scholars and everything, but we shouldn’t use the scholar as the final thought [42y/M/MPV].
Other participants felt that they were not allowed to speak or voice their opinions at
certain events, even certain progressive Muslim events. This indicates a difference of
opinion which was often not welcome. Only the opinions of those in the group were
welcome and endorsed:
Zaynab: They [NY Community of Progressives] really made sure that I didn’t get a chance to talk. Like I said they were very guarded; they were careful not to let me have a part in the conversation at all; they just wanted me to sit there as an observer mainly [47y/F/MPV].
Participants expressed that they were not considered qualified to speak about Islam.
This happened for a variety of reasons. For some progressive Muslims they were
considered unqualified due to their status as a convert, because they do not read
Arabic, due to their sexual orientation, or their gender.
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ReformVersusTradition
That data shows that for some progressive Muslims, reform is at the crux of their
social and religious activism through which they hope to create change and make
Islam more relevant to contemporary social conditions in North America. For others
reform carries a negative meaning and they instead hope to return to the original
meaning of the Qur’an or one of the many ‘traditional readings’ that suit their
identities. Some view a reformed version of Islam as no longer being authentic Islam.
El-Tawhid Juma Circle radically varies from Muslims for Progressive Values and
other progressive groups in their attitude toward Islamic reform. Due to this they have
stopped using the word progressive to describe themselves in order to distance the
organisation from the discourse of reform and focus instead on the selection of one
interpretation from the many available interpretations pointing towards a plurality of
acceptable interpretations:
Michelle: You know so we don’t do that [reform] and also progressives - Muslims for Progressive Values have kind of used the word to - used the word in such a way that people... at least in the states and in Canada associate progressive Islam with them and we don’t share their values for the most part. We got really worried about being associated with them. So you know, so we had to pull back. We were also just pulling back because we didn’t like, you know this air of reform that it had. See we kind of see ourselves as employing one traditional reading. Everybody else has their traditional readings and we have another possible reading that is present within the Tradition. There is no reform happening here. We’re pulling out what’s meaningful to us from the Tradition and we are making that work, just like everybody else does [51y/F/ETJC].
Michelle’s stance with regards to the interpretation of Islamic texts and the Traditions
fits into the paradigm of everyday religion. This type of religion is usually
individualised, pragmatic and focused on personal experience and autonomy rather
than established religious rules. Here Michelle identifies that ETJC looks for what is
meaningful and useful to them from the Tradition – this is helping them to fulfill a
goal, as do types of everyday religion. This type of religion is more about the morals
and values of each practitioner as opposed to dogma.
Additionally, most Muslims who engage with issues of social equality frame
their own discourse, not as a borrowing from Western discourses or creating a new
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discourse, but rather as one part of numerous “indigenous Islamic interpretations”
(Safi 2007: xviii). Some progressive Muslims resist the term reform:
Trent: I don’t think it is reform, I think it’s just basically taking it back to the roots. If we actually want to go back to how it was back in that day, if you want to take it back 1400 years ago, in the Prophet’s mosque, there wasn’t all this segregation B.S… He didn’t treat women like that. So come on! Our movement, no I think it’s just a different interpretation. For any religion to remain relevant it has to be bought into 2013 you know? [44y/M/ETJC].
Instead of simply disposing of religious traditions Trent attempts to reengage with and
reinterpret the Qur’an and Tradition to make it relevant to the contemporary world.
Safi clarifies, “Progressives generally hold that it is imperative to work through
inherited traditions of thought and practice: Sunni, Shiite, Sufi, juridical,
philosophical, theological, mystical, poetical, “folk Islam,” oral traditions—all must
be engaged.” (Safi 2007: xxv).
The evolving nature of Islamic law was reported as a negative thing and that it
could not be God’s law if it changed over time. This directly contradicts the
preference for ijtihad (independent reasoning) that many progressive Muslims hold.
If ijtihad were to be implemented there would of course be frequent changes to the
law depending on social and cultural contexts. Safi confirms that Progressive
Muslims often insist that the, “egalitarian spirit of the Qur’an in areas ranging from
women’s rights to religious pluralism should take precedence over more conservative
later rulings.” (Safi 2007: xix). Joyah explained that in her opinion changes to shar’ia
law were made to benefit powerful men:
Joyah: Even in Malaysia every two and a half years the shari’a law changes, much to the detriment of women. As a Muslim woman, whether you like it or not, you are governed by shari’a law in matters of marriage divorce and children. I go back it’s like the laws change and it’s supposed to be God’s law, how come it changes every three years? You know it’s so bullshit! The honest truth is that it’s just a bunch of men that decide what the law is and they just do it to their advantage and despite what the Qur’an says [52y/F/MPV].
Regarding the making and changing of Islamic law participants often drew attention
to the fact that these so called religious laws and any reform thereof are driven by
humans and almost exclusively by men. As mentioned above the authority held by a
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few men results in a power dynamic whereby many other Muslims will never have
the opportunity to exercise such authority or make their own interpretations. Due to
this many progressive Muslims are active in trying to seek social and cultural change.
WorkingforSocialandCulturalChange
Ayman spoke of what he feels is the real crux of the issue between progressive and
normative Muslims and also many of the Muslim groups in between – that there is
not a mainstream of Muslim thought. In his opinion this fact is causing the disorder
now present in Muslim culture. The lack of a central body of authority in Islam is
causing a crisis in religious authority that makes it difficult for anyone to claim they
have the one correct interpretation of Islam. The Internet also contributes to the
breakdown in religious authority by providing anyone a platform to publicise their
preferred interpretation of the Qur’an and the Traditions:
Ayman: I don’t think there is a mainstream of Muslim thought. So one symptom of the disarray in Muslim culture at this time is because there is no mainstream. Actually it’s the absence of thinking rather than thinking... They think if they say anything that everyone will disagree straight away. Nobody is able to form a nucleus around what is right [72y/M/QDG].
Instead of a reform of the Qur’an or the Tradition, progressive Muslims from the data
called for a social or cultural change amongst Muslims, or a re-interpretation of texts
and practices, not a change of religious texts themselves. Here Islam becomes a
socially dictated, socially constructed field. In the case of progressive Islam, it is
understood to be what Muslims do and label as Islam. In this sense Islam develops
into a much broader socially dominated category:
Aarish: I’m not saying you should be an atheist or anything like that but I think Islam is how Muslims practice it. It’s very difficult to say what is Islam or what isn’t Islam. For me to say Islam should change in my view [is] kind of nonsensical because there is no Islam but there are the practices of Muslims and those need to change. It’s nothing radical or revolutionary to say that Islam needs to change in my view, because Islam as it’s practiced has changed since the beginning of Islam [26y/F/MPV].
Emma also argued that Muslims needed to change, not Islam:
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Emma: I think the culture needs; I don’t know I can’t say that. I can say, as a Western woman the fact the Saudi Arabia doesn't let women drive is just crazy. I think it’s crazy that women in Jordan don’t go to the masjid (mosque). Women need faith communities. We all need faith communities. Do I think that Islam needs to change? I think we all need to change, I don’t think Islam as it’s written in the Qur’an - I don’t think that Islam needs to change. I think the culture - some of the cultural stuff around Islam needs to change [42y/F/MPV].
Before starting El-Tawhid Juma Circle Ali, Trent and Michelle attended a liberal
mosque that was more progressive than many non-progressive mosques, but still not
progressive enough for their liking, especially in matters of gender and sexual
equality. At this mosque the leaders said they were moving towards having female
prayer leaders but the community were not yet ready. Participants perceived multiple
ways of ‘progressing’ that indicate an individualised approach to religion:
Ali: Trent and I used to go there for Eid. At the Noor Centre the women and the men pray in the same hall. The women pray on the left side and the men pray on the right side. They have had women giving the call to the prayer for a number of years. Then they started having women doing the pre-khutbah, the pre-sermon on Fridays. They would come in and do a talk and then some man would come up and do the formalities to get it within the definition of a Friday sermon. So problematic but you know, the narrative was, well the community is not ready but we are moving them incrementally towards blah, okay? [50y/M/ETJC].
Some participants described change or reform as inevitable and something that will
occur regardless of agitation or activism from Muslim reformers or religious activists:
James: It’s not that the Islamic world or Muslims need to change, but that such change will take place over the centuries or even years whether they like it or not. It wasn’t that long ago when women and daughters were fully covered up in black in Iran after the revolution. Look at pictures of Iranian women and girls these days and you’ll see that their heads are covered only by token hijabs (head scarves) [51y/M/online].
Aarish saw the ideas presented in progressive Islam as historically unique even
outside of an Islamic context, although they do seem to borrow from enlightenment
thinking:
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Aarish: It’s historically unique. Our ideas might not be profound and they might be borrowed from enlightenment thinking. The existence of that type of synthetic group – that’s what is profound. It’s that you have a group of human beings being raised with Islamic upbringings and the idea of ihklaq (morals and manners) and that the rasullah (messenger of God) being the most perfect being, the most excellent form of a man but also accept that fact that we live in a different reality from his that’s a very unique situation in history. Not just in Islamic history but in any history [26y/M/MPV].
Others reiterated that Islam itself doesn’t need to change but the people themselves
need to change through education and improving their economic situations:
Ivy: Does Islam need to change? No. Does Allah need to change? We need to change, people need to change. Islam the religion doesn’t need to change, it doesn’t ever need to change. The Qur’an doesn’t need to be rewritten, we just need to look at it a little more objectively and not use it to.... We need to stop being so externally negative [36y/F/online].
In terms of social change participants identified a need for acceptance of a variety of
Islamic beliefs and that acts of violence due to a difference of opinion should be
completely ruled out and a plurality of beliefs accepted:
Madeline: As far as the Islamic community I’d like to see more openness on both sides to see different expressions and practices of the religion. I’d like to see people open to the fact that people might not practice like you do. I’d like to see people be more open and respectful of that and less militant of each other [35y/F/MPV].
As a solution to the questioning of religious authority Aarish called for a move
towards more humanistic understanding of Islam through individual acceptance,
social equality, compassion and diversity with a more decentralised centre of religious
authority pointing towards similarities with everyday religion. Some respondents also
endorsed implementing a new theological position to view God as the highest
realisation of good, rather than a corporeal body. Aarish describes fighting for the
right to hold a plurality of beliefs and to be able to have a more individualised type of
Islam:
Aarish: In order for us to meet our last principle of diversity we have to be okay with the fact that every single progressive Muslim is going to have a different theology, a different belief about that, a different relationship with that… That’s really what we’re fighting for, that’s really what we’re
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struggling for. So I would hope we can move away from that type of theology [26y/M/MPV].
Again this resonates with everyday religion, particularly with themes of
individualisation, emphasis on personal experiences, individual morals and autonomy.
Aarish’s understanding of Islam also links to a more decentralised, deinstitutionalised
form of Islam that is also present in forms of everyday religion. In everyday religion
the boundaries of religion are lose and it focuses mainly on personal experiences and
not always on activities that are associated with traditional religion. Here religious
authority is more individualised and focused on personal meaning and autonomy.
Most participants agreed that Islam itself did not need to change or be
reformed but argued that social and cultural change was needed. Participants
contended that there should be a variety of interpretations and more latitude available
to influence Muslim practice and indicated that a more individualised Islam would be
preferable. In this type of individualised religion believers would be free to develop
their own religious understandings. This more individualised form of Islam could also
be explained through everyday religion which is focused on personal morals and
values. The next section will discuss the data further and also compare progressive
Muslim practice with texts on progressive Muslim thought and seeks to explain these
sociologically. In doing so the individualised nature of progressive Muslims can be
discussed.
Discussion:ThePluralCharismatic‘Shared’ConceptofAuthority
New progressive religious identities produce a shift in religious authority allowing
women and those not normally permitted to assume leadership roles and espouse their
individual understanding of Islam. Among participants from ETJC this was termed
‘shared authority’. Duderija identifies the important role that female critical-
progressive scholars and activists have played in deconstructing the “epistemic
privilege” possessed by the entirely male religious scholars and clergy and that they
are “thereby shifting of the locus of authority and normativity in Muslim discourses.”
(Duderija 2013: 75). This democratisation of religious knowledge leads to the
fragmentation of religious authority and is part and parcel of the debate surrounding
who has the right to speak for and, therefore, define Islam authoritatively and
normatively (Duderija 2014: 446).
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Following the creation of plural inclusive worship spaces progressive Muslims
felt the need to reconsider the normative authority structures dominant in many
Muslim worship spaces. In order to allow for full equality and social justice there was
a need to open up leadership positions to all. To do this ETJC coined the term “shared
authority” that saw authority spread throughout the congregation instead of resting
with just one or two people. Through this method their sense of religious authority
also became plural. This means that imams or the leaders of the mosque became
coordinating imams or leaders and encouraged others to learn and share the roles of
imam, khatib and muezzin. Shared authority allows women, LGBTQ people and a
greater number of men equal access to leadership positions. Each society carries its
own cultural building blocks for religious expression. Now however the global media
make religious practices and symbols available to people far from the locations where
those traditions originated (Clark 2007). Focusing on lived religion means that any
concept of “authentic pure tradition” should be left to theologians (Ammerman 2014).
The concept of shared authority also extends to a shared responsibility for
making Islamic legal decisions or moral rulings. Participants explained that they did
not need to ask a scholar for Islamic advice but instead conducted ijtihad
(independent reasoning) to reach a decision about what action would be best for them
(as in everyday religion). This also extends to a concept that Trent explained called
fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) of the heart that sees progressive Muslims making
individual moral decisions according to what feels right for them. In this sense their
concept of authority is much more plural than what is predominantly seen in
normative Islam. Here a single source of religious knowledge or leadership is very
uncommon, instead the responsibility for understanding Islam is shared more equally
amongst the congregation.
For most of Islamic history women have not had a substantial presence in
mosques and places of religious learning. This has hindered women’s ability to obtain
the knowledge and certifications as well as a reputation as a teacher required for
traditional scholarly authority (Kalmbach 2011: 15). For centuries only males were
permitted to attend the public institutions in which the education and debate that led
to scholarly authority were conducted (Kalmbach 2008: 38). In the absence of access
to traditional forms of authority women have turned to alternate forms of authority.
Despite the fact that in recent years some women have been given access to places of
religious learning Kalmbach suggests that charismatic authority remains an
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“important avenue for female religious leadership” (2008: 40). Charismatic authority
has been and still is much more accessible to Muslim women than scholarly or
traditional authority. The magnetism and personality of Weber’s charismatic leader
offers an entry point for women as religious authorities. Female Sufis have always
constructed their claim to authority on a kind of charisma that Kalmbach refers to as
baraka (divine goodness) “that is based on a reputation of piety (including but not
limited to piety obtained through formal learning) and (often) family connections”
(Kalmbach 2008: 41).
In progressive Islamic practice, charisma is much more aligned with Roth and
Joas’ interpretation of Weber’s view of charisma as a revolutionary force that leads to
a change of social structure and reform of new communities. However, this does not
account for the more individualised nature of progressive ‘shared authority’. This
model of religious authority extends Weber’s category of charismatic authority and
creates a new category - ‘shared-charismatic authority’ - in which leaders rely on their
charisma rather than traditional qualifications to share leadership more widely. Due to
the fact that progressive Muslims do not have one leader but attempt to share the
leadership as equally as possible an element must be added to Weber’s notion of
charismatic leadership in order to represent a shared type of authority.
Progressive Muslims rely on an alternate type of authority in order to
deconstruct the hierarchy present in many traditional kinds of authority. They rely on
shared authority that allows leadership positions to be shared among more people.
However, my participants did not construct their authority around their reputation for
piety. They instead constructed it around their “special gifts” whether they are
pastoral care, academic scholarship, or musical talent. This may indicate a
democratisation of charisma. Constructing authority on the basis of gifts rather than
on traditional methods of authority making, progressive Muslims from the data were
able to drastically widen the range of people able to claim religious authority. This is
advantageous not just for women but also for LGBTQ people and men without a
traditional Islamic education.
The transformation present in progressive Islam is much better described as a
process of individualisation. Individualisation manifests itself in a deterioration of
obedience to traditional authorities and through “an eclecticism of religious practice
based upon the principle of the individual’s choice in matters pertaining to religious
belief and practice” (Duderija 2007a: 148). Individualisation paves the way for a more
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cosmopolitan Islam. Duderija argues that it achieves this through liberation from
patriarchal, cultural and ethnic restrictions and is employed “to disassociate
individuals from established ethno-national communities” (Duderija 2007a: 148).
Individualisation also contests established normative understandings of Islam itself
(Duderija 2007a: 148 and Fadil 2005: 143). Individualisation should be understood as
strongly related to broader trends of migration, globalisation, and modernisation
which in turn “transform religious identities and practices in relation to the
‘reproduction of Islamic normativity and authority’ and the transmission of Islamic
knowledge” (Duderija 2007a: 149). Participants described entering into a process
where they sought Islamic knowledge on their own and interpreted the texts for
themselves, thus gaining their own understandings, and in turn altering their religious
identities and practices. Individualisation relates both to the de-territorialisation, de-
institutionalisation, and de-nationalisation of religion (see Chapter Three).
Specifically, individualisation connects to the idea that God is no longer the collective
God of tradition, but a chosen personal God grounded in individual faith (Wilke
2015).
As seen in the data above progressive Islam relies on the absence of traditional
hierarchical authority to operate in an alternate fashion distinct from normative
Muslim communities. Ebrahim Moosa writes of his fears of the institutionalisation of
progressive Muslim practice and indicates that this may have detrimental effects for
the movement. Especially in a top down authority structure he worries that,
“progressive Muslims run the risk of becoming servants of power” (2007: 127). If a
hierarchical structure were to be instituted in progressive communities they would
cease to embody the egalitarian spirit that is at the core of their values and practices.
Interestingly above Aarish saw progressive Islam moving from deinstitutionalised to
institutionalised with a formal clergy in the coming years.
Adis Duderija argues that one main feature of this “new religiosity” among the
new generations of Western born Muslims is a process of, “individualization,
privatization or Protestization of Islamic faith and practice” (2007a: 148). This
understanding of religion considers that one’s religious identity should exist only in
the private sphere. Participants in this research also indicate this by saying they wish
to keep their religious beliefs private. Duderija contends that this change has
similarities with the “post-Reformation Protestant Christian tradition” (2007a: 148).
Regarding the protestantisation of Islam in the Constitutional era in Iran
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(1900), some Iranian intellectuals announced the need for “Islamic Protestantism”.
This group felt that Protestantism was a significant factor in questioning the hegemony
of instutionalised religion and clerical authority. They argued that the protestant form
of Islam would stop the power of the clergy over the people and release the potential
for social change. It was also hoped that it could push religion and the religious to
confront the possibilities of modernity. This goal was not achieved (Mahdavi 2014).
The second call for “Islamic Protestantism” took place in the 1960s when Ali Shariarti
called for radical reform in Islamic thought. For him “Islamic Protestantism” was less
about dogmatic changes and much more about social reforms (Mahdavi 2014). In
2002 Hashem Aghajari insisted on the urgency of the project of “Islamic
Protestantism”. He argued that Muslims need “Islamic humanism” and “Islamic
Protestantism” (Mahdavi 2014). What is common is all three waves of Islamic
Protestantism in Iran is the idea that the application of Weber’s Protestant ethic in a
Muslim society has more to do with the de-institutionalisation of religion and the
removal of the interpretational monopoly from the clergy. Islamic Protestantism is
seen by some as able to resolve the strain between modernity/democracy and Islam by
pluralising religious thought and in turn secularising the Muslim public (Mahdavi
2014).
However, Syed Farid Alatas disagrees with the use of the term protestation of
Islam. He indicates the perils of “attributing Christian characteristics to other
religions”. He reasons that in doing so it prevents us from understanding issues
specific to Muslim experiences (2007: 517). Interestingly he contends that the majority
of Muslims see reform in terms of “the empowerment of tradition” indicating a “return
to the vision and values of the Prophet Muhammad” and the practices that sprung from
these ideals and not in the form of a Protestant type reform (2007: 517). This
description is itself quite general and is profoundly altered by different interpretations
of what the real values of the Prophet really were. Participants also spoke about
returning to the originally intended meaning of the Qur’an encompassing social justice
and equality. Just as Alatas (2007) argued it is clear that progressive reform is not the
same as what some term the Protestantisation of Islam. The typical view of Islam is
that it does not have a connection with modern economic patterns as Protestantism
does. Anthropologist Robert Hefner has studied Islamic movements in Indonesia that
contradict the conventional view, “suggesting that under certain conditions (which do
not prevail everywhere) a self-consciously Islamic movement can promote values that
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are compatible with modern capitalism (and indeed with pluralism and democracy)”
(Berger 1968: 452). This is also the case for progressive Islam.
A shared plural sense of authority also creates the potential for religious
reform and social change. Participants agreed that for the most part they prefer to
encourage a social change amongst Muslims, but not a reform of Islam itself. They
still viewed Islam as complete, but explained that they believe that it had been
misinterpreted and misunderstood by Muslims. Their notion of reform through social
change would see Muslims returning to the central themes of the Qur’an and focusing
on achieving social justice, not only in their communities but also in the world at
large.
Conclusion
Many progressive Muslims question the qualifications of Muslim scholars and
whether they are more qualified than other Muslims to speak on behalf of and
interpret the faith. As a result, progressive Muslims are working toward altering the
authority structures in their worship spaces by introducing the concept of shared
authority. This allows those who would ordinarily not have access to leadership
positions to lead the congregation and also attempts to dismantle existing power
structures. This is particularly important for minority groups such as women and those
from the LGBTQ community. As such, progressive leadership is open to all and is to
be shared with as many members of the congregation as possible through shared
authority. This new type of authority is plural, recognising multiple leaders and
multiple roles in the worship space. What is behind these attitudes is the idea that
Islam must be pragmatic; it must suit one’s everyday life and so dogma, authority and
tradition are not the most important elements of these Muslims’ lives, because other
things are equally or more significant (Jeldtoft 2011).
Participants questioned the traditional points of entry for Muslim leaders
wondering if normative religious leaders and scholars were educated enough and if
the knowledge they transmit holds any value in current Western social contexts. This
may indicate their preference for a Western tertiary education over traditional
madrasa (school of religious instruction) programs. Progressive Muslims approach
authority in an entirely different way than normative Muslims
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Even amongst progressive Muslim groups there is a debate regarding reform
versus alternative interpretation. Those affiliated with MPV are more likely to call for
the reform of Islam, even if it is just a reform of the behaviour of Muslims. However,
those affiliated with ETJC prefer to consider their interpretation of Islam as one of the
various traditional interpretations in existence. Plural interpretations are important to
progressive Muslim practice. In general, reform in progressive Islam is framed in
terms of social and cultural change rather than a change to the religion itself. Viewing
interpretation in this way paves the way for plural conceptions of authority and also
for social change via hermeneutic activism.
This chapter has argued that progressive Muslims employ a new method of
authority – shared authority – which is more individualised than traditional forms of
religious authority. This type of authority focuses on the varied gifts and talents of
each individual. Due to this it could be argued that progressive Muslims are becoming
more individualised, or that they value the individual and their perspective and
understanding more than their normative counterparts. Shared authority suggests that
this is an everyday religion, which emphasises participation and individual autonomy.
The next chapter will discuss gender activism and the plurality of approaches
employed to work towards social equality and in line with the aim of this thesis, how
these approaches link to processes of individualisation.
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ChapterNine:ExaminingGenderActivisminProgressiveIslam
The objective of this chapter is to explore one particular issue, gender equality, in
order to illuminate the lived experiences of progressive Muslims and to ascertain to
what level processes of individualisation are present in the data. Gender inequality is
one of the main concerns of progressive Muslims (Safi 2003a) and the study’s
participants actively aim to make gender equality possible through their practice and
activism. This chapter also presents an analysis of the way progressive Muslims from
this research view gender and their ideas about gender roles, although the data
collected mostly focuses on women. It analyses participants’ attitudes to feminism
and women’s rights, how these attitudes extend to their religious practice and activism
and also examines resistance to gender segregation. This chapter first presents a case
study from Zaynab that highlights her views on gender activism. She describes in
detail some of the social activism undertaken by herself and other progressive
Muslims to remedy gender inequality and stereotypical views of Muslim women as
silent and subordinate. Following the aim of the thesis this chapter aims to test the
individual nature of progressive Muslim gender activism. The following case study
illustrates the diverse individual approaches to seeking gender equality while also
revealing a communitarian aspect to this activism.
GenderandIslam
In order to examine what gender means and how progressive Muslims experience it, it
is important to first understand what the normative view of a Muslim woman is. Here
I focus on women due to the fact that women are more likely to report social
inequalities. Women are also more likely to have their bodies and behaviours
scrutinised. Coming from a textual perspective Duderija states:
The normative, authentic Muslim female identity is constructed in reference to that of a veiled, secluded woman who remains within the private space of her home and does not venture or mix into the public space of the male ummah (Muslim community). Another aspect of this ideal Muslim female is that of an obedient wife whose religious duty is to please and satisfy the needs of her husband (Duderija 2011: 361).36
36 ‘Men have a status above women’ (Qur’an 2: v. 228).
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It has been asserted that women are subjugated and stripped of their rights in Muslim
societies and communities (Afshar 1994, Fox 1977, Odeh 1993). This perception has
also garnered public action by secular feminist groups like Femen who designated an
International Topless Jihad Day on April 4th 2013 and employed the slogans,
“Muslim women let’s get naked!” and “better naked than burqa” in order to attempt
to free Muslim women from clothing they view as restrictive and emblematic of
Muslim women’s inequality (Gordts 2013). It is acknowledged by sociologist Fatima
Mernissi (1987 and 1993) (and also by Amina Wadud 1999 and Leila Ahmed 1993),
that Muslim women are treated remarkably differently than their male counterparts.
Women are often excluded from any significant participation in religious life.
Mernissi (1987) posits that the need to control women’s access to the public sphere
stems from the idea that women cause fitna (temptation) or social chaos if given
unrestricted access to the male public domain. In addition to the limitations that
Muslim women experience accessing the public sphere and religious spaces, Muslim
women also face discrimination in the area of family law. For instance, Muslim
women are often denied the right to seek a divorce or retain custody of their children
in the event of a divorce (Carroll 1997: 100). These issues are also prevalent among
Muslims living in Western societies. Mernissi asserts that the entire Muslim view of
civilization revolves around ‘the struggle to contain the woman’s destructive, all
absorbing forces’. Women are to be ‘controlled to prevent men from being distracted
from their social and religious duties’ by ‘creating institutions which foster male
dominance through sexual segregation’. (1975: 138).
To provide an example of this in contemporary times, in March 2014, on
International Women’s Day, a UK based Sheikh Abu Eesa Niamatullah posted some
comments on his public personal page referring to the day as “bakwass (bullshit) day”
and reminding his followers that, “starting tomorrow, it’s 364 International Men’s
Day again, so stick that in your oven and cook it”. He also created a meme37 featuring
his own picture that read, “Don’t try to understand women. Women understand
‘Men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the other, and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and send them to their beds apart and beat them. Then if they obey you, take no further action against them’ (Qur’an 4: v. 34). ‘Women are your fields: go, then, into your fields whence you please’ (Qur’an 2: v. 224) and the testimony of women is worth one half that of men; ‘… but if two men cannot be found, then one man and two women whom you judge fit to act as witnesses; so that if either of them make an error, the other will remind her’ (Qur’an 2: v. 282).37 Internet meme: an image, video, and/or piece of text that is copied, often changed slightly and sent rapidly on the Internet.
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women and hate each other”. 38 The reactions were rapid, particularly from U.S.
Muslims, with condemnations being issued for days. Subsequent apologies from Abu
Eesa caused further dissent and discussion among Muslim communities in the West
regarding women’s rights. For example, Activist Hind Makki suggested that Twitter
users use the hashtag #MuslimMaleAllies to shift the focus from the misogynistic
comments of Abu Eesa to those Muslim men that uphold the rights of women.39
These types of events have been catalysts for a variety of movements to begin to
promote a more progressive and inclusive vision of Islam.
For many progressive Muslim scholars gender inequalities in Muslim societies
and communities are not derived from the religion itself but are seen as a result of
patriarchal interpretation of the scriptures and dominant social structures (Barlas in
Duderija 2011). Asma Barlas highlights the Qur’an’s emphasis on the equality of all
human beings before God, whether male or female. She continues to argue that the
Qur’an does not determine gender roles or make commentary on these but instead
refers to male and female bodies or moral personalities (Duderija 2011). She also
points out that the Qur’anic dress code is not just for women but also applies in
different ways to men (Barlas 2002). In the words of Al-Hibri, for progressive
Muslims “there is no metaphysical, ontological, religious, or ethical primacy for the
male over the female” (2000: 53).
Fatima Mernissi confirms that the origins of gender segregation are based on the
Muslim concept of an “active” female sexuality resulting in “external precautionary
safe-guards” like veiling, seclusion, constant surveillance and gender segregation
(1975: 15). This is founded on the idea of women’s kayd (power), which is believed to
be the power of women to deceive and defeat men both by cunning and intrigue and
not by force. This theory considers the nature of woman’s aggression to be sexual
“endowing [the Muslim woman] with a fatal attraction which erodes the male’s will to
resist her and reduces him to a passive acquiescent role” (Mernissi 1975: 15). Duderija
also argues that, “Women are thus a threat to a healthy social order (or umma)” (2008a:
413). It is in reaction to these ideas of female allurement and control that many
discourses of male power have been produced, “including the traditional Muslim ideal
of a submissive, docile and obedient women” (Shaikh 1997: 13).
38 https://www.change.org/p/al-maghrib-institute-fire-abu-eesa-niamatullah39 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/10/muslim-male-allies_n_4936848.html (last accessed 8/07/2015).
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These constructions of femininity and masculinity have been employed in order
to enforce limitations upon females in the public and the private sphere. According to
this understanding women are viewed as sources and causes of fitna (social or moral
chaos). In the words of Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “women are seen as walking, breathing
bundles of fitna and, on the basis of this view, womanhood is artificially constructed
into the embodiment of seduction” (2001: 245). On this basis women are viewed as,
“anti-divine and anti-social forces.” (Duderija 2008a: 413). In contrast, progressive
Muslims try to see a plurality of ways to be feminine. Furthermore, veiling is seen as
“a symbol of sexual segregation” and the division of the public and private spheres
(Mernissi 1975: 16), which interestingly most progressive females do not practice.
Certain assumptions about the nature of women underpin the normative fiqh
(philosophy of Islamic law) rulings regarding women. Ziba Mir-Hosseini (1996)
argues that the significant suppositions that underlie fiqh rulings regarding women are
based on the following presuppositions:
(1) Women are created of and for men.
(2) God made men superior to women.
(3) Women are defective in reason and faith.
(4) Femininity is defined by women’s haya (modesty and shyness) and
masculinity is constructed in relation to man’s ghira (sexual honour and
jealousy)” (Duderija 2014: 442-443).
Sa’diyya Shaikh agrees with this depiction and contends that in Muslim history, “Men
and notions of masculinity are associated with rationality, intellect, and spirituality. In
contrast, women and “femininity” are constructed as emotional, irrational, carnal and
sexual” (1997: 8).
Although countless scholars argue that gender equality is guaranteed through
the Qur’an, social practices like gender segregation indicate a different reality for
Muslim women. Gender segregation in normative Muslim worship and learning
spaces takes on a variety of forms and is heavily influenced by culture. Some
mosques, even those in the West, do not have any allocated space for women while
others have a completely separate section, often on a different level of the mosque,
sectioned off from the main part of the mosque with floor to ceiling screens or
partitions. Few mosques allow women to pray at the back of the main section of the
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mosque behind the men and fewer still allow women to pray beside or in front of
men.
As well as a focus on gender segregation in Muslim communities by
progressive Muslims, there has also been a focus on woman led prayer. There are
many who argue fiercely against woman led prayer and maintain the importance of
this type of gender segregation in the United States and abroad. Muzammil Siddiqi of
ISNA (Islamic Society of North America) constructed his argument against woman-
led prayer on the history of past practice and thus community consensus and,
“emphasised the danger of women distracting men during prayers. Thus women
should at least be placed behind men in congregational prayers” (Hammer 2012: 47).
However, many progressive Muslim congregations attempt to completely modify this
format by holding prayers where men and women pray side by side. Other female
participants in my study have also staged protests at normative Muslim mosques in
order to assert their rights to pray in the main section of the mosque. Widespread
gender segregation in Muslim societies is said to cause social problems and
misunderstandings between men and women. It also exemplifies an axis of power.
Fatima Mernissi states that:
Men do not understand women and women do not understand men. The cosmic frontier indicates the line of power, because wherever there is a frontier, there are two types of creatures walking on earth, the powerful on one side and the powerless on the other (Mernissi 1994: 242).
Interpreted in this way, gender segregation has a lot to do with what Mernissi terms
the ‘Muslim male elite’ maintaining power and the status quo. Progressive Muslims
and scholars argue that in the early days of Islam women’s conditions in mosques
were very different from what we observe now. Duderija writes that:
They [women] would frequently attend the mosque, which was a widespread practice. Often men would pray behind women and their prayers would be considered valid. A physical barrier in the mosque did not separate women and men and, importantly, some early Muslim jurists maintained that a physical barrier between men and women during the prayer would invalidate women’s prayers (Duderija 2008a: 421).
Many use this method of argumentation to suggest that the current practice of gender
segregation has strayed from what was originally intended and they use these
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interpretations to effect social change. Zaynab is one progressive Muslim who uses
this type of argument to question gender segregation and interpretations of the Qur’an
that devalue women. The next section of this chapter examines her experience of
gender inequality and gender activism in detail. Zaynab is not representative of the
participants in this research because of her experience as a protest organiser and
media spokesperson but has been chosen as a case study as she provides specific data
on progressive gender activism. Following the case study, data from other participants
will be discussed via subthemes (attitudes to gender, women’s role in Islam, gender
segregation, gender equality and feminisms) and compared to data presented in the
case study. This chapter will examine progressive Muslim gender activism, the way
progressive Muslims perceive gender roles and how they engage in gender activism.
It will also answer the aim of this thesis by examining the individual and community
nature of progressive Muslim gender activism.
CaseStudy:GenderActivisminProgressiveIslam–Zaynab
In this case study Zaynab raises themes of gender inequality, gender segregation,
gender activism and the importance of choice. This case study will establish that
progressive Muslim individuals are involved in gender activism and it will be argued
that Zaynab is the inventor of her own personalised religious alternatives that
combine her personal experiences and faith values (Beck 2010 and Mythen 2013).
This is also established in the other results chapters. Zaynab is a 47-year-old
unemployed cleaner and housekeeper living in Seattle. She is a convert to Islam and
comes from a Native American and Caucasian background. She has been well known
as an activist for women’s rights in the Muslim community and gained media
attention for participating in gender segregation protests in Washington D.C.
mosques. She tells me that she has three years of college education without
completion and that she is also multilingual in Spanish and Arabic.
In the past Zaynab has been involved in leading prayers. She described the
experience as a little daunting but also very liberating, “It can be done and it does get
received well” [47y/F/MPV]. She said that she had to recognise that the people
participating already have their mindset open enough to accept it, “It’s not like I
walked into your average mosque and led prayer and wow people actually accepted it
- no it was under special conditions that we arranged for and the people that attended
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that had somehow wrapped their head around woman led prayer” [47y/F/MPV].
Woman led prayer is usually carried out under special circumstances and is not
widespread. Her earlier experiences of leading prayers involved leading only women.
Later she led mixed gender prayers and reported that some congregants were not
comfortable and would stand to the side. “People should stand where they want to be.
Some people argue, what if the women want to be in another room? Okay well let
them stand in the other room, let the women who want to be part of the congregation
stand with the congregation” [47y/F/MPV]. For Zaynab choice is the most important
factor, which means that her approach aligns with ‘choice feminism’. Linda Hirshman
coined the phrase ‘choice feminism’ to name the common assumption in the US that
the women’s movement has liberated women to make any choices they wish
(Ferguson 2010). Choice feminism involves individualisation because of the emphasis
of personal autonomy.
Our conversation then turned to the difference in attitudes to gender
segregation inside and outside of the mosque:
It’s so psychotic because obviously they [Muslim women] got there [the mosque] somehow, somebody saw them, if they go shopping for groceries, or they go to the doctor, or to work, it’s so psychotic that when you walk in a mosque that the rules are so different that you can’t be seen by a man [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab recalled that she had heard progressive men argue that gender segregation is
insulting to men, that it suggests that men are such “uncontrollable animals” that they
need the partition to stop them from giving in to their desires.
Zaynab previously participated in the organisation Muslims for Progressive
Values in Washington D.C.. One of the board members of this organisation would
often apologise about a particular mosque that he would go to, “Like, it was so sexist
and so horrible. I was curious, so I thought I have to go see it”. They were near the
Islamic Centre near Embassy Row and decided to go in:
You walk in and there are these beautiful marble steps and the entranceway had ornate wood carvings but we didn’t get to go in there we had to go around the side, kind of like a slaves entrance, you know you go around the side and there’s just a plain old metal door, all utility. We were ushered to this corner spot and they had wood panels about seven or seven and a half feet tall, they would just stand up kind of like
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room dividers or privacy screens but they were solid wood you know and they had them arranged so that we were boxed into this corner like five by five square foot [47y/F/MPV].
She said that there were not very many people at the mosque because it was Maghrib
(sunset prayer) time and that due to the wood panels separating them from the
congregation they could not even tell they were praying:
Then we heard the salams (final line of prayer). We were standing there waiting for the prayer to start and we couldn’t figure out that they were praying until we heard somebody saying the salams at the end. I’m like, “what!” So we missed joining in that prayer [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab was understandably upset that they had missed the prayer due to the strict
gender segregation arrangements:
I was like this is a really disgusting, I was really irritated that I missed the prayer because I was prohibited by this stupid box [partition], which somebody else referred to as the ‘penalty box’. We call it the penalty box. We did something bad, so we need to go back to this little dark corner. So I told my friend, you know what we need to protest this and not just at this mosque but at every mosque [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab mentioned that as bad as the conditions were at that particular mosque, there
are mosques and prayer rooms where the conditions are worse, where women are
relegated to a utility or storage room: “I don’t believe that that was intended by the
Prophet and that was not present within his community. We started [protesting] just
by getting in a line behind the men” [47y/F/MPV].
These protests represent an attempt to create an individual form of Islam that
is more compatible with Zaynab’s life experiences and is also a form of everyday
religion. Beck (2010) asserts that the subtleties of various forms of cosmopolitanism,
globalisation and individualisation interrupt established configurations of sociality
and then introduce new structures. Zaynab is attempting to initiate a new social
configuration of gender within mosques. In Beck’s ‘cosmopolitan imagination’, in the
same way that employment histories, intimate relationships and family are subject to
individual decisions and choices, religion also becomes a part of what he calls the
‘do-it-yourself’ identity (Beck 2010: 49). Here Zaynab is creating a ‘do-it-yourself’,
everyday form of Islam.
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Within the interview, I asked Zaynab how the men in the congregation reacted
to the presence of the protesters. She said that most of them were encouraging the
others to leave the women alone, however, she also said there were people who would
get upset. Even when taking into consideration the influence of cosmopolitanism and
globalisation, religion retains an incomparable significance in which the conservation
of tradition is privileged (Mythen 2013: 123). This is illustrated through some of the
men’s reactions:
Well often they [the men] would turn around and tell us where the women’s section is and to go over there and we’ve had people be physically and verbally hostile, very insulting, [saying] “you just want to look at men’s butts”, I mean I’m there to pray aren’t you there to pray? [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab explained that during their protests the police were always called to the
mosque and said this was because, “We weren’t obeying them. We weren’t moving or
getting out like we were supposed to” [47y/F/MPV]. Here the men are trying to
maintain gender segregation and what they consider to be traditional Islam. The
protestors were understood to be trespassing and so were removed on each occasion
by police. Zaynab commented that these actions did not change anything but that
perhaps with continued effort a change could be achieved.
Zaynab revealed that while she was in D.C. the mosque protests polarised
people. This was evident in the responses on Facebook and other online forums, and
even within MPV, an organisation comprised of people who are expected to identify
themselves as progressive Muslims. Even those who argued for gender equality
expressed different ways to achieve it. This may indicate that for some progressive
Muslims tradition is still important. This reveals the individual nature of progressive
Islam. Although progressives may agree on broad values they disagree about what
equality should look like and how it should best be achieved:
There was a lot of sniping back and forth and arguing, which in one way it’s seen as kind of negative, but I don’t see it as negative. I think I started people talking about the issue. It’s important to get people to talk about it… I began to be more outspoken and they didn’t like that. They thought that wasn’t very feminine [47y/F/MPV].
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She argued that Islam provides rights for women, but that women need to claim those
rights. She did not advocate for removing the rights of others in her quest for
women’s rights:
We essentially have the rights; we just need to exercise them. It’s very hard to claim them though because you’re going against the flow of what that community is doing or expecting out of the women or of the men. I’ve actually had women say, “Why don’t we ask them if we can pray behind the men, they just might say yes?” I mean if they was any evidence of permissiveness there wouldn’t be a barrier, the barrier excludes permissiveness. There is no permission with the barrier. So stop waiting for permission just step over and take your rights. You don’t have to take anybody else’s rights, just take your rights [47y/F/MPV].
She felt that perhaps a prolonged effort might have produced some permanent social
change or reconfiguration:
Honestly I feel like if we had kept doing it like once a month or something that there would come a point where it would be like, “well they came to pray, big deal” [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab hopes that prayer areas could be integrated at least to the point where the
women are not in a separate space, nor right on the back wall, but directly behind
men:
At that time [of the D.C. protests] I thought that - and I still think so a little bit - that prayer areas should be integrated at least to the point where the women are not on the back wall but directly behind men. That we should protest at mosques, that the women should protest at mosques and push to have this done, to change what is existing [47y/F/MPV].
Zaynab stated that in normative mosques it was very unusual for women to be on the
executive board. Often the justification for their absence was that they might be called
to lead people in prayer as part of their leadership role and that women are unable to
do this in normative Islam:
The excuse [why women cannot be on the board] and I’ve heard it, is that they may be called in prayer and they can’t lead prayer, which is a silly thing. We can’t have them leading us in religious affairs, they might lead us astray, but you know they can be treasurer or whatever. You can lead
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us astray financially but not religiously. It doesn’t make sense [47y/F/MPV].
She emphasised that those progressive Muslims who do not have a physical
community should develop their own communities. She urged others to go out and
create their own communities, “even if you’re making it in a coffee shop or
somebody’s living room once a month or something and have that experience without
relying on some mosque that’s already established and are being run as if they are in
Pakistan or in another country” [47y/F/MPV]. Here she advocates for the creation of
what Beck refers to as a personalised religious alternative that combines personal
biographical experiences and faith values. Beck differentiates between religion and
faith, “In other words, individualization theory differentiates between (organized)
religion and (individualized) faith in order to distinguish itself from secularization
theory” (Beck 2010: 40). Zaynab’s desire to develop her own community indicated
her preference for personal faith over organised religion. McGuire points out that
religion is in a constant state of change, “At the individual level, religion is not
unitary, fixed, or even consistent. It should be expected that individual’s religious
practices and the stories they tell to make sense of their lives are always changing and
growing” (2008). Although elements of Zaynab’s religious understanding and
practice are quite individualised, it is important to recognise that community plays a
strong role in her religious life. A feeling of agreement and commonality with others
was important to Zaynab.
Zaynab explained that for those women who want to stay in the normative
Muslim community it requires a lot of energy to do these protests and push for
change, “but it’s worth it”. She identifies the protests at the mosque in Embassy Row
as being really rewarding. “It took a lot of nerves and a lot of protest. It’s really
exhausting but there’s a lot of women out there - and men - that just don’t have the
nerve or the stamina to do that kind of work” [47y/F/MPV]. Here Zaynab indicates
the difficulty of her activist work even though she finds it rewarding. She also alludes
to the difficulty faced by anyone trying to question or change the status quo in the
Muslim community.
This case study has showed that although many Muslims believe that gender
equality is provided for in the Qur’an, progressive Muslims question this. Progressive
Muslims are particularly concerned with the presence of gender inequalities in
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Muslim settings and are actively involved in trying to change this. This case study has
illustrated that progressive Muslim individuals are involved in gender activism and it
has established that Zaynab can be seen to be emphasising an individualised,
pragmatic Islam with a focus on participation, personal experience and autonomy.
Some of these values are also feminist, especially her focus on women’s participation
and personal autonomy.
In the next sections data will be explored from a variety of participants and
grouped by sub theme. The rest of the chapter will discuss women’s roles in Islam
along with gender segregation in Muslim settings. It will explore the connection
between the concept of awrah (nakedness or shame) and the practice of gender
segregation. Lastly, it will discuss the positives of gender mixing and the use of the
label ‘feminism’. This chapter will answer the aim of this thesis by outlining how
progressive Muslims articulate their gender activism and examining the individualised
nature of progressive Muslims’ gender activism.
AttitudestoGender
In order to better understand the way progressive Muslims perceive gender it is
important to consider their responses regarding gender characteristics. Most explained
that gender differed between each individual and some recognised that gender is
socially constructed category:
Afreen: I think it can go either way and I think it depends person to person. I think women can be equally as… they can carry those typically masculine traits or traits that you would think that are masculine, then men can be very tender and very caring and women can make great leaders so I don’t know. I don’t like to put that in any kind of box. They can take on both types of traits if that makes sense [26y/F/MPV].
Zaynab felt that gender roles should be able to be adjusted in a relationship to suit the
personalities of the couple and not be dictated by religion. For her, women
undertaking untraditional mechanical or maintenance tasks did not make them any
less feminine:
Zaynab: I don’t think there’s any reason why a man can’t help raise a child or a woman can’t go out and fix a flat tire if she’s really mechanically adept… I think there has to be room for adjusting roles in
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an individual couple. I don’t think the religion should dictate… I don’t think anybody should dictate the roles for a person [47y/F/MPV].
Many participants viewed gender as a socially constructed category and thought that
all people have characteristics that could be considered masculine and feminine.
Stemming from this there was a belief that gender roles were fluid and contingent on
the talents of an individual, not depending on their sex.
These types of attitudes to gender make it possible for progressive Muslims to
see women in a diversity of roles and to accept them as leaders. This perception is a
social rather than biological conception of gender. This is consistent with how social
constructionists such as West and Zimmerman’ see gender:
We argue that gender is not a set or traits, nor a variable, nor a role but the product of social doings of some sort. What then is the social doing of gender? It is more than the continuous creation of the meaning of gender through human actions. We claim that gender itself is constituted through interaction (West and Zimmerman 1987: 129).
West and Zimmerman further explain that, “Gender is a powerful ideological device”
that is able to produce, reproduce and legitimate the limits and choices that are
grounded in a particular sex category (1987: 147). Importantly, this conception of
gender, as opposed to a biological construction of gender, makes change possible,
which is a central objective for this activist community. In the following sections the
limits and choices available to Muslim women within their specified gender roles will
be identified and discussed. Later we will examine the gender activism of progressive
Muslims who seek to rearrange these categorisations.
Women’sRolesinIslam
This section aims to outline the diverse ways that women’s roles in Islam are
understood and enacted by progressive Muslims. As the case study demonstrated,
progressive Muslims are concerned with women’s roles in worship spaces. A
principle agenda for many progressive Muslim movements is to improve on issues of
gender and sexual inequality. Progressive Muslims do this through providing gender
equal worship spaces. Participants observed that women do play more of a role in
progressive circles and that the future possibilities are endless. However, ten
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participants thought that normative Islam still needed to be moderated in terms of
women’s participation. In Joyah’s view Islam is being practiced contrary to the
teachings of the Qur’an because there are so many derogatory passages in the hadith
that contradict the worth of a woman:
Joyah: What I find is that because the spiritual value of the woman traditionally has been cheapened I feel that coupled with verse 4:3440 of the Qur’an where it talks about the husband being allowed to beat the wife - however you want to interpret beat - it gives the man, the Muslim man, that added religious right to beat his wife, so to be abusive, verbally, physically [52y/F/MPV].
Bringing Muslim women onto a symbolically equal footing with men serves to
demonstrate that there is a plurality of ways of practicing Islam. Aarish explained that
Muslim women should be more involved in mosques:
Aarish: I think that Muslim women particularly… need to have more of a role in the mosques. Obviously with the progressive setting it’s limitless because structurally there won’t be any problem with a woman being the leader, we don’t need to moderate the progressives but we need to moderate the orthodox. I would definitely like to see more women on executive boards and becoming religious scholars [26y/M/MPV].
Fahim explained that culture had a significant effect on gender dynamics in Muslim
societies. He was concerned that the treatment of women in Muslim societies and
communities would reflect badly on Islam:
Fahim: No, in a sense when mainstream Muslims treat women as second class citizens that reflects badly on Islam, certain rules, such as inheritance, dress, and prayers and so on, I feel those issues people interpret as their local customs dictate. For example, women in Indonesia are allowed to work and drive. Whereas in Saudi Arabia, local Saudi Women are not allowed to fully function in any job she desires nor can she drive (sic) [35y/M/online].
Violations of women’s personhood and dignity are often justified through theology
(Sachedina 2009). As explained by Abdulaziz Sacehdina:
40 “Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, guarding in [the husband's] absence what Allah would have them guard. But those [wives] from whom you fear arrogance - [first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them. Indeed, Allah is ever Exalted and Grand” Sahih International version.
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The religiously justificatory language, using threats of divine wrath and punishment that is employed by religious representatives to coerce women has led to the silencing of women’s legitimate complaints against violations of their personal integrity (Sachedina 2009: 4).
Participants said that they believe an ‘ideal role’ is imposed on Muslim women by
Muslim men. This appears to not only be an ideal role, but a normative role that
Muslim men impose on Muslim women. This goes against the conceptualisations of
gender as social, fluid and constructed, presented above. There is a dispute here over
what gender means. In many Muslim cultures and contexts, if women do not fulfill
their ‘ideal role’, then they are stripped of their ‘feminine’ label and are seen to be
behaving like men, thus bringing shame on themselves and their families:
Zaynab: That’s them [Muslim men] trying to impose on you their idea of what your role is. You said you’re a woman? Well if you’re a woman this is how you’ll be and if you’re not like this you’re not a woman. Oh my God, it’s horrible! So the unspoken message there is that if you’re not wearing your hijab and you’re not praying behind your husband and doing what they consider to be quote unquote feminine then you are behaving like a man, as though that’s something wrong. You’re doing it wrong. Somehow it’s a shame to not be feminine [47y/F/MPV].
An image of the normative female role is also upheld in religious advice and religious
ceremonies. Afreen was particularly angered by the sermon on common roles and
duties offered at Muslim marriages that mostly instruct the wife to be obedient but do
not mention much about the husband’s role or responsibilities:
Afreen: I don’t know if this is just a Pakistani thing - after the ceremony conservative families will have the mawlana (religious leader) do a mini sermon type thing. It’s themes related to marriage and they talk about the duties of the wife. That would make me so angry! I was like wouldn’t you do it at least show and talk about both of their duties but no, it was about what the woman was responsible for, what she should do to keep her husband happy [26y/F/MPV].
Again, as seen in Chapter Six, interpretation of the Qur’an is very important to the
practice of a progressive form of Islam. It is important for progressive Muslims to
understand the Qur’anic verses in their historical context and then to interpret them for
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use in the contemporary world. They see the patriarchal interpretations of orthodox
Islam as a choice to live a secluded life:
Aarish: The overall message of the Qur’an is the starting point for gender relations… There are people who don’t argue against patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an because that is how they choose to live today. They are being taught to seclude themselves. They are socialised to think that way [26y/M/MPV].
Some participants felt that Islam was being practiced contrary to the spirit of the
Qur’an, particularly in relation to gender equality. Joyah felt that generally the Qur’an
presents men and women as spiritually equal but that some passages in the hadith were
actually derogatory towards women. She also indicates that there are some
problematic verses in the Qur’an that may also be seen to give men permission to be
physically abusive to their wives:
Joyah: It [equality] is very important because we are in the Qur’an spiritually equal to men and how Islam is being practiced is contrary to the teachings of the Qur’an because women are you know you have a lot of hadith that contradict the Qur’an on this issue where if you pray behind a woman your prayer is not accepted. There are so many derogatory passages in the hadith that contradicts the worth of a woman [52y/F/MPV].
When reflecting on how to address gender inequality Maria suggested it would be
effective for women to begin to be more active on the periphery of religious spaces
and then move to the centre and into leadership positions. For her social conditioning
was required before Muslim women could be fully accepted into leadership
positions:
Maria: I think the place to start with that is not hoisting ourselves to centre stage. You need to start on the peripheral edges and then move in. I think when you jump right into the centre you create more problems than it’s worth. I think if you start conditioning, you know like leading a prayer not in the mosque but somewhere else outside the mosque. Having more say in our boards and community centres and on the mosque, that starts the conversation [31y/F/QDG].
All progressive Muslims who participated in this research agreed that Muslim women
should be more active in areas of religious leadership and in religious life in general,
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although they varied on what they thought the ideal scenario would be. Some wanted
to see women as imams, while others thought that women should first be present on
mosque boards before taking up spiritual leadership roles. Eight participants pointed
to a discrepancy between the message of the Qur’an and the hadith in terms of
equality for women. Normative Muslim congregations were usually not a target for
the religious activism of progressive Muslims; instead they preferred to start their
own spaces called unity mosques that cater to their desire for social justice and gender
equality. However, the issue of equality in some forms of shari’a law remains,
especially in family and inheritance laws, produces ongoing legal and social issues. It
should therefore be noted that progressive Muslims creating their own gender equal
worship spaces does not resolve the issue of gender inequality in the mainstream
understanding of shar’ia law.
ViewsonGenderSegregationinMuslimSettings
Many of my female participants viewed normative mosques as sites at which
women’s subordinate position is particularly clear and some male participants also
highlighted this. For many normative mosques are experienced as places of
humiliation. The first indication that they are not valued members of the congregation
is that they are usually accommodated in a gender segregated area that is often in need
of maintenance. The blog Side Entrance, written by Hind Makki documents the
condition of women’s areas in mosques across the world.41 Some women are forced
to pray in stairwells and broom closets. At times the women in this study also had
trouble taking part in lessons because they were placed in separate room watching the
speaker on a television:
Emma: I know a friend who is taking a hadith class, it’s in Atlanta and everybody is going. They had them [the women] in another room watching a video and they couldn’t even see what they had up on their board and they couldn’t ask questions - meaning you’re not important [42y/F/MPV].
41 http://sideentrance.tumblr.com last accessed 12/11/2016.
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As with many of the other participants in this research, Joyah identified gender
segregation as a visible area of inequality for Muslim women that is in stark contrast
to how they are treated in other areas of their lives:
Joyah: I think a lot of them [Muslim women] go through that contradiction, or that double standard where you are a person living out their dream and living out your full being that God has created you and then you step in the mosque and all of a sudden you are a second class citizen [52y/F/MPV].
The demand for segregation of the genders in some cases went so far that some
congregants of normative mosques wanted to introduce a partition to segregate the
congregation even in the outdoors:
Bushra: Yeah my [religion] teacher said he once gave a class in a park and there were people asking where is the partition? He was like, “dude it’s a park, what do you want me to do?” [26y/M/online].
Female participants refused to attend spaces where they were separated from the
congregation with covered windows. They felt being able to see the imam (prayer
leader) was important. They often stopped attending mosques altogether if there was
no progressive congregation nearby:
Ivy: I don’t get the whole separation thing, the whole barrier thing. If you’re going to be a leader in my mosque and tell me how to live, I want to look [at] you in the eye… When I went in there [normative mosque] I was like this is awful, I can’t see anything and I can’t hear anything [36y/F/online].
Some converts to Islam found the segregation in normative mosques particularly hard
to deal with and even felt that their faith was affected by their treatment at normative
mosques and that finding progressive congregations who practiced Islam differently
saved their faith:
Emma: We used to have a TV where we could watch the imam lead prayers and now they have taken that out so we can only hear it over the loud speaker. The women’s section is so crowded that when we were praying and coming back up someone sat on my daughter’s head. She didn’t mean to, but that’s how cramped and crowded we were that she sat on her head [42y/F/MPV].
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Others found that segregation was a big factor even at university Muslim Students
Association events and wondered where the logic was in segregating the genders when
they mix freely in classes and all other social events at the university:
Afreen: I actually did get involved with the MSA with the Muslim Student’s Association, but I realised they were too conservative for my taste, you know. They wanted to segregate the room which I figure if you’re in an American university, and in class you don’t sit segregated, you have no problem sitting next to a guy in class. Why would you want to do that now? [26y/F/MPV].
One participant likened the segregation of women in Mecca to an erasure of women
from that particular holy space. By extension this could be true in any normative
mosque:
Trent: I’ve got to say that if an alien went into Mecca in 2014 they might think that all men are gay, and all the women, where are they? Just because they are so separate. It was so interesting for me to be there where guys are arm in arm and the women are like five miles back behind them. I was like wow; the women have sort of been erased [44y/M/ETJC].
Other participants felt they wanted to protest or make their disapproval known at
mosques that do not allow women to attend, although often they did not do so, so as
not to cause trouble for male family members:
Emma: My husband’s family live in New York City too and when we were visiting I said, “Oh I want to go to the mosque and pray with you” and he said, “You can’t, there’s no space for women”. I was like, “Oh that’s not fair I’m going to go anyway”. He said, “Please don’t”. I was like okay; I’ll leave it alone [42y/F/MPV].
Emma explained that progressive Islam made her feel empowered, but that conversely,
attending normative mosques made her feel like she did not belong and that she was
not important. As seen in Chapter Seven creating a feeling of belonging and
inclusiveness is one of the most important missions in progressive Islam. Her
sentiments were shared with many others who took part in this research:
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Emma: Well, because it [progressive Islam] makes me feel like I’m empowered also. I don’t feel like - when I go to the regular mosque and we are put into a back room where we are really crowded, we can’t even see the imam - I don’t feel like I’m part of anything like I’m not important. It doesn’t have to be a woman who prays, it can be a man who prays, but as long as we all pray together. That makes me feel like I’m important in Islam [42y/F/MPV].
For the participants, gender segregation was emblematic of deeper social issues they
felt existed in the Muslim community. Women reported that not worshipping in the
main mosque space made them feel as if they were not important, that they were not
included as part of the congregation, and that as a result that they did not belong. For
some this resulted in the decision not attend a mosque at all or to seek a sense of
community online (discussed in Chapter Seven). For others this meant joining a more
inclusive space if one was available or starting protests against gender segregation to
bring about change.
The reasons for enforcing gender segregation in Muslim worship and learning
spaces are many and varied. Most of the reasoning behind gender segregation is
linked to women being viewed as a fitna or a temptation. Joyah commented, “It’s all
sexualised - Islam. You know the fact that you’re expected to wear hijab (head
covering). The fact that the woman’s voice is awrah… it’s all sexual” [52y/F/MPV].
Ayman reiterated this point:
Ayman: Now today you can travel the Muslim world and in a large part of the Muslim world they don’t even allow women in the mosque… There is a deeply held belief that women don’t belong to the area where the imam is praying because they are a source of distraction and temptation, right? [72y/M/QD].
Joyah saw this view of women as a temptation as sexualising the act of prayer and
connected this idea to strict gender segregation during worship:
Joyah: That’s why we are so segregated in prayer because we are thinking about getting turned on and you take wudu (ritual ablution) and then you can’t shake the hand of another person because it cancels your wudu right? What, because you’re so fucking gutter you can’t think of anything except getting turned on when you shake someone’s hand? Are you kidding me? [52y/F/MPV].
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Afreen mentioned that a lot of men also bring up the subject of gender segregation,
especially in terms of their fears of being distracted by seeing women while praying.
She was dismayed that there were a variety of excuses available to men that justified
segregation while women had to compromise. This idea is reinforced by Islamic legal
rulings. Juliane Hammer reports that Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi 42 argued, “that a
woman cannot lead men in Friday prayers and the purpose of this limitation is to avoid
the sexual distractions of men” (2012: 44). This is a static and biological construction
of gender and this idea also goes against the common depiction of men as rational
leaders. Afreen also comments on the irrationality of this type of thinking:
Afreen: Oh you know a lot of men raise this issue and women too, you know there’s a certain reason why men should pray in front of women, women behind men, because you know men have a tendency to look and not focus and that kind of thing. Then that always makes me think, don’t you as a human civilisation move on and move forward and progress and become better. To be able to control those urges you know? Rather than just make an excuse [26y/F/MPV].
Breaking the pattern of gender segregation in normative mosques was considered too
difficult for most participants and the few that had tried to protest women’s conditions
said it was exhausting and not very successful. Instead, many of the participants
decided to start their own communities where they could feel accepted and welcome.
This way they did not need to constantly agitate for the change they wanted to see,
feel unwelcome, or defend their Muslim identities.
AwrahanditsConnectionwithGenderSegregationinPrayer
The idea of awrah (nakedness or shame) is used in arguments to justify gender
segregation and lack of women’s prayer leadership. As mentioned in the Qur’an
Muslim women and men are required to cover the private areas of their body, which
vary according to gender and, also by school of thought. Muslims that subscribe to a
more literal interpretation of the Qur’an sometimes believe that a woman must also
cover her face as well as her hair and body (Sharif 1987). In more strict
interpretations this concealment can also extend to the female voice, leaving women
silent in the public space and unable to communicate her concerns outside of her
42 Egyptian Islamic theologian based in Doha, Qatar and chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars.
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family (Mernissi 1987). Sachedina (2009) outlines the need to go beyond texts and to
understand the level of prejudice present against women in a variety of Islamic legal
texts:
Clearly, such a reading of the term awrah does violent injustice to some of the most fundamental articles of the UN Declaration that guarantee women’s human rights. Given that this concept still forms the basis of a number of juridical decisions that restrict a Muslim women’s access to normal channels of communications to voice her concerns, whether in spousal or other familial-social relations, it is necessary to go beyond the text and the context of these rulings to fathom the level of prejudice against women that forms an entire genre in Islamic juridical texts (Sachedina 2009: 9).
Restricting Muslim women’s opportunities to voice their concerns has wide
implications for women’s rights and also more specifically for women’s access to
public space. This issue is at the core of the social activism of many progressive
Muslims who seek to ensure gender parity for Muslim women. Joyah commented on
the implications of silencing women. For example, she discovered that many
normative Muslims object to her album of Islamic songs because it contains the female
voice:
Joyah: I was really shocked that all the Muslim retail stores with the exception of two, everyone turned me down, they wouldn’t sell my CD or distribute it, for the reason that - two reasons. One, I use all the musical instrumentation and second a lot bigger than that my voice, a woman’s voice as a singing voice is haram (not permissible) [52y/F/MPV].
Bushra was alarmed that her voice is considered private and that this could negate her
right to share her opinion. She could not reconcile this with her view of Islam, “Oh
yeah like some people say that a woman’s voice is awrah. That freaks me out. Saying
what? I can’t talk [publicly]? I can’t recognise that as being a valid thing in Islam”
[26y/F/online].
The socialisation process that supports these gender boundaries also makes it
difficult for men to know how to interact with Muslim women. Men feel the need to
demonstrate respect for women by not trying to shake hands unless she makes it clear
that she is willing to shake hands:
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Aarish: If I meet a Muslim woman I won’t put my hand out because I’m trying to respect her. I wouldn’t be thinking of why is she not shaking my hand, but it would make me feel weird [26y/M/MPV].
Like Zaynab, many of my female participants felt incensed that men interact with non-
Muslim or uncovered women all the time in the course of their daily lives yet when
they go to the mosque they feel scandalised by any evidence of women’s attendance.
Bushra commented, “It’s like don’t you go to the grocery store? Don’t you live here?
[U.S.] I don’t know, it’s sad” [26y/F/online]. Emma also wondered, “How do these
men watch television? Are they not feeling seduced all the time?” [42y/F/MPV]. This
is particularly observable in the Western context where the majority of people are not
Muslim. In other words, the dominant cultural context enables this objection. These
participants could not rationalise how men existed in an open society with non-
Muslims, but then visited the mosque and did not want to see any trace of women. This
perspective questions cultural rules. Similarly Sachedina argues that, “…women’s
rights in the Muslim world are still being suppressed under claims of cultural
distinctiveness and Muslim identity” (2009: 4). Cultural commitment as well as a
commitment to religious beliefs are seen to oppress women.
HowDoesProgressiveIslamRemedyGenderInequality?
Progressive Muslims work to remedy gender inequality in a number of ways. During
fieldwork I observed that firstly, they do not segregate their congregations by gender
and have women and men praying side by side. Secondly, they welcome people to
dress as they please; this includes women praying without hijabs. This indicates a
plural way of perceiving Muslim women. Thirdly, they allow women and LGBTQ
people to give the call to prayer, to lead the prayer, or give the sermon. Many mention
that there was no historical precedence from the Prophet’s life to indicate that worship
spaces should be segregated by gender:
Ali: We don’t gender segregate because there was no gender segregation in the early years in Islam until actually - some people say - during the Prophet’s life in Medina. But my professor claims that it wasn’t institutionalised until the time of… Usman as Caliph (chief civil and religious leader). So Medina is gender segregated but Mecca still is not. We call our salah (prayer) Mecca style and people are free to stand where they are most comfortable [50y/M/ETJC].
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The practice of woman led prayer has received much media attention since Amina
Wadud conducted her woman led prayer in New York in 2005. If you were to make an
assessment just by reading media articles and searching on YouTube, you would be
forgiven for assuming that woman led prayer is a common practice, but even amongst
progressives I found it hard to see it practiced in person during my fieldwork
(however, this may also be because I was only in the United States for two months). As
mentioned previously, the focus on the choice of the individual was the most
important. People in inclusive progressive congregations are encouraged to stand
wherever they feel comfortable and to come dressed however they like:
Ali: We taught people to stand next to whoever they want. If they are not comfortable next to the person they are next to then they should move to some place where they are more comfortable. We have women that come that have chosen to have their prayer mats a little bit detached from everybody else - that is fine. So we’re not here to tell you how to dress and how not to dress. We are not here to tell you how to stand and where not to stand [50y/M/ETJC].
Some described the experience of worshipping at an inclusive mosque to be a powerful
one, particularly for women who may not have had the opportunity to pray in the main
congregation, give the sermon, or lead the prayer before. Here progressive Muslims are
creating a ‘do-it-yourself’, everyday Islam:
Trent: It’s powerful. Women don’t leave our space feeling bad about themselves. When I have a daughter she can come and sit beside me… When you leave our space for the most part people feel lighter. They feel better about the day. They are not feeling bad about themselves or guilty… I like a space like that. I like that my mother can sit anywhere, my mother doesn’t have to cover if she doesn’t want to… These kinds of things I think are powerful and amazing. It should be celebrated. I never understood why you would go into a religious space where you couldn’t sit with your family [44y/M/ETJC].
There are several factors that I observed that make Muslim women feel they are not
welcome in the main section of the mosque. These include, being in a secluded
section of the mosque with physical barriers, having to enter through a side door or
back entrance and dirty unmaintained spaces. Also, not being able to see, hear, or
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meet the imam and often being removed on Fridays to make space for men. Lastly,
being made to pray outdoors during Ramadan or Eid due to lack of space. One of the
key objectives of progressive Muslims is to change gender-based discrimination
through social activism, which varies widely from practitioner to practitioner. This
activism takes the form of reinterpretation of religious texts and changes to
established religious practices. In this way they are crafting an everyday
individualised Islam that fits their experiences, moral and values.
ChoiceandEquality
Much of the discourse surrounding women’s rights amongst the participants focused
on options and agency and the need for women to support each other’s choices.
Emma recognised that there are alternatives available to Muslim women and wishes
other women could stand up for each other’s choices. Emma, as with other
participants, is possibly evoking what is termed choice feminism. Choice feminism
views freedom as the ability to make individual choices and oppression as the
inability to choose (Ferguson 2010). Second, because under this paradigm the only
criterion for assessing women’s freedom is the availability of personal choice, this
perspective asserts we should not judge the choices that women make, all choices are
indicative of freedom (Ferguson 2010). Finally, this perspective is supported by the
historical narrative that says that the women’s movement has made it practicable for
women to make free choices (Ferguson 2010). This could also be described as third
wave feminism. This perspective links closely to an individualised view of Islam and
morality:
Emma: Also with the moral compass thing women should stand up for people’s choices, I don’t think that every woman should believe that women should lead prayers and I think it should be that women are standing up so that other women can have their choice. I would love to see more mosques that maybe don’t want to pray side-by-side and that’s okay. You know allow the women the option to be in the same room. To be in the back if that’s as far as they can go [42y/F/MPV].
Bushra felt that it was not in a woman’s best interest to try and do all the things that
men do as they would then be taking on double the work including their household
duties and motherhood, in this respect she was unusual in the data. She felt working
outside the home should be a choice made by each individual, which suggests that
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she subscribes to choice feminism. This also indicates the diverse ways progressives
view gender roles:
Bushra: For me actually I kind of think that it’s not always in a woman’s favour to try and do everything a man does. You know like in Islam like if they [women] want to work they are permitted to work, but they don’t have to provide for their families. I mean I don’t think it’s for the benefit of a woman. If you want to work, work but it’s not mandatory for you to work and if you make it mandatory for yourself you are just making it difficult for yourself… If you want to do that and that’s your goal then do it. I mean you can do that if you want but don’t make me do it [26y/F/online].
Participants suggested a way to solve the issue of gender segregation would be to let
the congregations decide what they were comfortable with in terms of gender
segregation in worship spaces. Lemzo thought it should be a choice for each
congregation to make:
Lemzo: For me it’s better to have the women on one side and the men on another if the people agree to it; it all depends on the congregation [25y/M/online].
Others suggested that events could be segregated according to the nature of the activity
and according to what the majority of women in the congregation prefer. This indicates
that tradition may still be important:
Bushra: I feel like in certain situations it can be segregated if that’s more comfortable. Like if there’s a sports event going on or something the sisters would prefer for it to be segregated. Like at the collective they were thinking whether or not they should put a partition up and they asked the imam and he said, “ask the women”. So I mean I think that’s probably the way to go about it [26y/F/online].
Some saw gender segregation as a cultural expression, not a religious command, and
likened it to a choice between having a carpeted or a tiled floor; that it should be up to
the preference of the congregation. Zaynab wanted to see more latitude in how the
religion is practiced, not necessarily reform:
Zaynab: I think the religious expression is fine as it is, with the exception of where men and women sit or stand. To me I don’t see that as religious. That’s cultural. There’s a difference between a religious expression and a
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cultural expression. The fact that we stand and recite the Qur’an, that’s religious. The fact that men and women sit here or there, that’s cultural, at least that’s how I see it. I don’t think we need to change in our religious practice. However, I think that there’s room for some more latitude in how we practice our religion [47y/F/MPV].
Participants felt that where they sit or stand in the mosque should be dictated by
individual preferences and the preferences of the congregation as a whole instead of
by cover-all religious mandates as in everyday religion, which focuses on personal
autonomy and individual fulfillment. Participants agreed that choice and agency are
important to be able to provide full equality for women. This links closely to the idea
of inclusivity which features strongly in the charters or principles of all progressive
Muslim groups. MPV’s tagline, “be yourself, be Muslim” is exemplary of this. ETJC
also describes itself as “human positive” meaning that all people are equal in all
aspects of ritual religious practice and “equal agents of Allah,” regardless of their
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, class, race, age, dis/ability, HIV status or
on any other grounds (ETJC website 2015).43
FeminismandProgressiveIslam
Even though progressive Muslims strive to attain social, gender, and sexual equality
(Safi 2003a), there is a lot of disagreement about the use of the term feminism and
especially the term Islamic feminism. Ten participants identified themselves as
feminists while six others did not. There were also four participants who were
undecided about using the feminist label. This could be because feminisms vary
widely in meaning, in part because “the patriarchal relations against which feminisms
constitute a resistance differ in their configuration from place to place” (Franks 2002:
38). As presented in the data, the term feminism carried many negative connotations
for participants including classism, racism and Western imperialism (Shaikh in Safi
2003a: 64). Joyah saw feminism as being anti-men and not inclusive:
Joyah: I don’t define myself as a feminist because in some ways... The word feminist has a very negative connotation because of the negative language or the anti-man language that comes with that baggage and I don’t want to have any more baggage than we already have… When
43 http://jumacircle.com (last accessed 8/07/2015).
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Muslim women’s rights are allocated it benefits everyone including men and especially children [52y/F/MPV].
Zaynab considers herself a feminist, but while interacting with others does not
usually use the term, even when working for women’s rights. In her mind feminism
has the connotation of “man bashing” and trying to take rights away from men. This
narrative supports the belief that we are now living in a post-feminist world, that the
women’s movement has already achieved all that is necessary (Ferguson 2010).
Rather than aligning herself with feminism, Zaynab prefers to describe her political
position as seeking ‘gender equality’. She wants to bring women onto a level playing
field with men, rather than alter the position of men. As well as suggesting a post-
feminist position this illustrates that feminisms’ ethnic and imperial legacy still limits
how it is taken up:
Zaynab: I would consider myself a feminist but in writing or talking to people in general I try to stay away from that word because with Americans and also with immigrants it has a connotation that can be very negative… It’s about trying to forward women’s agency and inclusion in the community, as opposed to trying to take anything away from men… I think use of gender equality or gender equity nowadays has been a good change in language it takes away the charge that can exist when talking about male and female issues… It’s more toward neutral [47y/F/MPV].
Others wanted to move away from defining feminism as an exclusively Western
concept and were in favour of using the term Islamic feminism. Black feminists and
women from the south have also leveled critique at feminism for universalising the
views and positions of privileged white women. This is partly why third wave
feminism has emerged. This appeal to multiple feminisms is also in line with the
desire for pluralism and individual choice. Afreen saw Islam as being inherently
liberatory and promoting equality for women:
Afreen: I think it would be fine because you know why should we define feminism as a Western concept? I know a lot of the feminist movements have happened here [the US], but that doesn’t mean that feminism or the ideas of feminism are only rooted in Western ideas, you know. I think Islam in its creation, it gave women plenty of rights that they did not have before. Or rather, it made them aware of the rights they have, that they lack knowledge of. That’s feminism in its own way you know? So I’m perfectly fine with the usage of that term [26y/F/MPV].
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Ivy related the idea of God’s mercy to feminism and equal rights for women. She
could not understand why God would create women with a diversity of talents, but
not allow them to use them:
Ivy: I think of myself as a feminist. There is nothing in the whole wide world, any action that I feel that I am forbidden to do because of my gender. That seems so weird - being a female and saying well I have the qualifications, the education, the mindset and the mental capacity to do that - but I have a vagina I’ll go home [36y/F/online].
For Emma women’s rights were viewed as a human rights issue first and foremost and
believed that women’s equality should be spoken of in terms of human rights rather
than feminism. She also pointed out that the community was failing women and not
Islam. This appeal to the more general and perhaps more inclusive concept of human
rights is typical of third wave (Snyder 2008), cosmopolitan feminism (Reilly 2007),
and ‘post-feminism’ (Braithwaite 2002; McRobbie 2004):
Emma: No, I think it’s human rights. I think it’s basic human rights… I don’t find a lot of these issues connect with feminism, I think it’s basic human rights… I think if people spoke about it in terms of human rights it would help [42y/F/MPV].
Aarish explained that in his experience feminism was a white dominated, western idea
and felt more comfortable labeling himself as a humanist rather than a feminist. He felt
women’s rights were part of equality as a whole and should not be singled out on their
own. In his perspective women’s issues could be solved under the umbrella of seeking
equality for all:
Aarish: A lot of Islamic feminism sounds like Richard Dawkins with his whole rationality thing. Maybe the Muslim female doesn’t need a female white knight to come and save them, I don’t think that. I think Malala [Yousafzai] probably did a lot more progress of women than a lot Westerners who go and try to do the same… I’m much more comfortable being a humanist than anything else. Gender equality comes with that [26y/M/MPV].
Showing more diversity still, some participants had a problem with the word Islamic
rather than the word feminism. Worrying that the term Islamic denoted a singular
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monolithic Islam instead of the diversity of practice that does exist, Ali felt Muslim
feminism was a better term to use:
Ali: I don’t like the use of the word Islamic. It to me connotes a certain sense of something that’s a monolith - of a singularity – so Islamic feminisms – maybe [there’s] some plurality there. Muslim feminism yes, but Islam is not an objective stone. It’s a living-breathing thing and it’s me who breathes life into it as it breathes life into us. So there is no singular monolithic Islam this notion of an Islamic this or and Islamic that for me becomes a little bit problematic, so an Islamic based feminism or an Islamic discoursed feminism, Muslim feminism - yeah I relate to that… I see feminism as a label, I see it as an analytic lens, as humanism as... these are ways of looking at reality or discourses. I see feminism as a lens [50y/M/ETJC].
For Michelle, Islamic feminism was about more than just a singular feminism, but
multiple feminisms, with multiple conceptions of equality and how it should be
achieved. Recognising multiple feminisms is also typical of third wave feminism, as
there is now an acceptance that one feminism cannot speak to all women and that there
are multiple political and theoretical perspectives. Her ideal feminism was linked to
choice of women in particular communities and how they want to change things, not
how outsiders would like to come in and change things. In some cases, choice
feminism is a method of recognising the victories of an ongoing plural women’s
movement. Michelle believes the negative reaction to feminism is not a reaction to all
feminisms but a reaction to the dominant form of imperial feminism:
Michelle: It’s about feminisms, it’s about women wanting whatever they want for themselves, it’s about educating women so that they can actually know what they want for themselves… It’s about helping women improve their own communities… It’s a very different kind of feminism, so I think when people are responding to feminism they’re responding to a lot of white feminism which just feels like total alienation [51y/F/ETJC].
After some thought Joyah reasoned that Islamic feminism was a better designation
than using feminism on its own. She saw the conjunction of the two terms as a
mechanism that could help break down prejudice that exists towards Islam. As other
participants have explained she also believes that Muslim women must seek their
rights through the framework of Islam:
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Joyah: Yeah, I think Islamic feminism is a good combination of two words because in the feminist secular world it’s looked upon as an oxymoron… So I mean the intersection between the two and so I think having those two words put together is in part a way of breaking down the prejudice against Islam – that makes expense of women’s rights in Islam. The only way for Muslim women’s rights to be achieved is through Islam because that’s a language that Muslims understand [52y/F/MPV].
Madeline identified as a feminist but also felt that her mission as an activist reached
further than just working for women’s rights issues, but also to working for
transgender and gay rights and for equality for all:
Madeline: I mean not just because I call myself one [a feminist], but I work pretty regularly to ensure that people have the ability to be who they are. We often consider feminism to be human rights for me it’s not just focused on women, but focused on all genders and gender expressions. I want a man and a transgender person, or inter-sexed, or me, or whatever [to lead prayer], I want everybody to have the ability to share space and be interactive together [35y/F/MPV].
Aarish pointed out that those who do identify as Muslim and secular feminist may be
in a difficult position, as they would not be accepted amongst Muslims nor amongst
secular feminists:
Aarish: I’m sure like if you were a progressive Muslim feminist you would be pissed off because you wouldn’t be accepted amongst Muslims and you wouldn’t be accepted amongst [secular] feminists either [26y/M/MPV].
Feminism is a contested label even among progressive Muslims who strive for gender
equality and social justice. Although there exists a diversity of opinions amongst
progressive Muslims on the use of the terms ‘feminism’ and ‘Islamic feminism’, the
ability to choose was very important to all participants. A variety of opinion as to
whether the term feminism was useful and also the use of the term Islamic feminism
was expressed in the data. Some felt Islamic feminism would help bridge some of the
gaps between religion and feminists, but others felt that any use of the term feminism
bought with it negative connotations of racism and classism. Often this results in all
participants being for and working towards gender equality and a ‘do-it-yourself’
Islam that is gender equal, but not naming their activism as feminist.
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Discussion:GenderPluralismandGenderActivism
Progressive Muslims are particularly interested in working for gender equality both
socially and religiously. Their methods of achieving this are varied but they agree on
a plural method of describing women’s roles and the best ways to achieve equality.
They see choice as the most important factor in accomplishing gender equality. This
is exemplified through the way they set up their prayer spaces. The spaces are not
gender segregated but they do allow for those who may not be comfortable praying in
a mixed gender environment. Congregants who are uncomfortable praying side by
side with the opposite gender can choose to detach their prayer mat from the others
and pray off to the side. In line with choice feminism (Ferguson 2010), participants
explained that the choice of where to pray and if there should be a partition during
religious lessons should be left to the women in the congregation rather than decided
by male religious leaders.
A plural view also applies to dress standards that often pertain mostly to
women’s standards of dress within normative Islam. Both MPV and ETJC do not
have dress codes for women or men. Michelle from ETJC explained, “People have to
be able to come in wearing whatever the hell they want”. This policy sees the end of a
uniform way for Muslim women to dress; progressives do not require members of the
congregation to wear the hijab (head scarf) even when praying or giving the sermon.
This rule results in a variety of interpretations of what modesty means and by
extension the normative ideal of a Muslim woman. Some women will drape a scarf
loosely over their hair while in prayer, others will cover their whole bodies, including
their hair, and some will pray in jeans and a t-shirt with no head covering. In
progressive congregations there is a multitude of acceptable ways that women can
dress.
Gender pluralism in this thesis also pertains to the opening of religious
leadership positions to women in progressive congregations. Progressive Muslims
recognise a variety of roles that Muslim women can play. This does not merely extend
to roles in the public sphere but also to those in the private sphere. The outcome of
this is the understanding that women are able to take on a variety of roles depending
on their talents and what they choose for themselves. Allowing women to take up
leadership positions in the mosque demonstrates a diverse view of gender roles by
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progressive Muslims. Gender is not a barrier for them in determining roles and
responsibilities in public or in private because of their diverse notions of what it
means to be male or female. This also links closely to the acceptance of transgendered
and gender queer people in progressive congregations where the concept of a
gendered binary is dismantled and is no longer a useful framework through which to
understand gender and gender roles. The capacity to fulfill certain kinds of roles then
becomes contingent on the individual’s personality and talents and not on their
gender.
In progressive Islam it is clear that essentialist gender assumptions have been
mostly disregarded. Women are seen as independent beings that are equal to men in
every respect. They are not viewed to be “defective” in faith or in reason and have a
fluid concept of gender and gender roles. Mir-Hosseini points out that gender in Islam
is socially constructed and is whatever Muslims make it to be (1998: 58). The
emergence of female religious leaders both in progressive Islam and also in other
types of Islam denotes what Hilary Kalmbach refers to as, “a major shift in structures
of Islamic authority” (2011: 1). She observes that the growth in the numbers female
Muslim religious leadership is intrinsically linked to, “larger social, religious, and
political changes” and that the presence of female leaders has increased the
attendance of women at normative mosques (2011: 1).
Woman led prayer has also been an important part of women’s religious
leadership. Participants reported that woman led prayer does not occur widely and
must be performed in special circumstances. Kalmbach supports this in her writing,
explaining that the negative reaction surrounding the 2005 woman led prayer illustrates
how women’s claims to authority are likely, “to be recognised fully only in
communities whose norms are similar to those they advocate” (2008: 24). Even still,
progressive Muslim scholars have called on Muslims, men and women, to participate
in woman-led prayers in what Laury Silvers refers to as, “an act of civil
disobedience”.44 Furthermore, Juliane Hammer describes woman led prayer as, “a
symbolic act to further discussions in Muslim communities about leadership, authority,
justice, and gender roles” (Hammer 2012: 52). Acts like these that address inequality
are viewed as performing jihad akbar (greater struggle) involving “self critique and
44 Laury Silvers was a Professor of Religious Studies at Skidmore College and a former PMU board member.
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self questioning” which some see as being at the centre of Islamic practice (Noor in
Safi 2003a: 330-331).
The gender activism of progressive Muslims raises questions about the use of
the term feminism. The concept of Islamic feminism appeared globally in the late
twentieth century in the form of a “religiously framed discourse of gender equality”
(Badran 2011). This discourse has provided two potentially useful developments.
Firstly, dismantling the idea of the family being a private space separate from public
space. Secondly, refuting the idea that Islam decrees a patriarchal organisation of the
family unit (Badran 2011: 1). Twenty years after the appearance of the term Islamic
feminism comes the emergence of ‘Muslim holistic feminism’. In using Islamic
feminism’s interpretations of egalitarianism and justice extracted from primary
religious texts concurrently with secular discourses of human rights, pluralism and
democracy, the new Muslim holistic feminism “echoes the multi-stranded discursive
approach” (Badran 2011).
Participants in this research were unsure of whether to use the term feminism or
Islamic feminism to describe their activism. Some preferred to avoid the term even
though their beliefs were feminist in nature. For six participants the term carried too
many negative connotations. Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons45 indicates that Muslim
feminists are often discredited as being “anti-Islamic, anti-nationalistic, or both”
(Simmons in Safi 2003a: 243). As was indicated earlier this is because feminism seems
to have imperialistic, origins and is aligned with the West. Some respondents may have
also felt reluctant to identify with feminism because of the violence that some Muslim
feminists face. In Muslim majority countries they face the risk of assassination
attempts and legal attempts to, “charge them with apostasy or to have their marriages
annulled because they are apostate” (Simmons in Safi 2003a: 243). Progressive
Muslim scholars from South Africa like Ebrahim Moosa and Farid Esack have suffered
enormously, including attacks on their lives, as a result of their progressive beliefs.
Even today Muslim feminist Nawal al-Saadawi requires bodyguards when she is at
home in Egypt (Simmons in Safi 2003a: 243). Considering this it is little wonder that
the term feminism is shied away from. even by gender activists. However, progressive
Muslim scholars argue that progressive Muslims in the U.S. have the unique
opportunity to practice Islam in an egalitarian way and that they should strive to re-
45 She is an Assistant Professor in Islamic Studies, Women & Religion, African-American Religious Traditions at the University of Florida.
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interpret religious texts in keeping with the socio-historical context of the current time.
Gwendolyn Simmons asserts that given that contemporary women fly F-16s, go on
space missions, and walk on the moon, it is questionable how relevant preaching about
women being emotionally and mentally fragile is in the present social context
(Simmons in Safi 2003a: 243). Participants did not view gender inequalities as
emanating from the Qur’an or Allah but from patriarchy, they see them as “a profound
human error that must be addressed, resisted and corrected” (Hammer 2012: 54).
Progressive Muslims approach gender roles, ideas around gender equality and
gender activism in a somewhat individualised way. Each participant perceived the role
of progressive Muslim women quite differently and the definition gender equality in
varied ways. Some participants felt that gender equality was best approached from the
periphery, and then having women work towards the centre and take up religious
leadership roles. Other participants believed that Muslim women should enter
leadership roles immediately. However, it should also be noted that some aspects of
gender activism are community orientated. For example, some participants commented
that women in congregations should be consulted regarding gender segregation and
that a consensus should be reached.
Conclusion
Zaynab’s case study illustrated that although many Muslims believe that gender
equality is affirmed in the Qur’an, the experiences of some Muslim women do not
equate to this. Progressive Muslims like Zaynab are especially concerned with the
presence of gender inequalities in Muslim settings and are actively involved in trying
to change things. The case study demonstrated that progressive Muslim individuals
are involved in gender activism and it was established that Zaynab is the inventor of
her own personalised religious alternatives that amalgamate her biographical
experiences and faith values (Beck 2010) in a form of lived religion (McGuire 2008).
It also examined the use of feminism amongst progress Muslims.
In order to be able to strive for gender equality, the progressive Muslims
viewed gender and gender roles in a fluid plural way. They recognised that gender is
a socially constructed category and that gender expression changes depending on
socio-historical context. This comprehensive view of what constitutes femininity and
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masculinity lends itself to an acceptance of a variety of gender roles. In this way
progressive Muslims have no problems accepting women in religious leadership
positions.
Gender segregation in Muslim settings takes various forms depending on
culture and the preferred religious interpretation of the congregation or the imam.
Generally, gender segregation is emblematic of a power hierarchy that is maintained
through a religious authority structure. Various reasons are stated for gender
segregation in Muslim worship spaces. However, the most common reason is that
women pose a temptation that may distract men from their acts of worship. This then
sexualises women and their presence in the worship space requiring their bodies to be
completely covered and entirely hidden from male view.
Participants suggested the best way to alleviate unnecessary power hierarchies
and create a more welcoming inclusive space is to enable choice for women and for
the congregation in terms of the configuration that they want to worship. Many
thought that gender mixing was a positive thing as it said to create mutual
understanding and respect between men and women. Progressive Muslims attempt
this by holding mixed gender prayers led by either men or women, giving women and
people who identify as LGBTQ the chance to undertake religious leadership roles,
and allowing people to come dressed as they choose to worship services.
Even though many progressive Muslims strive for gender equality, feminism
is still a contested label due to its connection with imperialism. Some participants
exhibited elements of third wave, choice feminism or ‘post feminism’ in the way they
recognised multiple feminisms, or viewed human rights as a better vehicle for
women’s rights than feminism. There was not a clear agreement as to whether the
term feminism was useful on its own or on the use of the term Islamic feminism.
Some participants sensed that Islamic feminism could possibly solve any
misunderstandings between those who take a religious stance and secular feminists.
However, others explained that any use of the term feminism bought with it
implications of racism and classism. However, gender activism still remains integral
to progressive Muslim practice.
This chapter has linked individualisation to gender and gender activism in
progressive Muslim communities following on from the aims of the thesis.
Participants’ individual ways of viewing gender and gender roles allow for a plurality
of ideas about Muslim women’s roles both in religious spaces and in general. This
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includes individual approaches to gender segregation and mixed gendered prayers.
However, some preferred to gain consensus from all women present indicating the
importance of community to some participants. Participants also supported individual
ways of dressing with an emphasis placed on individual choice and not on meeting
religious requirements. This plurality of opinions and practices also allows for a
variety of views regarding feminism including those who do not claim the feminist
label, those who call themselves Muslim feminists, and finally those who appear to
subscribe to choice feminism although they may not label themselves as such.
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ChapterTen:Conclusion
ThesisSummary
This research was conducted via fieldwork in the United States (US) and worldwide
via Skype, comprising of ethnographic observations and face-to-face interviews. This
thesis has explored the lived experiences of self-identified progressive Muslims, a
topic that has not been research previously. More specifically: it examined the
questions; who are progressive Muslims? How and why are progressive Muslim
communities formed? How is authority exercised in progressive Muslim
communities? How is gender activism articulated and experienced in progressive
Muslim communities? Broadly, progressive Islam strives to realise a plural and just
society through a critical engagement with Islam and the ideals of social and gender
justice (Safi 2003a). Apart from social and gender justice progressive Muslims also
place a strong emphasis on pluralism. Defining progressive Muslims more
specifically becomes problematic as participants exhibited different levels of
‘progressiveness’, a variety of diverse opinions, and use different methods to reason
through their practices and beliefs.
Progressive Muslims are concerned with all types of social inequalities,
including poverty. Progressive Muslims who participated in this research deal with
social and gender inequality by retaining a Muslim identity label and changing the
discourse from within. They also do this through identifying new ways of
contextualising and reading religious texts, by challenging dominant religious
practices with social action, and by rethinking and dismantling plus rebuilding Islamic
authority structures. These activities can take the form of reinterpretation of religious
texts, woman led prayer, mixed gender congregations, women and LGBTQ people
giving the sermon, and the abolition of traditional leadership structures to include
multiple leaders. Gender equality is a key project of progressive Islam that takes the
form of social activism. This activism comes in the form of action seeking to remedy
social inequalities.
There exists a diversity of progressive interpretation and practice. Some
progressive Muslims prefer a narrative of reform while others try to avoid this term
and see their understanding of Islam as one of the many possible traditional
interpretations. Progressive organisations also vary by the types of events they hold
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and the types of rituals they perform. Some chapters prefer to run primarily social
events while others prefer to hold worship services only. The fieldwork showed that
there are two ideal types of progressive Muslims, those more interested in religious
rituals and those who practice a more social Islam. Each progressive chapter runs to
meet the specific needs of the community it serves. Members of Muslims for
Progressive Values (MPV) in Los Angeles identified that many of their members do
not value religious rituals, so they structured their program with a religious service
first and a social gathering afterwards. For some, progressive Islam is a social outlet
while for others it is a connection to a religious tradition. This links with the notion of
everyday religion as progressive Muslims focus on individual experiences that are not
always equated with traditional religion, they are pluralistic and the boundaries of
Islam are lose and must help individual to fulfill some sort of goal (Ammerman 2014;
Jeldtoft 2011; McGuire 2008). Progressive Muslim individuals participate in what
Beck refers to as the creation of multiple belief structures. They illustrate this through
their reinterpretation of their religious texts to suit their ideals of social and gender
justice. This is an example of Beck’s idea of ‘do-it-yourself religion’ as progressive
Muslims are in effect creating a version of Islam that best suits their other personal
beliefs and facets of their identities. Progressive Muslims also illustrate new social
formations through their concept of ‘shared authority’, which attempts to remove the
hierarchy from progressive Muslim spaces and place the emphasis on the individual.
Theories of religious individualisation encompass a variety of phenomena from
“invisible”, “functional religions” like sports and science to the occurrence of
believing without belonging (Davie 1994). These types of individualised identities
continued to be religious despite their distance from the church, declining religious
practice, or identification as being religious in a more general way (Wilke 2015). The
same can be said of progressive Muslims in reference to their Muslim identities.
Many individualised Muslims continue to use the Muslim label to describe
themselves despite their decline in ritual observance and sometimes becoming un-
mosqued. The absence of religious observance and community does not appear to be
damaging to their Muslim identity.
To review the data presented in previous chapters, in Chapter Five I contended
that progressive Muslims display a diverse variety of religious identities and that
participants took a pluralistic approach to their identities. Moreover, participants were
also involved in crafting personalised alternatives that fuse personal experiences with
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faith values (Beck 2010). Participants also illustrate this in Chapter Six through their
reinterpretation of religious texts to suit their individual ideals of social and gender
justice. In Chapter Seven, I argued that after revisiting and reinterpreting the Qur’an
and the Tradition participants seek or create plural inclusive worship spaces that allow
for an individual understanding of Islam. In Chapter Eight I examined how
progressive Muslims illustrated new types of social formations (Beck 2010) through
their concept of ‘shared authority’, which attempts to remove the hierarchy from
progressive Muslim space and encourage the individualisation of Islam. Finally,
Chapter Nine established that progressive Muslims are particularly interested in
working for gender equality, both socially and religiously. Their gender activism is
perhaps an example of Beck’s ‘do-it-yourself religion’ as progressive Muslims are in
effect creating a bespoke version of Islam that best suits their experiences and facets
of their identities. Their activities might also be described as constituting everyday
religion, where the emphasis is on personal experience and autonomy and religious
commitment is more about the morals and values of each practitioner rather than
religious dogma (Jeldtoft 2011).
ProgressiveMuslimsBetweenPluralismandCosmopolitanism
Progressive Muslims display an affinity for a plural view of Islam in their identities,
interpretations of the Qur’an, communities and worship spaces, views of authority,
and gender roles. They also work to breakdown national and ethnic barriers in their
worship spaces and communities.. Religious pluralism and cosmopolitanism
contribute to the analysis of Progressive Muslim beliefs and practice. Pluralism is
present in some normative views of Islam that are considered to be plural in their
nature, seeing normative Muslims tolerating Christians and Jews. However, this
progressive brand of pluralism embraces intra-religious pluralism in a way that is
seldom seen in normative Islam. There are two types of progressive Muslim pluralism
in the data: Islamic and Western liberal. Progressive Muslims from this research draw
the majority of their plural ideas from a Western liberal model. However, there are
limits to progressive pluralism. Although they claim to be inclusive of all, progressive
Muslims do not welcome debate in their spaces and as such do not welcome more
conservative Muslims who disagree with their views.
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The work of Ulrich Beck is useful to analyse the practices of progressive
Muslims. Beck identifies two faith types: one closed and hierarchical and the other
open and based on individual choice. This model is useful for describing progressive
Muslims as they clearly fit into the open individual model while normative Islam
could be regarded as belonging to the former category, although it is certainly not
always closed and hierarchical. Individuals are involved in what Beck refers to as the
creation of multiple belief structures. Progressive Muslims illustrate this through their
reinterpretation of their religious texts to suit their individual ideals of social and
gender justice. The participants appear to be taking part in ‘do-it-yourself religion’, as
progressive Muslims are in effect creating a bespoke version of Islam that best suits
their other beliefs and facets of their identities. Progressive Muslims have illustrated
new varieties of social formations through their concept of shared authority, which
attempts to remove the hierarchy from progressive Muslim spaces and thought. In
removing this hierarchy they clear the way for a more plural version of Islam.
ProgressiveMuslimPluralism
Progressive Muslim pluralism exists in both an inter and intra-religious form with
participants engaging with a variety of different faith traditions and also with diverse
forms of Islamic thought and practice. This is illustrated in the participants’ frequent
remarks on their sense that Islam was not the only religion with truth-value and is also
illustrated in the mixing of different forms of Muslim practice in one worship space.
Michelle commented, “You know, I’m meant to think as a Muslim that Islam is best,
but I don’t really feel that”. Here Michelle is showing a plural outlook on religion. El-
Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) has a rule of following the way the imam (prayer leader)
prays whether he or she is Jafari Shia, Ismaili or Shafi Sunni, this demonstrates an
openness to different forms of Islam or inter-religious pluralism. The data shows a
diversity of beliefs, practices and emotions towards Islam amongst progressive
Muslims. Three participants described themselves as atheist or agnostic Muslims
while others described a process of questioning Islam that brought them a feeling of
closeness to the religion, or their identity, that they did not experience previously.
Supporting these themes in the data, Adis Duderija reiterates that writings on
progressive Muslim thought place a solid emphasis on ethnic and religious pluralism:
“…PM [progressive Muslim] thought places a strong emphasis on irreducible
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religious and ethnic pluralism where plurality of interpretations of religious texts and
religious experiences is considered a norm and the Will of the Creator of all
humanity” (Duderija 2010b: 5). This progressive type of pluralism links closely to
plural interpretations of the Qur’an, just as was evident in the data, and this will be
discussed in more depth below. Furthermore, Duderija links the concept of a plural
society with the process of critically engaging with Islamic texts and “The relentless
pursuit of social justice, an emphasis on gender equality as a foundation of human
rights, a vision of religious and ethnic pluralism, and a methodology of nonviolent
resistance” (Safi in Duderija 2007b: 353-354). The pursuit of social justice is present
in the data in many forms including gender segregation protests (see Chapter Nine),
the creation of unity mosques which share the vision for social justice, creating plural
Sunday schools (see Chapter Seven), the opening of leadership positions to all (see
Chapter Eight) and the inclusion of LGBTQ people in the congregations and
communities (see Chapter Five).
TwoTypesofPluralism
Two distinctive types of pluralism are present within the progressive Muslim groups
who participated in this research. The first sort of pluralism is an Islamic based type
pluralism that can be found espoused in the Qur’an (Duderija 2010b). This style of
pluralism rests on the premise that Islam is the ultimate source of knowledge but that
people of the book (Jews and Christians) should be accepted and respected. The
second type is a Western liberal conception of pluralism that favours the separation of
religion and the state and is based on an individualist philosophical outlook.
Throughout the data, participants favoured the Western liberal model, especially in
regards to the separation of religion and state, freedom of speech, religious authority
and the structure of their religious communities. Although progressive Muslims refer
to Qur’anic principles, the language that they use is fundamentally Western liberal
and linked to discourses of human rights and equality.
Calls for complete inclusivity could be seen to be in contradiction with some
normative Islamic principles, namely the idea that one should encourage good and
forbid evil wherever it is found. As mentioned previously, there is a “no talk back
rule” on theology in progressive communities, which means that this idea of
correcting one’s brother or sister on matters of religion or morals is abandoned.
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Islamic pluralism (as described in the Qur’an) often seems to refer to a kind of inter-
religious pluralism that respects the beliefs of people of the book (Christians, Jews
and sometimes Zoroastrians), but perhaps not Muslims who veer from the mainstream
of Muslim practice and understanding.
However, Western liberal pluralism allows (in some ways) for a much more
detailed conception of pluralism; both inter and intra-religious pluralism, which sees
an acceptance and celebration of a variety of religious (Islamic) and irreligious
practices with a focus on equality. This type of pluralism draws from liberal
discourses of equality that focus on social justice, gender and sexual equality and
inclusivity. This focus on discourses of equality does however exclude some parties
including normative Muslims and more conservative Muslim groups like Salafis.
TheLimitsofPluralisminProgressiveCommunities
Although the progressive Muslims interviewed for this thesis are perhaps the most
plural Muslims to be found, there are limits to their pluralism. For the most part they
pride themselves on being motivated by social justice and being completely inclusive.
However, there are of course exceptions to this rule. A significant portion of the data
from this research features the discussion of Salafi, Wahabi or normative Muslims
and why progressives view it necessary for them to amend their religious practice and
social customs. It is difficult to comprehend how progressives could be inclusive of
groups or individuals who propagate some of the inequality they are rebelling against.
Progressive spaces, although inclusive and welcoming, have rules about the
discussion and the debate of their practices and beliefs in their worship spaces. There
is an understanding that by attending you fully agree with their practices and will not
question the rightness of their worship space or practices while in the space. Although
this is done to protect the congregants and ensure they have a place they feel safe to
worship in, this in some sense excludes some from being included. Can a space be
truly plural and inclusive if it does not welcome everyone? This is especially
problematic when other Muslims are excluded and unwelcome. In this sense
progressives are not excluding on the basis of religion because they welcome others
of different faiths into their worship spaces, they are excluding on the basis of
ideology. Those who also hold progressive or liberal views are welcomed into their
worship spaces and communities regardless of their faith or irreligion. Here we can
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see that there are some who are excluded from their ‘inclusive’ space. Those who are
excluded could generally be described as conservatives, both Muslim and non-
Muslim. For these reasons it could be argued that the pluralism displayed by the
participants indeed has a limit.
Participants often partly formed their identities in opposition to normative
Muslim identity. They view their own beliefs, practices and identities as dialectically
opposed to more strict interpretations of Islam, particularly those that they refer to as
Salafi or Wahabi. Many participants described a need to differentiate themselves from
more strict interpretations of Islam after September 11. Much of progressive practice
and their focus on social justice attempts to present a more liberal inclusive version of
Islam that is dissociated from fundamentalist or extremist interpretations of Islam that
perpetuate social inequality. This explains the emphasis progressive Islam places on
achieving gender and sexual equality as the level of women’s equality in Muslim
communities is often used as a measurement of how well Muslims have taken on
liberal values (Safi 2003a: 11). This focus on creating their identities in the negative,
or in opposition to others, highlights the othering of Salafi Muslims by progressives
and also the limits of their pluralism.
ProgressiveCosmopolitans?
Some of the principles held by progressive Muslims, such as the attempted removal
of ethnic divides and calls for diversity, could be understood as lending themselves to
a cosmopolitan worldview. Their concern for an equal, diverse, transnational, anti-
racist, anti-nationalist manifestation of Islam could be the perfect fit for many
theoretical renderings of cosmopolitanism. However, the actual existence of lived
cosmopolitanisms is still debated (Turner 2006). Interestingly, on first reading this
passage below by Anthony Appiah seems to describe some of the desires of my
progressive Muslim participants until the final sentence:
They believe in human dignity across the nations, and they live their
creed. They share these ideals with people in many countries, speaking
many languages. As thoroughgoing globalists they make full use of the
World Wide Web… They would never go to war for a country; but they
will enlist in a campaign against any nation that gets in the way of
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universal justice. Indeed, they resist the call of all local allegiances, all
traditional loyalties, even to family. They oppose them because they get
in the way of the one thing that matters: building a community of
enlightened men and women across the world. That is the reason they
also reject traditional religious authorities (though they also disapprove of
their obscurantism and temporizing). Not that they think of themselves as
antireligious. Far from it; but their faith is simple clear and direct… They
are young, global Muslim fundamentalists; they are a recruiting ground
for Al Qaeda (Appiah 2006: 137-138).
Surprisingly here Appiah is actually describing the ways Muslim fundamentalists
could be considered to be counter-cosmopolitan. If this excerpt from Appiah was
comprehensively describing progressive Muslims there are some important details
missing. Here there is no mention of the diverse interpretations of Islam present
among progressive Muslims, their plural identities, or their concept of ‘shared
authority’, nor their plural communities, or their diverse views on gender roles.
Beck’s ideas regarding the individualisation of religion, which link to his vision of a
cosmopolitan religious future, are also useful for describing the collective
organisation and individual behaviour of progressive Muslims who can be viewed as
participating in ‘do-it-yourself’ religion. I now move to examine religious pluralism
more specifically.
ProgressiveMuslimIdentity
Progressive Muslim identity is self-identified in nature meaning that whoever
identifies as Muslim is accepted as such no matter their deeds, good or bad, or any
other aspects of their identity. Participants presented a plurality of intersecting diverse
identities. Some participants identify as Atheist or Agnostic and Muslim or gay and
Muslim; marrying aspects of identity that are not generally considered to fit together.
Participants also reconcile their religious identities with other parts of themselves, like
their sexuality or political views. This links to Beck’s (2010) assertion that religious
practices are being restated by individuals at a grassroots level as they pursue
religious solutions that correlate well with their individual spiritual compasses. The
theme of individualised autonomous religion also links to the notion of everyday
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religion. Everyday religion presents a type of religion that is individualistic,
pragmatic, and usually does not adhere strictly to traditional boundaries of religion.
Progressive Muslims interviewed for this research describe experiencing a
transformation in their social identity. Some were quite private with their religious
identity prior to September 11 and afterwards went public to try and change the
stereotypical view of Muslims as violent and backward. Other participants stated that
they still prefer to keep their religious identity private, perhaps indicating a preference
of separating religion from the public sphere. Much of their religious identities are
based on their opposition to aspects of normative Islam that exhibit and reinforce
social inequalities. Progressive Muslims see a need to retain their Muslim identity so
that they can instigate social change from within. They believe that any social change
in Muslim communities has to come from within and use Islamic language and terms
to achieve this. Progressive Islam is articulated primarily as social activism and is
more socially than religious based, focusing strongly on a sense of belonging. As
progressive Muslim practice is focused on experiences, not always equated with
traditional religion and aims to help individuals to fulfill some sort of goal it shares
similarities with forms of everyday religion that are very individualised (McGuire
2008). This is exemplified in the way progressive Muslims make religious decisions,
they primarily do so on their own without directions from a religious scholar or
leader.
ReinterpretingtheQur’anandtheHadith
Progressive Muslims revisit and reinterpret the Qur’an and hadith in light of their
commitment to social justice and human rights. Most use a critical-progressive
method of Qur’anic interpretation (Duderija 2012). Duderija explains that this entails
a combination of two traditional interpretation methods, firstly that the interpreter
engages with texts through established legal theories rather than directly (2012: 183)
and secondly, engages with the Qur’an and hadith directly light of the consensus of
the early Muslim communities (2012: 183). The critical-progressive method then also
takes into consideration the contemporary knowledge in humanities and social
sciences. Two participants identified as Qur’anists and disregard the hadith altogether.
Progressive Muslims approach the Qur’an with a plural worldview. They
accept multiple and diverse interpretations and believe that the Qur’an can sustain
242
multiple feasible interpretations. This leads to what Duderija calls ‘social
hermeneutics’ and ‘hermeneutical activism’ through which progressive interpretations
of the Qur’an are employed to bring about social change. The reinterpretation of the
religious texts is also acutely important to the social formation and practice of
progressive Islam as the vision for the progressive Muslim movement began in
scholarly reinterpretations of the Qur’an and the Tradition and also through appeals
for social justice to be implemented in Islamic practice through social hermeneutics. It
is also important to note that this reinterpretation of the Qur’an in order to inform new
social practices can be explained through Beck’s individualised religion (2010) along
with other theories of individualised religion (Wilke 2015) and everyday religion
(Ammerman 2014; Jeldtoft 2011; McGuire 2008).
CreatingaPluralMuslimCommunity
Following on from the realisation of social hermeneutics Progressive Muslims create
communities reflective of their egalitarian values that are both plural and inclusive
linking progressive Islam with forms of everyday religion. They foster a sense of intra
and inter-religious pluralism in their congregations meaning that non-Muslims can
offer the sermon and a variety of Muslim beliefs and practices are accepted and
exhibited. Feelings of belonging and acceptance are very important to progressive
Muslims hence their “no talkback rule on theology”. Progressive Muslim spaces are
diverse because congregants base their practices on individual experiences (Beck
2010). The individualisation of religion thesis gained additional ground through
Ulrich Beck’s (1986) thesis of an encompassing process of individualisation that
impacts the whole social structure (Wilke 2015). In connection with Beck’s
cosmopolitan view of religion, the individualisation of religion is focused on the
advancement of respect, reciprocity, and compassion (Mythen 2013). MPV conducts
both religious and social gatherings while El-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) only offers
religious services. Both groups run a form of unity mosque where all are meant to be
welcome including women, LGBTQs and the disabled. Nine participants also
reported that they do not have a progressive Muslim community near them so they
prefer to form online communities or connect with other progressive Muslims online.
Knoblauch highlights the important role of modern communication technologies,
specifically the development from industrial to information society, and the growth in
243
education in the transformation of religion – particularly among women (Knoblauch
2008). These technologies also provide an avenue for alternate forms of authority and
in turn new interpretations of Islam.
ReligiousAuthorityinProgressiveIslam
Progressive Muslims question, deconstruct, and reimagine traditional Islamic
authority structures. They use a form of shared authority rather than traditional
authority. Leaders do not have a traditional Islamic education and instead rely on their
Western education. Progressives employ a shared concept of authority that distributes
the leadership roles more equally with more members of the congregation. These
communities need a plural form of shared authority in order to allow women and
LGBTQ leaders. Progressive leadership itself requires the absence of a defined
hierarchy in authority to remain progressive (Esack 1997).
Shared authority also encourages individuals to make their own religious and
moral decisions without consulting a scholar or an imam (prayer leader), in a sense
creating a ‘God of one’s own’ (Beck 2010). Beck explains that a ‘God of one’s own’
is not the collective God venerated by members of major religions. “He is a God one
can choose, a personal God who has a firm place and a clear voice in the intimate
heart of one’s own life” (Beck, 2010: 139). This new type of shared charismatic
authority encompasses a process of individualisation and a move away from the
collectivism prevalent in many normative Muslim communities. This move towards
individualised forms of religion, according to Knoblauch, is what unites alternative
spirituality. It does this with its very inclusive style of religion, through the search for
a holistic interpretation of life and an experience-based religion in which great
transcendences play a major part (2009). In terms of reform progressive Muslims call
for social and cultural change rather than a reform of Islam itself. Progressive
Muslims have illustrated new varieties of social formations through their concept of
shared authority, which attempts to remove the hierarchy from progressive Muslim
spaces and thought.
244
ExaminingGenderActivisminProgressiveIslam
Progressive Muslims see the possibility of multiple roles for men and women and that
both can possess masculine and feminine traits. They also see both genders and those
in between as equal and believe that women should be more active in religious
leadership roles. Generally they place an emphasis on choice and equality for all. This
is closely related to choice feminism. Their practice of gender activism revolves
around removing gender segregation and introducing female leadership. Progressive
Muslim gender activism demonstrates Beck’s idea of ‘do-it-yourself religion’ as
progressives are creating a version of Islam that best suits their other beliefs, their
lifestyles, and facets of their identities, just as in everyday religion. Interestingly they
do not all accept the label feminist even though they believe in the principles of the
term. Progressive Muslims believe that gender inequality is the result of patriarchy
and human error and does not come from the Qur’an or Islam itself.
Participants wholeheartedly agreed that agency and choice were essential to
be able to guarantee full equality for women. Although there are a variety of opinions
amongst progressive Muslims (as with all Muslims) regarding the use of the terms
‘feminism’ and ‘Islamic feminism’ the capability to make an individual choice was
significant in the view of all participants. This relates closely to the concept of
inclusivity which features strongly in the charters or principles of most progressive
Muslim groups. MPV’s tagline, “be yourself, be Muslim” is exemplary of this.46
ETJC also describes itself as “human positive” meaning that they consider all people
to be equal in all aspects of ritual religious practice and “equal agents of Allah”
outside of the worship space irrespective of their gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, class, race, age, dis/ability, HIV status or on any other grounds.47
Conclusion
This thesis has explored the lived experiences of self-identified progressive Muslims.
It examined progressive Muslim identity and identified a diversity of progressive
identities including those who identify as atheist, agnostic, feminist and gay. It
discovered that social activists who felt that they were not fully welcome and
accepted in their previous religious communities started their own progressive 46 http://mpvusa.org (last accessed 8/07/2015). 47 http://jumacircle.com (last accessed 8/07/2015).
245
Muslim communities. These spaces were formed to provide a sense of belonging and
inclusiveness to those who felt unwelcome in normative Muslim settings for a number
of reasons. Progressive unity mosques are built on pluralist notions of diversity,
acceptance and dialogue. In connection to this progressive Muslim worship spaces
cultivate an alternate view of authority. Shared authority permits progressive Muslims
to share leadership positions more widely within their congregations to also
incorporate women and LGBTQ members who have been formerly excluded from
such positions. They use a form of shared authority instead of traditional authority.
Most of their imams do not have a conventional Islamic education and instead rely on
their secular education and their charisma. Finally gender activism in progressive
communities is articulated through encouraging free mixing of the genders in their
worship spaces, through having female imams, muezzins (caller to prayer) and khatibs
(one who delivers the sermon) and also allowing women to dress as they please in the
worship space.
Two different types of pluralism exist amongst progressive Muslims, firstly an
Islamic kind of pluralism and a Western liberal sort of pluralism. Yet, there are
restrictions to progressive pluralism. Progressive Muslims are the most plural
inclusive Muslim communities that can be located and declare that they are entirely
inclusive and driven by an aspiration to realise social justice, but they do have
procedures to prevent debate and dissention in their worship spaces. This excludes
normative Muslims and those who do not subscribe to their liberal pluralist beliefs
and also non-Muslims who are not liberal. The limits of their pluralism are also
evident in the construction of their identities and practices in opposition to normative
Muslim beliefs and rituals that they believe help to maintain social inequality.
Beck’s ideas on the individualisation of religion also provide a point of
analysis for the phenomenon of progressive Islam. It is a “do-it-yourself”
individualised type of religion that sees progressive Muslims creating personalised
substitutes that combine personalised experiences with faith values to create a version
of Islam that best suits their other beliefs and facets of their identities. Instead of
diminishing, Beck (2010) sees religion as establishing itself in new and complex ways
and also as being more closely aligned with self-identities. Progressive Muslims are
able to create connections between religious ethics and non-religious based morals,
encouraging a cosmopolitan perspective that opposes prejudice and violence, where
believers are receptive and accepting of the cultural and religious outlooks of others.
246
Parts of the data also share commonalities with forms of everyday religion.
These include exhibited elements of privatised religion (being un-mosqued/un-
churched) and pragmatic religion (Ammerman 2014). This type of religion also places
an emphasis on personal experience and autonomy and the morals and values of each
practitioner (Jeldtoft 2011). It is often individualised, inclusive, pluralistic and
emphasises participation (McGuire 2008). The boundaries of this type of religion are
loose and observed beliefs and practices are not always what one would recognise as
traditional religion (Jeldtoft 2011). Everyday religion helps practitioners fulfill some
type of goal (McGuire 2008). Practitioners may abandon some practice that no longer
work for them and keep or adapt others. At the individual level, religion is not
unified, fixed or methodical. It is expected that individual’s religious practices and
beliefs and the narratives that the use to make sense out of their lives are always
evolving and growing (McGuire 2008).
This is the first study of its kind focusing on the social experiences of
progressive Muslim groups in North America including MPV, ETJC and the Qur’an
Discussion Group. Progressive Muslims have been employed as a case to test theories
of religious individualisation. However, the research only achieved a small sample
size due to a limited time overseas to conduct fieldwork. This is also quite a broad
study as no previous studies have been undertaken to understand these groups. It
should also be noted that the findings of qualitative research usually cannot be
generalised to the study population or community. Qualitative research is also more
difficult to analyse and often does not fit neatly into standard categories. The study
also did not include enough LGBTQ participants to focus on that area in more depth.
This presents an area for future study. Not much is known about progressive groups in
UK, Europe and Australia, LGBTQ people in progressive communities, and
progressive Muslim groups in Muslim majority countries, future research should
focus on these groups. There is also a need to understand progressive Muslims in
Muslim countries. There are also two studies on multiple modenities and new
religious movements that are connected to the themes in this research.
The key argument of the theory of multiple modernities is that types of
modernity are so diverse and dependent on culture and historical context that the term
itself must be spoken of in the plural (Eisenstadt 2000). Eisenstadt’s multiple view of
modernity is based on the socio-cultural mixing constructed through “the ongoing
dialogue” between globalising forces. Due to modern transnational dynamics, not
247
only are multiple modernities produced but, “within all societies, new questionings
and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity are emerging” (2000: 24).
Supporters of the multiple modernities theory recognise two important points: firstly
that there are multiple ways of being modern and secondly that not all modernities are
secular. (Berger et al. 2008: 44). Although the theory of multiple modernities can be
broadly related to progressive Islam, it would make more sense to undertake a
comparative study between progressive Muslims in a Muslim and a non-Muslim
country in order to compare the development of modernities in different contexts (see
Hefner 1998). This is of course out of the scope of this research, but would make an
interesting topic for future research.
Some may argue that progressive Islam could be a new religious movement.
Although there is no one criterion or set of criteria for describing a group as a ‘new
religious movement’, use of the term usually requires that the group be both of recent
origin and different from existing religions (Chryssides and Zeller 2014). There has
been some debate by those who study NRMs about what constitutes ‘new’
(Chryssides and Zeller 2014). Progressive Islam is not a new religious movement as
some members/adherents are not even calling for reform of Islam but a return to
original Islam. Progressive Muslims argue that they are still within the fold of Islam
and as such may not constitute a new religious movement. However, it would be
interesting to conduct a comparative study between progressive Muslim groups and
NRMs which have originated from Islam in the United States such as the Nation of
Islam (See Lee 1996 and Starrett 2011), and the Five Percent Nation (see Corbiscello
1998; Aidi 2004 and Bibi Khan 2012). This also provides an avenue for further
research.
This thesis aimed to test the levels of individualisation present in progressive
Muslim communities and to what extent their practice can be described as an
individualised form of Islam. Although progressive Islam presents many
individualised elements including the practice of shared authority, fatwa of the heart,
individualised approaches to interpretation, understanding and practice and gender
activism, the collective still remains important for some participants. In short,
progressive Muslims are individualised in many respects but there are some cases
when individualisation is abandoned in favour of community and group consensus.
For example, some participants commented that instead of each woman praying
where she wants to pray in the mosque that there should be a consensus reached by all
248
women in the congregation. This is linked to the traditional belief that ijma
(consensus) should be reached by the scholars in order for a ruling to be legal. In this
case the scholars are not consulted but the community. To conclude, progressive
Muslims show a high level of individualised behavior, however communitarian ideals
still influence their practices.
249
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AppendixA:MPVPrinciples
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
We accept as Muslim anyone who identifies as such. The veracity and integrity of that
claim is between the individual and God, and is not a matter for the state nor an issue
which other individuals can or should judge. We welcome all who are interested in
discussing, promoting and working for the implementation of progressive values –
human rights, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state – as well as
inclusive and tolerant understandings of Islam.
EQUALITY
We affirm the equal worth of all human beings, regardless of race, sex, gender,
gender identification, ethnicity, nationality, creed, sexual orientation, or ability. We
are committed to work toward global societies that ensure social, political,
educational, and economic opportunities for all.
SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS AND STATE AUTHORITIES
We believe that freedom of conscience is not only essential to all human societies but
integral to the Qur’anic view of humanity. We believe that secular government is the
only way to achieve the Islamic ideal of freedom from compulsion in matters of faith.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
We support freedom of expression and freedom of dissent. No one should be legally
prosecuted, imprisoned or detained for declaring or promoting unpopular opinions
whether political, artistic, social or religious, even when that expression may be
offensive and that dissent may be considered blasphemous.
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
We are committed to social, economic and environmental justice. We believe that the
full self-realization of all people, in a safe and sustainable world, is a prerequisite for
freedom, civility, and peace. We support efforts for universal health care, universal
public education, the protection of our environment, and the eradication of poverty.
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GENDER EQUALITY
We support women’s agency and self-determination in every aspect of their lives. We
believe in women’s full participation in society at every level. We affirm our
commitment to reproductive justice and empowering women to make healthy
decisions regarding their bodies, sexuality and reproduction.
LGBTQI INCLUSION
We endorse the human and civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer,
and intersex (LGBTQI) individuals. We affirm our commitment to ending
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and we support full
equality and inclusion of all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation or gender
identity, in society and in the Muslim community.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
We promote interpretations that reflect traditional Qur’anic principles of tolerance,
inclusiveness, mercy, compassion, and fairness. We call for critical engagement with
Islamic scripture, traditional jurisprudence, and current Muslim discourses. We
believe that critical thinking is essential to spiritual development.
COMPASSION
We affirm that justice and compassion should be the guiding principles for all aspects
of human conduct. We repudiate violence, whether on an individual, organizational,
or national level.
DIVERSITY
We embrace pluralism and the diversity of inspirations that motivate people to
embrace justice. We affirm that one’s religion and belief system is not the exclusive
source of truth. We engage with a diversity of philosophical and spiritual traditions to
pursue a more just, peaceful and sustainable world.
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AppendixB:InterviewQuestions
Interview Questions
How are Islamic practices constructed in a minority/majority context?
What does Islam mean to you?
Where did you gain your religious knowledge?
Describe your experience with mainstream Islam.
Do you feel a need to distance yourself from mainstream Islam?
If you have lived in a Muslim country, do you feel your practice changes in the
United States?
How is gender enacted in progressive Muslim groups?
How do you feel about women led prayer?
Are you comfortable being led in prayer by a woman? (male)
Would you be comfortable leading a congregation in prayer? (female)
Do you feel progressive congregations/groups are gender inclusive?
How comfortable are you with gender mixing?
How do progressive Muslims understand notions of femininity/masculinity?
What characteristics do you consider to be masculine/feminine?
What role do you think Muslim women should play in society?
Describe the division of labour in your home.
Describe your relationship with your significant other (if any).
Describe the gender dynamics in your childhood home.
How do progressive Muslims interact with mainstream and other minority
communities?
Do you mix with other minority groups/communities?
How do others react to your progressive ideas?
Does Islam/Muslims need to change?
Can progressive Islam be linked to the notion of cosmopolitanism?
Are there ethnic divides in your congregation?
Should Islam be inclusive?
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Do you think Islam is compatible with Western values?
Who can be considered a Muslim?
Should Muslims be more understanding of the beliefs of others?
Are the social manifestations of progressive Islam indicative of some kind of
religious/spiritual capital?
Describe the leadership style or your organisation.
How is feminism/Islamic feminism understood/practiced by progressive Muslim
groups?
Do you consider yourself a feminist?
Does Islam afford women their full rights?
Do Muslim women need feminism?
Is Islamic feminism a useful term?
Should Muslim women be active in religious leadership roles?
Demographic Questions
How old are you?
What is your occupation?
What are your parents’ occupations?
What is your ethnic background?
Where were you born?
What is your educational background?
What religion are your parents (if any)?
Do you identify as coming from a particular class background?
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AppendixC:InformationSheet
Participant Information Sheet
Project Title: Gender in Progressive Islam: Social Implications in the United States Who is carrying out this study? My name is Lisa Worthington and I am a Doctor of Philosophy candidate under the supervision of Associate Professor Adam Possamai, Doctor Kate Huppatz and Professor Bryan Turner. The research will form the basis of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Religion and Society Research Centre at the University of Western Sydney. What is this study about? This research intends to undertake a sociological study of the lived gender experiences of self identified progressive Muslims. This research proposes to test if progressive Islam instigates larger social processes for seeking gender equality in progressive Muslim communities and as such examine the human experience of such a movement. What does the study involve? Should you agree to participate, you would be asked to contribute through participation in an online interview via email or Skype. How much time will the study take? Participation in this study will take one hour of your time. Will the study benefit me? This project will not provide any direct benefits to participants. However, this project will provide a platform for members of various progressive Muslim communities to voice their opinions regarding gendered religious practices in their communities. Will the study involve any discomfort to me? There is no anticipated or foreseeable risk of harm to the participants in this research. However, participants should be aware that discussions they participate in will be able to be viewed by other participants in the study. Any general discomfort or frustration for participants may arise from misunderstandings of religious beliefs or specific customs.
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How is this study being paid for? The study is being sponsored by the University of Western Sydney. Will anyone else know the results? How will the results be disseminated? All aspects of the study, including results, will be confidential and only the researchers will have access to information on participants. A thesis will result from the research and reports of the study may be submitted for scholarly publication but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a thesis or report. Can I withdraw from the study? Participation is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to be involved and - if you do participate - you can withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any consequences. Can I tell other people about the study? Yes, you can tell other people about the study by providing them with the chief investigator's contact details. They can contact the chief investigator to discuss their participation in the research project and obtain an information sheet. What if I require further information? When you have read this information, Lisa Worthington will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Lisa Worthington [email protected]. What if I have a complaint? If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 or email [email protected]. Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the outcome. If you agree to participate in this study you may be asked to sign a Participant Consent Form.
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AppendixD:ConsentForms
CITYUNIVERSITYOFNEWYORKTheGraduateCenterDepartment of Sociology CONSENTTOPARTICPATEINARESEARCHPROJECTProject Title: Gender in Progressive Islam: Social Implications in the United States Principal Investigator: Ms. Lisa Worthington
The Graduate Center The City University of New York 365 5th Avenue New York, NY 10016
347-951-7587 Faculty Advisor: Professor Bryan Turner
The Graduate Center The City University of New York
Room 5307.04 365 5th Avenue New York, NY 10016 212-817-2056 Site where study is to be conducted: New York City and Washington D.C.
Introduction/Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The study will be carried out by Lisa Worthington under the supervision of Professor Bryan Turner, from the Graduate Centre at the City University of New York. The purpose of this research study is to undertake a sociological study of the lived gender experiences of self identified progressive Muslims. This research proposes to test if progressive Islam instigates larger social processes for seeking gender equality in progressive Muslim communities and also to examine the human experience of such a movement. The results of this study may be published in academic journals. Procedures: Approximately 30-40 individuals are expected to participate in this study in New York and Washington D.C.. Each subject will participate in one semi-structured interview. The time commitment of each participant is expected to be one to two hours. Each session will take place at a time and place mutually convenient for the participant and interviewer. Possible Discomforts and Risks: Your participation in this study may involve referring to past personal experiences. If you are uncomfortable you may choose to stop the interview at any time. If you are upset as a result of this study you should contact 1-800-LIFENET, a free crisis intervention service run by the New York City Department of Mental Health and Hygiene.
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Benefits: This project will provide a platform for members of various progressive Muslim communities to share their opinions and experiences regarding gendered religious practices in their communities. It is hoped that this research will be able to establish that progressive Islamic theology instigates social processes for establishing gender equality in progressive Muslim communities Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you decide to leave the study, please contact the principal investigator Lisa Worthington to inform them of your decision. Financial Considerations: Participation in this study will involve no cost to the subject. Confidentiality: The data obtained from you will be collected via a digital audio recording. The collected data will be accessible to members of the research team, Ms. Lisa Worthington and Professor Bryan Turner. The researcher will protect your confidentiality by securely storing the data. The collected data will be stored only in paper format with identifiers removed, in locked filing cabinets and on a password protected computer. Audio files will be used to ensure accurate representation of what has been said and are transcribed by Lisa Worthington and will be destroyed after the transcription process. I wish to review a transcript of this interview Yes No If you wish you may designate a pseudonym (false name) that will be utilized to identify you. I wish to utilize a pseudonym Yes No My pseudonym will be_______________. I give permission to the researcher to use my pseudonym and or voice recording in published materials: Yes No Contact Questions/Persons: If you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the Principal Investigator, Lisa Worthington on 347-951-7587 or email [email protected]. If you have any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Kay Powell on phone: 212 817-7525 or email: [email protected]. Statement of Consent: “I have read the above description of this research and I understand it. I have been informed of the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that I may have will also be answered by the principal investigator of the research study. I voluntary agree to participate in this study.
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By signing this form I have not waived any of my legal rights to which I would otherwise be entitled. I will be given a copy of this statement.” ______________ ____________________________________ __________________ Printed Name of Signature of Subject Date Signed Subject ______________ ____________________________________ __________________ Printed Name of Signature of Person Explaining Consent Form Date Signed Person Explaining Consent Form ______________ ____________________________________ __________________ Printed Name of Signature of Investigator Date Signed Investigator
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Participant Consent Form
Project Title: Gender in Progressive Islam: Social Implications in the United States
I,…………………………, consent to participate in the research project titled Gender in Progressive Islam: Social Implications in the United States. I acknowledge that: I have read the participant information sheet and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. I consent to taking part in a one hour interview and the audio taping of the interview. I consent to the use of unidentifiable data gathered through this interview being used in reports resulting from this study that may be published in academic journals. I understand that my involvement is confidential and that the information gained during the study may be published but no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher/s now or in the future. Signed: _____________________ Name: ______________________ Date: _______________________ Return Address: University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith South DC NSW 2751 Australia This study has been approved by the Human Ethics Research committee Approval number: H10133
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AppendixE:AdditionalTables
Figure 2: Methods of Interviewing
Name Interview Method
Connection Issues
Michelle Skype with video
No
Maria Face-to-face - Joyah Skype with
video No
Emma Via phone - Zaynab Skype with
video No
Ghadeer Skype with video
Yes continued without video
Bushra Skype w/o video
No
Madeline Skype then phone
Yes Skype abandoned
Afreen Skype w/o video
No
Ivy Skype with video
No
Burak Skype w/o video
No
Lemzo Face-to-face - Ayman Face-to-face - Yohanes Skype with
video No
Ali Skype with video
No
Trent Skype w/o video
No
James Text chat Yes, connection would not sustain Skype
Franciso Text chat Yes, connection would not sustain Skype
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Fahim Text chat Yes, connection would not sustain Skype
Aarish Fact-to-face -
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