The Limits of onetary Economics

The Limits of onetary Economics

Ricardo LagosNYU

Shengxing ZhangLSE

Is the medium-of-exchange role of money

relevant for Monetary Economics?

Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Motivation

Current wisdom:

Medium-of-exchange considerations are irrelevant for monetary transmission in modern high-velocity credit economies

Two results (based on reduced-form models from the 1980s):

Monetary equilibrium is continuous under a certain “cashless limit”

Money plays small quantitative role in high-velocity calibrations

Intro

Monetary Economics without M Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Medium-of-exchange considerations are irrelevant for monetary transmission in modern high-velocity credit economies

Two results:

Monetary equilibrium is continuous under a certain “cashless limit”

Money plays small quantitative role in high-velocity calibrations

onetary Economics Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Generically, as velocity becomes arbitrarily large, the monetary equilibrium does not converge to the equilibrium of the economy without money

Magnitude of effect of monetary policy on consumption and welfare in the cashless limiting economy depends on a sufficient statistic:

: deposit spread that intermediaries impose on lenders

: price elasticity of demand for the goods purchased with cash or credit

(1 − θ)ϵ

1 − θ

ϵ

Our findings Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Rate of return on money affects prices in transactions that do not involve money

The option to engage in monetary trade disciplines the market power of credit/payment/settlement intermediaries

Off-equilibrium latent money demand small volume of monetary trade feeds back into prices negotiated in all pure-credit non monetary transactions

⇒

Intuition Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Economic environment• consumers, producers, bankers; infinite horizon

• two stages per period; good consumed and produced in stage

• good 1:

• producer marginal cost:

• consumer demand:

• first-best: such that

• assets:

• money

• inside bond (claim to good 2 issued in stage 1)

• relative price of good 1 in terms of the bond:

• stage-1 market structure:

• two contemporaneous markets: goods-and-money | bonds-and-money

• producers access both markets (the rest only access goods market, so must settle sales in cash)

• bankers intermediate credit: is their (Nash) bargaining power with producers (deposit spread)

• All consumers can access both markets, and face no borrowing limit or markups in the credit market

i ∈ {1,2} i i

κu′�−1 ( ⋅ )

c* u′�(c*) = κ

Mt+1 = μMt

φ

α ∈ [0,1]

1 − θ ∈ [0,1]

good 1 market

bond market

producer

bank

er

producer

α

1 − α

θconsumer

good 2 market

consumer

producer

banker

period t

production bond repayment money injection consumption (good 2)

consumption (good 1)


consumption too low unless

(producer markup induced by deposit spread and imperfect access to credit)

u′�(cn) =κ

αθ⇒ αθ = 1

Nonmonetary economy

producer

good 1 market

bond marketba

nker

producer

α

1 − α

θconsumer

goods

bondsbonds

goods• Expected per-unit profit:

• In equilibrium:

Πn ≡ αθφn − κ

Πn = 0 ⇒ φn =κ

αθ

• Demand:u′�(cn) = φn

producer consumer

: relative price of good 1 in terms of the bondφn


Monetary economy

good 1 market

bond market

producer

bank

er

producer

α

1 − α

θconsumer

money

goods

bondsbonds

goods

money

mon

ey

good

s

• Expected per-unit profit:

• In equilibrium:

Πm ≡ α(1 + θρ)φm + (1 − α)φm − κ

Πm = 0 ⇒ φm =κ

1 + αθρ

• Demand:u′�(c) = (1 + ρ)φm

producer consumer

: interest rate on the inside bond

(rel. price of good 1 in terms of good 2)

ρ

φm ≡ p1t /p2t

consumption too low unless or u′�(c) =1 + ρ

1 + αθρκ ⇒ αθ = 1 ρ = 0

(latent threat)


Difference between Monetary and onetary: (latent) money demand

Producers’ off-equilibrium threat to sell for money disciplines intermediaries’ market power

• Expected per-unit revenue:

• monetary economy

• nonmonetary economy

• To see the seller’s latent threat, set ; then

Rm ≡ φm + αθρφm

Rn ≡ αθφn

θ = 0

Rn = 0 < φm = Rm

good 1 market

bond market

producer

bank

er

producer

α

1 − α

θconsumer

money

goods

bondsbonds

goods

money

mon

ey

good

s

(latent threat)

producer


Stationary monetary equilibrium SME SME as NME as α → 1 α → 1

bond rate ρ = ι ≡μ − β

βρ = ι

relative price φm =1

1 + αθικ φm →

11 + θι

κ φn →κθ

consumption c = u′�−1 [(1 + ι) φm] c → u′ �−1 ( 1 + ι1 + θι

κ) cn → u′ �−1 ( κθ )

price level pt =Mt

(1 − α)cPt → ∞

real balances Z ≡Mt

pt= (1 − α)c Z → 0

velocity V ≡ptcMt

=1

1 − αV → ∞


SME SME as NME as α → 1 α → 1


βρ = ι



11 + θι

κ φn →κθ


κ) cn → u′ �−1 ( κθ )

price level pt =Mt

(1 − α)cPt → ∞


pt= (1 − α)c Z → 0

velocity V ≡ptcMt

=1

1 − αV → ∞

Cashless limit Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

SME SME as NME as α → 1 α → 1


βρ = ι



11 + θι

κ φn →κθ


κ) cn → u′ �−1 ( κθ )

price level pt =Mt

(1 − α)cPt → ∞


pt= (1 − α)c Z → 0

velocity V ≡ptcMt

=1

1 − αV → ∞

Cashless limit Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Discontinuity: cashless limit nonmonetary economy≠ SME SME as NME as α → 1 α → 1


βρ = ι



11 + θι

κ φn →κθ


κ) cn → u′ �−1 ( κθ )

price level pt =Mt

(1 − α)cPt → ∞


pt= (1 − α)c Z → 0

velocity V ≡ptcMt

=1

1 − αV → ∞

limα→1

[φn − (1 + ρ)φm] =1 − θ

θ1

1 + θικ > 0


Theorem. Let denote the compensating variation associated with a deviation in the nominal policy rate from (the Friedman rule) to in the cashless limit of the stationary monetary economy. Then,

: deposit spread that intermediaries impose on lenders : price elasticity of demand for the goods purchased with cash or credit

τ (ι)0 ι

dτ (ι)dι

≈ − (1 − θ) ϵ

1 − θϵ

Is the discontinuity quantitatively relevant? Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

The stationary equilibrium conditions of our model can be obtained from a reduced-form MIU representation with:

• and are treated as “deep” parameters, and is separable in real balances monetary considerations are irrelevant

• But our theory implies and (a Kareken-Wallace-Lucas critique) our mechanism is not captured by conventional MIU formulations

U (ct, ht,mt

pt ) ≡ u (c1t) + v (c2t) + Amt

pt− ψh1t − h2t

A ψ U⇒

A = A (ι) ψ = ψ (ι)⇒

Connection with the money-in-the-utility-function approach Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

The stationary equilibrium conditions of our model can be obtained from a reduced-form MIU representation with:

• and are treated as “deep” parameters, and is separable in real balances monetary considerations are irrelevant

• But our theory implies and (a Kareken-Wallace-Lucas critique) our mechanism is not captured by conventional MIU formulations

U (ct, ht,mt

pt ) ≡ u (c1t) + v (c2t) + Amt

pt− ψh1t − h2t

A ψ U⇒

A = A (ι) ψ = ψ (ι)⇒

Connection with the money-in-the-utility-function approach Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

Monetary equilibrium is not continuous in the cashless limit if there is market power in credit/payment/settlement intermediation

In the cashless limit:

Medium-of-exchange considerations are important for monetary transmission —even in near-cashless economies where credit supports a large volume of transactions with arbitrarily small aggregate real money balances

ΔwelfareΔι ≈ (1 − θ) ϵ < 0

Conclusion Intro Model Equilibrium Cashless Limit Welfare MIU Conclusion

The Limits of onetary Economics

Ricardo LagosNYU

Shengxing ZhangLSE

The Limits of onetary Economics

Documents