United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Settling International Maritime and Territorial Disputes (SCS)
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Settling International Maritime and Territorial Disputes
(SCS)
Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Delegates,
We’d like to extend a warm welcome to all those of you attending the simulation of the United Nations Convention on the
law of the Sea discussing the South China Sea Dispute at the JUIT Model United Nations 2017. The UNCLOS is
considered one of the toughest challenges any Model United Nations aficionado faces because of the technical nature of
the debate and sheer scope of debate that can be achieved, unhindered by its mandate. However, we urge you to
research well, read and understand all the topics under the agenda, take notes while researching that will help you
characterize debate and form moderated caucuses, and you will find this to be an enjoyable learning experience.
First and foremost, what one must understand is that a Delegate in a Model United Nations Conference is representing
not the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister or the President of their allotted country, but the Permanent Representative
of that country to the United Nations. Thus, you will be required to NOT repeat or simply read out statements from your
research, but analyze it according to your foreign policy and present the analysis to the Council. Secondly, this Council is
not picking up this agenda for the first time, we must remember that when we simulate the Council, it is assumed that the
Delegates representing the Council Members will come researched and well informed of the discussion on the agenda
that has happened in the past, and have knowledge of the documentation (SC or GA resolutions, reports of the Secretary
General, news reports, etc.) of the matter. Once we begin with debate, we sincerely hope that Delegates move straight to
discussing current issues rather than informing the council of simply their troop contributions, as has been seen in past
simulations.
Your Executive Board is here to guide debate, and will be taking part in substantive debate only through the updates and
questions to you. We will refrain from giving our opinion on matters unless we are ruling on Points of Orders. Regarding
Rules of Procedure, I would ask you to be conversant in them but not regard them as strict and unbreakable. Rules of
Procedure were made to aid debate, not hamper it, so we would like to keep the Points of Orders for usage of personal
pronouns to a minimum. Further, we would love for the delegates to converse amongst themselves and promptly let the
Executive Board know if they wish for any rules to be amended to improve debate.
We see a lot of delegates come in and expect a cut and dry debate on the Agenda. Going through a bunch of reports
and reading their conclusions out is not going to work here. What this Executive Board expects is that you to express an
analysis of the information you have, not to just read out that information. This will be a fast paced committee, and
despite the tremendous pressure, it will be a refreshing experience from the usual pace of debate in MUNs. Here, you
can take action; you can debate about HOW to take the action instead of only WHY that action is necessary. If you are
well researched and versed in your country’s foreign policy, be creative with your solutions, and be proactive! Never be
afraid to suggest something out of the box, because it is going to be discussed by your peers if you can lobby. Do not be
afraid of being wrong, because the best experience of being a Delegate at an MUN Conference is completely giving in to
become that person and feel their responsibility and dedication to representing their nations.
Best of preparations!
Imran Ahmad Ali Naman Anand Tarunam Mahajan
Chair Vice Chair Rapporteur
Special mention to Mr. Siddhant Bajaj and Mr. Pritthish Roy for helping shape up this guide.
How to read the Study Guide
Given the nature and complexity of the agenda, it is impossible to deliver an authoritative
document on the subject. The substance of this guide is therefore intended only to help you in
developing basic background, context, vocabulary and familiarity with the subject area of
substantive discussion in this simulation. Most of the information disseminated in this guide
is freely available on the Internet with a simple web search. Therefore, please use this
guide only as a basic refresher and not as a substitute for actual research and policy
parsing, understanding and construction.
Study Guides are, contradictory to popular belief, not supposed to contain all the
information on a certain topic. A good study guide consists of information that a delegate
can use to gain basic information on the issue at hand and the links for further research that
they must use to prepare for the final conference. All the information given in this guide is
from an unbiased perspective and we have refrained from making judgments as much as
possible if none has been made by the United Nations.
This study guide is divided into sections to permit a delegate to comfortably understand the
implications of various aspects of the issue. The first section is about the UNCLOS and most
probably the most fundamental of all. The functions and powers of all councils and
committees are outlined by their mandate, which also defines the scope of debate in council.
The mandate also defines what kind of actions can be taken under UNCLOS and how it is
separate from the actions taken by other councils.
The second section is a very practical and integral aspect of being a delegate in this Council. It
will also help you in future MUNs. It clearly marks out the sources that will be accepted as
proof/evidence in Council. There are two important things to be kept in mind regarding this
section. Firstly, that in situations where the Executive Board asks a delegate for
proof/evidence to back up their statements, no other sources will be accepted as credible
besides those mentioned here.
Secondly, these are the only sources, which will provide you with correct facts as they
themselves follow strict monitoring and checking while reporting or collaborating data.
Research can be done from any source as such, but make sure you crosscheck your statements
and speeches with these sources to be on a safe side.
The major chunk of this guide is its substantive section. Quotations from the Guide cannot be
used as fact in Council. For the same reason, citations have been provided for almost all the
information given in the guide, and these citations have mostly been taken from credible
sources acceptable as proof. Delegates are strongly recommended to go through the entire
articles cited and not just read the titles as it will help in your wholesome understanding
and make sure that misquotations do not occur in statements.
An advised pattern of research is the following:
1. Understanding of the UN and the Committee – Mandate, etc.
2. Research on the allotted country, especially with respect to the agenda, past policies or
actions taken
3. Understanding the Foreign Policy of the allotted country by studying past actions, their
causes and consequences
4. Reading the Study Guide
5. Researching further upon the Agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide
6. Prepare topics for moderated caucuses and their content
7. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are
going to use in committee
8. Keep your research updated using news websites given in the Proof
Proof/Evidence in Council
Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources:
1. News Sources:
a. REUTERS– Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact or is in
contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.
b. State operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or
against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or
substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any Country as such but in
that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Thus, its
value is comparatively persuasive and not substantive. Some examples are, RIA
Novosti (Russia), IRNA (Iran), BBC (United Kingdom) and Xinhua News Agency and
CCTV (P.R. China)
2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State
Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another
country. However, a nuance is that the Executive Board as credible information can
still accept a report that is being denied by a certain country. Thus, its value is
comparatively persuasive and not substantive. Examples are,
a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America1 or
the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation2
b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India3, People’s Republic of
China4, France5, Russian Federation6
c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations7 – Reports and other documents
d. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO8, ASEAN9, OPEC10, etc.
3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for
the Executive Board of the UNCLOS.
a. UN Bodies: Like the UNSC, GA, HRC, etc.
1http://www.state.gov/index.htm2http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm3http://www.mea.gov.in/4http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/6http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng7http://www.un.org/en/members/(Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative)8http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm9http://www.aseansec.org/
b. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency11, World Bank12,
International Monetary Fund13, International Committee of the Red Cross14, etc.
c. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System15, the International Criminal
Court16
Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia17, Amnesty International18, Human
Rights Watch19 or newspapers like the Guardian20, Times of India21, etc. be accepted as
PROOF; but may be used for better understanding of any issue and even be brought up
in debate, if the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a
Government.
11http://www.iaea.org/12http://www.worldbank.org/13http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm14http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp15http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm16http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC17http://www.wikipedia.org/18http://www.amnesty.org/19http://www.hrw.org/20http://www.guardian.co.uk/21http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
About UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole.
The Convention comprises 320 articles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.
Some of the key features of the Convention are the following:
Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters;
Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits used for international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other aspects of passage;
Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; the waters between the islands are declared archipelagic waters where States may establish sea lanes and air routes in which all other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through such designated sea lanes;
Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection;
All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ's of coastal States of the same region or sub-region; highly migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded special protection;
Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances;
Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles;
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations to States on the shelf's outer boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles;
All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, over flight, scientific research and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other States in adopting, measures to manage and conserve living resources;
The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of islands are determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own would have no economic zone or continental shelf;
States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to cooperate in managing living resources, environmental and research policies and activities;
Land-locked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States;
States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution;
All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State, but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States when the research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and fulfills specified criteria;
States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology "on fair and reasonable terms and conditions", with proper regard for all legitimate interests;
States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention;
Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under
the Convention, to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration. Conciliation is also available
and, in certain circumstances, submission to it would be compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive
jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.
Introduction to the agenda
SOUTH CHINA SEA is an existing pending issue for discussion under UNCLOS
The South China Sea (SCS) is an expanse of water from Singapore and the Straits of Malacca to
the Taiwan Straits that encompasses 3.5 million kilometers. The region constitutes a vast
amount of potential wealth with oil reserves estimated to be between 28 and 213 billion
barrels, and around two quadrillion feet of natural gas reserves; these are largely believed to
be centered on the Spratly and the Paracel Islands archipelagos. There are also abundant
fishing opportunities in the region; in 1988 the SCS accounted for 8% of world fishing catches,
a figure that has likely grown since then. In addition, the SCS hosts more than half of the
world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage, and a third of all maritime traffic. Major disruption of
these commercial lanes would have far-reaching local and global repercussions; territorial
control over these areas bestows tremendous amounts of political leverage. As such, control
over these areas similarly constitutes a security situation for every member state in proximity
or that conducts business in the region, which represents the vast majority of member states.
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve both island and maritime claims among
several sovereign states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China,
Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
There are disputes concerning the Spratly and the Paracel islands, as well as maritime
boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere. There is a further dispute in the waters near
the Indonesian Natuna Islands. The interests of different nations include acquiring fishing
areas around the two archipelagos; the potential exploitation of suspected crude oil and
natural gas under the waters of various parts of the South China Sea; and the strategic control
of important shipping lanes.
The South China Sea is a critical commercial gateway for a significant portion of the world’s
merchant shipping, and hence is an important economic and strategic sub-region of the Indo-
Pacific. It is also the site of several complex territorial disputes that have been the cause of
conflict and tension within the region and throughout the Indo-Pacific.
The South China Sea channels a third of the world’s shipping and is rich with islands, fisheries,
oil and gas deposits. It is also one the most disputed areas in Southeast Asia and has the most
potential for armed conflict. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Brunei have made overlapping territorial claims to these waters, as well as to some of the
islands and rocky outcrops in them such as the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. Small naval
confrontations and skirmishes between official vessels and fishing boats of various countries
have become commonplace.
Maritime tensions stem from several, linked disputes that are cumulative in their effect. The
principal driver is the quest of all countries for natural resources to fuel economic growth, in
this case oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish. To secure those resources the countries
concerned claim various rocks and islands in the East and South China Seas, and the broadest
exclusive rights to exploit fish in the sea and hydrocarbons and minerals in the seabed. Each
state defends its version of history to fortify its case and each acts diplomatically and in other
ways to assert its claims. Nationalistic publics push governments to be firm in protecting
these national interests. In recent years, there have been numerous dangerous incidents in
the region.
Geography
Geographically, the South China Sea plays a significant role in the geopolitics of the Indo-
Pacific. The South China Sea is bordered by China, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, the
Philippines and Taiwan. Their significant economic growth over the last 20 years, as well as
activity in other Asian economies including Japan and South Korea, has contributed to a large
portion of the world’s commercial merchant shipping passing through these waters, from
which it continues on through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombak Straits. The South China Sea
also contains rich fishing grounds and is reported to hold significant reserves of undiscovered
oil and gas, which have in part driven many of the territorial disputes that characterize the
region. The major island and reef formations in the South China Sea are the Spratly Islands,
Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Natuna Islands and the Scarborough Reef.
Territorial dispute
The defining characteristic of the South China Sea and a significant source of tensions in the
region are the competing legal claims of territorial sovereignty over its islands. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was concluded in 1982 and came
into force in 1994, was meant to establish a series of legal measures and laws on the economic
rights of nations based on their territorial waters and continental baselines. This is
encompassed in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 200 nautical mile area that extends
from the baseline of the coastal nation and gives the nation sole natural resource exploitation
rights within the zone.
While UNCLOS has been signed and ratified by nearly all the coastal countries in the South
China Sea, legal and territorial disputes still persist, primarily over the Spratly and Paracel
Islands as well as the Scarborough Shoal. In terms of the Spratly Islands, more than 60
geographic features have been reportedly occupied by claimants, which consist of Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Malaysia. The Paracel Islands are the subject of
overlapping claims from China, Vietnam and Taiwan. In 1974 South Vietnamese troops were
driven from the Paracel Islands by Chinese forces in a battle that resulted in their occupation
by China. A further clash between Vietnamese and Chinese forces occurred in 1988, with
reports of significant Vietnamese casualties. Another major dispute is over the Scarborough
Shoal, which is claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan.
Major Island Chains:
The Spratly Islands are in the southern end of the South China Sea, contains some 100-230
scattered islands, isles, shoals, banks, atolls, cays, and reefs that spans some 164,000 square
miles. The Spratly Islands are too small and barren to support permanent human settlement
independently, and few have fresh water or any significant land-based resources. Yet, these
islands are still considered strategic, economic,and political assets for littoralstates in the
South China Sea, principally because they can serve as legal base points for states to project
claims of exclusive jurisdiction over waters and resources in the South China Sea. It must be
realized, though, that the Spratly Islands area holds strategic importance for all states in the
region, simply because these islands straddle the sea lanes through which commercial vessels
must sail en route to and from South Asian ports. The islands are currently occupied by 6
countries: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
The Paracel Islands are an archipelago that includes over 30 islands, and many sandbanks,
cays and reefs, over a maritime area of around 5,800 square miles. Like the Spratly’s most of
the islands are too small for permanent settlement. However the islands are contested due to
possible oil reserves in the seabed near the islands. China took over the Amphitrite Group in
1950 from Taiwan during the Chinese Civil war and the Crescent Group from South Vietnam
in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in January 1974. In July 2012, China established the city of
Sansha, under Hainan Province, to administer the area.
Claims
China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine- dash line"
which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island
chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map
detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those
claims are mirrored by Taiwan.
Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty
over the islands before the 1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracel
Islands and the Spratly Islands since the 17th Century - and has the documents to prove it.
The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical
proximity to the Spratly Islands as the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.
Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan
Island in China) - a little more than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles
from China.
Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within
their economic exclusion zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of
islands in the Spratly Islands.
Positions of Stakeholders
China: The reasons for China’s interest in the South China Sea are clear. Energy resources,
fisheries, a semi-closed sea to allow for the expansion of Chinese submarine nuclear
capabilities (this will expand China’s largely absent second-strike abilities along with their
development of new longer-range and submarine capable intercontinental ballistic missiles;
this is analogous to the USSR’s bulwark of the Sea of Ohkhotsk in the Cold War), denying
nations like India the ability to operate ballistic missile nuclear-capable submarines in the
region which would be close enough to target Beijing, avoiding political embarrassment as the
claims were originally made by the Republic of China and relinquishing them would be seen
as cowardly, and lastly keeping the United States’ influence limited in the region.
To this end, China has undertaken several vigorous efforts to secure their claims to the 9-dash
line area. Chinese vessels have been confrontational and antagonistic to vessels of
neighboring nations who venture too near to Chinese claims, going as far as to open fire and
ram them on occasion. China is also expanding several reefs and constructing infrastructure,
like the Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and several others. Moreover it is rumored they are
preparing to declare an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, obliging
aircrafts crossing through it to accommodate a number of Chinese-imposed rules.
In seeking solutions through United Nations and international apparatuses Beijing has a few
options. Beijing could seek to stifle meaningful discourse on the topic while it builds up its
presence in the region via reef-construction and infrastructure, naval and air military forces,
and so forth. This would eventually allow them to make more of a legal claim and then operate
through international legal apparatuses with more of a valid case. Beijing also would most
likely be favorable to bilateral negotiations with many of the nations involved in the territorial
disputes. If there is a conference or a meeting of all the parties involved they could figuratively
‘gang up’ on China and force less favorable terms. In this regard, China is most likely open to
concessions on some of the claimed territories; any concessions would be very small, any
agreements would only be reached if China were to look powerful domestically and
internationally, and if they did not bolster the United States’ influence and perceived ‘boxing
in’ of China.
France: As one of the world’s largest militaries and economies, France is understandably
concerned with the disputes concerning the balance of power in the South China Sea. France
has long since relinquished their colonial possessions in the region but still sees a large
portion of its transnational trade move through the region, in addition to having alliances with
the United States which has a vested interest in the region. Moreover, European countries and
companies are much involved with the military build-up processes taking place; these exports
are being regulated by the EU which provides a possible lever of influence if the EU’s member
states could reach a consensus. Lastly, partnering with regional member states and fostering
cooperation and communication through mutual exercises could aid in increasing maritime
safety and security, institutional capacity-building, and in confronting ‘un-traditional’ security
threats. Whichever solution France chooses to pursue will be one that is amenable to their
Western allies in addition to protecting their economic and security interests in the region.
Russian Federation: Despite being on the sidelines for a long period with regards to East
Asian affairs, Russia is now a sought after energy and military partner, particularly by
Vietnam, and a wider range of states in Southeast Asia. This is mainly due to Southeast Asian
states seeking to balance a rising China despite Russia’s past Asia policy focusing on bilateral
relationships with both China and India. Despite this, Russia still sells a large portion of arms
to the region in cooperation with member states in addition to cooperating in the South East
Asian Nations-Russia Energy Cooperation Work Program for the years 2010-2015. Through
all of this, Russia has also sought to serve as a counter-balance in the conflict between China
and the United States’ interests in the region; the consequences of which include precipitating
enhanced United States military presence in the region which does not bode well for Russia.
As such, it has not formally taken a side in the debate and would likely desire a solution that
minimized military escalation from other superpowers in addition to avoiding potential
conflict.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom occupies a similar policy space to its European P-5
contemporary France in that it has significant geopolitical security concerns regarding the
balance of power in the South China Sea, as well economic interests in the region. The United
Kingdom has not taken a position on the underlying sovereignty disputes in the region but it
has rejected a power- based order in Asia and believes territorial disputes in the region
should be resolved according to international rules; that is to say disputes resolved not
through force or coercion, but through dialogue and international law. They still maintain a
multilateral pact known as the Five Powers defense Arrangements alongside Australia,
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore which is the only such arrangement in Southeast Asia.
The United Kingdom would likely want to see a resolution that involves multilateral
cooperation with respect to international law, and an agreement that does not give weight to
military power or coercion.
United States: Until recently, the United States has had virtually no response to previous
building by Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea. Still, the United States officially
has not taken a position on competing sovereignty claims. The United States has expressed a
desire to settle maritime claims via international legal apparatuses and diplomacy alone,
citing the Philippines’ case against China at the United Nations Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague as an example where both parties must adhere to the conclusion. In
response to China’s intensification of efforts to assert sovereignty though, the United States
has come out in vocal opposition; the United States Navy has operated continuously in the
region since World War Two, and according to Defense Secretary Ash Carter, has every
intention of doing so. The United States has used aircraft and naval vessels to assert freedom
of navigation of the region in addition to bolstering its allies’ surveillance and intelligence
gathering capabilities, and improved military hardware. The United States plans to continue
to navigate close to Chinese territorial waters, to which China has responded that it will
defend its territorial limit; if the United States wavers it will risk the impression that it lacks
resolve in light of other recent foreign policy actions. The United States has many routes to
securing its interests in the region.
The United States is interested in seeking a solution that is done legally and through
international apparatuses to establish a precedent worldwide, and also as to counter China’s
regional influence as a military and economic powerhouse, and not allowing those factors to
decide the outcome of these disputes. The United States would also like to use this
opportunity to strengthen ties with its regional partners, militarily, economically, and
politically, as this will prove beneficial as the geopolitical and economic importance of the
Pacific greatly expands in the 21st century. The United States would also be interested in
seeing specific actions established as non-permissible, along with specific actions to be taken
if those requests are violated. The United States, to counter China, would also like the United
Nations to vocally denounce aggressive actions in the region. Lastly the United States would
like to encourage the application of legal apparatuses before China shifts the ground beneath
the proceedings, quite literally. There are many more possible solutions the United States
could pursue, but anything that counters China’s influence in the region, allows more energy
resources for the United States, or reaffirms the economic, security, or geopolitical interests of
the United States.
Angola: Because of its location relative to countries directly involved in the South China Seas
dispute, at first glance Angola may seem to have little input. It is important to note there are
several ties to member states involved though as well as the possibility of establishing
precedents that would serve Angola elsewhere. China has approved a $2 billion line of credit
to Angola to rebuild infrastructure and serves as its largest trading partner and export
destination, as well as the fourth-largest importer. China imports a large amount of its energy
resources, with a sizeable portion coming from Angola. Moreover, Angola would surely
benefit from measures that increased maritime security as it suffers large losses due to piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea.
Chad: Chad shares little in common with the claimants in the South China Sea as a landlocked
African nation. As the seventh poorest nation in the world, Chad relies upon aid from more
developed nations and as such would not seek to alienate one at the expense of another. As a
former French colonial possession they have stronger connections with France than the rest
of the Council. Any solution Chad seeks would likely pertain to the hydrocarbon aspect of the
South China Sea, and would most likely be amenable to all resolutions that appease the major
powers and all resolutions conciliatory in nature.
Chile: Chile is not directly involved with the South China Sea conflict but has several interests
in the region. This includes their participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership which includes
several contending Southeast Asian Countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico but not
China. Furthermore as they suffer their own maritime problems regarding security and
ecological preservation, they would benefit from any agreement that establishes precedents
that would help in their particular case.
Jordan: Jordan is not directly involved with the claimants but has largely followed a pro-
Western foreign policy and maintained close relations with the United States and the United
Kingdom. Any agreement they seek in the South China Sea would likely be amenable to
Western powers, which includes limiting China’s regional influence and seeking peaceful
negotiations.
Lithuania: Since their acceptance into the United Nations in the 1990s, Lithuania has largely
sought to court Western nations and include itself in security agreements with them. In 2015
though China began to establish stronger diplomatic ties with the country, including increased
investment and exchange programs. Lithuania would likely seek a peaceful solution to the
South China Sea with no particular bias towards any major nation; Lithuania would also most
likely seek to bring about this agreement as a conciliator and establish itself internationally as
a cooperative nation.
Malaysia: While Vietnam and the Philippines have both had direct confrontations with
Chinese naval forces over the belligerent creation of oil rigs in territorial waters, increased
patrols, and purposeful reclamation of the Spratly islands, Malaysia has kept a lower profile.
In 2013 and 2014, in response to increasing Chinese encroachment into Malaysia waters, and
Beijing’s outrage over the mishandling of the March 2014 MH370 airline tragedy that led to
the death of 153 Chinese nationals, many Malaysian elite began to question their historically
“special” relationship with China. Malaysia was the first ASEAN nation to normalize ties with
China in 1974, and they traditionally have had very strong economic ties with Chinese
tourism providing a large source of income. Because of this, Malaysian officials continue to
“play it safe” and not stir things up with China and risk severingbilateral ties. Malaysia’s first
and foremost desire is to maintain the 8 out of 11 maritime features within the Spratly Islands
(the other three being occupied by Vietnam or the Philippines); these provide a large amount
of energy resources for Southeast Asia’s second-largest oil and natural gas producer, and the
world’s third-largest liquefied natural gas exporter. Secondarily they seek to maintain
relations with China despite the fact their 8 claimed features lie within the 9-dash zone staked
by China.
Third, they want to ensure broader regional peace and stability within the South China Sea
and in regards to shipping and communications. Lastly, Malaysia wants a resolution to this
dispute through international law and norms, not through any permutation of “might makes
right.”
New Zealand: Until 2014, New Zealand had remained largely silent on the subject of the
South China Sea which is altogether not distant from its borders. In 2014 Foreign Minister
McCully appeared before parliament and set out a four-point position saying that New
Zealand does not take a position on the sovereignty claims involved, and that it urges all
parties to exercise restraint and avoid actions that might inflame the situation, also New
Zealand encourages all parties to resolve issues peacefully in accordance with international
law, and lastly New Zealand encourages the development and conclusion of an ASEAN-China
Code of Conduct. The impression of many member states is that New Zealand wants to
maintain the lowest profile possible on this issue.
Nigeria: Nigeria does not have a direct interest in any particular route to addressing the
South China Sea conflict, but like many other SC members it has ties to member states that are
involved with the conflict. In the absence of Western aid and investment, Nigeria has pivoted
towards China for military and economic aid. In response, bilateral cooperation has largely
increased and the two countries maintain close ties. Moreover, Nigeria relies largely upon on
its hydrocarbon exports for a large portion of its economy; in any agreement regarding
hydrocarbons Nigeria would seek a precedent favorable to its economic interests.
Spain: Spain’s main involvement with the South China Sea conflict has been its advocacy for
the Philippines because of their cultural and colonial linkages. In this, Spain has been critical
of China’s recent adversarial actions in the South China Sea and has offered to be the voice of
the Philippines within the European Union. Furthermore, Spain serves as one of the major
arms exporters to the region in its continued military buildup. These elements mean that
Spain would likely seek a solution that limited Chinese influence in the region, in addition to
settlements that favor the Philippines, and maintain their economic interests in the region.
Venezuela: Venezuela is involved with its own dispute in the Caribbean that mirror China’s
claims to the 9-Dash line in the South China Sea. The Essequibo region was traditionally in
possession of Guyana but upon discovering large reserves of hydrocarbons in the area,
Venezuela has staked its claim and since made several politically adversarial moves in the
region. Venezuela would seek a settlement for a precedent that favors its own interests in the
Essequibo region.
ASEAN: ASEAN has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without settling the issue of
sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
(DOC) in the South China Sea that committed all parties to those territorial disputes to
“reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight
above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of
international law” and to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.” Since then ASEAN has attempted to
promote a code of conduct for the SCS but has failed to secure unanimity. At the ARF in Brunei
earlier this month there was agreement to hold consultations on the issue in Beijing in
September. Thailand is seeking to coordinate the ASEAN position in advance.
EU: The EU has a major interest in the SCS because of its role for trade and investment in the
region. In its 2012 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, the EU
stressed the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and encouraged the
parties to peacefully resolve disputes in accordance with international law, particularly the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, the EU suggested in the
guidelines to look at previous examples and offered to share experience if wished by the
conflict parties.
Bilateral Cooperation
In April this year Japan and Taiwan reached an agreement to jointly share and administer the
fishing resources in their overlapping claimed exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea,
an important breakthrough after 17 years of negotiations and a potential model for other such
agreements. Other incidences of the joint administrations of resources in disputed waters in
the SCS have de-escalated tensions and promoted economic development, such as Malaysia
and Brunei's 2009 agreement to partner on exploring offshore Brunei waters, with drilling in
offshore oil and gas fields off Brunei beginning in 2011; and Thailand and Vietnam's
agreement to jointly develop areas of the Gulf of Thailand for gas exports, despite ongoing
territorial disputes.
Role for the EU
EU has useful experience in resolving conflicts within and outside EU, including management
of the seas and resources. It established the common fisheries policy (CFP) and set quotas for
member states experienced in marine protection and negotiating ever-higher environmental
standards for coastal states and unbiased outsiders with experience and ASEAN keen to
benefit from in other areas. This could be useful third party for technical assistance. But
ultimately up to involved parties to resolve the disputes. The only viable solution in the long
run is to start setting aside disputes and begin joint development.
Motivations for the Conflict:
Hydrocarbons and Oil:
In Vietnam, soaring food prices, weakening confidence in the currency and a stagnating job
market are forcing the government to develop energy sources in the South China Sea to
improve its economic performance and shore up its legitimacy. Already highly dependent on
South China Sea oil for revenue and energy, the government in 2007 embarked on its
“Maritime Strategy to 2020” aimed at increasing the share of the maritime economy from 48
per cent of its GDP in 2005 to 55 per cent in 2020. A key component of the plan is offshore oil
and gas. Since then, Vietnam has stepped up its pursuit for new energy sources in the South
China Sea.
The South China Sea’s energy resources are also an economic lifeline for the Philippines,
which faces its own economic problems. A net importer of oil, the Philippines regards the
South China Sea’s potential reserves as vital to its energy security. The contested Reed Bank,
where Chinese patrol boats maneuvered to expel a Philippine seismic vessel in March 2011, is
believed to contain large reserves of natural gas. Some observers in Manila characterize the
President Aquino’s government desire to distinguish between disputed and non-disputed
areas as an attempt to defend the country’s claim to Reed Bank, the Spratly Islands as a whole
and all its resources.
In China’s view, these developments forced Beijing to more assertively defend its claims, as it
too seeks to accelerate its exploitation of South China Sea energy resources. A Chinese analyst
described the cable cutting incidents between Chinese vessels and Vietnam’s oil survey ships
in May and June 2011 as Beijing’s response to Hanoi’s increasing “unilateral” economic
development in disputed areas. So far, China has not yet drilled in areas further from its
southern coastline due mainly to technical considerations. However, the Chinese land and
resources ministry identified the South China Sea as one of its ten strategic energy zones in
2005; and public oil companies are preparing for offshore exploration and drilling. Some
Chinese scholars have also suggested that more active energy exploration would bolster
China’s claims and protect its interests.
Yet China has not objected to all moves by South East Asian states to develop energy
resources within disputed territory. Although it claims many Malaysian natural gas fields
located offshore of Sarawak, it has not challenged their exploitation so far. Neither did it
comment on reports that Brunei and Malaysia had reached an agreement on the joint
development of energy resources in a disputed area claimed by both countries that also falls
within the nine-dashed line. This reflects the different ways in which China treats the different
claimants.
China recently became the second largest net oil importer in the world behind the United
States and the world's largest global energy consumer. Gas imports have also risen in recent
years, and China became a net natural gas importer for the first time in almost two decades in
2007. EIA forecasts that China's oil and natural gas consumption will continue to grow in
coming years, putting additional pressure on the Chinese government to seek out new
supplies to meet domestic demand. Japan is the third largest net importer of crude oil behind
the United States and China, as well as the world's largest importer of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), owing to few domestic energy resources. Although EIA projects oil consumption in
Japan to decline in coming years, Japan will continue to rely heavily on imports to meet
consumption needs. Therefore, both China and Japan are interested in extracting hydrocarbon
resources from the East China Sea to help meet domestic demand.
Fisheries:
Disputes between China, Vietnam and the Philippines over fishing in contested waters are
another potential trigger for conflict. Fishing boats from these countries are venturing further
afield as stocks in their respective waters become depleted, worsening a trend of harassment,
confiscation of catch and equipment, detention, and mistreatment of fishermen. Fisheries
resources are of significant economic importance, but they also provide a pretext for
increased civilian patrols in the South China Sea and rally nationalist sentiment.
While China is the largest consumer and exporter of fish in the world, the fishing industry is
even more crucial to Vietnam. Seafood was its second biggest foreign exchange earner in
2010, accounting for 7 per cent of its $71.6 billion of exports. The fishing catches of Vietnam
also provide close to half of the total protein intake of a significant portion of the population.
But in coastal and inland areas, stocks have significantly declined due to over fishing and
environmentally harmful techniques. These problems are leading the government to
encourage fishing fleets to go further offshore into the South China Sea to reduce the pressure
on closer fishing grounds. Vietnamese fishermen now increasingly sail beyond the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) into the waters off the resource-abundant Paracel Islands. This puts
them into more frequent contact with Chinese law enforcement vessels that patrol the islands
occupied by China.
Similarly, run-ins between Philippine and Chinese vessels are also on the rise. Philippine
policymakers appear more concerned about the political stakes involved in defending their
fishermen’s access to the South China Sea than about the fishing industry’s economic
significance. The industry accounts for less than 5 per cent of GDP, but employs close to one
and a half million people. The annual catch, however, has been declining since the 1990s. In
the waters off Palawan, where stocks remain plentiful, Philippine authorities regularly
intercept Vietnamese and Chinese fishermen. During the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the
Aquino government denounced environmental degradation and violation of the country’s
fisheries code, seeking to demonstrate its efforts to enforce Philippine laws in its maritime
zones.
China, for its part, also encourages its fishermen to sail further afield. In addition to patrolling
disputed waters, Chinese authorities offer fishermen incentives such as upgrading and
equipping their boats with satellite navigation systems. These allow them to range even
farther from home and immediately inform Chinese law enforcement forces in the event of
confrontation. Beijing also issued an annual fishing ban over portions of the South China Sea,
including some of the areas Vietnam and the Philippines consider to be in their EEZs. Both
countries object to the ban.
Increased Militarization of Islands and Civilian Patrols:
Many South East Asian nations buoyed both by GDP growth in the previous decade and
lobbying by arms companies, are expanding their militaries in response to China’s position on
the South China Sea issue and its military modernization. While increased military power is
likely to raise the threshold for, as well as cost of, armed conflict, it could also embolden
countries to be more proactive in their territorial claims, making skirmishes harder to resolve.
There is a risk that in seeking to flex their military muscle, claimant states will engage in
brinkmanship that could lead to unintentional escalation. Vietnam and Malaysia are leading
regional military buildup. Their growing defense budgets have resulted in contracts with
Russia, India and other countries for more advanced and costly items such as Kilo class
submarines and Sukhoi Su-30 fighter aircraft. They are also developing their domestic defense
industries. Vietnam is implementing its own anti-access/area denial strategy, including the
launch of its first indigenously built gunship. The Philippines lags behind its neighbors but
President Aquino is committed to improving the armed forces, particularly the navy and air
force. In addition to nearly doubling the defense budget to $2.4 billion in 2011, he has
embarked on a military modernization program that will cost almost $1 billion by the time he
leaves office in 2016. His government relies on the U.S. to assist with these purchases, and two
Hamilton-class cutters from the U.S. coast guard have already been sold at minimal cost to the
Philippines. The administration has also discussed buying F-16 fighter jets from the U.S., and
Washington has also offered to deploy spy planes and provide real time access to surveillance.
There is growing interest in submarines from the various claimant states but such equipment
fundamentally alters the regional security equation. Their clandestine nature allows them to
be deployed undetected for surveillance missions inside other countries’ territorial waters.
Yet their utility in the South China Sea is questionable. The region’s topography limits the
space in which submarines can navigate, which increases the likelihood of run-ins as rival
claimants deploy submarines to the same areas. This could result in a collision or armed clash
should surface ships and other units try to force a submarine out of their territory.
Naval vessels may be drawn into disputes more frequently as countries have limited options
for responding with force on the sea. Maritime law enforcement units in both Vietnam and the
Philippines are poorly equipped and understaffed, and sometimes rely on their navy to
enforce maritime laws.
Recognizing the need to improve their ability to safeguard coastlines and maritime zones,
some South East Asian countries are also beginning to modernize their coast guard and
maritime law enforcement forces. Compared with China’s powerful and expanding agencies,
other claimant countries’ coast guard and civilian agencies are small and ill-equipped.
Vietnam’s Marine Police, for example, only became independent of the military in 2008, and
has only about 1,000 personnel. The Philippine coast guard lacks ocean-going capacity and is
comprised of a small fleet of patrol boats, although other countries, notably Japan and the U.S.,
have respectively provided patrol vessels and funding for a radar system.
Despite their paramilitary and civilian nature, coast guard and other maritime law
enforcement vessels may stoke, rather than diminish, tensions. Because each country believes
their territorial claims to be indisputable, governments are having their maritime law
enforcement agencies aggressively assert jurisdiction in disputed areas. This brings them into
regular contact with civilian vessels and other paramilitaries. The involvement of paramilitary
vessels lowers the threshold for confrontation. As they operate under more relaxed rules of
engagement than the navy, they have more often been involved in aggressive actions such as
ramming or cutting cables and fishing nets on other boats. Moreover, when facing law
enforcement rather than military ships, fishermen and other civilian vessels may be more
likely to resist or try to escape, particularly as coast guard and law enforcement are generally
less armed than naval vessels. As these units expand, such incidents could become more
frequent and serious.
History of United Nations Involvement
Ownership over the SCS has been in doubt ever since the end of the World War II and the
collapse of Japanese imperialist ambitions. Throughout the 20th century various occupying
forces and member states have laid claim to the area. Debate has taken place through a large
variety of forums, summits, and organizations to little avail. At the beginning of the 21st
century, the Hainan Island incident involving a collision between the aircraft of the United
States and the People’s Republic of China reignited debate over geopolitical claims in the
region. In 2002 the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) along with China agreed to
a code of conduct in the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the SCS; this included being
respectful of legal evidence of claims and concerns, seeking solutions based upon the 1982 UN
convention on the Law of the Sea and international law, resolving outstanding disputes
through friendly negotiation both bilaterally and including concerned parties. Since then
though there have been countless incidents and deaths in the region due to collisions, live- fire
demonstrations, detainments, and provocations. In 2009 the deadline for states to make
seabed hydrocarbon claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
passed which is suspected to have increased claims and also to have inflamed tensions.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the result of decades of diplomatic
work and in 1982 it was adopted with 130 votes in favor, 4 against, and 17 abstentions. It
defines and limits territorial sea and details the rights and responsibilities of nations who use
the oceans. Specifically it introduces Exclusive Economic Zones within which a Member State
enjoys sovereign exploitation rights over natural (living and non-living) resources; it extends
from land’s low water line out 200 nautical miles and foreign states may still navigate freely
and fly overhead as well as lay underwater cables and submarine pipes. It also formalizes the
Continental Shelf as a natural extension of land territory (which is limited to 12 nautical
miles) subject to the Member State’s control; for legal application the Shelf can extend to the
edge of the continental margin, up until the point at which the shelf descends to an abyssal
plain on the ocean floor. Together this limits the jurisdiction of member states to between 200
and up to 350 nautical miles and is at the crux of the claimants’’ contestations.19 While the UN
convention on the Laws of the Sea contains provisions to solve overlapping Exclusive
Economic Zones and continental shelves, these provisions are disputed and can be abrogated
by individual bilateral treaties. All of the member states in disputes except for Cambodia have
signed and ratified the UN convention on the Laws of the Sea.
International Law governing claims:
International Legal Claims Recognized by International Court of Justice (ICJ):
Treaty Law: As compared to the other bases for territorial claims, the treaty justification is
more legal in nature—that is, it is less emotionally persuasive than an historical claim might
be. Nevertheless, claims based on treaty law are particularly persuasive at the ICJ because
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute obligates the court to consider treaties. Moreover, through treaties
parties agree to relinquish their historical or other claims to the property subject to the treaty.
Thus, it is no surprise that treaties (unless defective) are binding on the parties that have
ratified them.
Geography: Geographical justifications for territorial boundaries are neither novel nor
uncommon. Mountain ranges, rivers, oceans, and other bodies of water and physical
formations have perennially separated political entities. Natural borders create a clear
dividing line between two states, offer a buffer of security (or at least the appearance thereof),
often do not require active patrolling by border guards, and historically have been more
difficult to dispute than borders less easily identifiable by a physical landmark.
Economic: Economic justifications for territorial claims assert that the territory in question is
“necessary to the viability or development of the state.” For example, the territory may be
necessary to facilitate internal and international transportation routes for goods (including
pipelines, roads, railways, and ports), to exploit raw materials, to cultivate land, and the like.
Similarly, states may desire the territory to attract foreign investment, which requires the
existence of land, sea, and aerial passages.
Culture: Cultural justifications are based on the “ethnic nation” argument, which underlies
any justification for drawing a border in a specific place because of a common language,
religion, kinship, or other cultural characteristic that defines the group of people living in a
particular territory. At the core of the cultural claim is a sense of belonging, but the
characteristic creating this belonging varies by group and region. In modern Western history,
language has been the chief unifier, whereas in the Middle East religion has played that role.
Language has also been used as a distinguishing characteristic that has enabled ruling classes
to emerge to the detriment of minority groups. In a territorial claim based on culture, the
claimant state contends that because of shared pasts, the inhabitants of the disputed territory
share the “same national background and aspirations” as the inhabitants of the claimant state.
Effective Control: A claim based on effective control is one in which a group claims certain
land because the group has “uncontested administration of the land and its resident
population.” Many scholars believe that under international law, effective control is the
shibboleth—indeed, the sine qua non—of a strong territorial claim. Under property law
generally, possession is a large factor in the determination of a property right. Professor
Andrew Burghardt acknowledges that the principal questions surrounding any such claim are
twofold: (1) what constitutes an abandonment of the land by the last governing entity, and (2)
what constitutes administration of the land. The status of abandonment as a precondition to
effective control is highly debatable. Norman Hill would require that the land be terra
nullius—a “territory not belonging to any particular country.” Previously, only discovered
land was terra nullius; now, the term encompasses land over which no state exercises
sovereign control. Another scholar defines abandonment as a “failure to maintain a minimum
degree of sovereign activity.” When the rightful sovereign acquiesces in the control of
territory by the infringing sovereign, the requirement of abandonment is inapplicable
altogether. This is the legal doctrine of acquisition by acquiescence, generally accepted by
common lawyers and rejected by civil lawyers. In many ways, it is analogous to the common
law principle of title by adverse possession.
History: Historical claims to territory are based on historical priority (first possession) or
duration (length of possession). Although effective control (possession) presents the
strongest claim under property law, historical claims create an underlying entitlement to
territory, regardless of whether a state has actual or constructive possession of the land at the
time of the claim. Thus, historical claims tend to be most common, compared to the other
claims discussed here. A claim of historic right is bolstered by the passage of time; when the
encroached state does not act to counter the claimant’s right, it is deemed to have acquiesced
in that right and is stopped from rejecting the title for lack of consent. Claims based on
historical priority are most closely related to claims based on historic title because such titles
are generally derived from first-in-time claims to land.
Uti Possidetis: a principle used to define postcolonial boundaries in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa, is a doctrine under which newly independent states inherit the pre-independence
administrative boundaries set by the former colonial power. The doctrine posits that title to
the colonial territory devolves to the local authorities and prevails over any competing claim
based on occupation. Thus, uti possidetis is predicated on a rejection of self-determination
and assumes that internal, administrative boundaries are functionally equivalent to
international boundaries. Commentators criticize uti possidetis because administrative
colonial borders were almost always vaguely drawn and did not correspond to the inhabitant
populations. Consequently, these commentators argue, reliance on uti possidetis has led to
many border disputes.
Elitism: Elitist claims to territory contend that a “particular minority has the right or duty to
control certain territories.” Conquerors—who, historically, made such claims most
frequently— often shaped them in terms of divine rights to rule certain territory. Such claims
have become rarer over time because they “run counter to the democratic ideal.”
Nevertheless, elitist claims have a modern and public incarnation in arguments for territory
based on superior technological ability—a particular group claims control over a territory by
virtue of having the capacity to develop the land’s potential most fully. Such claims are
consistent with a labor theory of property law, which grants property rights to the person (or
entity) investing labor in the land, thereby making it productive. But for the capable person’s
labor or technological ability, the territory’s resources and potential would not be tapped.
Ideology: Ideological justifications resemble claims of a “special mission” based in “unique
identification with the land” and having inherent “exclusivist overtones.” Thus, ideological
justifications for territorial claims are more appropriately termed ideologically imperialist.
Chief examples of this claim are the Crusades, the Ottoman Turks’ eastern advance, anti-
colonialism, and social justice, among others. The anti-colonial ideological justification, which
argues that colonial borders are per se inappropriate delimiters of territory for moral or legal
reasons, is essentially the antithesis of an uti possidetis claim.
The Spratly Islands Dispute
The Spratly Islands dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute between Brunei, China (People's
Republic of China), Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, concerning ownership of
the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated "maritime features" (reefs, banks, cays,
etc.) located in the South China Sea. The dispute is characterized by diplomatic stalemate and
the employment of military pressure techniques (such as military occupation of disputed
territory) in the advancement of national territorial claims. All except Brunei occupy some of
the maritime features.
There has been a sharp rise in media coverage owing mainly to China's increasingly vocal
objection to the presence of American naval vessels transiting the area in order to assert the
right to freedom of navigation within international waters.
Most of the "maritime features" in this area have at least six names: The "International name",
usually in English; the "Chinese name", sometimes different for PRC and ROC, (and also in
different character-sets); the Vietnamese, Philippine and Malaysian names, and also, there are
alternate names, (e.g. Spratly Island is also known as Storm Island), and sometimes names
with "colonial" origins (French, Portuguese, Spanish, British, etc.).
The Spratly Islands are important for economic and strategic reasons. The Spratly area holds
potentially significant, but largely unexplored, reserves of oil and natural gas; it is a
productive area for world fishing; it is one of the busiest areas of commercial shipping traffic;
and surrounding countries would get an extended continental shelf if their claims were
recognized. In addition to economic incentives, the Spratly Islands sit aside major maritime
trade routes to Northeast Asia, giving them added significance as positions from which to
monitor maritime activity in the South China Sea and to potentially base and project military
force from. In 2014, China drew increased international attention due to its dredging activities
within the Spratly Islands, amidst speculation it is planning to further develop its military
presence in the area. In 2015 satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing
an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef within the Spratly Islands whilst continuing its land
reclamation activities at other sites. Only China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Vietnam have made
claims based on historical sovereignty of the islands. The Philippines, however, claims part of
the area as its territory under UNCLOS an agreement parts of which have been ratified by the
countries involved in the Spratly islands dispute.
Reasons for the dispute
There are multiple reasons why the neighboring nations in particular and the rest of the
world in general, would be interested in the Spratly Islands.
Hydrocarbons
In 1968, oil was discovered in the region. The Geology and Mineral Resources Ministry of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) has estimated that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas
reserves of 17.7 billion tons (1.60 × 1010 kg) compared to the 13 billion tons (1.17 × 1010 kg)
held by Kuwait, placing it as, potentially, the fourth largest reserve bed in the world. The
United States Energy Information Administration contests this, estimating almost no oil and
less than 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas exists in fields near the Spratly Islands. Still,
these large potential reserves have assisted in intensifying the territorial claims of the
neighbouring countries.
In 1968 and 1970, the Philippines started to take their territorial claims more seriously and
stationed troops on three islands which had been claimed by the adventurer Tomas Cloma as
part of Freedomland. In 1973, Vietnamese troops were stationed on five islands.
On 11 March 1976, the first major Philippine oil discovery occurred off the coast of Palawan,
near the Spratly Islands territory. In 2010, these oil fields supplied 15% of all petroleum
consumed in the Philippines. In 1992, the PRC and Vietnam granted oil exploration contracts
to US oil companies that covered overlapping areas in the Spratly Islands. In May 1992, the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Crestone Energy (a US company based
in Denver, Colorado) signed a co-operation contract for the joint exploration of the Wan'an
Bei-21 block, a 25,155 square kilometres (9,710 sq mi) section of the southwestern South
China Sea that includes Spratly Island areas. Part of the Crestone's contract covered Vietnam's
blocks 133 and 134, where Petro Vietnam, Petro Star Energy (USA) and ConocoPhillips
Vietnam Exploration & Production, a unit of Conoco Phillips, agreed to evaluate prospects in
April 1992. This led to a confrontation between China and Vietnam, with each demanding that
the other cancel its contract.
Commercial fishing
The region is one of the world's most productive areas for commercial fishing. In 2010, the
Western Central Pacific (excluding the northernmost reaches of the South China Sea closest to
the PRC coast) accounted for 14% of the total world catch at 11.7 million tons. This was up
from less than 4 million tons in 1970. The PRC has predicted that the South China Sea holds
combined fishing and oil and gas resources worth one trillion dollars. There have already
been numerous clashes between the PRC and the Philippines, PRC and Vietnam, and between
other nations over "foreign" fishing vessels in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and the
media regularly report the arrest of Chinese fishermen. In 1984, Brunei established an
exclusive fishing zone encompassing Louisa Reef in the southeastern Spratly Islands.
Commercial shipping
The region is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. During the 1980s, at least 270
ships passed through the Spratly Islands region each day. More than half of the world's
supertanker traffic, by tonnage, passes through the region's waters every year. Tanker traffic
through the South China Sea is over three times greater than through the Suez Canal and five
times more than through the Panama Canal; 25% of the world's crude oil passes through the
South China Sea.
International law
South China Sea claims and agreements.
Extended continental shelf claims, 2009
Via UNCLOS, the United Nations provided for countries with coastlines to submit claims to the
UN's Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), (for their continental shelf to
be extended beyond 200 nautical miles of their shores), by 13 May 2009. A total of 48 nations
made full claims, and dozens more made preliminary submissions. Two of the submissions
made to the CLCS addressed claims in the South China Sea (SCS) – one by Vietnam for a claim
over the northern portion of the SCS (which included the Paracel Islands), and another jointly
by Vietnam and Malaysia for a joint claim over a "defined area" in the middle of the SCS
between the two countries, which included part of the Spratly Islands. Brunei made a
preliminary submission notifying of its intention to claim a continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from its shores.
China (PRC) immediately issued protests over the two submissions and called on the United
Nations not to consider them. It also issued a stern warning to countries not to claim the
islands which it said were its sovereign territory.
Philippine protests to ITLOS, 2011
On 23 May 2011, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III warned the visiting Chinese Defense
Minister Liang Guanglie of a possible arms race in the region if tensions worsened over
disputes in the South China Sea. In March, the Philippines complained that Chinese patrol
boats had harassed a Philippine oil exploration vessel in disputed waters near the Spratly
Islands, and subsequently filed a formal protest at the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS).
Philippines submission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2013-2016
On 22 January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People's
Republic of China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).On 19 February 2013, China
rejected and returned the Philippines' Notification. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts
as Registry in this arbitration.
Philippine Justice Antonio T. Carpio states that the case is solely a maritime dispute, and not
territorial in nature. The Philippines seeks clarification from the tribunal as to whether
China's 9-dashed line can negate the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone as guaranteed
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which China is a
signatory. As part of the case, the Philippines also seeks clarification on whether rocks above
water only at high tide, (such as Scarborough Shoal), generate a 200-nautical-mile (370 km;
230 mi) EEZ, or only a 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) territorial sea. Clarifications of
whether China can appropriate low-tide elevations, such as the Mischief Reef and the Subi
Reef within the Philippines' EEZ have also been included in the case. "The Philippines is not
asking the tribunal to delimit by nautical measurements overlapping EEZs between China and
the Philippines. The Philippines is also not asking the tribunal what country has sovereignty
over an island, or rock above water at high tide, in the West Philippine Sea."
According to a PCA press release on 12 July 2016 "The Tribunal concluded that, as between
the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to
resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention, within the sea areas falling
within the ‘nine-dash line’,"
Diplomatic moves
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea
On 22 July 1992, ASEAN issued a declaration on the South China Sea, emphasizing that the
dispute should be solved peacefully without resorting to violence.
1995 Agreement
Following a 1995 dispute between the PRC and the Philippines, an ASEAN-brokered
agreement was reached between the PRC and ASEAN member nations whereby one country
would inform the other of any military movement within the disputed territory, and that
there would be no further construction.
The agreement was promptly violated by PRC and Malaysia: claiming storm damage, seven
PLA Navy vessels entered the area to repair "fishing shelters" in Panganiban Reef (Mischief
Reef); Malaysia erected a structure on Investigator Shoal and landed at Rizal Reef
(Commodore Reef). In response, the Philippines lodged formal protests, demanded the
removal of the structures, increased naval patrols in Kalayaan, and issued invitations to
American politicians to inspect the PRC bases by plane.
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 2002
On 4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea was signed by the 10 foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and China (PRC). The
parties explicitly undertook in this declaration, "to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned". The parties also
undertook to exercise self-restraint with activities that would complicate or escalate disputes
and affect peace and stability, including refraining from inhabiting the presently uninhabited
islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features. The parties pledged to carry out confidence
building measures, such as: holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between
their defense and military officials; ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who
are in danger or distress; notifying on a voluntary basis other parties concerned of any
impending joint / combined military exercise; and exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant
information. The parties may also explore or undertake cooperative activities such as: marine
environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication
at sea; search and rescue operations; and combating transnational crime, including but not
limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy, armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
The declaration eases tensions, but falls short of a legally binding code of conduct.
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
In July 2012, China (PRC) announced that it is open to launching discussions on the Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea, but called for all parties to exercise self-restraint in keeping
with the spirit of previous declarations and United Nation conventions. This announcement
has been criticized by many neighboring states because of the contradictions seen in the
Scarborough Shoal at that time where China has established de facto control.
On 2 August 2012, the United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution declaring that
China's July 2012 actions to unilaterally assert control of disputed territories in the South
China Sea "are contrary to agreed upon principles with regard to resolving disputes and
impede a peaceful resolution.”
Chinese dredging activities
In 2014 Janes reported that during 2013–2014 China had begun a substantial program of
dredging and land reclamation at three sites in the Spratly Islands. Janes concluded that 'The
strategic effect of China's dredging and land reclamation makes it the most significant change
to the South China Sea dispute since the 1988 Battle of Johnson South Reef. If completed as
envisioned in the CGI designs, China will have its first airstrip in the Spratly islands – and a
base from which to impose its interpretation of the surrounding features' sovereignty'.
Janes also noted that in contrast to the previous construction projections of other countries in
the Spratly Islands, 'The main difference between these activities and China's is that they
modified existing land masses, while Beijing is constructing islands out of reefs that for the
most part were under water at high tide'.
There is no known official term for the projects; the phrase "great wall of sand" was first used
by Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, in March 2015.
2015 construction of an airfield at Fiery Cross Reef
In April 2015 new satellite imagery revealed that China was rapidly constructing an airfield at
Fiery Cross Reef, in addition to its ongoing dredging activities in the Spratly Islands. In
September, China had completed a 3125-metre runway.
Questions to Consider
Now that the issue has been explored in considerable detail and the UNCLOS is brought up to
speed regarding the South China Sea, there are a variety of important concerns the Council
may wish to consider:
• China is a major economic and soon to be military power not only in South East Asia, but the
world. China’s neighbors and other states that are involved in the dispute, namely Vietnam
and the Philippines, are concerned by China’s aggressive use of civilian and military vessels to
force China’s will on its neighbors. Should the UNSC seek to condemn Chinese actions in the
South China Sea as an attempt to forcibly take over disputed territories? Or, should the UNSC
condemn all actions and hostilities taken by all parties involved that take place in disputed
waters?
• Currently, China controls and administers the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part
of Chinese sovereign territory. Vietnam claims that these islands were forcibly taken illegally
by China some years ago. Should the UNSC recognize that China is the current and sovereign
owner the Paracel Islands, thus delegitimizing Vietnam’s claim to the islands, or should China
have to return the Islands to Vietnam? (Remember, there is currently a sizeable Chinese
population and military forces on the Paracels, and forcing China to remove its installations
could result in an escalation of military conflict.)
• The Spratly Islands are currently under dispute between China, Vietnam, Taiwan,
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Although there has not been fighting between the states,
there have been aggressive and political actions that result in increasing patrols and
maneuvers on the open seas. Furthermore, states have been building up military bases,
including artificially constructing islands to create military airfields and bolster their claims.
Should the UNSC order a halt to expansion or military installations on any islands in the South
China Sea until issues of sovereignty over the islands are resolved? Or should the UNSC
remain silent on the issue?
• Should the UNSC design and promote negotiations among the sovereign states involved,
especially in regards to exploration of resources and oil in disputed territory and waters?
• Does the UNSC have the authority to settle disputes and compel parties to settle the disputes
through the International Court of Justice?
• In case of armed conflict between states in the South China Sea, does the UNSC have an
action plan to deal a crisis? Should it? What would such a plan look like?
• As a permanent member of the UNSC, will China frustrate all progress toward addressing
concerns about peace and security in this risky situation, or can China be a constructive
partner in UNSC decision-making with regard to this situation?
Conclusion
The South China Sea disputes are extremely complex when viewed from the perspective of
international law and the law of the sea. They involve sensitive issues of sovereignty over
offshore feature. They also involve on how the LOS convention applies to the feature in the
South China Sea, including whether the features are Islands of being subject to a claim of
sovereignty and a territorial sea of their own, whether the islands are entitles to an EEZ
(EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE) and continental shelf of their own, and how to delimit the
maritime boundary when there is an overlap between the EEZ from the mainland and an EEZ
from an offshore island. These disputes would be very complicated even if only two States
were involved. They are even more complex when several States are involved.
While tensions in the South China Sea are continuing to evolve, there are several processes
and dialogues underway in an effort to build confidence within the region and establish a
common code of conduct. In 2002, ASEAN and China issued a joint ‘Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, which affirmed the signatories' commitment to
international law and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Declaration also
called for the adoption of a code of conduct for the South China Sea, to be negotiated by the
parties subsequently. It is unclear how the possible negotiation of a code of conduct will be
affected by international legal action that has been taken by the Philippines against China, or
how ASEAN will respond to China’s recent policies in the South China Sea. However, as a basis
for a code to be negotiated, confidence between the maritime powers in the South China Sea
will first need to be established
Timeline: Major Actions in the South China Sea (Since 2006):
• 2006-2007: Vietnam increases offshore petroleum exploration projects in waters claimed by
China.
• 2006: The State Oceanographic Administration’s Marine Surveillance force begins regular
patrols in the South China Sea.
• 2007-2008: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues demarches and threats against foreign
oil companies investing in Vietnam.
• January 2007: The Fourth Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party’s Central Committee
adopts a resolution mandating the development of a national ‘Maritime Strategy Towards the
Year 2020.’ The strategy envisions that maritime industries, especially fishing and petroleum,
would account for 55 percent of GDP in 2020, up from 48 percent in 2005.
• April 2007: Vietnam establishes one township and two communes in the Truong Sa (Spratly
Island) District that administers the Spratly Islands
• November 2007: The Philippine legislature begins debate on an archipelagic baselines law,
which includes 53 features from the Spratly Islands as part of the Philippine archipelago.
• 2008-2009: The number of Vietnamese fishing boats operating near the Paracels increases
significantly. China’s Bureau of Fisheries Administration detains Vietnamese fishermen
operating near the Paracel Islands.
• June 2008: China’s 2004 joint seismic survey agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam
expires and is not renewed.
• Nov 2008: A task force from the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet conducts circumnavigation exercise
in the South China Sea.
• February 2009: The Philippine legislature passes an archipelagic baseline law, which
included claims to some of the Spratly Islands. The bill is signed into law in March 2009.
• March 2009: Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi makes a public visit to Swallow Reef, a
feature in the South China occupied by Malaysia.
• May 2009: Vietnam independently and with Malaysia submit claims to the UN Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for extended continental shelves in the South China Sea
• May 2009: The Philippines objects to China’s claims to the UN
• May 2009: China’s submits a map with the “nine-dashed line” to the UN Commission on
Limits of the Continental Shelf.
• May 2009: China expands the duration of its annual fishing ban about 12 degrees north in
the South China Sea. China links patrols by the Bureau of Fisheries Administration with its
claims in the South China Sea.
• November 2009: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry convenes a large international academic
conference on the South China Sea to launch its campaign to “internationalize” the dispute.
• January 2010: Vietnam assumes the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and begins a 11public
effort to build consensus within ASEAN on the South China Sea and to engage the major
powers, especially the United States.
• March 2010: The Vietnamese Prime Minister makes a public visit to one of the Vietnamese-
held Spratly Islands.
• March 2010: Task Force from the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet conducts training exercises in
South China Sea.
• April 2010: Approximately 20 Vietnamese fishing and coast guard vessels surround a
Chinese Bureau of Fisheries Administration patrol vessel.
• July 2010: The PLAN conducts an exercise held in the northern portion of the South China
Sea with vessels from each of the three fleets in the Chinese navy.
• November 2010: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry convenes a second international academic
conference on the South China Sea.
• November 2010: The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet conducts an amphibious assault exercise in the
northern part of the South China Sea.
• February 2011: The Philippines begins a seismic survey in the waters near Reed Bank.
• March 2011: MSF boats maneuver aggressively around Philippine seismic survey vessel
operating at Reed Bank.
• March 2011: Vietnam begins seismic surveys in waters claimed by China.
• April 2011: The Philippines submits a note verbale to the UN contesting in detail China’s
claims to territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.
• May 2011: A MSF vessel severs the towed cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey boat off the
coast of central Vietnam in waters China claims
• June 2011: A Chinese fishing boat becomes entangled in the towed cable of a Vietnamese
seismic survey vessel
• June 2011: Vietnam holds a live-fire naval exercise in the South China Sea.
• June 2011: Five legislators from the Philippines make high profile visit to Thitu Island held
by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.
• June 2011: Philippines unveils new plan to resolve disputes in the South China, known as a
Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC) that would limit claims to
maritime jurisdiction from contested islands.
• June 2011: Calls grow in the Philippines for inclusion of contested land features in the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States
• June 2011: The Philippines names the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea.
• November 2011: Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry hosts a third international academic
conference on the South China Sea.
• November 2011: Philippines pushes at its ZoPFFC at the East Asian Summit
• February 2012: The Philippine pushes for ASEAN to negotiate a code of conduct before
entering into any talks with China.
• March 2012: The Philippines and Vietnam reach an agreement to hold joint patrols 12in a
portion of the Spratly Island.
• April 2012: The Philippines moves to arrest Chinese fishermen in Scarborough. China
dispatches MSF and Fisheries Administration vessels to the shoal and quarantines fruit
imports from the Philippines.
• June 2012: Vietnam begins to use advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft to patrol the skies over the
South China Sea.
• June 2012: Vietnam’s National Legislature passes a Maritime Law that reiterates its claims to
sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
• June 2012: China’s State Council upgrades the administrative status of the Paracels and
Spratly Islands from county to prefectural-level city named Sansha.
• June 2012: CNOOC invites bids for exploration blocks located within Vietnam’s 200nm EEZ.
• June 2012: China’s Ministry of Defense announces that China has already established a
“combat-ready” patrol system in the South China Sea.
• June 2012: Four MSF ships conduct patrol in the Spratly Islands
• July 2012: A large fishing fleet from Hainan conducts a high profile trip to the Spratly
Islands.
• July 2012: The Sansha military garrison is established in Sansha city.
• November 2012: State-run media announced that police in Hainan Province, China will have
the authority to board and search vessels deemed to be violating Chinese territorial waters
beginning January 1, 2013.
• November 2012: Chinese fishing boats severed the seismic survey cables of a Vietnamese
ship near Con Co Island between the Vietnamese coast and China's Hainan Island.
• March 2013: Malaysia displayed no concern over China conducting a military exercise at
James Shoal on March 2013.
• January 2014: China imposes a "fishing permit" rule in the South China Sea, over the
objections of the United States, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
• March 2014: Two Philippine ships are expelled by the Chinese Coast Guard from Ayungin
Shoal in the Spratly group of islands.
• March 2014: The Republic of the Philippines files a case to an international tribunal in The
Hague in its case against China over competing South China Sea claims.
• May 2014: Vietnamese naval ships and Chinese vessels collide in the South China Sea. The
incident occurred as China set up an oil rig in an area to which both nations lay claim. On May
26, a Vietnamese fishing boat sank near the oil rig, after colliding with a Chinese vessel.
• August 2014: American Boeing P-8 Poseidon of VP-5 harassed by Chinese Shenyang J-11.
Links to Resources:
1. Al Jazeera, “Interactive: South China Sea disputes.” This feature includes a clickable map
and information updated through late 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/09/interactive-south-china-sea-
disputes-2012919124850123831.html
2. Dolven, Ben; Manyin, Mark E. & Kan, Shirley A. Maritime Territorial Disputes in East
Asia: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. UNT Digital
Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306520/. Accessed September 14,
2014.
3. O’Rourke, Ronald. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.
UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc122273/. Accessed
September 14, 2014.
4. International Crisis Group, “Stirring Up the South China
Sea.”http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-stirring-up-
the-south-china-sea-i.aspx.Accessed September 14, 2014.
5. International Crisis Group, “Stirring Up the South China Sea, II: Regional Responses.”
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/229-stirring-up-the-
south-china-sea-ii-regional-responses.aspx.Accessed September 14, 2014.
6. Beckman, Robert. “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime disputes
in the South China Sea.” American Journal of International Law, 127. Accessed September 14,
2014. http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Beckman-THE-UN-
CONVENTION-ON-THE-LAW-OF-THE-SEA-AND-THE-MARITIME-DISPUTES-IN-THE-
SCS.pdf.This 2013 article by a National University of Singapore professor argues that UNCLOS
must be accepted as the basis of all claims by the countries involved, because that would
provide a workable framework for reconciling competing claims. (advanced level)
7. Broadly consistent with Professor Beckman’s emphasis on UNCLOS as the key to settling
thecompeting claims are recent statements by U.S. President Barack Obama, reported here
bythe Voice of America (VOA) in an article entitled, “Obama Pushes Law of the Sea to Help
Settle South China Sea Claims” (includes 3-minute
video):http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-pushing-un-law-of-the-sea-to-help-settle-
south-china-sea-claims/1928052.html
8. Sumner, Brian Taylor. “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice.” Duke
Law Journal. Accessed September 17, 2014.
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=dlj
9. Tonnesson, Stein. “An International History of the Dispute in the South China Sea.” EAI
Working Paper No.71, Accessed September 17, 2014. Though this document is a bit dated, it is
still useful for “deep background” research.
http://www.cliostein.com/documents/2001/01%20rep%20eai.pdf
10. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “Maritime Resources in the
South China Sea and China’s Management in the International Legal
Context.”http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/BCAS2013_Su_Hao.pdf
11. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “Cooperation from Strength: The United
States, China and the South China
Sea.”http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_C
ronin_1.pdf
12. The National Bureau of Asian Research. “Competing Claims in the South China Sea.”
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/SouthChinaSea_Roundtable_report.pdf.
See also the other entries on the NBR’s “Maritime Security” page,
http://nbr.org/issue.aspx?id=139, accessed 18 September 2014, including Abraham M.
Denmark, “Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?”
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=458, and for one author’s perspective on the United
States’ role, James R. Holmes’ “Responding to China’s Assertiveness in the South China
Sea,” http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=746.
13. Center for Strategic Studies, “The South China Sea in Focus.”
http://csis.org/publication/south-china-sea-focus
See also “The South China Sea in High Resolution” http://csis.org/program/south-china-
sea-high-resolution
14. International Security and Intelligence Bureau, “Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the
South China Sea”http://www.international.gc.ca/isrop-prisi/assets/pdfs/Report-
South_China_Sea.pdf
15. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “South China Sea”
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR133-SEARP-Harnit.pdf
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