The Kuril Balance: A Balance Paper on the Potential Conflict Between Japan and Russia

The Kuril Balance:

A Balance Paper on the Potential Conflict Between Japan and Russia

By Sergey Alexashenko Georgetown University

for GOVT-‐451 11/27/12

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Introduction to the Conflict

History of Russo-‐Japanese Relationship and the Kuril Islands

As the Russian Empire extended its reach into the Far East in the 19th century, it

was confronted with the presence of its new neighbor, the Empire of Japan. The first

formal treaty between the two countries that marked the beginning of their

diplomatic relationship was the Treaty of Shimoda, signed on 7 February 18551.

The Treaty was signed in good faith and its goal was to develop economic

cooperation between the two countries. Among other items, Article II of the Treaty

addressed the issue of territorial disputes. It stipulated that the border between the

two countries would lie between the islands of Etorofu (Iturup) and Uruppu (Urup).

Japanese territories were to include Etorofu and all of the islands to the South of it,

while Uruppu and the northern Kurils were to be placed under Russian control2.

From then on, the ownership of the islands would always be a subject of dispute and

negotiations between the two countries. Numerous treaties and military operations

changed the ownership of the islands in the 20th century. The Treaty of St

Petersburg (1875) granted Russia control of the Sakhalin Island in exchange for

Kuril Islands up to and including Shimushu3. A few decades later Japan defeated

Russia in the Russo-‐Japanese War and acquired southern Sakhalin under the Treaty

of Portsmouth, which marked the end of the war in 19054.

The next major change of ownership happened at the end of World War II. As

part of the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, known as “Operation August Storm”,

USSR’s Fifth Area Army seized control of Sakhalin and the Kurils, including Shikotan

and the Habomai islands5. A legal framework for the new border followed in a few

years – under the Treaty of San Francisco(1951) Japan renounced all claims to the

1 Wolf Mendl, “Japan's Northern Territories: An Asian Falklands?”,The World Today , Vol. 43, No. 6 (Jun., 1987), p. 99; 2 Ibid. Also, see map in Appendix 1. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

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Kuril Islands6. However, the Soviet Union refused to sign that treaty, mainly

because it was unclear, what islands were to be included into the “Kuril Islands”

group. The current Japanese position is that islands up to and including Iturup are

“Northern Territories” and that their ownership should be Japanese, as per Treaty of

Shimoda7. However, the Soviet Union and, later, Russian Federation never actually

relieved control of the islands.

Importance of the Kurils

One might wonder why do two great nations have a conflict that spans over a

century over a group of very small islands that are barely populated and have no

industrial value of any importance. There is no consensus on this issue, but several

viewpoints are expressed in the modern society.

One of them argues that the Kurils are of strategic importance to Russia.

Ekaterina Koldunova from the Moscow State University says that the Southern

Kurils offer strategic access to the Pacific for Russia. That may seem plausible, but

the evidence does not support it – later on in this paper we will see that there are no

strategic forces on the Southern Kurils8.

A second viewpoint is that the importance of the Northern Territories to both

countries lies in their Exclusive Economic Zones9. The waters around the Southern

Kurils are rich in marine life – in fact, they have been referred to as some of the

richest fishing grounds in the world10. Since fishing is a major source of food in

Japan, it is reasonable to assume that this viewpoint holds some merit.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., p. 100 8 Ekaterina Koldunova, “The Kuril Islands are of strategic importance to Russia,” Russia Today,(12 May 2009), <http://rt.com/politics/the-‐kuril-‐islands-‐are-‐of-‐strategic-‐importance-‐to-‐russia/ > [accessed 12 November 2012]. 9 Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Southern Kuril Islands Dispute” (PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 226, September 2012), <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf> [accessed 12 November 2012]. 10 Stephen Kotkin, “The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-‐Japanese Relations: Volume 1, between War and Peace, 1697-‐1985; Volume 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-‐1998 by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter, 2000), pp. 270-‐274;

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Finally, there are numerous experts who say that the main reason why the two

countries cannot agree on the ownership of the islands is national pride. Russians

feel like keeping possession of the islands is a matter of “national honor” and that

giving them away would be seen as an “admission of weakness”11.

While attribution of causality may be difficult in this case, as it is in many social

disputes, it is probably safe to say that all of these interests play a role in the

dispute. Furthermore, because of the complexity of the issue, it is not likely that a

diplomatic solution will be reached anytime soon, which creates potential for an

armed conflict.

Conflict Assumptions

The goal of this paper is to analyze the potential armed conflict between Japan

and Russia over the Southern Kurils. For the purposes of this paper, the following

assumptions have been made about this conflict:

• Japan would be the initial aggressor

• The purpose of the aggression would be to seize the islands up to and

including Iturup and fortify them to minimize the possibility of Russia

conquering them back again.

• No third country would choose to exploit the moment and launch an

offensive against either Russia or Japan during this conflict.

• If the initial Japanese offensive is successful, Japan will not try to

capitalize on the advantage by conquering larger parts of Russia than just

the Kuril Islands.

• Russia will have no intelligence warning it about the incoming attack.

11 Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Southern Kuril Islands Dispute” (PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 226, September 2012), <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_226_Gorenburg_Sept2012.pdf> [accessed 12 November 2012].

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Going into the conflict

Russia

The Russian Armed Forces are divided into three military districts – Western,

Southern and Eastern MDs12. The Eastern MD includes all of the armed forces in the

Pacific Ocean, as well as the adjacent regions. Hence, only the forces of that military

district will participate in the initial stages of the conflict.

Navy

Because of the size of Russia and the relatively large number of seas and oceans

that it borders, the Russian Navy is highly fragmented. The majority of the Navy is

located in the Western and Southern MD’s, while the Eastern MD only hosts the

relatively minor Pacific Fleet. Table 1 below demonstrates the ships that Russia has

in that fleet13:

Table 1

Ship Class Ship Quantity

SSBN 5

SSGN 5

SSN 4

SSK 9

CGHM 1

DDGHM 7

FSGM 4

12Dmitriy Boltenkov, “The Russian Navy’s ‘New Look’ Reform in 2009-‐2011”, Moscow Defense Brief #2(28), 2012, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-‐2012/item3/article3/>, [accessed 14 November 2012]. 13 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Russia”, Military Balance, #1(111), pp.190-‐191;

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FSM 9

PCFG 10

MSO 2

MSC 5

Amphibious 4

Logistics and support 15+

At a first glance, this does not seem to be too formidable of a power. The fleet

only has one thirty year-‐old cruiser, supported by seven destroyers14. However, the

real force here is the submarine fleet – 23 subs, 5 of which can carry ballistic

missiles, are capable of taking out major naval forces.

In addition to the ships, the Pacific Fleet has a naval aviation force. Table 2

shows the airplanes that it consists of15:

Table 2

Aircraft class (NATO) Aircraft type Quantity

BBR Tu-‐22M 17

FTR MiG-‐31 30

ASW Tu-‐142M 14

MP Il-‐38 15

This is a sizeable force of aircrafts that fill different functions. Tu-‐22M are long-‐

range bombers, which can destroy almost any type of ships, as well as many ground

targets. MiG-‐31s are fighters that provide cover for the navy from enemy jets, and

the Tu-‐142Ms and the Il-‐38’s are designed to find and take out enemy submarines.

14 Ministry of Defense, Guard rocket cruiser of project 1164 “Varyag”, (Гвардейский ракетный крейсер проекта 1164 «Варяг»), at <http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/type/navy/pacific/flagship.htm>, [accessed November 14, 2012]. 15 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Russia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.191;

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Aviation

While the Russian Navy’s Pacific forces may not seem like a formidable force, the

real Russian strength in the region lies with its Air Force. Table 3 shows the Air

Force assets that Russia has available in the region16.

Table 3


FTR MiG-‐29 60

FTR MiG-‐31 14

FGA Su-‐24M 115

FGA Su-‐24M2 10

FGA Su-‐27SM 48

ATK Su-‐25 72

ISR Su-‐24MR 28

In addition to these aircraft, the Russian Air Force has 72 helicopters in the

Eastern District, which, while not specifically equipped to deal with submarines, can

still be useful against surface vessels. Together with the aircraft, they present a

formidable air force, which could be the deciding factor in almost any conflict

around the world. It is important to note that Russia chooses to use the planes’ own

radars in combination with ground-‐based radar stations to find enemy aircraft. That

choice can significantly alter the course of an air battle.

Other military forces

While for geographic reasons Navy and Air Force are going to be the primary

war assets in this conflict, it should be noted that Russia has other forces in the

region, which may come into play. The first asset that is worth mentioning is the

16 Ibid.

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Russian 18th machine gun-‐artillery division that protects the Kuril Islands17. It

consists of two bases, the first one located on Kunashir and the second – on Iturup.

However, as the Russian media reports, the bases are pretty ineffective. About 80%

of their equipment requires repairs and they are still using some arms from World

War II18. These bases have no significant anti-‐air assets that could turn the air battle

around. Hence, it is unlikely that these bases would be of importance in a XXIst

century conflict around the islands. The second asset that is important to mention is

the Russian Strategic Forces. Russia has the nuclear capacity to wipe Japan off the

face of the Earth19.

Finally, an asset group that should be mentioned in this paper is Russia’s

military assets in central and Western parts of the country. Russia has a great

number of military assets including over 1600 aircraft and 67 submarines scattered

around the country20. While they will not participate in the initial phases of the

conflict, there is the potential for them to join the fight, if the war goes on for an

extended period of time.

It would also be prudent to mention a military capability, which Russia does not

have, but one that it used to own, one that could be instrumental in deciding the

outcome of this war. Medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that had been

developed in the Soviet Union were destroyed, as part of the Intermediate-‐Range

Nuclear Forces Treaty between the USA and the USSR21. Not having MRBMs is a

serious blow to Russian military capabilities, especially in a region where the sheer

mass of their ground forces cannot be used to achieve victory.

17 Top War, Minister of Defense promised to rearm the 18th machine-‐gun-‐artillery division, (Министр обороны пообещал перевооружить 18 пулемётно-‐артиллерийскую дивизию), at <http://topwar.ru/3272-‐ministr-‐oborony-‐poobeshhal-‐perevooruzhit-‐18-‐pulemyotno-‐artillerijskuyu-‐diviziyu.html>, [accessed 14 November 2012]. 18 Ibid. 19 More precisely -‐ 1605 nuclear warheads. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Russia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.183; 20 Ibid. 21 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-‐Range and Shorter-‐Range Missiles”, (signed at Washington December 8, 1987), <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/inf>, [accessed 15 November 2012].

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Strategic Thinking/Doctrine

The official Russian Military Doctrine last reviewed in 2010 does not list Japan

among the key threats that Russia sees for its well-‐being22. In fact, most of the

threats that it lists are concerned with other countries trying to topple the Russian

government, rather than with foreign nations trying to conquer Russian territory. It

is also quite important to note the Russian doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons.

The Russian Military Doctrine states that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear

weapons, if Russia is attacked by weapons of mass destructions, or if a conventional

attack on Russia threatens the very existence of the country”23. Since this paper is

assuming a war that would largely revolve around a few very small islands, it is

unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used. Even the members of the Russian

government would probably not regard the Kurils as central to the very existence of

Russia.

The big question about the Russian doctrine is whether Russia would allow itself

to lose a small war. There are two ways, in which the situation could proceed if the

early Japanese offensive were successful. The first is that Russia could cede control

over the Kurils and stop the war quickly, like it did after the loss at Tsushima a

century ago. The second way, in which the Russian government could choose to

proceed, is to escalate this conflict into a prolonged all-‐out war against Japan where

Russia would not stop until the Kuril Islands were reclaimed. This option may seem

likely at first – Putin’s ambitions seem to be nothing less than to be the new Peter

the Great in terms of how well he reforms the Russian army24. A defeat in a war

against Japan would certainly undermine his status as a military reformer and,

hence, would be undesirable. However, I do not think that this option is likely. It is

often the case that the primary motivation of a political leader is to stay in power25.

22 President of Russia, The War Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации), (02.05.2010), at < http://xn-‐-‐d1abbgf6aiiy.xn-‐-‐p1ai/ref_notes/461>, [accessed 24 November 2012]. 23 Ibid. 24 Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making, (UK:T&F Books 2008), pp. 149-‐150; 25 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, (Public Afairs, 2012) p. 49;

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And for Putin, or any successor of his, a prolonged war would be unwise. The power

base of the current government is already beginning to erode and a prolonged war

for a group of largely irrelevant islands could make the Russian population very

unhappy, perhaps even enough to demand a change in leadership26. That means that

Russia would try to end the war with one massive counteroffensive, rather than to

try to go for the long term.

Combat/Military Preparedness

It is frequently noted that, while the Russian Armed Forces are pretty strong on

paper, they may be quite weak in reality. The Russian military is described as

“lacking in coordination”, having “low morale” and lacking “able commanders and

supporting officers”27. Furthermore, the Russian military equipment frequently

doesn’t work. Russia is notorious for having rockets, fighter jets, and satellites

falling out of the sky28. There are multiple reasons for that. A commission that had

been charged with looking into one of the more notorious Russian military

incidents, the sinking of the Kursk submarine, reported “a shocking level of

negligence on all levels of the command; stunning breaches of discipline and shoddy,

obsolete, and poorly maintained equipment”29. As if that wasn’t enough, the Russian

soldiers aren’t getting anywhere near enough training. For example, the Naval

Airforce pilots on average fly just about 40 hours a year30. That is nowhere near

enough to be proficient – by comparison, the US Marine Corps Aviation pilots on

average fly for between 248 and 365 hours per year31. Moreover, Russia still

employs a conscription system, which means that at any given point its armed

26 “Living with Putin, again”, The Economist, (16 July 2012), at <http://www.economist.com/node/21556955>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 27 Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making, op. cit, p. 151; 28 Julia Ioffe, “Why Russia Is The World’s Deadliest Place To Fly”, Forbes, (02 November 2011), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/juliaioffe/2011/11/02/why-‐russia-‐is-‐the-‐worlds-‐deadliest-‐place-‐to-‐fly/>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 29 Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p 49; 30 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Five: Russia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.186; 31 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Three: North America”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.62;

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forces are filled with people with little to no training or experience, most of whom

are not dedicated to being soldiers.

In addition to that, the Russian command seems to be making questionable

tactical decisions with their assets. In the war with Georgia, for example, Russia sent

a strategic bomber Tu-‐22M3 on a reconnaissance mission, during which it was shot

down32. This was a highly wasteful use of a very valuable asset, and, so far, it does

not seem that Russian command is on track for making better decisions than the

ones made during the war with Georgia.

That leads me to conclude that through the combination of these factors, the

Russian Armed Forces would not perform very well in a modern armed conflict.

Through an educated guess, I would estimate that only around half of the Russian

forces in the region will actually be able to perform their duties, and a lot of them

wouldn’t be able to execute their maneuvers properly.

Japan

Unlike Russia, Japan is small and its interests are highly localized. Hence, it

would be fully able to utilize all of its armed forces from the beginning of the

conflict. Considering that the two countries have comparable levels of military

expenditures ($72 billion per year for Russia to $59 billion per year for Japan), just

because of Japan’s geographic position, the country would be at a strong

advantage33.

Navy

The Japanese Maritime Self-‐Defense force has an impressive array of ships, listed

in Table 434.

32 Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War”, US Army War College, (2009),< http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09spring/mcdermott.pdf> [accessed 15 November 2012]. 33 “Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011”, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), (Stockholm, 2012), < http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-‐factsheet-‐on-‐military-‐expenditure-‐2011.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 34 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.246;

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Table 4

Ship Class Quantity

SSK 18

CVH 1

CGHM 2

DDGHM 20

DDGM 7

DDM 3

FFGM 16

PBFG 6

MCM+MSO+MSD 37

Amphibious 25

Logistics and support 77

These ships are generally divided into escort flotillas with 7-‐8 warships in each.

On the surface, it is superior to the Russian Pacific Fleet in every way in terms of

naval combat – it has twice as many carriers as the Pacific Fleet, almost 3 times as

many destroyers, and even a small aircraft carrier. Moreover, the large number of

support ships would ensure the success of continuous operations outside of

Japanese harbors. Japan does, however, have fewer submarines than Russia in the

region. The advantage that Japan has in submarine warfare is that the Japanese

submarines are relatively modern and among “the most advanced submarines in the

world”, while Russia mainly uses submarines that are a few decades old35. Since

we’re talking about submarine warfare, where stealth and electronics are key, Japan

might actually have the upper hand in this instance. 35 Gordon Arthur, “Submarines Gain Buoyancy in Asia-‐Pacific Region”, Defense Review Asia, (27 April 2012), <http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/160/SUBMARINES-‐GAIN-‐BUOYANCY-‐IN-‐ASIA-‐PACIFIC-‐REGION > [accessed 15 November 2012].

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Japan also has Naval Aviation forces. 93 of its 95 combat aircraft are P-‐3C

Orions36. These planes are designed to find and destroy submarines, as well as to get

reconnaissance information and relay it to other military groups. These aircraft

would make it very hard for Russian subs to approach Japanese ships unnoticed.

Aviation

The Japanese Air Self-‐Defense Force counts 374 combat capable aircraft, as well

as numerous support planes. The breakdown of the combat aircraft by type is

presented in Table 5 below37.

Table 5


FTR F-‐15J 202

FGA F-‐2/F-‐2B 87

FGA F-‐4E 72

ISR RF-‐4E 13

The first thing that is quite distinct about the Air Self-‐Defense force is that it is

very fighter-‐oriented and lacks long-‐range bombers. In fact, there are no dedicated

bombers in it whatsoever. However, both F-‐4Es and F-‐2s can be armed with a

variety of bombs and other air-‐to-‐ground weapons, so Japan does have sufficient

capacity to bomb Russian ground targets en masse. The second thing to note about

the Japanese air force is that it uses AEW&C planes to spot enemy aircraft. That may

be a vulnerability for Japan during their offensive operations.

Other military assets

For the most part, naval and air forces would be the only military assets used by

Japan in this conflict. There is a possibility that Japan could use artillery fire to take

out the existing military bases on the Southern Kurils, but planes or ships could do

36 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.247; 37 Ibid.

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the job equally well. It is possible that Japan will transport some ground-‐based anti-‐

air weapons to the islands, if it successfully captures them – that would make it

easier to maintain air dominance over the islands.

Another force that could be used that is not sea-‐ or air-‐related is a cyber attack

force, but Japan has not reported having one. Japanese Ministry of Defense did state

cyberspace as a priority for the next couple of years, but its documents only reveal

defensive intentions38. And while Japan may actually be working on developing

cyber attacks, we have no evidence to support this theory, so cyber attacks will not

be featured in this scenario. Another factor that is crucial to understanding, how this

conflict would play out, is that the USA provides a nuclear deterrence shield for

Japan39. That is a significant deterrent, which might make Russia think twice about

using nuclear weapons to retaliate against such a local strike, as the one on Kuril

Islands.

Strategic Thinking/Doctrine

Japanese military doctrine is very defense-‐oriented. In fact, its National Defense

Program Guidelines explicitly state that Japan maintains its armed forces for

defensive purposes only40. That being said, countries rarely write that they intend to

conquer all of their neighbors in their national doctrines – that would antagonize

other countries and reduce the first strike advantage by making neighboring

countries prepare for the possibility of an invasion. In fact, evidence suggests that

Japan is becoming more offensive in its military exercises. A few years ago the Air

Self-‐Defense Force conducted its first live bomb-‐dropping exercises41. Such

exercises can be viewed as circumstantial evidence that the defensive-‐only attitude

is waning.

38 “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace”, (Tokyo, report prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Defense), <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/stable_and_effective_use_cyberspace.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 39 “National Defense Program Guidelines”, (Tokyo, report prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Defense), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 40 Ibid. 41 Norimitsu Onishi, “Bomb by Bomb, Japan Sheds Military Restraints”, New York Times, (23 July 2007), p. A1;

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Combat/Military preparedness

Overall, Japan has a relatively high level of combat preparedness. Its pilots train

for a respectable 150 hours a year42. Its officers and soldiers frequently train

together with their American counterparts43. However, there is the issue of Japan

lacking practice – Japan hasn’t participated in an actual war since World War II. And

it is a valid point of view that military exercises do not give as much experience as

real war experience. In the case of an armed conflict with Russia, this disparity only

really applies to high-‐level commanders. People who serve in the Eastern MD in

Russia have not seen any wars during their military careers either, so Japan is

unlikely to be at a serious disadvantage because of its peaceful decades.

The Theater

Geography

The Kuril Islands are small islands, located very close to Hokkaido. Because of

the location of the military bases of both countries, the islands are in range of all the

aircraft that Russia and Japan have in the region. However, it is important to note

that some Russian airfields are located pretty far inland. The water in the Kuril

straits is pretty deep – the deepest strait is 7600 feet deep44. Submarines can easily

pass through without having to rise higher and risk being detected. Overall, the

islands provide a perfect location for a test of naval and air powers.

Key points to control

The winner of the conflict is the country, which, at the end of the war occupies

Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai islands. As far as places that offer their

holders tactical advantages go – controlling the straits between the islands is

important, because it limits the naval movement of your opponent. Otherwise, the

geography of the theater is pretty simple.

42 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Six: Asia”, Military Balance, #1(111), p.247; 43 “National Defense Program Guidelines”, (Tokyo, report prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Defense), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 44 “The Okhotsk Sea”, (Oceanographic Atlas of the Bering Sea, Okhotsk Sea and Japan/East Sea), <http://pacificinfo.ru/data/cdrom/2/HTML/e_3_00.htm>, [accessed 15 November 2012].

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Indigenous population

The indigenous population is unlikely to play any significant role in the conflict

over the islands. The total population of the islands is around 17,000, they are not

armed well and there is little space for them to conduct partisan warfare45. They

could come into play if the dispute were to be resolved by the international

community through democratic means, but this paper focuses on the military

solution to the issue.

The Conflict

The First Strike

In modern warfare between large countries, the advantage of a first strike can be

critical. During World War II, we have seen the Germans crush the French in the

matter of days and the Soviets do the same to the Japanese, not to mention all the

other rapid campaigns of the XXth century. It would stand to reason that Japan

would try to exploit this advantage as much as possible and try to eliminate as many

of the Russian military assets in the region as it can to limit the options available to

Russia for a counterattack. Figure 1 shows how the Japanese see the military theater

around the islands46.

45 “Yuzhno-‐Kurilsk Journal; Between Russia and Japan, a Pacific Tug of War”, New York Times, (02 October 2002), <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/02/world/yuzhno-‐kurilsk-‐journal-‐between-‐russia-‐and-‐japan-‐a-‐pacific-‐tug-‐of-‐war.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm>, [accessed 15 November 2012]. 46 “Security Environment Surrounding Japan”, (Tokyo, report prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Defense), <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/12Part1_Chapter2_Sec4.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012].

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Figure 1

While Japan could just take the islands straight away, it would find its forces

surrounded by Russian planes and ships. A smart and ambitious goal for the first

strike would be to take out the Russian naval groups both near the Sea of Japan and

Kamchatka, as well as all of the airfields shown on this map. After that, Japan could

take the Kuril Islands and Russia wouldn’t be able to launch a counteroffensive

without bringing its forces from other military districts. That would give Japan time

to fortify the islands and install coastal and anti air defenses. Moreover, if all of the

airfields were destroyed, Russia would have no way to try and restore air

superiority in the region for a while.

Taking out the Russian Pacific Fleet would be relatively easy – simultaneous

strikes from Japanese subs, carriers and aircraft would almost certainly sink all of

the Russian ships in the region. Some submarines might escape, but they would be

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alone in a region with a lot of enemy presence and no harbors to dock at. Moreover,

the Japanese have plenty of Orions to hunt the subs down. The airfields might

provide a slightly more difficult challenge for the Japanese. The airfields that are the

furthest away from the Russian airspace border (the three on the left of Figure 1)

are approximately 700 miles inland. The maximum speed of F-‐4Es is Mach 2.23, or

approximately 1470 miles per hour47. That means that the Russian aircraft stationed

there will have just under 30 minutes to take off and meet Japanese planes in the air.

Normally that would be a reasonable time for an advanced military force to react,

but in the case of Russia there are two factors to consider – the mountain of

bureaucracy and lack of experience of fighter pilots. I do not think that the Russian

pilots at these bases will both get permission to and actually take off in the case of

an offensive. Moreover, these bases are unlikely to hold more than 75 or so planes48.

Because the other airfields are located so close to the Russian airspace borders,

Japan can allocate a 100 or so planes to those particular bases. While the Japanese

Air Self-‐Defense Force might sustain some losses, it can almost definitely destroy the

airfields with the first strike.

A coordinated first strike on all of the important targets at once would require

significant competence and coordination, however, with the modern communication

technologies in play, I have full confidence that Japan would be able to pull it off

without major mistakes. The way Japan would have to do it is depicted below.

47 Laurence K. Loftin, Quest for Performance: The Evolution of Modern Aircraft SP-‐468. (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, History Office, Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1985). 48 There are 14 Russian airfields in the region and 3/14 of the number of Russian aircraft in the region is 74.36.

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Figure 2

In this figure, blue arrows represent naval attacks and red arrows represent air

strikes. All of these movements must start at the same time, as soon as the group

that goes the furthest West crosses the border. That gives Japan an advantage of

confusion – the Russians won’t know what’s going on until the first bombs start

falling. And an average Russian officer would never take the responsibility for

shooting first – initiative is not praised in the Russian Armed Forces. So, this plan of

attack may buy a few minutes for the aircraft that have to go to the furthest bases.

20

Now, there is always the possibility that the Japanese first strike would fail at

destroying the Russian airfields, either because of an intelligence leak or because of

poor execution. In that case, Japanese forces would have to actually face the forces

of the Eastern MD in a series of straight up battles. Now, the goal of the Russians

would be to simply protect the airfields until the Western forces relocate to crush

the Japanese. So, the Japanese would be operating on a tight schedule, racing to

destroy the airfields. That means that they would have to actively extend their

planes over enemy land, where the enemy has radars and anti air. Moreover, the

Japanese would have to move their AEW&C planes pretty far into the open. And if

the Eastern Russians have the good sense to target them down, they could just win

that fight on their own, without having to wait for the Western forces – Japanese Air

Self-‐Defense Force is unlikely to be able to operate very well, while blind, since they

rely on multiples of radars over their own territory, where they usually practice.

Counter-‐Offensive

However, if Japan succeeded in its first strike, Russia would be left with just two

options, neither of which would be very appealing for the country. The first thing it

could do is to try and go for the long-‐term war, building new airfields and moving

war assets in from the West. In the meantime, it could launch a major submarine

raiding campaign on Japanese ships. However, there are a few drawbacks to this

approach. The first one is that once the Japanese control the region, they are

unlikely to be surprised by submarines – their anti submarine forces are pretty

large. The second drawback is that Russia risks all of its Air Force and Navy assets,

which it cannot afford to rebuild. With the low levels of staff competence, it is a real

risk that should not be discounted. The third drawback is that building airfields

under bombardment is pretty difficult and is likely to result in some losses. The final

drawback is that it would draw Russia into a prolonged war, which, as previously

mentioned, would be problematic for those in power.

The other way, in which Russia could proceed, is to threaten to nuke Japan or to

actually nuke it. While either option may achieve the desired military objective,

which is to make the Japanese leave the Kurils, both options are liable to put the

21

world on the brink of nuclear holocaust, because of the US-‐Japanese alliance. This

may not be something even the Russian leadership is willing to do.

The grimness of the situation, which Russia would face if Japan succeeded in its

first strike, underlines the benefits of having MRBMs. The thing about MRBMs is that

they can be launched from railways, there’s no need to build actual facilities like

airfields. For a country as large as Russia, medium range ballistic missiles could be a

very good tool of conventional deterrence, simply because of the range that they

would cover with the help of the Russian railroad network. Moreover, MRBMs are

perfect at clearing out enemy armed formations in scarcely populated areas.

Prolonged war

In the event that Russia decides to go for a prolonged war, a stalemate is likely to

occur for a while. Japan would not have the land forces to successfully invade

mainland Russia, and Russia would not have the capacity to reclaim the islands. In

that case, as is usually the case with long wars, the country with the stronger

economic backbone would be likely to win. In this case, the country is Japan. Japan is

currently spending much less on its military in terms of its GDP than Russia. If it

were to catch up in that metric, it would outproduce Russia by almost a factor of

three49. And while war weariness might appear faster in a relatively more liberal

country of Japan, economics is likely to be the key determinant of victory.

Conclusions

Japan beats Russia

What might have seemed unthinkable a few decades ago seems like a likely

possibility today. The permanently peaceful Japan has the capacity to beat an ex-‐

superpower in a conventional war. This is a very rare example of a country that has

no nuclear weapons, but one that can win an offensive war against a country with a

49 “Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011”, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), (Stockholm, 2012), < http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/sipri-‐factsheet-‐on-‐military-‐expenditure-‐2011.pdf>, [accessed 15 November 2012].

22

large nuclear arsenal50. That being said, the conflict was defined in very narrow

terms. It is still rather unlikely that Japan has the capacity to conquer the whole of

Russia. That does not reduce the significance of these results. Japan’s primary

interests are ocean-‐based and Japan is developing a force that is very effective at

working in this arena.

First strike is key

As almost any campaign between two opponents of similar levels of military

strength, this one can be decided by a single factor. In this case, it’s the execution of

the first strike by Japan. Because naval and air assets are much more difficult to

replenish, a successful first strike can win a naval war.

Russia needs to change its ways

It is quite obvious from this paper that Russia needs to find new ways of

defending its territories. I can see two ways to do this. The first one is to leave the

IRNF treaty and to begin producing medium range ballistic missiles. Russia still has

a fairly advanced level of missile technology, which could allow it to develop very

strong conventional weapons. MRBMs, apart from their obvious military potential,

can also serve as deterrents for local conflicts that generally don’t invoke the use of

nuclear weapons.

The second way for Russia to boost its defense is to change its doctrine to one

that would allow Russia to use nuclear weapons in a conflict of any scale. That will

make potential attackers think twice, even those under the US missile shield.

Moreover, Russia could negotiate with the USA to reach an agreement, where the

defensive use of tactical nukes does not trigger an automatic nuclear response.

Finally, it is fairly obvious that Russia’s geographic position is not conducive to it

being a naval power. The difficulty of moving its fleets, combined with the lack of

funding for building new ones should make Russia reconsider its priorities. It may

just do better by switching funding to highly mobile land-‐based groups. Moreover, if

Russia loses the ambition to project power over the Pacific, it could actually give 50 Although, to be fair, the US nuclear umbrella is almost equivalent to owning nuclear weapons.

23

away the Kurils without considering it a loss. Hence, it would need its Pacific fleet

even less than it does now.

24

Appendix 1

Image taken from: http://wikitravel.org/en/Kuril_Islands

25

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The Kuril Balance: A Balance Paper on the Potential Conflict Between Japan and Russia

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