The KKE, A Study of Its Failure, No. 1

f1ASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Narne of Candi date .l1!J....o...r _T....h_om....a....s_A...._.._Ha....a.....s....e _

Title of Thesis The Communist ArmY of Greece 1944-1949:

A Study of Its Failure

Approved by:

--', Research Advi sor ~~~---~.............--- ­

~..._ Ep"lC~n~9'~UI-.~ Member, Graduate Research Faculty

~~..... ~"'iIi......~Member, Graduate Research Faculty

.a~~~~_.' ~l~:==_. r~ember', Consulting Faculty

~ ~cep~~~~:':::-day of ~ 1976 by _

, 01 rector. Mas ter of ~1ili tary Art

and Science.

This opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Ar~ Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

Accession Number: ADA029881

Citation Status: Active

Citation Classification: Unclassified

Field(s) & Group(s): 050600 - HUMANITIES AND HISTORY

Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS

Unclassified Title: TI,e Communist Atmy of Greece, 1947-1949: A Study oflts Failure.

Title Classification: Unclassified

Descriptive Note: Final rept.,

Personal Author(s): Haase,Thomas A.

Report Date: 11 Jun 1976

Media Count: 148 Pagers)

Cost: $14.60

Report Classification: Unclassified

Supplementary Note: Master's thesis.

Descriptors: 'GREECE, 'COMMUNISTS, 'INSURGENCY, FOREIGN POLICY, POLICIES, LEADERSHIP, GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN), ATTITUDES (PSYCHOLOGY), FAILURE, THESES, HISTORY, TREATIES, COMMUNISM, YUGOSLAVIA

Abstract: This research project is designed to examine the empirical evidence available to date concerning the reasons for the defeat of the Communist Army of Greece in 1949. This work is the result of this author's endeavor to understand and evaluate why the Communist Insurgency failed in Greece. This failure is specifically addressed herein to determine whether the Communist defeat was the result of military action or politicallU1moil within the Communist Party of Greece. In order to answer this question, the study provides an historical interpretation of all the significant events during the existence of the Party from 1919 to 1949. Investigation reveals that the Greek Communist Party strategically lost the war when the Central Committee reintroduced the question of the creation of an independent Macedonia as part of the Party's objectives. On the military side of the problem, the decision by the Communists to switch from subconventional to conventional warfare was the most serious mistake made. This change of policy was predicated on the existence ofa large popular base from which to operate. TIlis study demonstrates that there was no large popular base. (Author)

Abstract Classification: Unclassified

Distribution Limitation(s): 01 - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Source Serial:

ABSTRACT

This researoh project is designed to examine the.

empirical evidence available to date oonoerning the reasons

for the defeat of the Communist A~, of Greece in 1949. Tbis

work is the result of this author's endea.or to understand

and evaluate why the Communi.t Insurgenoy ~ailed in Greeoe.

This failure is specifically addressed herein to deter­

mine whether the Communist deteat was the result of military

action or political t~oil within the Cammunllt Party of

Greece. In order to answer this question, the stud7 provide.

an historical interpretation of all the significant e.ents

during the existence of the Party tram 1919 to 1949.

Investigation reveals that the Greek Cam-unist Party

strategically lost the war when the Central Committee reintro­

duoed the question of the cr.ation of an independent Maoedonia

al part of the Party'l objeotives. On tbe military lide ot the

problem, the deoision by the Communists to switob trom sub­

conventional to conventional wartare was tbe moat serious mis­

take made. This change of policy was predioated on the existence

of • large popular base from which to operate. This study

demonstrates that there was no large popular base.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It Is very difficult in extracting oneself from the

daily pace or activities to indulge in a critical review or a

particular aspect of history. This 1s especially true in tbe

area of the Greek Civil War where tbere seem. to be a monopoly

on the examination of this historic event by a very few

authors. It is with the idea of reevaluating this War and

or providing some fresh insights regarding tbis historic

event, that this study is undertaken.

The fact that I have pursued this project to its end,

and that the initial .eal did not falter to the point of

doing only what was necessary to fulfill a requirement, i.

primarily due to my mentor, Proteslor Jo••ph R. Gola-an, at

the Command and General stafr College. For the inordinate

..ount or time he spent working on the project with me, and

for his guidance and assistance, I wish to express my sincere

gratitude.

I also wish to thank Lieutenant Colonel Robert N.

storms and Major Peter R. Bankson or the strategy Department

at the Command and General Starf College, b•• ides Protes.or

Harry J. psomiades, consulting faculty advisor rram the

Political Soience Department or Queens College, who provided

.e with valuable assiltanoe in historical re.earch and in the

i

I the structural composition or this endeavor. Additionally,

wish to express my gratitude to the starr or the Command and

General starr College Library ror their a••iatance in locat­

ing and procuring much of My researoh material.

Finally. there 1s no way I can expre.s the debt I

owe to my wire for her encourage.ent and support whioh enabled

.e to complete -this undertaking. It was tbe oaabined erfort

or all or the.e wonderful people that enabled .e to per.eyere

to the end.

ii

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

TABLB OP 001'1''''8

Aoknowleds

PAGB

..·nta • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1

'l'ab1. ot Content. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 111

Df'l'RODUC'1'IOW 1

Obaptel'

I. ORGAllZA'lIOI OF THE I'D • • • • • • • • • • • •• 6

II. THB ORI0118 OP TIE CIVIL WAR • • • • • • • • • •• 36

III. THE CIVIL WAR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6$

IV. THI DB'BAT 0' TKB XXI • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 99

V. OOlCLUSIOl8 ••••••••••••••••••• 119

APPDDIX

A. GUBRRILLA DI8P08I'1'10. ABD STBDOTH • • • • • • • • 129

B. Itf'fILLIGDCB ])IVISIOI SPBCIAL BBIBPIIG • • • • • • 130

BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 133

111

IIfRODUC'lIOlf

The Civil War that rased in Greece fro. 1~7 to -1949

va. tbe tirat full-Ieale Co_uni.t "War fd Ifatlonal Liberati_"

1n Burope durinl tbe At..s.c AI.·. Tbi. r.aearo.b ettort vl11

en4••vop to widea tb. ap.otrua or kaovle41e ooae.rn1Ds tbe

••••cml tor the d.et.a, ot tb. C.-nmlat wueJlPl11a. lD tbi.

Oiy11 War.

Tbe ta11ur. of Gr.ek Ca..ual.t In8Ur,..o7 1. ...t otten attrlbut•• to tbe c10alac ot t~. Y~••1••1&D border b7

!lto, wbleb 4epri••4 tb. Ca-aualat• • t ..... aanotU&r1 lato

wtaiob tb.7 oould retr••t vltb 1apua1t,.. Alaot".z- r ....n pro­

t.re4 tor tb. det.at vaa tbe aaa.lv. Aaer10aD .111tarr a1d

t~t v•• 81.en to tbe Gre.k 'oro•• , tb.r.b7 all.vlD8t~.. to

o••rwta.la tbe suerpill... It i. tbe purpo.. or tbi. .tu47 t.

Nex..l.e tb. re••oa8 tor ttl. cI.t••t of th. C.-ami.t A7Iq ill

1949. In ord.r to aoo..,11.b tb1••xaalnat10D, tb••oop. of

tb. pap.r v111 be to 4et.1'II1.. it tbe pr1llaJ-J 1'..... tor ,be

tailur. of tke COllllUai.t APIq or Gr••o. ill 1949 v•• 1I111tal'J'

.etten Oft tbe part ot tb. O...ualat A71q, 01' tb. pol1t1••1

~o11 tb.t exi.ted vlt~lD tb. C.-nmi.t Partf ot Gr••••, or

,..bap. ..e. a oaabiaat18n ot e•••t. ao.ewb.re bet••.n t~•••

two .xtr•••••

2

Witb tbat stated purpo.e and scope as par..eters on

the subject or the Greek Civil War, tbis atudy is intended to

provide an analysis or the Cam.unist tailure to aobieve

viotory against tb. Go••ra.ent ot Gre.oe.

ID order to d.soribe tbe historioal setting tor the

events oontained berein, it is Dot necea.Rr, to relate tbe

exploits ot Alexander the Great or e.en CODatantiDe. There

are, however, oerta1D aspects ot Greek hi.torr that abould be

.entioned iD at lea.t a chronolosioal lequence tor ODe to

appreciate tully tbe evente dilou••ed in this atudy.

Greece vas under Ottoman rule tor tour hundred 7eara.

This Turkisb doaination ended by an .~ed insurrection tbat

eventually le.d to Greek Independenoe in 1829. SubaequentlJ,

the oountry va. ruled by a .onarcby tor the re.t ot the

oentury. Tbere val neverthele•• a sucoe.stul Revolution

against the Kins in 1843 tor tbe purpo.e ot obtaining a

Constitution. By 1864 tbe CODstitution ~po.ed It.itatlon.

on tbe Sovereisn similar to tbo.e 1mpo.ed on tbe kiDSS ot

Inlland.

On the international aoene, during the oentury

tollowins tbe Greek Revolution, tbe Greeks toulbt three wara . a8ainat Turkey, between 1821 and 1908, tor the independenoe

or areas they considered part ot Gre.ce. This Irredeati..

culainated in an attempt to dominate. a lars_ part ot Aaia

Miaor. Tbis l.at military operation, in 1922, whiob va. a

disalter tDr Greece, tinally killed the expan.loaiat dre..

3

for tbe re.toration of tibe sr.at slor7 of Cla••loal, or

B1aantine Gre.ce.

The "M••ali Id••," tb. Gr••t Dr... or Id••, v•• d.ad.

The Gr.eka were tree to turn th.ir attention to .ocial aDd

eooDoaic probl.... AI a OODI.qu.no. ot t~11 lntroap.ctioD,

tla. MonaroA,. 0 ... uncleI' attaok. Tbe major 4 'io political

oOlloern inltb. Int.•rwl.l' Era vas 1;b. CODltl1;utl 1 Que.tioD.

Tbia vaa b••ioal1,. tbe Que.tion of vb••e t~e KiDs tit iD tbe

Or••k po11t10al spber. 1n vbat tbe Oreeka oa1le4 a "CroWDed

D_oorao7." In tb••tte.pt to re.olYe tbi. and ottaer i ••ue.,

tb. A~7 re.olted in 1922. Sbort17 t~ereatter, b7 19~ a

Republio .a••atab11,bed v~l.b en.u~.d ooupa until 1935 vbeD

• Wation.l Rererendua retur884 tb. KiDS to t~. tbraD••

!b... jor exteraal .yent '~t ~oted on tbe Ore.k

aO.D. durins tb. 1920'. and 1930'., va. t~.....ly. population

ex.bans. tbat ocourred •• a re.ult ot t.e dete.t or the Gre.k

~ in Asia Minor in 1922. !bi. entopo.4 repatriation or

tbe Gre.ks traa ADatoli. inor••••d tbe ,opal.tioD ot tb. b...•

land by tventy percent ad tbus oontribut•• to tbe d.yel.flleDt

ot • rural and urbaa proletariat.

S,. 1935 tb.re ..eriK a ratb.r larl·. O--=i.t -8aD·

1.ation 1n Gr••oe ·vblob .a. relarded •• • part ot a Pan-Slayio

veel.e tl'71na to out into Gr.eo.. Tile wid••p••a. teeliDs ....

• n,. Greeta led to tbe re-..erlenoe ot Ru•••paobla, wbiola .

• raDBlate4 iato • real dread ot tbe 818.10 ~ord.s to tke ••rt~.

4 On 4 Augult 1936, tbe Kiftl uaed tbe pretext ot •

Ca.auDiat thr••t to tb•••ourit7 of t~. "tion to 41••ol.e tb.

Go.ernment and e.tabli.b a dictatorlblp under Jobn Metaxa••

!he Oam.unist Party va. foroed t. exl.t al a olaDde.tine orsan­

1.atloD duriD! tbe era of Metaxal. !bl1 undersr.und exl.tence,

to.ether witb tb. eltal.atloD of otber oppo.ltlOD partl.s bJ

tbe Dictator, helped to e.tabl11~ a cobe.l.e 1Dtraltructure

t~t produced the oa17 united polit10al part7 dur1Dl tb. sub­

.equent Ge~D Oocupatio.. Metaxa. soverDeG Greeoe tbroulbout

tbe turbulent Pre-War Period aDd tbe berol0 .1ctorr or Greek

~. asaiast the Italian In•••ioD of 28 OCtober l~O. B7 tbe

-ad or April 1941, howe.er, Oe~D7 bad oooupied all or Greeoe.

Arter tbe SeoODd World War, tbe Oo..unlat orlaai.atlOD,

tbat had bl••••••d •• • R.ai.taac. A~ ...1nat t~. G.~

OCoupatio., ensaled 1ft two unluooe••tul a~e4 o.Dt~oDt.tloD.

vlt~ the 188a1 GovernaeDt of Greece. Tbe.e att-.ptl oocurred

between Deoe.ber l~ and Deo..ber 1~9 vlt~ O..-aallt oontrol

or tbe country as tbe objectl.e.

In order to evaluate tbe reaIons tor the tailure of

tke C~l.t. to aokle.e a .1oto~, this Itud7 wlll.~e

dlvi.ed Into tly. obapter.. Tbe firat two obapter. provide

a biator7 of tbe C~Dlst Party of Gr.eoe a.d Intr.duoe tbe

proxtmat. caus•• of tbe 01.11 Wars. The tbird obapter i. an

exa. natlon of tbe ertorts by tbe Co-.aalst. to orSaDi•• an '

~ capable of conductlns guerrilla operations agalDat

the Go.ernment in order to secure politic·al iDtlueDce. The

study is fooused on tbe military applicatioD ot strategic

and tactical tbought by the Camauniata during the initial

stage. ot organization. Tbe fourth cbapt.r prt.ari17 evaluate.

tb. political structure .f tbe Ca-aunlst Part7 aDd tbeir

~y during tbe 1948-1949 period.

In the last ohapter the study .dar..... the rea.ons

vby the Communists tailed. In abort, the atrates10 and

taotical ai.take. (botb polltioal and ml1ltar7) tbat led to

tbe deteat ot th. COIIIIUDiat Insurgency 1m 1949, in light ot

the Inr~tion pre.ently availabl.,wl11 be eYaluat.d.

Chapter I

ORGANIZATION OF THE KKE

The origin of the Communist Party of Greece, or the

KKE, can be traced back to November 1918 when the first national

m8etln~ of Greek Soolal1at. took place at the Peraaeus Hotel

in Athens. l The reported purpose of the KKE organization was

to provide solutions to the social problems whi~h were infect­

in~ the country. This utopian idealisM developed potential

for violent revolution when the Greek Socialists became the

Communist Party of Greece. 2

In the fo~atlv8 stages of the new Communist Party in

Greece, two divergent trends took shape: one faction was in­

elined to favor union of the Party with the Communist

International; and the other favored non-involvement without

international affiliation.) The segment of the Party that

favored union with the Communist International, received

support in 1919 and 1920 from the Bolshevik Regtme in Russia.

~he official name of the Communist Party in Greece is the Kommounlstikon Komme Ellados and will be abbreviated as KKE throughout the rest of this study.

2Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil ~ 1944-1949 (London:Faber and Faber, 1966), p. ~ ----­

3Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The ~tory of the Greek Communist Party (London: -nxtord universityress,-r905T, pp. 2-).

6

This occured because the Soviets sought to spread tbeir

influence tbrough the medium of the Camintern.4 Tbe taction

favoring non-involvement witb external organisations tailed

and the pro-Comintern group, witb external assistance, pre­

vailed.

The Communists' 'organisation ot Greece in tbe 1920's

and 1930's existed amid an agrarian society. This aeant that

the social conditions of Greece did not fit the claasic .ode1

tor a proletarian revolution in tbe Marxist tradition. The

urban proletariat consisted ot close to 36,000 workers wbo

were employed in about 2,000 industrial concern. throughout

Greece. The total population categorized as urban dwellers

ranged from 18 to 22 peroent. 5

In oontrast to pure Marxilt Dootrine, the original

KXB was composed ot a saall group ot intellectuals and studeDt.

wbo admired the Russian Revolution. Tbis group, atter it.

formal adoption into the Camintern, rigorously:followed

Moscow's variety of Communism. This adherence to Kr••lin

Doctrine proved to be detr~ental to the successful operation

of the KKE in later years. I

The KKE, in pursuance or aobieving a Marxist revolu­

tion, managed to infiltrate the existing poorly org·anized

4Artbur E. Adaal, Stalin and His T~ea (Hew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,~7~ pp. 10-11.

SDouglas Dakin, Tbe Unltioatlog or Greece 1770-1923 (London: Brnest BenD L~.a, 1972), P.~9.

1

trade unions by "snapping up key positions until about haIr

of them were CommunIst-controlled or dominated. ,,6 The KKE

found A ready source of recruits within these organized

unions which were in a rudimentary stage of development.

Another organization that proved to be a target for exploita­

tion by the KKE was the Army. During tbe early 1920's, the

Greek military establishment was in shamble". after the

oatAstrophe in Asia Minor, in which the Greek Army was

deteated by the Turks. 1

After tbis defeat, tbe KKE cla~ed that during the

Asia Minor campaign, small elements ot the Greek Army were

members of the KKE, and that these uncoordinated elements

disrupted communications and betrayed olassitied information

to the Turks. The KKE asserted that these elements were act­

in~ as agents for the Soviet Union, knowing that the Soviets

su~ported Kemal under the terms of the Turko-Soviet Treaty

ot 1921. Thererore, they acted in consonance with the Communist

60 'Bal18nce, !he Greek Civil War 1944-1949, p. 30. One exoeption to the unions being poorly organized was the maritime union. Tbe area or tbe greateat intiltration however occured among the tobaoco workers, especially those tram Asia Minor.

75ee A.A. Pallis, Greeoe's Anatolian Venture and Atter (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 19~ tor a detaIled account of the Greek attempt to secure smyrna and its hinterland as a Greek possession and the total defeat otthe Greek military at the hands of Mustapha Kemal. Additionally, it must be pointed out that the Greek Army had been part of an expedition­ary force against the Russians in 1919 and thi8 precluded rapiddevelopment of friendly ties between Greece and the Soviet Union.

International'. Objective•• 8 In Dece.ber 1924. tbe Tbird

Bxt~aordin.rr Congr••• to~al17 .nrolled tbe KKE into tbe

Third Co.intern; simultaneously the KKE adopted a pollo7 ot

support for the ••tablishment of • Mao.danian state. 9

In reality, tbe KKE acoepted what tbe Greeks per­

ceived as a Slavic Th.si8, tbat a SlaYic Maoedoniaa natiODa11t7

.xi.ted and desired to e.tabli.b it.elt in the ancient terri­

tO~7 of Mac.donia. 10 Tbe Mac.donian QU••tioD .rupted into a

contest betw.en YU8oalavia, Bulgaria. and Gr••ce tor oertain

te.rltorie8 along their camaon border, Wbicb came into being

a. a result ot the Balkan Wara and the Pir.t World War. The

gr.atest prize to be acbieved by the ••tablishmeat or a Slavic

Maoedonia state would haye been aoee•• to tbe Ae8ean b7

YU8o.lavi. aDd Bulgaria. To moat Greeks the Slavic strusSl.

tor Macedonia was an atte.pt to de-Helleni.. northern Greeae

and to unde~ine tbe Greek Itate. Tbi. probl.., and its etrecta

on tbe KKE will be explored througbout the remainder ot tbi.

stUdy. To iJlag6ne that tbe Greek COJlllllUDiat vet.raDI w.re tbe

ori8inatora of this propos.l is difficult. It would ••••, in orde!

8Kouaoula., ReYolution and Dereat: !!! storr !! !!! Greek Cammi.t Partl, p. 11. ­

9To KKK dr, to 1918 eOI to 1931, (Athenl, 1~7), Vol. I, p. 3$8:- lJrte rOii kouaoul••;-Rii'OIutlon and D.r.at: 'lbe sto!'l !!. !!!! f!~ CODIlufti.t Party, p. 1. - ­

l°Macedonioua, Stalin and tbe MacedoDian Question (st. Louis: Pearlstone PublllhlDK"'Comj)iiiy, 1918), pp. 23-24. Alao Elizabetb Baker, Macedonia (London: R07al Institute ot Int.raational Aftaira, 1950). p. 3.

to be aocepted by the Greek Communists, that moral coercive

power and Party disoipline were brought to bear on th. infra­

structure ot the KKK. After all, their own ethnic co.patriots

from Aaia Minor were located in that area.

The problem of providing support tor the founding of 11. an autoDOI'lOUI Macedonia would become a millstone around tbe

neok or the KXE:

Prom the early days of tbe party no otber i ••ue bas caua.d more trouble 1n its relation with tb. Greek people and witbin ita ranks than the ao-called "national questioD," i.e., the party's continuedllagitation tor a separate Mac.donian state.

In January 1926 tbe KKE wal outlawed tor the first

ti•• a8 • direct result of an act of the 'art,." 's newspaper,

Rilopaatia (Radical), wbich procla~ed support for Kaoedon1an

Independence:

Th. IKE's slavish adherenoe to the C.-1Dte~ line of thougbt, its 8upport of the Balkan Communist Pederation and its advocaoy ot autoDo.y tor Macedonia and Thraee were contrary to the12mAjority Greek opinion and inclination.

Atter tbis, the KKE was an unpopular part~ within

Gr.ece. Even within th. Part,. the "National Qu••tion" was

llXou8oula., Revolution and Defeat: Tbe Storl ot tbe az...1I: C~ht Pftl" p. 1. Tbra-who!. problem or • pIiDti o•••le .6 IDa.pen en Macedonia, with tbe accaapaDylng diffi­culti8s that would certainly ensue between Yugo8laYia, Bulgaria,and Gr••oe, vas known as the National Question. The Bu18arlan CGamuniat. boped to tmpose tbeir will on the Yugollavian C~uni8t Party to acquire control ot the Maoedanian territor, 1n Yugoslavia.

l20 'Ballance, Tbe Greek Civil War 19!4-1~9, p. 30. Paftgalos, the dictator-ol Gr.ece In 19~ Waa SaVIng probl..s with Bulgaria and the outlawing of the KKE vaa direotly a~d at tbe Bulgarians.

10

too much for the "petty-bourgeois intelleotuals" who thought

88 nationalistic Greeks. Consequently, a nonviolent purge

oocured; and by 1927 the KKE was considered nothing more than

a mere mouthpieoe for the Soviet party line in Greece: l3

From 1927 to its ultimate defeat in 1949, the KKE

followed a Moscow-oriented party line. During the period

between 1920 and 1932, the KKE had no major influence in the

political sphere. This was probably due to the fact that

the early Party was comprised mostly of intellectuals and,

therefore, was small.

The parli~entary system, which wa. dominated by

powerful political figures ot the time, was not swayed by a

~arty of SOMe 2,500 members. ,~. KKE, because of its in­

te1lectual and p~o1etarian base, had not penetrated the aa8S

or agrarian ~easants to form A Popular Front. Unlike the otber

Balkan oountries there wal no problem in the ar.. of land re­

fo~. Sinoe there was no land issue among tbe p.a.ant., there

was no major Agrarian Party. This unique situation in Greec.

precluded major exploitation of the ra~era by the Ca.muniats. 14 .

13Kousoulas, Revolution and Deteat: !h! story ~ !a! Greek Communist Party, p. 29. -- ­

14Ibid • There was one small agrarian party in Greece, but it did~ have much political experienoe. In 1909 the land question was resolved. This was the oulmination of cer­tain redistributions of lands in 1821 and 1881.

11

Consequently, in order to increase tbe pertorBance of

the KKE in 1931, the Soviets dispatcbed to Greece Nikos

zaobariades,15 a Moscow-trained and trusted adherent of the

strict Bolshevik l1ne. This JUD 1mew that "ttle test of real

suocess could onl,. consider (sic) a taDg1ble approacb towards

tbe revolutionary conque.t or power by th. party.,,16

In Dec••ber 1931 the Fourth Plenua of tbe KKK voted

ZAohariade. to be the h.ad ot tbe Party. In 1935, pr1aarl1~

owing to an internal Party controversy over whetber tbe KKK

should tollow national or international objective., Zacbarla4e.,

by combining splintered faotions of the Party, bec..e tbe tirst

man to fill the newly-oreated post o~ Secretar7-General o~ the

KKE.

Under Zaohariades, between 1932 and 1935, • oell-tJP.

infrastructure waa built. This organization va. used to create

labor unrest wbich .erved to tmprove th. meager political

standing ot the KKE 1n Greec.. Most of these endeaYors

ulti..tely failed owing to laok of popular support.

l5Wikoa Zaonariades vaa a Greek born in Nicaaedia in 1920. Betwe.n 1922·and 1925 be studied in Moscow at the Oommunist University ot Eastern Europe. In 1926 be va•. ~­pri.oned ift Greece tor asitatins in tavor ot a Maced.Dian atate. Atter bis rel•••e be returned to t.e Soviet Union tr_ 1928.··to 1931. Kou8oulal, RevolutiQD aDd D.t...t: Th.B'1i! of tb. Gr••k C..-un18t Part~,_ p. 2891 a180 ••• -- ­

• liDo., '1'&. ore.k Clyl1 ~ PJ44-194', .!! Ea••1II.

16rranz Borkenan, World C~nl ••: A Hl.to~ of tb. International (New York: W.W. Nort'on, 1939)"; p. 11 • - ­

12

Among these various efforts there was one notable

success in attaining political power by the KKE; and that

came in 1936. It was the high-water mark tor tbe KKE in the

legitimate application of political influenoe during the

interwar period. This power was achieved by tbe combination

of leadership by Zachariades; his refutation of a program

for Maoedonlan Independence; and the introduction or propor­

tional representation. l ?

Proportional representation was introduced in 1932

by the Liberal Party because it had lost popular support.

The Liberals hoped that by the employment or tbis system they

would minimiz. the electoral losses that would certainly

ocour under the old majority system. Under the majority

system the winning party took all of the parliamentary seats

from a district. This electoral change had unforeseen con­

sequences. It allowed a small party to aoquire aeats in

the parliament and to exeroise political power far 1n excess

of its actual strength.

Zachariades was quiok to realize the potential for

the KKE of a system of proportional representation and started

to take actions designed to capitalize on this new possibility.

In the short span of four years under Zachariades' leadership,

l7Kousoulas. ReVOlution and Defeat: Tne StOtz of the Greek Communist par~. p. 70. PrOPortional repreaen atlOn--­was usea In Greeoe . ram 1924 to 1928 and was reintroduoed in 1932.

13

tbe Party membership increased from about 19,000 to 100,000. 18

Tbis was acoomplished by taking adYantage of tbe political

instability and the worldwide economic criais. Tbe KKE al.o

renounced the unpopular policy of support tor an independent

Maoedonia. This disavowal removed the major stumbling block

in the recruitment of nev member.. Tbe other ractor tbat 8ub­

.~8D'1.111. aided recruit.ent rrom discontented group., vaa

tbe disunity exbibited on tbe part ot the Governaent. The

tirat manire.tation of tu~oil in tbe Governaent in tbe po.t­

war era oocurred wben tbe Monarchy was replaced b7 a Republio.

During this oonstitutional transition, the new Republic

endured many assaults; the la.t two occurred in 1933 and 1935,

wben Liberal element. attempted coup•• 19 Lapsel7.a a re.ult

or tbese events the Monarohy wa. reestabli8be4 (3 NoYe~er 1935).

The oyerall etrect ot the leadership of Zaobariad•• ,

and tbe electoral system of proportional repre.entation, vas

tbat tbe KKK acquired fifteen s.at. in Parll~t. The•••eata

allowed tne Communist delegatea to dictate tb. selection ot

the next prtme minister, giyen the even distribution ot .eats

between tbe Monarchist. and Liberals. 20

18!lli., p. 71.

19Ibit1., p. 97.-200'Ballance, T~e Greek CiVil War 1~-1~9, p. 30.

The Liberals stated puDrrc17 that tbeyQutliot ?OJWII1 a goyerlUllent vith the Co.-unllts. Tbere was onl,. on. Yote ditterence (Monarcbists ~3, Liberals ~2) between tbe two major parties within the Parliament.

In 1936, the KKE sponsored maaa-demonstrations in the

large cities in support of their representatives. Zachariades

Was largely responsible for the instigation or the riots that

ensued, and took tham AS a sign of popular support for the

KKE.

In view of this newly-acquired maaa-support, tbe Party

decided to push the process to the revolutloD&r1 stage by pro­

cla~lng a General Strike for 5 August 1936. 21 If the

Communists bad been trying to produoe a Fascist-type regt.e,

witbin tbe legal Government of Greece, they could not have

picked a better time.

The conolusion that conditions were ripe for a Revolution

probably led the Party to a falae .ense of .ecurity and power.

The large increase 1n membership, together with the aeemingly

deoisive power of their delegates in Parliament attenuated tbe

real power of the government 1n the minds or tbe KKE. 22

The power of the Government, regardless of apparent

weaknesses, was exercised with alacrity. On 4 August 1936

the King, George II, established a dictatorship under Metaxaa. 23

2lcbeka Kbronla A~ones (Ten Years or Strugsle), (CentralCo_ittee or the m, :l:9!i ), p. m. ­

22Thia Was because none of the major parties would ooop_rate with the Canmunlsts. See a180 Everett J. Marder, Soutbeastern Europe, II, 1 (1975), pp. 53-69.

2~etaxas was an ex-military man and a member of Parli~ent at that t~e. He controlled lesa votes tban the Communists. From 1936 to 1940, be was the dictator of Greece.

15 Metaxas had convinced tbe King that tbe Communists would threaten

tbe Constitutional Monarchy, if they were sucoesstul in tbe

strike set tor 5 August.

The organization or the KKK was attacked ruthlessl~ and

de.troyed by Metaxas' ••ecret police. Tbe large part~, whicb

Zaohariades bad developed, dieintegrated betw••n 1936 and l~O.~

But tbe le••ons learned tram the undersround aurviva1 ot the

Part~ durin! the Dictatorship or tbe Fourtb ot August, would

produoe a KKE tbat was oapab1e ot plunging Greece into a dev••'.t­ing Clvi1 War 1n 1946. 25

The drag••t that Metaxes used againat tbe Co.munl.ts pro­

.duced toe 1eader,ot the KKE: . Zaobar1ade. waa .1nJaroerated until

the invaaion ot Greeoe by Germany in 1941. At tbat point, contact

was lost and Zacbariade. temporarily disappeared trom the O~ek

staRe. haying been depopted to A OePaan eoftcentpatioft c.-p.

Metax•• a180 employed bi. Securit7 Police to achieye tbe

disintegration of the KKE, by creating tbrouSD his ase.ts a

parallel 8overnment-oontrolled Communist Party; Politburo; IDd

newspaper "vying for the allegiance or tbe remaining party

followers and spreadln8 even more contusion witb tbeir contict ­

ins and partl,. police-directed pronouncellents.,,26

24Kousoula., Revolution and Deteat: !!!! 8to17 ~ !!!! Greek Communist Partl, PP. 112-1~

250 'Ballance, The Greek Civil ~ 19W!-l949, p. 30.

26Kousoulas, Revolution and Deteat: !!! Storr ~ !!! Greek COJUlunist Par~, p. 144. ­

16

As 8 result of tbe Gove~ent'8 erforts, the KKE was

a~st eliminated. On 27 April 1941, as the Nazi rorce•

..'.~.d Athens and began the G.~an Occupation, tbe Communist

Party of Greece was a skeleton organization without errecti.e

leadership.

Under the German Occupation, a 8pontaneous revolt

against tbe invaders began in the mountain areas of Gre.ce. 21

In Greek history, tbis wa. an area that bad a ricb tradition

of rebellion against oppres.ion. In the Plndu8 Mountaina the

Gr.eks historically conducted guerrilla wartare, especlal17

tbe various rO~8 of insurgenoy during the oenturie. ot Turkisb

rule. 28 The legend or tbe beroic Guerrilla Figbter waa reborn

in 1~1.

There are some wbo proc1atm that tbese Guerrillas were

organized, or inspired, in their initial stases b~ tbe Coaaunlats.

Ba••d on tbe bistorical exaaple ot previous insurgent .oye••nt.

in the mountains, and tbe deplorable state ot the KKE in l~l,

it 1s yerJ ~probabl. that tbe Communists were solel1 responsible

tor tbis Resistance effort. The organization ot th. oyerall

Re.istance moye.ent atter 1942 wa., in large part, done b~ the

27Jobn Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Gre.ce (London: Ernest Benn Liaited, 1968), p. 175. T618 work pre.ents so•• cogent rea'OD WDY tbe.e author. tblnk the Re.istance effort in Gr••ce wal Dot completely apaDtaneous.Also see Kouaou1as, Revolution and Deteat: Tbe s~ or the Greek Communist Partl, p. 11. --- --- - -- --­

28Athenian, Inside the Colonels' Greece (London: Cbatto And Windus, 1972), p;-Il.

17

Communists; but tbe initial Resistance was completely spontaneous 29in nature. It is logical to conclude that the Gre.ks did not

wait to be organized against tbe tyrant, but ~ediately fougbt

for their freedom as they had dODe tor centuries.

Atter the National Greek Government fled trom Gr.ece in

1941, tbe KKE started to reorganize. George Siantoa, a new

leader, emerged to replaoe' Zaohariades. 30 He 'recognized the

need to push tbe Party objectives aside for a while and con­

centrated on tbe ~edlat. n.eda ot his occupied country.31

It is important to bigkligbt one or iaa ·dOllinant tbe.e.

that constantly influenced the Party leaderabip during tbe

29Dominique Bude., The Kapetaaios: Partisans and Ci"il ~ in Greece, 1943-l!i9 (LOn(lon: ILB, 1972), pp. 11-l27

3°Extracted from Kousoulas, Revolution and Deteat: Tbe :'017 ~ the Greek C~1a1; Part]'. p. 296. oeOiOie S1ot08 Vii om in K~lt.aiD 1890, 80n orra poor faaily of tobacco

gro"ers. Hia formal eduoation did not 80 beyODd tOUJ'tb grade.H. work.d from the aBe of tbirteen aa a tobacco worker in Karthitaa. At the aBe of fift ••n he became a ...ber ot tbe Tobacco Workers' Union and 800n beBan to take part in at~ike., d.-on.trationa, and riotl. He joined tb. Part7 in 1920. In 1934 be beo...e the Secretary ot the Pira.ue part,. organization.Be va. arre.ted in 1936 aDd did not relain hi. fr••do. until Sept.-bel' l~l. He wa••lected Secretar,. ot the Central Co.-itte. in Januar., 1942 and was tbe ·leadiD8 figure or tbe part,. tbrough­out the re.istance. He vas a nationali.t. Also Ie. DominiqueBUde., The Kapetaniol: Partisans Iftd C1Yll War in or••c., , 199-3-1949, §1!.881i!. - - - ­

3~h. G.~. released many Communists trom jail and thus aided tbe KKB'. reorganisation. It RUst be r ..emb.red that Ruseia and German., vere atill al11ed at this t~e. s•• W.A. lIIurtl.y, and otbera, A Sbort B1.,0I7 !! 01'••0. (CuabridBe:Uni.ersit., Pr.s., 196$), p. 145.

18

~tillti.8 of this period, 1941-1949. It 1. not a nev concept

but ane tbat helps in explaining the Part~'s tailure to expand,

during tbe early days or the Resistance, wbile illustrating

the Party's inf1lXibi1ity in attempting to 8uper~o8e tbe

Rusaian model of Revolution wlt.in Gre.ce:

The Central Committee was deep17 auspicious ot the e.erBing movement, rooted a. it va. in rural banditr7 fl.vored with folklore. The insurreotional model current at tbe t~e leaDed bea.ll7 Gn tbe urban prolet.riat, and it. alber.at. tend.d to aD 32 at••iatic Stalinist distrust ot the p.....tr~.

Tbe KKE dld not understand tbe rural struggle tbat va.

d••e1opins tD tbe mountalna. They were blinded b7 their Ideo1087

or Urban Insurreotion; oODsequent17, the Pa.t7 leaders oould

not full7 oomprehend tbe scope nor potential of the rural

struggle. There vere axoeptioDa, however, aDd Andrea. Tai•••,

• member of the Politburo and later Political Otticer ot the

Cammunist Armr, urged the Party to organi.e a Communist

R••istance Movement in tbe mountaina. 33

°'Ballance, in ~ ~!! Cl.i1 ~ 1944-1949, states

tbat the KKE founded a Resistanoe A~7 on 27 September 1~1.34

32Eude., ~ Kapetanioa: Partisane ~ Ciyil ~ !e Greece, p. 11.

33Eudes states that Andrea. Tz1ma. waa a MOUDt.1D Man, a native or Macedonia. He va. more reflned and oulti••ted th.n the otber early inaurgeDts. Tzt.as .an_ged to overoome the Part7'. reservations about rural insurreotion and lent a man to orBanize tbe resistance in tbe mountaiDa. ~., p. 7.

340lBallance, !!! ~£!!! Ciyl1 !!£ 1~-19U9, p. 149.

19

However, Stavrianos report'. that tbe actual date the KKE

announced its da~i8ion was 10 April 1942. 35 Tbe unit that was

.established to gain control of the resistanoe movementa was

called tbe National Libe~atlon Front, or _EAM. 36

Tzimas sent Aris Velouchiotis to tbe mountains to create

the military a~ ot EAM. 37 It was called tbe Greek Popular

Liberation Army, or ELAs. 38

BLAS took great oare to conceal its true Communist identitl

This effort included recruiting a re.peoted non-C..-uniat member,

Stefanol Sar.phis, a Republioan, a. tbe C~Dd.r ot BLAS. It

was, nevertbeless, completely oontrolled by Cammuniats. 39

3SL•S• stavrianos, Greece: kaerioan Dil.... and 2EE!rtunltl (Chicago: Be..,. Regoner,. do., 19>2), p. 0;:­

36Tbe offioial n..e wa. Bthnikon ~iel.ftb.retikon Meto~n (the National Liberation Jrontr-an it will 6e laentIfied 81 EAM throughout tbis stud~.

3:gde94 Tbe ~.tanio.: Pazotiaana and Civil War in Greeoe, 19 -1 9;-Pp;-6-8. Arl.'s real naae-i.a TbanaSll-­Klalfaa. . nOll-de-suerre derived trom tbe god ot war, Area. He was born in Velouch!. Aris's family belonged to the liberal bourgeoisie. In 1929, at age twenty-thre., he bec..e A leader ot the Young Communists. In Jul,. 1939, during the dictatorsbip, be signed a public dontession of repentance tor being • Communist. As Klar. he was a marked man and sub.e­quently ohanged his name. Tztaas.betri••4ed btm and propelled h~ to the bead ot the new mov..ent. Also Kou80ula., Re.olutioD and Det.at: Tbe gtoil ot tbe Greek Communist P51t1, p. J49-190;OTBa11anoe,!!! ree ~vrrwar i94ljO-J949, p. •

38Tbe orricial name Is Bllinikos Laik8a Ap.ltth.rot~os stratos (Greek Popular (or National) tISeration I~J and It Wlil be I'efe:rred to as ELAS throughout ttus stud,..

39c.M• Woodhouse, ~Pl. of Diaoord (London: HutobinaoD and Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 6. -- ­

--

20

'llhe nRme of ~(,AS had R populAr, as well 8S emotional And

pAtriotic App68], since it.. reproduces the sound of thft Greek

word th~t 19 the name of their oount-ry (Hellas). .b;LA~.)':J ~nd

especially !!:AM's policy was to "est9blish in Greece, by force

or political infiltration. 8. People's Delllocracy.,,40

As a consequence of the philosophy of patriotic

resistance, the leadersbip of BAM/ELAS insured that military

operations were conduoted against the Germans. The military

aspect, however, was always of secondary ~portance, when

compared to the ~oal of insuring the eXlatance or an adequate

force with which to establish undisputed political control

within u~eeoe on Liberation Day.41

As R oorollary of this political objective, there

existed the requirement to destroy, or bring under ELAS's

dominance, any other resistance movement. Tbis goal was

achieved in December 1944. when ELAS defeated the only other

major resistance movement that posed a threat to the

Communists, the Army of EDES. 42 But by late 1944, however.

British military press.nce had replaced the destroyed

Republican organization thereby nullfying ELAS's gains.

40campbell and Sherrard, Modern Greece, pp. 1.74-195.

41Ibid., p. 115.

!~2This organization. Ellinikoa DiJDokratiko8 Etbnikos S:pdesmo! (Greek Democratic National X~y), known as EDES, was supported by Britain during the war and if this had not been done "the whole of Greece would have been controlled by EAM/ELAS when the Germans left it." Woodhouse, Apple S!! Discord, pp. 82-83.

21

SUbsequently Great Britain sponsored 8.nd supported the

returned Government of National Unity.

The war within Greece during the Occupation, and the

~~rst Civil War (December 1944), was tOU8bt by the sama

Communist leadership. In retrospect, it can be seen that

divergence existed within the highest echelons of the KKE:

There was a oonflict between the flexible ltopportun1 it ,. line, which Siantos supported, and the dogmatic line advocated by the new genera­tion of Party cadres, which was characterized by unconditional alignment with Moscow. 43

Siantos probably reaohed the highest position in tbe

KKE by not adopting an extreme stance on either side of the

Party's internecine struggles ooncerning whlob policy the

Party should adopt on the National Question. The major an­

tagonist of Siantos was Yiannis Ionnides,44 who was part of

the revolutionary group and adherred to the dogma or Moscow's

infallibility.45

Ionnides and his followers had reached the SBDl8 con-

elusion as Tzimas with re~ard to the mountain struggle:

43Eudes • The ~etan1os: Partisans.!!!!! Civil ~ ~ Greece, 19~3-1949~.-z9

44yiannis Ionnides was a barber by trade. Born in Volos in 1901 And a Party member since 1923. He studied with Ze4hariades in Moscow and returned to Greeoe in 1931. He was jailed under Metaxas and liberated by a guerrilla band during the Occupation. Ibid., p.-- 157.

45campbe11 snd Sherrard, Modern Greeoe, p. 115.

22

••• 8xcept thAt in their eyes the finRl stru~~le must be led by the revolutionary elite rollowin~ the canonical model of the October Revolution. Aris and the Kapetanios - the mountain. bearded ~uerrillas, "roundheads" - 46 were suspected of e.11 the libertarian sins.

Even within the revolutionary camp of the KKE,

opposin~ courses of action could be recognized. Tzimas had

been sent to the mountains to insure the compliance, on tbe

part of the leaders of EIAS. to Party doctrine. He tried to

Achieve this, but one mAjor problem seems to bave beeD ever-

present: the cadres of the KKE and BAM were in Athens and

did not understAnd the realities of a rurAl resistance. 47

As was mentioned previously, the Athens leadership did not

attempt to ndopt the Soviet model of Revolution to the local

conditions, but Tz~as. as an on-the-spot observer. would

try to Accomplish that task.

The task was facilitated because the milieu in which

4tlELAS operated was sympathetic to the ~u8rrillA cause. As

an out~rowth of this, the KKE, throu~h ELAS, had an enormous

opportunity to cnpitaliz8 on the conditions prevelant in the

mountains but failed to exercise thAt opportunity. The reason

for this failure WAS that the KKE did not have a social pro­

~rgm: prob~bly due to the lack of trained cadre in this field.

46Eudes, The K8~etani2!l Partisans ~ Civil ~ ~ Greece, 1943-1949. p. 1. 7.

47woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 62.

4dEudes, !h! KaietaniOS: Partisans ~ Civil ~ ~ Greece, 194~~, p. 4 .

2)

It had a good military syst~-·howev8r. and exercised com­

petent Bdmlnistration in the mountain areas.

There were many pro~r~s initiated by ELAS in the two­

thirds of Greece that it controlled but these efforts had no

lastin~ effeot. The chief characteristios ot the administrative

syst•• of ELAS were the establishment of councils tor local

self-government and rapid dispensing of justice by People's

Courts. Other shortlived programs, such as a l~it.d land

reform program and the creation of youth movements, tailed to

~roduce the popular-support base that BAM/ELAS wanted to cre.te.49

The failure to institute eftective programs in the

mountains was a direct result of the separation of the ideological

headquarters in Athens from the implementing unit in the mountains.

The KKE's failure to appreciate tbat the conflict in Occupied

Oreece had to be political in nature at all t~es, not just on

Liberation Day. would be the major strategic error committed

during the Occupation.

An effort to correct this inadequacy in the overall

pro~ram was made by offering the command of ELlS to stetanos

saraphis, a well known Republican officer and a figure in the

abortive Venezelist coup of 1 March 1935, who once organized his 50

own resistance movement. It was a common belief that Saraphis

49stavrianos, Greece: kmerican Dilemma ~ OpportunltI, 1943-1949, pp. 81-85.

500lBallance, The Greek Civil War 1~laG9, p. 82; also see h~des, The KapetanlOi: Partisans and C v ar in Greece, 194)-1949, P:-So. Colonel saraphls waS-One of t~mOit prestigious figures in the Greek Army. He had supportedVen11eios in 1916 in the pro-Allied, anti-Monarchist Revolt. FOr his band in the 1935 coup Metaxas exiled htm.

24

was forced to take command at actual gunpoint, but this is UD-

likely in view of his subsequent writin~9. It is certainly

probable that stron~ pressure was brou~ht to bear in order to

accomplish this chan~e of allegiance. It could have been threats

to his family or, what is more likely, the threat of reprisals

among his guerrilla followers. Nevertheless, the KKE certainly

realized the advantages to be accrued by the enrollment of

Saraphis:

The political impact was considerable, and lar~e numbers of officers wbo had been hesitant about joining the underground began flowing into ELAS, where their numbers soon rose as high as seven hundred. 51

The next major political effort to emerge from the KKE

was the establishment of the political Committee for National

Liberation, or PEEA, in March 1944. 52 This was the result of

the laaderships' desire to be ~eco~nlzed officially by the B~itigh.

The British controlled the purse strings of the Resistance and

demonstrated close cooperation with the legal government of

Greece and only a permissive tolerance of ELAS. The Party also

attempted to chan~e its urban political outlook, which hindered

its appreciation of the rural-mountain struggle by the ere.blon

of the PEEA. 8 front for the KKE.

In order to understand fully the ramifications of this

complex situation, one must realize that from a small core of

51Ibid., p. 61. Saraphis took command of ELAS 20 M~ 1943.

52'rhe official title was Politiki h'pltropi Etbnikis ~eleftherosls (Political Committee for National Liberation). it will be referred to as PEEA in this study.

25

resistance fighters, a mass movement finally evolved. During

the build-up there was no change in the higher levels of the

PRrty leadership, not a single man who joined the Party "was

Admitted to the top echelons of the Party leadership."S3

'rhe KKJ:4; leadership, attemptinp; to show the connection it

had with the people, and also to demonstrate posse~sion of some

political power, instigated a mutiny in the Greek forces of the

Middle East Command that were part of the exiled Greek Government.~

The KKE thou~ht that this action would cause Great Britain to

reco~nlze its political base. 55 As a seoond objective of the

mutiny there was en attempt to acquire legitimAte political

power within the exiled Government of Greece. The exiled

Government had taken up residence in Cairo after the fall of

Crete; but because of the lack of communication with Occupied

Greecft had lost contact with political developments in the home­

land until 194.3. In late 1943 find early 1941~ the P~A had

Attempted to portray itself 8S the GOV6rnment of the People of

OCcupied Greece, and, therefore, entitled to be part of the

Government after Liberation.

The results of these efforts to Achieve legitimacy cul­

minAted in the Lebanon Conference of May 1944. According to

Edward Forster, a historiAn:

S3~Udes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil WAr in Greece, 1943-19~9:-P. b7.

S40fBallance, The ~reek Civil ~ 1944-1949, pp. 182-187.

55constanttne Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (London: Pen~uin, 1969), p. 83. --- ---- ­

-------

2b

It has never been satisfactorily explained why EAM agreed to attend the Lebanon Conference. This party had certainly not renounced its policy of ~aining control of Greece. It 1s possible that it foresAw the Allies would free Greece and that it calculat8d that it would be to the PArty'~ ultimate AdvAnt8~o to hAve some plsce in the Government. S6

Porster omits the most important question: Why did

FAM/ELAS in the guise of the PEEA even consider participation,

to achieve an ultimate advantage when, in fact, it already had

the means and capability of realizing its goals? Perhaps there

is only a slight difference in perception, but it will be well-

worth exploring in some detAil how some previous preconceptions

of the KKE affected events prior to, And after, the conference.

The image of the guerrilla in the mountains, coupled

with the lon~ tr8dition of rural, primarily agrarian, rebellion,

oombined to present sn unorthodox view of Marxism. It WAS not

the ideal Communist Revolution; but it was a real Revolution.

The KKE WAS prepAred to renounce this movement at what it

believed would be the decisive moment for achieving the Russian

model. 57

It must be assumed that the KK~ felt that it was in

possession of an infrastructure capable of executing Urban

Revolution, which would be the Revolution of the Proletariat

56Edward s. Forster. ~ Short Historbof Modern Greece z 1821-19S6 {New York: Praeger, !9~, p. 2~.

~7S.e Joseph stalin. Marxism and the National ~estion, (New York: International Publishers, 1942';-p:-9.

27 I"lnd definitA]y not rJ,n Agrarinn Hevolution; nnd, therAf'ore,

caul d ,'lccept the points of the Lebnnon Conference. SpAC 1 fic­

ally, this mennt thn t a ftar Li bern tion the force s of EL.,/I,~)

and the Greek Middle E~lst F10rces would 9.11 he demobll ized

by (;overnment of NntionFll Unity. c..;n rrhere WnS also an.'l

aareement, signed nt Casertn, which put EL.AS forces under

British control for the LiberAtion of Greece. The 3i~ning

of this ngreement on 26 September 19~+ WAS also desi~ned to

secure British favor, in the form of money and nrms, for

ELAS. This is n key point in subsequent hlstoricnl develop­

ment, becnuse the mAnner of implementin~ the Cnserta A~reement

:In<1 the points of the Lebnnon Conference would provide the

')9immectiFlte causes of' the F.trst Civil Wnr.'

After the Conference, tho KKE had to decide if it

would consol1dnte its mA:'ltery of Greece before Lihel"ntion.

or entor the Pl~;EA into the Nntion'-l] Uovernrnont nnd str1ve to

hQ~chievA control by politlcnl infiltrntion. rphis l"ltter

L; (1- Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Storx of the

Greek Communist Pnr!l, pp. IH8-1crr:­

l~9woodhouse, :t1.pple of Di scord, p. 301). rrhe [luthor stqtes the mAin pOints of' tneconterenc·. as follows:

(1) the reor~Mnizatlon of the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle Enst.

(:!) The unlficntion of all guerrilln forces undAr the command of the Greek Government of N.'ltionnl Unity.

(3) The people of Greece would have n free choice of fl political regime flfter Liberation.

t \()- Floyd A. Spencer, War nnd PostWAr Greece (Washington: Government Frinting Office, ~?-r;-pP:-'b9=(l.

2b

course of' nction WfiS i.niti~lly followed, but there nre

divers:;;ent notlons of why nnd how this came to pass. C.M.

Woodhouse, ,'I member of the British Militnry Mission to Greece

durin~~ the Occupntion, believes thnt Moscow ordered the K~

• r; 1to infiltrnte the Government r8ther than resort to vlolence.

rrhis opinion wnS hnsed on whnt Woodhouse mip;ht hnve known

cancer-ning the preliminnry tnlks between the Soviet Onion ·,nd

Britnin rep;f\rdlng post-WAf' spheres of influence in the i~rtlkans.h,l

On the other hAnd, the Greek Government has produced rlocuments

thRt report the Communist Pnrty of Greece was free to decide

upon the t8ctics to be employed in achieving the finnl objec­

tive of their ende:lvors.()3

Some ndditionel points must be considererl to gRin an

8l:"preetation for the complexity or the events leadinp; up to { ,L~the Civil Wnr. Pirst of nIl, the f'runous PercentAges ~greement

"lWoodhouse, A~Ele of' j)iscord, p. 11'). 'l'his opinion was prob ~ l. b 1'Y f'0 rmu In t e by the nu t hor B. f t e r the f net. Sinc e it would have been almost impossible for Woodhouse to hnve known this information while flctually in the mountFlins of Greece with ELAS.

6 ){·Sir John Wheeler - Bennett and Anthony Nichols,

The Semblnnce of Peace: The PoliticRl Settlement After the second ~rld W~l.r (London:~acmillan, 1972), p. 197.

t, \.ireek Under-Sec ret Rria t for Pre 55 and In forme ti on, 'Phs Conspirflc1 Agninst Greece LAthens, 191+7), p. 11.

()i~In October, st,'llin and Churchill divided the Bnlknns in t 0 S phere S 0 fin flu enc e . F'orex amp1 e the US SR had f:; 0 per ~ent .influence :in Yugoslnvia and so did Rritain. In Greece it wns 10 per eent faT' the USSR Hnd 90 per cent for the Hritish. Wheeler-8ennett and Nichols, The Semblnnce of Peace: The Politicnl Settlement After the-3econd WorId-Wnr, p. 19~--------- --..-....... -- -- -­

29

precluded the direct Assistance of the USSR to the Greek

Commun i.sts. It is uncertn in j f the contents of thi s ;~R;reement

were known to tho KKE. rJ.1hey were prob3.hly not, but if these

were known it would tend to substAntiate Woodhouse's conten­

tton.

'rlhe Gre e k Government reported that a "c ant inp;enc y

Pl,qn" for the mil i tory tllke-over of Greece hnd been developed

6by the KKE. e..; 1'his plan wns not implemented upon Liheri:ltion,

Hno there is probably only one person who influenced sinntos

not to execute this option. He Wns Colonel Popov of the Hed

f\rmy, who nrrived in Greece ln July 1944. 66 The contention

tb~lt the l3ri ttsh-Soviet A~reement (the Percentflge Agreement)

WqS the only thinp: thrlt can ncc.ount for the decision to 1n­

f'tltr'lte the Government is not completely v'llid. t)7 There

were mnny other fnctors thAt entered into Slnntos' decision

to tnftltrnte the Government.

One at' these f'nctors wns SiR.ntos' discovery or .'1

major defect within the KKE, the If-lck or externHl assistance.

6e;·~Spencer contends thHt there WAS no plnn. Spencer,

W~r and Postwar Greece, pp. 71-72.

6bRickhnm Sweet-~scot, Greece: A Politic~l Rnd Economic Survey 1939-1953 (London: Royal Instltu€e of InternfltionAl Affatrs, 19t:;4), p. 41. 1\1so see Campbell nnd Sherrnrd, Mode!:!!. Greece, p. IdO.

67Kou30ulns, Revolution find Defent: 'I'he Stol? of the lireek Communist PRrty, p. 197. Elides And others con endtnat the RKE aia not hnve knowled~e of the Agreement between Stolin nnct Churchill.

'llh£:.: (ircek Commllni.~~ts bel i eved that R:; soon R~,

';pt>mF1n.': wn~~ df-1feAteo thn Soviet llnion WOl11d rlevot"l !ll 0 y' n 11 t. ten t ion R n rl. 0 f' r e r m0 r e ~HJ h 8 tan t -t B 1 3lJ pro r t to ~;m811 WRrs of' l.tl'(H'Rtlon in the countrie[) 1Jlre fi d:1 r r (~e d f'rom the NA ?- 1.:1 • (, ()

:3i.Rnto~~ 'pe,llizod t.he intrins1c value of' extern1l1 ~11PPOr't llnd

t'e 11 Bved thAt he requ ired tha t SllPP01"lt to wi.n hi:3 oh.i ec t i ve ~;

hut. there WAS no response from Tito during October Flnd eFlrly

f' qNovember •..

Greece experienced a politi.cal power-VRCllUm 1n October,

'Phe Germans had already withdr13.wn, but &\M/f';LA.'; ctid

not ~ct to 3eize power before tho (iovernment of NationR]

Unity r.ould e~-;tahl tsh it8elf' as the de facto (J-ovnrnment.

1\1 '1 1 t f'd by the S 0 v jets, tho 01 n MFl n (:<) iAn t 0 ~) h A rl not h P, en

nhlo 1-0 f'inn the ecnn'Sf'e to embark li~LA~) on A soli.tnry ndventur(~

in thf-) ~er.on(i hAl f' of' Octobor~,'10 l~lls()d on thf: prevIoll:; ht~tOT-'~,'

of' di~t~irl1ne to oT'der~~ lNlthin tho KKlt;. Lhn lnnc~tton of'

the lJreAk Comml1n13t~3 to mi3~l tho r,hane0 to t'ult'lll tholr>

rri.mRry goals of the entire HesistancA Movement.

t', l) , .,

I t~ J c.1 •

31 Once the opportunity was lost, why did the Party

later alter its position from one of infiltration to one of

~ed aggression?71 Before attempting to answer this question,

A brief survey of the international situation in 1944, DB it

pertains to Greeoe, is warranted.

There were politicR1 forces outside Greece, especially

among the Allied Powers, that exerted a dominating influence

on the conduct of internal affairs on the Greek scene. Their

effect on the KKE can only be surmised from the modus operandi

of the Party in the post-Liberation period. One consequence

of this pressure was the apparent immobility of ELlS in

OCtober and November. ELlS may not have been so inactive had

the Greek Communists realized fully the subsequent importance

of the Percentage Agreement. The KKE did not know the extent

of the oommittment by Churclill to support the Greek Government. 72

In view of these conditions, the KKE was operatin~ in R state

of flux in relntlon to the internAtional, as well as the

national, power struggle.?3

By late November the situation had not drastically

changed as there were still British troops in Greece. But the

71Tsoucalas, ~he Greek Tragedi' p. 82. Tsoucalas con­tends thnt there was never any intent on on the part of the KKE to use Armed rebellion.

7?~inston S. Churchill, Their Finest li2~L (Boston: Houghton Mills, 1953), p. 254.

73woodhouse, ~pple of Discord, p. 216.

]2

KKE, even as late as 28 November, still abided by the agree­

ments of the Lebanon Conference. 74 This can only be explained

by the Conununist's desire to achieve recognition by Gren.t

Britnin and A strict adherence to the idea of political in­

filtration.

It does not seem completely accurate to explain the

rapid transition fram n policy of infiltration to insurrection

in late November AS simply tha.t the KKE "realized that if they

complied with the government wishes to disarm they would lose

a superiority of men and material. ,,75 The forces of ELAS

numbered a.bout 40,000 troops, while the Government had at its

disposRl approximately 20,000 men. The difference in strength

WAS impressive but not very meaningful. The KKE reAlized taat

the relAtive combat-power of these forces was nearly equal.

The trnining and modern weAponry available to the sMaller

force compensated for its numerical weakness. 76

On 28 November the PEEl submitted a proposal for dis­

~nment to the Government, but on the next day refused to

sign or honor its own proposal. The idea that they had not

realized the disparity in combat power, resulting from reduc­

tion to equal numbers of ELA. and Government troops in a new

74spencer, ~~ Postwar Greece, pp. 71-72.

75camPbel1 and Sherrard, Modern Greece, p. 180.

76woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 214-216.

J3 integrated National Army, seems to presuppose stupidity on

the part of the KKE.

There had to be. ot>her'··:CaetoZ's' .whieb :'emtered into ·the

decision to change from infiltrating tactics to violence:

The political victory the EAM Central Committee was seeking to achieve by armed pressure did not seem so very inaccessible; but only if one under­stands the tenacity of Churchill who, defying American public opinion and strong internal opposi­tion, meant to show how he could struggle for demooraoy against all totalitarian assaults on it. 77

EAM enjoyed certain advantages. In addition to its

exploits against the Germans,78 it physically controlled

most of the provinces within Greece through the administra­

tion they had established during Occupation. 79 After a

buildup of Government and British troops in November, the

Communists did not enjoy the s~e superiority of forces that

they had at the time of Liberation:

It is easy to sympathize with EAM's position. They had risen to supremacy in Greece during the years of occupation through hard work, danger and

77Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War inGreece, 194J-1949;-P. 203. - ­

78Eudes lists some of the military operations con­ducted by ELAS. Ibid., p. 227.

79stnvrianos gives a detailed description of the EAM administration in ELAS controlled areas. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 80-81; also Stefano! Saraphls, Greek RiSIs€nnce iymy: The story of ELAS (London:Farleigh Press Limited, 1~5 , In passim. -- --- ­

34

suffering. They saw no reason why they should of their own will relinquish the power they had won •••• 80

Eudes, in his book !B! Kapetanlos, states that Tzamls

got • commitment of support from Tito for their proposed

Insur~ectlon during the night of 28 November 1944, and that

Ionnides convinoed Siantos that: 8l

The line of least resistance led straigbt .s 82 an arrow to the outcome desired by their enemies.

The combination of these two events provide the miss­

ing links to the question of why the KKE aoted as it did on

29 November. 83 On tbat date the KKE threw down the gauntlet

to the Government by refusing to cooperate in a plan for de­

aobillzation. Tbe KKE bad decided to launch a coup to a.l~.

power by naked rorce, and "even if tn. ooup were to rail, a

gaping wound would be dealt to tb- Greek body polltic •••• ,,84

80Willlam Hardy McNeil, The Greek Dilemma: War andAft.~.th, (New York: Llpplncot~1947), p. 130. - ­

81Eudes , The ~etanio8: Partisans and Civil War in Gre.ce, 19~-t9N' P.-nJS. The extent or tbrs-comm1tment Ii Dot known, u was probabl~ not of great significance for material support. The psycbologlcal import must bay. been profound.

82porster, A Short History 2f Modern Gre.ce, 1621­1956 t P • 226 •

83stavriano8, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, p. 1~; and Tsoucalas, T6. Greek Trag8aI, p. 84.--­

84stepben G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers ~9~~ ~ (Tbessalonikl: Institute ot Balkan-8tudies, 196jf,-p:-b2.

35

The EAM ordered. a demonstration for 3 December 1944

to protest tbe Governments' policy and tn. order of tbe

British commander, General Scobie, to disarm ELAS by 10

December. 85 The demonstration tbat occurred on Sunday was

at first authorized by the GoYernment and then cancelled.

However, it was too late, and the ensuing violence inaugurated

tbe First Civil War.

85woodbouse, ~ of Discord, pp. 216-217. For an eyewitness account of--B10ddj" Sunday," See W. Byford-Jones, The Greek Trl10~ (London, 19~6), pp. 138-140. One of the best worKs on t e events or December 1944 is by Iatrldes. see John O. Iakrides, Reyolt in Atnens: The Greek Communist "Second Round": 1944iI2i> ,PrInceton: Pl'lnceton University Pres8, l~n pass •

Chapter II

THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR

The bloody Civil War that followed the demonstration

in Athens on 3 December 1944 resulted in the apparent defeat

ot ELAS. In reality, it resulted in the defeat of the very

small portion of ELAS that was around Atbens. BAM realized,

however, that continued resistance would bave meant total de­

struction in the face or the overwhe1ming combination of Gre.k

and Britisb military power. Additionally, since the Yalta

Conferenoe was to open in February same influence may have

be.n exerted by the Russians at this time to achieve a cease

tire in Greece. Consequently, the KKE indulged in peace talks.

When the Peaoe Conferenoe opened on 2 February 1945

at Varkiza, Slant08 did not employ the considerable forces of

ELAS that still remained intact. He also failed to use them

as a bargaining lever. He was probably unduly influenced by

the need to acquire legality for the KKE. S1*Dt08 boped to

insure the KKE's ability to cDDtinue ita struggle by means of

political infiltration after tne cessation of hostilities.

The oruoial question of the VarklzA Conference was that

of amnesty. It was not clearly resolved tor all members of

37

ELAS, but the leaders of the KKE and EAM were assured of it.

As 8 result of the Yarkiza meeting, ELAS was disbanded. 86

The disintegration of ELAS had a profound effect on

the average resistance fighter:

••• who comprised most of ELAS's troops ••• but had no plaoe in the commissars' revolution.

In their eyes, all the discredit whioh had been heaped upon the traditional politicians had re­bounded onto the revolutionary politioians who preached Revolution by the industrial proletariat in a bureaucratic jargon to whioh they were pro­foundly allergic. 87

The Communists tailed to take advantage of their most

important asset:-- tbe People, the Rural Proletariat. The

reasons behind this failure were disous8ed in the first

ohapter. Tha end result vas that the Communists bad not in­

dootrinated the people during the three years of the Occupation.

Whether Churohill knew this or not, he presented A

myth to the world to justify Britisb military intervention

to force the disbandment of ELAS. That myth stated that the

Battle of Atbens, the First Civil War, was fou~bt a8aiDat

Communism. 88

86steranos Saraphis, Greek Resistance A~: The ~orz or ELAS, p. 32. The last page of thls wor contiIns

• 8uiDo~di.bandm.nt order and farewell address to ELAS.

87Eudes , Tbe Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil ~ ~ Greece, 1943-l~, p. 233_

88stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemna and.........Opportunity, p. 120.

)8 Churcbill's solution was overslaplistlc. Tbe most

plausible explanation of tbe events leading up to tbe Civil

War in the period immediately after Liberation, was that the

OCcupation of 1941-1944 forced the legally-constituted

Government or Greece to work in a vacuum insofar as the

internal affairs of the Mainland were concerned.

The Government had lert Greeoe under the ons1augbt of

German troops and was at Cairo for most of tbe war. The King,•

however, spent 8 great deal of bis ttme !in England ratber

than Cairo witb the firm support of tbe British governaent,8~

and there were no major political leaders, from Greece in tbe

Government at Cairo. In 1~ the King's Government returned

to Greece and proceeded to reestablisb a carbon copy or the

pre-Metaxas era.

During the absence of the legal government, however,

a new type of order was born, matured, and reacbed a degree

of self-sufficienoy in Greece. The Gov.~nment-of-Oecupation,

EAM/ELAS, was the government to the maJo~ity of nome1and

Gr.eka. On top of tbis, there waa a strong Republican senti­

ment, botb within and outside Greece.

It can be concluded from the variety of political

affiliations, that ... real cause ot the first Civil War

WAS the irreconoilable differences between these diyerse

orders. Tbe confrontation that materialized in this situation

89churcbill, Their Finest ~, p. 257.

39

led inexorably to armed confrontation. Also there were severe

reprisals by the Rightists against ELAS after the war which

only served to exacerbate the situatlon. 90

The confliot in Dec-mber 1944 was not, as Churchill

reported, a single engagement between Democraoy and Communism,

but between different democratic elements and the pressure

applied by two of the tbree traditional Great Powers. The

fighting terminated in the Treaty of Varkiza which dismantled

&LAS and started the KKE on a new legal road. Tbis new

Avenue led to the same destination; and the job of the KKE was

to salvage the wreckage and prepare for the next round - the

Tbird Round. 91

The First ClY!1 War had demonstrated clearly that in

guerrilla warfare political and military objectives are in­

••parable, and that the leadership must be very able in both

fields. It was apparent that the KKE did not possess these

attributes, otherwise they would haye presented a !!!!

aocQ!Pli to the Allies in September 1944 when the Germans wlth­

drew.

9°Frank Smothers, William Hardy McNeill, and Elizabeth D. McNeill, Report on tbe Greeks (New York: Twentieth Century Fund~ 1948), p. 1~2;-ana-Campb.l1 and snerrard, Modern Greece, p. 103.

91The First Round was tbe Communist term for the attack of EDES by ELAS in 1943; the Second Round was the First Civil War of December 1944-January 1945; and tne Third Round a Second Civil War occurred between 1946-1949.

40 The Varkiza Agreement, therefore, was signed by the

KKE in order to enable them to work for their aims by political,

rather than military, means. Once ELAS was disarmed, the KKE

leaders had to rely on the principles stated by the Great

Powers at Yalta. They fi~ly believed that the United states,

Great Britain and the Soviet Union would cooperate in "belping

(the) Liberated Peoples to create freely chosen democratic

Institutions.,,92

Not all members of ELAS subjugated themselves to the

conditions set forth at Varkiza, or boped-for Allied support.

Some 3,000-4,000 Communist cadre-type troops crossed over tm northern borders of Greece. 93 Additionally, a number of ELAS

units, some as large a8 a battalion, found the oonditions or tbe ~reement unacceptable because of perseoution by the

Rigbt-Wing elements witbin the Greek body-politic. Tbese

Rigbtists hunted down the former members of ELAS as common

cr~inals. Consequently, tbese groups were forced into the

lD.ountains. 94

92stavrianos, Greece: Amerioan Dileana ~ Opportunity, pp. 144-145.

930lBallance, The Greek Civil War 1944-1949, p. 113; and Tsoucalas, The GreeK:Trasedy, p. 9~ Alao Kousalas, Price or Freedom, (Syracuse: Syraouse University Press, 1953),P7 149. Kousalas reports figures of 20,000 refugees to Yugoslavia, 5,000 to Bulgaria, and 23,000 to Albania.

940'Ballance, The Greek Civil War 1944-1949, p. 113. Also Eudes gives a vivid narration of tbe mysteriou8 demise of the founder or ELAS, tbe intrepid Aria. He a180 gives tbe types and sizes of some of tbe units that did not comply with tbe Varkiza Troaty. JUdes, The Kapetanio8: Partisans ~

Civil ~ .~ Greece, 1943-l9~ pp. 234-59.

-----

While the VarkizA Agreement was being implemented for

all ostensible purposes, the KKE conducted a soul-searching

evaluation to discovor the reasons for the debacle of December

1944. 9S Tbe Eleventh Plenum of the KKEts Central Committee

(April 5-10, 1945) declared:

••• the Britisn military intervention "had interrupted only temporarily" (the noraal democratic) development, and proclaimed that the basic purpose of the KKK vaa to struggle for the eradication of Fascism, for securing democratic evolution, tor de.ocratic reviyal'96 and for "popular d.emooracy."

Tbis was only rnetoric to cover up the real magnitUde

and extent of tn. defeat of the First Civil War. The Party

decided its own mistakes were: (a) that tne Central

Co.-itt.e had not aoved to the mountains in time to adequately

prepare ELAS for the political victory desired; (b) ELAS was

not trained sufficiently to be able to defeat British troops;

and (0) the most exp.~ienc.d troops were kept out ot the Battle

of Athens. 97 This!!! culpa on tbe part of tbe leadersbip did

not save the overall structure of ELAS. In April two of the

major Sooialist Movements, wbich were part of EAM but were not

95zotos states that EAM gave instruotions to ita followers to carryon their efforts to subvert tbe governaent eyen before it signed the treaty. Zotos, Gr••ce: Tbe Strussle ~ Freedom, (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 161.

96Xydls, Greece ~ the Great Powers, 1944-1941, p. 89.

97Eudes , !h! Ka~etan10s: Partisans and Civil War inGreece, 1943-1949, p. 2 3.

42 Communista, broke away from what was by then a Communist

organlzation. 98 This reYealed the true identity of EAM/ELAS.

The next montb, on 30 May 1945,99 the Moscow-trained

Seoretary ot the Party, Hikos Zacharladea, arrived'back in

Athens from his internment in the German concentration oamp

in Dachau. 100 He immediately reaffirmed that only a "Peoples'

Republic" would solve the difficulties in Greece. But at

tbe same time the wartime leaders of the KKE were guilty,

according to Zachariades, of not adhering to ~the doctrines of

Lenin and stalin. lOl

Although there 1s no hard evidence tbat the Soviets

enoouraged or direoted the ensuing events after the Varkiza

Pact, it should be remembered that the Russians used inatru­

aenta (such as the Lublin Government in Poland) to work their

will 1n East Europoan countrios. It CaD be seen that the

98These sooialist elements formed a new politioal parties known as the Popular Demooratic Union and the Socialist Party of G~eece.

99Various dates are reported for the return of zaobariades, but they all fall within ninety days of 30 May1945.

lOOxydis, Greeoe and the Great pow.ra 1944-l9~7, p. 93; and Kousoulas, Revoluiion-ina-nefeat: Th. S tOry !! !-! Greek Co.-unlet Party, p. 219. --­

lOlo'Ballance, Tne G~8ek Civil War 1~4-1949t pp. 208­215; and Eudes, !he KaPitanios: P.rtiiiD.~lWar in Greece 1943-19~9, in pasaim. --- --- -­

43 aaa. type of ideologioal and political impetus could be

employed in Greece where a full-scale Communist Organization

existed:

But it appears to be beyond any reasonable doubt that Soviet influence was as important for the resumption of the armed struggle in 1946 as it had been for the softening of the Communist position in the middle of 1944. 102

Even thou~h many bave praised Stalin for his adher­

ence "to the Percentage Agreement, 103 the Soviet policy of non­

intervention in Greek affairs did not last long. It must be

r ..embered, bowever, that throughout the entire existence of

tbe KKE there is no evidenoe to suggest that Greece ranked

very high on the list of Soviet priorities. This 1s partic­

ularly true in the ~.diate post-war era. Other issues

received tbe thrust of Soviet attention, specifically the

Soyl.t OCcupation or Iran and the pressure exerted on Turkey

for a base in the Straits, and retrocession of two provincea.

On the other band, ;Iust because Gr.ece did not merit

the full attention of tb. Soviets did not imply that tbere

waa no Russian intervention or interest in the area. The

first evidence of Russian intervention in Greek arfairs Arter

l02Tsoucalas, Tbe Greek Tragedy, p. 101; and Woodhouse, ~ti of Discord, in Eiiitm: Ilso see Eud••, The KaEetanios: ar sans and CIvil ~12 Greece, 1943-l949,'~ passfm.

103Kousoulas, Revolution ~ Deteat: !h! Story 2! ~ Greek COJll1lu!!!!! Partz, p. 223.

------

44 the War came through Tlto, who on 8 July 1945, called for

"an end to the oppression of 'Slavic minorities in Greece

by Monarehofasaista. ,,,104 In JulY' 1945, the USSR no longer

had to pursue a policy of abstention in Greece, since tbeir

efforts to impose absolute Communist control of Eastern 105EUrop.an countries bad met with significant success.

This meant that tbe Percentage Agreement had almost vani8hed.

In June 1945 the Twelfth Plenum of tb. KKE's Central

Co.-itt•• reflected tb18 attitude in the views of the rein­

stated Zacbariades. l06 In Qrder to ade.uate1y investisate

bow this man's views integrated into the oyerall CommUDlst

strategy, it is necessary to expand temporarily from tbe

microcosm of the internal Greek scene and briefly acan the

During this time, tne Soviet leaders certAinly lamented

tbe failure of the KKE's efrort to ••tablish a People's

Democraoy within Greece. One can infer this from the overall

sohe.e of the Soviet Union, whioh was to SUbjugate Greece as

part ot the overall plan to acquire the straits of the

l04zot1s. Gr••oe: The Struggle for Freedom, p. 161; and Kousoulae, Price or Pre.CIom, p. 121.­

l05Poland and Rumania are eXRmples.

106Kou8oulas, Price ~ Freedom, p. 149.

'\. 45

Dardanelles. 107 If this goal had been achieved, the Soviet

Union could have e~joyed almost exclusive control of the

eastern Mediterranean.

The American position was at variance with tbis Soviet

objective. President Truman stated that the United states

favored open and free international navigation rights in the

straits. lOB If American policy could preyail it would, in

ettect, neutralize Soviet strategy in tbe area.

But the Soviets persisted in asserting their position

and on 21 January 1946 the USSR, in pursuance of the afore­

mentioned strategy, filed a Letter of Prot••t to tbe Security

CaUDail of the United Nations. This Letter addressed the

pre.ence of British troops in Greece and their support of the

Greek regime. 109

The 8ubtle distinction that was made between the

British troops in Greece, and the British government's support

of the Greek government, may have been the last vestage of

the Percentage Agreement. This was due to the fact that:

l01cyril Falls, "Aftermath of War: The Greek Army and the Guerrillas," Illustrated London News, LXII (September 27, 1947), p. 346. Falia gives an analy~or the complete Russian scheme in tbe Balkans as it was perceived in England in 1947; aDd Kou8oulas, Price ~ Freedom, p. 151.

l06Ibid., p. 1$2. The Soviets had asked for a naval bas8 in the-straits, unrestricted passage of tneir war ships, and closure of the Straits to warships of non-Black Sea powers.

l09Xydls, Greec! ~ !!! Great Powers, 19~4-1947, p.136.

46

••• by the middle or 1945 the Soviet's attitude had a1ao hardened. During the Potsdam conterence, Molotov pr••ented a memorandum to the British in which he sta\ed for the first tim. that the Soviet Union disagreed witb and protested against the way Britain was handling tbe Gr••k problem "on the grounds of an old and indefinite authorlzat1on.,,110

Stalin, in his attempt to achieve Soviet aims in tne

Dodecaneae Islands of Greece (formerly held by Italy), demanded

• military base there ant even specified its location. All

parties realized, however, that as long a8 Britiah troops were

in Greece, any oonfliot could have enormous international

ramifications. Consequently, tbe main thrust of Soviet and

KKK policy with regard to England was to secure tbe reaoval lllot British oombat power.

The Greeks, in collaboration witb the British, countered

the Russian demands in the United Nations. They pointed out

that there were major border-violations by forces from

Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania tbat oo~ld be very detri­

mental to tbe national security of Greece. This offered the

British a reason to remain on Greek soil.

Although the Soviets had raised what was to be called

the "Greek Question" in January 1946, it was not until September,

after mo~e charges and oounteroharges were made, that the

"'I. United States' representatire to the Security Council proposed

110Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedl, p. 100.

111The reader can draw a comparison to a st.iliar de.and made on the United states by the Communists in the Republic of Viet NaB.

47 the establishment of a Subcommittee tor investigating the

allegations. 112 The Soviet representative at first vetoed

this proposal, but when Greece reintroduced the issue at a

later date, he finally agreed to a Commission. 11) In ti•• ,

the Council adopted tne published results of tbe United

Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB). This

report substantiated the Greek claims that there were

border violations and acts of support for guerrilla opera­

tions within Greece by Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, and Albania. l14

In viewing these outside influences, at least those

outside the sphere or the KKE, there is a possibility that

one can conclude that tbe KKE did not enjoy tn. blessings of

Moscow in its preparation for, and participation in armed

rebellion. This observation is possible beoau•• tn. Soviets

.~r.ed to the UNSCOB and oertainly knew wnat th. findings

would be in advanoe. It is also possible that this oonclusion

occurred because acoording to M110van Dj11as, Stalin said that

112U•N• Securit~ Council Official Records. Record Number Nine:--o.r. PUb1tcatlon 1946-1947, p. 239.

l13Kousoulas, Price 2! Freedom, pp. 174-115.

114Se8 the Report by tbe Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Inoidents. U.N. Doc. 5/3600 Vol. I, para 2, in The United Nations and the Problema of Greece, Department or-State Publ1catio~9~1947. Also EUdes, The Kapet.niGs: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949~ p: 261. EUdes states that tbe CommIsSIon-did not do a cam­plete investigation sinoe its used only witnesses and docu­.ents produced by the Athens goyernment.

46 "the uprising in Greeoe had to be stopped and stopped

quiOkly_"llS This has also led many to believe that StA.lln

said this in light of his acoeptanoe of tbe Percentage

Agreement.

The fact that the Percentages Agreement was dead bas

been demonstrated. Likewise, it is apparent tbat the KKE

was allowed to pursue its goal of establishing a People's

Democracy. It 1s logical to conclude, in view of the

obedience that Zachariades had demonstrated to Moscow, that

an order by Stalin to halt offensive operations would have

be.n obeyed. Besides, in 1948, stalin put the real question

to Kardelj:

"Are you sure that the Greek partisans could triumph?" "Certainly," said Kardelj, "but onlyif foreign intervention does not increase in Greece and the Greek Partisans do not make serious pDlitical and strategic mistakes."

It is the latter part of this statement tbat will provide the

major focus of this paper. In order to acoomplish this, it

1s necessary to return to the internal processes of the KKE.

l15Miiovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., ~), p. 182. stalin's motivation, for wanting the war stopped, was probably based on his fear of retaliation by the West if he enorouched too much onto what was considered the free world. The free world was Dot the same as that contained in the spheres of influence of the Peroentage Agree.ent.

116Vlad1mlr Dedljer. Tito (New York: S~on and Schuster, 1953), p. 321. ---­

49 Since it is certain that Zachariades was an

International Communist, which in the KKE meant one who ad­

herred to the Moscow line of Communism, it would be Incon­

slatant to believe that he did not follow the dictates of

M08COW. Sometimes his unmodified acceptance of Soviet doc­

trine worked to tne detrtment of the KKE. For example, wben

Zacbariades returned to Greece be ~ediately spoke out in

rayor of abandoning Greek territorial claims to Nortbern

BP1rus, whicb was a portion or soutbarn Albania. ll7 This

oourse of action, bowever, was not in line with wbat the

.. jority of Greek Communists wanted. Ultimately, Zachariade.

modified his statements on this subjeot to support inclusion

of this territory in Greece.

To demonstrate that his change of opinion did not con­

tain any contradictions for an adberent or International

Comaunism, it 1s only necessary to envision the total objec­

ti.e of Communism in the Balkans. Northern Epirus waa already

within tne Soviet orbit, but in view of tbe overall anticipated

results of Q Communist Greece, the effect would be tne same

in the long run. Tbi. can be illustrated in tbat tne:

Soviet policy was to coordinate Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria into same sort of satellite Balkan Communist Federation, and it ~ovlet POlicyJ was not ad.erae to 8 largecbunk of northern Greec•••• wbich worried the

117Kousou1as, Price !! Freedom, pp. 130-133.

so qreek Communista, many of whom were nationalistsliS.s 1Il11cb. a8 C,omaunlsta.

Tbere were, aovever, betw••n the t~. that Zacbarladea

returaed to Gr••a. and tae outbreak of hoatilitie., certaiD

coad.itlons wblcb the COlDlur11at u••d to tb.e.1r advantage in

the post Cly11 War period. These .et.,of oircumstances sub­

staat1a11,. ai4e4 in tlaeir endeavor tG'l laul1Gb. tbe "third

road." AD eXUllDa't1oD of tbe•• oODdltloll8 will provide a

'baal. tor ex:plalning tJa. proxiaate causes or tile Seo.nd C1v11

War.

As a point or departure.. in tbe •••%'ob tor 1...4i.te

cau••• of t •• War, t.e ultiaat.· r.,.SOR, tae complete political

Go.tr.l or Gr•••e." _at be r •••plla.I••4.. . It was toward tbi.

tinal 80al t"at all C_.lIlli·at effort. were directed. Aoo.r4­

insly, 1. Juae 1~$, at tbe !velttb Plenuaot the Central

Oo..itt•• , Zaokarl.de., per8oDal17 untou.~.4 by tbe Itl..­

of deteat illth. Deoeaber Revolution, st.•ted taat to. KXE

would follow a temporary strategy of political infiltration

·~t. gain tim., for UllCleralningthe opponent, and to gataer

toro••,to p••• tbea, to the attaok. 1I119 , In order to tmpl••••t·tb18 strateg1, the COBmuniats

tn4ulled 18 ~riou8 anti-Governaental vituperations while

118o'Ballanoe, !be Greek Civil War 19!4-l949, p. 114; and .e. Dedljer, -Tit., ;:-321. --­

51

it "vociferously trumpeted the Party's intention to struggle 120for the setting up or a Peoples ReJ;>ub11c •••• tt This ca11-'

to-~s was the overtmanlrestation or a decision 'on 15

December 194.5 to shift from infiltrat.ing tactics to armed

insurrection. Tpe next year, 1946, would see tne .trects

ot tbis decision. l21

1m tbe thirteen montbs f~llowing tbe Varkiza

Agr••••nt, tbere were .any ~11.latlon8.and oountercnarg••

betw.en the torc.s on both s1de8. One ,of tbe most, de,vastatillg

iacrtainatioD8, launcbed by the Greek Government ,against tbe

C....nl.ta, followed tbe discovery of the 'remains of 8,000

b••tage. wbo had been murdured by ELAS in January, 1945. In

order to foil the .rreets of th.is charge, EAH reported tat

, 1,289 per.ons were executed by the Gre.k Government and OYer

30,000 viOt~8 were tortured for their Leftist affiliatioDs

atter Varklla. 122

It 18 obvieus that tbere was oonsiderable expression or eaotione and b~utalitl by both sides during 1945-1946. But tbis

il only one example. Tb.r. are many more that were just &1

120xytlis,'Greece and 1e!. Great Powers" 19!H+-1947, .p. 136.

121 .Ibid., p. 140. Xydis mentions tbat the Soviet new agency TASS-!evoted considerable space to tn. speech by Z&cbariadel •

. 122'raouealas, The Greek rri!edY, p. 94; and Eude.,

!h! KaEetaniosl Parti'iiiis ~' C v !!2. !!!. Greece, .!9!+3-J;949, p. 2bO. Euaes presents a detailed statement of figures in . varioua oategorie.. Variance. between figure. given by d1rterent souroe. on this matter are m1n~al,(•• g. 1,289 exeouted as compared t~ l,219 executed).

-'-~------_.------- ­

52 volatile. They were used by the KKE to justify its decision

to instigate armed rebellion.

Zacharlades certainly realized that the long-range

objective for armed insurreotion was the attainment of

123political power. To achieve this, the KKK identified the

Government's weakness very early in the planning stage; and

.iewed this as 8 favorable prerequisite for the resumption

of hostiliti.s.l24 The Communists realized that there was

not only political upneaval,' as evidenced by a succession of

oaretaker ~overnm.nts, but also large scale soeial and

125economic chaos in Greeoe after tbe war. In order to

exaoerbate tbe situation, the KKK plotted to insure that every

government should fail until there was no alternative but a

takeover by the Communiats. 126 This course of action w••

strictly in line with the infiltration policy adopted after

tbe Pirst Civil War.

One element of a combination within the KKE's plotting

was an attempt to influence the political outcome of

l23rsouoalas, !h! Greek Tragedy, p. 87.

124Campbell and Sberrard, Modern Greece, p. 182.

12$porster, ! Short Hiatorl ~ Modern Greece, p. 227.

l26woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 261. The govern­ments of P1astiras, Voulgarii; Keneilopou1os and Sophoulls railed in 1945-1946. These governments did not fail because of Communist pressure, but because of economic problems within Greece after tbe war.

53 elections held in March 1946. They ordet-ed mass· abstentions

from the polls by Party members. The boast that ".:')ne half of

tbe Greek population" would be exoluded 'from repr""sentation

in Parliament, as the KKE olaimed, Pl"('·':ed to be false.

However, by employing this taotio the KKE hoped to be able to

ola1m all the votes or the people who abstained in support of

the boycott, and additionally they could cla1m all the votes

or those who did not normally vote.

In reality, leas tban ten percent of the registered

voters abstained for political reason8.~27 There vere 1,850,000

Greeks registered, and 1,111,000 voted. l28 Regardless or their lack of demonstrated eleotoral strength, the KKE j reoognized that a fUndamental problem existed in the pOlitiC~l

struoture or the Greek Government, since it was plagued jY

constant turnover of administrations. This was the very/ /

thing that the Commu61sts were trying to achieve but due to

miscaloulations on their part they were not prepared to

capitalize on this opportunity. They believed that there had

to be more areas of oonflict with the Government that would

serve solidly popular support for their revolutionary aotivities.

127Tsoucalas, The Greek Tra~edY, pp. 96-97; and Budes, ~he Kapetanios: Partisans and elv! war !a Greece, 1943-1949, p~ 263.

. 128U• S• Department of state. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections Publloatlon-2522 (Washlngton: ~overnment PrintIng ofrioe, 1946), p. 20. Also see New York Till••, 26 July 1946. - ­

Tbe KKE did not have to look very rar to riDd

anotber area or controatation. The Right-Wing excessea com­

mitted against membera ot the Lett only served to intensity

tbe desire tor armed resistance. Albeit unintentionally, tbe

Rigbt was forcing many eX-ELAS fighters into wRat was not

only a Communists' camp. 18 order to support these asser­

tions, SOBle uaaplea are warranted. In ...11' June 1946 the

Royalist Go••rnment iDYoked a drastic e.ergeDcy aeasure. It

established sumaaary courts empowered to pass death, .senteDce.

for using araa against tbe autberlties. TAe "Extraordinary

Meaau.rea tor Public Order" of 7 June 1946 authorized houae­

to-bouse .earobes; made strikes 1llegal; and ~po.ed heavy

penaltie. :for a~ed rebellion.

F.N. Spencer, i8 ~~ Postwar Gr••ce, contends

tbat tbe KKB did notbing to justify these mealures taken

against the.. Altbougn, in substanoe, he Is oorrect to1s 1s

not totally true. Prior to the enaotment of this mea.ure,

S~. Leftist bands bad already taken to tbe bl11sl29 in vio­

lation or tbe Varkl&a Treaty. However, tbey presented no

signifioant tbr.at to tbe Government. On tbe otber hand, tbe

Gr.ek Rigbtlsts and the British were responsible for the

l29smoth.ra~ Report on:~be Greeks, p. 152;!!!!!!! Ti••s, 17 July 1946; and Spenoer, ~~ Postwar Greece, p. 96.

55 nullification of the Varkiza Pact. 130 Former ELAS men were

beaten, arrested, and tried on trumped-up oharges. 131

By taking aotion against known and suspected members

of RAM/ELAS, the Right had inoreased the membership of the

Lett. For example, it dismissed university professors and

barred them for life from any public position, largely because

they had fougbt in the Resistance. At tbe same time, professora

wbo had collaborated aotively witb the enemJ, or were appointed

by Metaxas, were retained. 132

The Rightist "Terror" oontinued to be a major oontri­

buting faotor in the resumption or hostilities, because it

played right into the Communists' hands by continuing to pro­

yoke incidents; espeoially in the provinc••• 13) Communist

newspapers appealed outright tor tbe "demoorat." to "take to

tbe hills" and to defend peaoe and llberty.134

l30Stavriano8, Gre.ce: ~.rlc.n D1l.... and :229rtunltI, p. 149; aDd biBallanoe, The Greek eliI! War, ~-1949, p. 113. -----­

l31London Ttmes, 17 April 1945.

132st.vrianoa, Greece: American Dile... ~I 2Pportuniiz, p. 117.

l33zotis, Greece: The Strut!le tor Preedom, p. 168; aDd Stavrianoa, Gre.c!: AmerIc.n D emma-ina QPportunity, p. 136. .

134spencer, War and Postwar Greece, p. 98; and see l!!! ~ Times, 29 Jul,. I946.

Anotber significant advantage that materially oontri ­

buted to the overall decision for resl1Ddng .b••&11ities, waa

the fact tbat all the countries on tbe nortbern border of

Greeoe were within the Soviet sphere of influence. 135 It w. increasingly olear in 1946 that Gr.ece's Northern neighbors

were b.lping to pr..ote disorder in Greece. 136

The Greek Communists realized very .arly tbe tremen­

dous strategic i.portance of the Soviet dominatioD within

are.c.'a northern neigbbors:

In the middle or Deoember 1945 the Party had aad. contaot with repre.entattYe. of Tito and D1mitrov at Pietriob, on the Bulgari~ frontier. The neigbboriDg eountries had pro­mi.ed substantial aid ift tbe 8yent of an 137 insurreotion in Gr.ece ••••

Tbe area north ot tb. Greek frontier also provided a

safe sanctuary for oonducting coordinating .eetings. Tbis

oertainly provided the KKK witb direot aoo.s. to all of it.

supporting elements at one time:

Aocording to moat reliable information a ••cret meeting was held yesterday (}7 August

135woOdhouse, Apple !! Discord, p. 232.

136c •M• Woodbouse, Tbe ~torI ot Modern Greece (London: Faber and Faber, ~8 , p. 2;8. A180 Sta.riano., Gr••ce: American Dl1.-na and OpportunltI, p. 179; vbere hestal.. thal tbe O...unl.t.~ariea to taxe o.er tbe armed banda in the hills and used th. aupport tro. north of tbe border to expand their base or operation.

137Eudea , Ttle Kapetan1oa: Part1.an8 and 01.11 War !! Greeoe, ~ p. 2$8. ----............ - -- ­

-----

1946) at Corni in southern Bulgaria, in whicb Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, and Greek Communists participated under the ohairmanship of a Russian agent ••• to draw up plans for. general riling In13B Greek Maoedonia ••••

At this time, the summer of 19~6~ tb. KKE realized

that their goal of achieving the removal of British troops and

influence would soon be acoompli.bed. It would coae to pass

not as a result of tbeir positive aotions, or those of tne

So3tiet Union in tbe United lations, but ultaately by default

on the part of the BritlaD government. Tbe act.a1 date for

withdrawal of Britisb troops was not known, "but it wae fore­

ab.adowed b1 their conoentration and steady reduction. ,,139

",it important of all waa the realization, on the part of tm KlB, tbat tbe Athena Regime could not exist without tbe

tinancial and military aid from Great Brltain. 140

It was t~u. that B~itain vas beginning to reel the

economic strain or keeping military forces in Greece. The

British requirement for total funding of their Greek program

tor 1947 was to be over $250,000,000. 141 It became apparent

b~ 1946, not only to tne KKE but to the United states aa well,

l38New York Times, 19 August 1946.

139Woodbouse, Apple !! Discord, p. 268.

140stavr1anos, Greece: American Dilemna and Opportunity, p. 257.

14lwheeler-Bennett and Nichols, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After t~Second Worl~Var, p. 563. '- -­

S8 that the British would soon be leaving Greece. 142 Tbe KKE

envisioned a lucrative opportunity to act in tbe power­

vacuum that would be created by British witbdrawal. In the

minds of the leadership of the KKE this created a second

chance, a chance to make ~end8 for tne failure to ac~ during

the power-vacuum ot October 1944 when tn. Germans retreated.

In understanding tbe KKE's decision to make an .~4.

bid tor power, despite the apparent wreakage of the Party, it

must be pointed out that tbey did enjoy the above-mentioned

advantages in 1945-1946. Tbere was one large bonus tbat the

KXB enjoyed during this period. The Communi8ts were recog­

nised as a legitimate political party, and were able to carry

out oampaigns ot propaganda against tne Government, in order

to capitali.e on tne political instability existant at the

time.

The sum of these forces and their interaotion witbin

the leadership of the KKE, led to the conclusion thAt the

time was "ripe" for armed revolution. 143 Of all tne faotors

that contributed to the resumption of Insurgency, probably

the most significant factor was the external help obtained

from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

142Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: Greek Communist Partl' p. 235. -- ­

The story of the

143Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The story ~ ~ ~! Communist Party, pp. 23~39.

In the preoeedlng obapter, it was noted that the

determination of Slantos in late November 1944 was inversely

proportional to the amount of external assistanoe available.

But in 1945 the meeting between Greek, Bulgarian and

Yugoalavlan Communists in Petrich provided the oatalyst for

tb. resumption of hostili'18s.

This meeting must be examined:

The actual disoussions tat Petric~ bave not been di80losed, but they must bave referred to tbe feasibility or the venture 8S well as to tb. military help whioh the Yugollavians and Bulgarians were prepared to offer. To wbat extent aid was ofrered, wbether or not the Soviet Union openlyencouraged tbe Greek Communist Party to take uP144a~8 ••• are questions that oannot be anavered.

At Petrioh there was no Soviet representatiye. 145

This in itself leada to various interpretations on wh,ther

Stalin could have "asked Yugoslavia ani Albania to give

olandestine material aid snd support ~o the Greeka).146

But no definite oonolu8ion oan be drawn from thi8 Soviet

abaenoe.

It is also possible that Tito offered material

support, and a military oamp at Boulkes, for the insurgents

in return "for approval of the unification of a greater

~T80uoalas, !h! Greek Tragedy, p. 100.

~'Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisan. ~ Civil War !e Greeoe, 1943-l9QY; p. 259.

1460 'Ballance, !B! Greek Civil War, 1944-1949, p. 122.

61

Macedonia which required territorial concessions from

Greece. ,,147

In retrospect, the sources available indicate that

there seems to be a logical sequence wltbin theae eYents

wbicb can support the contention that tne factor of external

aupport was the quintes••nce of the KKE's deoision in switch­

ing trom its policy of "infiltration to open warfare. Tbe

.eeting at Petrich occurred in December 1945. In January

1~6 the Soviet Union put forth its complaint to the United

Nations on tne Greek Question. Additionally, 1n February

1946, at the Second Plenum of tbe Central Committee,

Zacbarladea established a politico-military unit tasked to

"examine the prospects for an iJlJlllediate seizure of power. ,,148

In Marcb 1946. wben Zaohariad88 waa in YUlo.la.ia tor talks

witb Tito, be was promised "all out helP.,,149

Tsouoalas, in !!! Greek Tragedy, state. that even

arter the pro.tse or external aid, and as late a8 August of

147campbell and Sherrard, Modern Greece, p. 182.

148Eudes, The Kapetanloa: Partisans and Civil War in Greece 1943-i9~ p. 25~. 1180 kouaoulaa;-Revolutlon­ucl bere.t :~ or ttle Greek Cm-un1at iarll. p. 231. IOUsoulas quotes ~tii Xinourgbla Kit.lt!as, 8noursbla latbikonta by Zacbariades wIth regards to this plenum:"atter veIgb.lng the domestic factors, aDd ttl. Balkan aDd international situation, the Plenum decided to go abead with tbe organizatioD of the new armed struggle."

149Ibid., p. 237. Tbis information was taken tram a report of tse-sixth Plenum in 1949.

tbe same year, the Communists still hoped to avoid a~ed

confrontation.1$O On the other hand, Zachar1adea reported

tbat there was no such attitude. and tbat tne IKE bad agreed

that tbe t~8 was ripe for rebellion in February.lSl

Zachar1ades certainly reported wbat b. believed to

be true and there is DO appareat reason to challenge the

.eraolty of his statement. It 1i necessary. no.e.er. to

point out that tbe two seemingly oontradictory yieva are not

in fact mutually exclusive. Zaoba.riades was correct. but at

tbe eaae ttme tbe oontention of Ts.uca1aa oannot be dls~s••d

.a unjustifiable. Beoause on 12 May 1946. Zaobariade. at.ted

tbat the Co....t.t. ought "to se.k a political solution to

n152tbe problema or GZ'••ce. This sp••cb undoubtedly produced

laa. contusion even amoag Party ...bera. Zacbarlad•• ' r.ason•

..y b. explalDsd by hia de.ire not to preloD8 tbe 4.part~.

ot tbe Britiah troop. by in8tigating iDternal diaorder. at

l ••at not until tbe a~ed element or tbe KIE waa ready.153

Simultaneou.sly, With the realization of all the Indl­

catioDS in favor of the war, tBere were certain facts that

tbe KKK perceived as detrimental to its cause. Zachar1.'e.,

150Taouoal•• , !e! Greek Trasedz, p. 101.

151zachar1ad•• , Dheka Kronia Palis, p. 40.

152Kousoulaa, Revolution and Defeat: ~ story !f ~ Greek Cgmmunist Party, p. 23~

lS3ZAcbariades, Dbeka Kronia Palis, p. 40

62

in his book, Ten Y!.!!:! After, offers what be calls "the tbinking"

of the KKE in 1946:

We all agreed that the situation was ripe, that we should take up arms and figbt. But we had also to examine the external facto~s.

We had to take into consideration the fact that we should not provoke the British into intervening immediately.

Our effort in this area was directed towards isolating the British, to prevent their Immediatel 54 armed intervention, while relying on the People.

On the surface, at least, the conditions for armed

insurrection seemed to be present in Greece in 1946. The

internal politic,al conditions were unstable; the reprisal

against the Left served only to polarize the issues; And there

would be a power vacuum upon the anticipated withdrawal of

British assistance to mention but a few.

Below the surface there were, nevertheless, certain

forces and trends that would negate the superficial advantages

enjoyed by the Communists. One of tbese was the return of the

King of Greece to power, which aomentarily produced A stabiliz­

ing effect on the political leadership of the country. ISS

Also, the events of 1946, from the viewpoint of the National

Government crystalized the differences between Greece and ber

154Ibid•-155Kousoulaa, Revolution and Defeat: !h! starI ~

~ Greek Communist PartY; p. 238~

Communist neighbors to the North, and her friendly neighbor,

Turkey, on the East. 156 This same trend of clearly identify­

ing the opposing power fore,s within Greece was apparent.

Tbe l~rgo multi-organizAtional BLAS was dead. As a result

the Communists stood 810ne. 151

Another fact, perhaps best identified &s psychological,

bad the potential to cut the .1n.wI. of the KKE and ultimately

de.troy its structure. It is best expressed as follows:

This is the essential difference between the Greeks and those Balkan peoples which the USSR had so far (1945) successfully penetrated. Bulgarians and Yugoslavians felt a racial kinship with the USSR that was independent or ideological sympathy. A Bulgarian or a Yugosl.vlan could be a Communist and a Nationalist at tb. s... t~e; a Greek oou1d158not.

As 8 oorollary to this, the Communists once stripped

of tbeir image as a broad popular coalition, as was the case

with ELAS, had to make it clear where they stood ideologically.159

This requirement only served to amplify the failure of the

Comaunists during the occupation wnen tbey did not prepare the

mass of peasant-soldiers of ELAS for the ultimate struggle.

The last major faot that impinged on the apparent

ripeness for Insurrection was tbe lethargic attitude of the

156woodhouse, Apple ~ Discord, p. 212.

157Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, p. 102.

158Woodhouse, Apple £! Discord, p. 114.

159Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, p. 102.

majority of the Greek people. This was evident on both 160sides of the political spectrum.

In the last analysis, the plans of the KKE to acquire

political domination of Greeoe in 1946 were based on the

assumption that the Movement would reoeive support from tbe

Communist block countries; and that the British would not

intervene. l6l But carrying Dut the plan of conquest by a~ed

rebellion by the Communists required an a~ed force. The

creation of that a~y and tbe tactical and strategic options

available to the Communists are tne topics of the next

ohapter.

160stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemna and ~portunitl' p. 118. He states the government ls-sIck and

8oucalas, The Greek Traied{, p. 102 gives the reasons for the G-.muniiti. Basica1 y he peop~e were tired of war.

161Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: !B! storl ~ ~ Greek Ca-munist Party, p. ~3'-2~9:--