The Kantian (Non)-Conceptualism Debate Colin McLear University of Nebraska–Lincoln [email protected]July 21, 2014 Abstract One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant en- dorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant’s theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant’s broader theory of cog- nition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy. 1 Introduction O NE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS OF DEBATE in contemporary Kant scholarship has been whether Kant endorses a position concerning the nature of sensory expe- rience called “conceptualism.” As a first approximation, conceptualism about experience is the claim that the capacity for conscious sensory experience of the ob- jective world depends, at least in part, on the repertoire of concepts possessed by the experiencing subject, insofar as they are exercised in acts of synthesis by the cognitive faculty which Kant terms the “understanding” [Verstand]. Exactly how we should under- stand this dependence relation, as well as the notion of experience that it presupposes, is something we will discuss in much further detail below. The historical question as to whether Kant endorsed conceptualism has also been linked to the philosophical ques- tion as to the commitments of the conceptualist position and whether it is, in the end, a tenable one. For the purposes of this article I shall focus primarily on the historical question, and thus I will largely ignore issues in the philosophy of mind and perception literature that have arisen independently of the scholarly debate concerning Kant. 1 The argument of this paper proceeds as follows. §2 briefly sketches the fundamen- tal elements of Kant’s theory of cognition. §3 articulates several major considerations which help to define the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant. In §4 I elaborate the conceptualist interpretation of Kant. I present and to some extent revise what I take to be the core interpretive commitments of the conceptualist position. §5 discusses several major objections to conceptualism and non-conceptualism, as well as a central issue of contemporary interest—viz. the so-called “Myth of the Given” and its connection to the conceptualism debate. I then summarize the argument of the paper. 1 For a useful overview of the contemporary literature see Gunther (2003); Siegel (2010); Van Cleve (2012). 1
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ONE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS OF DEBATE incontemporaryKantscholarshiphasbeenwhetherKantendorsesapositionconcerningthenatureofsensoryexpe-riencecalled“conceptualism.” Asafirstapproximation, conceptualismabout
Kant’sconceptionofourmentaleconomyisbasicallytripartite, consistingofsensations[Empfindungen], intuitions [Anschauungen] and concepts [Begriffe].2 These are allvarietiesofwhatKantcalls“representation”[Vorstellung].3
The category is representation (representatio) in general. Under itstand representations with consciousness (perceptio). A perception[Wahrnehmung], that relates solely to a subject as a modification ofits state, is sensation (sensatio). An objective perception is cognition(cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus).Thefirstrelatesimmediatelytotheobjectandissingular; thesecondismediate, conveyed by amark, which can be common tomany things(A320/B376–7).4
AsKant’sdiscussionhereindicates, thecategoryofrepresentationcontainssensation,intuition, and concept. The faculty that provides sensory representations is called“sensibility” [Sinnlichkeit]. Sensibility generates representations based on being af-fectedeitherbyentitiesdistinctfromthesubjectorbythesubjectherself. Thisisincontrasttothefacultyof“understanding”[Verstand]whichgeneratesrepresentations“spontaneously”—i.e. withoutadvertancetoaffection.
2 Thereareothersignficantrepresentationalkinds, suchas schemata and ideas, buttheinterpretivetradi-tionhasfocusedprimarilyonsensations, intuitions, andconcepts. I followthattraditioninmydiscussionhere. Onecould, however, objectthatthedebateisnotwell-formed, andemphasizetheimportanceofincluding, e.g., schemata, inthediscussionoftherelationshipbetweenconceptpossessionandper-ceptualexperience. Fordiscussionofschematainthegenerationofperceptual“images”see Matherne(Unpublished); cf. Griffith(2012); Williams(2012).
Sensibility inthecognitivefaculty(thefacultyofintuitiverepresentations)contains twoparts: sense and the imagination…But the senses, on theotherhand, aredividedinto outer and inner sense(sensusinternus); thefirstiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbyphysicalthings, thesecondiswherethehumanbodyisaffectedbythemind(An7:153).
Doestheoccurrenceofanintuitioncountashavinganexperience, inourcontem-porarysenseofacognitivelysignificantmentaleventorstatewithaparticular(sense-modal)phenomenalcharacter?9 Moregenerally, doesKant’susageoftermslike“per-ception”[Wahrnehmung]and“experience”[Erfahrung]cleanlymatchupwithours?Givenhowslipperythesetermsare, evenintheireverydayusage, weshouldbesome-whatcautiousinthinkingthattheydo. Atleasttwoworriesloomlargehere. First, wemightworrythatdisputesconcerningthenecessaryconditionsofhavinga“perception”oran“experience”aremerelyverbal. Second, wemightworrythattheconcepts<per-ception>and<experience>arenotwell-defined, andthusthatnosubstantivedisputeshouldhangoneitherof them. For thepurposesof thispaper, I shall take thecon-cepts<perception>and<experience>assufficientlywell-definedthatwecancredibly
6 Thereisafurthercontroversyhereaswhethertheimmediacyofintuitioniscompatiblewithanintuition’srelatingtoanobjectbymeansofmarksorwhetherrelationbymeansofmarksentailsmediacy, andthusthatonlyconceptsrelatetoobjectsbymeansofmarks. See Smit(2000)fordiscussion.
There isalsoaprimafacie tensionbetweenthesuggestionabove, thatwedistin-guish“intuition” from“perception”—i.e“Wahrnehmung”—andKant’s remark in theStufenleiter passagequotedabove, that“perception”[perceptio]isthecategoryof“rep-resentationwithconsciousness”, inwhichheincludesintuition. Onedifficultyisthat“Wahrnehmung”, “perceptio”, and“Perzeption”arealltypicallytranslatedinEnglishusing“perception”, whileitisunclearthatallthesetermsmeanthesamethingforKant,orthattheymeanwhat wemean, using“perception”initscontemporaryEnglishsense.Butthedifficultyisn’tjustrelatedtotheproblemofEnglishtranslation; rather, thetextofthe Stufenleiter seemstodefineintuitionintermsofbeingaconsciousrepresenta-tion (and thusa “perceptio”), but I suggestedabove theKantdistinguishes intuitionfrom Wahrnehmung byappealtothepresenceofconsciousnessinthelatterbutnottheformer.
Onepossiblemoveinresolvingthistensionistosaythatthenotionof“conscious-ness” in the Stufenleiter concerns consciousness of the representation, rather than,specifically, itscontent. Intuitions, onthisreading, wouldbeconsciousrepresentations,butthesenseinwhichtheyareconsciousdiffersfromthatofa Wahrnehmung. ThereisalreadygroundforsuchadistinctioninKant’sdifferentiationbetweentheconscious-ness inherent in the awareness of a representation—its “clarity” [Klarheit], whichrequiresonlythattherepresentationsufficefordistinguishinganobjectfromothers—andtheconsciousnessinherentintheawarenessofthecontentofarepresentation—its“distinctness”[Deutlichkeit], whichrequiresthatoneclearlyrepresentallthedifferentpartsofthecontentoftherepresentation(orthepartsofitscorrespondingobject)(An7:137-8; cf. JL 9:34; R 643, 15:283; R 1709, 16:89).15 Thismeansof resolving theissueisperhapsmadeevenmoreattractivebyKant’sremarkinthe Anthropology that,
15 Therearecomplications, however, in simply equating clarityandconsciousness; cf. B414-15, note.Kantalsoseemsquitehappytoentertainthepossibilityofunconsciousor“obscure”[Dunkel]intuitions(An7:135); cf. Wunderlich(2005), 141-2; Grüne(2009), ch. 1.3.
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Thispassage suggests thatan intuition, of itself, isatbestconscious in the senseofbeing clear [klar]. WhenanintuitionisapprehendedinanactofWahrnehmung (cf. Pr4:300), itscontentisbroughttogetherinsuchawaythatitbecomes(atleasttosomedegree) distinct [deutlich], andthusacandidateforcognition. Inthismanner, weseemabletoresolvethetensionbetweentheaccountofthedifferencebetweenintuitionandWahrnehmung offeredaboveandKant’sremarksinthe Stufenleiter.16
GiventhedifficultyofprovidingapreciseaccountofhowKant’sterminologymapsontocontemporaryusage(assumingthatitdoesatall), I focusbelowonwhatI taketo be a central aspect of the contemporary debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualistinterpretationsofKant—viz. whether intuitions, understoodbythisde-bateasmentalstateswhicharebothcognitive, andhavesense-modalspecificphenom-enalcharacter, dependon(andinwhatwaytheydependon)actsoftheunderstanding.TheemphasisonintuitionisgroundedinKant’stextsinsofarasKantrepeatedlycitesempiricalintuitionasthatwhichisourfirstorprimarymeansofbeingsensorilyrelatedtoactualobjects(Pr4:283; cf. Pr4:350; B160; A180/B222; OD 8:217). I shallfreelyusetheterms“perception”, “experience”, and“perceptualexperience”todescribethementalstatesKantdesignatesby“intuition”[Anschauung], solongasitisunderstoodthattheseEnglishtermsaremeantinourcontemporaryusage, notnecessarilyKant’s.
Thequestiontowhichwenowturnconcernstheconditionsunderwhichamen-tal state type thatKantdesignatesas“intuition” [Anschauung] requiresorotherwisepresupposesmentalactsofsynthesis(oratleastthecapacityforsuchacts)bytheun-derstanding.
Though it is controversial as towhatmightbeconsidered the “natural”or “default”readingofKant’smaturecriticalphilosophy, thereareatleastfourconsiderationswhichlendstrongsupporttoanon-conceptualistinterpretationofKant’smaturework.
IfKant’spositionisthatsyntheticactscarriedoutbytheunderstandingarenecessaryfor the cognitive standingof amental state, thenKant is contradicting fundamental
Third, anypositionwhichregardsperceptualexperienceasdependentuponactsofsynthesiscarriedoutbytheunderstandingmustalsoconstruethe“pure”intuitionsofspaceandtimeasdependentuponactsofsynthesis.22 However, Kant’sdiscussionofspace(andanalogously, time)inthethirdandfourtharguments(fourthandfifthinthecaseoftime)oftheMetaphysicalExpositionofSpaceintheTranscendentalAestheticseemsincompatiblewithsuchaproposedrelationofdependence.
tion.25 CharlesParsonsandEmilyCarsonhavearguedthatspacemustbegiveninaphenomenologicalmannerasanoriginal, non-conceptualrepresentationinorderthatwebeabletodemonstratetherealpossibilityofconstructedmathematicalobjectsasrequiredforgeometricknowledge.26 Ultimately, however, therearedifficultiesinas-sessingwhetherKant’sphilosophyofmathematicscanhaverelevancefortheconceptu-alismdebate, sincethesenseinwhichintuitionmustbenon-conceptualinaccountingformathematicalknowledgeisnotobviouslyincompatiblewithclaimingthatintuitionsthemselves(includingpureintuition)aredependentuponaconceptually-guidedsyn-thesis.27
Thenon-conceptualistreadingisthusclearlycommittedtoallowingthatsensibilityaloneprovides, in a perhaps very primitivemanner, objective representationof theempiricalworld. Sensibilityisconstruedasanindependentcognitivefaculty, whichhumanssharewithothernon-rationalanimals, andwhichisthejumping-offpointformoresophisticatedconceptualrepresentationofempiricalreality.
A state’spossessionofcontentthusdeterminesacorrectnesscondition, invirtueofwhichwecanconstruethestateasmapping, mirroring, orotherwisetrackingaspectsofthesubject’senvironment.
Tomakesenseoftheideaofamentalstate’sorepisode’sbeingdirectedtowardstheworld, inthewayinwhich, say, abelieforjudgementis, weneedtoputthestateorepisodeinanormativecontext. A belieforjudge-menttotheeffectthatthingsarethusandso—abelieforjudgementwhosecontent(aswesay)isthatthingsarethusandso—mustbeapostureorstancethatiscorrectlyorincorrectlyadoptedaccordingtowhetherornotthingsareindeedthusandso. (Ifwecanmakesenseofjudgementorbeliefasdirectedtowardstheworldinthatway, otherkindsofcontent-bearingposturesorstancesshouldeasilyfallintoplace).29
HereMcDowellclaimsthatbeliefsandjudgmentshaveaparticularwayofdisclosingtheworld to a subject and that this is away inwhichwemightunderstandworld-directedmentalstatesmoregenerally. Hefurtherclaimsthatthewayinwhichamen-talstate isdirectedat theworld is in termsof itspossessingacorrectnessconditionconcerninghowtheworldinfactis. McDowellthenrelateshisunderstandingofsuchworld-disclosingorworld-directedstatestoperceptualexperience.
McDowellhereutilizesKant’sterm“intuition”[Anschauung]whichMcDowellequateswith“experiential intake.‘’Soheendorses the idea that intuitionhascontent (beingnecessaryforour“takingin”thatsomethingisthecase), andthatitisinvirtueofthiscontentthattheexperientialstate, togetherwiththeworld, iseithercorrectorincorrect.Fromthiswecanconcludethat, accordingtoMcDowell, intuitionshaverepresenta-tionalcontent, thatthisentailsthatsuchcontentisassessableforitscorrectness, andthatintuitionswithcontentaretherebymentalstatesassessablefortheircorrectness.Hence, McDowell’sinterpretationclearlyunderstandsKantasendorsingaversionofthecontentassumption.
29 McDowell(1996), xi-xii.30 McDowell(1996), 9.
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Manynon-conceptualistopponentsofMcDowell’sinterpretationneverthelesssharewithhimanendorsementofthecontentassumption.31 However, theydifferwithhiminatleastoneoftwoways. First, thecontentofanexperiencewhichsetsitscorrectnessconditionsisattributedtotheexperienceregardlessofwhat, ifany, otherconceptualcapacitiesthesubjectmayhave. Non-conceptualcontentsarethusmeanttocaptureaspectsoftheperceivingsubject’sexperiencethatmaywelloutrunthesubject’sowncapacitiesforarticulation.32
Second, proponents of non-conceptualist readings of contentmay construe non-conceptualcontentsascorrectinamannerthatisaltogetherdistinctfromconceptualcontents, whicharetrueorfalsedependingonwhethertheconditionssetoutbytheconceptsconstituting thecontentare satisfied. Incontrast, non-conceptualcontent,muchlikethecontentofamaporarecording, isaccurateorinaccurate. Itthusadmitsofdegreesofapproximation.33
Wecanseethesetwofeaturesofnon-conceptualismatworkinaninterpretationofKantthatis, inmanyways, directlyopposedtoMcDowell’sconceptualism. RobertHannahasargued that, forKant, sensible intuitionspossesswhollynon-conceptualrepresentationalcontent. WecanseethisintwoquotesfromHanna, thefirstofwhichdescribes thenon-conceptualist position andattributes it toKant, while the secondarticulatesingreaterdetailthekindofrepresentationalcontentHannathinksispresentinperceptualexperience.
31 Many, butnotall. See Tolley(2011), Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcomingb).32 Endorsementofthisthesissometimesgoesunderthename’statenon-conceptualism’or’relativenon-conceptualism.’ See Heck(2000); Speaks(2005); cf. Allais(2009); Hanna(2005), Hanna(2008), Hanna(2011b).
33 Cf. Burge (2003). This conception of non-conceptual content also goes under name ’content non-conceptualism’or’absolutenon-conceptualism.’ See, again, Heck(2000); Speaks(2005).
Inaddition to thecontentassumption, I definedconceptualismascommitted to thecontentofintuitionbeingcompletelycomposedofconcepts. Againstthis, ClintonTol-ley(Tolley(2013), Tolley(2011))hasarguedthattheimmediacy/mediacydistinctionbetweenintuitionandconceptentailsadifferenceinthecontentofintuitionandcon-cept.
40 See McLear(Forthcomingb)formoreextensivediscussion.41 Kantdoesnot, however, denythatintuitionhas“content”[Inhalt]insomesenseotherthanthatofacorrectnesscondition. Fordiscussionsee Tolley(2011), Tolley(2013); McLear(Forthcomingb).
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ifweunderstandby“content”…arepresentation’sparticularrelationtoanobject…thenit isclear thatweshouldconcludethatKantacceptsnon-conceptualcontent. This isbecauseKantaccepts that intuitionsputusinarepresentational relation toobjects that isdistinct inkind fromtherelationthatpertainstoconcepts. I argued, furthermore, thatthisisthemeaningthatKanthimselfassignstotheterm“content”. (Tolley(2013),128)
3. ∴ Thecontentof intuition isdifferent from thecontentof concepts—i.e. it isnon-conceptual
Tolley’sargumentgivesusgoodreasontorejecttheideathatintuitioncouldhave, inKant’ssenseoftheterm, aconceptasits“content”.42 HoweveritdoesnotdemonstratethatthecontentofwhatKantcallsanintuitionisnotsomethingthat we wouldconstrueasconceptual, inawidersenseof that term. Forexample, bothpureandcomplexdemonstrativeexpressionshaveconceptualform(e.g. thatcolor, thisperson), butarenot, inKant’s terms, “conceptual” since theydonot exhibit the requisite generalitywhich, accordingtoKant, allconceptualrepresentationmust.43
4.3 Conceptualism&Synthesis
If it isn’t textuallyplausible tounderstand thecontentof an intuition in conceptualterms(atleastasKantunderstandsthenotionofaconcept)thenwhatwoulditmeantosaythatKantendorsesconceptualismwithregardtoexperience? Themostplausibleinterpretation, endorsedbyawidevarietyof interpreters, readsKantasarguing thatthegenerationofanintuition, whetherpureorsensory, dependsatleastinpartontheactivityoftheunderstanding. Onthiswayofcarvingthings, conceptualismdoes notconsistinthenarrowclaimthatintuitionshaveconceptsascontentsorcomponents,butratherconsistsinthebroaderclaimthattheoccurrenceofanintuitiondependsat
What’smore, the fact that intuitionsaregeneratedaccording toactsof synthesisdirectedbyorotherwisedependentuponconceptualcapacitiesprovidessomebasistoclaimthatwhatevercorrectnessconditionsmightbehadbyintuitionmustbeinaccordwiththeconceptualsynthesiswhichgeneratedthem. ThisseemsnicelyinlinewithKant’smuchquotedclaim,
The same function that gives unity to thedifferent representations in ajudgment alsogivesunitytothemeresynthesisofdifferentrepresentationsinanintuition, which, expressedgenerally, iscalledthepureconceptofunderstanding. (A79/B104-5)
Understanding is, generallyspeaking, thefacultyof cognitions. Thesecon-sistinthedeterminaterelationofgivenrepresentationstoanobject. Anobject, however, isthatintheconceptofwhichthemanifoldofagivenintuitionis united. (B137; emphasisintheoriginal)
Accordingtotheconceptualistinterpretationwemustunderstandthenotionofarepresentation’scontentasarelationtoanobject, whichinturndependsonaconcep-tuallyguidedsynthesis. Sowecanreviseourinitialdefinitionofconceptualismtoreaditasclaimingthat(i)thecontentof anintuitionisakindofrelationtoanobject; (ii)
Oneof themaincriticismsof theconceptualist readingofKant is that it seeminglycommitshimtothepositionthatperceptualexperienceisconstrainedbythesubject’srepertoireofconcepts. However, HannahGinsborghasarguedthatKant’sconceptual-ismneednotbeconstruedinsuchaway.47 Instead,
thereisroomforalessdemandingconceptionofwhatitisforunderstand-ingtobeinvolvedinperceptualsynthesis, aconceptionwhichdoesnotrequirethatanyconceptsbegraspedantecedentlytoengaginginsynthe-sis. Onthisconception, tosay thatsynthesis involvesunderstanding issimply tosay that it involvesaconsciousnessofnormativity…I want toclaimthatthisconsciousnessofnormativityispossiblewithoutthesub-ject’sfirsthavinggraspedanyconceptgoverninghersynthesis, and, morespecifically, withouthersynthesisneedingtobeguidedbyanyconcept.(Ginsborg(2008), 71)
AccordingtoGinsborg, weneednotreadtheconceptualistasmakingthestrongclaimthat perceptual experience is constrained by conceptual repertoire that the subjectbringswiththemtoexperience. Instead, weneedmerelyseetheissueofconceptu-alizationasoneinwhichthesubjectcombinesanassociationofsomebundleofsenseimpressionswiththesensethatsheisassociatingthemassheought, anditisthiscon-sciousnessofthenormativityofone’scombinationthatisresponsible“fortheobject-directedcharacterofourperceptions” (Ginsborg (2008), 74). Hence, ifGinsborg iscorrect, oneofthemainsourcesforobjectingtoconceptualistreadingsofKant—viz.theirsupposeddenialthatnon-rationalanimalsenjoyperceptualexperiences—wouldberemoved.48
46 Onemightworryhereabouttheobjectofperceptualhallucination. I setthisissuelargelytooneside,thoughitiscompatiblewiththeaccountgivenabovethatthe“objects”towhichoneisimmediatelyre-latedinperceptionarealways“intentional”objects. See Aquila(1983); Pereboom(1988); Longuenesse(1998), 20-6; Aquila(2003), Aquila(2008); Grüne(2009), 42.
A significantfurthersourceofcriticismofthenon-conceptualistreadingisthatitatbestrendersineffectualKant’sapparentstrategyfordemonstratingthelegitimacyofthecategoriesintheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction, andatworstshowsKanttobetotallyconfusedinhisargumentativestrategy.56
A key text for this readingcomes in theconclusion to the secondor“B-edition”versionoftheargumentoftheTranscendentalDeduction.
What thispassageanditscontextsuggest is that theculminationofKant’sargumentdemonstratingthelegitimacyoftheaprioriconceptshecallsthe“categories”requiresshowingthatallperceptiondependsonasynthesisviathecategories. Here, however, itisimportanttonotethatKantisusing“perception”[Wahrnehmung]inhisowntechnicalsense, asdiscussedin§2above, ratherthanourcontemporaryEnglishsense. Sohearguesherethatthecategoriesarenecessaryforconsciousnessofthecomplexcontentofanintuition. Butit isn’tclearthatthisisequivalenttobeingnecessaryforhavinganintuition, andthusforhavingasensoryexperienceinthecontemporarysensewithwhichwe’vebeenconcerned.
A further, andmuchdiscussed, text in theB-editionTranscendentalDeduction isalsooftentakenassupportingaconceptualistinterpretation. ThereKantsays,
Here theconceptualist takesKant to “complete” theargumentof theDeductionbyarguing that even the existenceof space and time aspure intuitions dependson asynthesisbythecategories.57 Theconceptualistideahereisthat, bymakingspaceandtimethemselvesdependonacategorialsynthesis, Kantassureshisdesiredconclusion—viz. thatallpossibleempiricalintuitionmustdependonthecategories, andthusthatallpossibleobjectsofempiricalintuitionmustfallunderthecategories. Theconceptualistthus takes thisasproof thatanon-conceptualistapproach toreading theDeductionmustmaketheargumenttherehopelessandKant’sstrategydeeplyconfused.58
One thing to note about the footnote passage is that, in thefirst sentence, Kantexplicitlyinvokesthenotionofspaceasanobjectofgeometry. Butitisn’tobviousthatKantidentifiestheconditionsunderwhichasubjectmayrepresentspacegeometricallywiththeconditionsforrepresentingspace simpliciter. Infact, Kant’sdistinctioninthefootnotebetweentheformsofintuitionandformalintuitionsuggeststhathedeniesanysuchidentification. SoKantcanconsistentlyholdthattheunityoftherepresentationofthepureformsofintuition—spaceandtime—isindependentofanysynthesis, whileacknowledging, ashedoesinthelastsentenceofthenote, thattherepresentationoftheseentitiesasobjects, aswedoin the formal intuitionsrequiredformathematics,requiresapre-conceptualsynthesiscarriedoutbytheimagination.59
We’vealsoseenonenon-conceptulistargument, above, thatKant’sargumentativestrategyintheDeductioncannotdependonmakingtheunityofintuitionitselfdepen-dentonsynthesisbecauseitjeopardizeshisargumentsintheTranscendentalAesthetic.SuchaninterpretationwouldalsodirectlycontradictKant’scharacterizationofthefinitenatureofhumanintellectualactivity(CJ 5:407; cf. B72; CJ 5:251-2, 253-4).60 Othernon-conceptualrepliestothisconceptualistreadingincludedenyingthatthesynthe-sisrequiredfortheunityofperceptualintuitionisitselfconceptual,61 anddistinguish-ingbetween the having ofan intuition, and the representationof thecontentof anintuition—wherethelatterisunderstoodasadeterminaterepresentationalrelationtosomeobject.62
Finally, andperhapsmostcentrallyforsomeconceptualistreadings(mostnotablySellars’sandMcDowell’s), theroleofconceptsinthegenerationofperceptualexperi-enceissupposedtohelpexplainhowperceptioncanplayajustificatoryratherthanmerelyacausal role in thefixationofbelief. Non-conceptualism, so theobjectiongoes, cannotaccountforthejustificatoryroleofperceptualexperienceinthefixationofempiricalbelief. Versionsofthisobjectionhaveoften, sinceWilfredSellars’sfamouspaper, goneunderthemonikerofthe“MythoftheGiven”.63 WhileitisnotentirelyobvioushowKant’stextsorargumentsyieldanysubstantiveconnectionwiththecon-cernsarticulatedbySellars, I shallsuggestbelowthreepossiblewaysinwhichsuchaconnectionmightbeunderstood.
A secondobjectionagainsttheGiven, thatmightbeattributedtoKant, isthatthemereoccurrenceofasensoryexperiencecannotlicenseanyparticularbelief. Instead,sensoryexperiencecanonlyplayitsjustificatoryroleagainstabackgroundofconceptspossessedbytheexperiencingsubject.70 Thisconnects toKantat least inthesensethat, if theconceptualist reading is correct, there is aparticularbatteryof concepts
To cognize anobject, it is required that I be able toprove its possibil-ity(whetherbythetestimonyofexperiencefromitsactualityor apriorithroughreason). ButI can think whateverI like, aslongasI donotcon-tradictmyself, i.e., aslongasmyconceptisapossiblethought, evenifIcannotgiveanyassurancewhetherornotthereisacorrespondingobjectsomewherewithinthesumtotalofallpossibilities. Butinordertoascribeobjectivevalidity to suchaconcept (realpossibility, for thefirst sortofpossibilitywasmerelylogical)somethingmoreisrequired(Bxxvi).
73 Fordiscussionsee Chignell(2011), 144–5; Chignell(2014); McLear(Forthcomingb), §§4.3and5.2.74 A further possibility is thatKant’s views are genuinely dividedhere, and that subsequentmoves inGermanidealismreflectthisfact. See Pippin(1989), ch. 2andthesourcescitedinnote 57 above.
To say thatKant is aconceptualist is, aswehave seen, to say thathe thinks (i) thecontentofanintuition(i.e. an“experience”inourcontemporarysense)isakindofrep-resentationalrelationtoanobject; (ii)suchrelationtoanobjectdependsonasynthesisdirectedinaccordancewithconcepts; (iii)synthesisinaccordancewithconceptssetscorrectnessconditionsfortheintuition’srepresentationofamind-independentobject.TheconceptualistreadingpromisestomakesenseofKant’sargumentintheTranscen-dentalDeductionbyshowinghowperceptualexperiencedependsonasynthesisbythecategories. Assumingthatwehavesuchexperience, if thecategoriesareneces-saryforperceptualexperience, thentheyhavelegitimateapplicationtotheobjectsofexperience. Inthismannerconceptualismpurportstohaveaninterpretiveadvantageovernon-conceptualistreadings. Conceptualistsfurtherclaimthattheirreadingbestexplainshowperceptualexperiencecouldplaya justificatory role in thefixationofbelief.
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