The Journal of Creative Behavior Volume 9 Issue 4 1975 [Doi 10.1002%2Fj.2162-6057.1975.Tb00572.x] HELEN F. DURIO -- Mental Imagery and Creativity

HELEN F. DURIO

Mental Imagery and Creativity

Interestingly, Sir Francis Galton, pioneer in the study of in­dividual differences, was involved in early research with bothcreativity and imagery. Galton's nineteenth century study ofthe characteristics of genius equated natural giftedness in theform of creativity with intelligence, a belief not supported bymore recent research. Galton also erred in considering mentalimagery a tool of "housewives and those of lesser intelligence"(Galton, 1952). Since Galton's time much more has beenlearned about creativity and imagery, but little research hasbeen done into the relationship of the two.

Ironically, there has been an almost complete absence ofexperimentally based research into the relationship betweenimagery and creativity, even though factors common to bothconstructs, such as originality and fluency of responses, spatialabilities, and spontaneous and free associations, are empha­sized in testing instruments used for measuring the twoabilities. To this writer, it appears that the individual ability toimage must play a valuable role in creative functioning, andindeed there are writings linking the use of imagery withcreativity, but few can be considered to be of an empiricalnature. It would seem that greater clarification of the role ofimagery in creative functioning could contribute more fully to

defining each construct in terms of observable behaviors. Be­fore attempting to relate the two, it seems wise to traceseparately the definitions of creativity and imagery.

David Ausubel (1968) has written thatcreativity is one of thevaguest, most ambiguous, and most confused terms in psy­chology and education. He insists that the creative person is amuch rarer individual than the intelligent person. Ausubelfeels it important that the criterion of originality be reserved

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for a definition of creativity, and that only those among thepopulation who demonstrate this quality to an extreme degreeby unique contributions to their fields should receive the label"creative."

Other writers are less restrictive in their definition of crea­tivity, suggesting that creative potential is present in almosteveryone. Fromm (1959) has defined the condition of creativityas the capacity for wonder and awareness. Guilford (1950)suggests that involvement in certain activities requiring theindividual's own planning and structuring, as in painting,inventing, writing, acting, composing, designing, etc., can beconsidered creative behaviors.

In reviewing various definitions of creativity, Gilchrist(1972) feels that much of the confusion results from the ap­plication of one term to different stages of the process ofcreative achievement. The word"creativity" may refer to thepotential of the individual for such achievement; yet it is alsoapplied to the intervening process by which the individual'sbehavior is directed toward a creative product, and lastly, tothe finished product itself. Gilchrist states, however, that alldefinitions of creativity share one essential ingredient: thecapacity to make products, tangible or intangible, that are bothnew and valuable.

This definition allows for the common practice of assumingthat creative behavior is distributed in some degree through­out the population and that it applies to a wide range of ac­tivities and products. Most research has utilized such a defini­tion in attempting either to identify creative individuals or tostudy those already so designated in the hope of discoveringthe correlates to creativity.

One of the most important processes in cognition is mem­ory, or the coding of information for storage and retrieval inthe memory system. "Imagery" refers ·to internal figural repre­sentations or codings which are related to sensory experiences.As with "creativity," the ·term "imagery" refers to both prod­uct and process, a usage that produces some confusion indefining it. Imagery as product refers to cognitive figural orspatial constructions; and as process, it can either be evoked asresponse to external stimulus, or invoke cognitive responsesitself by serving as stimulus. Thus, imagery can be involvedin all decoding, encoding, and cognitive construction processesof figural or spatial content.

Some writers differentiate between imagery and perception,in that while perception always requires an external stimulus,imagery does not (Bugelski, 1971). Others prefer to consider

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image and percept analogous, overlapping processes. Segal(1971) feels that sensory input only gives a clue to cognitiveconstructions on the individual's part. If his cognitive con­struction matches an external stimulus, it is a percept. If hisconstruction does not match, it is imagery.

The idea that images are vital to thought has captured theattention of philosophers for centuries. In the late nineteenthcentury, imagery was analyzed by Fechner, Wundt, Galton,James, and Titchener during the early development of psy­chology (Segal, 1971). The Wurzburg School of German psy­chologists also conducted controlled experiments and found noevidence to support the notion that images were involved inmediating between verbal symbols (Posner, 1973). Later,Bartlett (1932) suggested that in the early study of imageryan incorrect emphasis had been placed on subjective descrip­tions rather than on the function of imagery in thinkingprocesses.

The study of imagery received little attention in the UnitedStates during the reign of American behaviorism. During thepast decade, however, more attention has been paid to an­alyzing the function of imagery in cognition, as Bartlett in 1932had suggested (Neisser, 1967; Richardson, 1969; Paivio, 1971).Ranken (1963) and Paivio (1971) feel that imagery is usefulfor processing spatially oriented material and coding the figuralproperties of shapes or geometric designs, while language ismore valuable for processing sequentially oriented material.Imagery as a mediator in cognitive processes has been studiedby Paivio and others through paired associate learning. It hasbeen found an effective aid to recall, though explanationsdiffer as to why figural representations are so useful asmnemonic devices.

In general, three classifications for the role of imagery incognitive functioning can be culled from the literature: (1)Imagery is a biologically primitive coding and processingsystem. (2) Imagery is a developmental stage of cognitiveprocessing which is seen extensively in children before lan­guage skills develop. (3) Imagery is an adjunctive functionused by persons of all ages to facilitate cognitions involvingspatial relationships.

It would seem from surveying the literature on this subjectthat imagery can be involved to some degree in creativefunctioning, irrespective of particular theoretical explanation.

If one takes the position that imagery is a more primitiveevolutionary form of thought, then the wonderment of anunsophisticate in perceiving his world can be equated to novel

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responses, despite their low level relevance for society. Somewriters have conceived of imagery as reflecting a rather artis­tic, idiosyncratic method of coding information, frequentlyshowing a lack of reality testing and corresponding limitationin accuracy, for the individual may draw conclusions based onimagery that the original object did not possess (Newell, Shaw& Simon,1958; Bruneretal, 1966; McKellar, 1972). Siipola andHayden (1965) found striking examples of the use of imageryamong the retarded, and Luria's (1968) mnemonist was not ofhigh level intelligence. While the relationship between intelli­gence and imagery is inconsequential (Betts, 1909; Brower,1947; Grossman, 1954), there is little evidence to suggestthat imagery is a primitive function. Irt has been reported toowidely as a contributor to problem-solving by eminent personsto be associated solely with the less able (Agnew, 1922;Hutchinson, 1949; Roe, 1952).

There may be a superficial relationship between the primi­tive in art and in life, in that in both cases the personsconcerned are less bound by conformity and more free torespond to sensory impulse, and their internal- representationsand constructions are probably relatively undistilled by sym­bolic conventions of others. Nevertheless, there will be quali­tative differences between the products of a creative artistutilizing imagery and work done by most instutitionalizedretardates or primitive peoples. In addition, Vinacke (1952), inanalyzing creative thinking, stresses the need of the artist tomanipulate his own past experience and to recognize hisautistic and emotional responses. This is an evaluative processunlikely to occur either to the sub-normal or to the bushman.

The theoretical position that imagery was a cognitive func­tion of early man is tenable, for it would appear that man didhave to develop laboriously a symbolic system of intercom­munication before he could rely on internal verbal categori­zations. The testing of such a theory is subject to the sameverification difficulties of all research into evolutionary pro­cesses; thus, imagery as primary thought is a speculative butattractive thesis. It does not, however, explain sufficiently theuse of imagery in creative endeavor.

The assumption that iconic representation is a developmen­tal stage predating the capacity for symbolic abstraction inchildren invokes the possibility that creative individuals re­main more tied to the iconic level than less creative persons.Certainly a child at three-and-a-half or four years of age oftenexpresses himself in totally unique ways, and asks questionsthat seem absurd to adults but suggest that he is speculating

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and categorizing his world by enactive and iconic imageryrather than verbal concepts. A four-year-old child describing awinding street as a "ring-a-rosy road" appears to be making amental comparison to the active memory of going around incircles until dizzy, and not classifying by the disjunction ofstraight and curved attributes. The child demonstrates crea­tivity in the sense of unique responses to his environment andmany of these responses are obviously dominated by spatialand pictorial references of his own making.

Betts (1909) investigated imagery in 112 subjects and con­cluded that children find meaning in imaging objects, whichexplains their dependence upon concrete thinking. He foundthat an important use of imagery in adults was in revivingimages from childhood, such as an odor or the face of afriend. Bruner, Oliver, and Greenfield (1966) have popularizedthe theory that young children rely initially on motor andsensory imagery for representing their world. They statethat the child's developing linguistic competence enableshim to use verbal encodings which allow more abstract group­ings or concepts by which he comes ·to structure his world.There is a gradual withering of imagery in the growing child,and his visual impressions become less vivid and more conven­tional. Hunter (1964) also suggested that the use of imagerydeclines with age.

The use of iconic representations in the cognitive formula­tions of young children before language maturity appears areasonable explanation of the developmental process. It can beallied to creativity by the very nature of imagery, which isconcrete, individualistic, and not bound by common bases ofabstraction; and children do evidence a richness of responseunseen in the majority of adults. It also seems logical toassume that adults who can recapture this vividness of per­ception in the form of visual, auditory, and kinesthetic im­agery are capable of more imaginative and novel responsesthan those who are immersed solely in verbal representations.However, the creative adult must also utilize the system oflanguage to transmit his fanciful responses to others. Thus, thecreative adult cannot be viewed as a child still tied to iconicrepresentation, or he fails to meet the complete criteria ofcreativity. As stipulated earlier, originality of response is anecessary but not sufficient criterion for behavior which is tobe labeled as creative.

If we are to consider a useful product as a necessarycriterion for creativity, then both the foregoing theoreticalperspectives for mental imagery fail to provide a complete

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basis for relating it to creativity.The theoretical position that imagery is a language system

separate from symbolic coding, available to both child andadult, offers perhaps the best perspective from which to con­sider creative functioning. It allows for the possibility that anadult may make use of vivid and individualistic imagery in thedevelopment of a creative product, and at the same time utilizethe generalizations of his society to judge the product's rele­vancy by a symbolic language which he shares with others.Thus, both iconic and symbolic systems are needed to achievethe highest level of creative functioning.

The view of mental imagery as a separate cognitive systemis shared by a large number of investigators (Ranken, 1963;Richardson, 1969; Gazzanga, 1970; Paivio, 1971; Frost, 1971;Posner, 1973). Visual or imagery processing as opposed toverbal encoding is seen as more dependent on the physicalsimilarity of stimuli and spatial context. Visual images arethought to be stored and retrieved according to organizationalprinciples unique to this system. The ability to process imagesseems to be dominated by the right hemisphere of the brainand related to concrete, distinct, and spatial stimulus proper­ties. Split-brain studies have revealed much about the dichoto­mous nature of the brain (Gazzanga, 1970). Verbal processingseems to depend more on the ability of the left hemisphere toabstract and retrieve pertinent symbolic codes filed in thememory system to represent abstract codings of one's pastexperiences, Ideally, both imagery and verbal language sys­tems work together to affect the mental operations and prob­lem-solving processes of humans. There is probably muchvariance in the dominance of coding systems, however, result­ing in individual differences in reaction to stimuli.

In differentiating between high and low imagers by meansof spatial relation tests and questionnaires, Paivio (1971)found that high imagers responded more quickly to bothimagery and verbal instructional sets when recalling bothconcrete and abstract pairs of words. Sentences have beenstudied by Paivio, also, and he suggests that imagery allowsone to mediate concrete verbal associations in the form ofsentences. His work with Begg indicates that in mediatingconcrete sentences meaning is not dependent upon the wordsthemselves, but is stored in nonverbal or imagery code, whilewith abstract sentences meaning is tied to the specificwordings.

Despite his belief that cognitions are linked to two basiccoding systems, verbal and imagery, Paivio supports the de-

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velopmental position that language competence in childrenmay initially be dependent upon imagery. In fact, he thinks itpossible that grammar or syntax, as well as meaning, is basedon imagery coding in children. This suggests that the meaningof functions in language (syntax) is formed through a child'sawareness of actions which are repeated frequently enough tobe predictable, In children these are stored in an enactive ormotor code, not a verbal code, suggests Paivio, but eventuallythey are associated with verbal symbols that become almostreflexive in thought patterns to account for language function.This theory brings Paivio into conflict with the theory of

"transformational grammar and innate capacity as formulatedby ChomskY'(1965) in regard to deep structure meanings.

Studies have indicated that pictorial and verbal stimuli alsoappear to elicit different types of free association responses.Free associations to pictures relate more to action than toobjects. Posner (1973) reports that a picture of a shovel evokes"dig" in most individuals, but the word "shovel" elicits more"tool" associations. Thus Frost's (1971) statement that imagerymemory has its own principles of organization appears to havevalidity.

Much research remains to be done on coding to ascertainthe distinctions between imagery and verbal systems. Thestimulus properties of symbols with varying degrees of ab­straction from referents will have to be analyzed for fullerunderstanding of what categorizations are being made inhuman cognitions. Some people apparently think easily inlinguistic code and others in visual representations. Guilford'stests (1967) suggest that abilities to use the three develop­mental codes of Bruner (enactive, iconic, and symbolic) maybe uncorrelated. Perhaps some problems lend themselvesbetter to verbal strategies and some to visual imagery (Roe,1952; Posner, 1973).

Most writers in the area of creativity stress the importanceof flexibility - the replacement of a rigid set by the ability tolook at a problem from many angles. Does the utilizer of apredominantly imagery code have more creative cognitiveconstructions than those individuals who use verbal coding?Does imagery contribute to creative and flexible problem-solv­ing? The absence of abundant research in this area prevents aready answer to the question, but a case for the correlation ofmental imagery and certain creative abilities can neverthelessbe made on the basis of available literature.

It has been noted that imagery allows a greater degree ofindividualization than does linguistic coding, which is based

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on symbolic categorizations, the attributes of which havebeen more determined by consensus. An individual's imagein response to a given stimulus is unique to him, while thesymbolic code for that same stimulus shares semantic com­monality with the coding of others. The use of imagery allowsmore concrete elaboration of the components of a problemthan does linguistic coding alone. A visual representation mayallow playful shifting of the elements in a problem situation,providing a measure of novelty in the imager's solution pro­cess that is not available to the verbalizer (Kubzansky, 1961;Harman et al, 1966; Walkup, 1967; Taylor, 1979). Some scien­tists have stressed the importance of visualizing workingmodels of abstract equations as means of gaining insight(Posner, 1973) which suggests that imaging parts of a structureprovides a means for creatively transforming it.

Psychoanalytical writers, and especially those of the Jungianpersuasian, have devoted much time to the place of imageryin relation to dreams and unconscious behaviors; and moreindirectly, to imageryas a wellspring of creativity (lung, 1968).Such study is not easy replicated, however, and must beconsidered a perspective that has failed to provide sufficientheuristic stimulation for empirical research.

Several authors have stressed the importance of imagery tocreative thinking without recourse to psychoanalytical sym­bolism (Bartlett, 1927; Arnheim, 1954; McKellar, 1957, 1972;Taylor, 1959; Walkup, 1965; Singer, 1966). Taylor feels thatmore creative persons will perceive a configuration in morepossible ways more quickly than noncreative. Singer has de­voted an entire book to the value of imaging in the form ofdaydreaming, which he theorizes fulfills the need for noveltyin man. Other authors have suggested utilizing imagery as atechnique to encourage creativity (Benham, 1929; Osborn,1953; Walkup, 1967; Taylor, 1969). Walkup feels that creativeindividuals have developed an unusual ability to image andcan even react to a word such as "poverty" by imaging odorsand depressed feelings, thus becoming sensually immersed insuch cognitions. He suggests training children to develop thisskill.

Stein and Meer (1954) found that more creative subjectswere able to form better gestalten to the Rorschach when itwas projected at varying levels of clarlty, a result that suggestsimagery construction on the part of creative persons. Davisand Manske (1966) found that subjects could verbalize moreuses for an object (i.e., a screwdriver) when told to visualize itin a particular setting (a picnic) than without such instruction.

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The use of imagery to solve a scientific problem has beenexplored by Hutchison (1949); Roe (1952); Guilford (1959);and Harman, McKim, Mager, Fadiman, and Stolaroff, (1969),and all attest to its usefulness in such endeavors.

Although there is an assumption that artists are more appre­ciative of spatial relationships and design than average per­sons, research is conflicting as to whether trained artists prefercomplex or simplified figures. The Barron-Welsh measure ofartistic creativity is based on the liking for complex design asopposed to symmetrical and simple (1952,1953). Complexityis supported in the work of MacKinnon (1967), who suggeststhat all creative types prefer figural complexity. In opposition,Arnheim (1947) contended that artists select simplified formsas their preference, and Brighouse found the same preferencefor simplicity among artists in a 1939 study,

Auditory, tactile, and kinesthetic imagery have receivedeven less attention than visualizations in the study of crea­tivity. In 1922 Agnew did ask musicians, psychologists, schoolchildren, and college students to rate the intensity of theirauditory imaging as they recalled the first phrase of "America,"and found that musicians reported the most vivid images,psychologists the least.

Khatena (1973) studied children scoring high on originalitymeasures in relation to the type of analogy they used mostfrequently, and found support for imagery, in that they pro­duced simple image analogies more than they invoked per­sonal, symbolic, or fantasy analogies. Their imagery analogiesalso increased in complexity with age. Kubzansky (1961) foundin a sensory deprivation experiment that imagery use amongsubjects after a two-and-a-half-hour period of isolation cor­related with the Guilford tests of creativity, but few other di­rect attempts to correlate imagery and creativity are available.This is paradoxical considering that similar underlying factorswhich seem to account for imaging and creative behavior areemphasized in tests for both these abilities. Free associationmeasures involving variety, vividness, and originality, as wellas spatial relationships, embedded figures, and, variations inperspective, appear to be common to measures of both at­tributes (Guilford, 1959; Sheehan, 1967). It is true that neitherconstruct of creativity or imagery has been so clearly definedby a domain of observable behavior as yet to avoid conflictingoutcomes in measurement. Neither creativity or imagery canbe considered a simple unitary behavior and thus examples ofpurported associated behaviors are given different interpreta­tions among investigators.

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If imagery does provide a type of mediation contributing tocreative functioning, then a question arises: To what degreeare imagery and creativity associated?

Earlier, imagery was defined as "figural cognitive construc­tions" and creativity as "original and productive behavior."Thus any relation of the two should center upon original anduseful cognitions of a figural type. This suggests a theoreticalcommon factor for both constructs, as well as additional fac­tors unique to imagery and creativity.

Any degree of commonality has yet to be verified em­pirically, but Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect (1959, 1967)suggests a position from which to consider both the commonand unique factors in imagery and creativity. Study of theunique factors from the SOl perspective provides a means forrecognizing important differences in individual coding stra­tegies. It can be seen by Guilford's matrix that divergentthinkers can use imagery as well as verbal contents in theircreative constructions, and conversely that figural content(imagery) can playa role in information processing throughthe operations of memory, cognition, convergent thinking,and evaluation, in addition to figural constructions of diver­gent thinking.

Undoubtedly the form of the incoming data (i.e., Paivio'sconcrete or abstract words) is of major importance in percep­tion, storage, and retrieval; but also seen as important is theindividual's own tendency to use mediation of a particulartype, such as either verbal or imagery coding. Informationprocessing is necessarily unique due to differences in pastlearning and genetic compositions. The meaningfulness of dataregistering upon sensory organs is in those cognitions con­structed by the individual and placed in storage to be re­trieved by his memory system. As Bartlett suggested in 1932,humans impose an idiosyncratic organization on recalled ma­terial. Individuals "reconstruct," rather than "recollect"; thisis the basis for distortion as well as possibly creative differ­ences in human cognitions.

The use of imagery as a mnemonic device has been wellestablished, but with a demonstrated relationship to creativity,curricular applications might make use of imagery training tofurther creative problem-solving. To date, training in the useof imagery has been largely to aid rote memory, but withgreater understanding of the relation between imagery andcreativity, one can speculate that such training could be incor­porated into the more molar activities involved in creative and

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productive problem-solving, such as visualizing hypothesesand solutions.

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Helen F. Durio.Address: 2405 Deer Pass, Austin, Texas 78746.

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