The Interstitial Subjectivities of the Yunnanese Chinese in Thailand1

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The Interstitial Subjectivities of the Yunnanese Chinesein ThailandWen-Chin Chang

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The Interstitial Subjectivities of theYunnanese Chinese in Thailand1

Wen-Chin Chang

In contrast with the high visibility of the ethnic Chinese in Thailand who originate from

the coastal provinces of southeastern China, the migrant Yunnanese Chinese are a later

group arriving in the country by land via Burma, mostly after the 1950s. Their migration

history and process of resettlement are intertwined with complex political, economic and

social factors. Feelings of anxiety, uncertainty and ambivalence regarding who they are

are often expressed in the speech of different generations. Although many studies tend to

determine a group’s identity (identities), the inquiry into the indeterminate aspect of

ethnicity in individual members is often overlooked. The present paper examines the

interstitial subjectivities of this particular migrant group to disclose an ongoing

negotiation of their inner self with the external social world across time and space in

connection with their twofold affiliations with Han Chineseness and a Yunnanese

overland trading ethos.

Keywords: Subjectivity; Interstitial; Liminality; Centre and periphery; Overland

Yunnanese

From ethnicity to subjectivity

Ever since Leach’s master work Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954/1993) was

published, many Southeast Asianists have been intrigued by the subject of interacting

social systems, especially between highland and lowland societies. Scholars have

identified different forms of group interactions, including symbiotic and confronta-

tional, and have broken the oversimplified dichotomy of highlanders versus

lowlanders in terms of contrasting fixed religious beliefs, modes of subsistence,

political systems and kinship structures. (e.g. Lehman 1967; Keyes 1979; Woodward &

Russell 1989; Tannenbaum & Kammerer 1996). With respect to ethnic studies,

researchers have commonly pointed out the fluidity and ambiguity of a group’s

Correspondence to: Wen-Chin Chang, Assistant Research Fellow, Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS,

Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei 115, Taiwan. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1444-2213 (print)/ISSN 1740-9314 (online)/08/020097-26

# 2008 The Australian National University

DOI: 10.1080/14442210802023632

The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology

Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 97�122

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identity in response to changes in circumstances (e.g. Moerman 1965; Kunstadter

1967; Lehman 1967; Keyes 1979; Anonymous 1987; Wijeyewardene 1990; Toyota

2003). Their findings are largely in accordance with ethnic studies in other parts of

the world, especially those pursuing a situational or instrumental interpretation. In

this direction, ethnicity is apprehended in the light of group contact and

interrelations (Eriksen 1993, p. 9), and ethnic boundaries are considered social

rather than cultural (Barth 1969). This approach leads to a focus on identity-as-

construction as against the primordial approach that emphasises identity-as-essence.

Linking ethnic studies with the development of world politics, group relations have

been investigated in particular from the angle of hierarchical opposition between

majorities and minorities within the framework of modern nation-states, especially in

the past three decades (e.g. Keyes 1981; Anderson 1983; Harrell 1995; Gladney 1998).

Researchers of ethnic politics direct their attention to how the state agency, with its

hegemony, determines the structural differentiation between the ruled and the ruling.

By probing into issues of cultural politics and power relations, they analyse the ethnic

discourses that are drawn up by the state for confirmation of its national unity and

the dominance and superiority of the ruling group, its objectification of minorities

and the latter’s appropriation of and resistance to representations of otherness. In

short, identity is deemed a relation of difference, which distinguishes Self from Other

by means of inclusion versus exclusion (e.g. Comaroff & Comaroff 1992; Hsieh 1995;

Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Blum 2001; Wang 2003).

Closely related to the present study, Hill’s Merchants and Migrants: Ethnicity and

Trade Among the Yunnanese Chinese in Southeast Asia (1998) adopts a research

emphasis on social boundaries and makes another contribution to Leach’s legacy. In

sharp contrast with the high visibility of the Teochiu (Chaozhou), Hakka, Hainanese,

Hokkien (Fujianese) and Cantonese in Thailand, the Yunnanese Chinese, a later

Chinese migrant group who arrived in the country mostly after the 1950s as a result

of the Communist takeover in China (and, later, the chaotic sociopolitical situation

in Burma), have so far drawn limited academic attention.2 Hill’s book is the first

ethnographic monograph to give a more complete picture of recent Yunnanese

migration in relation to the persistence of Yunnanese mobility throughout history,

especially through the long-distance caravan trade in upper mainland Southeast

Asia.3 Based on Leach’s approach, Hill probes into the interaction between Yunnanese

identities and the changing circumstances in the larger social world through a

historical analysis of the interplay between trade and politics. Rather than resorting to

the typical cultural explanations, she provides enlivening historical contextualisations

and insights into both the Yunnanese periphery position from China proper and their

relationship with this powerful central state when interacting with local polities.

Historically, the Yunnanese were referred to as Ho/Haw in upper mainland

Southeast Asia and were known for their specialty in long-distance trade and political

mediation (Hill 1998, pp. 68�73). Hill argues that this identity dynamism and

ambiguity is continued in the present day ethnicity of the migrant Yunnanese in

northern Thailand. It is seen, on the one hand, in their appropriation of many

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Chinese customs, in particular the funeral rituals used as an upward strategy for

demonstrating their Chinese identity and merging themselves with their ‘overseas’

counterparts in the public eye, and on the other in their close intragroup affiliation

and self-assertion of the Yunnanese entrepreneurial penchant for risk taking.

Furthermore, the case of the Yunnanese distinguishes itself from that of many

ethnic minorities in the region in two ways. First, prior to out-migration, the

Yunnanese Chinese belonged to the great majority group (the Han) of the powerful

Chinese state; those residing in urban areas in Yunnan often enjoyed cultural,

political and economic positions superior to those of autochthonous ethnic

minorities (Giersch 2006, pp. 193, 203).4 Second, they are a ‘civilised’ people with

a written history. Therefore, as far as historical analysis is concerned, Hill has the

advantage of access to historical documents to trace the movement of the Yunnanese.

This is very different from researchers working among tribal groups without a written

culture, who are dependent totally on the collective memory and oral history of the

people and some piecemeal evidence recorded by lowland groups. As Leach himself

acknowledges, the presentation of highlanders’ ethnohistory is often speculative

(1954/1993, p. 238).

Hill’s interpretation from a long historical perspective is insightful. Nevertheless,

there is a major deficiency in her ethnographic analysis. Since launching field research

among the migrant Yunnanese in the second half of the 1970s, her research site has

been limited primarily to Chiang Mai (the capital of Chiang Mai province in

Thailand), despite the fact that a far larger Yunnanese population resides in more

than 70 border villages, mainly in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces with a few in

Mae Hongson province. This constraint on her fieldwork was due to the

inaccessibility of most Yunnanese villages before 1990, related to their direct or

indirect connection with two Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang; KMT) armies, the

Third and Fifth Armies, composed primarily of Yunnanese Chinese.

The KMT armies were based on remnant troops that withdrew from Yunnan to

Burma after the Communist takeover of 1949. They organised themselves as guerrilla

fighters in Burma during the 1950s. In 1961, the guerrilla organisation was disbanded

under international pressure, but a major part of the Third and Fifth Armies

(totalling approximately 3,200) was able to retreat to northern Thailand with tacit

permission from the Thai government. From the 1950s to the 1980s, these two KMT

forces played an important role in facilitating the resettlement of a large number of

Yunnanese refugees in the country (see Kanjana 1995; Chang 1999, 2001, 2002,

2006a).5 The KMT forces functioned as patrons for their fellow Yunnanese,

negotiating their entry with the Thai government. Moreover, the KMT forces fought

for the nation in several important battles against the communist forces along Thai

borders and inside the country in the early 1970s and early 1980s. Their bravery

assisted them and many civilian Yunnanese refugees in obtaining legal status. Yet,

both their military entrenchment and involvement in contraband border trade caused

great controversies in Thai society and the international media, and this still

overshadows the public perception of the Yunnanese in Thailand today.

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During the period when the KMT troops were stationed in a series of posts along

the northern border between the 1960s and 1980s, most Yunnanese villages were

under their supervision. Outsiders were generally not allowed to enter the villages.

Under such circumstances, long-term ethnographic research was simply not possible.

This factor has resulted in either overlooking the role of the KMT forces in the

migration history of the Yunnanese refugees and the process of their resettlement, or

a misrepresentation of the armies in nearly all existing studies. In Hill’s case, the

omission results in a failure to examine the intertwining relationships between

the KMT forces and the Yunnanese migrants when discussing the issues of identity,

trade and politics. Nevertheless, her early studies of the migrant Yunnanese have

considerable significance, and her analytical insights have, indeed, laid a good

foundation for later researchers.

Over the past 13 years, I have been to 25 Yunnanese villages along the Thai border

and have also conducted research among the urban Yunnanese in Chiang Mai,

Chiang Rai and Bangkok.6 At the beginning of the research, the subject of ethnic

identification was a major concern. I recognised that their shifting identities as

Yunnanese (Yunnan ren ) or Chinese (zhongguo ren ) or Han (hanren

) in different contexts that corresponded to many other ethnic studies stressing

ethnic fluidity. However, after getting to know the people better, learning not just

what they say, but also how they think, feel and do things, I came to see that the

assertion of multiple identities does not sufficiently articulate who the migrant

Yunnanese are. It is not just what they identify with, but also what they do not

identify with and their constant feelings of liminality centred on their repeated

experiences of displacement. The emotions of anxiety, uncertainty and ambivalence

regarding who they are came across in their speech of different generations7 more and

more clearly after I had gained their trust enough that they would tell me their stories

and allow me to wander around the village and family spaces to observe their

everyday life. I came to see their narrations and practices as disclosing an ongoing

negotiation of their inner self with the external social world across time and space

that encompasses both primordial and instrumental elements in their identity.

Cultural expressions are not always appropriated for ethnic demarcation, as claimed

by Hill.

Looking into the research trend of ethnic interrelations, scholars have endeavoured

to reconstruct and deconstruct the communal memories of ethnic communities, and

to illustrate the formation and development of ethnic categories and interaction

patterns. However, the voices of individual subjects are insufficiently heard; the

dimension of their inwardness is often overlooked. Many studies tend to determine a

group’s or community’s identity (identities), but the inquiry into the indeterminate

aspect of ethnicity in individual members is often ignored. In contrast, the case of the

Yunnanese leads me to go beyond the knowable and verbalised domain and to look

into the realm of subjectivity, meaning ‘the inner feeling self [and] its relationship to

emotional experience in the world’ (Ellis & Flaherty 1992, p. 2), in order to learn how

individuals seek to survive in everyday experiences in relation to ethnic others; in

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what manner they negotiate with, give in to or resist the social matrixes they are

enmeshed in. Consequently, this research orientation enables me to look at many

delicate feelings, such as loss, pain, desire, wish, alienation, anxiety and ambivalence.

I have tried not only to look at the strategies they apply, but also to delve into the

multiple subject-positions involved in the process of shaping and reshaping the

strategies, and to perceive the constraints as well as agency in response to the external

contexts (Smith 1988; Hall 1990). This approach is accordingly consistent with

Belsey’s viewpoint on aspects of both liminality and agency in one’s subjectivity; as

she puts it:

The subject is . . . the site of contradiction, and is consequently perpetually in theprocess of construction, thrown into crisis by alterations in language and in socialformation, capable of change. And in the fact that the subject is a process lies thepossibility of transformation.

In addition, the displacement of subjectivity across a range of discourses implies arange of positions from which the subject grasps itself and its relations with thereal, and these positions may be incompatible or contradictory. It is theseincompatibilities and contradictions within what is taken for granted which exerta pressure on concrete individuals to seek new, non-contradictory subject-positions. (Belsey 1991, p. 597)

In another paper (Chang 2006a), I have explored the migrant Yunnanese

subjectivity with respect to their diasporic consciousness tied to their repeated

movement on the one hand and their social memory about their Han ancestors’

migratory practices on the other. That paper looks into the Yunnanese migrants’

conceptualisations of home and the intertwining of their various migration patterns

as refugees, military men, traders and labourers. The feeling of ‘dwelling in

displacement’ underscores the fundamental basis of their narrated stories and

constructs particular discourses on ‘home away from home’. By probing the physical

and cognitive aspects of their migration that links up with the longue duree of

Yunnanese migration culture and trading tradition, I accentuate the different layers of

their perceptions of time and place and illuminate their interplay. The findings point

to the Yunnanese ‘multiple positioning’, connected to their self-questioning of where

their home is (homes are), and disclose the underlying interstitial state of their

diasporic consciousness.

In the present paper, I look further into the subjective ambivalence of the

Yunnanese with respect to their identification. Although mindful of liminality, my

investigation does not deny the fact of ethnicity or deride ethnic theories. In fact, the

question of intergroup relations has to be considered in order to work through and

work out8 the realm of subjectivity and the external life-world. In the following

sections, I examine the identity discourses of the Yunnanese contained in varied

forms of narratives*oral, written and performative*that concern the rhetoric of

Han Chineseness underlining their genealogy books, their adherence to a Yunnanese

lifestyle demonstrated in their funeral rituals par excellence, the informants’ self-

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ascriptions (in relation to other communities) and public perceptions of the

Yunnanese drawn from Thai academic studies, media reports and my conversations

with ordinary Thai people. Ethnographic data point to the significance of the military

background of the Yunnanese and a Yunnanese trading ethos, which interact with the

ethnocentric thinking of Han identity. On the one hand, their appropriation of

different identities allows each individual to position himself/herself differently in

response to specific circumstances and opens up the possibilities for change. On the

other, their acknowledgement of the unresolved tensions embedded in these different

identities reveals a deep sense of loss*loss of who they are. It is an ongoing process of

identification and de-identification that situates the Yunnanese in a constant state of

liminality or a realm of interstitiality, embracing both forces of agency and

constraints.

Refugee�Warrior Community

In contrast with many other cases of dispersed refugees, a large proportion of the

Yunnanese refugees in Thailand acted in organised groups under the direction of the

KMT troops. They were united by the same fate and constituted what Zolberg,

Suhrke and Aguayo (1986) call a ‘refugee�warrior community’. Throughout the 1950s

to the 1980s, the KMT armies played a leading role in facilitating a large number of

helpless Yunnanese refugees in their resettlement, providing protection from the

assaults of other military forces, and finally gaining legal status in Thailand.

Moreover, the KMT armies organised cross-border trade in the form of mule

caravans and assisted civilian traders in the engagement of the same. Nevertheless,

the troops were also a source of exploitation; abuse of military power occurred from

time to time in the recruitment of new members or in the forcible taking of women.

Looking back to their life experiences, the old generation has sad memories of

sufferings in repeated flights and wars. While relating past history, a sense of

uprooting and displacement underlies their stories. For the ex-soldiers, their lives

were occupied by fighting in various places. Many elderly informants reported joining

the military in order to survive*the army provided sustenance and a way to fight

back so that they could regain their homeland. They launched attacks in Yunnan from

time to time and frequently had military conflicts with the Burmese army. They regret

the fact that they spent a large part of their lives in the army. Some of them fought

against the Japanese during the Second World War. After the Japanese came the

Chinese Communists, who were then followed by the Burmese, the Miao and the

Thai Communists. Many lament that they have not achieved any personal success and

feel like failures.

While narrating former military experiences in Burma, informants often referred

to the unstable situation that compelled the troops to move frequently. They

frequently had to walk through heavy rain and brave the relentless heat. The

fluctuating weather conditions caused various illnesses; malaria was a terrible threat

to the troops. In addition, the soldiers encountered shortages of essential goods. ‘You

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had to eat anything you could find,’ said a dadie9 (first generation in Burma and then

Thailand) of Patang village (Wiang Kaen district, Chiang Rai province). He was born

in 1935 and fled Yunnan when he was 16 years old. He joined the KMT later in

Burma and recalled the living conditions:

It happened from time to time that we didn’t have food. The troops had to findwild vegetables, but sometimes other troops would have passed the place before us.In that case we could hardly find any wild vegetables . . . Some plants made you sickafter eating, but when your stomach is empty, you just eat. Once we did not haverice for 7 days. We could only get a kind of water plant along a river . . . There wasno salt either. After eating the plants for 7 days, we became very feeble and couldnot see things clearly. We finally received a telegram saying that rice had beendelivered at a certain place. We had to walk for another 3 days to reach that place.

As far as the civilian refugees were concerned, they too experienced great pain in

flight. Many came to Burma a few years after the troops had arrived there. Although

many refugees gathered around the KMT bases in order to seek protection, frequent

warfare affected their living conditions and forced them to move frequently. A

dama10 (first generation in Burma and then Thailand) of Huo Fei village (Fang

district, Chiang Mai province) narrated her flight experience:

I got so tired from walking and carrying my child on my back . . . I gasped. [On theway, there were] big holes [on the] muddy ground. People fell into a big ditch.Mules, adults and children all fell. Some people were too tired to carry theirchildren. They abandoned them on the way. Some of them were eaten by wildanimals. I carried my child. I didn’t leave him on the way. I continued to carry himeven though I often felt I would be unable to do so.

After retreating to Thailand in 1961, General Li and General Duan, the

commanders of the Third and Fifth KMT Armies, gained a foothold along the

northern border by establishing a series of military posts. Most of the troops’

dependents remained in Burma in the 1960s; movements of Yunnanese civilian

refugees to Thailand took place only after 1964 when the sociopolitical conditions in

Burma became increasingly unstable. General Li and General Duan sent their troops

to Burma in the second half of the 1960s and 1970s. They escorted a great number of

dependents and fellow refugees to Thailand. Luo dama (first generation in Burma

and then Thailand) of Ban Mai Nongbua related her family’s entry into Thailand:

My family came with [a troop of the Third Army] in [1973]. There were about 120families on that trip. We first arrived in a mountain village near the Burmese�Thaiborder, but could not enter Thailand without a permit . . . General Li had tonegotiate with the Thai government and, about a year later, we were finally allowedto enter the country. We were divided into several groups and assigned to different[KMT] villages.

Despite destitute living conditions at the beginning, migrant Yunnanese slowly

reconstructed their familial and communal lives. The most illustrative phenomenon

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relating to community life in the Yunnanese villages is shown in their cultural

organisation of the village landscape. In the course of my visit to many Yunnanese

villages, I realised that the villages have a distinct structure irrespective of size.

Regardless of the continuous influx of new arrivals, the houses are arranged in a

certain order. In the initial stages, the village was divided into wards. The early

migrants built their houses along the two sides of the main road. By and by, new lanes

appeared that were connected to the main road, thus forming an organic whole. The

later migrants settled around the earlier migrants.

Many of the KMT villages began to hold Chinese lessons immediately after their

arrival.11 Gradually, other public facilities, such as the Guanyin temple, the cemetery,

shrines for Yunnanese/Chinese gods and the marketplace, were set up. Moreover, each

village established a self-governing committee responsible for implementing the

orders of its patron, the KMT army.12 The committee also maintained contact with

local Thai authorities, took care of village matters and organised public ceremonies.

Simply put, in Burma first and later on in Thailand, the Yunnanese refugees made

an effort to follow in the steps of their predecessors by pursuing a familiar lifestyle.

This was done by engaging in long-distance caravan trade that took them away from

the villages and maintaining Yunnanese tradition in everyday life, especially through

food processing, ritual observance and the cultural organisation of the village

landscape. Thus, the Yunnanese refugees created a link between the past and

the present. Some of them became aware in the 1960s, and others in the 1970s, that

the dream of ‘fighting back to Yunnan’ would remain a dream. In this situation, it

was the village settlement that helped them plan for the future and establish a sense of

continuity even on foreign soil. By relocation of the familiar cultural sites mentioned

above, the Yunnanese refugees were able to transform a ‘non-subject-position of

space’ into ‘the subject-position of place’ in a meaningful manner (Hirsch 1995, p. 9).

It was a process of emplacement and home-making. Each Yunnanese village mirrored

a small Chinese society and became the new home of the villagers. This helped bring

about a sense of belonging in the wake of a transient status. These efforts were the

result of a longing for their old homes. However, the Yunnanese refugees continued

to be haunted by the uprooting they had undergone. Thus, there is a paradox in their

diasporic subjectivity that is characterised by displacement and emplacement.

Han Ancestry

While narrating their migration history, many informants did not limit themselves to

their own experiences of flight. They often mentioned their ancestors’ immigration to

Yunnan in the form of organised armies led by generals during the Yuan (1271�1368

CE) or Ming (1368�1644 CE) periods. In Home Away From Home (Chang 2006a),

I have analysed Yunnanese migrants’ appropriation of genealogy books or oral

narration about the history of their founding ancestors’ movement to Yunnan to

make claims for their Han descent. Although this popular social memory may

overwhelm the reality, the underlying significance is connected to their subjectivity.

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On the one hand, such reference connects the Yunnanese migrants’ military

background in a foreign land with their ancestors’ heroic conquests in frontiers

perceived as ‘barbarous’ at that time; on the other, it accentuates their orthodox Han

genealogy and points to the differentiation of their Han allochthonous position from

that of non-Han autochthonous others in Yunnan. Consequently, distant ancestral

localities prior to their ancestors’ migration to Yunnan continue to serve as

meaningful tropes for the present-day identification of the Yunnanese migrants.

Apart from genealogy books and oral narrations, Yunnanese migrants’ religious

practices, especially in daily ancestor worship, death rituals and celebration of

traditional festivals, constitute another means that emphatically indicates their Han

Chinese identity. These performances express the Yunnanese cosmology, which is

centred on communications between human beings and the supernatural. The latter

includes deities, ancestors and ghosts that exist in invisible realms and are believed to

possess the power to protect or harm/punish humans. This belief leads the people

to hold rituals in a discreet manner so as not to offend supernatural beings and to

entreat them to bestow health, prosperity, harmony and so on.

However, I am not suggesting a fixed Yunnanese way of ritual observance. Local

influences and adaptations are evident. In this respect, the eclectic nature of popular

Chinese religion (Yang 1994) helps the integration of new elements in ritual

performance, such as the use of modern forms of paper money and worship items, or

inviting Thai monks to chant sutras at funerals. Such adaptations are invested with

proper meanings conforming to their pre-existing tradition and are deemed

Yunnanese Chinese rather than Thai. Take the invitation of Thai monks as an

example. Back in Yunnan, people were accustomed to hiring Buddhist monks.

Although the Buddhist monks in Thailand follow Theravada Buddhism, and those

(among the Yunnanese Han) in Yunnan follow Mahayana Buddhism, Yunnanese in

Thailand consider invitations to the former as a suitable substitute. They differentiate

between Buddhism in China and that in Thailand only in terms of the manner of

clothing and the monks’ way of living, and not on the basis of any theological

differences. In ritual performances, what differs is the language used; the act of

chanting sutras itself is deemed unchanged and, thus, remains as efficacious as the

traditional one. In other words, the new practice does not contradict their knowledge

of and contact with Buddhism in China (see also Hill 1992, p. 327).13

Such religious practices mark a sociocultural boundary between the Yunnanese

migrants and the Thai people, who do not perform these practices. At funerals, I have

heard elderly informants remark that the non-performance of the rituals will result in

their assimilation. Hill has also treated the Yunnanese organisation of funerals in

Chiang Mai temples as a means of public demonstration of their Chinese ethnicity

(1998, p. 137). However, beyond their ethnic differentiation, I suggest that, more

fundamentally, the ritual performances express the people’s profound attachment to

their origins based on their cosmology between the dead and the living. It is not

uncommon for families with improved financial conditions to seek opportunities to

hold salvational rites for their departed members for whom they were not able to

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organise proper rituals when they died (in Yunnan, Burma, Thailand or other places).

There have also been salvational rites organised for all the clan ancestors. The scale of

such performances is extensive; the performances are presided over by more than 10

Taoist priests and last more than 10 days. The rituals traverse spiritually through

distant time and space, connecting the dead of different periods, those who departed

in varied places and the human world with the spiritual world. Basically, the

performances are an obligation the people owe to their ancestors and other spiritual

beings prior to any consideration of ethnic boundaries.

This central motive of obligation is also articulated in the narration of many ghost

stories and relevant dreams by participants at the xiangbang (mutual assistance )

of funerals.14 Owing to space limitations, I only cite one example here.15 One early

morning when I joined a xiangbang, villagers were circulating a mysterious story

related to the departed grandmother of the bereaved family. The family had

performed the burial rites more than a month before. Many paper models of horses,

horse grooms, cars and electrical appliances had been burned to her at the grave. The

family was going to erect the tomb tablet that day. However, prior to the day, a female

relative dreamed that the grandmother came to tell her that there was a hole in the

neck of one of her horse grooms and thus they could not proceed easily on their

journey. That relative related the message to the bereaved family the next morning.

Villagers were discussing the dream. They said that after the ritual of infusing life into

the offerings, these paper objects become real. The hole in the neck must have been

made accidentally while transferring the offerings to the grave. The family then

decided to burn more paper ingots to the grandmother so that she could use the

money to hire another horse groom.

Parallel to the social memories of Han ancestry, the ritual performances and ghost

stories also disclose how the Yunnanese subjectivity is connected to distant time and

space. Although far away, the relevant time and space are intimately tied to

Yunnanese everyday life. On the one hand, the persistence of ritual performance

reveals the fear and anxiety held by the Yunnanese of incurring spiritual punishment

in the event of failure in observance; on the other, it illustrates consciousness of their

origins and their present existence in a foreign land. Therefore one’s subjectivity is

linked not only to the present time or the human world, but also connects the past

and future with the present, and the human with the spiritual. While illustrating a

strong sense of continuity in Han descent (whether authentic or not) and the

perception of its superiority, fundamentally the ritual observances of the Yunnanese

are supported by their religious beliefs over and above any considerations of ethic

differentiation.

Superior Han Chinese Discourse

The preceding discussion on Han descent and the cultural organisation of the village

landscape among the migrant Yunnanese manifests their forceful Han Chinese

identity. In contrast with interpretations given by mere instrumental or primordial

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approaches, a standpoint that emphasises Yunnanese subjectivity embraces both

elements in relation to ethnic others and to their own ancestors. Although in terms of

Han Chinese identity the case of the migrant Yunnanese seems to correspond to

many general studies on earlier overseas Chinese that delineate a homogeneous

picture of their clinging to ‘Han Chineseness’, the following sections looking into

intergroup relations will discard this homogeneous understanding. The main

question tackled is, how do the overland Yunnanese, with their particular migration

history and distinctive Yunnanese characteristics, separate themselves from different

ethnic groups, as well as their outstanding overseas counterparts (those Teochiu,

Hakka, Hokkien, Hainanese and Cantonese) in Thailand? Rather than coming up

with a unifying position in relation to various communities, we detect their shifting

positions between central and peripheral identities in different contexts and perceive

the ambiguity and tension embedded in their subjectivity.

In Relation to the Thai and Hill Tribes

The discourse of civilising other ethnic groups was often brought up when

informants talked about their resettlement in villages surrounded by hill tribes or

Thai people. This situation not only exists generally in villages where Yunnanese Han

are the majority, but the mentality of regarding Han culture as superior and being

proud of acculturating the ‘less developed’ others also exists in villages where

Yunnanese Han are the minority. The following narrative is given by Peng dadie (first

generation in Burma and then Thailand), who settled in the lowland Thai village

Tathon (Mae Ai district, Chiang Rai province). He said:

We Chinese (zhongguoren ) can endure hardships. We came here, worked

hard and lived in a frugal way. They Thai people (taiguoren ) saw us and

liked us. We worked for them; we did everything. We fertilised farms with cattle

and horse excrement. Thai people didn’t know about fertiliser before. They saw us

use it and learned from us . . . We came to their village. We had to learn their

language, word by word . . . We Chinese have perseverance. We worked for them

for 1 year and saved a little bit. We worked for them for 2 years and saved a little bit

more. Afterwards, we bought our own land.

This kind of pioneering discourse of a superior Han Chinese mentality recurred

frequently when informants recalled their early stages of resettlement. The following

narrative was given by Rao dadie (first generation in Burma and then Thailand) of

Huae Hai village (Wiang Haeng district, Chiang Mai province), where most ex-

soldiers of the Third Army have married women of other nearby ethnic groups

(including Tai, northern Thai and Lahu women). It conveys similar sentiments:

In the beginning we spoke Baiyi hua [the Tai language] with our wives and

gradually taught them Yunnanese. Some are able to speak very fluently; some only

to a certain degree. Though Han people are the minority in this area, we stay

together and our way of living is still primarily Han. Our next generation can also

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speak Chinese [Yunnanese] . . . As we Han people stay together, we don’t have to

speak their languages; we force them to speak our language.

In terms of Harrell’s ethnic interpretation (1995), the above narratives are

underpinned by an ‘ideology of the civilizers’ (Harrell 1995) founded both on the

belief in superior Han descent and origin from a powerful state with a long history.

The ideology was expressed in statements about the people’s proclivity for endurance,

diligence and frugality, their advanced agricultural knowledge and their way of living.

It illuminates a heroic spirit of pioneers that echoes their distant Han ancestors’

exploration in Yunnan.16 Whereas Yunnan was a frontier to their distant ancestors,

the border villages of northern Thailand are a wasteland to the Yunnanese migrants.

To emphasise their cultural superiority, Yunnanese migrants often make con-

temptuous remarks about other ethnic minorities, especially about hill tribes, by

saying that they are sexually immoral and backward in their living. ‘Those minority

people are different from us Han (tamen shaoshou minzu gen women hanren butong

)’ is a common opinion (which implies that everything

Han is superior). The Yunnanese who have married hill tribe women are often teased

by their fellow men and warned to keep a watch over their wives or not to stay in

their wives’ villages because it is believed that these women are likely to run away with

other men. Other general negative comments are that hill tribe people do not wash

themselves often or only wash and change clothes once a year, that they do not work

hard and do not know how to save money. Some villagers even remark on the

children of mixed marriages as ‘offspring of barbarous people (yiren shengde xiaohai

)’.

In comparison with Hill’s research, I differ from her view that the Yunnanese in

northern Thailand ‘do not express the extreme ethnocentricism and unshakable sense

of superiority’ (1998, p. 113). My findings indicate the opposite. Moreover, Hill

claims that the Yunnanese in Thailand always call themselves Chinese (zhongguoren

) (1998, p. 27) and do not use the term Han (hanren ) (1998, p. 14). Based

on the above narratives (and general conversations not quoted here), I found that

informants usually refer to themselves as hanren (Han people) in relation to other

ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu ) and call themselves zhongguoren (Chinese)

vis-a-vis the taiguoren (the Thai majority ). The term zhongguoren literally

means ‘people of the Central Kingdom/State’ and taiguoren means ‘people of the Thai

Kingdom’. The term zhongguoren implies a political message of people and state/

kingdom, whereas hanren stresses the cultural superiority of Han civilisation.17 For

the migrant Yunnanese now staying in Thailand, they see themselves as originally

from China, a much larger and more powerful nation than the host country. With

regard to the hill tribes, the Yunnanese consider the mountain peoples as without a

true nation; thus, the comparative basis for identity centres on the standard of

civilisation. In other words, the Yunnanese alternate between ‘Chinese’ (based on the

criterion of state) and ‘Han’ (based on the criterion of culture) when relating to

different groups; both positions convey superior meanings for them.

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In Relation to Yunnanese Muslims

With respect to group interactions, it is necessary to mention the relationships

between Yunnanese Han and Yunnanese Muslims (the Hui). Like Yunnanese Han, the

Hui are allochthons in Yunnan. The Hui migrated to Yunnan from the Yuan period

onwards for military or commercial purposes from Central Asia or northwestern

China (Yang et al. 1994; Forbes & Henley 1997). Many Yunnanese Muslims are good

at trading. Muslim traders had been engaged in long-distance caravan trade with

Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam possibly from the Yuan period. However,

Yunnanese Han have been a much larger group in engaging in this activity since the

Ming period, following their massive inflow into Yunnan.18 Most Muslim immigrants

married Han women. These Muslim immigrants adhered to their religion, but

absorbed much of the Han culture. Based on physical appearance, Yunnanese

Muslims are quite indistinguishable from the Han people today.

Owing to their religious practices and engagement in trade, historically the

Yunnanese Muslims have tended to stay together in towns and cities. According to

Suthep (1977, p. 48), a small community of Yunnanese Muslims in Chiang Mai has

been visible since the 1890s. Apart from Chiang Mai, where the majority of

Yunnanese Muslims are located, among the 25 Yunnanese villages I have been to, six

have Yunnanese Muslim communities. Although there is no record of the entire

Yunnanese Muslim population in Thailand today, it is certain that they form a small

minority compared with the Yunnanese Han.19 Most of the Yunnanese Muslims also

arrived after the 1950s. They went through the same flight experiences and engaged in

military activities and caravan trade as did the Yunnanese Han, although the young

generation of Yunnanese Muslims (especially those residing in cities) are reluctant to

acknowledge former connections with the KMT.

Despite the similarity in daily practices, a ‘we�they’ social boundary between the

Han and the Hui is maintained, based mainly on the criterion of religion. While

talking about religious beliefs, Yunnanese Han call themselves believers of Buddhism

(xinfojiao ) or of Heaven and Earth (baitiandi ), but in relation to the

Muslims they identify themselves as ‘we believers of Han religion’ (women hanjao

) and the latter as ‘those believers of Islam’ (tamen huijao ). Similarly,

the Muslims refer to themselves as ‘we believers of Islam’ (women huijao ) and

to the Han as ‘those believers of Han religion’ (tamen hanjao ).

In their accounts to outsiders, both Yunnanese Han and Yunnanese Muslims often

reduce their bilateral differentiation to the consumption or non-consumption of

pork. Yet, Yunnanese Han often add an ethnocentric judgment while pointing out the

difference and comment that the Muslims are a bit demanding and self-centred (ba

) in observance of their religious dictate. The Yunnanese Han explain that when

holding banquets, they have to prepare ‘Muslim banquets’ (huixi ) for the Muslim

guests, but when the Muslims hold banquets they do not show the same

consideration to their Han guests. Moreover, the Han consider the Muslims

untrustworthy by referring to the saying ‘one can eat the meal offered by the

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Muslims, but never listen to the Muslims’ words (huizi de fan keyi chi huizi de hua

bukeyi ting )’. (In contrast, I have not heard

Yunnanese Muslims making any negative remarks about the Han group; however,

this may be due to my own Han status.) Hui informants tend to emphasise that both

Han and Hui are Chinese, and differ only in religion. The Hui also like to stress their

sense of solidarity, especially seen in their religious practices and monetary donations.

Although both Han and Hui attend communal activities organised by the Yunnanese

Association in Chiang Mai, they do not have much interaction in business and

intermarriages rarely occur. In short, the Han regard themselves as superior to the

Muslims, in terms of descent and culture, whereas the Hui distinguish themselves by

their religious devotion and group solidarity.

Peripheral Inferiority

Kolo Versus Jin-ho

Among the Thai people, the Yunnanese further distinguish the northern Thai from

the central Thai. By resorting to the ideology of civilisers, the migrant Yunnanese

place themselves in the centre vis-a-vis the ethnic others in the periphery. Although

being a minority themselves, they demean the autochthonous northern Thai with a

pejorative image of barbarity and underdevelopment, treating them as a subgroup of

the Thai people. This derogatory perception is implied in the appellation of Kolo for

the people. The origin of the term is uncertain; it is actually not used by the northern

Thai themselves. Based on my interviews, only the rural Thai people living around

the Yunnanese villages are aware of this appellation and are annoyed by it. A

stereotyped story repeated widely among the elderly Yunnanese shows their scornful

perception of the northern Thai. They said that the Kolo were still very wild (yeman

) and poor when they arrived in Thailand. They dared not leave their villages

alone for fear of being robbed or killed by the Kolo. They stressed that the Kolo were

especially in favour of robbing the Yunnanese because they knew that every

Yunnanese carried a pen, a watch and 30 or 40 baht (Thai currency) with him.

It is true that before the 1980s northern Thailand was not very developed and

public security was weak in remote areas. Mote mentioned that more than 20

villagers from Ban Yang were killed by armed Kolo gangsters during the first 10 years

after the village was founded (1967, p. 512). Informants also described some incidents

of robbery and murder committed by local Thai. However, Kolo gangsters were not

the only bandits; there were bands of Yunnanese robbers as well, who particularly

selected their prey from fellow Yunnanese (Mote, 1967, p. 493). The pejorative

connotations ascribed to Kolo are stigmatised perceptions applied by the Yunnanese.

Actually, most Yunnanese refugees were even poorer than local Thais when they

arrived. In order to make a living, some people had to work for nearby Thai farmers.

The pen, watch and cash mentioned above symbolise civilisation and development. It

may be true that some Yunnanese refugees had these objects with them, but certainly

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not all of them did. Today, the term taiguoren (Thai people) is applied more

commonly by the Yunnanese; however, in comparison with the ‘diligent’, ‘trust-

worthy’ and ‘civilised’ Chinese, the Thai in general are regarded as ‘lazy’,

‘untrustworthy’ and ‘superficial’. Such stereotypical perceptions exist not only among

members of the older generation, but also among the younger generation.

Interestingly, the narration about ‘Kolo’ parallels that about the term ‘Jin-ho’ (or

Ciin-haw) used by Thai people when referring to the Yunnanese migrants. Deviating

from the historical connotations of ‘Ho’, which see the Yunnanese Chinese as traders

or political intermediaries in upper mainland southeast Asia, the term has changed to

a derogatory name category in Thailand, often suffixed with another word ‘Jin’.

Etymologically, ‘Jin’ is the standard term for ‘Chinese’ in the Thai language, but the

origin of ‘Ho’ is no longer certain.20 Today, the compound term ‘Jin-ho’ particularly

refers to migrant Yunnanese connected with KMT forces.21 Instead of being civilised

Han Chinese, the Yunnanese are perceived as a backward and violent hill tribe,

specialising in contraband border trade, especially drug trafficking. For the general

Thai public, the entrenchment of the KMT armies along the border was a threat to

their national sovereignty and the illicit trade was unacceptable. Critical reports

projected the KMT as a serious problem (especially in the 1970s). The following

excerpts from local newspapers illustrate this view.

The KMT is notorious for its dealings in the opium trade. Their activities are

shrouded in mystery and it is next to impossible for a stranger to penetrate their

camps. No person[s] other than military officials [are] allowed to go up to the

KMT camps in Chiang Rai or Chiang Mai [provinces]. Press interviews with KMT

leaders such as Lao [D]uan and Lao L[i] [the two leaders of the KMT troops in

Thailand] are denied and doubts linger as to their intent. (Thanit 1973)

Throughout our history Thailand has . . . claimed that it has never been a victim of

colonization. But the presence, actions, and arrogant behavior of the CIF22 General

Li and [D]uan . . . have abused our welcome and so taken advantage of their

hosts . . . constitute a colonial presence in our country . . . Li and [D]uan have

exercised authority in challenging the legitimate passage of Thai police and customs

officials . . . We can only hope that our Government will wake up to the true nature

and objective of their insidious and dangerous guests and begin soon to take

whatever measures are necessary to regain sovereignty in the northern border areas.

(Theh 1974)

These [Chinese Ho] were considered ‘illegal’ since the residents were paying no

taxes to the government and had been engaging in illegal activity. Some of them,

despite having been granted Thai citizenship, did not speak Thai and were far from

having developed a Thai identity. (Pongsak 1984)

Behind these hostile remarks lay a ‘xenophobic fervor of nationalism’ (Hanks 1964,

p. 12). The framework of nation-state was embedded in the formation of Thai

identity. The Jin-ho who retained their distinctive traditions and community life were

perceived as unassimilated and their loyalty to Thailand was questioned.23 Their

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military organisation and engagement in the narcotics trade were the central points of

criticism. However, the deeper layers of regional politics linked to inter-state

animosity, power struggles between local groups and central states and official

corruption were not discussed in these reports.

In writings released by the Thai government, as well as in those of Thai academics,

similar criticisms of the Jin-ho are found. By reviewing a few titles, we will

understand the situation: Problems of Security along the Thai-Burmese Border in

Northern Thailand (Saiyud 1982); The Invisible Refugees and Related Problems (Kraisri

1982); Problems of Minority Groups and the National Security: A Case Study of Chinese

Ho (former KMT Military Refugees) (Anan 1990); Hill Tribes and Minority Groups in

Northern Region and National Security (Somphong 1990); A Minority Group in

Thailand: A Case Study of the Policy to Resolve the Kuomintang Problem (Nittha 1993).

All these writings deal with the migrant Yunnanese (and some also with hill tribes)

and refer to them as Ho. The works are based primarily on official data and media

reports, but not on in-depth interviews with Yunnanese migrants. The Ho are

sometimes mistakenly categorised as a hill tribe24 and are associated with illicit entry,

underground trade, threats to national security and deforestation, as well as being

seen as a hindrance to Thai�Burmese relations. Similar remarks have been made by

most Thai people I have interviewed or talked to casually (including academics) in

neighbouring areas of some Yunnanese villages, Chiang Mai and Bangkok.

The involvement of the Yunnanese in the drug trade was real. There were clashes

between Yunnanese traders and the Thai Border Patrol Police; the government also

launched military actions to target the drug trade a few times in some Yunnanese

villages.25 In short, the migrant Yunnanese are perceived as problematic. However,

their participation in fighting against the Communist forces in Thailand is not

appreciated or remembered. The cultural aspects of their life are also ignored, owing

to limited mutual contact. All the criticisms of the migrant Yunnanese are founded

on a nationalised or moralised framework and lack a deeper analysis of

contextualisation.

Juxtaposition of the narratives of Han descent presented by the Yunnanese with

those of the Thai reports and academic writings on the Ho shows a chasm between

the discourse of Han Chinese superiority and that of vicious Jin-ho. In reality, a sense

of superiority and inferiority coexists in Yunnanese subjectivity itself with respect to

who they are. Although deriving strength from a heroic social memory of Yunnanese

migration history, Yunnanese migrants tend to hide their Yunnanese identity from

the general Thai public. Many informants belonging to different generations confide

that this feeling of awkwardness arises especially when they have to go through the

Thai bureaucracy to apply for citizenship or other documents. Teacher Li (first

generation in Burma and then Thailand), who has been settled in Chiang Mai for

nearly 30 years, complained: ‘It takes endless efforts to get a Thai ID (fei jiuniu erhu

zhili ), and it costs you much money [for bribery]’. Yunhua (second

generation in Thailand), a university student I interviewed in 1995 and 1996, moved

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to Chiang Mai with her family from Ban Mai Nongbour in the early 1990s. She told

of her experiences:

I feel bad every time I have to tell a government officer which village I was from. As

I am a university student, I am treated decently, but I still feel anxious about

revealing my Yunnanese identity. I know fellow villagers are easily discriminated

against when they go to government offices. They don’t speak Thai well. It seems

that the Thai authorities see the infamous past related to the illegal trade imprinted

on their faces. They don’t speak Thai well.

Meixiang (second generation in Thailand), also a university student in 2002,

related similar feelings:

I feel uncomfortable when classmates playfully call me Jin-ho. I’m from doi

[mountain] Mae Salong. To them, Jin-ho means a hill tribe from mountains. They

don’t know we are Han people from Yunnan . . . Sometimes I correct them with the

term ‘Jin-Yunnan’.

Bound by different discursive forces, affiliations and contextual constraints, most

urban Yunnanese are conscious of the need to cover up their Jin-ho identity from the

outsiders, but still maintain their intragroup association. Two Lin sisters (first

generation in Burma and in-between generation in Thailand), who have worked in

Bangkok for over 20 years, are successful business women. They first worked at a

Teochiu company for many years and then opened their own import�export

company. The capital flow per month is over a billion baht. Their hectic life only

allows them to go home for a few days during the Chinese New Year. Their parents

still live in a Yunnanese village and their married eldest sister lives in another village

nearby. The married sister told me that her parents are not used to the busy lifestyle

in Bangkok. Moreover, they feel uncomfortable about confining themselves in their

daughters’ apartment. Lin dajie noted:

My sisters demand that my parents do not speak with the neighbours. They are

afraid they would reveal their Yunnanese background . . . Over the years, they have

kept their Yunnanese identity a secret. I cannot blame them. I was in Bangkok

before. I know how people think of us Yunnanese. But I feel sad for my sisters; deep

in their minds, especially of the youngest one, lies a strong sense of inferiority.

The informants’ words above disclose deep anguish and distress at their social

location. Stepping outside the Yunnanese villages, they also step out of the central

position of their self-perception. To sustain their Han Chinese superiority, they learn

to appropriate the identity of the overseas Chinese originating from southeastern

China. However, in relation to these counterparts who came by sea, the Yunnanese

are also situated in a marginal position, as analysed in the following.

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In Relation to the ‘Overseas’ Chinese

The descendants of earlier Chinese immigrants from the southeastern coastal

provinces of China have successfully integrated with Thai society and have become

the most outstanding ethnic group in Thailand on account of their eminence in

economic, political and academic fields (Skinner 1957, p. 1958; Cushman 1989). They

are mostly located in urban and central Thailand. Their successes have not only been

socially recognised, but also socially accepted by the general Thai public. In relation

to these Teochiu, Hakka, Hokkien, Hainanese and Cantonese, the Yunnanese are

conscious of their peripheral status, seen from both social and cultural standards.

Despite the claim of Han descent, their home province in Yunnan is a remote frontier.

Historically, it was seen as a barbarous land, full of poisonous vapour and diseases.

Criminals and punished officials were exiled there. It is still considered one of the

least-developed provinces in China. Its distinctiveness lies in the ethnic cultures of the

non-Han minorities. Likewise, the northern borderland of Thailand where most

Yunnanese migrants are settled is seen as a remote region. It was once a buffer zone

for various ethnic militias and considered an unlawful area. Its attraction for tourists

today depends largely on its natural landscape and hill tribe cultures. Accordingly,

both Yunnan and northern Thailand convey images of wildness, original beauty and

exotic ethnicities to outsiders. Thus, the Yunnanese, with their military background,

are wrongly seen as one of the hill tribes. Even their overseas counterparts are

unaware of their Han descent and look down on them as a result of the

contemptuous meaning ascribed to the ‘Ho’. Consequently, when moving to cities,

the Yunnanese conceal their overland background and try to merge into the group of

overseas Chinese.

Vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese, the Yunnanese tend to highlight their differentia-

tion in terms of their penchant for risk taking in economic ventures. This, in turn, is

attributed to the ‘wild’ physiography of Yunnan, which demanded such a

temperament. Huang dadie (first generation in Burma and then Thailand) says:

We Yunnanese have a kind of daring spirit (maoxian fannan de jingshen

) and tough personality. This is mainly due to the mountainous

environment in Yunnan. The land is not fertile for agriculture. Yunnanese simply

have to leave their homeland to make a living. Our ancestors had been engaged in

the caravan trade for hundreds of years.

Ah Song dage (first generation in Burma and in-between generation in Thailand)

makes a similar remark: ‘We Yunnanese love gambling on big trade . . . [We] have a

sort of wild temper (sanba piqi ). When stationed in mountains [during the

period of the KMT armies], [those military Yunnanese] talked with guns’. In contrast,

the ethnic Chinese who arrived by sea are considered conservative. Ah Song dage

further characterises the differentiation: ‘Those Teochiu are good at business.26 They

are willing to earn 1 baht, 2 baht [yikuai liangkuai douzhuan meaning

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making small profits]. We Yunnanese only aim at big profits [douzhi zuo dade

]’.

Yunnanese audacity seems to be the primary factor in their economic undertaking;

nevertheless, in addition to a daring disposition, the organisation of long-distance

trade requires strict observance of discipline, division of labour and the observance of

taboos (Zheng 1982; Wang and Zhang 1993). Leadership and hierarchy in particular

were two distinctive features demanded in the armed caravan trade, as I have analysed

in another paper (Chang 2002). In addition, informants comment that shrewd

traders are keen to observe changing circumstances to control their investment. The

ethnic enterprise of the jade trade among the Yunnanese illustrates this trading ethos

(Chang 2003, 2004, 2006b). It is therefore the combination of audacity, shrewdness

and discipline in implementation that determines the success of long-distance

economic undertaking. In comparison with the discourse of civilised Han Chinese-

ness, this image of an audacious and shrewd temperament highlights a contrasting

dimension. Being migrant Yunnanese in Thailand, they carry on their Yunnanese

traditions, which bring with them rich sociocultural resources for application in trade

and everyday life; however, the traditions cast a shadow on their identity in relation to

the majority Thai, as well as their overseas counterparts.

Conclusion: Unresolved Tension

Accordingly, Yunnanese subjectivities are linked to varied discursive affiliations; the

articulation of each identity is based on a certain discourse or ideology and

simultaneously conceals the others. On the one hand, we may say that their shifting

between these different affiliations facilitates the better accommodation of migrant

Yunnanese in the host country and their continuing movement. It provides them a

psychological space to fall back on and respond to different communities in different

contexts. However, conversely, the oscillation points to their ambivalence in a

culturally mixed position*neither convincingly Han nor genuine Yunnanese. More

specifically, they are not considered as equally Han as the overseas ethnic Chinese and

their clinging to a Han origin excludes them from a Yunnanese autochthonous

footing, despite their emphasis on a Yunnanese trading ethos. Hence, their identity

narratives reveal an interstitiality*what Bhabha has called ‘feelings of overlap and

displacement of domains of differences’ (1994, p. 2), embodying unresolved tension

and uncertainty in their subjectivities. The equivocal situation is especially seen in

their acknowledgement of their somewhat ‘wild’ nature, but at the same time their

dissatisfaction with the Thai public’s perception of them as a lawless and backward

‘tribe’ involved in smuggling activities.

Among the migrant Yunnanese, the first generation has experienced the most

traumatic hardships on account of repeated warfare, displacement and resettlement in

destitute conditions. Many dadie have survived from one battle to another, and from

one retreat to another. Their memories are haunted by fear, blood, death, hunger and

diseases. Many dama, although not direct participants in the fighting, lived under

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great stress caused by poverty, worries about their husbands’ safety, children’s

illnesses, fear of each new environment they arrived in and so on (Chang 2005).

Although strongly attached to Yunnanese tradition and nostalgia for Yunnan, the old

generation sees this native province as a changed homeland. When going back, they

discover that their original villages or towns have changed a lot and many old relatives

and friends have passed away. Yunnan, to them, is a place for visits but not for

permanent return. Having built up their second homes in Thailand with their bare

hands, they identify these border villages as their ‘final home’ where they will pass

away. Different from earlier Chinese immigrants in southeast Asia, they have no wish

to be buried in their homeland. Although grateful to Thailand as a fertile and tolerant

country, they do not trust local Thais and feel distanced from the Thai government.

For most of the younger generation, going to cities for their personal advancement

has become an unavoidable trajectory. More and more Yunnanese youth go to Thai

schools for higher education and engage in a variety of different professions.

Although having direct contacts with Thai society, most Yunnanese still maintain

their intragroup associations. They may behave as the Thai do in the public domain,

or even partly adapt to the Thai lifestyle at home, yet the present study’s analysis of

their inner self opposes any superficial interpretation of a trend towards assimilation.

As long as the demeaning perception of them as Ho continues, the demarcation

between the Yunnanese and Thai people is likely to remain.

In conclusion, the migration history and process of resettlement of the Yunnanese

Chinese in Thailand is complex and the complexity is related not only to

contemporary contexts, but also connects to different discursive forces developed

throughout history. The present study has tried to probe into these intricate threads

and shed light on the different facets of the people’s subjectivities. It is a realm that is

neither an ontological given nor a fixed state of being, but something in the process of

formation. Metaphorically, this is a realm that resembles borderlands that ‘thematize

problems of boundary’ (Johnson & Michaelsen 1997, p. 2), suture both limitation

and potentiality and traverse in a process of constant negotiation between inclusion

and exclusion. The special Yunnanese military background and the twofold

affiliations with Han Chineseness and a Yunnanese overland ethos have distinguished

them from the general picture of overseas Chinese in Thailand. Although the two

identity resources provide sociocultural enrichment, the Yunnanese also have to

reconcile any tension arising between the two aspects.

Notes

[1] I conducted intensive fieldwork among migrant Yunnanese in northern Thailand from

November 1994 until August 1996. Subsequently, short-term fieldwork ranging from 1 to 3

months was undertaken in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004�2005, 2006 and 2007 in northern

Thailand, as well as in upper Burma (totalling 12 months). I am indebted to the anonymous

reviewers for their invaluable comments, and especially grateful to one reviewer for his help

in language editing. In addition, I thank Sun Laichen for discussion of the term Hanren while

I was revising the paper, Michael Herzfeld for advice on publication and to the Harvard-

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Yenching Institute, Harvard University, which is hosting me for the academic year 2007�2008. Any remaining errors are my responsibility.

[2] The term ‘Yunnanese Chinese’ generally refers to the Han Chinese group in Yunnan but, in a

broader sense, it also covers the Muslim group (see Hill 1998, pp. 106�7). In the present

paper, the focus is on the Yunnanese Han who have migrated to Thailand; they are also called

Yunnanese, following their self-reference as Yunnanren. In terms of migration route, the early

Chinese migrants who came from the coastal provinces of southeastern China by sea to

Thailand, and their descendants, are classified as ‘overseas’ Chinese in the present paper. This

group includes the Teochiu (Chaozhou), Hakka, Hainanese, Hokkien (Fujianese) and

Cantonese. Conversely, the Yunnanese came to Thailand by land and are referred to as

‘overland’ Yunnanese (Chang 2006a). Skinner’s Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical

History (1957) and Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (1958) are

regarded as early classics for studies on the ‘overseas’ Chinese; later, this group is also referred

to as ‘Sino-Thai’ or ‘ethnic Chinese’ by other authors (see Cushman 1989).

[3] Other ethnographic studies include Mote (1967), Suthep (1977), Imanaga (1990), Forbes

and Henley (1997), Wang (2006), and Huang (2007). Mote’s article is the first publication

dealing with contemporary Yunnanese migrants in Thailand based on a 1-week visit in two

villages. Huang’s recent work treats the issue of ethnic identity of the Yunnanese Chinese in a

border village in northern Thailand by adopting a perspective of shifting identities in relation

to external contexts. The rest of the studies are focused on Yunnanese Muslims.

[4] There are exceptional cases where the Han are a minority to adjacent non-Han groups; for

example, see Shih (2003).

[5] The number of Yunnanese refugees in Thailand in the 1950s was still small. Three

Yunnanese villages were founded during this period with the help of KMT troops. Most

Yunnanese refugees have arrived since the 1960s. Based on my field data and relevant

records, there were at least 44 Yunnanese refugee villages in 1974. Among them, 29 can be

classified as KMT villages (i.e. those under the protection and supervision of the KMT

forces). A rough estimate of the population of the KMT Yunnanese in the mid-1970s was

approximately 25,000 people and Yunnanese refugees as a whole numbered approximately

30,000. The continuous inflow of Yunnanese refugees from Burma has ensured a steady

increase in the Yunnanese population in Thailand. According to 1994 data released by The

Free China Relief Association, a semi-official organisation in Taiwan that established

The Service Corps for Refugees in Northern Thailand in 1982, there were 77 villages

inhabited by Yunnanese refugees. The total population in these villages was 89,018. The

Han Chinese accounted for approximately 60 per cent (approximately 54,000); the rest was

accounted for by other ethnic groups, mostly hill tribes.

[6] Ban Mai Nongbua (Chaiprakan district, Chiang Mai province) was my major research site

for intensive participant observation during my doctoral field research. For basic data

regarding the 25 villages, see Chang (1999, pp. 102�4).

[7] For classifying generations, see Chang (2006a), where I integrate the factors of place and time

in categorising the generations.

[8] The term ‘to work through and work out’ is derived from Bhabha’s writing on in-between

culture (1996, p. 59).

[9] While referring to former officers, the Yunnanese still use the previous military ranks; for the

rest, the Yunnanese address each other with affiliated terms based on the kinship principle.

In the present paper, I adopt this custom to address my informants as I did during the course

of my fieldwork. Dadie ( ), senior uncle, is an address for male adults who are older than

one’s father.

[10] Dama , senior aunt, is an address for female adults whose husbands are older than

one’s father.

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[11] The textbooks were brought in from Taiwan; for an analysis of Chinese education in the

Yunnanese villages and the people’s relationships with Taiwan, see Chang (2006a).

[12] Generally speaking, the Yunnanese villages of the Chiang Mai and Mae Hongson provinces

were under the domain of influence of the Third Army, whereas those of the Chiang Rai

province were under the domain of influence of the Fifth Army.

[13] Invitations to Yunnanese Taoist priests still prevail in ritual affairs. Some of the priests travel

between the Shan state of Burma and northern Thailand. Their profession has become a

transnational business.

[14] Xiangbang is the most illustrative form of reciprocal exchanges among Yunnanese, especially

at weddings and funerals. On such an occasion, villagers lay aside their work and go to the

family undertaking the event to give whatever help is necessary. In effect, this serves as a

significant impetus to Yunnanese communal life and is a prominent performative narrative

revealing Yunnanese intragroup associations.

[15] For more stories, see Chang (1999, p. 242�3).

[16] The positive impact of the migrant Yunnanese on nearby ethnic groups in agriculture has

also been noted by Mote (1967, p. 506) and Hanks and Hanks (1987, p 137�8) in their earlier

studies.

[17] The self-reference of hanren in relation to ethnic minorities as non-Han is also a prevailing

phenomenon among the Yunnanese Chinese in Burma. According to elderly informants, this

differentiation in address has been passed on for generations, since the days in Yunnan.

Whereas hanzu (the Han nationality) is a modern creation of the early twentieth century,

hanren is an old term in Chinese history (see Jia 2003, pp. 169�84). I suspect that Hill’s

informants used zhongguoren rather than hanren while speaking to her because Hill is

American. In the context of the Chinese language, it makes more sense for the people to

express their ‘Chinese’ identity to Hill, a Westerner, when talking about their relations with

the majority Thai and also the minority hill tribes. In addition, the field site where Hill

conducted her research was basically in Chiang Mai (not the border areas), where the

number of hill tribes was very small at the time of her research. Hence, the chances of urban

Yunnanese remarking on tribal minorities were small.

[18] Based on my own field research in northern Thailand, the Muslim population constitutes less

than 10 per cent among the migrant Yunnanese. Informants (both Han and Muslims)

consistently stress that the Han is the largest group in Thai�Burmese transborder trade.

Thus, the finding contradicts many earlier Western travelogues and colonial surveys, which

maintained that the Yunnanese Muslim traders were the major group (e.g. Sladen 1870;

Anderson 1876/1972; Colquhoun 1900). Several later academic studies followed this view

(e.g. Yegar 1966; Suthep 1977; Forbe & Henley 1997). My interpretation is that the Muslims

traders could have been more noticeable in some parts of the borderlands, especially during

the time when the Muslim revolt took place (1856�1873 CE); the Muslim traders controlled a

major part of the Yunnanese border trade (see Wang 1968; Huang 1976). However, the Han

Chinese have been the primary trading group in history. Sun (2000), investigating the issue

of Chinese�southeast Asian overland interactions from the fourteenth to seventeenth

centuries by using historical sources in Chinese, Tai and Burmese, indicates the

predominance of Yunnanese Han over Yunnanese Muslims in long-distance trade (p. 223).

Giersch (2006), working on the transformation of the Yunnan frontier between the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, also presents similar findings.

[19] The five villages with Yunnanese Muslims are Ban Yang (Fang district of Chiang Mai

province), Huo Fei (Fang district of Chiang Mai province), Tathon (Mae Ai district of

Chiang Mai province), Mae Salong (Mae Faluang district of Chiang Rai province), Ban

Tham (Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai province) and Wawii (Mae Suae district of Chiang Rai

province). The ratio of the number of Muslim families to that of Han families in these

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villages in 1995�6 was 70:400 in Ban Yang; 20:130 in Huo Fei; 20:40 in Tathon; 25:730 in Mae

Salong; 10:150 in Ban Tham; and 30:286 in Wawii.

[20] Li Fuyi (1976, p. 31�4), a Chinese scholar on Tai studies, says that the term ‘Ho’ was used by

the Baiyi (a Tai-speaking people) to refer to the rulers of the Nanzhao Kingdom (738�902

CE) and their descendants in Yunnan. ‘Ho’ means ‘grand’ or ‘heaven’ in the Baiyi language.

The capital of Nanzhao was referred to as ‘Tai-ho’ (grand town) and Nanzhao was called

‘Meng-ho’ (the grand kingdom). However, with the great influx of Han Chinese into Yunnan

at the beginning of the fourteenth century and the concomitant process of Sinicisation, the

term ‘Ho’ was used by the Tai people with reference to Yunnanese Chinese both in Yunnan

and neighbouring countries. Giersch also mentions that Han Chinese are called Ho by the

Tai in Yunnan (2006, pp. 14, 36, 84).

[21] The Yunnanese Muslims in Thailand are referred to as Ho Islam or simply also as Ho by the

Thai people.

[22] The Chinese Independent Forces (CIF) is an official name given by the Thai authorities to

the KMT.

[23] This suspicious attitude was also directed towards tribal minorities.

[24] The same treatment is found in the categorising system of the library of Chulalongkorn

University.

[25] For example, in 1982, a powerful military operation was launched in Ban Hin Taek (Mae Fa

Luang district of Chiang Rai province), the headquarters of the infamous drug warlord Khun

Sa. More than 200 people died in this operation. In 1984, another action was undertaken by a

special Thai military unit, The Black Panthers, in Ban Piang Luang (Wiang Haeng district of

Chiang Mai province). It lasted 18 days; more than 30 villagers were arrested and killed

without trial. The Thai government’s reaction to drug trafficking varied from time to time,

depending on who was in power at any given moment and on the varying degrees of pressure

exerted by the US Drug Enforcement Administration. There were also connections between

high-ranking Thai officers and the KMT troops and other drug warlords; for a description of

the complex interrelations, see McCoy (1991).

[26] The Teochiu are the most prominent group in terms of numbers and economic success

among the ethnic Chinese in Thailand. The Yunnanese often refer to them as representative

of all the ethnic Chinese who came by sea to Thailand.

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