The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agr eement By:Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall,January 14, 2014 No. 599 January-February 2014 The Geneva nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has become a focus of growing domestic controversy in Iran between the conservatives and Revolutionary Guard on one side, and President Hassan Rouhani, the nuclear negotiating team, and those considered the reformist camp on the other. Optimism on a possible improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations is gradually giving way to the anti- American discourse that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard promote. At the same time, the regime‟s security establishment, particularly the Revolutionary Guard and the Intelligence Ministry, are continuing a crackdown on the opposition and social networks, making clear that they will do whatever is necessary to protect Iran‟s revolutiona ryIslamic nature. In the short time Rouhani has been in office, the Revolutionary Guard commanders have had considerable success in constraining his hesitant efforts toward a domestic transformation, while repeatedly warning that they will not accept the use of the nuclear agreement to facilitate far-reaching domestic, regional, and international changes (mainly toward the U.S.) that would divert Iran from the path they have ordained for it. In any case, Rouhani is part of the establishment, and his room to maneuver in effecting major domestic changes is limited to begin with. His charm offensive in the West does not add up to a real change in Iran, given the strong status of the Revolutionary Guard. The intensity of public support for Rouhani is of no significance when it comes to Iran‟s nuclear progress and status. No r is the p ublic suppo rt for Rouha ni likely to have substantia l implica tions for the state of civil society and human rights in Iran. The interim nuclear agreement betwe en Iran and the P5+1, and subsequent assessments both in the West and in Iran about “winners and losers,” have become a focus of fierce domestic controversy in Iran between the
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8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement
The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the
Geneva Nuclear Agreement
By: Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, January 14, 2014
No. 599 January-February 2014
The Geneva nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has become a focus of growing domestic
controversy in Iran between the conservatives and Revolutionary Guard on one side, and President
Hassan Rouhani, the nuclear negotiating team, and those considered the reformist camp on the other.
Optimism on a possible improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations is gradually giving way to the anti-American discourse that Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard promote. At the same time, the
regime‟s security establishment, particularly the Revolutionary Guard and the Intelligence Ministry,
are continuing a crackdown on the opposition and social networks, making clear that they will do
whatever is necessary to protect Iran‟s revolutionary Islamic nature.
In the short time Rouhani has been in office, the Revolutionary Guard commanders have had
considerable success in constraining his hesitant efforts toward a domestic transformation, while
repeatedly warning that they will not accept the use of the nuclear agreement to facilitate far-reaching
domestic, regional, and international changes (mainly toward the U.S.) that would divert Iran from
the path they have ordained for it.
In any case, Rouhani is part of the establishment, and his room to maneuver in effecting major
domestic changes is limited to begin with. His charm offensive in the West does not add up to a real
change in Iran, given the strong status of the Revolutionary Guard.
The intensity of public support for Rouhani is of no significance when it comes to Iran‟s nuclear
progress and status. Nor is the public support for Rouhani likely to have substantial implications for
the state of civil society and human rights in Iran.
The interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, and subsequent assessments both in the West and in
Iran about “winners and losers,” have become a focus of fierce domestic controversy in Iran between the
dissatisfaction is anything more than a further instance of inappropriate behavior? What did we gain
from this?16
[From an editorial by Kayhan‟s editor in chief Hossein Shriatmadari, headlined “Why Not Be
Serious?!”] One must say first of all that there is no doubting the fact that Iran‟s negotiating team is
comprised of sons of the revolution and trustworthy and reliable people who have been assigned a
complex and fateful mission, which has made support for them a religious and national duty. But
even the sons of one family [a quote from Khamenei] who are trustworthy can, despite their pure
desire and positive motivation, make mistakes, without detracting from the trust that the public feels
toward them….There are many testimonies and documents pointing to the fact that the heads of the
American-Israeli fitna 88 [opposition figures who led the protests after the June 2009 presidential
elections], after having failed in their plot, now seek to damage the Islamic regime under a false
pretense of supporting the government of Mr. Rouhani and false claims of support for the nuclear
negotiating team. Precisely for this reason, they insist on creating the impression that all constructive
criticism stemming from a desire to help the negotiating team is hostile and opposed to the current
government and the negotiating team.
Kayhan also criticized Zarif‟s statements to the students belittling Iran‟s military capability compared to theUnited States, calling it a “message of surrender” and a “very harmful error that must not be repeated….In
dialogue and particularly in the diplomatic arena, when one says something, what counts is what the other side
understands and not this or that intention of the speaker.”17
An Ice Breaker
On the other hand, former president and head of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom
the West has long regarded as a “savior” working to promote Western-Iranian relations, called the agreement
an “ice breaker” that had overcome the taboo on relations with the United States. The conservative camp has been attacking Rafsanjani for this stance and trying to disassociate, as much as possible, the issue of the
nuclear talks from the issue of relations with the United States, which still, despite the “Rouhani effect,” is a
loaded, almost taboo subject in Iran. Rafsanjani expressed gratitude to the nuclear negotiating team and said
the signing of the agreement had “rescued us from great distress….Now we feel a letup. Our international
status will improve, though much time remains until the final agreement takes shape.”18
The newspaper Jomhouri-e Islami, which is affiliated with Rafsanjani, wrote in that vein under the headline
“The Victory of Logic”:
The signing of the nuclear agreement is beyond doubt a victory for the Iranian people that was achieved
through the rise to power of the moderate stream. Therefore, the victory should be called the victory of logic.
Such an agreement could also have been reached in previous years, but because the previous governmentlacked logic and because the senior officials of the previous government, and particularly the president himself
[Ahmadinejad], adopted harsh, violent language, not only was there no progress in talks but hardship and
distress mounted and the wall of distrust grew higher and thicker. The agreement will not only benefit Iran but
also the region and the whole world. The important aspects of the agreement are that enrichment will continue
in Iran, new sanctions will not be imposed, and the previous sanctions will be gradually reduced and
eventually lifted….The Iranian negotiating team achieved all this without crossing the red lines that have been
8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement
laid down [by the Supreme Leader] and without at all forgoing Iran’s nuclear rights or closing a single
nuclear facility.19
Sadegh Zibakalam, a senior professor at the University of Tehran and a well-known political analyst, asserted
that the Geneva agreement is not restricted to the nuclear issue and called it
a historic turning point because the policy of struggle [that was promoted by radical elements in Iran] againstthe West [mainly the United States] was breached. The details of the agreement are not important, nor is what
Iran or the West will do during these six months [of the implementation of the interim agreement]. What is
important is that for the first time since the Islamic Revolution an agreement was reached between Iran and
the West, an agreement that the extremists [inside and outside of Iran] are trying to subvert.
Ziva Kalam claimed that the Supreme Leader‟s support for the agreement prevents the extremists from
characterizing it as a failure. “What is important is the rift that was created among the extremists regarding
their anti-Western stance.” Rouhani‟s Twitter account quoted parts of Kalam‟s article.20
“The Elements That Engage in Petty Criticism”
Foreign Minister Zarif did not passively countenance the Revolutionary Guard‟s attacks on him and the
negotiating team. He used his Facebook and Twitter accounts (ordinary Iranian citizens are not allowed to use
these networks) to contend with his critics, particularly among the Revolutionary Guard and including Jafari.
While apparently showing restraint because of his mother‟s illness (meanwhile she died), Zarif wrote on his
Facebook page:
In recent days the Americans acted inappropriately, and we will respond as necessary while taking all aspects
into consideration. Of course, some elements [that is, of the Revolutionary Guard, along with other domestic
critics], who from the start were not happy about what occurred in Geneva, reported on the early death [of theagreement], which is more of a wish than the truth. We are seriously continuing the Geneva talks, though of
course we will react in a way that is appropriate, calculated, effective, and wise to any inappropriate and
unconstructive step (even if it does not entail a violation of the agreement). In addition, the elements that
engage in petty criticism of us, while exploiting our inevitable silence, certainly know that we have a fitting
response to everything they say. But the negotiating team has a more important mission, namely, the national
interest, and at the moment does not see fit to respond on some of the issues. The team is prepared to hold its
peace amid unfair and unjust accusations out of consideration of the national interest, but we will respond to
all these assertions at the right time.21
Meanwhile, in a series of interviews to the Western and domestic media, the foreign minister emphasized that
he upholds the Supreme Leader‟s red lines regarding Iran‟s right to enrich uranium and maintain its nuclear
program, despite the claims of the United States and of the White House “fact sheet”22 that was posted on the
White House‟s website. As Zarif told the University of Tehran students,
They [the West] claim that the wor d “enrichment” does not exist in the text of the agreement. True, the word
“enrichment” does not exist in the White House “fact sheet,” but if that is one’s point of reference instead of
the text of the agreement that [the nuclear negotiating team] signed 23…then do as you wish….Enrichment is
mentioned in two places in the document and it is stated that there is no solution to the nuclear dossier without
acknowledging [Iran’s inalienable right] to enrich….[Rest assured that] not an iota was missing from this
8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement
gas.30 On another occasion Salehi said his organization aims to make Iran a center of uranium enrichment for
West Asian countries.31
Conversely, Salehi‟s predecessor in the post, Fereydoun Abbasi, said Iran had unnecessarily accepted the
conditions the West had dictated on curbing its level of uranium enrichment. “A hero is the one who does not
surrender to the conditions of his powerful opponent.” He asserted that suspending 20-percent enrichment
would “prevent Iran from reaching its developmental goals on the time schedule it had set for itself.” Abbasi
also criticized “Rouhani‟s vague and passive stance that undermines the will and resolve of the Iranian
people.”32
Leveraging the Geneva Agreement to Enhance Ties with Regional States
Iran is also trying to leverage the nuclear agreement to improve its relations with the states of the region,
particularly Saudi Arabia. But here, too, some amiable statements by the foreign minister (on attempting to
resolve a dispute over certain islands with the United Arab Emirates, and on improving ties with Saudi Arabia)
have prompted sharp criticism by conservatives. In the Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspaper Asharq Alawsat ,
Zarif published an opinion article, “Our Neighbors Are Our Priority,”33 in which he tried to use the nuclear
agreement to court Iran‟s neighbors. He also visited the Gulf states bearing such messages.
President Rouhani, for his part, published an article in the Saudi daily Al-Eqtisadiah in which he touted the
agreement‟s importance and again denied that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons, mentioning
Khamenei‟s fatwa against such weapons – a fatwa from which no direct quotation can be found, not even on
Khamenei‟s own website.34
In response to these initiatives, Kayhan wrote that “the statement by Mr. Zarif that it is possible to converse
with the UAE about its claim to possession of the island of Abu Musa [a strategic island overlooking the Strait
of Hormuz] was ill-considered” and “a statement one does not expect to hear from an experienced diplomat.”
Alraf Ala‟eddin Borujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, has termed Arabstates‟ request to attend the nuclear talks as irrelevant. “I wonder why countries with no nuclear capability and
with no leverage in negotiations would demand such a thing….[I]t is not even worthy of consideration.”
Borujerdi‟s deputy said the announcement that the security of Arab states was connected to the security of Iran
is a true and real announcement. For years we wanted the Arab states to acknowledge this reality.” He added:
It is very impudent of them to demand to participate in the talks between Iran and the P5+1, because not a
single one of them wields any significant weight. They can only watch from the side as Iran takes strategic
steps to ensure the security of the region. We will talk with the Foreign Ministry so that we can officially
clarify Iran’s position on these pointless demands.35
No Real ChangeThe domestic debate in Iran on advancing the nuclear program concurrently with the negotiations with the
West will likely continue and intensify, if the negotiations progress. It is only at the end of January that the
implementation of the interim agreement is supposed to begin. But criticism related to the nuclear negotiations
by elements in Iran – some of them close to the Supreme Leader – is mounting.
8/13/2019 The Internal Iranian Struggle in the Aftermath of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement
In sum, the Revolutionary Guard and the Supreme Leader will keep steering the president and the foreign
minister along a clear-cut path of seeking to extract maximal concessions from the West. Such concessions
would entail, on the one hand, Iran‟s preservation of its nuclear capability, and ability to “break out” to nuclear
weapons, and, on the other, an easing of the economic pressure.
We are still in the midst of the drama of Rouhani‟s election as president, ostensibly despite Khamenei‟s stanceand auguring a “strategic change in Iran.” The Iranian reality has proved time after time, however, that the
Revolutionary Guard‟s hold on power and influence on the Supreme Leader is only growing. From the
Revolutionary Guard‟s standpoint, the nuclear negotiations are of diplomatic importance and may be of some
economic benefit to Iran. The Revolutionary Guard, however, will obstruct any attempt, by means of the
negotiations, to effectuate the transformation that the reformist camp and the Iranian people desire.
If necessary, Rouhani, too, will receive a letter of warning from Revolutionary Guard commanders, as the