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1 The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response When All Else Fails 1 Littler Mendelson, PC 2016 SCCE Dallas Regional Compliance & Ethics Conference 2 Philip L. Gordon Littler Mendelson, P.C. 1900 16 th Street, Suite 800 Denver, CO 80202 Phone: 303.362.2858 Email: [email protected] Allison E. Moore Littler Mendelson, P.C. 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512.982.7255 Email: [email protected]
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The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response ...€¦ · The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response When All Else Fails 1 Littler Mendelson, PC 2016 SCCE Dallas

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Page 1: The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response ...€¦ · The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response When All Else Fails 1 Littler Mendelson, PC 2016 SCCE Dallas

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The Insider Threat: Prevention, Detection, And Response When All Else Fails

1

Littler Mendelson, PC 2016 SCCE Dallas Regional Compliance & Ethics Conference

2

Philip L. GordonLittler Mendelson, P.C.1900 16th Street, Suite 800Denver, CO 80202Phone: 303.362.2858Email: [email protected]

Allison E. MooreLittler Mendelson, P.C.100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512.982.7255 Email: [email protected]

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I. Why Should You Worry

About The Insider Threat?

II. Creating A Culture Of Data

Stewardship

III. Understanding, Detecting

And Preventing The

Malicious Insider

IV.Security Breach Response

Agenda

3

Why Should You Worry About The Insider Threat?

4

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2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report5

Insiders Are #1 Cause of Security Breaches

18%

16%

15%

15%

14%

12%

8%

<1%

<1%

<1%

Average total cost = $7 million.

– ↑ 8% from $6.5 million in 2015

Average cost breakdown:

– $730K in detection and escalation

– $590K in notification costs

– $1.7M in post-breach costs, i.e., help desk and remediation

– $4M in loss of customers/good will

Average cost per lost or stolen record = $221

– ↑ 2% from $217 in 2015

2016 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, Ponemon Institute, May 2016

Cost of a Security Breach

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� 39% of CEOs/Boards involved in

data breach preparedness in 2015

vs. 29% in 2014 (Ponemon/Experian 2015)

� Several CEOs have recently lost

their jobs at least partly because of

a security breach

– HB Gary

– Ashley Madison

– Director of OPM

The CEO & Board Cares

77

� Dozens of class action lawsuits

have been filed in the wake of

security breaches

� Many are dismissed early in the litigation process

� However, the plaintiffs’ class action bar is starting to see some success

Class Action Litigation

8

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Federal Enforcement

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� FCC: $25 M fine imposed on telecom provider whose employees stole information on 280,000 customers

� HHS: 34 publicly announced settlements since January 2011

- 15 settlements exceeded $1M

- Average settlement > $1.3M

� SEC: Investment advisor fined $75K for poor cyber security

9

1. $95K to NY (3/16): Employer’s online application was insecure,

making about 500 employment applications available on Google

2. $20K to NY (1/16): Failure to notify workers of a data breach of

names and driver’s license numbers and collection of

unencrypted geolocation information on workers

3. $15K to NY (12/15): Nurse took patient list with diagnoses when

leaving hospital’s employ

4. $40K to MA (12/14): Theft of employee’s company-issued laptop

with more than 2,000 patient records

5. $100K to MA (12/14): Employee’s personal laptop with 3,800

patient records stolen from unlocked office

AG Enforcement Is Ramping Up

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� Unintentional

– Even good employees can cause significant harm

with the tools they have today.

� Intentional

– A motivated employee who wants to do you harm,

can do so.

– Traditional tools to detect and prove harm may not

be as effective.

Insider Threat Model

11

Establishing A Culture Of Data Stewardship

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� Key steps for reducing risk:

1. Implement comprehensive pre-employment screening of employees and temps and contractors

2. Tailor checks for positions involving access to sensitive data

3. Consider conducting continuous monitoring on current employees

‒ Only 36% conduct any form of on-going surveillance for changes in

an employee’s risk profile (Sterling 2016)

� Confirm that background check program complies with FCRA, ban-the-box laws, and EEOC guidance

Background Screening

13

� During the on-boarding process

� Key Terms:

1. “Confidential Information” should cover sensitive

consumer and employee information

‒ Beware of potential NLRB, EEOC, SEC restrictions

2. Summarize key information security obligations

3. Require return of all confidential information upon

request or at termination of employment relationship

Confidentiality Agreements

14

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� Policies and procedures need to address all forms of

data, not just digital data “owned” by IT

� Policies and procedures not directly related to

safeguarding data also are critical

- Code of ethics - Pre-employment screening

- Confidentiality - Acceptable use

Policies And Procedures

15

� Every employee should receive data privacy training at

orientation

– Only 44% provided training at orientation (Ponemon/Experian 2015)

� Employees with access to trade secrets, confidential

information, or personal data should have more in-depth

training

– Training can vary based on job functions and sensitivity of data that is

accessed

� Periodically send reminders, updates, and notices

– 71% of companies that provide training do so only once or sporadically

(Ponemon/Experian 2015)

Information Security Training

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1. Employer’s legal and/or contractual

obligations to safeguard sensitive data

2. Types of information falling within scope of

legal duty

3. Potential consequences for employer of

noncompliance

4. Steps employees can take to safeguard

sensitive data

Big Picture Points

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1. Importance of protecting log-in credentials

– In 2015, 63% of confirmed data breaches involved weak, default or

stolen passwords (2016 Verizon Data Breach Report)

2. How to create a strong password

3. Screen security

4. How to recognize a “phishing” e-mail

– Sanctioned phishing tests conducted in 2015 revealed that 30% of

phishing messages are opened and 12% click on the

malicious attachment (2016 Verizon Data Breach Report)

Training On Safeguards

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Phishing E-mail: Exhibit #1

Your Account has been limited ! Login Now and solve it

Dear Client

It looks like your account has limitation due to login from unkowndevice . We are keep your informations secret so you need to login to your account and provide us with some informations as security check .

To reset your account access please enter the link below

Login Now

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5. Physical safeguards for

mobile devices

6. No storage in personal

online accounts

7. What is a security

incident?

8. How to report a security

incident?

Training On Safeguards

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1. Devices must be registeredand centrally managed

2. Password protection

3. Remote wipe capability

4. Encryption

5. Inactivity time

� Require participation in a BYOD program for

employees using a personal mobile device

for work

Mobile Device Security

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1. Only employees who need

access to sensitive information

to perform job responsibilities

have authorized access

2. Authorized access restricted by

“minimum necessary” principle

3. Access rights are modified

when job duties change

4. Terminate access promptly

upon termination of

employment

Technical Access Controls

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1. Provide departing employee with copy of

executed confidentiality agreement

2. Remind employee of ongoing obligation to keep

information confidential

3. Ensure return of all employer-owned computers,

mobile devices and portable storage media

4. Ensure return of all paper documents containing

confidential information

Exit Interviews

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5. Coordinate removal of confidential

business information from any

“BYOD device”

– Only 38% of organizations do this

(Blanco Tech Group 2016)

– Only 34% securely wipe departing

employees’ BYOD 100% of the time (Blanco Tech Group 2016)

6. Coordinate removal of confidential

information from all personal

accounts and media

Exit Interviews

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The Malicious Insider

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� Attend ALL information security training sessions

� Sign a confidentiality agreement

� Sign a non-competition agreement

� Volunteer as a security “steward”:

• Volunteer to update or create policies

• Volunteer to test security measures/policies

The Malicious Insider WILL…

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Unauthorized Data Storage Devices:

Data Exfiltration

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Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

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Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

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Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

Less in size…

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Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

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Steganography

Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

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Unauthorized Recording Devices:

� Camera phones (yes, even the innocent iPhone)

� Phones can easily record audio

• Meetings

• Sensitive conversations

� Smart glasses

� Pen and other spy cameras

Data Exfiltration: Think Outside the Box

Images from: http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51rEusQbg5L.jpghttp://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/31biUVj0mkL.jpghttp://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41AJALwHpdL.jpg

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Inspiration?

The Result…

Images from:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Martin_Motors_CEO_Rear.JPGhttp://images.caradisiac.com/images/3/7/6/9/23769/S0-Shuanghuan-CEO-et-Jonway-UFO-en-France-au-mois-de-mai-101155.jpg

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Inspiration?

“Naturally, our cars are inspired by European carmakers,” said Karl Schlössl, a German who is the chief executive of China Automobile. “But we reject the charge that they are copies.”http://www.bmwblog.com/2007/09/13/frankfurt-2007-bmw-vs-shuanghuan/

The Result…

Image: http://www4.pictures.gi.zimbio.com/62nd+International+Motor+Show+Cars+IAA+cc0QC1ZxBxyl.jpg

35

Knock it off!

The Result?

Image from: sunboar.files.wordpress.com/2006/10/bmw-vs-byd-logo.jpg

BMW X5 Toyota Land CruiserShuanghuan CEO

Images from:http://images.forbes.com/images/2002/07/08/test_int_415x308.jpghttp://images.caradisiac.com/images/3/7/6/9/23769/S0-Shuanghuan-CEO-et-Jonway-UFO-en-France-au-mois-de-mai-101102.jpghttp://www.sobrecoches.com/var/plain_site/storage/images/coches/toyota/land_cruiser/novedad_r_edition/interior/toyota_land_cruiser_r_edition/313114-1-esl-ES/toyota_land_cruiser_r_edition1.jpg

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Detecting And Preventing Insider Threat Activity

37

Odd hour activity

Undue curiosity

Positions screen tohinder view

Rogue systems

Bogus accounts

Detection: Insider Indicators

Remote access sites/software:

• PCAnywhere

• Citrix

• WebEx

• GotoMyPC

Unauthorized websites

Anonymity websites(TOR)

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� Joking and bragging

� Installs unauthorized software– Duty associated software

• Photoshop, Nero, programming software– Unassociated harmless software

• Spotify, Telegram, Games– Suspicious software

• Network Sniffers, Password Crackers, Rootkits

� Escalated privileges

� Monitor Help Desk tickets for trends– Insiders do call for help when their attempts

to circumvent security measures break things

Detection: Insider Indicators

39

Detection: Collecting Useful Data

&Account Records

GPS

&Print Servers

Logs-Firewall-IDS-A/V-Sniffers-Proxy-System

Create a timeline.

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� Look for strange activity / behavior

− Emailing lots of pictures

� Look for tools

− Good list: www.jjtc.com/Steganography/tools.html

− Sometimes you won’t find tools…

• copy /B source.gif+source.zip target.gif

(creates a file that is a GIF and a ZIP at the same time)

Identifying Steganography

41

�Analyze current IT security posture

� Implement Strategic Initiatives

�Regular Assessment of Risk

Prevention

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� What tools do you have to detect and log activity?

� What can these tools detect and not detect?

� How can the data these tools provide be used?

� Does the IT/Security staff understand how to configure and

use the tools available?

� How far back is data available from these tools?

� Who is monitoring the reports from these tools? How often?

� Are your privacy policies consistent with your practices?

� Who can grant exceptions to your policies?

Analyze IT Security Posture:Table Top Exercise

43

� Policies for the People

� Policies for IT/Management

� Information Classification

� Monitoring Use:

• User-based analytics

• Digital Loss Prevention

• Specialty tools for more sensitive data

Implement Strategic Initiatives

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Assess risks of current operations and decide whether to update the rules.

Consider new technology or new data categories:

– Use of cloud tools

– VPN (with or without personal devices)

– BYOD polices

– Forbid devices in sensitive areas?

Regular Assessment of Risk

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When Is An Incident A Breach?

46

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� State Law

� HIPAA

� GLBA

� Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard

� International Data Protection Law

Is The Incident A Breach?: Sources of Law

47

State Breach Notification Laws

47 states D.C., Puerto Rico, USVI, and Guam now mandate notice of security breach

Only the following states do not have notice statutes: AL, NM, and SD

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Trigger Event

1. Unauthorized acquisition

2. Unencrypted

3. Computerized

4. Personal information

5. A material risk of harm

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Computerized vs. Paper

Ten states require notice even when the breach does not involve computerized data:

AK, CA (medical providers only), HI, IA, IN, MA, NC, SC, WA, WI

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Personal Information Defined

First name or initial plus last name plus:

� SSN

� Driver’s license number and/or state-issued ID number

� Credit or debit card number or financial account number in combination with any required password

Other information included:

AK, AR, CA, CO, FL, GA, IA, KY, ME, MD, MO, MT, NC, ND, NE, NJ, NV, OR, PR, RI, SC, TX, VA, WI, WY

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The Notification Process: How Does It Really Work?

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1. What happened?

2. Was the data in paper form or encrypted?

3. When did the incident occur?

4. When was the incident discovered?

5. Has law enforcement been contacted?

Understand The Incident

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1. Who was affected by the incident?

2. Where do affected individuals reside?

3. How many affected individuals per state?

4. What categories of information were affected and for which individuals?

5. What steps have been/should be taken to mitigate the incident?

Understand The Affected Population

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Need For An Interdisciplinary Team

� Legal Counsel

– Preserve attorney-client

privilege

– Navigate patchwork of breach

notification laws

– Prepare required notices to

affected individuals and to

government agencies

� IT Department/Outside

Forensic Firms

– Conduct investigation

� Business Unit Leader

– Business judgment calls

– Customer relations issues

� Communications

– Media relations

– Notices to customers

55

1. Most jurisdictions: “Without unreasonable delay”

2. Beware of short reporting deadlines

– PR: 10 days to Dept. of Consumer of Affairs

– VT: 14 business days to the state’s Attorney General

– CA: 15 business days to Dept. of Health Services

– FL: 30 days to individuals

– OH, RI, WI, WA, VT: 45 days to individuals

3. Strive to complete notification within 30 days of discovery

4. Do you need law enforcement delay?

Know Your Deadlines

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1. Breach Counsel: Involve at the earliest possible stage

– Establishes attorney-client privilege of communications with the SIRT and with breach response vendors

2. Identity Protection Services: Select vendor, negotiate pricing, complete contracting

3. Printing/Mailing Vendor: Get timelines and mailing list requirements

– Preparing the mailing list can be the most time consuming aspect of security incident response

– Beware of special populations: minors, deceased, non-English speakers

4. Call Center Vendor: Select vendor, complete contracting, develop FAQs

5. Public Relations Firm: Develop a press release in case the breach goes viral

Get Your Vendors Working

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1. What happened

2. Types of personal information involved

3. What has organization done to investigate,

mitigate and remediate

4. Steps individuals should take to protect

themselves

5. Contact person

� Laws of various states impose 21 additional

content requirements

Notice To Affected Individuals

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� Required only in CA and CT and only for breaches

involving social security numbers, and in California,

driver’s license numbers

� Credit monitoring is the best practice if there is a

risk of financial harm

� Important considerations:

Offer Identity Protection Services?

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– Are minors impacted?

– Fraud resolution services

– Cost

– 1 year vs. 2 years

– Types of personal information impacted

25 States & PR:

� More than 1,000 individuals: HI, MO, SC, VA

� More than 500 individuals: CA, FL, IA, RI, WA

� More than 250 individuals: IL, ND, OR

� No minimum: CT, IN, LA, MA, MD, ME, MT, NC,

NE, NH, NJ, NY, PR, VT

Notice To Government Agencies

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Littler Mendelson, PC 2016 SCCE Dallas Regional Compliance & Ethics Conference

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