The Incest Taboo by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

8/13/2019 The Incest Taboo by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

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European Social and Political Research, Vol. 13 (20062007)

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The incest taboo

Alkistis Elliott-Graves

1. Introduction

One of the great philosophical debates which is still important today isthe debate concerning nature and culture. Which of the two is moreimportant? Which of the two ultimately shapes human nature? Itseems that scientists, social scientists, teenagers magazines,cookery books, indeed almost everyone has their own idea about howfar humans are influenced by their genetic makeup and how much isleft to cultural conditioning. The debate itself however, is verysignificant philosophically, because of its far-reaching implications.Ones position on this debate greatly influences ones perception ofother important philosophical questions, such as: what it means to behuman, to what extent human action is free as opposed to pre-determined, what, if anything makes humans stand out from the restof the animal order. These questions then give rise to moral positionsconcerning for example, human and animal rights, fairness, justice,tolerance, economic policy, education, and so on. The list is endless.

Many scientists and social scientists have dealt either directly or

indirectly with the nature versus culture debate and its implications.One such account, though indirect in its approach, is neverthelesstruly interesting. This is Claude Lvi-Strausss explanation of thephenomenon of the incest taboo as the bridge between nature andculture, which occurs in the introductory chapters of the ElementaryStructures of Kinship. Here, Lvi-Strauss gives the incest taboo aunique place among all phenomena concerning humans, because itbelongs at once to both the natural and cultural domains. His work iscontroversial in many ways and though some of his points may beviewed as overstated or extreme, the overall work is still considered aclassic and essential reading for anyone studying the subject.

In this essay, I will examine Lvi-Strausss conception and analysis ofthe incest taboo from a philosophical perspective, i.e. by focusing on


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Alkistis Elliott-Graves The incest taboo

26 European Social and Political Research, Vol. 13 (20062007)

the ideas and situations which influenced Lvi-Strauss, together withtheir implications. The first part will be an analysis of Lvi-Strausssdefinition of the incest taboo and its implications for the nature versusculture debate. I will then argue that Lvi-Strausss seeminglyextreme position that culture overrules nature is based on a deeprejection of anti-rationalism, fuelled by his philosophical and historicalcontext rather than an absolute rejection of the natural sciences. Thiswill be shown through an analysis of the evolution of Lvi-Strausssown ideas. Ultimately, I will attempt to show that if a theory of theincest taboo which focuses on its pre-social origins can be at least

conceptually combined with Lvi-Strausss own theory, then the viewthat nature and culture are in radical opposition, must be revised oreven rejected outright.

2. Lvi-Strausss theory of the incest taboo: a brief summary

It is possible to define the incest taboo in many ways and on manydifferent levels. In fact, many of the problems which arise indiscussions of the phenomenon stem from its definitions and theconnotations which each of these involve. Lvi-Strausss theory of theincest taboo is very complex, and at first glance can even seemcontradictory. According to Lvi-Strauss, the incest taboo is auniversal rule existent in all societies which prohibits marriage andsexual relations between specific kin members. Together with

exogamy, the rule which prescribes possible marriage and/or sexualpartners, it is the basis of the system of kinship which in turn is thestructure on which society is based.

1However, this concept of a

universal rule is paradoxical. This can be seen when one takes intoaccount Lvi-Strausss conception of Nature and Culture. Both theseconcepts do not have clear definitions in Lvi-Strausss writings, norare their interpretations constant. Still, there are a few characteristicsof the two orders which seem to stand out. Natures maincharacteristics are universality, spontaneity and the absence of rules,whereas if a phenomenon is particular, non-spontaneous and

1C. Lvi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, London, 1969, pp. 8-

9, 46.


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European Social and Political Research, Vol. 13 (20062007) 27

governed by rules, then it must belong to the domain of Culture.2In

fact, the surest criterion for distinguishing a natural from a culturalprocess is the presence or absence of rules.

3Therefore the incest

taboo must be a cultural phenomenon, as it is a rule and morespecifically, a particular rule, which is expressed differently in eachsociety. On the other hand it is at the same time universal, as it existsin all societies, and thus must also belong to the domain of nature.

4

There can be no objection to this, Lvi-Strauss states, as it is obviousfrom empirical observation (anthropological research) that the incesttaboo is universally present, while its cultural aspect is asserted by its

very definition.

5

Lvi-Strauss dissolves this paradox by giving the incest taboo aunique place among all socio-biological phenomena, indeed amongall phenomena that can be characterized as human. He states that asit is the only exception in this categorization of phenomena, it mustrepresent the transition from a state of Nature to a state of Culture.

6

Lvi-Strauss famously asks in the first chapter of the ElementaryStructures: Where does nature end and culture begin?

7It is easy to

see where culture begins; anywhere there is a rule. Yet with theincest taboo also comes the end of sovereignty of nature over man.

8

Thus the prohibition of incest marks the passage form nature toculture.

9This passage however does not result in a complete loss of

natures influence on humans, just that the universal natural

spontaneity and instinct become coded, modeled and governed

2F. Korn, Elementary Structures Reconsidered: Lvi-Strauss on Kinship,

London, 1973, p. 10.3Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. 8.

4Ibid.

5Ibid., p. 9.

6H. Gardner, The Quest for Mind: Jean Piaget, Claude Levi-Strauss, and the

Structuralist Movement, New York: Knopf, 1973, p. 125.7Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. 4.

8Ibid., p. 25.

9R. Delige, Levi-Strauss Today: an Introduction to Structural Anthropology

(trans. N. Scott), London: Berg, 2004, p. 58.


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according to specific rules. Therefore although nature still is part ofthe equation, culture superimposes its influence on the end result.

10

The above analysis is however a simplification of Lvi-Straussstheory, even though he himself expresses it thus in the first chaptersof the Elementary Structures.There is another concept, another rulewhich precedes the incest taboo and is located in the unconscious ofall humans. This is the theory of reciprocity, which is based on Lvi-Strausss analysis and interpretation of the work of Marcel Mauss. InEssai sur le don. Forme et raison de lchange dans le socitsarchaques, Mauss states that the basis of society is the need for the

exchange of gifts.11The giving of a gift includes the obligation toreciprocate which is the foundation of the rousseaunian socialcontract and so the relation between the individual and society isformed.

12It would be impossible to do justice to Mausss work in this

essay, therefore the analysis will only focus on Lvi-Strausssinterpretation of Mauss. For Mauss, the relation of gift exchange is thebasis for the social contract and thus for society itself. For Lvi-Strauss however, it is not that exchange occurs in order for the gift tobe given in return, but vice versa, i.e. that gifts are given in order tosecure exchange.

13The focus is different between the two thinkers.

Lvi-Strauss views gift giving as a means for exchange, while forMauss it was the actual gift and its symbols which was moreimportant than generalized exchange.

This may seem like a small change yet its significance is immense.The actual gift is just an example of exchange, and is of minimalimportance in itself. It is now possible for Lvi-Strauss to formulate histheory of kinship as another example of the manifestation ofreciprocity. In terms of kinship, the elementary parts of the exchangeare women, who are exchanged between families. Yet in order for this

10Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. 25.

11M. Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift(trans. N. Scott), Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press, 1999 p. 1.12

S. Clarke, The Foundations of Structuralism, Sussex: Harvester, 1981, p.44.13

Ibid.


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to occur, the incest taboo must exist so that no claim can be madefrom the men in one family over their own women.

14This does not

mean that the incest taboo becomes less important; it is still universal.It is the first manifestation of the theory of reciprocity into anempirically observable phenomenon. Thus, even though it is thetheory of reciprocity which is the actual transition from nature toculture, the incest taboo is the first universal manifestation of thistransition. Its universality also proves that the theory of reciprocityfrom which it derives must also necessarily be universal. Thus Lvi-Strauss can now explain how the theory of reciprocity originates in the

unconscious without having to do the same for the incest taboo. It isenough to show that the incest taboo is a product of the theory ofreciprocity, and this he has done by showing that the exchange ofwomen is the fundamental social relation.

15

However, there still exists the problem of the apparent oppositionbetween nature and culture and the difficulty of understanding therelation between them. Even though the incest taboo is the bridgebetween them, Lvi-Strauss often states and implies that they are atodds. In the Elementary Structureshe states that the phenomenoncan only be examined from a cultural, i.e. anthropological/sociologicalperspective, while the natural sciences cannot provide insight into itsworkings. He does not deny the natural aspect of the taboo but alsoattacks those who would explain the prohibition of incest as a purely

cultural or natural phenomenon by affirming that both these extremistexplanations lead to contradiction. Nor is it a composite mixture ofnature and culture, but a transition, a transformation of one into theother.

16Still, he denies that the study of biology, genetics or

evolutionary theory could help with its explanation. He states:

14Ibid. p. 68-69.

15Ibid. p. 68.

16Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. 24.


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even if the incest prohibition has its roots in nature it is only inthe way it affects us as a social rule that it can be fullygrasped.

17

It can thus be deduced that on one hand Lvi-Strauss does not wantto deny completely the role of nature in the prohibition of incest, yet atthe same time he wants to assert the importance of culture overnature.

Lvi-Strauss gives little justification of these statements. He does,however, state explicitly in the Elementary Structuresthat a vicious

circle develops if one looks for a natural explanation for the origin ofinstitutional rules, which by his definition areculture, as they cannotbe established without language

18. (He does not, however, give any

further analysis of this point). It seems to be taken for granted by Lvi-Strauss that language is what distinguishes humans from the animalorder and as soon as it exists, society and culture also exist.

19

Language is also a manifestation of reciprocity, given that there mustnecessarily exist at least two individuals exchanging symbolicinformation. I will return to this point in section 5. It is now time toexamine why Lvi-Strauss conceived of and

defined the incest taboo

and its implications for nature and culture in this particular way.

3. Why does Lvi-Strauss assert cultures importance overnature in the explanation of the incest taboo?

Intellectual context, theoretical aims and conception of socialanthropology

There are many reasons which pushed Lvi-Strauss to thiscontroversial theory and to the remarkable statement that the incesttaboo can gain nothing from explanation which focuses on its naturalaspect. The motivation is a combination of factors which range from

17Ibid. p. 29.

18Ibid. p. 8.

19Lvi-Strauss, in R. Kearny, Modern Movements in European Philosophy:

Phenomenology, Critical Theory, Structuralism, Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 1994, p. 255.


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Strauss diverged from Durkheim but then later on in his life returnedto some of Durkheims viewpoints. In the ElementaryStructures,however, the divergence is apparent.

23Lvi-Strauss keeps the idea of

functionalist explanation yet asserts that it cannot stand on its own. Ifit is to make any sense, it must be rooted in the individual psychologyand not in the collective consciousness.

24This is a very important

philosophical point, as by providing a functional underpinning forsocial structure in the individual, he could eliminate Durkheimsappeal to a metaphysical logic of evolution.

25Functional explanation

is not causal, i.e. a phenomenon is not explained by how it has come

about, but by its function, its purpose, and thus the temporal order ofcause and effect is inverted.26

One way of providing a functionalexplanation within the temporal framework is to combine it withevolutionary theory. Thus, as the origins of social structure cannot beexplained in terms of human actions (given that, according tofunctionalists, society superimposes itself on the individual), agenetic, evolutionary explanation is given whereby the selectivepressures of evolution dictate how both society and humans comeinto being and act.

27(This is very simplistic view of Durkheimian

functionalism, which serves purely to show the similarities anddifferences with Lvi-Strausss own work.) The implication is that allsocieties in the world today are arranged on a type of evolutionaryscale from the most primitive to the most advanced.

28

Even if this claim is a somewhat extreme version of evolutionaryreductionism, it is easy to see why Lvi-Strauss would reject such anexplanation. This extreme biological reductionism does not leave anyspace for free individual action, or more importantly for Lvi-Strauss,

23Moravia, Sergio La Ragione Nascosta. Scienza e Filosofia nel Pensiero di

Claude Lvi-Strauss, Firenze: Sansoni, 1969, pp. 155-168.24

Clarke, 1981, p. 47.25

Ibid. p. 39.26

The author acknowledges the lectures given by Professor Sebastian

Gardner for having explained this idea to her.27

Clarke, 1981, p. 48-49.28

Ibid. p. 49.


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the individual unconscious as the basis of society. Lvi-Strauss wasattempting, through his account of the unconscious, to give a rationalexplanation for the basis of society, and in order to do so he had to goagainst this simplistic view of evolution. In fact, it is biologicalreductionism itself which caused the greatest gap between Lvi-Strauss and Durkheim. (This will become more apparent from theanalysis in the following sections.)

The historical context is also important. In the late 1940s, the worldwas just picking itself up from the horrors of the Second World War.Evolutionary thinking had been used in a very negative way, the ideas

of Social Darwinism attesting that human races were diverse and thatsome were biologically superior to others. Lvi-Strauss, as ananthropologist, was striving to show exactly the opposite; that allhumans were biologically similar and that any cultural differences didnot show advancement or regression, simply different ways of doingessentially the same thing. Thus, for example, the contents of theincest taboo may be different in each society yet the important thing isthat the incest taboo exists everywhere. In 1959 Lvi-Strauss wroteRace and History,a paper which condemns the ethnocentricattitude that existed in the Western world at the time and did notallow for cultural differences, dismissed anything non-Western asprimitive.

29Thus Lvi-Strauss used an almost relativist argument in

order to show how much he feared the misinterpretation of

evolutionary theory and biological reductionism.

At the same time, he was an important part of the structuralistmovement, which became very popular during his lifetime. Some ofthe basic concepts of structuralism would logically lead to his ideasconcerning nature and culture, described above: for example, hisbelief that structures, especially in their elementary forms, are thebasis of human life. These structures are not consciously conceivedby humans and then put into practice, but exist as entities in their ownright.

30Thus, when examining a social phenomenon, it is more

29Lvi-Strauss, 1952, p.21.

30G. Gutting, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

London: Routledge, 1998. URL:http://www.rep.routledge.com
http://www.rep.routledge.com/http://www.rep.routledge.com/


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important to analyze these structures (an expression of culture) andtheir relationships with the individuals in whose unconscious theyexist, rather than the natural or biological characteristics of theseindividuals. As a structuralist, Lvi-Strauss also advocates a type ofdeterminism which again results in the importance of culture overnatural instinct. Lesprit humain loosely translated as the humanmindis determined by the laws that govern the structures ofsociety.

31The unconscious, which is the same for primitive peoples

and those who live in more complex societies provides the point ofcontact between the social and the individual mind, yet it is never

reduced to a matter of individual psychologism.

32

Thus again, thenatural individual impulse must be contained within the greaterstructure.

However, in many ways Lvi-Strausss writings diverge fromstructuralism. Many of his commentators write that identifying hiswork and structuralism as identical is a great error, which leads to amisinterpretation of his ideas.

33Others agree that Lvi-Strausss

ideas do contain some basic structuralist ideas, but say that the bulkof his work goes beyond the frame imposed by structuralism.

34In fact,

in the Elementary Structureshe places a lot more weight onindividualism than is generally apparent in mainstream structuralism.

Another motive that drove Lvi-Strauss to this conclusion concerningnature and culture is the following. As noted in the introduction, thenature versus culture debate in terms of the incest prohibition appearsmostly in the preface and introductory chapters of The ElementaryStructures. This is because it is used only as an introduction andframework for his elaborate theory of how kinship systems work. Thushe stresses the importance of incest prohibition as the basis ofsociety itself in order to justify the focus of his book. Then, throughhis brief discussion he argues (whether successfully or not) that any

31P. Pettit, The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis, Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 1975, p. 77.32

Clarke, 1981, p. 212.33

Dyson-Hudson, in Robey, 1973, p. 218.34

D. Sperber, p. 25.


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explanation of this phenomenon must focus on its cultural aspect. Hecan then proceed with the in-depth analysis of his theory, whichexplains kinship systems solely in terms of their cultural and socialcharacteristics.

Lvi-Strauss does not differentiate between the origins of the incesttaboo and the taboo itself. Still, his analysis of how the incest tabootransforms nature into culture and the eminence of culture after thatimplies a historical progress from one time period or era into another.This strikes the reader as a distinction which needs to be made if theanalysis is to make sense. It comes to a point where, he states,

there only, but there finally culture can and must, under pain ofnot existing, firmly declare Me first, and tell Nature, You go nofurther.

35

It is almost as if he is imagining an Age of Natureending and anAge of Culturebeginning. Therefore one could interpret the naturalaspect as important in the originsof the incest taboo, while thecultural aspect as essential to its evolution ever since. If this is thecase, and Lvi-Strauss is deliberately leaving the origins of the incesttaboo out of his analysis, then one could understand why he goes toso much effort to explain why the incest taboo has these twoconflicting aspects, but then rejects the first. If it is only in the originsthat nature is important, then Lvi-Strausss has provided a

justification for his insistence that culture is the only aspect importantto his own study.

Whatever his reasons may have been, the result of this was a deeprejection, one could say even fear, of evolutionary thinking andexplanation, which stayed with Lvi-Strauss even though he revisedhis own theory later on in his life. As will be shown more extensivelyin the following sections, this rejection stemmed mostly from theresidual contempt for biological reductionism rather than a rejection ofevolutionary theory itself.

35Lvi-Strauss in Korn, 1973, p. 10.


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4. The later development of Lvi-Strausss theory and itsimplications

As the discussion in the previous section has highlighted, when tryingto get to grips with Lvi-Strausss work, it is often quite difficult tounderstand what exactly he means. Indeed sometimes he comesacross as ambiguous, even contradictory. And it is not only detailswhich seem to change but central definitions which oscillate betweenvarious meanings. Some of Lvi-Strausss commentators interpretthis simply as resulting from his style of writing. For some it is thisartistic way in which he expresses himself which is part of the genius

of his work.36For his critics however, this ambiguity undermines hisargument. His use of poetics, i.e. a reliance on metaphors, has beencriticized as drawing away the reader from the argument in question.

A parallel criticism is that this inconsistency throughout his works(especially the inconsistency of definitions) and his use of technicalterms renders his analysis incomprehensible to the reader and thusdetracts from its intellectual value.

37

Even though there may be some truth, however exaggerated, in thesecriticisms, the underlying reason for the inconsistencies is simply thatLvi-Strausss theory evolved throughout his lifetime. The ElementaryStructures of Kinshipwas originally Lvi-Strausss doctoral thesis andwhen writing it his ideas were not yet fully formed. Indeed, in thepreface to the second edition of the Elementary Structures, written in1967, he reassesses his position dramatically. He states explicitly:

As to the basic problems raised in the introduction, many newfacts and the development of my own thought mean thatnowadays I would no longer express myself in the same way.

38

The preface to the second edition is probably the key text whichshows the evolution of his theory and is central to its understanding.

36Sperber in Sturrock, 1971, p. 21.

37Korn, 1973, pp. 142, 144.

38Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. xxviii.


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The most important change is demonstrated by the new definitions ofnature and culture. Culture is

the synthetic duplication of mechanisms already in existence[in nature] but which the animal kingdom shows only indisjointed form and dispersed variously among its membersaduplication, moreover, permitted by the emergence of certaincerebral structures which themselves belong to nature.

39

This means that culture is what makes humans human, and eventhough animals do have behavioural patterns that can in some sense

be interpreted as examples of culturetool-making, communication,social structure etc.humans are the only species whichsystematically combine all their characteristics given by nature andtransform them into culture. Humans thus still differ from otheranimals, yet to a much smaller extent than was previously suggested.It is the natural characteristics which exist in all animals to differentdegrees, which can be used to form culture or aspects of it. However,there is no teleological reason, on Lvi-Strausss account, whichshows that it must necessarily be so. The implications of thestatement quoted above are far-reaching and the answer to thefamous question Where does nature and Culture beginraised in thesecond section takes on a whole new meaning.

Nature and culture are no longer to be viewed as diametrically

opposed. Before, the idea was that the incest taboo, as amanifestation of the theory of reciprocity, was the mediator betweenthose two orders. Now, however, the contrast between nature andculture would be neither a primeval fact, nor a concrete aspect ofuniversal order.

40In other words, nature and culture are not a thesis

and antithesis, but just two not-easily distinguishable aspects in theessence of humanity. In fact, Lvi-Strauss explicitly states that inorder to understand culture, one must trace it back to its source andseek out its loose ends in other animal and even vegetable

39Ibid p. xxx.

40Ibid p. xxix.


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families.41

This is effectively an admission that evolution has playedan important role in the origins of culture. Moreover, he evenacknowledges the fact that culture neither necessarily superimposesitself over nature, nor irreducible to it.

42The Lvi-Strauss of 1967 has

thus virtually obliterated the contrast between nature and culture.

However, he continues to believe that there is no room for biologicalcausation in the explanation of the prohibition of incest within theframework of social anthropology. The question one therefore needsto consider is, why does Lvi-Strauss still deny the importance ofbiology in the explanation of a phenomenon which he himself has

admitted originates in nature? The answer can be found againthrough the examination of the social and intellectual context in whichLvi-Strauss was writing. It seems that Lvi-Strauss was not againstbiological explanations in general, but was adamantly against acertain type of biological explanation, evolutionary reductionism.

I now want to introduce the hypothesis that Lvi-Strauss was not atodds with biology as such but with the notion of reductive explanation.

Application of this notion could lead to extreme biologicalreductionism, as shown in the previous section. Lvi-Strauss rejectedall sorts of reductionism, not just the reductionism found inevolutionary and genetic analysis. In the same way he believed thathumans are more than the sum of their genes and societies morethan the sum of their subjects, he did not reduce the unconscious toindividual psychology.43He rejected psychological reductionism asmuch as he rejected any other type of reductionism and theirrationalism that he believed usually went with it.

It may seem that there is a contradiction here. On the one hand Lvi-Strauss rejects reductionism, yet, on the other hand, he himselfreduces reciprocity to the unconscious and culture to nature. There isa subtle difference, however. Lvi-Strausss reductionism has acertain limit and does not seek irrational explanations, whereas it

41Ibid p. xxx.

42Ibid.

43Clarke, 1981, p. 212.


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seems that he thinks that social, psychological and biologicalreductionism are extreme forms of reductionism, which verge on theirrational and are thus counter-intuitive. Though this point cannot beirrefutably proven, it is probably safe to say without further analysisthat this rejection of extreme reductionism would have, among otherfactors, led to his dismissal of genetic and evolutionary explanations.

It is now widely accepted, however, that biological explanationsevolutionary explanations includeddo not have to be reductionist.Even though it has often been the case in the past that evolution isthe classic example of reductionism, it is now widely believed that this

is a very simplistic interpretation of evolution, indeed amisinterpretation. Natural scientists affirm that evolution is not a linearprocess, as interpreted in the past, but much more complex. It isdriven simultaneously by many factors, many of which are nowknown, some of which can be rationally inferred, which have resultedin the immense biodiversity which we see today. Although genes areimportant as the smallest units of evolution, one cannot explain everysingle process of evolution, natural and cultural, solely in terms ofgenes. This means that although more complex than previouslythought, evolution is also a lot more sophisticated and evolutionaryanalyses are not irrational. Evolution does not explain individuals byreducing them to the interactions of their genes, but allows for otherfactors, including cultural ones, to influence their behaviour.

5. Theorising the pre-cultural incest taboo

5.1. Some theories which explain the absence of incest with little orno reference to culture

As shown in the third section, Lvi-Strauss states in the preface to thesecond edition of the Elementary Structuresthat due to many newfacts especially from the field of genetics, he would not expresshimself in the same way if he were to rewrite the book.

44However the

phrase many new facts is an understatement for the huge boom ofresearch in the natural sciences since 1947. The focus of some of this

44Lvi-Strauss, 1969, pp. xxviii-xxix.


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new research has been the incest taboo and its position as alandmark for the origin of culture. In this section I will examine someof the most important theories and their findings, focusing especiallyon an evolutionary explanation of the origin of society, and the pre-social explanation of incest aversion.

By the time Lvi-Strauss was writing the first edition of the ElementaryStructures, Edvard Westermark had long since published his theory ofbiological incest aversion. This stated that children growing uptogether will either develop an instinctive revulsion of sexual relationsfor one another or will simply become indifferent to each other as

potential sexual partners.45This theory also has newer evidencewhich supports it. Studies of kibbutz systems in Israel and minormarriages in China also seem to show an inherent incest aversion forchildren who grow up together as brother and sister.

46These studies

demonstrate that it is not necessarily only the existence of a taboowhich makes people feel aversion towards their siblings, butconversely that the taboo could have evolved from this naturalaversion. Furthermore, there is additional evidence in the animalworld which supports Westermarks theory.

A surprisingly large number of animal species do not commit incest,ranging from insects, prairie deer mice and geese to chimpanzees.

47

Although the existence of these occurrences does not prove beyondall doubt that there is some sort of conscious or unconscious naturalmechanism which inhibits desire for incestuous reproduction, it doessupport the theory that the incest taboo is something more than apurely cultural phenomenon and that studying its natural aspect couldprovide answers to the riddle it poses.

45Westermark in D. Aberle (ed.), The Incest Taboo and the Mating Patterns

of Animals,American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 65 No 2 (Apr. 1963),p. 260.46

D. Spain, Taboo or not Taboo: Is that the Question?, in Ethos, Vol. 16,No.3 (Sept. 1988), p. 285.47

Roscoe, 1994, pp. 49-76.


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It has been proposed that aversion to incest has evolved because ofits deleterious effects on offspring. We know that incestuous relationsrun a much higher risk of resulting in dead or mutated offspring.

48

Close inbreeding is therefore dangerous for the particular population.This however does not explain the origin and persistence of the incesttaboo. Deleterious effects do not alwaysoccur as a result ofinbreeding; there are many other factors which are importantsimultaneously.

49Moreover, the danger decreases dramatically if the

individuals are not within the nuclear family, i.e. between second, thirdcousins and so on.

50The incest prohibitions around the world,

however, do not reflect this. It is very often the case that one set ofcousinsfor example on the patrilineal sideare encouraged to getmarried, yet marriage with the same cousin on the matrilineal sidewould be considered incest.

51The degree of relation is exactly the

same and has the same chances of producing dead or ill offspring,but the cultural incest prohibition views them differently. This showsthat we cannot take for granted the idea that primitive peoples tookthe possible deleterious effects of inbreeding into account when theincest taboo came into existence. In fact, if Lvi-Strauss is right insaying that the incest taboo has its roots in the unconscious, it seemsimprobable that the connection between inbreeding and geneticdepression was made. Even if it was made, then it could only haveoccurred after the incest taboo already existed and at most, couldhave given the incest taboo greater credibility.

5.2. The pre-cultural basis of the incest taboo as an explanation of itsorigin: Seymour Parkers interpretation

There are many theories which differentiate between the natural andcultural aspect of the incest taboo, but focus on its origin, i.e. itsnatural aspect. One such theory is developed by Seymour Parker inThe pre-cultural basis of the incest taboo: toward a biosocial

48Aberle, 1963, p. 256.

49R. Bixler, Ray, Incest avoidance as a function of Environment and

Heredity, in Current Anthropology, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Dec. 1981), p. 641.50

Brown, 1991, p. 123.51

Lvi-Strauss, 1969, p. xxxii.


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theory.52

In it, Parker states that even though reducing the culturalphenomenon of the universal incest taboo to instinctive need is not anadequate explanation, this does not mean that there is no biologicalbasis for the incest taboo.

53That is, he distinguishes between the

origins of the incest taboo and its eventual cultural importance as arule. Although incest may have some sort of function in society, itsorigins, he believes, are genetic. He does allow for the fact thatcultural factors added new selective advantages but that they did soto a pre-existing propensity towards incest avoidance.

54. The idea is

that the incest taboo became very important as a cultural

phenomenon, yet it did so by reinforcing natural, instinctive humanpropensities. He states that incest avoidance is not a sufficientcondition for the existence of the incest taboo, and nor is it anecessary condition; yet he is adamant that it was a facilitatingcondition.

55In terms of evolutionary probability however, a facilitating

condition is so important that no theory can afford to dismiss italtogether.

Parkers theory attempts to answer the question When did the humanway of life become peculiarly human?

56This question bears striking

resemblance to Lvi-Strausss own question about where nature endsand culture begins if viewed from a certain viewpoint. I will return tothis point in the next section. Parker gathers evidence aboutprehistoric life and formulates a hypothesis for the emergence of

incest prohibitions based on systems of alliances.57

Very briefly, theidea is that the hunting of large game results in population dispersalwhere social life is based on hunting family groups. Scarcity ofresources forces alliances between family groups which arecemented with marriage between members of different groups. Incest

52S. Parker, The precultural basis of the incest taboo: toward a biosocial

theory, inAmerican Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 78 No.2 (Jan. 1976),pp. 285-305.53

Ibid p. 286.54

Ibid. p.287.55

Ibid. p. 299.56

Ibid. p. 298.57

Laughlin, 1974, quoted in Parker, ibid., p. 298.


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prohibitions reinforce this by prohibiting marriage with the women ofthe family group, thus enabling individuals to seek spouses outsidethe family group.

This, however, is quite similar to Lvi-Strausss own explanation ofexogamy in terms of alliances between family groups. According toLvi-Strauss, when something is scarce, it takes on the properties ofan economic good.

58Incest prohibition alone freezes women within

the family group, making them scarce, and with the rules of exogamythis action is annulled. Thus alliances between family groups worktogether with the rules of exogamy to make sure that potential

spouses can be found when necessary.

The importance of the existence of these theories does not stem fromthe plausibility of their content. In fact, I am in no position to be able todetermine their validity. However, they have aspects which arecompatible, or even in some cases strikingly similar to Lvi-Strausssown theory, even though their focus and objectives are different. Thusone can examine if these theories are at least conceptually consistentwith some of Lvi-Strausss fundamental ideas. This will be the focusof the next section.

6. Is it conceptually possible to combine Lvi-Strausss theorywith other evolution-oriented theories of the incest taboo?

As shown in sections 3 and 4, Lvi-Strauss did not think highly ofevolutionary or biological explanations of the incest taboo. Eventhough he revised his own theory in later life and admitted that he hadtreated discoveries in the field of genetics too lightly, he still statedthat the importance of the incest taboo was to be found in its culturalaspect. However, in section 5 it was shown that many theories whichprovide an evolutionary explanation for these phenomena are notalways diametrically opposed to Lvi-Strausss own theory. Moreover,many of the scientists writing these papers quote Lvi-Strauss anduse his theory as a point of reference from which to proceed. Thepurpose of this section is to examine whether at least some of these

58Korn, 1973, p. 13.


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evolutionary explanations are theoretically compatible with Lvi-Strausss own discussion of the incest taboo. In order for this tooccur, it is necessary for Lvi-Strausss warnings about theevolutionary explanation of the incest taboo to be ignored. After all, itwas shown in section 3 that his warnings stemmed from his rejectionof extreme reductionism, not evolution itself.

The first important premise for the argument is that Lvi-Strauss didnot reject evolution as the explanation of biological features. Indeed, itwould be rather absurd if he did, because of the accumulatedevidence which supports Darwins theory for the evolution of species.

In terms of anatomical and biological characteristics, Lvi-Straussagreed that humans, like all other animals, have the genes and formsthey do today because of environmental and natural selectionpressures. However, many scientists today believe that behaviouralpatterns can also evolve, and more importantly, that aspects of thisevolution are brought about by similar selection pressures as thosewhich control the evolution of genes and forms. In fact, it has alsobeen suggested that some genes can even influence behaviouralpatterns. For example, very complex behavioural patterns of courtshiphave evolved in many animal species which take place beforereproduction can occur. It is also a frequent occurrence that younganimals observe and copy their parents behaviourfor finding andcatching food.

Changes in behavioural patterns also occur in humans, and it is ofteneasy to see how they evolve. Some of these changes occur within alifetime; for example, infants behaviour changes as they grow intoadults. In addition, the study of history shows that within a fewgenerations, behavioural patterns can change dramatically; forexample, people can espouse a new religion which changes theirwhole outlook towards life. Alternatively, sudden changes in theenvironment, such as a plague, can upset normal modes of behaviourand result in new patterns. After all, one cannot deny that culturesdiffer from each other and from those cultures existent in the past.The natural, easy explanation for this is that each culture has evolved


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into a pattern that suits it best, and enhances its chances of survival.This, however is badevolutionary thinking.

59Cultures do not know

what is good or bad for them, nor is their evolution predetermined.There is no perfect final state which a culture must reach and whichall cultures aspire. There exist also countless examples ofbehavioural patterns in various societies that actually undermine thesurvival of the individual and the society. It is not clear for example,how civil wars or smoking can help the survival of the individual or thegroup to which he/she belongs, nor how these phenomena can beexplained in terms of natural selection. In fact, to do so would be to

provide the reductionist type of explanation against which Lvi-Strauss warned.

Still, as stated in section 5, evolutionary explanations do not have tobe reductionist, yet they are equipped with the ability to take intoaccount many other factors beside natural selection pressures.Seymour Parkers theory is just one example of the many theorieswhich provide a bridge between incest aversion and the manifestationof the incest taboo. It is of particular importance here because of itsclose connection to Lvi-Strausss ideas, but it is by no means theonly important work. If it is proven that these two theories are notincompatible, but that one can follow on from the other, then animportant connection will have been established. Even if later onParkers theory is provenwrong, then there will still be the possibility

that another compatible theory can be formed to take its place.

As stated in the previous section, Parkerlike Lvi-Straussexplains the cultural manifestation of the incest taboo in terms ofalliances between families, where the biological tendency of incestaversion becomes a cultural way of life, which is then perpetuatedand reinforced by various cultural rules.

60This, according to Parker, is

the origin of the cultural aspect of the incest taboo. This theory alsogives extra support to the idea that incest prohibition is universal(because of the way it originates) but the rules governing it differ from

59R. Dawkins,The Selfish Gene(30th anniversary edn.), Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 3-4.60

Parker, 1976, p. 299.


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culture to culture, because they evolve in different ways depending ondifferences in each natural and cultural environment.

However, there still remains a problem if these theories are to becompatible with each other. This is the problem of the so-called bigbangtheory for the emergence of culture. The problem is that on theone hand Lvi-Strauss states that language and therefore culturecould only have come about all at once, but on the other handevolutionary explanations of behavioural patterns show that evencultural phenomena evolve over a period of time. This problem isdissolved, however, if one looks closely at the evolutionists concept

of a period of time. The evolutionary timescale is very different to thatused for practical purposes in everyday life. This is because theevolutionary timescale starts billions of years ago, in order to take intoaccount the formation of the planet and everything from then untilnow. Therefore if the timescale is billions of years, 30,000 years (thetime in which it is believed that culture came into existence) is truly ablink. Any evolution within this timeframe is really an explosion, a bigbang.In terms of human a human timescale, it still is thousands ofgenerations. With this in mind, it is at least conceivable that Lvi-Strausss theory can be reinterpreted and extended to fit thisevolutionary timescale. The main point here is that what Lvi-Straussexplains as the workings of incest prohibition, its manifestation ofreciprocity, and the role of the unconscious do not have to change.

The only factor which needs to be revised is the timeframe in whichall this occurs.

In addition, the existence of a timeless unconscious does notundermine this analysis. If humans are not conscious of the culturalchanges that are occurring around them, but merely externalising andvocalising concerns which pre-exist in their unconscious, then it doesnot matter if it takes a second or 30,000 years for a culturalphenomenon to be fully formed. In fact, one cannot say that theincest taboo, or any other cultural phenomenon for that matter, is fullyformed, as it is constantly evolving even in our time. This is apparentin Western societies, where the prohibition of incest concerns onlyclosely related individuals, while moral sanctions for incest are


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applied less strictly or not at all if the incest relationship occursbetween consenting adults.

Subsequently, it seems that at least on a conceptual level, Lvi-Strausss theory can be combined with others in order to produce afuller explanation of the incest taboo, and through it the origin ofculture itself. The practical examination of this combination is acomplex, empirical matter. What should be retained is the idea thatinterdisciplinary analysis can result in an explanation more fruitfulthan one confined to a single field of study. Socio-biologists havestarted down this path and although not every single paper published

is necessarily valid or useful, the idea of combining materials andmethods is, I think, a way of expanding mental horizons and couldresult in great explanatory success.

7. Conclusion: Is the Nature Culture debate necessary?

The opposition between nature and culture has been a central themein this essay. Importance and power has oscillated between the twoorders for a very long time resulting in the ingraining of this idea ofopposition in many peoples minds. Nowadays however, thelegitimacy of the debate itself is being questioned. There has been anincreasing tendency to view nature and culture as interrelated andworking together in terms of their effects on the human environment.Many natural and social scientists now think that everything that

occurs in humans is a result of a combination of heredity and theeffects of the environment, and thus any explanation must take intoaccount both natural and cultural factors.

61

There is however a problem with this idea. Not everythingin humannature is the result of combination of environment and heredity. Thereis a distinction between natural and cultural phenomena which cannotbe simply eliminated. For example, one would be hard-pressed to findgenetic reasons for one persons preference for one particular balletproduction over another. Conversely, it would be absurd to seek a

61S. Pinker, Why nature & nurture wont go away, in Dedalus, Nov. 2004.


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cure for genetic disorders such as Downs syndrome or haemophiliain the cultural sphere.

There seems to be no simple way out of this debate. Not evencombining the two extreme theories always provides good answers.In addition, every time a particular theory is proven unsatisfactory, thedebate seems to spring up again anew. Still, a very important pointhas been made with the combination of the extreme nature andextreme culture theories. Even though it is not always the case thatboth nature and culture influence human phenomena, very often bothdoand moreover, it is not usually easy to say whose influence is

more obvious and important. Lvi-Strausss account of the incesttaboo greatly reflects this. He himself, who was so adamant in thebeginning that natures importance as an explanatory mechanism wasobliterated by the advent of culture, later acknowledged that thingsare not so simple, and that culture is a lot more easily reducible tonature than was previously thought.

This is a very important shift in ideology, which was to have farreaching effects. The important difference is that nature and cultureare no longer viewed as diametrically opposed. As shown in section4, with a few sentences, Lvi-Strauss effectively eliminated thenature-culture debate; he was not alone. His shift in ideology wasmirrored by many natural and social scientists to great success. Thisis, I think, one of the most important changes of ideology of our time,because the destruction of the idea that natural and cultural factorsare independent and necessarily work against each other, hasallowed both the natural and social sciences to make huge leapsforward. It has also allowed for the emergence of new disciplineswhich would have been unthought-of if nature and culture were atodds, for example socio-biology, evolutionary anthropology, etc. Itseems as though both the natural and social sciences do not feel theneed to seek answers in extremist theories any more. It seems to beunderstood now that even if something cannot be explained by acombination of natural and cultural theories, this is not because theyare at odds; it is usually because on one hand there is no time for thecultural aspects to have any influence, as with the case of hereditary


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diseases, or on the other hand, there is no space for the naturalfactors to influence, as in the case with the artistic preference.

It now seems rather counter-intuitive to say that overall, nature ismore important than culture or vice versa. After all, human nature,and maybe even some animal natures, are the way they arebecause of both natural and cultural phenomena: they have bothnatural and cultural aspects to them.

The ultimate aim of this essay has been to show the limitations whicha theory can encounter if nature and culture are defined in particular

ways, especially if they are viewed as opposites; at the same time,the aim has also been to show that as soon as nature and culture arenot viewed as opposites, many of the original limitations of the theorydisappear, and more importantly it can now, at least in theory, becombined with other theories and thus provide more satisfyingexplanations of the phenomenon being examined. Lvi-Straussstheory was particularly interesting for many reasons. Firstly the verytopic of the incest taboo and its universality is simply fascinating.Secondly, the connections Lvi-Strauss makes are not alwaysexpected, yet sometimes provide insight into the workings of humannature. They are intellectually stimulating, pushing the readers ownmind to examine the issues at hand. Examination of his theory ofincest sparked my interest in the extremely complex nature ofhumanity and alerted me to the importance of the nature versusculture debate. Interestingly, with the analysis of the theory, it seemedobvious that Lvi-Strauss was writing at a time very different to ourown (at least in terms of scientific research), and that my owneducation (and interest in evolution) greatly affected my interpretationof it. It seems that we are all products of our time to some extent, andit is possible that being a product of thistime may require thisdissolution of the debate between nature and culture.

The Incest Taboo by Alkistis Elliott-Graves

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