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Claremont CollegesScholarship @ Claremont
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship
2016
The Impact of Technology on the EntertainmentDistribution Market: The Effects of Netflix andHulu on Cable RevenueNicole P. AliloupourScripps College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please [email protected] .
Recommended CitationAliloupour, Nicole P., "The Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Distribution Market: The Effects of Netflix and Hulu on CableRevenue" (2016). Scripps Senior Theses. Paper 746.http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/746
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THEIMPACTOFTECHNOLOGYONTHEENTERTAINMENTDISTRIBUTIONMARKET:THEEFFECTSOFNETFLIXANDHULUONCABLEREVENUE
by
NICOLEALILOUPOUR
SUBMITTEDTOSCRIPPSCOLLEGEINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOFTHEDEGREEOFTHEBACHELOROFARTS
PROFESSORSEANFLYNNPROFESSORROBERTOPEDACE
DECEMBER11,2015
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Abstract
Online streaming has revolutionized the way that people consume
filmsandtelevision.ThisstudywillexaminehowNetflixandHuluhave
disrupted the North American distribution oligopoly and asses
whether their low subscription prices are adversely affecting major
cable companies who dominate the distribution sphere. A review of
existingliteratureonthetopicwillexploretheinfluenceoftheInternet
ontheentertainmentdistributionoligopolyaswellasconsumertrends
andbehaviorfavoringNetflixandHulu.Additionally,datafrom2007to
2014 will be used to analyze variables that indicate a correlation
between Netflix’s and Hulu’s growth and Time Warner Cable’s
decreasingrevenue.
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TableofContents
Introduction..................................................................................................................................................4
RelatedLiterature......................................................................................................................................5
TheEntertainmentMarketOligopoly...............................................................................................6
Technology’seffectonthelongstandingoligopoly...................................................................10
ConsumerInfluence................................................................................................................................12
NewerPlayersintheDistributionMarket....................................................................................13
ShortcomingsoftheLiterature..........................................................................................................14
DataandVariables...................................................................................................................................17
Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................25
References...................................................................................................................................................29
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Introduction
Rapidtechnologicalinnovationsoverthepast10yearshavedisrupted
entertainmentdistributioninawaythathasbeenunprecedented.Aspersonal
computers,laptops,tablets,andsmartphoneshavebecomecommonhousehold
goods,emergingcompanieshaveembracedtechnologicaladvancementsand
incorporatedthemintotheirbusinessmodelstocreatearevolutioninthewaythat
audiencesconsumeentertainment.NewfirmssuchasNetflixandHuluhavegrown
throughtheuseoftheInternetasaplatformtodistributefilmsandtelevisionseries,
cuttingcostssuchasphysicalinventory,set-topboxes,remotecontrols,and
modems.Nevertheless,theyareabletooffercustomersalargevarietyofshowsand
moviesthatsatisfybothpopularandnichedemands.
Thesenewercompaniesbringawiderassortmentoftelevisionandvideo
contenttoconsumerswhopreviouslywerehardertoaccess.Ratherthandelivering
abundlepackageofgenerictelevisionstationsoronlyofferingbigcommercial
contentatahighprice,theyhavealibrarythatalsocontainsindependentfilmsand
productionsthatnevermadeittotheatersorlargerrentalservices.Thelarger
supplyofvideocontentandlowercostsassociatedwithdistributionallowformore
competitivepricingamongthenewercompaniesthataredisruptingtheoldfilmand
televisionoligopoly.IfNetflixandHuluareabletoentertheoligopolyanddecrease
pricessignificantly,howdoesthateffectcablefirmsincludingTimeWarnerCable
whohaven’tadjustedpricesaccordingly?
Inthisthesis,IanalyzeNetflixandHulutounderstandhowtechnologyhas
openedthedoorforsmallerfirmstoenterthisoligopoly;furthermore,anoverall
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declineinTimeWarnerCable’srevenueindicatesthatlow,competitivesubscription
pricessetbyNetflixandHuluareadverselyaffectingcablefirms’abilitytocompete.
Ilookattechnologicalshiftsthathaveoccurredoverthepastsevenyears,howthese
companieshaveincorporatedthemduringthesespecificperiods,andpatternsin
pricesandrevenuethroughoutthistimeline.Examinationofvariablespertinentto
bothconsumersaswellasNetflix,Hulu,andTimeWarnerCablewilldevelopa
biggerpictureofhowthesupplyanddemandforentertainmenthasshiftedand
affectedcablerevenue.
RelatedLiterature
Technologicalinnovationoverthepasttenyears,especiallythrougheasy
accessandthecommercializationoftheInternet,hasrevolutionizedfilmand
televisiondistribution.Theever-changingnatureoftechnologyandconsumer
behaviorhaspromptedrapidchangesindistributionmethodsfromyeartoyear,
makingthisanintriguingtopicofresearchwithineconomic,business,legal,and
mediasectors.TomEvens(2014)dissectstheclashoftelevisionplatforms,drawing
macroeconomicandmicroeconomicanalysesoftherolethattechnologyhasin
disruptingorshiftingthemarket.CamilleJohnson(2014)usesalegallensto
examinehowthecurrentdistributionoligopoly,threatenedbyemergingconsumer
trendssupportingonlinedistribution,mayneedgovernmentinterventiontokeep
mediaconglomeratesfromusingrestrictivepracticesthatblocknewcompanies
fromemerging.Additionally,AlejandroPardo(2013)focusesonHollywood’s
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distributionrenaissanceandhowexistingbusinessmodelsmustadaptto
technologicalchangesinordertoremaincompetitive.
TheEntertainmentMarketOligopoly
Ineconomics,anoligopolyisamarketstructureorindustrythatisheavily
influencedanddominatedbyafewlargefirms.Thesmallconcentrationof
companieswithinoligopoliesresultsfrombarrierstoentry,suchashighcosts,that
keepnewerandsmallerfirmsfrompartakinginthemarket.Thegoodsthatthese
profit-maximizingcompaniesproducearealmostexactlythesame,whichiswhy
firmsareconstantlycompetingtodominatelargesharesofthemarket.Asaresult,
theyareinterdependentononeanother,keepingsimilarpricestostaycompetitive.
Oligopolisticfirmstendtohavecontroloversupply,givingthemsignificant
influenceoverprices.Nevertheless,pricingtendstobeconsistentamongallfirms
becausetheyrisklosingrevenueandmarketsharestocompetitorsiftheyraisethe
pricesoftheirgoods.Conversely,iftheydecidetolowerpricesoftheirgoods,other
firmswillhavetodothesametoremaincompetitive.
Massdistributionofentertainmentcontenttendstobedonethroughcable
andsatellitetelevision,asthisisthemostcommonmodeforpeopletoconsume
televisionandfilms.Bloombergreportsindustryleadersandtheirmarketsharesin
thecableandsatelliteindustry,indicatingthattherearetenmajorfirmsinthe
NorthAmericasectorcomprisedofthefollowingcompanies:Comcast,DirectTV,
TimeWarnerCable,DISHNetwork,CharterCommunications,CablevisionSystems,
EchoStar,ShawCommunications,BCEInc.,andRogersCommunication.Ofthese
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companies,BloombergspecifiesthatComcasthasthehighestsalesfollowedby
DirectTV,TimeWarnerCable,andDISHNetwork.Comcasthasamarketshareof
26.7%,DirectTV’smarketshareis20.5%,TimeWarnerCablehasashareof
14.20%,andDISH’sshareis9%(Bloomberg2015).Thesefourcompaniestogether
hold70.4%ofindustryshares,andthesixothercompaniescombinedhaveamere
29.6%(Bloomberg2015).A$202.5billionindustrycontrolledandrunbya
relativelysmallnumberoffirmsisastrongindicationofanoligopoly.
Evensanalyzestheentertainmentdistributionmarketthrough
characteristicsincludingindustryconcentration,numberofbuyersandsuppliers,
entrybarriers,andtechnologicalchangestoevaluateitsoligopolisticnature.
Economiesofscaleareprevalentincableandsatellitedistributionmarketswithin
theentertainmentindustry.Americanentertainmentandleisureconsistslargelyof
filmandtelevisionconsumption,whichiswhythemajorityofhouseholdstendto
purchasetheseservices.Highdemandforentertainmentprogramsmeansthat
companiesinthisindustrycanproducetheir“goods”atalargerscaleanddecrease
inputcosts.Furthermore,consolidationisasignificantcharacteristicinmedia
distributionasameansofmaximizingefficiencyinthiseconomicsetup.
Mergers,acquisitions,andverticalintegrationincreasethesefirms’
competitivepositionsandbargainingpowersignificantly,whichhasledtoa
tendencyofoligopolisticcontrol(Evens2014).TosupportEven’sobservations
aboutindustryconsolidation,onecanlookatthenumberoneleaderincable
distribution.Comcastisamajorconglomeratewhoseservicesextendbeyond
providingcabletelevision,Internet,andphoneservices.ItboughtNBCUniversal,
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anothermajorconglomeratethatownsstudios,themeparks,broadcastnetworks,
andcablechannels.Additionally,TimeWarnerCablehasthesecondhighestmarket
shareincabledistribution.Alongwithitsfunctionasacablecompany,TimeWarner
Cable’sassetsincludeHBO,WarnerBrothers,CartoonNetwork,CNN,NewLine
Cinema,andmore.Comcast’sownershipofNBCUniversal’scontentandTime
WarnerCable’sownershipofWarnerBrothersandotherassetshaveclear
advantagesbecausetheycontroltheirownsupplychain.Withtheownershipof
contentcreators,theycangenerateandnegotiatefavorabledealsfortheircore
businesseswhileincreasingcontentpricesforcompetitors.
Filmandtelevisiondistributors’consolidationhascreatedanindustrywith
lesscompetitionandmuchmorebargainingpower.Inthemarketstructure,thereis
alargergroupofbroadcastersandasmallnumberofmajordistributors.The
numberofcompetitorsindistributionisamajorindicatoroftheoligopolyand
pointstothedifficultythatsmallercompetitorshave:“Thestrengthofafirm’s
competitivepositionultimatelydependsonthepresenceofsubstitutes,andthe
abilityofsuppliers(orbuyers)tobypasspowerfulpartiestobargainbetter
commercialterms”(Evens2014).Evenssuggeststhatpooledbargainingor
collectiveactionmaybeausefulstrategyforsmallerornewercompaniestohave
morebargainingpowerwhencompetingagainstconsolidatedorvertically
integratedconglomerates.Johnsonclaimsthatalternatively,smallercompanieswho
arenotpartoftheverticallyintegratedsystemhaveahardtimecompetingandare
typicallyforcedtointegratethroughunfavorablearrangementswiththebigger
videoprogrammingdistributors”(Johnson2014).
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Barrierstoentry,includinghighentrycosts,havehistoricallyprotected
majorentertainmentcompaniesfromcompetitiveentry,reinforcingbargaining
powerintelevisionmarketsaswell(Evens2014).Inparticular,thesepricesinclude
contentandphysicalcapital.Televisiondistributionhastypicallybeendonethrough
cableandsatellite,asconsumersareabletowatchprogramsontheirTVsthrough
cableboxesandsatellitedishessetupintheirhouseholds.Thepriceofcontentis
high,especiallyfornewerfirmswhodon’thaveestablishedrelationshipswith
contentcreators.Asmentionedbefore,ComcastandTimeWarnerCableown
contentsupplyandcanobtainfavorabledealsforthem.Whatimpactdoesthishave
onemergingfirms?ComcastandTimeWarnerCablecanengageinanticompetitive
behaviorthatlimitsthecontentthatNBCUniversal,WarnerBrothers,etc.are
willingtoselltothesenewerfirmsormaytrytoblockthemoutcompletelyby
signingexclusivedeals.Additionally,theymaypricethecontentatan
astronomicallyhighcostthatnewerandsmallerfirmswon’tbeabletopay.This
strengthenspowerdynamicsamongoligopolisticcompaniesandkeepstheindustry
concentrationsmall.
Thesecondentrycostthatisdetrimentalfornewercompaniesisthepriceof
physicalequipmenttheymustinvestin(Johnson2014).2014Bloombergreports
projectthegrowthrateinsalesrevenueforComcasttoincrease7.7%in2015and
TimeWarnerCabletogrow3.43%(Bloomberg2015).Withthisamountofgrowth
forsuchlargecompanies,thesetwofirmshavethemeanstocontinuemass
investmentoncapitalandequipmentsuchascableboxes.Smallerfirmslookingto
enter,however,wouldhavetoputdownamassiveinvestmentforequipmentthat
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theycan’tguaranteewillbesold.Havinginadequateinitialfundsforinvestmentand
aweakclientbase,newfirmsmayfacechallengesbreakingintothecableindustry
orstayingafloat.Theabsenceofpublicindustrydataindicatinghowmuchcable
companiesarepayingfortheproductionofcableboxes,machinery,rawmaterial,
makesithardtodeterminethepricenewfirmswouldhavetoinvestinorderto
manufacturecableboxes.Itisunrealistictoassumethatanemergingfirmwouldbe
heldincomparisontoComcastorTimeWarnerCable,butthecompanywouldat
leastneedtobecomparabletoRogersCommunicationinordertoenterandremain
competitiveintheoligopoly.Bloomberg’sindustrydataindicatesthatRogers
Communicationhasthesmallestmarketshareintheindustrywithatotalof2.02
millionNorthAmericansubscribers.TobeonanequalplayingfieldasRogers
Communication,anemergingfirmneedstobepreparedtoserviceasimilaramount
ofcustomers;moreover,itwouldmostlikelyhavetoinvestintheproductionof
about2.02millioncableboxes.Thismassiveinvestmentmaybeparticularlyrisky
forsmallerfirmswhoareunsureiftheywillmakeitintheindustry.Highentrycosts
aswellasverticallyintegratedcorporations’exclusiveaccesstocontenthave
limitedthenumberoffirmsthatcanenter,compete,andsurviveinthedistribution
realm.
Technology’seffectonthelongstandingoligopoly
Technologicalinnovationhasbeenamajorfactorthatcanpotentiallydisrupt
competitionandthestatusquooftheindustry’sstructure.Evensclaims,“New
technologyerodesentrybarriersandchallengesoligopolycontroloverbottlenecks
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thatgiverisetogatekeepingpower”(Evens2014).Pardoechoesthissentimentthat
technologysuchastheInternethasbeenerasingbordersandshiftingparadigmsof
televisiondistributionthatwereoncedefinedandcontrolledbythesemajorfirms.
PardoexplainsthatHollywoodiscurrentlyatadigitalcrossroadcharacterizedby
twocentralmovements:“Ononehand,theemergenceofanewmarketforthe
commercializationofaudiovisualproducts(Internet,digitalreproductiondevices,
smartphones,smartTVs)…and,ontheother,theemergenceofanewtypeof
consumer,knowncollectivelyas‘theiPod-‘or‘theNet-generation’(Tapscott2009)”
(Pardo2013).Becauseoftheabundanceofconsumerswhohaveaccesstothe
InternetanddevicesthatconnecttotheInternet,companiessuchasNetflixand
Huludidnotneedtoinvestinsuchhighentrycosts,capital,andlaborfortheir
streamingservices;moreover,theirbusinessesrelyonInternetaccessinorderto
function,avoidingtheneedtopurchase,manufacture,andinstallcableboxesor
satellitedishes.
Withloweredinitialbarriers,thereispotentialformorecompetitionamong
distributors.WhileEvensarguesthatentrybarriershavedecreasedinthefaceof
digitalabundance,hebelievesthattheyarestilllikelytopersistbecauseofthe
presenceofeconomiesofscale(Evens2014).Nevertheless,heclaims:“Digital
technologynotonlyincreasesefficiencyinthesupplychain,butalsotendstoshift
bargainingpowertothosepartiesthatadaptquicklyinordertoreapthefruitsfrom
thenewdigitalopportunities”(Evens2014).Newercompaniesinthedistribution
realm,particularlyNetflixandHulu,havebuilttheircompanymodelsinwaysthat
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mirrorandquicklyadapttotechnologicalinnovations,forcingestablishedfirmsto
keepup.
ConsumerInfluence
Consumershaveavitalroleinthechangingdistributionmarket.While
JohnsonandPardorefertochangingtelevisionaudiencesbydifferentnames,they
bothagreethattechnologyhashadasignificantimpactonthewaythataudiences
consumeandwatchtelevision.Johnsonreferstotwodifferenttypesofemerging
consumerswhoarethreateningthetraditionaldistributionmodel.Shedescribes
“cordnevers”asagroupof“techsavvy‘20-somethings’”whohaveneversubscribed
totraditionalmultichannelvideoprogramming,optingforInternetstreaming
optionsinstead.Cordcuttersareconsumerswhopreviouslypaidforcableor
satellitetelevision,buthavedecidedtostopsubscribing.Likethecordnevers,they
havechosentoaccesstelevisionandprogramsthroughtheInternetinstead
(Johnson2014).Ratherthanexaminingemergingaudiencesbasedontheir
televisionviewinghabits,Pardolookstotheirabilitytokeepupwithtechnological
devicestodeterminetheirbehavior.Heframesthedigitizationofentertainment
with“therapidexpansionofthe‘Appleecosystem’”(Pardo2013).Since2001,Apple
hassucceededinsellingover140millioniPods,promptingequallysuccessfulsales
ofiPad,iPhones,andotherdevices(Pardo2013).Additionally,Apple
commercializedmorethan3millionmoviesaswellas100millionepisodesof
televisionshowssinceOctober2005(Pardo2013).Thisinnovationhasshiftedthe
waythatconsumersinteractwithtechnology:“This‘iPod/iPhone/iPadgeneration’
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epitomizesthenewpeergroupofuserswhoseaudiovisualexperienceisbasedon
allsortsofmediaplatformsandwhoseprofiletoalargeextentmirrorsthatofthe
cinema-goingpublicandthosewhoplayvideogames”(Pardo2013).AstheInternet
isreadilyavailabletoconsumersandsmartdevicesarecommonhouseholditems,
thesenewtechnologicallydrivenusersinteractwithentertainmentinamore
efficientway.Marketingexpertshavededucedthatnumericallythisgenerationof
usershasreachedacriticalmass,andtheirconsumerpracticescontrastthoseof
previousgenerations(Pardo2013).Withtheprevalenceofcordcutters,cord
nevers,andagenerationofAppleusers,JohnsonandPardoviewchangesin
distributionasaresponsetogrowingdemandfordigitalplatformsforonline
televisionviewing.
NewerPlayersintheDistributionMarket
Currently,theleadersofonlinecontentdistributionincludeNetflixandHulu.
Netflix,establishedin1999,hasevolvedfromamailorderDVDrentalcompanyto
anonlinestreamingservice(Johnson2014).CompetingwithBlockbuster,itallowed
consumerstoconvenientlyrentmoviesfromthecomfortoftheirownhome
throughtheInternet.By2007,Netflixrevolutionizeddistributionbyemployinga
WatchInstantlyfeaturethatallowsaudiencestoplayselectmoviesandshows
immediatelyontheircomputers.Theironlinestreamingfeaturehaselevatedtheir
businesssignificantlyandhasbecometheirmajorsourceofrevenue,servingmore
than40millionsubscribers(Johnson2014).Forafixedsubscriptionpriceof$7.99
permonth,consumerscanhaveaccesstounlimitedonlinestreamingaswellasDVD
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rentals.Withrapidsuccessandgrowthoverarelativelyshorttimespan,the
companyhasbegunproducingitsownoriginalcontentincluding“HouseofCards”
and“OrangeistheNewBlack”.ThesuccessofNetflixandonlinestreaminghasbeen
metbycompetition.In2008Huluemergedintotheonlinedistributionmarket.
SimilarlytoNetflix,Hulustreamstelevisionandfilmsthroughanonlineplatform
andoffersasubscriptionforHuluPlusatthesamepriceof$7.99permonth.
CurrentlyownedbymajortelevisionconglomeratesincludingComcast,21stCentury
FoxCorporation,andtheWaltDisneyCompany,itistheprincipaldigitaldistributor
ofnetworktelevision(Johnson2014).
ShortcomingsintheLiterature
Johnsonexaminestheemergenceofonline-baseddistributorsthroughtheir
abilitytoactasdirectcompetitorsoftraditionalmultichannelvideoprogramming
distributors,or“MVPD”s.Inthissense,shefocusesontheideaofvirtualcable
companieswhocanprovidethesamechannelsandcontentastraditionalcable
companies.Bydoingso,shearguesthatMVPDshavemadeitimpossibleforthese
virtualcablecompaniestoexistbecauseofanticompetitivebehaviorsuchasillegal
dealswithcontentprogrammersthatpreventothersfromaccessingcontentor
manipulationofpricestodiscourageMVPDsubscribersfromcancelling.Whilethis
isavalidpoint,thisthesisemphasizestheinfluencethatinnovationhasonchanging
themarketasawholeandfindsanemphasisontheideaofanonlinecablecompany
tobesomewhatlimitinginresearchinganddeterminingtheeffectsthatonline
distributionhasontheexistingmarketandcablecompanies.Johnson’sfocusonthe
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inabilityofvirtualcablecompaniestoemergedoesn’tfullytaketheideaofshifting
consumerpatternsandpreferencesintoaccount.
Onlineplatformsdon’tnecessarilyneedtoprovideidenticalservicesascable
andsatellitecompaniesinordertobesuccessful,asEvensechoes.Duringtimesof
digitizationandtechnologicaladvancement,thereisgreatopportunityfor
innovationtobemorefruitfulthanreplication.Anexamplesupportingthispointis
thephysicalDVDrentalbusiness.Inthefollowinganalogy,Blockbustercanbe
equatedtocableandsatellitetelevisioncompanies,andNetflix’soriginalbusiness
modelofonlinerentalofphysicalDVDscanbeequatedtoonlinecablecompanies
thatJohnsonmentions.WhileNetflixputBlockbusteroutofbusinessbecauseit
offeredthesameserviceinamoreconvenientway,Netflix’soldbusinessofDVD
rentalsneededtogoastepfurtherintostreamingtofullysatisfyconsumertrends.
Thisinstanceofinnovationshowsthatperfectsubstitutes,orreplication,suchas
onlinephysicalrentalservicesmaynotbeaseffectiveasanalternateformof
competitionthatrespondstoconsumerneeds.Streamingisanalternativetorenting
films,whichhasbecomeamorepopularchoiceinthepastfewyears;moreover,
streamingandonlinedistributionofcontentdonotnecessarilyneedtofollowcable
andsatellitetelevisionmodelsinordertodowellinthemarket.Onemayarguethat
cableandsatelliteoffermorechannelsandcommercializedcontentthatothersmay
nothaveaccessto,butitisimportanttonotethatNetflixandHuluofferawide
selectionofpopularprogrammingfrommajormediacompaniessuchasNBC
UniversalandABCTelevisionaswellasindiefilms,nichecontentoftenoverlooked
bycablecompanies,andoriginalcontent.Atasignificantlylowerpricepointfor
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unlimitedaccesstothousandsoftitles,thesedigitaldistributorshavebeenmajor
contributorstothecordneverandcordcutterphenomenon.
Additionally,literatureontheinfluenceofNetflixandHuluoncable
companieshasyettodefineorexamineaclearrelationshipbetweenthenewer
companies’growthandtheeffectsthattheyarehavingoncableandsatellite
companies.WhileNetflixandHuluwereabletousetechnologytobreakintothe
distributionindustryandcompetewiththeseMVPD,whatexactlyistheimpactthat
theyarehavingonthemajorcableandsatelliteconglomerates?Towhatextenthave
theydisruptedtheoligopolyandwheredotheystandinthemarket?Asmentioned
earlier,inanoligopolisticindustry,conglomeratesareforcedtorespondtoprice
changesamongrivalstoremaincompetitive.Hulu’sandNetflix’spricesare$7.99,so
howisthisimpactingcablecompanieswhosepricesremainabouteighttimes
higher?Whatkindofvariablesanddataarehelpfulinassessingtheimpact?The
followingdatasectionsanddataanalysiswillexamineaspectsofdistribution
includingconsumerhabitsandtrends,prices,andrevenuetoobservearelationship
thatcanaddressexistingquestionsandholesinthestudy.
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Dataandvariables
Intheliteraturereview,theauthorscharacterizedcertainsubsetsof
consumersasbeingcordcutters,cordnevers,andtheAppleGeneration.Figure1
uses2015datafromDeloittetoshowthedifferentagegroupsoftelevision
consumers,indicatingthepercentageofeachagegroupthatstreamsmonthly.Data
revealsthatamongyoungertelevisionviewers,thereisahigherpercentageof
individualswhostreammonthly.Theoldertheaudiencemembersare,thesmaller
thepercentageofpeopleintheiragegroupswhostreamtelevisionmonthly.This
makessenseintuitivelybecauseyoungergenerationstendtoadapttonewer
technologyatafasterrateandhaveaneasiertimechangingtheirhabits
accordingly.A14-yearoldcordneverwillhaveasmoothertransitionfollowing
distributiontrendsthana40-yearoldconsumerwhohasbeenwatchingcable
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televisionfordecades.Whilethetrendinthedatashowsapatternofdecreasing
percentagesofstreamersasconsumersgetolder,thereisanoticeablysharper
decreasebetweenthosewhoare32-48yearsoldandconsumerswhoare68and
older.However,thereisonlya12%differencebetweenthepercentageof14to48
yearoldswhostreammonthly.Accordingtothedata72%of14-25year-old
televisionviewersutilizeonlinestreamingcomparedtothe23%ofpeople68and
older.Overall,53%ofconsumersofallagesstreamtelevisionprogramsmonthly,
indicatingthatstreamingonaveragehasbeenembracedbymorethanhalfof
individualsinallagegroups.
Asmentionedearlier,Netflix’sandHulu’sonlinedistributionservices
emergedaround2007,rivalingmoreestablisheddistributorssuchasComcastand
TimeWarnerCable.Thesecompaniesarerelativelynew,whichiswhytheiryearly
revenueisanimportantfactorinunderstandingtheirexpansionintothismarket.
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Ratherthanlookingattheirrevenueincomparisontothoseofthemajorcableand
satellitecompanies,itisbettertoanalyzeindividualchangesinrevenuefromyear
toyeartodeterminehowquicklythecompaniesaregrowing.Hulu’sfinancial
informationisnoteasilyaccessible,sotherevenueIobtainedcomesfromStatista.
Statista’sresearchanalystscollecttheirdatathroughresourceswithintheindustry.
IalsolookedintoNetflix’sannual10-Kfinancialreportsfrom2007to2014to
collectitsrevenue.Overall,therevenueforbothcompaniespointstoasignificant
yearlygrowthrate,whichisdepictedinFigure2.DatasuggeststhatNetflix’s
revenuehasincreased4.57timesoverthespanofsevenyearsfrom$1,205,340,000
to$5,504,656.Hulu’srevenuein2013is50timeshigherthanitsrevenuein2007,
increasingfrom$20,000,000to$1,000,000,000.Thesegrowthratesindicate
significantmomentuminthecurrentonlinedistributionmarket.
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In2014,approximately87%ofU.S.householdssubscribedtoeithercableor
satellitetelevision(Experian2014).Physicaltelevisionsaretypicallygood
indicatorsofsatelliteorcableuse,sothenumberoftelevisionhouseholdsintheU.S.
cansupportthisstatisticandillustratetheprevalenceoftheseformsofdistribution
overthepastdecadeorso.CollectedonStatista,Figure3showsthisdatafrom2000
to2016.Thenumberoftelevisionhouseholdsdramaticallyincreasedfromtheyear
2000to2010;however,from2010to2012-2013therewasanoticeabledeclinein
thenumberofTVhouseholds.Thedataindicatesthatalthoughthenumberreaches
alowpointby2012-2013,thenumberofTVhouseholdspicksbackup,butataslow
ratethatbarelysurpassesthe2010mark.Onlinestreamingbecameavailable
around2007,whichcouldpotentiallyexplainthedisruptioninthegraphand
decreaseinTVhouseholdsfrom2010asstreamingbeganpickingupinpopularity.
Nevertheless,theincreaseinpopularityandrevenueofNetflixandHuluthroughout
thefollowingyearsarenotquiteconsistentwiththeincreaseintelevision
householdsfollowing2012.TheownershipoftelevisionsandtheuseofNetflixand
Hulu,however,arenotmutuallyexclusive.Thenumberoftelevisionhouseholds
doesnothaveanycausationalrelationshipwithsatelliteandcableusage,butcan
showarelationshipofcorrelation.TheinconsistencyofNetflixandHulu’sgrowthin
revenueandincreaseinhouseholdtelevisionscansuggestthatperhapsconsumers
havedecidedtousebothmodesofdistributiontowatchTVshowsandfilmsorthat
ratherthansolelyusingtheirlaptops,computers,andsmartdevicestowatchNetflix
orHulu,cordcuttersandcordneversprefertousetheirtelevisionmonitorsto
projectcontentfromNetflixorHulu.
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ThenumberofU.S.householdswithcomputersalsoisanimportantvariable
inunderstandinghowdigitizeddistributionhasbeenabletoenterthemarketand
competewithcableandsatellite.AccordingtotheU.S.CensusBureau,
approximately78%ofU.S.householdshadhigh-speedInternetconnectionin2013
(U.S.CensusBureau2013).ConsumersmusthaveaccesstotheInternetinorderfor
onlinestreamingtobecomeawidespreadtrend,andthemostcommonformof
Internetusageisthroughcomputerownership.Inaspanoftwelveyears,therehas
beena30%increaseinhouseholdswhoowncomputers,with84%ofhouseholds
havingatleastonecomputerbytheyear2013.In2010thereisanoticeable
decreaseinthepercentageofhouseholdswithcomputers,whichisasimilartrend
tothebriefdeclineinthenumberofTVhouseholdsmentionedinFigure3.Thisis
interestingtonotebecauseitindicatesadipincomputerandtelevisionownership
duringthesametimeperiod,whichperhapspointstoexternalfactorsthat
decreasedtheconsumptionofdifferentelectronicgoods.Nevertheless,thedatain
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Figure4showsaclearoverallincreaseincomputerownershipintheU.S.This
implicitlyindicatesthatInternetusagehasincreased,providingaplatformforHulu
andNetflixtocontinuegrowing.
Onlinedistributionhasbeencompetitivewithinthemarketbecauseofits
relativelylowprices.ConsumerscanhaveunlimitedstreamingoptionsonHuluor
Netflixforamonthlypriceof$7.99,whichisanattractivedealconsideringcableand
satellitetelevisionpricesaresignificantlyhigherthanbothpricescombined.
Averagemonthlycabletelevisionpricesareimportanttonotebecausetheyhave
grownexorbitantlyovertheyears.Figure5showsdatareportedbytheFederal
CommunicationsCommissionin2013,revealingaveragecabletelevisionmonthly
subscriptionpricesfrom1995to2013.Thedataassociatedwiththefigureshows
thattherehasbeena$42increaseinmonthlycablepricesduringthistimeperiod.
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Cableandsatellitetelevisionhavebeenmajorsourcesofentertainmentfordecades
astherehavebeenfewotherdistributionoptionswithinthemarketuntilrecently.
Figure5showsthataveragemonthlypricesofcabletelevisionwereoverthree
timesmoreexpensivein2013thanin1995.Likemostoligopolies,cabledistribution
companieshaverelativelysimilarpricesthatareinterdependentononeanother.
Increasingpricesofcablewillbeimportanttokeepinmindwhenlookingat
revenue.IsTimeWarnerCable’srevenueincreasingatasimilarrateasgrowing
cableprices,orisitsinabilitytolowerpricestorivalthatofNetflixandHulu
influencingitsrevenue?Asstatedwiththeothervariables,thereareoutsidefactors
thatcontributetothedramaticincreaseinprice.Forexample,theremightbemore
channelsandbundlesavailablethathaveincreasedthevalueofcabletelevisionover
time.Anotherexamplemaybethatpricesofrawmaterialshaveincreasedorthe
purchasingofnewtechnologytomanufacturecableboxeshaselevatedproduction
costsforcablecompanies,pushingthemtoincreasepricesaccordingly.Thereare
myriadsofexplanationsthatcancontributetotherisingprices;nevertheless,it
mostlikelystillaffectsconsumers’decisionstopaywhentheyhavetheoptionof
lowerandconsistentpricesthroughNetflixandHulusubscriptions.
ComcastandTimeWarnerCablearethetwodominatingcable
conglomeratesinthedistributionrealm,whichiswhytrendsintheiryearlyrevenue
arerepresentativeofhowthecableindustryasawholeisdoing.Thesedistributors
havefunctionsthatgobeyondvideocableservicesandextendtoInternet,
telephone,andotherservices;furthermore,itisamistaketomerelylookattheir
overallrevenuebecauseitdoesn’taccuratelydepicthowtheircabletelevision
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businessisdoing.IchosenottoanalyzeComcastbecausedataonitsbusinessistoo
intertwinedtothatofNBCUniversal.Therevenuereportedinitsannualfinancial
reportscombineservicesoftheircorebusinessaswellasrevenuefromitstheme
parks,studios,andcablechannels.Thismakesitverydifficulttodistinguishhow
muchoftherevenueiscomingfromcable,Internetandphoneservices,orfromNBC
Universal.Instead,IexaminedTimeWarnerCable’sannual10-Kfinancialreports
from2006-2014andfounddatathatisbrokendowntoprovidespecificrevenuefor
theirvideocableservices.
Figure6showsTimeWarnerCable’srevenueduringthistimeperiod.In
2006,itsrevenuespikedbyapproximately$3billionandpeakedin2010.From
2007to2008therewasabriefdipinrevenue.Whilethereareseveralfactorsthat
mayhaveinfluencedthisdecreasesuchasthefinancialcrisis,itisworthconsidering
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thatNetflixlauncheditsstreamingservicesthatyear.Following2007,TimeWarner
Cable’svideorevenuestaysconsistentandlackssignificantgrowth.Infact,from
2012to2014thereisanoverallplungeinrevenue.Giventhatcablepriceshave
risennoticeably,itisinterestingthatTimeWarnerCable’srevenuedoesn’tincrease
atasimilarrate.Perhapsthispointstoalossofconsumerswhoarewillingtopay
higherprices.Thetrendsinrevenuefrom2007to2014provideanoteworthy
contrasttoitsrevenuegrowthfrom2006-2007.Iftherehavebeensignificant
externaleconomicfactorsinfluencingthelossofrevenue,theywouldhavemost
likelyalsoaffectedNetflixandHulu’srevenueandgrowthratesaswell.Figure2’s
datashowingsubstantialgrowthinNetflix’sandHulu’syearlyrevenueoverthis
sametimeperiodindicatesacorrelationbetweenonlinestreamingandanoverall
decreaseinrevenuegrowthintelevisioncableservices.
Conclusion
ThetelevisiondistributionmarkethasbeenaffectedgreatlybyNetflixand
Hulu.Therearevariousviewpointsexpressinghowtheoligopolisticnatureofthe
industryisshiftingasaresultofnewertechnology,butthemajorityoftheliterature
onthistopicconcludesthatonlineplatformsarenecessarytosatisfyconsumer
needsandhaveallowedsmaller,newercompaniestocompetewithlargercableand
satelliteconglomerates.Myanalysisillustratesthatcurrentconsumertrendsand
changesincompanies’revenuespointatarelationshipwhereonlinedistribution
andlowersubscriptionpricesshiftrevenueawayfromolderconglomeratessuchas
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TimeWarnerCabletoneweronesincludingNetflixandHulu.Furthermore,the
oligopolisticstructureofthemarkethasbeendisruptedasaresultoftechnology,
whichhasremovedmajorbarriersthatoncepreventedsmallercompaniesfrom
succeedingandsurvivinginthisindustry.
Thisthesistookaparticularlycloselookattheeconomictheoryofoligopoly.
Tofindarelationshipbetweenthedistributionrealmandthemajorfirmsthat
dominatethemarket,Iresearchedtheentrancebarriersthathavebeenprevalentin
theindustryaswellascostsandotherlimitationsthathaveshapedtheoligopolistic
structure.Consolidationamongcontentcreatorsanddistributorshaveenforcedan
unequalpowerdynamicamonglargerandsmallerfirmsfordecades;moreover,
contentcreatorsandprovidershaveengagedinanticompetitivebehaviorthathas
madeitnearlyimpossibleforanewerorsmallercompanytoparticipatein
distribution.Technology,however,hasbeenabletoalleviatesomeofthese
obstacles.
Additionally,mythesislooksatabreakdownoftelevisionconsumption
habitsthathavechangedasaresultoftechnology.Consumerbehaviorandtrends
areintegralinunderstandingwhyHuluandNetflixhavebeenabletocompete
againstdominantcableandsatellitetelevisioncompanies.InmydataIfoundthat
thenumberoftelevisionsperhouseholdhassteadilybeenincreasingoverthepast
decade,buttheincreasehasbeenatalowerrateroverthepastfewyears.American
householdshavealsobeenincreasingtheirconsumptionofcomputers,with
approximately84%ofhouseholdsowningcomputersin2013.Aspricesofmonthly
cablesubscriptionescalatedbyabout$20from2007to2013andcontinuerising,it
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isnotsurprisingthatTimeWarnerCable’srevenuehasdecreasedoverthistime
periodasNetflixandHuluprovidecompellingalternatives.
Thedatapointstorelationshipsamongthevariablesthatsupportthecentral
argumentofthisthesis,butthereweresomelimitationspresent.Unfortunately,
industrydataishardtocollectbecausemuchofitisprivate.Similarly,itisdifficult
tocollectinformationspecifictotelevisionandvideoservicesbecausemajor
conglomeratessuchasComcastreporttheirdataalltogetherorlumptheminto
categoriesthatmakeithardtofindspecificcabletelevisionstatisticsorrevue.My
analysisoftheindustrycouldhavebeendeeperifthesenumbersweremore
accessible.Additionally,thechangesinonlinedistributionhaveoccurredprimarily
since2007.Thisrelativelyshorttimeframegivesmystudyalimitednumberof
observationsanddatapointstolookat,whichiswhyrunningaregressionand
creatingamodelisaparticularlychallengingtaskforthistopic.Eachyearoverthis
timeperiod,therehavebeenchangesintechnologyanddevelopmentsinonline
distributionthatarehardtoaccountforinthedata.Nevertheless,thisrestraint
concerningtimeframeiswhatmakesthistopicworthstudyingbecausechangesin
theindustryareoccurringsorapidly.Ineveryindustry,thevastmodificationsand
advancesintechnologyareinevitablygoingtoimposethissortofdatalimitation,
butatthesametimemarkprogressandgrowth.Intheentertainmentworld,there
hasbeentremendousyear-to-yearinnovationthatcontinuesimprovingtheway
filmsandtelevisioncanbeconsumed.Whileitissomethingthathasbeenshifting
thestructureofthemarket,itisbenefittingconsumersbymakingiteasierand
cheaperforthemtoaccessandwatchtelevision.Myexplorationofdigitalizationof
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distributionprovidesvaluableanalysisthatcontributestoadiscussionofthe
changesintheentertainmentindustry,butalsospeakstoabiggerissue:As
technologycontinuestoadvanceineveryindustry,itisuncertainhowitmay
interactwithandpotentiallydisruptmanyoligopoly-dominatedsectorsofour
economy.
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