The Impact of Consolidation Policy on the Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

8/11/2019 The Impact of Consolidation Policy on the Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

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The impact of consolidation policy on the performance ofdeposit money banks in Nigeria

2012. Newman Enyioko. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of thereative ommons !ttribution"Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use,distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original or! is properly cited.

"lobal #ournal o$ %anagement and &usiness 'esearch(ype: ouble &lind *eer 'evieed +nternational 'esearch #ournal*ublisher: "lobal #ournals +nc. U)nline +N: 12-144 5 *rint +N: 026-43

+mpact o$ +nterest 'ate *olicy and *er$ormance o$eposit

%oney &an!s in Nigerian&y Neman 7nyio!o%edonice %anagement and 'esearch 8onsulting 8ompany Nigeria Limited

bstract -(he current credit crisis and the transatlantic mortgage 9nancial turmoil haveuestioned the e;ectiveness o$ ban! consolidation programme as a remedy $or9nancial stabilityand monetary policy in correcting the de$ects in the 9nancial sector $orsustainable development.%any ban!s consolidation had ta!en place in 7urope, merica and sia in the last

to decadesithout any solutions in sight to ban! $ailures and crisis. (he study attempts toe


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Nigeriantrictly as per the compliance and regulations o$ :?olume @ +ssue @ ?ersion @.0 Aear 0@

"#%&'-& 8lassi9cation:#7L 8ode: 3B

+mpact o$ +nterest 'ate *olicy and*er$ormanceo$ eposit %oney &an!s in NigerianNeman 7nyio!o

Abstract-

The current credit crisis and the transatlantic

mortgage financial turmoil have questioned the effectiveness

of bank consolidation programme as a remedy for financial

stability and monetary policy in correcting the defects in the

financial sector for sustainable development. Many banks

consolidation had taken place in Europe, America and Asia in

the last two decades without any solutions in sight to bank

failures and crisis. The study attempts to examine the

performances of banks and macroeconomic performance in

!igeria based on the interest rate policies of the banks. The

study analyses published audited accounts of twenty "#$% out

of twentyfive "#&% banks that emerged from the consolidation

exercise and data from the 'entral (anks of !igeria "'(!%.

)e denote year #$$* as the preconsolidation and #$$& and

#$$+ as postconsolidation periods for our analysis. )e notice

that the interest rate policies have not improved the overall


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performances of banks significantly and also have contributed

marginally to the growth of the economy for sustainable

development. The study concludes that banking sector is

becoming competitive and market forces are creating an

atmosphere where many banks simply cannot afford to have

weak balance sheets and inadequate corporate governance.

The study posits further that consolidation of banks may not

necessaily be a sufficient tool for financial stability for

sustainable development and this confirms Megginson "#$$&%

and omoye "#$$+% postulations. )e recommend that bank

interest rate policy in the financial market must be market

driven to allow for efficient process. The study posits further

that researchers should begin to develop a new framework for

financial market stability as opposed to banking interest rate

policy.

-. -ntroduction

he impact of consolidation on bank structure has

been obvious, while its impact on bank

performance has been harder to discern. The

overnment policypromoted bank consolidation rather

than market mechanism has been the process adopted

by most developing or emerging economies and the

time lag of the bank consolidation varies from nation to


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nation. (anking sector reforms are part of monetary

policy instruments for effective monetary systems and

ma/or shifts in monetary policy transmission

mechanisms in the last decade in both developed and

developing nations. The banking sector in emerging

economies has witnessed ma/or changes to compete,

attract international investment and increase capital

Author 0 Medonice Management and 1esearch 'onsulting 'ompany

!igeria 2imited. Email 0 newmanenyioko3yahoo.com

market growth. There are as many reasons and

strategies for bank consolidation as there are banking

/urisdictions. )hen the opportunities in the operating

environment for banks, either within the boundaries of a

country, an economic 4one or geographical sphere,

become amenable only to consolidated institutions,

there is a tendency for marketinduced consolidation.

Many cases of bank consolidation that have been

recorded to date in the modern history of banking are of

this kind, and ready examples are the European and

American bank mergers and acquisitions of the 567$s

and 566$s. Marketinduced consolidation normally

holds out promises of scale economics, gains in

operational efficiency, profitability improvement and


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resources maximi4ation. The outcomes have however,

not totally confirmed these supposed benefits and they

have varied across /urisdictions, especially when

compared with the particular preconsolidation

expectations.

A new view is that bank mergers are not /ust

about ad/usting inputs to affect costs8 rather, they also

involve ad/usting output "product% mixes to enhance

revenues. Two research efforts taking this approach are

Akhavein, et al. "5669%, covering mergers in the 567$s,

and (erger "5667%, covering mergers in the 566$s.

These studies find that bank mergers do tend to be

associated with improvements in overall performance, in

part, because banks achieve higher valued output

mixes. )hile these studies do not track all of the

channels through which bank mergers affect the value

of output, they suggest that one channel has been

banks: shift towards higher yielding loans and away from

securities. This channel is particularly interesting given

the other results in these studies. They find that merged

banks also tend to experience a lowering of their cost of

borrowed funds without needing to increase capital

ratios. The lower cost of funds is consistent with a


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decline in the overall risk of the combined bank

compared to that of the merger partners taken

separately. This apparently occurs even though a shift to

loans by itself might be expected to increase risk. ;ne

interpretation of these results, then, is that a merger can

result in a reduction in some dimensions of risk, which

then affords the postmerger bank more latitude to shift

to a higher return, though perhaps higher risk but output

mix. The sources of diversification could be differences

T

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in the range of services, the portfolio mixes, or the

regions served by the merging banks.

The ob/ective of the study is to review the

effectiveness of bank interest rate policy and bank

deposits "performance% in the economy.

--. 2iterature 1eview

a% The Evolution of the !igerian (anking ector


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The banking operation began in !igeria in 576#

under the control of the expatriates and by 56*&, some

!igerians and Africans had established their own banks.

The first era of interest rate ever recorded in !igeria

banking industry was between 56&656+6. This was

occasioned by bank failures during 56&? 56&6$ due

mainly to liquidity of banks. (anks, then, do not have

enough liquid assets to meet customers demand. There

was no wellorgani4ed financial system with enough

financial instruments to invest in. Cence, banks merely

invested in real assets which could not be easily reali4ed

to cash without loss of value in times of need. This

prompted the Dederal overnment then, backed by the

)orld (ank 1eport to institute the 2oynes commission

on eptember 56&7. The outcome was the promulgation

of the ordinance of 56&7, which established the 'entral

(ank of !igeria "'(!%. The year 56&6 was remarkable in

the !igeria (anking history not only because of the

establishment of 'entral (ank !igeria"'(!% but that the

Treasury (ill ;rdinance was enacted which led to the

issuance of our first treasury bills in April, 56+$. The

period "56&656+6% marked the establishment of formal

money, capital markets and portfolio management in


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!igeria. -n addition, the company acts of 56+7 were

established. This period could be said to be the genesis

of serious banking regulation in !igeria. )ith the '(! in

operation, the minimum paidup capital was set at

!*$$,$$$">FG*7$,$$$% in 56&7. (y =anuary #$$5,

banking sector was fully deregulated with the adoption

of universal banking system in !igeria which merged

merchant bank operation to commercial banks system

preparatory towards interest rate programme in #$$*. -n

the H6$s proliferation of banks, which also resulted in the

failure of many of them, led to another recapitali4ation

exercise that saw bankHs capital being increased to

!&$$million ">FG&.77% and subsequently !#billion

">G$.$5++ billion% on *th #$$* with the institution of a

5?point reform agenda aimed at addressing the fragile

nature of the banking system, stop the boom and burst

cycle that characteri4ed the sector and evolve a banking

system that not only could serve the !igeria economy,

but also the regional economy. The agenda by the

monetary authorities is also agenda to consolidate the

!igeria banks and make them capable of playing in

international financial system. Cowever, there appears to

be deliverance between the state of the banking industry


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in !igeria visIvis the vision of the government and

regulatory authorities for the industry. This, in the main,

was the reason for the policy of mandatory interest rate,

which was not open to dialogue and its components

also seemed cast in concrete. -n terms of number of

banks and minimum paidupcapital, between 56

5697, the banking sector recorded fourtyfive "*&% banks

with varying minimum paidup capital for merchant and

commercial banks. The number of banks increased to

fiftyfour "&*% between 56965679. The number of banks

rose to one hundred and twelve "55#% between 5677 to

566+ with substantial varying increase in the minimum

capital. The number of banks dropped to one hundred

and ten "55$% with another increase in minimum paidup

capital and finally dropped to twentyfive in #$$+ with a

big increase in minimum paidup capital from !#billion

">FG$.$5++billion% in =anuary #$$*, to !#&billion

">FG$.#billion% in =uly #$$*.

Jrior to the ma/or policy shift by the 'entral

(ank of !igeria "'(!%, !igerian banking experienced a

steady increase in the number of distressed depositmoney

banks, i.e those rated by the '(! as marginal or

unsound. This created the fear that !igerian banking


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could be heading towards systematic distress. The

marginal and unsound banks increased in number from

seventeen "59% in #$$5 to twenty three "#?% in #$$# and

#$$?, and then twentyseven "#9% in #$$* representing

thirty "?$% per cent of the operating banks in the system.

This figure rose to seventeen"59% per cent only three

years earlier. -t can be argued that sudden monetary

policy shifts was partially responsible for the increase in

the number of marginal and unsound banks in #$$*

"see Table --%. The corollary is that the institutions

concerned have had inherent and deepseated

weakness that the policy shift exposes, and no matter

what, they would have eventually become distressed.

oldfeld and 'handler "5675%8 and omoye "#$$+%

opined that any policy shift must be consistent with

market framework if the ob/ective of the policy is to be

achieved. They decomposed the total lag between the

need for policy and the final effect of policy into four

parts. Dirst, recognition effect, which refers to the

elapsed time between the actual need for a policy action

and the realisation that such a need, has occurred.

econd, the policy lag, which refers to the period of time

it takes to produce a new policy after the need for a


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change in policy must have been recognised. Third,

outside lag, which is beyond the comprehension of

policy, refers to the period of time that elapses between

the policy change and its effect on the economy. This

lag arises because individual decision makers in the

economy will take time to ad/ust to the new economic

condition. Fecision of this nature must conform to

monetary policy norms if it is to achieve its desired

ob/ective. Dourth, cultural lag, which measures the

banking culture responsiveness to policy change in a

predominantly poor banking habit population. -n the

developing nation, banking culture is still primitive and

-mpact of -nterest 1ate Jolicy and Jerformance of Feposit Money (anks in

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policy change which could have been distributed overtime

and its impact felt was /ettisoned. uch omission

may bring negative cost to the economy. Dor instance,

oldfeld and 'handler "5675% stated that monetary

policy, though affects the economy less directly, will

have a longer outside lag and that monetary policy

tends to influence investment, and the lags in the

physical process of building plants and machinery are

undoubtedly longer than the lags in producing

consumer goods. Therefore, the longer outside lag of

monetary policy must be balanced against the shorter

policy lag in deciding the optimal policy mix.

b% Monetary 'ontrol Techniques and -nterest 1ates

tructure

Jrior to AJ and immediate post AJ, monetary

management relied on direct controls of reserves and

interest rates structure of banks. Cowever, in 566?, an

important reform of the monetary management

strategies was the introduction of open market

operations ";M;%. ;M; became the dominant

instrument of liquidity management complimented by

reserve requirements and discount window operations.

>nfortunately, the new approach was yet to find its


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footing when macroeconomic management returned to

an era of regulation by 566*5667. -rrespective of the

market fundamentals, the monetary authorities pegged

minimum rediscount rates at 5?.& per cent, as well as

specified interest rates limits to not more than #5

percent for lending rates, while the spread between

savings and lending rates was expected not be more

than 9.& per cent.

As it turned, the introduction of ;M; followed

by a return to interest rates control opened up another

investment portfolio to the commercial banks. This

manifested mainly in the new opportunity offered the

savings public to diversify their portfolio investments

from traditional savings and the stock markets into

money markets. The banks were also offered the

opportunity to diversify from traditional credit purveys,

and foreign exchange markets transactions to trading in

money market instruments especially treasury bills and

repos transactions at the ;M;. Table ? shows that the

yield rates on ;M; and treasury bills transactions were

comparatively more attractive than savings rate, while

the alternative investment portfolio which would require

borrowing to meet working capital requirement were


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priced out of the profitability threshold of the investing

public. )hile low savings rate encouraged holders of

idle cash balances to invest in money market

instruments, it alsoencouraged financial institutions to

shy away from the more risky lending portfolio and its

associated high transactions costs to the relatively safe

portfolio with little or no costs, with the guarantee of very

good returns. -n the face of credit apathy, financial

sector operators found investment in foreign exchange

and public debts instruments especially treasury bills

very lucrative as the returns on them moved in tandem

with the M11. Thus, the policy created a dilemma in the

form of tradeoff costs reflected in the arbitrage gains for

speculators in the financial markets. -ronically, rather

than serve as a penalty rate for borrowing from the

central bank, the attractive treasury bills rate which

followed the rise in M11, saw the central bank

borrowing from the banks and the public as part of its

monetary control functions. uch funds were sterili4ed

but which upon maturity the central bank was duty

bound to pay the interest rates accrual, probably via the

creation of high powered money with adverse

implications for inflationary control. ;ne may argue that


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if the '(! issued the debt instruments in favour of the

government that the burden of debt service should be

borne by it. >nfortunately, during this period, fiscal

authorities were known to resort to ways and means

advances far above the permissible limits, and which

were usually written off at the end of the day. The

changes in the structure of treasury bills holdings

attested to this. Jrior to the commencement of AJ,

'(! accounted for a significant proportion of the

treasury bills outstanding. Cowever, with the sharp rise

in treasury bills rate, the situation changed, with the

deposit money banks and the public now accounting for

the ma/or share. The shift in investment portfolio of the

banks to this segment of the markets is quite rational.

-ndeed, the banks ceased the opportunity of the

permissive financial operating environment to mobili4e

funds cheap, and invest in relatively secure instruments.

Also, their liability structure attested to this. The main

sources of fund are demand deposits, time, savings and

foreign deposits, central government deposits reserve

accounts and unclassified liabilities. )hile the costs of

funds from demand deposits, reserve accounts, and

central government deposits is known to be very low,


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that of savings deposits have been seen to also be low

in recent time. -ndeed, less than ?$ per cent of their

funds are mobili4ed from the more expensive sources.

The point to be made is that a significant proportion of

their investible funds are sourced cheap, but are

channelled into secure portfolios "money market

instruments%. ;ne is not surprised that since 5666 that

the financial institutions that survived the distress

emerged to become very sound and have had

outstanding record of profitability, derived mainly from

the defective interest rate structures.

---. Methods

This study used the regression and correction

methods to analy4e the relationship between interest

rates and bank performance. The framework for the


!igerian


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!igerian


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study has its basis on the Keynesian and endogenous

growth models.

-@. 1esults

Table 5 0 !igeria0 tate of the (anking -ndustry

'ategory #$$5 #$$# #$$? #$$* #$$& #$$+

ound 5$ 5? 55 5$ #& 5$

atisfactory +? &* &? &5 &

Marginal 7 5? 5* 5+ &

>nsound 6 5$ 6 5$ &

ources 0 '(! Jublication "#$$+%

Cowever, from Table -, the reason that may

advance for the present poor state of the !igeria

banking industry after interest rate could be viewed from

the perspective of wrong planning. -nterest rate through

merger and acquisition and or buyout requires assets


18/32

clarification and cleansing of the balance sheets in a

situation where unsound banks merge with sound

banks. Therefore, strengthening the balance sheet is

imperative for those who seek to be acquired and those

who are in pursuit of expansion. (anks that are unable

to show financial stability through their balance sheets

industry as amplified by hiratori "#$$#%8 ;ka4aki and

awada "#$$?%8 omoye "#$$+% and Michiru and

awada "#$$?%. hih "#$$?% points out the possibility

that credit risk could increase in the event of a sound

bank merging with an unsound one. Also, most of

empirical literature suggests that bank interest rates do

not significantly improve the performance and efficiency

of the participant banks (erger et al "5666%, and Amel,

F8 '. (arnes, D. Janetta and '. alleo "#$$#%. They

concluded that if a voluntary interest rate does not

enhance the performance of the participating banks,

any performance enhancing effect of the interest rate

promoted by the government policy is more

questionable.

a% 1egression 1esults

Model ummary

a. Jredictors 0 "'onstant%, (ank Jerformance


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A!;@Ab

a. Jredictors0 "'onstant%, (ank Jerformance

b. Fependent @ariable0 -nterest 1ate

'oefficientsa

a. Fependent @ariable0 -nterest 1ate

The results indicate that there is significant

relationship between interest rates and bank

performance as the t value for the interest rate is 55.&+&.

Cowever the model did show statistical significance with

reference to the impact of interest rates policy on the

economy because f statistic is 5.#+9.

b% Jerformance of the (anks

The profit efficiencyLasset utili4ation has not

been impressive. Although the banks have been able to

efficiencies have declined since the conclusion of the

interest rate. Dor instance, the industry return on equity

declined from ?&.#7 per cent in #$$* to 55.5# per cent in

#$$+, while return on asset declined from 7.?9 per cent

to #.$6 per cent over the same period. The asset

utili4ation ratio also declined8 while an average bank was

able to earn ?* kobo for every !5.$ asset in #$$*, this

declined to 55kobo in #$$+. Thus, while the interest rate

are likely to perish in an increasingly competitive


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double their gross earnings from their pre interest rate

performance level, their profit and asset utili4ation

industry in terms of asset si4e, deposit base and capital

adequacy, the profit efficiency has not been impressive.

The banks will need to become more efficient in terms of

their ability to generate enough return to /ustify the

Model 1 1

quare

Ad/usted

1 quare

td. Error of the

Estimate

5 .#5#a .$*& .$$6 &.99?7+

Model um of quares df Mean quare D ig.

5 1egressio

n

*#.#?? 5 *#.#?? 5.#+9 .#9$a

1esidual 6$$.555 #9 ??.??9

Total 6*#.?** #7

Model >nstandardi4ed 'oefficients tandardi4ed

'oefficients

t ig.

( td. Error (eta


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5 "-nterest 1ate% 5+.+$& 5.*?+ 55.&+& .$$$

(ank

Jerformance

.$#$ .$57 .#5# 5.5#+ .#9$


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The degree of private sector credit has been suggested

to be a better indicator of bank contribution to private

investment. -n #$$*,

commercial banks channeled #*.$7

per cent of their lending to the nonbank private sector,

but this declined to ##.*9 per cent by #$$+. 2ikewise,

the value of commercial bank credit relative to the FJ

which was #.9? per cent in #$$* rose marginally to #.65

percent in #$$+. There has not been any appreciable

growth in terms of the growth in credit to the private

sector because the commercial bank credit which has a

growth rate of #+.+ percent between #$$? and #$$*,

grew marginally to ?$.7 percent in #$$& and declined to

#9.7# percent a year after the interest rate. This confirms

the views of 'raig and Cardee "#$$*%. -n terms of price

stability, the level inflation increased from 5$.$ percent in

#$$* a preinterest rate period to 5#.$ per cent, a post

interest rate.

The analysis suggests that banking sector has

not shown a serious response of being able to meet

monetary policy expectation. The relative performance

of the banking si4e in terms of asset si4e, private sector

credit, relative to the economy have


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been very marginal

such that it can be safely concluded that the interest rate

exercise has not brought about any meaningful

contribution with respect to some of these performance

indicators.

d% (anking ector and the 'apital Market

The market capitali4ation

of quoted banks was

?*.*5 per cent of total market capitali4ation of the

!igerian tock Exchange "!E% in #$$*, but rose

significantly to *5.7$ percent in #$$& and renamed at

*5.7* per cent by #$$+. The !E market capitali4ation

grew by 5+$.9$ per cent between #$$* and #$$+,

whereas, the banking sector market capitali4ation grew

by ##?.?? per cent over the same period. -n fact, about

contribution, and it has further improved the value and

liquidity of the !igerian capital market.

@. 'onclusion and 1ecommendation

The study has reviewed the -nterest 1ate Jolicy

and Jerformance of Feposit Money (anks in !igeria

"567$#$$6%. )e notice that there seems to be a

presumption that the reform in the banking sector is all

that is required to fix the economy. The idea underlying


24/32

the interest rate policy is that bank interest rate would

reduce the insolvency risk through asset diversification.

)e noted that there is the possibility that credit risk

could increase in the event a sound bank merging with

an unsound one and that bank interest rates do not

significantly improve the performance and efficiency of

the participant banks. Thus, strengthening of the

balance sheet is imperative to those who seek to be

acquired and those who are in pursuit of expansion to

avoid bank failure. -t is equally noted that interest rate

programme through merger and acquisition require

timeframe. The study concludes that banking sector is

becoming competitive and market forces are creating

an atmosphere where many banks simply cannot afford

to have weak balance sheets and inadequate corporate

governance. The study posits that interest rate of banks

may not necessarily be a sufficient tool for financial

stability for sustainable development and this confirms

Megginson "#$$&% and omoye

"#$$+% postulations. The

study recommends that bank interest rate in the

financial market must be market driven to allow for

efficient process. The study further recommends that


25/32

researchers should begin to develop a new framework

for financial market stability as opposed to banking

interest rate policy.

1eferences 1frences

1eferencias

5. Akhavein, =alai F., Allen !. (erger, and Favid

Cumphrey. 5669. NThe Effects of Megamergers on

Efficiency and Jrices0 Evidence from a (ank Jrofit

Dunction.N 1eview of -ndustrial ;rgani4ation 5#.

#. Amel,F., '. (arnes, D. Janetta, and '. alleo

"#$$#%

O-nterest rate and efficiency in the

financial sector8 A

review of international evidence,P =ournal of banking

and Dinance, @ol 5$,!o#,.

?. (erger,

A.!.,

1..Femset4.

and J.E.trahan

"5666%

OThe -nterest rate of the financial services -ndustry

0

'auses, 'onsequences, and implications for the


26/32

future,P =ournal of (anking and Dinance #?, 5?&56*

*. (erger, !. Allen. 5667. NThe Efficiency Effects of

(ank Mergers and Acquisition0 A

Jreliminary 2ook

at the 566$s Fata.N -n (ank Mergers Q Acquisitions,


!igerian


#9


@ersion -

# $ 5#

Bea r

*+.?# per cent of the total growth in market capitali4ation

came from the growth in banking sector market

capitali4ation. This, from the capital market perspective,

indicates that the banking sector has made a significant

eds. B. Amihud and . Miller. Amsterdam0 Kluwer

Academic Jublishers.

&. (- "#$$5%P1isk Management Jrinciples for

Electronic (anking0 A (asel 'ommittee publication

#$$5

+. '(! "#$$&% Ouidelines and -ncentives on -nterest


27/32

rate in The !igeria (anking -ndustryP.Jress release

April 55, #$$& on (anking ector -nterest rate0

pecial -ncentive to Encourage )eaker (anks.

9. '(! "#$$+% O 'entral (ank of !igeria tatistical

Jublication

7. 'raig, teven . and Cardee, Jauline

"#$$*%PThe

-mpact of (ank -nterest rate

on mall (usiness

'redit AvailabilityP >niversity of Missouri, eptember

6. Feloitte Touche Tohmatsu

"#$$&% OThe changing

banking landscape in Asia Jacific0 A 1eport on

bank -nterest rate, eptember

5$. Durlong, Dred "5667% O !ew @iew of (ank -nterest

rateP D1(D Economic 2etter 67#?8 =uly #*,

55. oldfeld, .M. and 2.@. 'handler

"5675%

OEconomics of Money and (ankingP Carper

-nternational

Edition Carper Q 1ow Jublisher, !ew

Bork, 'ambridge Cargerstown,

Jhiladelphia,


28/32


29/32

&$.

59. omoye, 1.;.'.

"#$$+a%

O'ompressing the

>nwieldy (anking ystem in !igeria0 The

Jrobabilities of oludian Cypothesis -P 5st

-nternational 'onference on tructural 1eforms and

Management of Dinancial -nstitution in !igeria,

Fepartment of (anking and Dinance, ;labisi

;naban/o >niversity, !igeria, -!697$*9+#9+

9? European =ournal of Economics, Dinance And

Administrative ciences -ssue 5* "#$$7%

57. omoye, 1.;.'."#$$+b% O(ank -nterest rate in

!igeria0 The Macroeconomic

ExpecttationP (abcock


!igerian


@ersion -

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#$5#

B ear

#7


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=ournal of Management and ocial ciences, @ol &,

!o. 5, eptember, -!0 5&69?6*7


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566+ 56.7* &5.*9

5669 59.7 &+.9?

5667 57.57 +?.*6

5666 #$.#6 +?.+?

#$$$ #5.#9 9#.79

#$$5 #?.** 7*.6$

#$$# #*.99 6&.#$

#$$? #$.95 559.6$

#$$* 56.57 5#6.9$

#$$& 59.6& 5**.9$

#$$+ 5+.6 5&9.5$

#$$9 5+.6* 5+9.*$

#$$7 5&.*7 #55.&6

#$$6 #&7.9#

ource 0 '(! (ulletins #$$9, #$$7 and ?$$6


!igerian


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The Impact of Consolidation Policy on the Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

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