The Human Factor Disaster risk reduction is about people David Alexander University College London
HUMANCONSEQUENCES
OF DISASTER
“ORTHODOX” MODEL
PHYSICALEVENT
HUMANVULNERABILITY
“RADICAL CRITIQUE” (K. HEWITT et al.)HUMAN
CONSEQUENCESOF DISASTER
HUMANVULNERABILITY
PHYSICALEVENT
1983-2017:The relative failure of the radical critique.
The continuing primacy of hazards studies.
Is technology a source of vulnerability?Have we created a 'technofix' culture?
Is it an outgrowth of the hazards paradigm?
Implicit axiom: thesolution to the failure
of technology ismore technology.
• algorithms and software
• robots
• unmanned aerial vehicles
• telecommunicationinstead of face-to-face.
Are we filtering out the humanity out ofemergency planning and management?
• they can go into unsafe spaces
• they can carry diverse forms ofsensor and be of various sizes
• they can be connected tonetworks and remote sensing
• they cannot really think, see and feel.
Can urban search and rescue (USAR)really be accomplished by robots?
The procedure:-1. Find a problem2. Simplify it to bare bones3. Invent an algorithm4. Hey presto!
Example:-1. How to optimise the distribution of
relief goods after a disaster.2. Where to put distribution centres.3. Apply a fuzzy analytical
hierarchy process.4. Problem solved (?).
• Missing or inadequate scenariosfor the impact of the disaster.
• Magnitude and frequency issuesgive different exigencies.
• Do field commanders want to usethe algorithm, are they able todo so, and would it help them?
• We don't construct warehouses inthe emergency phase of a disaster.
• Route blockages are commonand somewhat unpredictable.
A chasm has opened betweenfield practice and new algorithms.
Humanitarian logistics: an increasinglypopular field in which many researchersdo not understand the essence of theproblems they are trying to tackle.
Redundancy• physical: more equipment• human: other ways of doing things
How much redundancy can we afford?• human redundancy - as much
as we can think and devise• technological redundancy –
only a few systems are inthe 'high reliability' class.
• telecommunication alternatives (cellnet ACCOLC, Bluetooth, pager, etc.)
• paper, pencil and aperson who can run fast
• procedures that favour autonomousoperations (i.e. do without a common operating picture).
For example, radios stop working
The technofix culture is anoutgrowth of the hazards paradigm:we should emphasise vulnerability!
• Are robots and dronessimply red herrings?
• Should we discouragethe algorithm makers?
• Do we need better humanitarianlogistics or none at all?.
A DRR that is about peopleis labour intensive:• machines and algorithms don't
answer back - but they do foul up• machines are cheaper than salaries
(capital expenditure is easier toauthorise than revenue expenditure)
The curse of emergency preparedness:capital expenditure overshadows revenue
expenditure (an unsustainable'one-off' culture).
The 'therapeutic community',if it exists, does so undervery difficult circumstances:fear, uncertainty, frustration,grief, sadness, disorientation...