The Household of Hasan Aga Bilifya: An Assessment of Elite Politics in 17th-Century Egypt

o\o\ TOME XXVII

tctTURQUE,SRE,VTIE, D'E,TUDE,S

peuples,langues,cultures,Etats

Publi6e parLe D6partement d'Etudes Turquesde l'Universit6 des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg,l'6quipe oEtudes turques et ottomanes (URA 1425)ri <lu CNRSet 1'Association pour le d6veloppement des 6tudes turques

avec le con(:ours clu Centre National de lu Recherche ScientiJique

EDITIONS PEETERS

Jane HATHAWAY I 135

Ohio State University

THE HOUSEHOLD OF

HASAN ACE BILIFYA:AN ASSESSMENT OF ELITE POLITICSIN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT-

he seventeenth century, it is generally acknowledged, was a period ofdecentralization in the Ottoman Empire, when local elites in the

empire's provinces began to dilute the authority of the imperial centerr.The identity of these elites was still in flux, however. Local vested inter-ests had not yet displaced Ottoman officialdom as sources of authority;meanwhile, Ottoman officials themselves were becoming localized and

cultivating their own interests and connections on the spot. It is withinthis context that we may evaluate the political culture of the empire'slargest province, Egypt, during this period of transformation.

Sultan Selim I (l-501-1520) had conquered Egypr, along with Syria,the Hijaz, and southeastern Anatolia, from the Mamluk sultanate in1517. The administration that the Ottomans imposed on Egypt retaineda number of features of the defunct Mamluk regime and even accolnmo-dated defeated Mamluk emirs who swore fealty to the Ottoman sultan.

At the same time, however, the Ottomans altered the Mamluk landregime and the military elite that it supported. They made no attempt to

''' AnearlierversionofthisarticlewaspresentedatColumbiaUniversity'sSenrinarfbrStudies in the History and Culture of the Turts in January 1993. I am grateful to the sem-inar palticrpants lbr their comments.

I Sec, for example, Halil inrrlcrk. "Military rnd Fiscal Transfbrmation in thc OttomanEmpire", Attltiv'unt Ottomonicunt VI (1980), pp. 283-337; idern, "Centralization ancl

Decentrirlization in Ottoman Administration", in Strrr/ics irt Eighteertth CertturT, lslanticHistorl', ed. Thomas NalT and Rogel Owen, Carbondale, lll., 1971 .

I

136 JANI] HATH:\WAY

preserue the system of cavalry-supporting assignments of usufruct, oriqtacs, that had prevailed under the late Mamluk sultanate and that itselfresembled the timar system in force in the Ottoman central lands.Instead, they introduced a contingent of imperially-appointed tax collec-tors known as emins, who delivered land taxes directly to the governor'streasury. In the course of the seventeenth century, the system of emiusgaye way to tax farms, or iltizams, which were sold at auction to thehighest bidders2. In this way, the revenues of all administrative units,from villages to entire subprovinces, came to be fanned by salariedofficials.

Many of the holders of these tax farms belonged to Egypt's Ottoman-era military elite, which consisted of seven regiments of soldieryr andthe class of grandees known as beys, or sancaks, who held the gover-norships of Egypt's subprovinces and such offices as pilgrimage com-mander (emir iil-har') and treasurer (defterdar'). These beys were in a

number of respects comparable to the emirs of the Mamluk sultanate andto lhe sancak beyis of the Ottoman central landsa. Tax farming, however,blurred the promotional line between soldiery and beys that prevailedunder the Mamluk iqta" system and the Ottoman timar system. With theintroduction of iltizant, the beys joined the soldiery as salaried func-tionaries.

Tax farms quickly became a source of tension between the beys andthe officers of the seven regiments. As the imperial treasury's ability todisburse salaries punctually diminished after the sixteenth century, offi-cers began to invest in tax farms. Initially, officers tended to farm urbansources of revenue, such as the customs, while beys held rural tax fanns,including those of the subprovincial governorships. By the late seven-

r On land tenure in the Mamluk sultanate, see Hasanayn Rabie, Ifte Financial Ststentof Egypt,A.H.564-74llA.D. 1169-1341, London, 1972, chapter 2; idern, "The Size andValue of the lqra" in Egypt, 564-141 A.H.11169-1341 A.D.", in Studie.s in the Econut)tiLHistr.rrv- oJ the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook, Oxford, 1970, pp. 129-138; A.N. Poliak."Some Notes on the Feudal System of the Mamluks", .lournal of the Rol,al Asiatit'Soci-en 1937, pp.97-101 . On the Ottomrrt tinut , see Halil inalcrk, The Ottonnn Entpire; TlrcClassical Age, 1300-1600, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin lmber, London, 1973. pp.104-118. On developments in Ottoman Egypt, see Stanfbrd Shaw, I/ie Financial urtdAdministrative Orgonization cmd Development oJ Ottonurn Egypt, l5l7-179B, Princeron.\962, pp.28ff., 65ff.

r These were the Mtiteferrika, Qavuqan, Janissaries (Mustahfizan), 'Azeban. Giiniil-liiyan, Tiifenkgiyan, and Qer akise.

1 In Egypt, sancak refered not to an assignment of revenue but to the bey hiruself.who held the tax falm ol'a subprovince or of other specified revenues.

teenth centurY, however, offiers; they were encouraged iIintroduction of the heritable

the end ol the centurY5. ln tL

at a permanent disadvantage

bey could hold the most ltprovincial govemorshiPs.

UnderstandablY, the histc

characterized bY a jockeYir

Compounding this rivalrY tt

entrenched factions, which r

did their best to exploit thei

the same time building uP tt

revenLres from the imPerial

cally attempted to curb the

most notable and eflective tFazrl Ahmed Paga disPatche

finances. Arriving in Cairo r

set about reimPosing centru

tic in this enterprise appear:

cers at the expense of be1 s.

were far better defined than

ble to bureaucratic control L

Ultimately, however, the:

date a regimental officer el

lenged the authoritY of later

ber of this elite was the oft.l

historian, Hasan A[a is not a

the pages of chronicles and

ligure who is omniPresent ir

is expelled; Hasan A[a is tculed: his execution is cami

ful grandee endows a mosqt

Hasan A[a BilifYa is kr

Turkish chronicles of sevet

s Shaw. op. cit., PP. 38-39.6 On Kara Ibrahim Paga's ref

Kdlrilr', Istanbul Urrivcrsity Libr:

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

teenth century, however, officers had entered the ranks of rural tax farm-ers; they were encouraged in this venture by the Ottoman government'sintroduction of the heritable life-tenure tax farm, known as malikane, at

the end of the century5. In this arena, notwithstanding, the officers wereat a permanent disadvantage to the beys, for only those with the rank ofbey could hold the most lucrative rural tax farms, namely, the sub-provincial governorships.

Understandably, the history of Egypt in the seventeenth century ischaracterized by a jockeying for position between beys and officers.Compounding this rivalry was a seemingly endless conflict between twoentrenched factions, which we shall meet shortly. Contenders for powerdid their best to exploit their connections at the imperial court while at

the same time building up their local power bases, often by withholdingrevenues from the imperial treasury. The imperial government periodi-cally attempted to curb the abuses of these local elites. In perhaps the

most notable and effective example, the reforming grand vezir KciprtiltiFaztl Ahmed Paqa dispatched his lieutenant to overhaul Egypt's troubledfinances. Arriving in Cairo with 2 000 troops in 1670, this new governorset about reimposing central control over Egypt's revenues6. A key tac-tic in this enterprise appears to have been empowering regimental offi-cers at the expense of beys. Since the duties and tenures of the officerswere far better defined than those of the beys, they were more suscepti-ble to bureaucratic control by the Porte.

Ultimately, however, these attempted reforms only served to consoli-date a regimental officer elite that, following the familiar pattern, chal-lenged the authority of later govemors. By far the most influential mem-ber of this elite was the officer known as Hasan A[a Bilifya. Yet to the

historian, Hasan A[a is not a highly visible strongman; he hardly leaps offthe pages of chronicles and archival documents. Rather, he is the sort offigure who is omnipresent in the background, pulling strings. A govemoris expelled; Hasan A[a is behind his expulsion. A troublemaker is exe-

cuted; his execution is carried out with Hasan A$a's approval. A power-ful grandee endows a mosque; Hasan Ala signs the endowment deed.

Hasan A[a Bilifya is known to us through the various Arabic and

Turkish chronicles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Egypt as the

s Shaw, op. r:it.,pp.38-39.6 On Kara Ibrahim Paqa's reforms, see Mehmed b. Yusuf al-Hallaq, Tdril'r-i Mtsr-t

Kr?/rlre, Istanbul University Library, T.Y. 628, fols. 203fT; Shaw, op. cit., pp. 281-294.

131

*---q*afF*-.ir+--

138 JANE HATHAWAY

longtime a[a, or commander, of the Goniilltiyan corps at the end of theseventeenth century. The Gdni.illiiyan, or "Volunteers," were a cavalryregiment of some 1240 members whose duties included delivering mes-sages, collecting taxes, and keeping order in Egypt's subprovinces; as

such, they were far less numerous and influential than the infantry corps,the Janissaries (Mustahfizan) and 'Azeban, headquartered in Cairo'scitadelT. Notwithstanding, Hasan Aga Bilifya was, for all practical pur-poses, running Egypt from roughly 1694 until his death (of naturalcauses) in 1704. To be precise, he headed a triumvirate that the SublimePorte seemed to feel was uniquely equipped to car:ry out its orders. Theother two members of this triumvirate were Hasan A!a's son-in-law, the

defterdar, or treasurer, Ismail Bey, and his prot6g6, the Janissary kdhyaMustafa al-Kazdaflr8. Evidence of this trio's authority is not lacking ineither archival or narrative sources. An imperial order of 1698 addresses

not only the officials typically named in such an order -

governor, chiefjudge (kadt), pilgrimage commander, defterdar

- but also Hasan A[a

and Mustafa KAhya. Meanwhile, the Egyptian chronicler al-Damurdashirefers to the tenure of the Ottoman governor Ismail Paqa (1694-1691) as

"the regime of Ismail Paqa and Hasan Ala Bilifya" (dawlat Isma'rlBasha wa Hasan AghA Bilfua)e.

Hasan Ala wielded such formidable influence above all because ofthe strength of his household: that is, the group of clients whom he col-lected around him. He was a uniquely shrewd household-builder at a

time when, I believe, household membership -

mgrn[slship in the

entourage of an influential personage -

was becoming critical toadvancement and even participation in Ottoman Egypt's military soci-etyro. Registers of the salaries of Egypt's soldiery from the late seven-

teenth and early eighteenth centuries reveal growing numbers of soldiersin all seven regiments who are billed as followers (atba', s. tabi') of reg-imental officers, of beys, of imperial officials, or even of ulema or

7 6mer Lutfi Barkan, Osnanlt intparatorlufiuttda zirat ekonominin hukukt ve mallesaslan,Istanbul, 1943, Vol. I, chapter CV, "Mrsrr Kanunndmesi", p.355; Shaw, o2.t:ir., pp. 196-197, 210.

8 KAhya, or kethi.ida, was a rank second to that of a!a. By the eighteenth century, how-ever, most regiments were dominated in actual fact by their kdhyas.

e Istanbul, Bagbakanhk Osmanh Argivi, Miihirnme Defteri 1ll, No. 12 (mid-Zilkade1110); Ahmad al-Damurdashi, Al-Durra al-musana Ji ukhbAr al-Kinana, BrilishMuseum, MS Or. 1073-1074, p. 52.

r0 See Jane Hathaway, "The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt", International.lournal of Middle East Studies XXVII, I (February 1995), pp. 39-52.

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

descendants of the Prophetrr. While the following of a lower officermight coalesce within his barracks, that of a higher officer or bey typi-cally centered on his house, which passed to successive leaders of hisentourage. Hasan A[a Bilifya's house was located outside BabZlwayla,the southem gate of old Fatimid Cairo12. The Bilifya household was themost effective of these entourages because Hasan Ala accomplished twopragmatic feats: first, he seems to have exploited his own imperial con-nections, in particular a link to the Chief Black Eunuch of the Ottomanimperial harem, to fashion a household that served both imperial andlocal interests; second, he balanced factional and regimental loyalties so

as to take maximum advantage of possible sources of wealth. I shalladdress each of these feats in l.urn.

HASAN AGA'S IMPERIAL CONNECTIONS

There is reason to suspect that Hasan A[a came to Egypt from theimperial palace, although it is impossible to determine precisely his ori-gins and identity apart from the offices he held. What little we knowabout his life before he became ala of the Goniilliiyan corps comes pri-marily from the above-mentioned chronicles. The well-known Egyptianchronicler 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti (1754-1825) describes Hasan as

rumi al-jins (" rumt by ethnicity ")r3. Although Runt and rurur refer to theRoman and, by extension, the Byzantine empire, Arabophone historiansof this period typically employ the tems when speaking of those parts ofthe Ottoman Empire previously ruled by the Byzantinss

- westgm and

central Anatolia and the eastemmost parts of the Balkans -

and moreparticularly the imperial capitalra. Al-Jabarti's obituary of Hasan A[adoes not mention, however, when Hasan first came to Egypt. The firstdate the obituary provides is 1085/1674-1615, when Hasan became a[a

rr Istanbul, Baqbakanhk Osmanh Argivi, Maliyeden Mtidevver 4787 (1086-1088116'75-1617 ) and 7069 (1 150/1737-1738).

i2 Ahmad Qelebi b. cAbd al-Ghani, Av'dah al-ishat'ot .fi mdn tawalla Misr al-Qahirantin al-u'uzara)wa al-bashat, ed. A.A.'Abd al-Rahim, Cairo, 1978, p.53.

r3 cAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Aja)ib al-atl.tdr-.fi al-rarajint t,a al-akhbar, Cairo, l9-58-1967, Vol. l, p.234.

ra See Daniel Crecelius and'Abd al-Wahhab Bakr, eds. and trans., Al-Damurdashi'sChronicla of Egypr, 1688-1755: Al-Durra al-ntusana Ji akhhAr al-Kinana, Leiden andNew York, 1991, pp. 168-169, n. 198. Al-Darnurdashi and al-Jabarti both ref'er to theOttoman slate as al-dawlat ol-rtimiyya; for example, al-Damurdashi, op. cit., p.72; al-labarti, op. clr., Vol. 1, p. 237.

.IANE HATHAWAY

of the 'Azeban corpsls. An endowment deed, or takfive t. has come tolight. however, that Hasan Ala signed in December 1615 as "lbrmerkih1,a" of the Qavuqan corpsr6. In 1087/1676-1611, according to the

Turkish chronicle of Mehmecl b. Yusuf al-Hallac1, Hasan was raised tothe beylicatelT. This sort of dubious promotion was in the sevcnteenthcentury often a convenient method of removing inordinately inf-luentialregimental ofiicers fiom their arenas of power. Hasan Ala was evidentlyablc to escape the beylicate in short order; al-Jabarti has him beinsappointed Miiteferrika Baqr in 1089/1678. then Gontilli-iyan ala in1093/1682. The cong6ries of regimental offices tl'rat Hasar-r Aga hetdalmost surely brands him as a palace product since at the tinre, the afasof the regiments and all Miitcl-enika olficers were dispatched fiom Istan-bul. Thc Mtitel'erika Bagr and the Qavugan k0hya were. furthermore.close to the Ottoman governor of Egypt and instrumental in the lunc-tioning of the governor's council, or dir,ttnlE.

One critical tidbit of intbrrnation that al-Jabarti gives us is that Hasan

A[a was about ninety years old at the tirre of his death in lT0zlri). Wecan therefore conjecture that by the time he appears in our chronicles.Hasan Ala would already have been some sixty years old; it is entirelypossible, then. that he pursued a cirreer at court befbre coming to Egypt.His posting to Egypt may. in firct, have been a fbnn of retirement or pen-sioning of-f that, expectedly or uu-, turned into a second career.

Yet al-Jabarti gives us to understand that Hasan Ala was also the Ibl-lower (a7bi') of one Mchmed Qavu; Qiyala; that is to sa1''. he belongedto Mehrned Qavu;i's hotLsehold. This Mehmed Qavug was probablycalled Qiyala because he held the tax thrm o['Shubra Qiyeia villagc inthe northwestern subprovince of Gl'rarbiy1,ar0. Shubra Qiyala was. notcoincidentally. enclowed to the irnperial pious fbundations (i'alrrlb) estab-

lished to service the Holv Cities ol Mecca and Medina: these for-rncla-

L) Al-Jabarti. op. r'it.. Yol.l, p. 23,1.rn Hamza 'Abd al 'Aziz Baclr and Daniel Clrecelius. ''The Waqfs of Shahin Ahmacl

Agha''. Aruzalcs islctntoloqiclut,.s XXVI (1992'1. p. 86.rr Al-Hallaq. op.cit..fo1.2l3. Al-Jabarti (op. tit., Vol. l, p. l3;1) does not include this

inlirrrnation.rf Shaw. r4t. tit.. p. 193. Thc eighteenth cerrtr.rry British traveller Richarc'l Pococke

rccounts horv tlrc governor u,alked in processions r,',ith the Qavuqan kAh1,a on his right.thc Miitclbrrik:r Ba;r on his left. See his,,1 Descrilttion of thc l:ust untl SontL,OtltcrPlrrccs. London. 17.13. Vol. I. p. 166.

L') Al-Jabarti. op. r'rt.. Vol. I, p. 237.r(' Thc l9-58-1967 edition ol al-Jabarti's chronicle has fi.tilu. uncloubtecll-y either a

rnisprint or a rnistranscription of the mannscript.

tions are known collectivelracquired the tax fatnl of B;

prorirtce irr Uppcr Eg1 Pt: '

narnell.This sort of sustained aur

ties between Hasan Aga Bi1

the Otton-ran imperial harert

oversaw the Evkef Ul-Har.-rl'

EvkAf. as we shall see. \\ il

Insolut'fls those who I'alrlrc :

cence, il rtot tlte blessing. ,

enjoyed a link of sonle st:rl

slenl perl ol ltis cal'eet irt t

Rlack Eunlrch would har.- :

line rnay well have gone ba.

Black Eunuch, who sou-uht

by installing his clients in E

It is certainly conceivalrliAglr Biliillt \\cre rr:elll: i'lhis agents. and that thev ort

of other -grandees indicate i

Egypt 's rnilitur'1 societr irr

Krzlar r.vas the muntlllk. t\','

Yusuf AEa (1671 - 1686 ) arr

Eunuch's penxanent vckil n

itics as a member of the Fr'

astonishinglY, that a rilrtr'behind the fbunding o1 th.'

Egyptian politics earlf inQiyala anc'l Hasan A[a Biithat of the Chief Black ELrr

riaI center or co-opting the Il

in positions that would enlt

2' Thc namc is cotnmonlr gtrr See Jatte Hathirival'. "The F

tury Eg1,pt". Studiu lsluntitu L\)thelc.

rr Al-Jabarti, rp. r'it.. Vol. I1.

sources citccl thcre.

1,+0

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

tions are known collectively as Evkdf iil-Haremeyn. Hasan A[a himselfacquired the tax farm of Bilifya, an EvkAf village in al-Bahnasa sub-province in Upper Egypt; from this village his entire household took itsname2i.

This sort of sustained authority over EvkAf villages indicates strongties between Hasan A[a Bilifya's circle and the Chief Black Eunuch ofthe Ottoman imperial harem (Krzlar Afasr or Dariissaade A$asr), whooversaw the Evkdf iil-Haremeyn from Istanbul. (Local supervision of the

Evkdf, as we shall see, was invested in beys or regimental officers.)Insofar as those who farmed the taxes of EvkAf villages had the acquies-cence, if not the blessing, of the Eunuch, Hasan Ala would seem to haveenjoyed a link of some standing to that official. If Hasan Ala indeedspent part of his career in the palace, then a connection with the ChiefBlack Eunuch would have been all the more likely. The Bilifya-Qiyalaline may well have gone back to the agent (vekil) of one or another ChiefBlack Eunuch, who sought [o ensure an orderly flow of EvkAf revenues

by installing his clients in EvkAf-related tax farms.It is certainly conceivable that both Mehrned Qavuq Qiyala and Hasan

Aga Bilifya were agents of a Chief Black Eunuch, or at least clients ofhis agents, and that they owed their positions to his patronage. Examplesof other grandees indicate that the Chief Black Eunuch did intervene inEgypt's military society in just this fashion. The grandee Mustafa BeyKrzlar was the maniluk, or military slave, of the Chief Black EunuchYusuf Ala (1671-1686) and seems to have served as the Chief BlackEunuch's permanent vekil in Egypt while participating in provincial pol-itics as a member of the Faqari faction22. Al-Jabarti reports, even moreastonislringly, that a mamluk of el-Hac Begir Ala (1717-1746) laybehind the founding of the Jalfi household, which gained prominence inEgyptian politics early in the eighteenth century23. Mehmed QavugQiyala and Hasan Aga Bilifya may have pursued a strategy similar tothat of the Chief Black Eunuch, either recruiting clients from the impe-rial center or co-opting them once they came to Egypt, then placing themin positions that would enable them to form their own power bases. This

2r The name is commonly given as "Balfiyya" in the secondary litdraturc.22 See Jane Hathaway, "The Role of the Krzlar Alasr in Seventeenth-Eighteenth Cen-

tury Egypt", Sttrdia Islamica LXXV (1992), pp. 147-149,156-157, and the sources citedthere.

r-r Al-Jabati, op. cit.,Yol.Il,p.521, see also Hathaway, art. cit., pp. 149-151, and thesources cited there.

t42 .IANE HATIJAWAY

may explain, for example, why Hasan A[a channelled Mustafa al-Kazdaflr into the Janissary corps rather than taking him into one of the

regiments that Hasan had commanded.The Bilifya household's ties to the Chief Black Eunuch would seem

to have become more reliable after Hasan A[a's death, particularly dur-ing the long tenure of the Chief Black Eunuch el-Hac Begir A[a (1717-1746). While Hasan A[a seems to have exercised cle J'ac'to authority inthe vicinity of Bilifya, his freedman Mustafa Bey Bilifya2a received offi-cial sanction to administer freely all villages in al-Bahnasa subprovincethat were attached to the various Haremeyn vakfs. A sultanic order of1733 grants all Evk6f villages in the region to Mustafa Bey as

serbestiyet, that is, a grant of complete administrative autonomyalthough not of outright ownership2s. I have identified six of the nine vil-lages near Bilifya that are enumerated in this order. Collectively, theyfbrm a coherent Bilifya stronghold in al-Bahnasa. The physical reality ofthis sphere of influence confirms that EvkAf-related tax farms were notsimply sources of revenue but cor.rld be used as a route to territorialaggrandizement26. In this way, a connection to the Chief Black Eunuchcould translate into genuine regional power.

The Damurdashi chronicle hints at a more direct link between the Bi-lifya group and el-Hac Beqir A!a. Al-Damurdashi envisions the scene inwhich the imperial government (al-dawla) names a new pilgrimagecommander and defierdar fbr Egypt for 114611133-1134. By the chron-icler's account, the Chief Black Eunuch

- that is, el-Hac Begir Ala -insisted that the post of defterdar go to "the son of sayyrcli, Mehmed

Bey Ismail "27. This Mehmed Bey was the son of Ismail Bey the defier-dar, the son-in-law of Hasan A[a Bilifya. We cannot be certain what al-Damurdashi intends by sayyldi in this passage, but elsewhere in the

Damurdashi chronicle and in medieval Mamluk usage, sayytd means

lr He was promoted tiom aga of the Qerakise corys to bey in 1710. See al-Darrur-daslri, op. cit.,p. 135.

25 Istanbul, Baqbakanlrk Osmanh ArSivi, Miihimme-i Mrsrr', Vol. V, No. l8(114611133-1134). This act of favoritisrn mely or may not be connected to Mustafa Bey'sposition as hcrzine sertlan, the officer who delivered the Egyptian revenues to Istanbuleach year.

16 Richard Pococke describes a similar grouping of nine villages in 'Ushmunayn sub-province that "...compose a small principality belonging to Mecca, and...subject to theEmir Hadge". See Pococke, Travels of Richartl Pocot'ke, L.L.D., F.R.S., rhrough Egypr.lntcrspersed with Mark.s and Obsert,ations by Cuptain Norden, Philadelphia, 1803, p. 60.

27 Al-Damurdashi, o1.t. cit., p. 407 .

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t44 JANE HATHAWAY

"master"28. El-Hac Begir Ala would therefore appear to be depictingIsmail Bey as his master. Such a state of afl'airs is possible from the

standpoint of chronology, although Hasan Ala Bilifya would seem a

more plausible candidate for master. In any case, what is perhaps morestriking than the implied master-slave relationship is the fact that a localchronicler such as al-Damurdashi is fully aware of the Chief BlackEunuch's personal interference in Egyptian affairs and his affinity forcertain local contingents -

in this case, the Bilifya household.

FACTIONAL AND REGIMIINT,\L LOYAL'I'IES

Hasan A[a Bilifya is frequently billed as head of the Faqari faction,one of two political factions

- the other being the Qasimi -

whoserivalry pervaded Egyptian society. The origins of these two factions are

convoluted, to say the least, and remain unclear. In accounts of the fac-tions' genesis, the Ottoman conquest itself looms large. According to aprevalent myth, the factions took their names from two sons of a Mam-luk emir who displayed their prowess in chivalric exercises (furusiyya)before the victorious Ottoman sultan Selim I2e. It seems more likely thatthe factions evolved from the competition between the military and

heraldic usages of the late Mamluk sultanate and those of the newlyarrived Ottomans30. But the factional division transcended the military

r8 On this point, see David Ayalon, L'esclat'age tlu nrumelouk, Jerusalem, 1951,pp. 25ff.; idem, "Studies in al-Jabarti I: Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk SocietyUnder the Ottomans", Jourltul of the Economit: and Social History oJ'the Orient 111,2-3(1960), pp. 2'75-216. According to Ayalon,.say'fid was a rare usage under the Mamluksultanate but became much more common under the Ottomans.

re Ahmad Qelebi, op. clr., pp. 283-284; al-Jabarti, op. cit.,Yol.1,pp.67-71. For a fulldiscussion of the different verslons of this myth, see P.M. Holt, "Al-Jabarti's Introductionto the History of Ottoman Egypt," Bulletin of the School of Oriental ancl AJrican SrudiesXXV, t (1962), pp. 42ft.

'r0 The myth recorded by Ahmad Qelebi and al-Jabarti notes that the father of Kasrmand Zi.ilfikar was named SldDn. Ahmad Qelebi further identifies him as Sld[n al-'Aiamr,commander-in-chief (atabak) to the Mamluk sultan Qaytbay (1468-1495). This does notsquare with what is known about Stdtn al-'Ajamr's life; nonetheless, there were a num-ber of late Mamluk emirs named Sldln or al-Sldlni, at least two of whom possessed

extraordinary .filrt1si,t1'o skills. Meanwhile, the brother of Sultan Qakmak (1438-1453),skilled in wrestling, rvas known as Qerkes al-Qasimi al-Musari' ("the wrestler"). TheMamluks' corps of imperial lancers commonly dressed in red, as did the Ottoman-era

Q:rsimis. Meanwhile, the Ottoman forces, above all the Janissaries, frequently carried a

banner depicting the caliph 'Ali's sword Ziilfikar, while their standards were typicallysurmounted by a ball or knob, as were those of the Faqens. On Sldln al-'Ajami, see

grandees and seems to have

perhaps extending back to a:

tions in Yemensl. What is irr

had become entrenched b1' rt

about 1730, all militarY ho

belong to one faction or the (

the military grandees themse

to preserve order among E,s

of revenues and offices betn

onism between the two facti(

imental officers and the be1 s

sway over Egypt as a result

between the BilifYa househ

attempted to realize a sche:

This conflict does much tohousehold overcame the ten:

alties in order to take adr I

Egyptian military society at

Ibrahim Bey b. Ziilfikat110211691, replacing the Pr

Shanab: Hasan Aga's son-i

post of defterdar. BY allougovernment broke with its

Muhammad b. Ahmad b. IYas. .t'trans. W.H. Sa}ron. London. 1911

ed. and trans. Gaston Wiet, Pan:.habits of the Mamluk emirs. see I

Cames in the Mamluk Sultanate. '

idem. L'esclatage tlu ttutntelrtuk. 1

Damurdashi, o1t. r:it., P. 2; a1-Jaba

tion". pp. 42ff. On Ottoman bann,

Art in tha Sen'ice oJ the Enryire.)t, Al-Damurdashi. r7,. 611.. n.

Introduction." pp. 42ff. The N1orl

Rrn[ Harlrm. associated with the (

'Ahdallah Muhammad b. IbrahinrKaram al-Bustani, Beirut. 196-1.

appear to have been based in the

R.B. Serieant, "Thc Coastal PoPr

compiled and with chaPters bl Br32 P.M. Holt has suggested I

grandees of the earlv seventecnt:

Holt. "Al-Jabani'r Intrt,dttetiun .

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA 145

grandees and seems to have had deep roots among the bedouin tribes,perhaps extending back to an ancient division between tribal confedera-tions in Yemen3l. What is important for our purposes is that the factions

had become entrenched by roughly 164032 and that between that date and

about 1730, all military households and all military grandees had tobelong to one faction or the other. The Ottoman government and, indeed,

the military grandees themselves seem to have counted on this dichotomyto preserve order among Egypt's military cadres by means of a divisionof revenues and offices between the two factions. Meanwhile, the antag-

onism between the two factions complicated the friction between the reg-

imental officers and the beys. In fact, the Bilifya triumvirate came to holdsway over Egypt as a result of a muted conflict within the Faqari factionbetween the Bilifya household and one Ibrahim Bey b. Ztilfikar, whoattempted to realize a scheme of Faqdrr and beylical aggrandizement.This conflict does much to illustrate the manner in which the Bilifyahousehold overcame the tension between rank loyalties and factional loy-alties in order to take advantage of a shift in the power structure ofEgyptian military society at the close of the seventeenth century.

Ibrahim Bey b. Zilflkar was appointed pilgrimage commander in110211691, replacing the powerful Qdsimi chieftain Ibrahim Bey AbuShanab; Hasan A$a's son-in-law Ismail Bey, meanwhile, retained the

post of defterdar. By allowing Faqarls to hold both posts, the Ottomangovernment broke with its normal practice of dividing the positions

Muharnmad b. Ahmad b. Iyas, Al Accolrnt of the Ottonwt ConqLrest of Eg.vpt, ed. andtrans. W.H. Salnron, London, 1921, pp. 112-1 l5; tdem,Jolu'nal d'un born'geois dLtCaire,ed. and trans. Gaston Wiet, Paris, 1955, Vol I, pp. 341,344; Vol. II, pp. 2,39. On thehabits of the Mamluk emirs, see David Ayalon, "Notes on the Furlsiyya Exercises andGames in the Mamluk Sultanate," Scripta Hierosol)-nitono IX (1961), pp.50,52,59-62;tdem, L'esclat,ag,e du nrunteloLrk, p. 20. On the habits of the Qasimis and Faqarrs, see al-Damurdashi, op. cit.,p.2; a1-Jabarti, op. t:it.,Yo1. 1,p.61: Holt, "Al-Jabarri's Introduc-tion", pp. 42ff . On Ottoman banners and standards, see Zdzislaw Zygutski, lr., OttomanArt in the Service oJ' the Empire, New York and London, 1992. pp. 46-50,79-84.

3rAl-Damurdashi.op.cit.,p.2;al-Jabarli,op.cit.,Vol. I,p.67; Holt,"Al-Jabarti'slntroduction," pp. 42ff. The Moroccan traveler Ibn Batuta (1304-1371) encountered theBan[ Haram, associated with the Qasimis, in the ancient Yemeni capital of Halli (?); see

'Abdallah Muhammad b. Ibrahirn b. Batuta, Rihlo lbn Bntritu, with an introduction byKaram al-Bustani, Beirut, 1964, p. 246. The Ban[ Sa'd, associated with the Faqarrs,appear to have been based in the Hadhramaut in what is now southeaslern Yemen: see

R.B. Serjeant, "The Coastal Population of Socotra", in Sototra: Islond oJ'Tranquilitr'.compiled and with chapters by Brian Doe, London, 1992, pp. 162-163.

r2 P.M. Holt has suggested that the two factions may have originated with twograndees of the early seventeenth century: Kasrm Bey and Ridvan Bey al-FaqAn. See

Holt, "Al-Jabarti's Introduction", pp. 44, n.2; 46, n.2.

I146 HATHAWAY

between a Faqari and a Qasimr. In pursuit of Faqari supremacy, Ibn Ziil-fikar attempted to manipulate the Janissary corps, which until then had

been controlled by Qasimis. He eliminated three Qasimi officers33, thusclearing the way for the return to the Janissary corps of the ambitiouslower officer Kiiqiik Mehmed Baqodabaqr. Always antagonistic to the

interests of the higher officers, KtiEiik Mehmed had been expelled fromthe regiment in 1680 and again in 168634.

KiiEtik Mehmed's cooperation with Ibn Zilflkar at first seems a bitbewildering. The baqodabaqr is portrayed in al-Jabarti's chronicle and insecondary studies as a populist hero who defended the common soldieryand the populace at large against the abuses of the grandees, both offi-cers and beys3s. Yet he appears to have had a personal stake in the

downfall of one of the Qasimr officers, the chief scribe (kdtib-i kebir)Selim Efendi. An order of 1696 reveals that the bagodabaqr owed Selim3000 gold pieces (;erifi altun) and was also in debt to two other Janis-

sary otficers and two customs officials36. Yet notwithstanding KtiqiikMehmed's personal grudge against Selim Efendi, Selim may have been

exactly the sort of extortionate higher officer whom KiiEtik Mehmed ispraised for opposing. Indeed, al-Damurdashi has Mustafa KAhya al-Kazdalh, Kiiqi.ik Mehmed's eventual archfoe, ananging Selim Efendi'sexpulsion from the Janissaries by accusing hirn of withholding moneyfrom the soldiers' salaries37.

At first blush, the Bilifya group seems to acquiesce in Ibn Ziilfikar'sand Ki.iEiik Mehmed's machinations. Ismail Bey and Hasan Ala stood toprofit financially from Ibn Ziilfikar's program of Faqari supremacy.Shortly after being named pilgrimage commander in 1691, Ibn Ziilfikar

33 The Janissary kAhya Halil was assassinated while the ba; ihtiyor (head of the higherofTicers) Receb Kdhya and the chief scrlbe (kAtib-i /rebir) Selim Efendi were raised to thebeylicate. Selim Efendi was eventually executed. See al-Damurdashi, op. r'it.,pp. 12-13;al-Jabarti, op. cit..Yol. I, p. 230.

3a On KiiEtik Mehmed's career, see al-Jabarti, op. cit.,Yol.l, pp.242-245; P.M. Holt,"The Career of Kuchuk Muhammad (1616-1694)", Bulletin of the School oJ Orienrol andAfrican Studies XXVI (1963), pp.269-281 .

35 See, for example, al-Jabarti, o1t. tit., Vol. I, pp. 238,241; Holt, "The Career ofKuchuk Muhammad", pp. 285-287 .

16 Miihimme Defteri 108, No. l3l5 (beginning Ramazan 1107). The document notesspecifically that Ki.iEiik Mehrned had 3000 Eerifi alrun of Selim's money zinmretinde (lit-erally, "in his possession"). Had Selim died heirless, this debt would probably have goneuncollected. Indeed. his assassins seem to have assumed that he had no heirs until someclaimants petitioned the imperial army, thus occasioning the order. Al-Jabarti (op. cir.,Vol. I, p. 233) asserts that Selim had no heirs.

37 Al-Damurdashi, op. cit.,p. 14.

engineered the transfer of I

from Janissary and 'AzebanFaqari beys, at that3S. These

tal officers only in 1670, as

Paga's reforming lieutenant.

one suspect that it was arran

the higher regimental officmented his eliminating the

Mehmed. Meanwhile, the Fr

age commander and defterd

to ensure Faqari control of lattached to beylical posts. Isr

urally have benefitted from t

whose al-Bahnasa tax farmBoth al-Damurdashi and a1-

with Ibrahim Bey b. Ztlfikarto have had some partia

bagodabaqr was expelled frc

had made him a Eorbact (ar

Mustafa al-Kazdafh, the

supervise one of the EvkAfZiilfikar's scheme, despite Iofficers from the Janissarv

precipitated a higher offictKAhya and KiiEiik Mehme

KiiEiik Mehmed exiled himBilifya succeed in persuadin

KAhya to return to Cairo. Or

one of his own clients to as:

38 Specifically, the Deqiget til-Fsary a!a, the Mehl'rediye to MuraciMuradiye to Ismail Bey in place otlah Bey in place of the 'Azab kiAhrnad Qelebi, op. cit., p. 178: al-

Bey as defterdar eight months lateie Al-Darnurdashi, op. r:1r., p. Iao Al-Jabarti, op. cit., Vol. I. p.1L Al-Jabarti, op. r'ir., Vol. I.

Mehmed's killer. Al-Damurdashi t

Selim Efendi. Ahmad Qelebi (op.

Mehmed uas nol \ orth the price c

TIIE IIOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

engineered the transfer of local supervision of the EvkAf iil-Haremeynfrom Janissary and 'Azeban officers to beys

- and almost exclusively

Faqdri beys, at that3S. These positions had been assigned to the regimen-tal officers only in 1670, as part of the program of Kopriilii Fazrl AhmedPaqa's reforming lieutenant. The timing of the beylical takeover makes

one suspect that it was arranged by Ibn Znlfikar in an attempt to weaken

the higher regimental officers. Such a strategy would have comple-mented his eliminating the Q6simi officers and championing KiiEiikMehmed. Meanwhile, the Faqan stranglehold on the offices of pilgrim-age commander and defterdar, unbroken for most of the 1690s, helped

to ensure Faqari control of EvkAf revenues once EvkAf supervision was

attached to beylical posts. Ismail Bey, the longtime defterdar, would nat-

urally have benefitted from this monopoly, but so too would Hasan A[a,whose al-Bahnasa tax farm was endowed to the EvkAf iil-Haremeyn.Both al-Damurdashi and al-Jabarti, in fact, have Hasan Ala conspiringwith Ibrahim Bey b. Znlflkat and the govemor3e. Hasan Ala seems even

to have had some partiality toward Kiigiik Mehmed; when the

baqodabaqr was expelled from the Janissary corps in 1686, Hasan A[ahad made him a qorbacr (an intermediate officer) in the Gciniilliiyanao.

Mustafa al-Kazda$b., the Janissary kAhya, lost the opportunity to

supervise one of the EvkAf [l-Haremeyn as a result of Ibrahim Bey b.

Ziilfikar's scheme, despite his complicity in the removal of the Qasimiofficers from the Janissary corps. The officers' elimination, however,precipitated a higher officer-lower officer struggle between MustafaKhhya and KiiEiik Mehmed. Mustafa Kdhya, for the moment, lost;Kiigiik Mehmed exiled him to the Hijaz. Only in 1694 did Hasan A[aBilifya succeed in persuading Ibrahim Bey b. Zilfikar to allow MustafaKAhya to return to Cairo. On his return, the disgruntled Mustafa ordered

one of his own clients to assassinate Ktigiik Mehmedal.

38 Specifically, the Degiget iil-Kiibra to Ibrahlm Bey b. Ziilfikar in place of the Janis-sary a!a, the Mehmediye to Murad Bey the defterdar in place of the Janissary kAhya, theMuradiye to Ismail Bey in place of the Janissary baq gavuq, and the Hassekiye to "Abdul-lah Bey in place of the 'Azab kAhya. Of these, Murad Bey was the sole Qasimr. See

AhmadQelebi, op.cit., p. 178; al-Hallaq,op.cit.,fol.226r.IsmailBeyreplacedMuradBey as defterdar eight months later.

3e Al-Damurdashi, op. cit.,p. 12; al-Jabarli, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 231.40 Al-Jaba1ti, op. cit.,Yol.I, p.242.al Al-Jabati, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 237. Accounts vary as to the identity of Kiiqtik

Mehmed's killer. Al-Damurdashi (op. cit., p.26) claims it was a vengeful Qasimi ally ofSelim Efendi. Ahmad Qelebi (op. cit., p. 190) says merely that whoever killed KtiqiikMehmed was not worth the price of a shoe on his foot.

JANE HATHAWAY

Ibrahim Bey b. Ziilfikar's flirtation with power ended not long after-

ward, when, in collusion with the governor, he attempted to kill his pre-

decessor as pilgrimage commander, the Qasimr leader Ibrahim Bey AbuShanab. There are several versions of the story in which Abu Shanab,

fearing just such a plot, hides out in his harem, only to discover that a

new goverrror has been appointed and that he has been named qdimmaqam, or interim governol2. As for Ibrahim Bey b. ZiJ,lfikar, he diedshortly thereafter, in the plague of 1696.

In the wake of Ibrahim Bey b. Ziilfikar's death, the Bilifya group didnot choose to pursue his ruthlessly pro-Faqari program. On the conffary,a rivalry seems to have festered between Ibn Ztilfikar's remaining clients

and the Bilifya allies. Thus Hasan Ala Bilifya, Ismail Bey, and MustafaKAhya al-Kazda!.h collectively deposed the govemor Ismail Paqa (1694-

1697) for supporting a freedman of Ibn Znlflkal against one of IsmailBey's alliesa3. Al-Damurdashi, meanwhile, stresses the care with whichHasan A[a and Ismail Bey maintained a working relationship with the

Qasimrs, in particular Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab. Hasan A[a, forinstance, asked Abu Shanab to pafticipate in Ismail Paga's deposition.

After Hasan A[a's death, Ismail Bey appears to have shared power withAbu Shanab44. Hasan A!a, along with Abu Shanab, appea.rs committedto the balancing act between Faqaris and Qasimis that the Ottoman gov-ernment itself pursued. This commitment seems to have been commonamong the household leaders of the late seventeenth century. IbrahimBey b. Ziilfikar's scheme of Faqari supremacy, however, threatened thisbalance of power.

But by supporting Kiigtik Mehmed, a baqodabaqr, Ibn Ziilfikar also

sought to curb the power of the higher officers, of whom Hasan Ala was

the foremost representative. Ibn Ziilfikar rccognized a threat to the beyli-cate in the regimental officers' ascendancy. By the late seventeenth cen-

tury, the officers were encroaching on the tax farms of ever-largerEgyptian villagesa5, a process that can only have been facilitated by the

officers' superuision of the EvkAf til-Haremeyn before 1691. When

a2 Ahmad Qelebi, op. cit., pp. 194-197; al-Hallaq, op. cit., fol.220r;'Abdiilkerim b.

'Abdurrahman, Tdrth-i Mnr, Istanbul, Siiieymaniye Library, MS Hekimollu A1i Paqa

705, fol. 99v; al-Damurdashi, op. cit., p. 30 (not the identical story).43 Ahmad Qeleb| op. cit., pp.201-202.a Al-Damurdashi, op. cit.,p.52; al-Jabarri, op. cit.,Yol.I,p.237.as By the early eighteenth century, regimental officers, above all Janissaries, perme-

ated the ranks of tax famers of Egypt's villages, according to a muqata'a (tax farm) reg-ister of 1134-113511721-1723 (Baqbakanhk Osmanh Arqivi, Maliyeden Miidevver 1350).

Ottoman officials attempteri

they otten went directly to tl

as ageflts, or lefti1s. Moreor,these ofllcers came to contrtr

villages that produced it. \c(paid in kind): during the Jl

where it was distributed to thcoff'ee4". The immense fisc.r

Egyptian villages cannot h

attempted to outmaneuver th

who was, atter all, the olficeOne could say, then, that

fikar parted company was th

case, to the Faqaris

bcys vs. loyitlty to oflccrs,rank loyalties seems to har e

enteenth century. Tlre peculi

was that it did not allow c'itl

the Bililya group was a fLrtt.

that of lbrahim Bey b. Ziildcsign of f-actional and. fi'orlAgu Bilill lr. itt conlrast. in-

system, presurnably in thc i

household's wealth and inlliofflcer/tax farmer, Hasan .r

opposed to beys. He took n,

Bey b. Ziilfikar seemed eas

officers and beys witl-rin hi.slrnre ol lrtx-l'ltrtn acqui'itr,Bey tlre cle.fierclur, whom 1

'16 This is explained by Pocr,'.Michel -1'uchscherer. "Le pelerin.,.caravane de la Mekkc en l73i) . i

r'- This perhaps cxplains rilrr irnan Bey. the govcrnor of thc l p':

pp. nl-9Xr. The tutttplrittl luir:t ..his rr-rinci whether hc u,ere a Fa.l.p. 207). he was oliginally a Qri:urclc Akhbclr al-rttrn vrtlb ntitt dat" ,,

Kftr?n (Topkapr Palace l-ibralr. \lopposite.

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

Ottoman officials attempted to extracl revenues from the countryside,they often went directly to these officers, sometimes empowering themas agents, or vekils. Moreover, by acquiring strategic village tax farms,

these officers came to control the flow of grain from the Upper Egyptianvillages that produced it. Not only was this grain important as revenue(paid in kind); during the pilgrimage, it was transported to the Hijaz,where it was distributed to the poor of the Holy Cities and exchanged forcoffeea6. The immense fiscal and commercial importance of the UpperEgyptian villages cannot have been lost on Ibn Ziilfikar when he

attempted to outmaneuver the officers; neither was it lost on Hasan A[a,who was, after all, the officer/tax farmer par excellence.

One could say, then, that the point at which Hasan A[a and lbn Znl-fikar parted company was the point at which factional loyalty

- in this

case, to the Faqdris - was subsumed by loyalties of rank: loyalty to

beys vs. loyalty to officers. Indeed, the tension between factional and

rank loyalties seems to have fuelled Egypt's elite politics late in the sev-

enteenth century. The peculiar genius of the Bilifya household, however,was that it did not allow either loyalty to overwhelm it. For this reason

the Bilifya group was a fundamentally different kind of household fromthat of Ibrahim Bey b. Zilflkar. Ibn Ziilfikar's household followed a

design offactional and, from all appearances, beylical supremacy. Hasan

Aga Bilifya, in contrast, insisted on the preservation of the two-factionsystem, presumably in the interest of orderaT. Meanwhile, although hishousehold's wealth and influence were rooted in the phenomenon of the

officer/tax farmer, Hasan A[a was not an officer who was radicallyopposed to beys. He took no part in the wars of rank in which IbrahimBey b. Znlfrkar seemed eager to indulge. lnstead, he cannily combinedofficers and beys within his household and allowed them all to join the

game of tax-farm acquisition. Hence he forged an alliance with IsmailBey the deJierdar, whom he himself had promoted from a[a to bey,

a6 This is explained by Pococke, A Dcscription oJ the East, Vol. I, p. 204; and byMichel Tuchscherer, "Le pdlerinage de l'6rnir SulaymAn Giwii al-Qazdugli, sirdAr de lacaravane de 1a Mekke en i739", Artnales isLantologiques XXIV (1988), p. 17.5.

a7 This perhaps explains why Hasan Aga led the Faqdn campaign against'Abdurrah-man Bey, the governor oi the Upper Egyptian province of Jirja (al-Darnurdashi, op. Lit.,pp. 61-98). The complaint against'Abdurahman was that he could not seem to make uphis mind whether he were a Faqari or a Qdsimr. According to Ahrnad Qelebi (r.rp. rrr.,p.207), he was originally a Qasimi, then allied with the Faqf,ns. The anonymous chroni-cle Akhbar al-nuv'n,ab ntin tl,u'lat Al 'utltnrun ntin hIn istuv'a!o alayha ul-sultan SaltnrKhtin (Topkapr Palace Library, MS Hazine 1623), however (fol.55r), says exactly theopposite.

150 JANE HATHAWAY

while cultivating Mustafa KAhya al-Kazda[h. His link to Ismail Bey gave

him a connection to the EvkAf til-Haremeyn since as a result of the trans-formation of 1691, Ismail Bey had taken charge of one of the EvkAf. Hadlocal EvkAf supervision been restored to the regimental officers, as

appears to have been their wisha8, Hasan Ala would still have enjoyed an

influential connection since the Janissary kdhya was his prot6g6.And yet the Bilifya household did not live or die by the superinten-

dency of the Evkdf iil-Haremeyn. By controlling the tax farms of strate-gic Evk6f villages, the household in effect circumvented the power ofthe local superintendents of the EvkAf. Meanwhile, it enjoyed the classicperquisites of the officer/tax farmer: revenues from customs, the coffeetrade, and protection rackets among Cairo's artisans and merchantsae.

One must conclude that Hasan A[a Bilifya far surpassed Ibrahim Bey b.Zilflkar at contingency planning. His household was prepared to takeadvantage of EvkAf iil-Haremeyn revenues should the opportunity pre-sent itself. At the same time, the household amassed altemative sourcesof revenue, some related to the EvkAf, that sustained its power in theabsence of such opporrunity.

C0]{CI,L]SIoN ANI) EPILO(;T:E

In building his household, then, Hasan A[a Bilifya was guided bysheer fiscal pragmatism and by an acute sensibility to the prevailing bal-ances of power on both the imperial and the local scenes. Hence hishousehold combined a balanced mix of officers and beys with cannyexploitation of court connections. (It is worth noting, in this regard, thatHasan A[a survived several changes of Chief Black Eunuch with theaccompanying changes in the power configuration within the imperialpalace.) At the same time, Hasan Ala, as leader of the Faqari faction,kept up a prudent d6tente with the rival Qasimi f-action.

r8 Istanbul, Topkapr Palace archives, E 52lll22 (mid-Zilkade I1l0/Au_eust 1698) isan imperial./crntan orderirg that local supervision of the Evkdf be restored to the Janis-sary and'Azab officers. Theferman was issued in response to a petition by the officers inquestion. It appears to have been ignored, however.

ae For a description of the practice of protection, or hintayet, see Andr6 Raymond,Arlisans et contmerEatlts au. Caire au XVIIIe siic/e, Damascus, 1973-14, Vol. II, pp. 688-692; idem, "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Egypt", British Societl'for MiddleEosr Studies Bulletin XVIII, 1 (1991), pp. l6-37. On the Janissaries'role in the customs,see Raymond, Artisans ct contnter('onts, vo1. II, pp.618-628.

The example of Hasan Ajthe household that ultimatel'

invaded in 1798: namelY, ttbeen Hasan A!a's own Pro

unchallenged control of Eg'

provincial governorshiPs, th,

had achieved a prePonderant

cate. At the same time, their l

to have extended far beYonc

By the middle of the ei-uht,

Black Eunuchs were financi

Meanwhile, the grandees' en

had reached such an exten

Eunuch's vekil in EgYPt to tt

One could argue that the I

Bilifya's strategies to the r;

teenth centurY. The two-fac

century: the Qasimi faction

routed in 1730 bY the Faqr

assemblage of fractious su

power upset, compromise I

were no longer viable Po

Kazdalhs took the Bilif,va

Whereas the BilifYa houset

between the two rival fact

Chief Black Eunuch and oth

sors eliminated or co-opted

doing, they became, as it \\.i

50 Topkapr Palace archives. D

revenues (fdiz) accrtring to el-Ha,the tax farms of three strategic Er.

5t Miihirume-i Mrsrr, Vol. \''IIAEa's potash muqAtu''a was leas.

(1169/1756) notes that revenues a

paid from Ibrahim KAhYa's /irrlrii'lage. Vol. VII, No. 455 (ll71l1'lelrljl1 frorn various Egyptian 3

Ebukoff Ahmed's sulplus incotrt.possession of Ibrahim KihYa.

51 Miihimnte-i Mr.rrr', Vol. VII.

THE HOUSEHOLD OF HASAN AGA

The example of Hasan A!a's pragmatism was not, I believe, lost onthe household that ultimately came to dominate Egypt until Bonaparteinvaded in 1798: namely, the Kazdalh household, whose founder had

been Hasan A!a's own prot6g6, Mustafa K6hya al-Kazdaflr. Seekingunchallenged control of Egypt's largest tax farms, including the sub-provincial governorships, the Kazdaghs by the mid-eighteenth centuryhad achieved a preponderance among both the regiments and the beyli-cate, At the same time, their leverage with the Chief Black Eunuch seems

to have extended far beyond mere control of EvkAf-related tax farmsso.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, it appears that exiled ChiefBlack Eunuchs were financially dependent on the Kazdalh grandeessr.

Meanwhile, the grandees' encroachment on EvkAf iil-Haremeyn revenues

had reached such an extent that the sultan ordered the Chief BlackEunuch's vekil in Egypt to take over local super,,ision of the Evkdf2.

One could argue that the Kazdafhs were obliged to adapt Hasan A[aBilifya's strategies to the radically altered circumstances of the eigh-teenth century. The two-faction system had broken down early in the

century: the Qasimi faction, riven with interrral divisions, was utterlyrouted in ll30 by the Faqaris, who proceeded to degenerate into an

assemblage of fractious successor households. With the balance ofpower upset, compromise and the maintenance of a loyal oppositionwere no longer viable political tactics. In such circumstances, the

Kazdalhs took the Bilifya modus operandi to its logical extreme.Whereas the Bilifya household had flourished by maintaining d6tente

between the two rival factions and cultivating partnerships with the

Chief Black Eunuch and other Ottoman officials, their Kazdalh succes-

sors eliminated or co-opted all rivals and manipulated officials. In so

doing, they became, as it were, Egypt's only superpower.J.H.

50 Topkapr Palace archives,D 252011 (15911'746), an account of the surplus Evkdfrevenues (filiz) accring to el-Hac Begir A!a, shows Kazdafhs and their allies holdingthe tax farms of three strategic Evk0f villages.

s\ Mi)himme-i Mrcr, Yol. VII, No. 240 (116911'755) describes how Hazinedar 'AIiAEa's potash muqata'a was leased to Ibrahim Khhya al-Kazdalh; Vol. VII, No. 309(1169ll'756) notes that revenues accruing to Ebukoff Ahmed Ala from Egypt are to bepaid from Ibrahim Kdhya's huh'An - that is, the sum he paid for the tax farm of a vil-lage. Vol. VII, No. 455 (111111758) notes that Ebukoff Ahmed purchased properties(entldk) from various Egyptian grandees (a'yAn). Vol. VII, No. 600 (ll72ll'759) hasEbukoff Ahmed's surplus income from the EvkAf iil-Haremeyn revenues $A)iz) in thepossession of Ibrahim KAhya.

51 Miihimme-i Mtstr,Yol. VII, No. 241 (116911755).