Top Banner
*All pictures are taken from Dr StrangeLove movie and other Internets Sergey Gordeychik Alexander Timorin Gleb Gritsai
110

"The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Jan 24, 2017

Download

Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

*All pictures are taken from Dr StrangeLove movie and other Internets

Sergey GordeychikAlexander Timorin

Gleb Gritsai

Page 2: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ Group of security researchers focused on ICS/SCADA

to save Humanity from industrial disasterand to keep Purity Of Essence

Alexander TimorinAlexander TlyapovAlexander ZaitsevAlexey OsipovAndrey MedovArtem ChaykinDenis BaranovDmitry EfanovDmitry Nagibin

Dmitry SerebryannikovDmitry SklyarovEvgeny ErmakovGleb GritsaiIlya KarpovIvan PoliyanchukKirill NesterovRoman IlinRoman PolushinSergey Bobrov

Sergey DrozdovSergey GordeychikSergey SidorovSergey ScherbelTimur YunusovValentin ShilnenkovVladimir KochetkovVyacheslav EgoshinYuri GoltsevYuriy Dyachenko

Page 3: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Please note, that this talk is by SCADA StrangeLove team. We don’t speak for our

employers. All the opinions andinformation here are of our responsibility

(actually no one ever saw this talk before). So, mistakes and bad jokes are all OUR

responsibilities.

Page 4: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

9260 km6 day 1:59

Page 5: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 6: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 7: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

A signal is a mechanical or electrical device erectedbeside a railway line to pass information relating to thestate of the line ahead to train/engine drivers.

A railroad switch, turnout or [set of] points is a mechanical installation enabling railway trains to beguided from one track to another, such as at a railwayjunction or where a spur or siding branches off.

Page 8: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 9: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://www.railway-technical.com/sigtxt5.shtml

Page 10: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mjx3S3UjmnA

Page 11: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Clear_track_circuit.svg

Page 12: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Occupied_track_circuit.svg

Page 13: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 14: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Weld resistanceWeld no transfer contactsSolid gold and bifurcated contacts-40 °C...+70 °C operating temperatureVital relays are gravity-operated devices

Page 15: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 16: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

LocomotiveTraction motors control/Cab SignalingAutomatic Train ControlPassenger Information and Entertainment

Wayside/StationsComputer base interlocking / Centralized traffic controlMarshalling yard automationAutomated railway level crossing protection system

Other systemsTraction substationsTickets / Passenger InformationTelemetry

Page 17: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

The train's signalling, control and train protection systems include a Transmission Voie-Machine (TVM) signalling system, Controle de Vitesse par Balises (KVB) train protection system, Transmission Beacon Locomotive (TBL) train protection system, Runback Protection System (RPS), European Train Control System (ETCS), Automatic train protection (ATP) system, Reactor Protection System (RPS) and train control system.http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/eurostar-e320-high-speed-train/

KVB - a train protection system used in FranceMEMOR - Belgian railway signalingTVM - in-cab signaling originally deployed in FranceTBL - train protection system used in BelgiumRPS - Runback ProtectionATP - Great Britain implementations of a train protection systemETCS - European Train Control System

Sibas 32 train control system guarantees a safe and smooth transfer of data via the Train Communication Network (TCN), which consists of the train bus (WTB) and vehicle bus (MVB)

Page 18: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

The train's signalling, control and train protection systems include a Transmission Voie-Machine (TVM) signalling system, Controle de Vitesse par Balises (KVB) train protection system, Transmission Beacon Locomotive (TBL) train protection system, Runback Protection System (RPS), European Train Control System (ETCS), Automatic train protection (ATP) system, Reactor Protection System (RPS) and train control system.http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/eurostar-e320-high-speed-train/

KVB - a train protection system used in FranceMEMOR - Belgian railway signalingTVM - in-cab signaling originally deployed in FranceTBL - train protection system used in BelgiumRPS - Runback ProtectionATP - Great Britain implementations of a train protection systemETCS - European bus (MVB)

Train!

Page 19: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ Loco’s internals¡ Traction control¡ Braking system¡ Cab signaling¡ Train protection system¡ Automatic train control¡ Passenger Information and Entertainment

¨ Software not available in public¡ True for the all railroad software

Page 20: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ SIBAS 32¡ Eurostar e320 high-speed trains¡ class 120.1 locomotive of German Rail¡ S 252 of Spanish National Railways (RENFE)¡ LE 5600 of Portuguese Railways (CP) ¡ Velaro¡ class 182 2nd gene EuroSprinter¡ EG 3100 in Sweden, Germany

and Denmark ¨ SIBAS PN

¡ New DB ICE trains

Page 21: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ SIBAS 32 updates to SIBAS PN¨ Proprietary SIBAS OS to VxWorks + WinAC RTX¨ S7 controllers to PC-based controllers with WinAC

RTX software¡ “configured and programmed with STEP 7 in exactly the same

way as a normal S7 controllerӬ WTB (Wire Train Bus) to ETB (Ethernet Train Bus)

¡ And PROFINET¨ Goodbye weird executable formats and IS. Hello

ELF/PE and x86/ppc

Page 22: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Follow https://github.com/scadastrangelove to get WinAC FeatureServer scanning and controlling tool very soon

Page 23: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ Hardcodes¡ No, hardcodes are for the authentication

¨ Known protocols¡ XML over HTTP, S7

¨ Secure network facing services¡ Self-written web server¡ Self-written xml parser¡ …

¨ Heavily based on WinCC code¨ Runs on Windows x86¨ Vulnerabilities

¡ Probably

Page 24: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

How to access PC-based controllers (WinAC RTX)?

¨ We don’t know¨ We don’t want to know¨ We will never know¨ Yet to not know¨ Yet to don’t know¨ Not yet to know

Page 25: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 26: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Notation in a chartWD Wayside devicesOC Object controller(s)CP/CPU Central Processing Unit IPU Interlocking processing unitYW Yardmaster’s workstationIG Integration gatewayEMW Electrical mechanic’s

workstationCTC Centralized traffic controlCM Centralized monitoringABS Automatic block systemCBI Computer-based interlockingDN Data networks

Page 27: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Notation in a chartWD Wayside devicesOC Object controller(s)CP/CPU Central Processing Unit IPU Interlocking processing unitYW Yardmaster’s workstationIG Integration gatewayEMW Electrical mechanic’s

workstationCTC Centralized traffic controlCM Centralized monitoringABS Automatic block systemCBI Computer-based interlockingDN Data networks

Page 28: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Notation in a chartWD Wayside devicesOC Object controller(s)CP/CPU Central Processing Unit IPU Interlocking processing unitYW Yardmaster’s workstationIG Integration gatewayEMW Electrical mechanic’s

workstationCTC Centralized traffic controlCM Centralized monitoringABS Automatic block systemCBI Computer-based interlockingDN Data networks

Page 29: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Notation in a chartWD Wayside devicesOC Object controller(s)CP/CPU Central Processing Unit IPU Interlocking processing unitYW Yardmaster’s workstationIG Integration gatewayEMW Electrical mechanic’s

workstationCTC Centralized traffic controlCM Centralized monitoringABS Automatic block systemCBI Computer-based interlockingDN Data networks

Page 30: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 31: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

1. Safety (Cyber Physical Threats)• set a less restrictive signal light• operate a switch with a train passing over it• set conflicting routes …

2. Economics (freight efficiency)• CBI CPU crash• Blocking of control• False indication…

3. Reliability and functional safety• CBI CPU reboot• Network crash…

Automation Communication Informatics, №7, 2015, CBI Threat Model

Page 32: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 33: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 34: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 35: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Notation in a chartWD Wayside devicesOC Object controller(s)CP/CPU Central Processing Unit IPU Interlocking processing unitYW Yardmaster’s workstationIG Integration gatewayEMW Electrical mechanic’s

workstationCTC Centralized traffic controlCM Centralized monitoringABS Automatic block systemCBI Computer-based interlockingDN Data networks

Page 36: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 37: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 38: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 39: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 40: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 41: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Validation and generation of geographical data using a domain theory, Lars-Henrik Eriksson, Uppsala University (c)

Page 42: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ Interlocking security (by Jakob Lyng Petersen)

¡ Trains must not collide¡ Trains must not derail¡ Trains must not hit person working the tracks

¨ Formal methods and verification (rtfm)¡ B Method, Event B

ú Underground rail network in Beijing, Milan and Sao Paulo ¡ Prover.com

ú Sweden, USA

Page 43: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ Safety critical systems¨ Abstract machines + formal methods¨ Atelier B

¡ Available IDE and C translator¡ No Ada translator

¨ Newer version – Event-B¡ See Rodin framework

Page 44: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 45: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 46: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ “Everything will be C in the end. If it's not C, it's not the end.” – almost John Lennon

Page 47: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

¨ KVB: Alstom ¡ Automatic Train Protection for the French railway company

(SNCF), installed on 6,000 trains since 1993 ú 60,000 lines of B; 10,000 proofs; 22,000 lines of Ada

¨ SAET METEOR: Siemens Transportation Systems ¡ Automatic Train Control: new driverless metro line 14 in Paris

(RATP), 1998. 3 safety-critical software parts: onboard, section, line ú 107,000 lines of B; 29,000 proofs; 87,000 lines of Ada

¨ Roissy VAL: ClearSy (for STS)¡ Section Automatic Pilot: light driverless shuttle for Paris-Roissy

airport (ADP), 2006 ú 28,000+155,000 lines of B; 43,000 proofs; 158,000 lines of Ada

Page 48: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Communication services,

Interlocking logic,Objects database,

Diagnostic,etc

Railroad site

HMIUser

interaction and

monitoringCommands

Site objects state

Commands

Site objects indication

Stat

ion

netw

ork

(Eth

erne

t, RS

xxx,

…)

Cont

rolle

rs

Page 49: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Communication services,

Interlocking logic,Objects database,

Diagnostic,etc

Railroad site

HMIUser

interaction and

monitoringCommands

Site objects state

Commands

Site objects indication

Stat

ion

netw

ork

(Eth

erne

t, RS

xxx,

…)

Cont

rolle

rs

C/C++ Ada

Page 50: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 51: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 52: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 53: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 54: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 55: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 56: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 57: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Boundaries between ETCS and the GSM-R Network

Page 58: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

28C3: Stefan Katzenbeisser: Can trains be hacked?

• ERTMS EuroradioSafety Layer

• RBC-RBC Safe Communication Interface

• VPN over GSM

Page 59: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

In areas where the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 or3 is used, the train maintains a circuit switched digital modemconnection to the train control centre at all times. … If the modemconnection is lost, the train will automatically stop.

Page 60: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 61: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/P38T9001%204.2%20FFFIS%20for%20GSM-R%20SIM-CARD.pdf

Page 62: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

― Remote data recovery (Kc, TIMSI)• Chanel decryption (including A5/3)• «Clone» the SIM and mobile station

― SIM “malware”― Block SIM via PIN/PUK brute― Extended OTA features (FOTA)

Karsten Nohl, https://srlabs.de/rooting-sim-cards/Alexander Zaitsev, Sergey Gordeychik , Alexey Osipov, PacSec, Tokyo, Japan, 2014

Page 63: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 64: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 65: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 66: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Attack host

Page 67: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Con

trol

Page 68: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 69: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Travis Goodspeed, Sergey Bratus, https://www.troopers.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/TROOPERS13-You_wouldnt_share_a_syringe_Would_you_share_a_USB_port-Sergey_Bratus+Travis_Goodspeed.pdf

HITB 2015, Bootkit via SMS by Timur Yunusov and Kirill Nesterov.

Page 70: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Con

trol

Attack the ATC

Page 71: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 72: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Source: moxa.com

Page 73: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

And tend to flyin the CLOUDs. Andbecome an IoT.But without strong secureapproach.

Source: moxa.com

Page 74: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Analyzed vendors:Bintec elmegDigiMoxaNetmoduleSierra Wirelessetc.

Page 75: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 76: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

SSH ? okay

Page 77: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Impact:¨ When private is publicly available it’s not a private (Oh hello, captain obvious!)¨ It’s not secure and safe communications (MiTM)¨ Remote login (SSH)¨ Fingerprint devices (extract public key from private, make md5/sha1, search on

shodan/censys)

Page 78: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Not only web management, but also ssh/telnet

Page 79: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Dear customer warned!

Page 80: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 81: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 82: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

1 5 ms 192.168.X.1 //SSH, Telnet2 5 ms 192.168.X.1 //SSH, Web, Telnet3 * Request timed out. 4 54 ms 10.112.X.237 //…5 54 ms 10.112.X.1 //…6 50 ms 10.112.X.2 7 66 ms 10.12.X.234 8 365 ms 10.12.X.226 9 51 ms 203.11.X.113 10 52 ms 1.2.X.165

Train

Wayside

Telecom

Page 83: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 84: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 85: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Kudos Semyon Rozhkov @sam_in_cubeFixed NetModule 3.7.xxxx firmware

Page 86: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 87: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 88: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2014/12/31c3-too-smart-grid-in-da-cloud.html

Page 89: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2014/12/sos-secure-open-smartgrids.html

Q: WTF SACADSOS?A: SCADASOS - (un)Secure Open SmartGrids is open initiative to rise awareness on insecurities of SmartGrid, Photovoltaic Power Stations and Wind Farms.

Q: How to participateA: Find Internet-connected PV and Wind power stations and notify vendors/CERTs/community.

Page 90: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 91: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

• 60 000+ SmartGrid devices disconnected from the Internet • Two Advisories

• XZERES 442SR Wind Turbine CSRF • SMA Solar Technology AG Sunny WebBox Hard-Coded Account

Vulnerability

Kudos @mmrupp!!!

Page 92: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

• Release 1.0• 37 vendors• PLC, RTU, HMI, gateways, switches, servers,

wireless ap, etc• http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2015/12/s

cadapass.html • kudos to Oxana Andreeva• Contribute!

Page 93: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

As a side note, there is about a 3GW buffer in the European energy grids -- take 3GW off the net within a couple of seconds (or add them), and lights will go out. For quite a long while.

Page 94: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2013/11/scada-security-deep-inside.htmlIEC 61850 tools:

Page 95: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://www.phdays.com/press/news/41213/

•Siemens SICAM PAS v. 7.0,SIPROTEC v4, protective relays and switches•GPS and GLONASS time servers•industrial switches.

Page 96: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 97: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Relay Protection

Page 98: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

Specially crafted packets sent to port 50000/udp could cause a denial-of-service of the affected device. A manual reboot is required to recover the service of the device.

Page 99: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

To access this information, the confirmation code “311299” needs to be provided whenprompted."...Siemens does not publish official documentation on these statistics. It is stronglyrecommended to work together with Siemens SIPROTEC customer care orcommissioning experts to retrieve and interpret the statistics and test information..."

Page 100: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 101: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2015/12/now-declared-capabilities.html

Page 102: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

For some context, it would have been interesting to hear about German legislation on the topic of green energy, especially as it relates to the increasing requirements for wind and solar plants to have the capability not just to read the current status but also to actually shut them down or reduce their output by a set percentage. In a few months, all the solar/wind plants that are marketed through the "Direktvermarktung".

01.08.2014 500 kW01.01.2016 100 kW

Page 103: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 104: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

*All pictures are taken from googleand other Internets

Alexander TimorinAlexander TlyapovAlexander ZaitsevAlexey OsipovAndrey MedovArtem ChaykinDenis BaranovDmitry EfanovDmitry NagibinDmitry SerebryannikovDmitry SklyarovEvgeny ErmakovGleb GritsaiIlya KarpovIvan PoliyanchukKirill NesterovRoman IlinRoman PolushinSergey BobrovSergey DrozdovSergey GordeychikSergey ScherbelSergey SidorovTimur YunusovValentin ShilnenkovVladimir KochetkovVyacheslav EgoshinYuri GoltsevYuriy Dyachenko

Page 105: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

*All pictures are taken from googleand other Internets

Page 106: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

…We explore... and you call us criminals. We seek after knowledge... and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias... and you call us criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe it's for our own good, yet we're the criminals.Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity…

Page 107: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove

The Chaos Computer Club is, by its chapter and by common consent, a galactic organization of all life forms, regardless of their age, gender or upbringing.

The Congress has always been a place where people can enjoy technology and culture, no matter what their background is.

Page 108: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 109: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove
Page 110: "The Great Train Cyber Robbery" SCADAStrangeLove