The Great Goat and Tank Event

India Review, vol. 7, no. 2, AprilJune, 2008, pp. 115154Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1473-6489 print; 1557-3036 onlineDOI:10.1080/14736480802055455

FIND1473-64891557-3036India Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2008: pp. 120India ReviewThe First Kashmir War RevisitedThe First Kashmir War RevisitedIndia ReviewSHUJA NAWAZ

The seemingly endless Indo-Pakistan conflict that became an integralpart of the history of twentieth century and continues to reverberateinto the twenty-first century had its origins in the birth pangs of thesetwo independent nations. They went to war almost as soon as the Brit-ish colonial authorities announced the end of their rule in India inAugust 1947. Fueled by a religious and ethnic conflagration acrossmuch of northern India and the area that is now Pakistan, the conflict inKashmir took on a life of its own and continues to echo in the politicalrhetoric in both states even today, affecting their ability to craft rationaland mutually advantageous economic and political relationships andplay a joint role as regional actors not only in the Indian Ocean but alsoin the New Central Asia: the area that includes Iran, Afghanistan, andthe Muslim Republics or stans of the former Soviet Union.

This article takes a fresh look at the origins of the Kashmir conflictin the period surrounding the partition of India. Much of the earlierliterature has relied on political records and memoirs of key individu-als on both sides of the conflict, in India and Pakistan. A key elementthat was missing was the military thinking that prompted the conflictand how the armies of both sides managed their operations. Insightsinto the thinking behind this conflict on the Pakistani side are nowavailable as a result of access to the previously secret files of the Paki-stan army relating to this conflict. These provide a fresh and detailedlook at the military planning and frustrations of military commanders

Shuja Nawaz is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within(Oxford University Press, April 2008) from which this article has been adapted. He was anewscaster and producer with Pakistan television and covered the IndiaPakistan War in1971 on the western front. He has also worked for the World Health Organization and TheNew York Times. He was a division chief for the International Monetary Fund and directorof the International Atomic Energy Agency. He was also Editor of Finance and Develop-ment, the joint quarterly of the IMF and the World Bank. Currently he is a political analystand author and speaks widely on radio, television, and at think-tanks on South Asia andCentral Asian issues.

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in conducting a war with serious logistical and political constraintsand may give a useful counterpoint to the many published accounts ofthis conflict in India.

This article puts the Kashmir War in historical perspective, exam-ines its causes, and then presents the thinking of the military officerswho surreptitiously managed the tribal incursion into Kashmir fromPakistan. It then analyzes the effects of this war on the officersinvolved and its possible effects on the emergence of a praetoriantradition in Pakistani politics, as evidenced in the attempted coupdtat of 1951. And it examines the lack of decisive thinking in thepolitical leadership of Pakistan on Kashmir that led to an ill-plannedincursion and a delayed involvement of the Pakistan army, making it adoomed venture from the outset.

The origins of the First Kashmir War lay in history but were givenimpetus by the lack of coherent and centralized decision making atboth the military and political levels in Pakistan. India had inheritedthe central political, administrative, and military command structureof the departing British. Pakistan had to start from scratch. Its capitalKarachi was distant from the army headquarters in Rawalpindi,1000 miles to the north. Both countries continued with British com-manders of their forces. Below them was generally a well trained andcompliant batch of native officers who were imbued with the Britishtradition of an apolitical officer corps. Most of them had had littleopportunity to interact with politicians or to consider political issues.But the sudden conflagration of ethnic and religious violence andexchange of refuges between the two states at partition exposed themto the deep political and religious conflicts that lay beneath the surfaceof what was British India.

Against this background, it became possible for some activistyoung officers in Pakistan to seize the opportunity provided by awavering ruler in Kashmir, who had failed to decide on acceding toeither India or Pakistan, to force his hand. Their initially surreptitiousactions were later on recognized by the political leadership but werekept largely secret from the British higher command. As a result theydid not benefit from any organized strategic planning or official sup-port at the level of the army command. Essentially, the conflictbecame a tactical exercise that was searching for a strategy and drewopportunistic politicians into its fold. A higgledy piggledy approachin Pakistan to military and political actions on Kashmir produced

Robert Stephany: the issues over kashmir began beforebritish left, pakistan had too little gov

The First Kashmir War Revisited 117

unsatisfactory results on both levels and created a simmering conflictthat continues to bedevil relations to this day between India andPakistan. And in the process, it helped create a pattern of relationshipsbetween the military and civil authority in Pakistan that has allowedthe military to influence and even control external policies.

With the issue of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan hang-ing in the balance, feverish activity proceeded in the corridors ofpower of New Delhi. Mountbatten was trying to get the HinduMaharaja of this state with a majority Muslim population not to takeprecipitate action but to ascertain the wishes of his populace beforecommitting. With a view to keeping options open and under Jinnahscareful approach so as not to upset the delicate balance of accession ofa number of key states that were still weighing their options (Kashmirand Hyderabad, being major illustrations of this case), Pakistan signeda Standstill Agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir. India held offfrom doing so. The Viceroys special aide V. P. Menon was deputed todiscuss matters with the Maharaja, who showed himself to be in astate of indecision, raising alarms in New Delhi. The concern amongIndian political leaders was that the longer Kashmir held out, thegreater the possibility that the Maharaja might either take an autono-mous position or, much worse, opt for Pakistan or allow Pakistan toenter Kashmir.

Nehru sat down and wrote an assessment to Sardar Patel onSeptember 27, 1947 that summed up the situation succinctly from theIndian point of view:

It is obvious to me that the situation there [Kashmir] is a dangerousand deteriorating one. The Muslim League in the Punjab and theNWFP are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerablenumbers. The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmirfrom the rest of India. The only normal route then is via theJhelum valley. . . .

I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kash-mir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is moreor less isolated.

He then proposed the release of Sheikh Abdullah and the NationalConference leaders followed by a declaration of adhesion to Indian

Robert Stephany: Mountbatten wanted to get india to takeover, population didn't want this

Robert Stephany: Pakistan took initial actions

Robert Stephany: Indians are fearful that kashmir will fallto the pakistani gov, they don't want this to happen

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Union for once this was done . . . it will become very difficult forPakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming intoconflict with the Indian Union.1

Patel joined forces with Nehru in continuously pressing the Maha-raja to accede to India. V. P. Menon meanwhile acted as the Viceroysemissary and a flurry of visits to Kashmir ensued. The Maharajameanwhile made matters worse by reacting badly to efforts by thepeople of Poonch in Jammu to assert their political rights.

Poonch in the region of Western Jammu Province is at a strategiclocation between the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, and the Pir PanjalRange the border of Kashmir with Pakistan. The southern spurs of thePir Panjal Range gradually descend into hilly areas to the south, merginginto the plains of Gujrat district in Pakistan. Before independence, a roadthat ran from Jammu to Bagh, crossing over the Chenab at Akhnoor andfrom there on to Beri Pattan, Noashera, Mendhar, and then Poonch, wasimproved. With Indian help, the Dogra government tried to establish analternate route from Bagh across the Jhelum River valley to the SrinagarValley to provide year-round access. The track from Poonch to Uri overthe Hajipir Pass was also improved but remained unusable due to snowfor much of the year.2 (Many of the key battles of the First Kashmir Warcentered on these roads and this region and the names of even smalltowns such as Akhnoor entered military lore in both India and Pakistan.)

This critical location gave the region great importance in a strategiccontext. Its population, largely Muslim, also had close ties to thecontiguous regions in Pakistan in the districts of Jhelum, Rawalpindi,and Gujrat. The people shared a strong military tradition with theirrelatives across the border. The so-called martial tribes (defined assuch by the British, who used such categorizations to recruit andretain soldiers for their armies in India) in Poonch were mainly Muslimand included Sudhans, Abbasids, Chibs, Rajputs, Dainyals, Mardyals,and Gakhars, mainly from the Poonch and Mirpur districts. Poonchishad traditionally been active soldiers. Some 60,000 of them had servedin World War II and they had strong links because of geographical,economic, and religious reasons with the contiguous areas of whatwas now Pakistan. On return from the war the soldiers found thatthey had become the subjects not of the benign Maharaja of Poonchbut of the Maharaja of Kashmir and were subject to all of the lattersonerous taxes. Dogra troops were billeted in the region to help collectthe taxes. The Poonchis also reacted badly to news of the slaughter of

Robert Stephany: Indian solution is to essentially takeover kashmir under adhesion to indian union, making ithard for pakistan to take over


Muslims in East Punjab. A public meeting was held in August 1947 atNila Bat, a village near Dhirkot, to support the demand for accession ofthe state to Pakistan. The Maharaja sent his Hindu Dogra forces to quellthe unrest. They opened fire on the gathering. On August 27, SardarAbdul Qayuum Khan, a local zamindar or landowner (and laterPresident of the Azad Kashmir government in Pakistani-controlledKahmir), led an attack on a police-cum-military post in Dhirkot andcaptured it, leading the Maharaja to unleash the full force of his DograHindu troops on the population. This effectively drew the lines inPoonch between the Hindu ruler and the Muslims population, all ofwhom were now seen as enemies. Villages were attacked and burned.3

The Poonchis reacted sharply to these events. Many ex-servicemenfrom Poonch exfiltrated across the still undefined border to Pakistan,to leave their families with relatives in Pakistan and began to preparethemselves for an armed rebellion.

Among the leaders of this rebellion was a young Sardar MohammedIbrahim Khan, a lawyer and member of the state assembly, who fledacross the border to Pakistan and attracted around him a core groupof supporters, including retired military officers and former membersof the Indian National Army (the force set up by the Japanese fromcaptured Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore). He was introducedto Colonel Akbar Khan of the Pakistan army at one point and askedfor help.4 Akbar, an ambitious officer with intellectual pretentious andcontacts among the literati in Pakistan, was the linchpin of whatwould become the Kashmir campaign on the Pakistani side.

According to Akbar, Ibrahim thought that the time for peacefulnegotiations was gone because every protest was being met withrepressions and, therefore, in certain areas the people were virtually ina state of revolt . . . if they were to protect themselves and to prevent theMaharajah from handing them over to India, they needed weapons.The amount of weapons requested was only 500 rifles. Akbar statesthat a few days later Mian Iftikharuddin, a leading member of the rul-ing Muslim League (and later publisher of repute) arrived in Murreeand said that he was being asked to go to Kashmir to see if he couldfacilitate accession to Pakistan. If that did not work out there ought tobe a plan to help Kashmiri Muslims take action against any likelyaccession to India. Iftikharuddin asked Akbar to prepare such a planbut warned that any action by us was to be of an unofficial nature,and no Pakistani troops or officers were to take an active a part in it.

Robert Stephany: Meeting was held to join pakistan,maharaja of kasmhir didn't approve, sent troops to end it,lead to violence

Robert Stephany: Population is now polarized/wantdifferent things

Robert Stephany: Akbar essentially decides that in orderto get freedom, must take up arms to attack indians

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Akbar discussed this issue with Ibrahim and others and thenreturned to Rawalpindi to prepare the action plan. As director ofWeapons and Equipment at GHQ in Rawalpindi he had a good ideaof the weapons situation in Pakistan, which was not very good.Moreover, the secrecy enjoined on him meant that he could not takethe Army Chief into his confidence and get orders issued to supportthe Kashmiris. He found that 4000 rifles had been sanctioned for thePunjab police that could somehow be diverted for this new cause (hismilitary mind had already assessed the need for a force larger than the500 sought by Ibrahim) and also arranged to find some condemnedammunition that was to be thrown into the sea. His friend ColonelAzam Khanzada agreed to allow this shipment of condemned ammu-nition to be diverted secretly for use in Kashmir.

The basic weapons having been acquired, he concentrated on theorganization of support for the Kashmiris. A critical need was trainedmilitary manpower. In the absence of serving Pakistani officers, heplanned to use ex-Indian National Army officers who had not beenre-inducted into the army after their release at the end of World WarII. His plan, entitled Armed Revolt inside Kashmir, concentrated onstrengthening the Kashmiris themselves internally and at the sametime taking steps to prevent the arrival of armed civilians or militaryassistance from India into Kashmir. It assumed that roughly 200Muslim troops of the state army would not fight against theirco-religionists, leaving a force of 7000 to contend with, most of whomwere scattered across the territory.

The action plan thus focused on severing two major routes thatlinked Kashmir to India: first, the KathuaJammu route, an unmet-alled road that passed through broken territory where guerrillaaction could hold up any traffic till the rains and winter snows made itimpassable. Second, the aim was to make Srinagar airport, the termi-nus for the likely air supply route from India, unavailable to Indianplanes.

Akbar gave this plan to Iftikharuddin on the latters return fromKashmir and was summoned soon after to a meeting in Lahore withthe Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan,a minister in the Punjab government. The armys commander-in-chief, General Frank Messervy, was by-passed in this exchange.Shaukat Hayat also had another plan in hand, which included the useof INA officers such as M. Zaman Kiani and Khurshid Anwar, a

Robert Stephany: Akbar found some weapons inpakistan, goet them for his cause

Robert Stephany: He refers to akbar

Robert Stephany: With weapons plan is to severconnections with india, just as the indian conference hadpredicted


commander of the Muslim League National Guards, to mount cross-border operations under the overall command of Shaukat Hayat.According to Akbar, there was a meeting later that evening, attended bythe Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed (later Governor General),Mian Iftikharuddin, Zaman Kiani, Khurshid Anwar, Shaukat Hayat,and Akbar himself. To his precise military mind Again the enthusi-asm was there but there was no serious discussion of the problemsinvolved . . . the allotment of funds received much attention [but] . . .operational details and their pros and cons were not discussed. Rightat the end of the meeting, Khurshid Anwar told Akbar privately thathe was not going to take orders from Shaukat Hayat. Soon thereafterShaukat Hayat told Akbar that he had no confidence in Anwar! TheMaster Plan for Kashmir was off to a less than illustrious start, withamateur enthusiasm leavened by some military fervor and a good dealof bickering among the principals!

On his return to Rawalpindi Akbar took then Colonel M. SherKhan, Deputy Director of Intelligence (and future Director of MI),into his confidence so he could get military information for planningpurposes.5 He also arranged with Colonel Tommy Masaud of thecavalry to collect and store the condemned ammunition. Air Commo-dore Janjua and others from the air force also offered to help withlogistics, as did Khwaja Abdul Rahim, the civilian Commissioner ofRawalpindi Division.

By early October, it had become obvious to the Pakistan Army thatthe situation in Kashmir was becoming critical, with the Maharajasreluctance to declare for either Dominion and a popular uprising inPoonch that was increasingly being abetted by relatives and supportfrom across the Jhelum River in Pakistan. An exchange of telegramstook place between the Pakistan and Kashmiri governments in earlyOctober, with Pakistan protesting the use of Armed bands, whichinclude troops against Muslim villages in Kashmir. These stories areconfirmed by the large number of villages that can be seen burning fromMurree hills. The Kashmiris responded on October 15 that they hadproof of Pakistani infiltration into Kashmir but were open to a neutralinquiry. But the words in the Pakistani message that were pregnant withmeaning were: The situation is fraught with danger, a message thatwas probably not lost on the new Chief Minister of Kashmiri, MehrChand Mahajan, who had worked on the Radcliffe Commission andhad recently given up his home in Lahore where he had been a judge.6

Robert Stephany: Pakistan now realizes that shit is aboutto go down

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Either before or soon after Akbar approached him,7 it appearsthat Colonel Sher Khan sat down and wrote a secret two-and-a-half-page appreciation of the situation in Kashmir in typically clinicalmilitary style.8 (This and other similar assessments have remainedhidden in the archives of the armys headquarters in Rawalpindisince 1947 and offer a look inside the thinking that led to the execu-tion of the war in Kashmir form the Pakistani side.) Copied to theSecretary, Defence, the Personal Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the Intelligence Bureau in Karachi, and hiscolleagues at GHQ, the Deputy Chief of General Staff and theDirector Military Operations and Intelligence, its main objectivewas to assess the likelihood of an uprising in Kashmir and, if it islikely, when it might occur.

Proceeding from the assumption that The general desire of theMuslims of Kashmir and those others is that the State should opt forPakistan, Sher Khan noted that the Maharaja is definitely nervousof a general uprising, and is wavering about an open declaration of theStates option for India. Under pressure, however, from the Maharani,Mr. Batru ICS [Indian Civil Service], and some Indian leaders, it isreported that a secret agreement has been reached in which the Maharajahas agreed to opt for India, and India has promised military assistanceif necessary. He then analyzed the attitudes of the non-Muslimgroups in Kashmir. Of the three main groups, he wrote that the KashmiriPandits, though small in numbers were very influential but they wereafraid of losing their priviledged [sic] position if the State opts forIndia, and are therefore against it. Hindus and Sikhs, other than thePandits, were expected to favor the India option. They were the bulkof the States forces. Also, refugees from NWFP and Western Punjabhad been armed, by the State authorities ostensibly for self defence.They too were seen as favoring opting for India.

Sher Khans analysis of the local inhabitants found the dwellers ofthe Valley of Kashmir to be not very martial. But the population ofthe hills to the West and the South, who constituted a majority of thepopulation, were deemed to be martial. Many of them were ex-soldiersor serving soldiers. They were reported to have clashed with stateforces over Pakistan celebrations on August 14 and are continuingto resist now. Sher Khan felt that Sheikh Abdullah had been boughtover but the indications are that he is not likely to command any sub-stantial following over Pakistan-India issue.

Robert Stephany: Kashmir bandits don't want to becomepart of india, siks and hindu's want to be part of india, asdo pretty much al start forces

Robert Stephany: people in valley of kasmhi were insupport of pakistan take over


Among the outside influences at work, Sher Khan identifiedIndia and the arrival of large bodies of armed Sikhs and Hindus inJammu, especially the import of INA and RSS Sangh (a right-wingHindu fanatical group) forces. (Ironically, Mohan Singh of the INAwas famously organizing his forces against his erstwhile Muslim INAcolleagues in Eastern Punjab.) He also identified Pakistan and theNWFP tribes as clamouring for Kashmir to opt for Pakistan. But henoted that so far no reports have been received of any move byarmed reinforcement from the Punjab to Kashmir. On the contrary,people along the border are vacating their homes and moving inland.But there is no doubt that there are some hundreds of religious fanaticsand adventurers who are prepared to and will cross the border. Himselfa Pathan, Sher Khan well understood the mood of the Frontier prov-ince. The Frontier tribes he stated are a totally different problem.Their tempers are dangerously high as a result of the East Punjabatrocities stories. Concluding that while it had been difficult for thetribesmen to cross the NWFP and Punjab governments to go to EastPunjab, he wrote that it will be quite easy for them to go to Kashmirshould oppression against the Muslims continue there. In brief, allthe factors which ordinarily make for trouble exist or may be createdin Kashmir in his view. The timing depended on various factors.

He identified the factors as, first, the Maharajas declaration of hisoption for India. This depended on Indian pressure and assurances ofeffective military support. This support, including equipment andsupplies cannot be effectively given until the road PathankotKathuais fit for MT [Motorized Transport] traffic. In his view, the earliest thisis to be expected to be through is the end of October. The declaration,therefore, might be expected then. The second factor was the oppres-sion of the Muslim population by the non-Muslim troops of the Stateof Kashmir and other armed bodies. He mentioned that in Poonchseveral villages had been burned and refugees had started arriving inPakistan. He warned that this might inflame the already incensedtribesmen from as far as . . . Afghanistan to cross the border to theassistance of the Muslims. The report of their casualties etc will keepa regular stream . . . going into Kashmir. This might start any day.

The third factor he identified as the Indian attitude over theJunagadh option. He thought a referendum might be held and theresults cooked. The final important factor was the weather.Large parts of Kashmir will be under snow in six weeks time wrote

Robert Stephany: India sends reinforcements

Robert Stephany: Pakistan sides with the use oftribesmen, thinks that they will work here because themuslims are oppressed and don't want to be part of india

Robert Stephany: India has started attacking villages,refugee's are pouring in and people are getting pissed

124 India Review

Sher Khan and the local population with their limited food andsevere winter condition will not be in a position to stage any serioustrouble. It will also be very difficult for the tribesmen to go to theirassistance in large numbers. His assessment was that the Maharajawas well aware of this situation and thus might delay his announce-ment until the weather started changing.

On the basis of this assessment, Sher Khan concluded that troublein Kashmir is likely . . . The NWFP incl[uding] Afghan tribesmen arelikely to be involved . . . [and] The trouble is likely to start any timefrom now. He was not far off the mark. Yet GHQ did not appear toget into high gear at that point, operating as it was at that time with askeleton staff and far from the political decision makers in Karachi.There does not seem to be any evidence of a master plan for the invasionof Kashmir with which the Pakistan army was associated. Moreover,the Prime Minister had already decided not to involve the Britishcommanders of the Pakistan army in his planning for the Kashmirwar, relying instead on a collection of semi-trained officers and civil-ians with pretensions of military knowledge. Given the nature of thePrime Ministers relationship with Mr. Jinnah, is seems unlikely thatall this planning was being done without Mr. Jinnahs tacit approvalalthough there has been some debate among Pakistanis about thisissue.

Regardless, a plan was approved by the Prime Minister and actioninitiated. Reflecting the highly romanticized view of his own role inthis venture, Akbar Khan took on the nom de guerre General Tariq,after Tariq bin Ziad, the legendary Berber Muslim invader of Spainafter whom Gibraltar is named (Jebel el Tariq) and who literallyordered his boats burned at the beachhead so there was no retreatonce his forces landed on the mainland. Indian sources maintain tothis day the formation of a formal Operation Gulmarg, giving thishodgepodge of plans and activities a shade more formality and sub-stance than they probably had in fact.

It was against this background that Khurshid Anwar managed tocobble together a force of some 2000 tribesmen from the North WestFrontier Province, aided by the Kashmiri-born Chief Minister KhanAbdul Qayyum Khan and the Commissioner of Rawalpindi Division,Khwaja Rahim. Early on Thursday, October 23, 1947 they crossedover into Kashmir through the Jhelum valley and hit the road toMuzaffarabad, Domel, and Baramula en route to Srinagar. This invading

Robert Stephany: Tribesmen invade kashmir frompakistan on oct 23ed 1947


force was a congeries of tribes, reflecting the tribal map of the frontierprovince: the main elements were the Mahsuds and Waziris. The othertribes that had responded to the call for help in Kashmir included theMohmands, Orakzais, Turies, Mangals, Zadrans, Maqbuls, Gurbaz,Khattaks, Bittanis, Ghilzais, Rajouries, Yousafzais, and Bangash.Hazara tribes from faraway Baluchistan, and Zadrans, Sulemnakhels,Ahmadzais, and Ghilzais from astride the Durand line that separatedAfghanistan and Pakistan also participated. Meanwhile from withinPakistan, Diris, Swatis, and Chitralis also joined the fray.9

By Friday night Nehru was informing Mountbatten at a dinner forthe Siamese Foreign Minister that tribesmen were being transported inmilitary transport up the Rawalpindi road toward Kashmir.10 Thefollowing day, at the Defence Committee, attended by Mountbatten,General Rob Lockhart, the Indian Army Chief, read out a telegramfrom the GHQ11 in Pakistan that some five thousand tribesmen hadattacked and captured Muzzafarabad and Domel and that consider-able tribal reinforcements could be expected. Other reports indicatedthat the invaders were only 35 miles from Srinagar. The DefenceCommittee began discussing ways of providing military assistance toKashmir but Mountbatten insisted on the need for accession by theMaharaja before any aid could be sent. Moreover, Mountbatten feltthat accession should only be temporary, prior to a plebiscite. Nodecision was taken, but V. P. Menon was dispatched to Kashmir tospeak with the Maharaja.

It was during this trip that Menon managed to persuade the Maharajato escape with his family to Jammu. And, the source of much latercontention, it was claimed that the Maharaja signed the letter of acces-sion to India on October 26 in Jammu where Menon had followedhim. Menon brought back the letter to Delhi. On the basis of thatletter, Mountbatten agreed to authorize Indian troop deployment inKashmir. Plans for such an airlift had begun much earlier. IndeedPatel had written to the Defence Minister Baldev Singh on 7 Octoberto be prepared to send arms and ammunition to Kashmir by air.I think the question of military assistance in time of emergency mustclaim the attention of our Defence Council as soon as possible. Thereis no time to lose, he stated.12 Commandeered civil aircraft andmilitary aircraft were part of the airlift, with some 33013 troops depart-ing from Palam airport in a Dakota that first night and arriving andsecuring Srinagar airport almost immediately. Future flights took

Robert Stephany: Reports come in that an invasion hastaken place

Robert Stephany: leader of kashmir flees

126 India Review

place from Willingdon (Safdarjang) airfield. By 11 November over600 aircraft sorties carrying over 5000 men and several thousandpounds of stores had been dispatched to Srinagar.14

India lacked good intelligence on the situation at that time. Eventhe commanding officer of the 1st Sikh Regiment, Lt. Col. DewanRanjit Rai, who was tasked with the first flight into Srinagar, was notgiven very specific information. According to Sinha, who took theminutes of the meeting where operational orders were drafted for theKashmir operation, India did not even know whether Srinagar airportwas available for landing at the time. So Rai was told to divert toJammu in case landing was impossible at Srinagar and to immediatelyhead up the road to Srinagar as far as he could.

The arrival of Indian forces in Srinagar was not a smooth opera-tion, given the poor communications and the abject condition of thestate forces, whose commander had been killed in the early fightingagainst the raiders. The Brigade Commander of 161 Brigade, L. P. Senwrote that he was short of manpower for the defense of Srinagar andonly discovered by chance that 1850 state troops had holed up in theirBadami Bagh barracks ever since hostilities began. Most of them wereveterans of earlier wars. It was only at the end of the first week ofDecember that a request for rations was received by 161 Brigadeheadquarters at Uri for rations for 2000 men. Assuming there was amisprint and an extra zero had been added, a query was sent back withthe authorization for the issuance of the rations. That is when Sendiscovered that there were indeed 1850 fully armed state forces availableto him who had chosen to sit out the action!15

The tribesmen linked up with forces of the Azad (or Free) Kashmirarmy inside Kashmiri territory. Indian reports indicate that they werewell armed with a complete range of infantry weapons includingmachine-guns and heavy mortars.16 But Akbar Khan described arag-tag force equipped with outdated rifles or home-made weapons inthe gun factories of the frontier province. Indeed, the 1000 men thatwere supposed to be ready to cut the JammuKathua road were notthere because their country-made rifles having broken down theyhad returned to Pakistan and the two hundred rifles meant for theSrinagar landing ground had not been given by Khurshid Anwar tothe people concerned. Reinforcements were produced in the form of100 ex-servicemen volunteers from Rawalpindi. But, as Akbar admits,it was too late then . . . as the Indian troops had already taken up

Robert Stephany: India sends troops to kashmir, conflicthas begun

Robert Stephany: The use of tribesmen with hand medown weapons didn't really work, 1k left b/c of bad guns,they didn't have proper arms, allowed indian's to take updefense/stop paskistan tribesmen advances


defence of the landing ground. Till this day, however, the story thathas taken root in Pakistani minds is that the raiders had taken the hillssurrounding Srinagar and could see the lights of the city.

The same evening that Indian forces landed in Srinagar, thePakistani Prime Minister had called an unofficial conference inLahore that included Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary,Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, then Secretary General, Abdul QayuumKhan, the Chief Minister of the NWFP, Nawab Mamdot, the ChiefMinister of the Punjab, and Colonels Sher Khan and Akbar Khan, toevaluate the situation. Akbar states that he proposed cutting theJammu road with three tribal lashkars of 1000 persons each andoffered to go with them. Everyone, except the Chief Ministers ofNWFP and Punjab, opposed this idea since they feared this mightprovoke a full-scale Indo-Pakistan war. Akbar, of course, felt thesefears were groundless since India knew the tribesmen had gonethrough Pakistan to get to Kashmir and had it so desired, India wouldhave launched a cross-border attack on the fledgling Pakistan earlierbut did not. In Akbars view, this was because India was not militar-ily strong enough to take such a risk. He was also of the view, thoughmistaken in his calculation, that the Indian army was only twice thesize of Pakistans. Perhaps he was looking at the troops in the Kashmirtheater alone. Regardless, Akbars idea was shelved and, in his view,an opportunity was lost to attain an advantage in the battle for Kashmir.He regretted the lack of daring on the part of Pakistani leaders at thattime.

He was not aware at that time that the same evening Mr. Jinnahhad ordered General Gracey, the acting Commander-in-Chief (whileMesservy was on leave) to launch the Pakistan army into Kashmir inresponse to Indias military intervention. Gracey is said to havedemurred, citing the need to get the Supreme Commanders permis-sion and most probably referring to the Stand Down instructions ofAuchinleck that would have meant the loss of Pakistans entire crop ofsenior British military commanders. Further, the Pakistan army wasin no position to launch and sustain a military operation against Indiaat that time. Auchinleck flew to Lahore to meet Jinnah and explain thereality behind the Stand By order.

The Lahore meeting on Kashmir under Prime Minister Liaquat AliKhan concluded at 2 am the next morning with approval of AkbarKhans idea for the formation of a Liberation Committee to coordinate

Robert Stephany: Assumed that b/c the indian's hadn'tlaunched an attach before, they weren't going to attack

128 India Review

actions in Kashmir. Next morning he was asked to meet the PrimeMinister and informed that he was now a member of this committeeand would leave his post at GHQ to become Military Advisor to thePrime Minister. He was to stay on in Rawalpindi for this work whichwas to be kept secret from the British officers and GHQ. Included inthe Liberation Committee were Sardar Ibrahim, Mr. GhulamMohammed, and Major Yousaf, who was to deal with the tribals.Akbar sought clarification of the military aim of the effort. Accordingto him, the Prime Minister wanted . . . to keep the fight going forthree months which would be enough time to achieve our politicalobject by negotiations and other means. Weighed down by the fearsthat his forces were operating on short supplies, especially of ammu-nition, Akbar rushed back to Rawalpindi on the 28th afternoon toensure that the tribesmen received their munitions on time.

It is interesting to note that Messervy had a concurrent view asdaring as Akbar Khans for the solution of the Kashmir problem. In aconversation with Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan, who was visiting him inearly 1948 at his home in Rawalpindi, Messervy stated that he hadgiven Iskander Mirza a piece of his mind [on the way the Kashmirsituation was being surreptitiously handled and planned in those earlydays]. In Messervys view all it required was a battalion in plainclothes, who would have been there within 12 hours a battalion lesstwo companies at the air field in Srinagar and two companies at BanihalPass and that would have been the end of the story. But no oneapproached Messervy for his views or plans. Somewhat presciently,this soldiers soldier commented that politicians using soldiers andsoldiers allowing themselves to be used, without the proper approvalof their superiors, were setting a bad example for the future.17

Messervy had by then told the Prime Minister that he was planning toleave but did not brief him on the political activities of officers atGHQ as the PM had not asked for his advice.

Akbar Khan left on October 29 for Kashmir, accompanied by apress reporter named Ali Akhtar Mirza. They drove along the JhelumRiver beyond Kohala and reached Muzaffarabad, which was the hubof the tribal forces. More and more buses loaded with tribal warriorswere arriving, armed with an assortment of colorful weapons of British,German, French and local manufacture, including pistols and huntingguns and many with just their daggers! Another 50 miles down theroad at Uri, where state forces gave battle to the tribesmen and blew

Robert Stephany: plan is to keep war going for 3 monthsto get their objective's


up the bridge across the river, Akbar noted that locals had helped cut anew road through the hillside to enable the tribal warriors to proceedto Baramula. The tribal force had hit Baramula on the 26th and foughta battle against the retreating state forces that blew up buildings and akey bridge over the Jhelum river to hinder the movement of theattackers. The tribals had also rampaged through the town. Finally,the Indian air force had attacked them in the city, further adding tothe devastation. Indian newspaper accounts and reports, includingfrom L. P. Sen whose forces took Baramula back during the campaignaccused the tribesmen of rape and pillage, with victims includingmembers of a convent.18 The attack stopped at Barmula for two daysthat may have been critical in the battle for Srinagar and Kashmir.

According to Akbar, his inquiries of the locals led him to believethat Khurshid Anwar had waited for Kashmiri leaders with whom hewished to confer about the future Government of Kashmir. Yetanother view was that the leaders of the force, including Khurshid,squabbled about who would lead the victory march into Srinagar. TheIndian view is quite different. They saw the tribals as having been dis-tracted by the prospect of loot and having won time, Indian forceswere able to move out of Srinagar and give battle on the road betweenBaramula and Srinagar. Akbar Khans own reconnaissance of Srinagarindicated that much of its boundary was waterlogged and the best waywas by road but that this would need armored cars that only thePakistan army could provide. He found his way back to Pakistan anddiscovered that his friend Tommy Masaud was willing to take awhole squadron of his unit armoured cars. Masud said his menwould go in plain clothes without official permission and at theirown risk. But this proposal was shot down at a meeting with SherKhan, Lt. Col. Arbab, and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a central govern-ment minister from Jhelum, since this action might precipitate warbetween India and Pakistan. No action was taken and the tribal attackappeared to have ground to a halt some 35 miles from Srinagar.

Akbar and his cohort were, however, kept busy by the arrival ofIndian forces in strength and the battles spread across the map ofKashmir towards the north and the southwest of the state. ByDecember, the Army Chief had been brought into the picture,though in a peculiar fashion. A meeting was held on December 4with the Prime Minister but Messervy was kept in a separate roomand communicated with Akbar by chit. Messervy told Akbar that

Robert Stephany: The indian army has begun air strikes

Robert Stephany: Tribesmen were not supported and theirattack was haulted

130 India Review

you will not have to do it with sticks alone any longer. I am goingto help, allotting a million rounds of ammunition for the war andthe release of 12 officer volunteers from the Pakistan army for threeweeks. By the end of December, India had elevated the issue to theUnited Nations. But the fighting continued on the field and off. TheAzad or Free Kashmir forces had set up a GHQ that was trying toacquire all the trappings of a major military enterprise. Akbar wasamused at the attempts by the Defence Minister to set up separatebranches of command for the GHQ, all according to the BritishField Service Manual that this individual carried with him at all time.And, the rivalries between field commanders in Poonch who keptpromoting themselves to field ranks, rising from Captain to Majorto Colonel and Brigadier, until both of them became Field Marshals.At this point, the Defence Minister, seeing no other title available,came to adopt the German rank of Captain General! While thisGilbert and Sullivanesque opera was underway, sporadic fightingcontinued, as Indian forces attempted to regain control in someareas. A major operation was occurring in Poonch, where a tempo-rary ceasefire was sought and granted by the local Azad commanderto allow Indians to evacuate the wounded. But winter had set in andwith it a slowing down of the action, a time to regroup and plan forthe spring when melting snows would allow freer movement oftroops.

Akbar Khan, reverting to his alter ego General Tariq, sat down anddrafted a note on February 8, 1948 on the Organisation of AzadForces HQ and Future Plan of Action19 for the battles ahead. (Thissecret memorandum helps explain how the initial thinking of Akbarwas affected by the general indiscipline of the tribals he had inductedinto the Kashmir fight.) His overall assessment was that the adminis-trative organization was in danger of collapse because of a lack ofcoordination between existing organizations and the influx of thousandsof out of control tribesmen. He saw the need for an organization thatwould integrate the different headquarters into one and for sendingaway the tribesmen back to Afghanistan from concentrations inSialkot and Gujrat districts (to avoid lawlessness in Pakistan); replacingthem with Pakistani tribesmen in controllable lashkars under ourleaders. Meanwhile he wanted the 1000 Darband lashkar and Azadforces to keep Indian troops in Jammu involved and to provide coverfor raids in Sialkot district.

Robert Stephany: Pakistan committed way more weaponsin december

Robert Stephany: Indians begin to advance but wintersets in and halts most operations

Robert Stephany: wanted to replace foreigners withpakistani's


At that point, Akbar Khan estimated a total of three Indian divi-sions, two divisional reconnaissance regiments (with armored cars andlight tanks), one armored regiment, plus two field and one mountainregiments deployed as follows: Force HQ at Jammu: with 50 Para and70 Brigade in Naushera and Beripattan; 80 Brigade to maintain the lineof communication (L of C) between Akhnoor [sic] and Beripattan; 77and 268 Brigade in Jammu and on L of C KathuaJammu; 161 Brigadein SrinagarUri sector; Poonch Brigade in Poonch; 36 brigade inJammu or on the way; and ten state forces in Jammu and Srinagar,including one battalion from the Eastern state of Patiala.

He expected India to build up fast for an offensive soon againstBhimber from Akhnoor, using armor and then the Naushera (alsoNoashera) force would break out west to Jhangar. Once successful,this force would try to link to Poonch via Kotal or attempt to link upfrom Uri and try to capture Muzaffarabad. Just a few days earlier,Indian forces had fought a pitched battle against the raiders atNoashera, who gave the Indians an opportunity to use their heavyweapons (including one squadron of armored cars and one batteryeach of field and mountain guns) and thereby inflict heavy casualties.The raiders had attacked from three directions but were met by wellentrenched Indian troops. Sinha estimated that there was some 2000 deadout of a tribal force of 15,000 (both figures are hard to verify. He admitsto a total of 963 bodies that were left on the battlefield. India suffered 33killed and 102 wounded. This battle gave the Indians a chance to regroupand then prepare for an advance on Jhangar under the newly named localJAK (Jammu and Kashmir) force Commander Kalwant Singh.

To counter these Indian forces and their likely plans, Akbar Khanproposed:

Preparations for an anti-tank defense around Bhimber, with demo-litions, road blocks, mines, etc. on the road between Akhnoor andNoashera and setting up of ambushes between Noashera, Jhangar,and Kotli to restrict the enemy in Noashera.

Raids on bridges/culverts on the JammuSrinagar road in the areaof Ramban from a base in Rajauri, accompanied by raids on theSrinagarUri road in the Baramula district by the Titwal battalionto force the Indian to disperse their forces towards Handwar andthus prevent any concentrated move on Muzaffarabad.

Robert Stephany: Loss of such a scale allowed for india toattack pakistan/go on offensive

Robert Stephany: Tactic - destroy stuff in enemies pathand attack using ambushes

132 India Review

Use of the Uri force to prepare bridges/culverts on the road betweenUri and Domel for demolition, establish roadblocks between Uriand Chinari and strengthen its own positions south of that road.

Block the UriPoonch road in the hills, and

Liquidate Poonch, before its relief by Indian [sic].

According to this hitherto secret assessment by Akbar Khan, the bat-tle for Kashmir was being run by an Azad force headquarters under aCommander-in-Chief and comprised mainly of ex-soldiers underarms in Azad Kashmir, plus a Tariq force headquarters comprisingthree Pakistan army officers, a political officer, a Pakistan Audit andAccounts officer, and a Civil Supply Organisation under an officerappointed by the Punjab Government. Not a large or well organizedeffort, to say the least! The GHQ Azad Forces was to deal with strate-gic and tactical advice and the routine logistical and supply issues.However, he felt that the administration and training of the Azadforces needed to be better organized on sound lines by PakistanArmy accepting tr[ainin]g and adm[inistration] responsibility to theseforces as allies, non-regulars or PNG [Pakistan National Guard]. Heestablished priority on the organization of training centers and recordoffices, training of officer cadets and technical personnel, reorganiza-tion of battalions, brigade headquarters and Lines of Communicationfacilities. Finally, and most important, he suggested closing down ofthe ad hoc Tariq HQ as soon as GHQ Pakistan take(s) over commit-ments. Akbar Khan then asked the Prime Minister to be relieved ofhis duties regarding Kashmir. By mid-February Sher Khan was totake on the mantle of General Tariq. The ground was being laid forthe formal involvement of the Pakistan army in the Kashmir war.

Less than two weeks later, on February 19, Brigadier Sher Khan,now responsible for managing the effort in Kashmir, reported to thePrime Minister in Karachi in his usual succinct and cut-to-the-chasestyle on the latest situation in the execution of the war in Kashmir.20

The show was thoroughly disorganized and completely out ofcontrol he began. My first action, therefore, was to reorganize andoverhaul the show and set-up.

Clearly picking up on Akbar Khans earlier General Tariq mem-orandum of February 8, Sher Khan stated that he had integrated the

Robert Stephany: Tactic of pakistan - take all wealth outof an area and attack enemy using ambushes

Robert Stephany: pakistan ready to use actual army inconflict

Robert Stephany: Tactic of using tribes men failed


three headquarters into one and cleared out the thousands of Pathanssitting in camps in Sialkot and Gujarat districts. These Pathans werea serious menace to law and order and a cause of a very serious drainon our resources of food, transport and ammunition and caused a lotof dishonest dealings e.g. the camp staff were drawing thousands ofmaunds [local measure of weight equal to about 82 pounds] foodgrains, ammunition and petrol and selling them. He said he was pre-paring to send tribesmen in controlled groups directly into Kashmirand was closing down all fixed camps in Pakistan, using only transitfacilities. He shut down the headquarters in Gujrat.

At the operational level, Sher Khan saw the Poonchis who havebeen our hard core showing signs of disintegration. Having foughthard for three months, they are now melting away from the front hewrote, giving the Indian garrison a chance to hit out successfully. Heproposed rushing 1000 reinforcements to the Poonchis right awaywith another 1000 in a week or ten days. There was no fresh develop-ment on the Uri front. In Noashera, Sher Khan reported that the tribalshad suffered immensely in their last daylight attack on February 6,resulting in complete disorganization and melting away of the lash-kars with their dead and wounded. He also reported that the Indianswere well prepared for an offensive in this sector and prayed that if hewas given another ten days respite he would ensure that theiradvance will not be a walkover.

In Bhimber, India now had two regiments of light tanks and armoredcars. Their intention appears to be to capture BHIMBER with theirarmour. The country is tankable right up to BHIMBER and it will be adesperate struggle to save it. He wrote of having made preparations inconjunction with the army and that nothing more could be done at thattime short of sending in our tanks. Sher Khans aim was to liquidatePoonch, with some heavy supporting arms. God willing we should beable to do it. (This is the first detailed indication of the thinking of theofficers who were planning Pakistans war in Kashmir and will likelyprovide Indian historians an opportunity to compare it with the manyIndian histories that have been published on this conflict.)

Then, he introduced a final note of despondency over the efforts inKashmir:

I do not wish to depress you, but I shall be failing in my duty if Ido not give you the absolute facts. I am quite sure you realize that

Robert Stephany: Tribesmen are unable to really do much,they are losing to the indians

134 India Review

our effort has spent its force. I was hoping and continuing tostrive, that with the assistance of the people who have been [sic]such good work we will continue the struggle. But I regret to saya large number of these are throwing in the sponge and backingwith one excuse or another.

He cited Zaman Kiani and other INA officers as deserting a sinkingship. Kiani was reported by Sher Khan to have stated that he hadhoped his services would be recognized by Pakistan, but insteadthey, INA, are being debarred from all service. So, he has asked to berelieved. (Here again the animosity between the INA and those whohad stayed true to the British oath intruded into relationships andactions on Kashmir.) Promising to keep the show going as best as ispossible, Sher Khan signed off with I just wanted you to be in thereal picture.

Within the next two weeks, the British High Commissioner in NewDelhi Sir T. Shone was writing to the Commonwealth Relations Office(CRO) in the United Kingdom on the military situation with the newsthat I understand General Tariq, Commander of the Azad Forces hasresigned.21 But he did not identify Akbar Khan by name, or who thenew General Tariq was to be. The High Commissioner was also keento draw attention to the news, reported extensively by The HindustanTimes on February 26, that Brigadier Haight, whom he identified asUSA ex-paratrooper Private, who served with the Azad Forces, hadgiven an interview in America in which Haight was reported to haveconfirmed the help given by Pakistan to the tribesmen.

The next six weeks or so saw a lot of thrust and parrying on thepart of the Indian and the Azad Kashmir and Tariq forces, as wintersnow and rains made movement difficult. This gave time for reflectionon the original and emerging strategies in the Kashmir War. By April5, the new General Tariq (a.k.a. Sher Khan) was evaluating the overallpicture from a higher perspective.22

The Kashmir operation, he wrote, had begun with the Poonchuprising and the tribal invasion. The initial aim was to try to create asituation in which the Maharaja would be forced to accept a plebiscitein the State. The accession of Kashmir to India and the arrival ofIndian troops had changed that situation. The objective changed thento make operations difficult and expensive for India so it wouldcome to agree to a free and unfettered plebiscite. The original

Robert Stephany: Troops are deserting, tribesmen army isfailing

Robert Stephany: Akbar resigns

Robert Stephany: Sher Khan becomes new leader oftribals

Robert Stephany: Original tactic of forcing leader ofkashmir to join pakistan failed, second one to get india tolose $ after a short war and force them to surrender inpakistan's favor also failed


expectation had been that if the struggle continued till December thenthis objective would have been achieved. Later this date was extendedto the end of March 1948. Although the Azad forces can be said tohave carried out this task very successfully, Sher Khan (GeneralTariq) correctly surmised that the political object had not beenachieved. Operations had been carried out on an extremely improvisedbasis and under heavy administrative difficulties. He considered that itwould not be possible to a carry on in this fashion and on the samescale beyond the end of April, presumably when the snow would havestarted melting.

He then proposed that, for this final phase of operations, thescope and objectives of the Azad Forces needed to be redefined thus:to hold the territory now under their control at any cost [originalunderline] and prevent India from securing a military decision. Thishe felt would not be possible without the Pakistan army openly joiningthe conflict. However, the introduction of the Pakistan army is notdesirable nor in the best interest of Pakistan he stated. So, he askedfor finance, food, clothing and equipment for the Azad forces on ahigh national emergency priority.

Sher Khans appreciation of the military situation included fourmain factors. First, in general, India was seen to have introduced intoKashmir two complete divisions and Corps troops numbering some10,000 men. He estimated that the daily supply requirement of thisforce from Pathankot to Jammu was of the order of 300 tons, plusadditional supplies for the civilian population. All this traffic was goingthrough the unmetalled PathankotKathuaJammu road which waslikely to be unusable during inclement weather, as was the case duringthe rains in the second week of March. Therefore, the Indian armysability to undertake large scale operations would depend on the abilityof its administrative machinery to meet these administrative demands.

The second factor that Sher Khan/General Tariq identified was com-munications to operate efficiently and maintain mobility and momen-tum. Of the three forms of communication; road, rail, and air, only thelast two existed in Kashmir and both were vulnerable to the elementsand hostile actions. Therefore, he deduced that India will make everypossible effort to achieve an early decision, military and political.

He then evaluated the relative strengths of the Indian and Azadforces, with the Indian army having an overwhelming superiority inweapons, equipment, organization and resources. Faced with such

Robert Stephany: Indian army has 10k soldiers in kashmir,they overpower the rebels, the rebels stand no chance ofvictory

136 India Review

odds, the Azad forces will not be able to and must not be expected tohold ground. In his view, they should . . . avoid staged battles.

The fourth factor was the weather, which had been bad. Snow hadhindered the build-up of Indian forces in Kashmir but also con-strained the ability of Azads forces to infiltrate around Indian flanksand interfere with their line of communications or of extending opera-tions to other parts of the valley. The approach of summer willenable both sides to intensify operations, he wrote. Even in winter,in Jammu the snow had not been a major factor and he expected theIndian army to launch a bigger effort than the one against Noashera inMarch. Yet he felt that the Pathans who have been the biting teeth ofthe Azad forces cannot stand up to the heat and are likely to disappeargradually from this front. His conclusion was that the Azad forcesneeded to expand operations into other parts of Kashmir to preventIndia from concentrating on any one sector. Meanwhile, more localsneeded to take over the role of the Pathans and contain the Indiaforces in the south by interfering with their line of communicationand prevent a link-up with the Poonch garrison.

Discussing the factor of time, Sher Khan/General Tariq thoughtthat the best period for operations in Kashmir from the administrativepoint of view was from April through June or until the monsoonsbroke. He did not expect the Indian army to be able to build up foranother offensive for at least another fortnight. If the Azad forcesopened other fronts they could dissipate Indian efforts. If they couldkeep operations going till August, without Indian having achieved amilitary decision, I believe that they will lose the KASHMIR war foreconomic and administrative reasons. He relied on the vulnerabilityof the Indian line of communication in the south that ran parallel tothe front for some 60 miles through hilly and broken terrain, leavingopen the possibility of harassment by Azads forces. In sum, SherKhan/General Tariq struck a positive cord by deducing that normallytime would have favored India but given the special economic cir-cumstances of KASHMIR, geographical conditions and inadequatecommunications it would appear that time would be in favour ofAzad forces, provided they can successfully prevent Indian Armyfrom achieving a military decision during the next three months,which it is possible to do.

Finally, he focused on Poonch which had been isolated by theAzad forces since December 1947. It had a garrison of one brigade

Robert Stephany: Pakistan new tactic, expand operationsin areas all over kashmir so that india can't pool troops inone area, also get civilians to attack the indian's

Robert Stephany: pakistani tactic = hold onto kashmir fora few months until india experiences economic relapseand weakens military effort


strength and approximately 20,000 non-Muslim inhabitants that hadbeen kept supplied by Indian Dakota aircraft. However, since March27, the landing ground had been under gunfire and no aircraft couldland. The options open to India were:

Air drops and supply by planes that could land in Poonch, but let-ting the garrison fend for itself. Though tactically sound, SherKhan thought this was not likely to be the course of action since,apart from the morale and prestige point of view its a runningsore for them. Little did he know that he was almost reading hisenemy commanders mind.23

Accept safe conduct that had been offered to them. In his view, thearmy would be only too pleased to do so, but it appeared that theIndian Government did not agree to this.

Try to link up with the town with ground forces. This was seen asthe most likely course of action.

Sher Khan then proceeded to get into the enemys head by looking atpossibilities for action. He thought that the nearest troops were in Uribut the garrison there was not strong enough for such an operation.The Noashera sector had the troops but was about 50 miles away andany movement would create a long line of communication throughbroken territory, subject to attacks. Another option would involvesending a strong column over the difficult Pir Panjal pass at the sametime as the move from Noashera. To forestall Indian moves, the Azadforces should open other fronts in the state, forcing India to spread itstroops thinly and thus prevent a build-up for an offensive in Poonch.

India had a number of options, according to Sher Khans analysis.It could mount an attack from Uri against Domel, a desirable target,but it did not have enough troops for this venture. It could relievePoonch by a combined offensive from Noashera and the valley overthe Pir Panjal: the most likely course. It could also launch an attackfrom Akhnoor to capture Bhimber, thus securing its line of commu-nications. And, finally, it could launch an offensive from Noasherato capture Mirpur but this was not likely since they would needtroops for the relief of Poonch. In retaliation, the Azad forces wouldneed to intensify attacks against the lines of communication and

Robert Stephany: india to use air drops

Robert Stephany: spread out indian troops to preventpooling up

Robert Stephany: possible indian tactics

138 India Review

extend operations to divert attention away from Poonch to otherparts of the state.

General Tariqs plan then was to extend and intensify operations inthe valley from Muzaffarabad and Gilgit and to attack the lines of com-munication and destroy transport from Akhnoor to Noashera, Jammuto Srinagar, and Uri to Srinagar. Their motto, he noted, should con-tinue to be a lorry a day keeps the Hindu away. In all of this theAzad forces were to avoid staged battles. At least 1000 additional rifleswere to be issued to the forces in the RajauriRiasi sector to enablethem to contain the Indian army in the event of possible dis-appearance[sic] of Pathans from this front. Overall, the upbeat theme of GeneralTariqs reports continued even as he waited for Indians next moves.

India meanwhile had changed its military command for the region,bringing in Lieutenant General K. M. Cariappa24 in January 1948 totake charge in the state. The British commander of the Delhi and EastPunjab Command, Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russell, was prohib-ited from entering the state because of the Stand Down order. One ofCariappas moves was to change the name of his Command to WesternCommand, despite the ribbing that its initials might provoke (WC!).

Soon after taking over, Cariappa moved his operational headquar-ters from Delhi to Jammu to be closer to the action, a fact that wasdutifully conveyed by the British High Commissioner in New Delhito the CRO in London, as a result of receiving direct informationfrom the Army Headquarters in India.25 Soon after setting up hisheadquarters in the Residency at Jammu, he began planning for offensiveaction to build upon the success at Noashera. The main operationsthat he reviewed were:

The recapture of Jhangar;

Advance from Noashera to Rajuari;

Advance to Bhimber, to secure his southern flank; and

Advance from Uri to Domel.26

Given their similar training and knowledge of the terrain, it is notsurprising that both the Indian and Pakistani commanders wereexhibiting a good understanding of each others capabilities and plans.

Robert Stephany: Indian tactics


But the weather turned bad and kept the Indian forces stuck atNoashera. The PathankotJammu road was out of commission andeven the Jammu airport could not be used. Cariappa decided to headout towards Srinagar through the Banihal Pass, hoping the snowswould soon melt, but got stuck halfway at Batot and had to return toJammu. The only way out was a road that went from Jammu toSialkot and then to India. Here occurred one of those bizarre inci-dents that have often surfaced in wars between Pakistan and India.Officially India and Pakistan were still at peace. Cariappa asked hisstaff officer Sinha to telephone the GSO (General Staff Officer 1) ofhis friend Major General Iftikhar Khan, who commanded 8 Divisionin Lahore, to get permission to travel back to India via Sialkot andLahore. Only a month earlier Iftikhar had invited Cariappa to attendcavalry week in Lahore. The British GSO1 was taken aback byCariappas request and promised to get back to him. Eventually thepolite response came that Iftikhar was out of town and BegumIftikhar was indisposed. In light of this situation it would beawkward for them to receive General Cariappa at that time! Theweather held Cariappa prisoner in Jammu for some weeks, until mid-March when it cleared up enough for the Indian attack to be preparedagainst Jhangar.

The Indian plans to retake Jhangar called for 19th Infantry Brigadeunder Brigadier Yadunath Singh to establish a bridgehead at Noasheraand then 50 Para Brigade under the Muslim Brigadier Usman to breakout for Jhangar. This brigade had been selected to avenge its defeat ofDecember last. Usmans Order of the Day concentrated on thisaspect of the coming battle:

I have complete confidence in you all to do your best to recapturethe ground we lost on 24th December and to retrieve the honour ofour arms. Then, quoting from the epic poem Horatius by ThomasBabington Lord Macaulay (which most missionary school educatedschoolboys in India and later in Pakistan had to memorize andremember as Horatius at the Bridge), he wrote:

To every man upon this Earth,Death cometh soon or late;And how many can die betterThan facing fearful oddsFor the ashes of his father [sic]

Robert Stephany: India's plan, get back to india by goingthrough pakistan... um what?

Robert Stephany: Weather played an important role in thisconflict

140 India Review

And the Temples of his Gods.So forward friends, fearless we go to Jhangar. India expects everyoneto do his duty.Jai hind!27

The attack on Jhangar was successful, commencing on 15 March witha coordinated ground and air attack, and ending the next day.28 Theweather turned better by the end of the month, ending the isolation ofSrinagar. Meanwhile Kalwant Singh was preparing for the attack onRajauri. As 50 Para Brigade carried out a deception on Kotli in theNorth, 19 Infantry Brigade headed towards Rajauri, which wascaptured after a fierce fight. Sinha describes evidence of what he calleda general massacre of the local non-Muslim population by thedefenders that he says was later shown to Dr. Wenger of the Interna-tional Red Cross.

Preparations then began for the summer offensive. First, the largeKashmir force was split into two divisions. The Srinagar Division orSri Div (later 19 Division) was placed under Major General K. S.Thimayya,29 a decorated veteran of the Burma front (where he wonthe Distinguished Service Order), while Major General Atma Singhwas given command of the Ja (Jammu) Division (later 26 Division) inthe south.

The Pakistan army was by then fully involved with the KashmirWar and keeping close tabs on developments. Despite the ban on BritishOfficers taking active part in hostilities between the two Dominions,the new Army Chief, General Sir Douglas Gracey, prepared anAppreciation of the Kashmir Situation30 for delivery at Rawalpindi onApril 20, 1948. (This secret document is the first indication of the for-mal induction of the British Commander-in-Chief into the conflict,against the Stand Down orders of Auchinleck.) He summed up thegeneral military situation in terms of the rapid build-up of Indianforces in Kashmir. By his count, India now had eight brigade groups,with supporting artillery, armor, engineers, bombers, fighters, andtransport aircraft in Jammu and Kashmir.

On March 15 the Indian Defence Minister had told his countrysConstituent Assembly that the Indian army would clear the raidersfrom Kashmir within the next two or three months. The offensive hadbegun already with Rajauri having been captured. This was followedby a reign of terror which included burning villages, massacre of civilian

Robert Stephany: India takes back jhangar, weather getsbetter, full scale war can now begin

Robert Stephany: India prepping for summer offencive

Robert Stephany: Pakistan takes notice

Robert Stephany: India offensive begins, pushes pakistanway way back, need for full military action

In


population and other atrocities. 4,000 men are reported to have beenvictimized in this manner, and great panic and confusion prevails inthe area, wrote Gracey. He expected the major offensive to beginshortly with Bhimber and Mirpur as its objectives, with a view tocoming right up to the Pakistan border.

Gracey feared that any such Indian moves and, given the recent illeffects on the civilian population in areas that India had recaptured,Pakistan may be faced with a big refugee problem . . . as the moveinto the RAJAURI area has already done. In his view, Mangla Head-works across the Jhelum River would be impossible to defend and ifthe Indians took Bhimber and Mirpur, they would have crossed theRavi and Chenab Rivers, and will be within striking distance of theJHELUM bridge, thus constituting a direct military threat toPAKISTAN. He saw a similar refugee situation developing in thePoonch area to the south, with the Azad forces unable to stop themassive Indian army presence between Rajauri and Poonch. Theresult would be a drain on PAKISTANs food and other resources.

In the Kashmir valley itself, India was seen to be preparing for anoffensive along the SrinagarBaramulaMuzaffarabad road with a viewto capture Muzaffarabad and Kohala. Again, Gracey saw the modernequipment and overwhelming superiority of Indian forces as well astheir supremacy in the air as giving them a distinct advantage over theAzad forces who are unlikely to be able to stand up to a heavyonslaught. The military implications of such a move would be verybad for Pakistan, since capture of either Muzaffarabad or Kohala wouldmean that the Indians would have crossed the Jhelum River and will beknocking at the back door of Pakistan posing a serious and a directthreat to Abbottabad, Rawalpindi, and ultimately Peshawar from therear. The refugee problem would be as bad as that expected in Poonch.

On the political front, Gracey saw India making overtures to KhanAbdul Ghaffar Khan, the Pathan leader who was known as the FrontierGandhi and was close to the Indian leadership. They had also startedmaking overtures to the Fakir of Ipi, through Afghan authorities,and are known to be supplying him with funds to stir up widespreadtrouble in Waziristan. Ghaffar Khan was reported to be sendingmessages to the Fakir of Ipi and both were seen as working inconcert to overthrow the govt. Afghanistan was also seen as gettingencouragement and financial assistance from India to stir up trouble inthe NWFP.

Robert Stephany: 4k die

Robert Stephany: india has superiority to pakistanimilitary

Robert Stephany: If india pushes back further, pakistanisecurity is under threat

142 India Review

In sum, Gracey produced a set of far-reaching recommendationsthat would only lead to one conclusion, the entry of the Pakistanarmy into a state of war with the Indian army in Kashmir:

If PAKISTAN is NOT to face another serious refugee problem ofabout 2 3/4 million people uprooted from their homes; if INDIA isNOT to be allowed to sit on the Doorsteps on PAKISTAN to therear and on the flank at liberty to enter at her will and pleasure; ifthe civilian and military morale is NOT to be effected [sic] to adangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are NOT to beencouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperativethat the Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the generalline URIPOONCHNAUSHAHRA. If necessary, regularunits of PAK ARMY must be employed to hold this line at all costs[emphasis added]. Technically, this might constitute a breach ofinternational conventions but in the vital interest of the security ofthe country the risk should be accepted and it should be possibleto justify this step before any impartial world tribunal.

In putting forward this blunt and very nationalistic assessment,Gracey was venting his own frustration with the half-hearted officialsupport for the Kashmir effort and reflecting the views of some of hissenior commanders, including the commander of 7 Division, Lt.General Loftus Tottenham. The army was also not happy with themanner in which elements within the military high command werebeing used by the politicians to run this private war in Kashmir,knowing that in the end the defense of Pakistan would rest with thearmed forces. As a contemporary lecture on Higher Planning31 deliv-ered at GHQ spelled out, there existed a number of mechanisms forformulation of national defense policy. These included the DefenceCommittee of the Cabinet, the Defence Council, the Joint ServicesCommanders Committee and the Joint Services Liaison Committee.Yet, as this hitherto secret assessment at GHQ asserts, NO Govern-ment orders were issued to the Pakistan army to support the KashmirWar. Everything was sub rosa.

Indeed, the first policy indication the Commander-in-Chiefreceived was towards the end of December 1947, two months afterthe operations had been in progress, and by which time India hadalready referred the matter to the Security Council. Even at that time,

Robert Stephany: if india wants to get kashmir, they willneed to get pakistan involved in a war


the Army Chief was told that he should help Azad forces withmaterial without unduly weakening the Pak army. The Govt. main-tained that this action was permissible and quoted the example ofAmerica helping Great Britain with material when she was not abelligerent. The second official governmental policy directive onKashmir to the Pakistan army came around the time that the Indianswere preparing their offensive and the Security Council discussionswere dragging on. The Primary task of the Pakistan Army, itstated, is to be prepared to meet the aggression from India. (This isthe first time that these secret directives are seeing the light of day inPakistan and they shed light on the ambiguity behind the conduct ofthe Kashmir conflict.)

This was a tall order, since the Pakistan army at that time hadeffectively only 10 Division, with three fully committed brigades, 8Division, with one Brigade in Malir (far from the Kashmir front), 7Division, with two brigades, one in Abbottabad and one in Rawalpindiand 9 (F) Division, a static division deployed in the Frontier regionwith three brigades. Loftus Tottenhams 7 division and the armoredbrigade were the GHQ reserve. After much debate in GHQ, 7 Divi-sion was given the task of defending Pakistan. In reality, all it could dowas adopt a policy of plugging the hole wherever India brokethrough the Azad forces. The senior brass at GHQ knew that thismeant surrendering the initiative to the enemy, which no commanderor troops likes doing. It was only later in the summer when the Indiansgained some momentum that the C-in-C had to gamble on com-pletely turning his back on the N.W. Frontier and commit the wholeof 9 (F) Div in Kashmir.

Unaware of the battles of ideas going on in GHQ and the corridorsof power in Pakistan, General Tariq continued making his secretassessment and plans for the summer ahead.32 He was fully aware ofthe Indian reinforcements that had streamed into Kashmir and alsothe changes in command and the structure of forces in Kashmir. Heexpected a general offensive in the South and probably also in thevalley in the next ten days. But his own assessment of the troops inKashmir was less than ideal. On the whole morale is reasonably goodbut [the troops] are tired, feeding has been difficult, have tatteredclothes [and they] are worried about the safety of their families [inKashmir]. He suggested that political leaders and workers shouldget busy immediately to prepare them [soldiers and the general

Robert Stephany: Pakistan is in the war

144 India Review

population in Azad Kashmir] for further sacrifices and strengthentheir resistance.

From the general build-up of the Indian forces, Tariq tried togauge Indian intentions. He thought they would

Try to link up with Poonch at the earliest date, attackingfrom Uri, Jhangar through Kotli, and also from the east, withthe Uri thrust being the main effort.

Attack against Bhimber from Akhnoor, with a supportingaction from the direction of Noashera.

The Indian aim, according to General Tariq, would be to drawour forces away from the L of C of their forces operating towardsPoonch. If they succeeded in capturing Bhimber, the Azad forcesL of C to Noashera would be cut off. Once these two operationshad succeeded, Tariq expected India to launch an attack againstMuzaffarabad and Mirpur.

In the face of these expected actions, he saw Azad forces as gainingground or being in attacking formations in the North from Gilgittowards the valley and also at Uri, where the front was narrow, allow-ing the forces to hold out against Indian attacks. He was less sanguineabout the ability to hold out in Poonch, where the local soldiers mightleave with their families for the safety of Pakistan across the border.The country in the south was open and India was expected to use itstanks and field guns to good effect, making a defense by the Azadforces harder to sustain. Moreover, the Pathans who have foughtextremely well and have been a great encouragement to the AzadForces and a terror to the enemy are finding the heat too much. Theheat is reducing their numbers and also their fighting efficiency.

Summing up the situation, Tariq saw India building up for amilitary decision during the next six weeks. Militarily he thoughtthe Azad Forces could prevent India from achieving this overall aimbut warned that there may be some loss of territory. At the politicallevel, he asked for help from the leadership and workers in Kashmir toprepare for a last ditch stand.

The Indian offensive began in May, as expected, and before theonset of rains that would have made movement difficult. A strongIndian column, Brigadier Harbakshs 163 Infantry Brigade, advanced

Robert Stephany: indian tactic to punch hole in poonch,then cutting off the rest of their force

Robert Stephany: weather made them weaker

Robert Stephany: Indian attack


from Handwara and captured Tithwal on May 24. Another column,the 161 Brigade under Brigadier L. P. Sen, advanced from Uri alongthe main road to Muzaffarabad and reached Chakoti on May 25, bywhich time it had come upon the first strong resistance in the shape ofa Pakistan army brigade comprising the 4/15 Punjab Machine GunRegiment, 4/16 Punjab, 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles, and the 4/13 FrontierForce Rifles. Little did Sen know that the Brigade Commander facinghim at Chakoti was none other than General Tariq, now back to hisnormal identity of Akbar Khan, whose brigade had been moved fromKohat to Kashmir for this defensive operation. The Indian advancecame to a halt at Chakoti. Thimmaya now decided to revise hisapproach and attempted to outflank Chakoti, giving Brigadier Nairs77 Para Brigade the task of advancing in a right hook along the northernbank of the Jhelum River at that point to the area behind Chakoti. Theaim was to reach the objective Point 6065 by May 31. Harbaksh wastasked to send a battalion from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad. Theaim was to pressure the Pakistani and Azad forces at Chakoti, allowingSen to advance. The right hook failed because of logistical difficulties,due to the bad terrain and lack of air supplies, Srinagar airport beingshut down due to the rains. The surprise element was lost and theoperation was reluctantly called off by Thimayya.33

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the remoteness of the northernreaches of the state, Azad forces, using their established base in theNorthern Areas, captured Kargil, Dras and a substantial portion ofthe Leh Valley, isolating Leh in the process. However, these thrustsby the Azad forces could not be sustained and the fear was that theentire territory that had been wrested from the Maharajas controlcould be overrun, creating a huge refugee problem. This would havehad a serious affect on the economic life of Pakistan and placed Indianforces across the major rivers and within easy striking distance ofPakistans lifeline of roads and railways.

To prevent the collapse of the Azad forces in the face of the con-centrated Indian attacks, Pakistan army troops were sent into battlewith General Graceys instructions that the Indian army is not [tobe] allowed beyond the general line UriPoonchNaushera. Theywere to avoid, as far as possible, direct clashes with the Indian armyand to buttress the Azad forces, while preventing any sudden breakthrough to the Pakistan border by the Indians.34 At the same time,the Pakistan army took over control of the war in Kashmir.

Robert Stephany: pakistani army

Robert Stephany: Stopping of indian advance

Robert Stephany: indian tactic

Robert Stephany: Pakistani military objective

146 India Review

By mid-June, Indian forces advanced from Rajauri and finallymanaged to link up with Poonch on June 23. But their attempt to meetwith the UriPoonch force was successfully halted by the Pakistanarmy and Azads forces. The following month, India managed to cap-ture Gurais in the north. In the south, Azads troops drove out Indianforces from the Mendhar area and Poonch was again isolated. Augustrains brought about a lull in major operations. The Indian summeroffensive had failed to achieve a major breakthrough.

General Gracey complained to his Indian counterpart, fellow Britishofficer General Bucher, that atrocities committed by Indian troops inKashmir are causing large number of Kashmiri Muslims to take refugein West Punjab. The British High Commissioner in New Delhireported to the CRO in London on 12 July that General Bucherpromised to inquire personally into this and, as a result of his visit toJammu on 7 July has sacked Commander 268 Brigade, BrigadierBikram Singh and one brigade commander.

The United Nations had in the meantime agreed to send a specialteam to the subcontinent to investigate the situation in Kashmir andtry to prevent further hostilities. The UN Commission for India andPakistan (UNCIP) under General Delvoie arrived soon after theIndian summer offensive had ended.35 Pakistan, meanwhile, took theopportunity to straighten out is defensive lines. Azad forces wrestedSkardu in the remote Northern area after having laid siege to it sinceFebruary 1948.

India was not sitting idle. The Western Command began examiningplans for a number of operations in the autumn. These includedDUCK to recapture Kargil and thus link up with Leh, EASY to linkup with Poonch via Rajauri, CAMEL to capture Hajipir Pass,SNOOK to capture Bhimber, STEEL to capture Kotli, CRAB to cap-ture Muzaffarabad and BLOOD to capture Mirpur. To implementthese plans, Major General Shringaesh was promoted to LieutenantGeneral and made Corps Commander V Corps that took over theTactical Headquarters of Western Command at Jammu in September1948. Cariappa wanted to move to the offensive but did not wish tobring the army high command into the picture, particularly on OperationEASY.36 He concentrated his forces in linking up with Poonch andmanaged to achieve that on November 20 after a hard fight, leading tothe exodus of some 60,000 Muslim refuges from the region into Pakistan.In the north India also managed to regain control over Kargil

Robert Stephany: indians advance

Robert Stephany: Winter stopped them with snow,summer stopped them with rain, weather = no good forattack

Robert Stephany: Foreign intervention


by November 22. By then winter was upon the region and there waslittle Indian activity in the north. In the south, Pakistani forces held anIndian advance on the Kotli road.

The UN discussions were moving into high gear by that time and thePakistan government was keen to wind up hostilities. But the militarycommanders were aching to take the Pakistan army on the offensiverather than playing a largely defensive role in Kashmir. Gracey cameup with Operation Venus, designed to get control of the Beri Pattanroad and the Indian dumps in the region through which most of theirsupplies passed to Noashera, Poonch and Jhangar. A subsidiary plan,Little Venus, to capture the hills overlooking this area was vetoed bythe Cabinet in Karachi on the grounds that it would create politicalcomplications. Iskander Mirza approved the idea of Venus and passedit to the Prime Minister with his support and the argument that itwould not only allow Pakistan to capture Akhnoor but also destroyor incapacitate five Indian divisions.37 The Prime Minister sat on theplan for a week and then decided to go with the UN resolution. Thearmy and 7 Division decided to press ahead with Venus anyway.According to his then GSO Habibullah Khan Khattak (later LieutenantGeneral), the commander of 7 Division, Loftus Tottenham, wanted tostrengthen our position territorially before the order [for ceasefire]were received by the Army.38 Habibullah was asked to proceed to thefront. Loftus Tottentham told him Habib pressure is building on meto do nothing on our front. The plan was that when Habibullah wastold on the phone to abort Venus he was to pretend not to have heardwhat was said and proceed regardless. At the Tactical Headquartersnear Qazi Baqar, Habibullah got a call from his division commanderbut the message was that the Prime Minister needed to speak to him.Having served as Liaison Officer to the PM, Habibullah knew himand so took the call. I distinctly remember the Prime Minister tellingme Habibullah, we are getting Kashmir on a plate and if one Pakistanisoldier is killed I would call it murder by you. Habibullah retortedSir, in human history how many territories have been given on theplate? Nevertheless he was asked to call off the attack.

Habibullah recalls calling 10 Brigade and 14 Para Brigade (underSher Ali) to stand down. But some gunner officer told me that theguns were charged and could not be unloaded without firing. I tele-phoned the GOC and he said Let the bastard have it! Each gun firedthe round in its breach and some medium guns fired extra rounds

Robert Stephany: Un is trying to end hostilities, indianoffensive is near its end, but pakistan wants to flexmuscle, with operation venus

Robert Stephany: Chance to take out 5 divisions, govrejects but army does it anyway

148 India Review

also. The result was the blowing up of the India dump near the BeriPattan bridge and damage to the bridge itself. The expected infantryattack that would have followed the artillery attack never materializedbecause of the Government of Pakistans instructions. Interestingly,Sinha notes that this was a typical Pakistan army action: firing artillerywithout infantry attacks!

Sher Ali has choice words for being asked to hold off on the overallplan that called for a surprise attack towards Jammu with his forcesand beyond to Pathankot and Gurdaspur, thus putting him a positionto threaten the flanks of any force that might have attacked Lahore.The surprise, of the concentration of so much force, was so completethat it caused panic in the Indian Divisional headquarters and theyabandoned their positions and the troops started for Jammu in haste.This caused panic in Jammu and the jail was broken and prisonersescaped writes Sher Ali.39 He bemoans the political decision to acceptthe ceasefire at 2359 hours on January 1, 1949 and thus deprivePakistan of the one chance of achieving a military breakthrough inKashmir. Iskander Mirza too opposed the ceasefire and sought a timelimit of three months for the ceasefire to prove its effectiveness in resolv-ing the Kashmir problem. He was overruled by the Prime Minister.40

Two weeks after the ceasefire, on January 15, 1949, GeneralGracey and the new Indian Army Chief Cariappa me

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