The Gold Standard Lecture 12 – Thursday, 19 October 2011 J A Morrison 1 Isaac Newton David Hume
Mar 31, 2015
The Gold Standard
Lecture 12 – Thursday, 19 October 2011J A Morrison 1
Isaac Newton David Hume
Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal TypeIII.Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”IV.Brief History of the
International Gold StandardV. Conclusion 3
Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal TypeIII.Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”IV.Brief History of the
International Gold StandardV. Conclusion 4
Historical Significance• Provides insight into most of
monetary history• Integral to First Era of Globalization• Enduring legacies in contemporary
system– International Monetary Fund– Distribution of worldwide gold supply
5
Intellectual Significance• Robust alternative to current system
of floating ERs• Lessons from First Era of
Globalization• Parallels with current crises– China’s “dirty float”– Constraints and opportunities generated
by currency union (e.g. Euro)
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Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal Type• Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”• Brief History of the
International Gold Standard• Conclusion 7
II. THE GOLD STANDARD AS AN IDEAL TYPE
1. The Gold Standard Rules2. Purchasing Power Parity3. The Automaticity of the Gold
Standard
Remember our understanding of an exchange rate: the
valuation between the domestic currency and
foreign currency/currencies.
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In theory, the gold standard (GS) was an exchange rate
regime that related the member countries’
currencies through their valuations to gold.
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$ £
¥ €
Gold as an Intermediary
Example: £1 = 1 oz gold = $4.86
II. THE GOLD STANDARD AS AN IDEAL TYPE
1. The Gold Standard Rules2. Purchasing Power Parity• The Automaticity of the Gold
Standard
The gold standard ideal was that all currencies would be freely convertible through
gold.
This would secure purchasing power parity
(PPP).
And PPP would ensure complete market
integration.19
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
• Purchasing power (PP): command over goods and services– $919.50 = 1 oz gold– £639.43 = 1 oz gold
• PPP: money enjoys the same purchasing power in every market even after making necessary conversions– Implied PPP (based on gold prices): $1 =
£0.695
• PPP can be calculated using any “basket” of goods & services– The Economist uses the Big Mac! 20
PPP versus Market Rates• Implied PPP (from gold prices): $1 =
£0.695• If I can trade $1 for £0.695, I should
be able to buy gold at the same “price” in GB and in the US
• BUT Market Exchange Rate: $1 = £0.691
Why the difference? Why doesn’t arbitrage eliminate the difference?
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Let’s go through an example…
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$499 £429
But the market ER is $1 = £0.63
So, $499 = £314
Yet...iPads cost £429 in London!
That’s over £100 more!
Why don’t the Brits just buy their iPads here?
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Well, some do buy them here!
But, for many, the costs are greater than just buying it
in London.
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Valuation• Valuation: the relationship between
market price and underlying “value”• Different ways to calculate valuation– Stock: price-to-earnings-to-growth (PEG)
ratio– Currency: PP versus ER
• Over and Under– Overvalued: currency purchases less
than ER implies (PP < ER)– Undervalued: currency purchases more
than ER implies (PP > ER) 27
II. THE GOLD STANDARD AS AN IDEAL TYPE
1. The Gold Standard Rules2. Purchasing Power Parity3. The Automaticity of the Gold
Standard
The GS was meant to automatically ensure both the quantity of money in
the world and the distribution of money
around the world.
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GS Regulation of Quantity• Official/Mint Price: price of gold in terms of
local currency• Free Conversion: monetary authority
should…– Purchase gold with currency at the official price– Sell gold for currency at the official price
• Automatic Quantity Adjustment– Overvalued currency sell currency for gold
decrease in currency and increase of gold– Undervalued currency sell gold for currency
increase in currency and decrease in gold
• Sustained increases in gold price mining30
By regulating the quantity of currency automatically, adherence to the GS would
theoretically ensure domestic price stability.
After all, if the official ER did not match the PPP,
currency/gold would be converted. 31
What about the distribution of gold? Who gets how
much gold?
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GS Regulation of Distribution
• David Hume’s Price-Specie-Flow Model
• Assume: costless int’l transport & conversion
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Excess Gold in
US
Rise in US Prices
US Imports Increase; Exports
Decrease
US Exports
Gold
US Prices Fall; BoT
Equilibrates
Despite these advantages, policymakers have
frequently found it in their interest to bend the “rules
of the gold standard game”…
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Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal TypeIII.Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”• Brief History of the
International Gold Standard• Conclusion 35
As a formal matter, being on the GS required two
things:
(1) maintain exchange rate stability (“gold parity”);
(2) maintain convertibility between domestic currency
gold... 12
(1) Maintain Exchange Rate Stability (“gold parity”)
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--> the monetary authority commits to doing everything in
its power to ensure that the market ER with gold remains at
the predetermined, official “parity.”
(2) Maintain Convertibility between Domestic Currency
& Gold.
--> No restrictions on the purchase/sale of domestic
currency/gold. No restrictions on the import/export of gold or
currency.
But remember the balance of payments constraint.
States only have a few ways to reconcile imbalances of
payments...
Remember this slide?
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Lecture 6: Balance of Payments (Slide #38)
Following the gold standard rules precludes two…
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Reconciling the BoP under the Gold Standard
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1. Adjustment of Reserves2. Adjustment of Internal Prices &
Incomes 3. Exchange Rate (ER) Adjustment4. Exchange Controls
1. Capital Controls: Limit convertibility2. Commercial Policy
Bracketing option 1 (adjusting reserves), states face a difficult
choice between:
(2) allow price-specie-flow to dictate changes in domestic macroeconomic conditions;
(4.2) use commercial policy (tariffs, subsidies, &c.)
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These are the “golden fetters” that have put
policymakers in a “golden straightjacket.”
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But why can’t they just adjust reserves?
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Remember the asymmetric positions of deficit and surplus
countries:
Surplus countries can accumulate reserves ad
infinitum.
While deficit countries will eventually exhaust their
reserves.42
IV. BREAKING THE RULES OF THE GAME
1. Deficit Countries2. Surplus Countries
Deficit countries have frequently violated the two
formal “rules of the gold standard game.”
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Exchange Rate Adjustment
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• Specie: Change quantity of precious metal in coins
• Backed currency: Adjustment of official exchange rate
• Fixed fiat currency: Shift in “target” market rate
Limitations on Convertibility
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• Restrictions on market exchange, foreign investment, and import/export of currency (e.g. China today)
• Government imposed costs on conversion– Fees to convert currency via monetary
authority– Restrictions on conversion (e.g. delay at
the mint)– Tax on capital movement (e.g. Tobin tax)
IV. BREAKING THE RULES OF THE GAME
1. Deficit Countries2. Surplus Countries
Sterilized Intervention
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• Intervention: government maintains stable market ER by selling domestic currency in exchange for foreign currency– Foreign currency is then held in reserve
• Sterilization: government counters inflation by buying excess domestic currency with government debt (open market operations)
• Sterilized Intervention: intervention + sterilization
The result is that the exchange rate remains stable, domestic
prices and incomes remain stable, and the government simply amasses foreign reserves.
This saves the surplus country from having to adjust today.
It also provides reserves for a “rainy day” in the future.
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Surplus Countries under the Gold Standard
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1. Adjustment of Reserves2. Adjustment of Internal Prices &
Incomes 3. Exchange Rate (ER) Adjustment4. Exchange Controls
1. Capital Controls: Limit convertibility2. Commercial Policy
Maintained through intervention
Inflation countered by sterilization
The sky is the limit!
But it also shifts the burden of adjustment
entirely onto the shoulders of the deficit
country.
And it creates competition for reserves.
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This is what the US and France did in the 1920s.
And this is largely what China is doing today.
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Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal TypeIII.Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”IV.Brief History of the
International Gold Standard• Conclusion 54
Here are a few of the highlights of the emergence
and ascent of the international GS.
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Britain Adopts the “Silver Standard”
• 1696: Locke convinces Parliament to adopt silver standard– permanently fixed– Fully convertible units into specified
amounts of metal
• Locke combated bimetallism– “Silver is the instrument and measure of
Commerce in all the Civilized and Trading parts of the world.” (374)
– Let gold float vis-à-vis silver; no official exchange rate between gold & silver 57
From Silver to Gold • 1717: Newton overvalues gold vis-à-vis
silver– Gresham’s Law: overvalued gold drives out
undervalued silver– Britain is on de facto gold standard
• 1819-1821: Ricardo convinces Britain to adopt de jure gold standard– Exchange rate stability: return to pre-war parity!– Convertibility: no limits on convertibility
Throughout, Britain maintained a robust commitment to a metallic standard. All that changed was the metal. 58
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The US: Hamilton versus Jefferson
• Hamilton’s Reports– Report on a National Bank (1790)– Report on the Mint (1791)– Report on Manufactures (1791)
• Hamilton: Banks & Paper Money– Stimulate domestic industry– Reduce dependence on foreign trade & capital – Court financial interest political stability
• Jefferson: Specie & International Integration– Market integration efficiency & peace– Suspicion of financial interest: banks &
corruption– Insulation Southern dependence on North 60
US Monetary Policy• 1791: First Bank of the United
States– Triggered Constitutional debate on Art 1,
Sec 8: “Necessary & Proper” Clause– Bank issues extensive token/paper
currency, heavily leveraged
• 1792: US Mint Act– Bimetallism– Hamilton says, “What the hell: we’ll
have some specie too!”
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My Assessment• Hamilton was lazy– Did not bother with important technical
details– Just copied Britain
• But he had political savvy–Won public debate by citing British example– Got backing of powerful financial elites– Had Washington’s ear
• Jefferson was a philosopher– Better understanding of technical details– But too abstract and reactionary for public– Did not build a coalition in time 62
Maggie and Me at the First Bank of the United States in Philadelphia
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France• Nominally bimetallic• But traditionally a silver country• 1840s: gold discoveries
overvalued gold de facto gold standard
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Setting the Standard• 1867: Paris conference to officially
appoint gold as int’l standard• Conference wasn’t legally successful,
but inspired trend• 1870s– Germany moves toward gold– France attempts to undercut Germany by
attracting gold bimetallic block busts
• 1879: US goes to gold; Japan follows• Network Effect: value of being on
common standard increases as membership increases 67
Lec 12: The Gold Standard
I. Intro: Why bother with Gold?II. The Gold Standard as an
Ideal TypeIII.Breaking the “Rules of the
Game”IV.Brief History of the
International Gold StandardV. Conclusion 68
The gold standard certainly seems dated.
None of us had been born when the international gold standard system collapsed
in the 1970s.
But there are good reasons to understand it… 69
Importance of Gold• Era of fiat currency (1971-present) is
vast exception to rule; commodity currency has been norm
• Will the new era endure?– Nth Currency is a national currency– Can governments be trusted with fiat
currency?
• Key insights useful to new era– Emergence of capital controls in China– Challenges in EU: integration versus
domestic policy autonomy 70
Essentials of Gold Standard “Era”
• Few countries fully adhered to the “rules of the gold standard game”– Deficit countries violated formal rules:
convertibility and ER stability– Surplus countries violated informal
rules: amassed reserves
• Level of adherence correlated with:– Closeness to London– Relative size of economy
How might we explain this correlation? 71
Next time, we’ll discuss the decline and fall of the gold
standard.
This will allow us to examine the political
dimensions of exchange rate regimes in a rich
context.72