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The Ghost In The Browser Analysis of Web-based Malware Niels Provos Dean McNamee Panayiotis Mavrommatis Ke Wang Nagendra Modadugu Google Inc
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The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Jun 13, 2020

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Page 1: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

The Ghost In The BrowserAnalysis of Web-based Malware

Niels ProvosDean McNamee

Panayiotis MavrommatisKe Wang

Nagendra Modadugu

Google Inc

Page 2: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Overview

• Introduction

• Detecting Malicious Pages

• Content Control

• Malware Trends

• Conclusion

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Page 3: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Introduction

• Internet essential for everyday life: ecommerce, etc.

• Malware used to steal bank accounts or credit cards

• underground economy is very profitable

• Internet threats are changing:

• remote exploitation and firewalls are yesterday

• Browser is a complex computation environment

• Adversaries exploit browser to install malware

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Page 4: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Introduction

• To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server

• Very easy to set up new site on the Internet

• Very difficult to keep new site secure

• insecure infrastructure: Php, MySql, Apache

• insecure web applications: phpBB2, Invision, etc.

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Page 5: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Detecting Malicious Websites

• Malicious website automatically installs malware on visitor’s computer

• usually via exploits in the browser or other software on the client (without user consent)

• Using Google’s infrastructure to analyze several billion URLs.

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Page 6: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Detecting Malicious Websites

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Web PageRepository

MapReduceHeuristical URL Extraction

Virtual Machine

Internet Explorer

MonitorExecution Analysis

URL

Result

Malicious PageRepository

Page 7: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Processing Rate• The VM gets about 300,000 suspicious URLs daily

• About 10,000 to 30,000 are malicious

7

11-01 11-21 12-11 12-31 01-20 02-09 03-01 03-21Time

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

Num

ber o

f URL

s

MaliciousInconclusiveHarmless

Page 8: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Content Control

• what constitutes the content of a web page?

• authored content

• user-contributed content

• advertising

• third-party widgets

• ceding control to 3rd party could be a security risk

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Page 9: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Web Server Security

• compromise web server and change content directly

• many vulnerabilities in web applications, apache itself, stolen passwords

• templating system

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<!-- Copyright Information --><div align='center' class='copyright'>Powered by<a href="http://www.invisionboard.com">Invision Power Board</a>(U)v1.3.1 Final &copy; 2003 &nbsp;<a href='http://www.invisionpower.com'>IPS, Inc.</a></div></div><iframe src='http://wsfgfdgrtyhgfd.net/adv/193/new.php'></iframe><iframe src='http://wsfgfdgrtyhgfd.net/adv/new.php?adv=193'></iframe>

Page 10: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Advertising• by definition means ceding control of content to

another party

• web masters have to trust advertisers

• sub-syndication allows delegation of advertising space

• trust is not transitive

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Russia

USAPopular Web Site

advertisementAds

CompanyJavascript

Ads

Company

Javascript

Ads

CompanyJavascript

Ads

Company

Javascript

Exploit

Server

HTTP

Redirect

Page 11: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Third-Party Widgets

• to make sites prettier or more useful:

• calendaring or stats counter

• search for praying mantis

• linked to free stats counter in 2002 via Javascript

• Javascript started to compromise users in 2006

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http://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?homepagehttp://expl.info/demo.phphttp://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?type=MS03-11&SP1http://expl.info/ms0311.jarhttp://expl.info/cgi-bin/ie0606.cgi?exploit=MS03-11http://dist.info/f94mslrfum67dh/winus.exe

Page 12: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Malware Trends and Statistics

• Avoiding detection

• obfuscating the exploit code itself

• distributing binaries across different domains

• continuously re-packing the binaries

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document.write(unescape("%3CHEAD%3E%0D%0A%3CSCRIPT%20LANGUAGE%3D%22Javascript%22%3E%0D%0A%3C%21--%0D%0A/*%20criptografado%20pelo%20Fal%20-%20Deboa%E7%E3o%20gr%E1tis%20para%20seu%20site%20renda%20extra%0D...3C/SCRIPT%3E%0D%0A%3C/HEAD%3E%0D%0A%3CBODY%3E%0D%0A%3C/BODY%3E%0D%0A%3C/HTML%3E%0D%0A"));//--></SCRIPT>

Page 13: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Malware Classifications

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01-11

01-14

01-17

01-20

01-23

01-26

01-29

02-01

02-04

02-07

02-10

02-13

02-16

02-19

02-22

02-25

02-28

03-03

03-06

03-09

03-12

03-15

03-18

03-21

Date

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

Uniq

ue U

RLs

disc

over

ed

AdwareUnknownTrojan

Page 14: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Remotely Linked Exploits• Exploits are leveraged across many sites

• Popular exploits are linked from over 10,000 URLS

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0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2001

10

100

1000

10000

Num

ber o

f URL

s

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2001

10

100

1000

10000

Num

ber o

f hos

ts

Page 15: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Discussion

• increase of web-based exploitation over time

• installed malware allows for remote control

• observed botnet like structures:

• pull-based: frequently checking for new commands

• observed user agents such as: DDoSBotLoader

• binary updates can be interpreted as command & control

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Page 16: The Ghost In The Browser - Semantic Scholar€¦ · The Ghost In The Browser Google Inc Introduction • To compromise your browser, we need to compromise your web server • Very

Google IncThe Ghost In The Browser

Conclusion

• Web-based malware is a real problem

• millions of potentially infected users

• Automatic detection of malicious web pages to secure web search results

• Identified four areas of content control

• Observed botnet-like structures

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