ARCHIVES CGSC FT LEAVENWO TH KtiK4 APR 7 1953 ir MONOASSIG PH MONOG PHi~ ACCESSION NO PO Ri.G.iSTRY. THE GERMANS OPPOSITE lI CORPS IN SEPTEMBER 1944 BY LUCIAN HEICHLER DISTRIBL DE THIS MONOGRAPH MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART, WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY The. German opposite VII Corps in Sep 44. Chi of- f-s 1--1-t -ib€>y -B -52 CGSC Form 160 13 Mar 51 Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5M • UNqCLASSIFI[Q p. r AXZ This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS DOCUMENT NO. R-16436.3oB COPY NO. STORY, Nomp 7," 7 _ a-l: 1 pg a pt: M
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ARCHIVESCGSC FT LEAVENWO TH KtiK4
APR 7 1953 ir
MONOASSIG PH
MONOG PHi~
ACCESSION NOPO Ri.G.iSTRY.
THE GERMANS OPPOSITE lI CORPS
IN SEPTEMBER 1944
BY
LUCIAN HEICHLER
DISTRIBL
DE
THIS MONOGRAPH MAY NOT
BE REPRODUCED, EITHER
IN WHOLE OR IN PART,WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF
THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
The. German opposite VII Corps in Sep 44.Chi of- f-s 1--1-t -ib€>y -B -52
CGSC Form 16013 Mar 51
Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5M
• UNqCLASSIFI[Q
p. r
AXZ
This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. R-16436.3oB COPY NO.STORY,
Nomp 7,"7 _ a-l:
1
pga pt: M
CHAPTER III
TrH GLE1ANS OPPOSITE VII CORPS IN SEPTEMBER 1944
Part of a Study of the German Side Undertaken inSupport of The Siegfried Line by Charles B. MacDonald
(OCMH: In Progress)
Based Entirely on German Records, This Chapter is Intendedto Complement Charter III of The Siegfried Line:
""VII Corns Penetrates the Line"
by
%2VL )~a c~,
Lucian Heichler
Research SectionOffice of the Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.December 1952
~~ ,;SSFED
UTabe A Sof Con s
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................
Defense of Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor ..
The DXXXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944
LXXXI Corps: Counterattack and Stalemate . . .
LXXIV Corps: Defense of the Lammersdorf Corridorand the West VIall ................
Page
..... 1
. . . . . 41
S. . . . 50
..... 87
APPENDIX: Map of the West Wall in the LXXXI and LXXIV Corps sectors
UNCLASSIF IED
Introduction
In the early years of World War II the German Army amply
demonstrated its ability to exploit victory to the fullest.
After the tide had turned against the Germans, it became ap-
parent that they also possessed the more outstanding ability
to quickly recover from a defeat before their opponents could
thoroughly exploit their success.
The German Seventh Army exemplified this faculty late in
the summer of 1944. Less than a month after suffering an
apparently decisive defeat in which it was crushed and battered
beyond recognition, Seventh Army established a coherent front
line from the Maas River to the Sohnee Eifel Range in September
1944. Committed in this wide are and supported by a motley
conglomeration of last-ditch reserves, the army's remaining
elements successfully defended the approaches to the Reich.
During its withdrawal from Falaise to the West Wall,
Seventh Army passed through three distinct phases. In the
first stage -- the rout following narowly averted annihilation
in the Falaise Pocket -- Seventh Army ceased to exist as an
independent organization. Its shattered remnants were attached
to Fifth Panzer Army until 4 September 1944. On that date
Seventh Army was apparently reconstituted under the command
of General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger. The army
then passed through the phase of delaying action while it
U~rsa~$
UMC lED 2
reorganized its forces and re-established the semblance of a front
line. Despite persistent orders from above to defend every foot
of ground, General Brandenberger realized that a fairly rapid with-
drawal was called for, if his forces were to reach the West Wall
ahead of American spearheads.*
MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).
The delaying action ended officially on 9 September 1944 when
Seventh Army was charged with the defense of the West Wall in the
Maastricht - Aachen - Bitburg sectors. Along with the fortifications
the army took over all headquarters and troops stationed in this
area.
Of Seventh Army's three corps, LXUXI Corps was assigned the
northern sector of the West Wall, from the Herzogenrath - Dueren
switch position to the Rollesbroich - Huertgen Forest sector.
LXXIV Corps was committed in the center, from Roetgen to Ormont,
and I SS Panzer Corps was to defend the West Wall in the Schnee
Eifel sector, from Ormont to the boundary with First Army at Diekirch.*
Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Anlagen, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw. [Orders: Army Group,
Army, etc.], 5.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred to hereafter as LCXXI Corps
KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.See also Appendix, map of the West Wall.
With this transition from the second to the third phase of
operations -- from delaying action to firm resistance based on the
u~~L~s~'INN
~i~e~SYI
fortified cositions of the WVest Wall -- the withdrawal from France
came to an end, and the defense of Germany began.
When U.S. VII Corps launched its reconnaissance in force on
12 September 1944, Seventh Army was in the midst of this process
of transition. While some of its elements had already occupied
their assigned West Wall so~tors, others were still fighting a de-
laying action well forward of the bunker line.
UNCLASSIFIEDB
h fit.i
Defense of Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor
On 12 September 1944 the forces of LJ I Corps, under the
command of Generalleutnant Friedrich-August Schack, were committed
from Breust on the Maas River eastward to Hombourg and Moresnet,
thence south along the West Wall to the boundary with LXXIV Corps
Tagesmeldungen [Daily Sitreps], 6.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred tohereafter as LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Four badly mauled, understrength divisions were committed in
the LXXXI Corps front line. In the northwestern sector, between
the Maas River and the Aachen area, 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions
held the line against U.S. XIX Corps.* In the southeastern half of
For an account of these two divisions, see Lucian Heichler,Chapter IV, The Germans Facing XIX Corps, OCMH (in progress).
the LUXI Corps zone, opposite U.S. VII Corps, 116th Panzer Division
and 9th Panzer Division faced the U.S. 1st Infantry and 3d Armored
Divisions.
The sector of 116th Panzer Division was defined in the northwest
by the boundary with 49th Infantry Division: Hombourg - Schneeberg
Hill - along the West Wall to Bardenberg. In the southeast the
boundary with 9th Panzer Division extended from Welkenrath via Hauset
U CLASSFIED
1111 "5
and Brand to Stolberg.* The organic strength of 115th Panzer Division,
Order, LTJXI Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LXXI CorpsKTB, Anlagen, Befehle an Dive, [Orders to Divs], 3.VIII. - 21.X.44.Referred to hereafter as LCX=I Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
und:r the command of Generalleutnant Graf Gerhard von Schwerin, was
organized in two armored regiments -- 60th and 156th Panzer Grenadier
Regiments -- the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, and the
116th Panzer Artillery Regiment.
Commanded by Generalmajor Gerhard Mueller, 9th Panzer Division
had only arrived in the LXXXI Cors zone on 11 September 1944. Its
sector extended from the boundary with 116th Panzer Division to the
boundary with LXXIV Corps (see above). According to General
Brandenberger its first wave had consisted of but three companies
of panzer grenadiers (advance detachment of either 10th or 11th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment), an engineer company, and two batteries
of artillery. General Schack amalgamated these elements with the
remaining forces of 105th Panzer Brigade (Major Volker). Since
its attachment to LXXXI Corps on 3 September 1944 this tank brigade
had lost most of its armored infantry battalion and all but ten of
its tanks. Instead of committing the weak elements of 9th Panzer
Division in the West Wall, L'I Corps had found it necessary to
send these forces into the front line. Badly mauled on their first
day of action -- as was to be expected -- the remaining elements
of Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer Division had assembled in Eynatten during
the night from 11 to I± September. They were to fight a delaying
N LA .iAIED
action back to their West Wail sector while all other elements of
thle division still enroute from their assembly area at Kaiserslautern
were to be committed immediately in the West Wall upon arrival.*
MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).
In addition to the units enumerated above, IXXDI Corps also
commanded 353d Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Paul M-ahlmann).
This division was exhausted and possessed very few organic con-
tingents. Far too weak to be committed in a front line sector,
its headquarters and remaining elements were moved to the assigned
W'est Wall sectors of 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions to establish
liaison with the various headquarters and local defense units in
the rear of LXXXI Corps.
On 9 September 1944 Seventh Army had attached to LXXXI Corps
the Wfehrmachtbefehlshaber [Military Governor] for Belgium and Nortnern
France with his staff and troops, the Kampfkommandant* of Aachen
A term whicn is difficult to translate. Literally, it means
"combat commander" but is used to describe a military officer ap-
pointed to organize the defense of a city or rear area.
See ivS # T-121 (Zimmermann et al.), pp. 1820ff.
(Colonel von Osterroth), the 253d Grenadier Training Regiment of
526th Reserve Division,* and a strange assortment of independent
The other two regiments of 526th Reserve Division, 416th and
536th Grenadier Training Regiments, were attached to LXXIV Corpswhile the division headquarters at Euskirchen remained directlysubordinated to Seventh Army.
UriLAS H[ED
battalions representing the proverbial bottom of the barrel. Some
of these were "Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions";* others were called
Luftwaffe ground troops hastily organized in infantry batta-
lions usually without sufficient training, poorly armed, and oflittle combat value, according to German postwar accounts, such asM.S # B-730 (Brandenberger).
Landesschuetzen Battalions (the termra is vaguely equivalent to "home
guard") which were quite inadequately armed, without heavy weapons,
and composed of men "as old as the hills".*
Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,
Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; Quotation from ETHINT 18(Schwerin).
Landesschuetzen Battalions were usually composed of men fifty
to sixty years old.
The situation in the LXXXI Corps area was canplicated further
by tne presence of police and Hitler Youth detachments who attempted
to make themselves useful by doing such work on the 'West WVall
fortifications as they saw fit, but refused to co-operate with the
military.
The various independent battalions described above were sub-
ordinated to 353d Infantry Division prior to their commitment with
the front line divisions. By order of Field Marshal Model (Commander
in Chief, Army Group B) the newly arrived 8th, 12th, and 19th Luftwaffe
Fortress Battalions were attached to 353d Infantry Division on con-
dition that they would be employed only in defense of the West Wall.
The division reported that by 1800 on 12 September 1944 the Schill Line --
eastern and more strongly fortified bunker belt of the West Wall --
would be occupied by the 19th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion, com-
mitted in the area northwest of Wuerselen (northeast of Aachen),
3d Landesschuetzen Battalion in the area northwest of Stolberg,
12th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion in the vicinity of Stolberg, and
2d Landesschuetzen Battalion south of Stolberg. The 8th Luftwaffe
Fortress Battalion was designated 353d Infantry Division reserve.*
Tel Conv, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 0110 on 12 Sep 44, andMng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen,Kampfverlauf [Operations), 2.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred to hereafteras ULXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Tabulation of Troop Trains Ar-rived 9 Sep - 31 Oct 44, Seventh Army KTB, Anlagen, Semi-AnnualReport of Seventh Army Transport Officer, 1.VII. - 31.XII.44.
General Schack learned on 12 September that the first of three
full'strength divisions (12th Infantry, 183d and 246th Volks Grenadier
Divisions) destined to reinforce the Aachen area during September
1944 would arrive in the LXXXI Corps sector in a few days. Hitler
had ordered 12th Infantry Division (Colonel Gerhard Engel), just
rehabilitated in East Prussia after service on the Eastern Front,
to begin entraining for the Aacnen sector at 0001 dn 14 September.*
Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 12 Sep 44, OB VEST KTB (Text), 1. IX. - 30.IX.44. Referred to hereafter as OB WEST KTB.
For additional order of battle data, such as strength information,see The LXXXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944, pp.4lff.
Southwest of Aacnen the forces of 116th Panzer Division enjoyed
an uneventful night from 11 to 12 September 1944. This enabled them
U 'NLA 5 [SFE 9
FIEU9
at 0800 on 12 September to occupy positions along the railroad
from Hombourg to Moresnet, and from Moresnet along the Gueule Creek
via Hergenrath to Hauset.* The object was to establish a coherent
Eng Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 12 Sep 44, and Daily -Sitrep, 116thPz Div, 1900 on 12 Sep 44, LIXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
defense line which, based on a railway tunnel and a creek, would
facilitate antitank defense. The division committed the 156th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment on the right, between Hombourg and
Moresnet, and the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment on the left along
the Gueule. The 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion was dis-
engaged and recommitted at daybreak north of the Gueule with the
mission to establish contact with 9th Panzer Division at Eynatten.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0810 on 12 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
The forces of 116th Panzer Division found their mobility
greatly restricted by the work of over-eager German demolition
engineers who had destroyed all Gueule Creek crossings from Moresnet
to north. of Eynatten and had blocked all roads leading to the West
Wall with the exception of the Moresnet - Gemmenich - Aachen road.*
TVlX, 116th Pz Div to L=XXI Corps, 0155 on 12 Sep 44, LIX ICorps KTB, Anlagen, Meldungen der Divisionen [Division Sitreps],25.VIII. - 1.X.44. Referred to hereafter as LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.; Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0810 on12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
on~ew~ifsL
C IE 10
These obstacles seriously interfered with General von Schwerin's
intention to withdraw to the West Wall on 12 September. But during
the morning General Schack ordered von Schwerin not to occupy his
West Wall sector before receiving special orders from IXXXI Corps,
and to hold out in front of the West Wall generally as long as
possible. *
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1000 on 12 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
The lull enjoyed by 116th Panzer Division was shattered at
noon on 12 September when American tanks probed German defenses
north of Montzen and Hombourg.* Shortly thereafter the storm
Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1155 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
broke over the heads of the Germans. The American reconnaissance
was followed up by a tank attack toward Hombourg. At the same time
American armor crossed the railway between Hombourg and Moresnet.*
Sitrep, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1200 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
American infantry pushed up the road from Hombourg to Voelkerich
and Bleyberg. While the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment fell back
before these attacks, American troops crossed the Gueule Creek be-
tween Moresnet and Hergenrath in the early afternoon and infiltrated
a3~: SDsE
UNC A SS IFthe lines of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.* General von
Sitrep, 116th Pz Div to LXXI Corps, 1330 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Schwerin was forced to withdraw about 1530 in a northwesterly
direction from Moresnet along the Gueule Creek.* The peculiar
Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 1900 on 12 Sep 44, LT; I CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.
direction of this withdrawal was probably necessitated by the fact
that German engineers had blocked the roads leading northeast.
While the U.S. 1st Infantry Division launched its drive on
Aachen and broke through the lines of 116th Panzer Division, the
U.S. 3d Armored Division jumped off from Eupen toward Eynatten and
Roetgen in the sector of 9th Panzer Division. West of the Eupen -
Aachen road the Americans took Lontzen and Walhorn; east of the road
tney pushed into Raeren.* From Walhorn they launched a tank attack
Sitrep, 353d Inf Div to LXXXI Corps, 1200 on 12 Sep 44, IXXXICorps KTB, Kampferlauf.
toward Eynatten, which fell into American hands at 1345. Elements
of Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer Division tnere withdrew northeastward.*
TWX, 9th Pz Div (105th Pz Brig) to LXXXI Corps, 1417 on 12 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div toLXXII Corps, 1425 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
INGLASIED
12
These elements and the local defense units under the command of
353d Infantry Division were unable to interfere seriously with
American operations. Later in the afternoon General Schack was
disturbed by a civilian report that American forces had occupied
Rott at 1800, conveying the impression that they had broken througn
the Wvest "Wall south of Rott.* The rumor that the Americans were
KTB Entry, 1800 on 12 Sep 44, TLXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
just south of Rott caused panic among the men of a Luftwaffe anti-
aircraft artillery unit committed at Rott. The 3d Battery (889th
Regiment) of the 7th Flak Division smashed the optical equipment
of their three 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, abandoned their positions,
guns, equipment, and belongings, and fled.* The cause of the false
Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXJCI Corps, 0050 on 22 Sep 44,UCOXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
alarm seems to have been an American armored reconnaissance patrol
on the Aachen - Monschau road.*
Tel Cony, LX.KII Corps to 353d Inf Div, 2150 on 12 Sep 44, L3IXICorps KTB, Meldunge n der Div.
In the evening of 12 September 353d Infantry Division reported
American armor converging on Roetgen from the west. Elements of
the 253d Grenadier Training Regiment observed American tanks and
jeeps, followed by strong infantry detachments on personnel carriers
"m L 31 ie
U u 13
moving along the Raeren - Roetgen road.* Two American tanks and
Ibid.
four armored cars accompanied by infantry pushed into Roetgen. One
platoon of the security company in Roetgen (328th Replacement
Training Battalion of 253d Grenadier Training Regiment) was pushed
into the southern part of the town. Intensive infantry fighting
developed as American armor advanced to the northern periphery of
Roetgen. Keeping out of the range of German entitank weapons, the
tanks fired into West Wall bunker embrasures, while American in-
fantry guns laid down a heavy barrage in front of the obstacle wall.
Low-flying aircraft attacked the obstacles and defense positions.
By 1900 the volume of American artillery and tank fire began to
dwindle. The Germans remained in possession of all West Wall
fortifications. An hour later German reconnaissance found that
the Americans had left Roetgen.*
Sitrep, 328th Repl Trng Bn to LXXXI Corps, 12 Sep 44, L~C; ICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2230 on12 Sep 44, LXIXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At 2000 on 12 September American tanks and infantry advancing
between the Hergenrath - Aachen and the Eupen - Aachen roads tcward
the Scharnhorst Line -- the first (western) band of West W1all
fortifications -- captured Bunker 161 at Brandenberg Hill, two
miles north of Hauset. Forces under the Kampfkommandant of Aachen
were immediately committed in a counterattack to wipe out this
UNC LA SII[ED
14
American penetration of the West Wall. They failed in this endeavor
but were able to stop the American attack. temporarily.* At the
Eng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, and Tel Conv,Seventn Army to LXXXI Corps, 1140 on 13 Sep 44, LXCXI Corps KTB,Kaapfverlauf; ihg Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 0555 on 13 Sep 44, Lm=ICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
same time American armored cars and a few tanks also reached the
West Wall about half a mile southeast of Schmidthof and apparently
decided to laager there for the night.*
Ing Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.
Late in the evening of 12 September General Schack issued an
order to his divisions which defined their assigned West Wall sectors
and outlined the further conduct of operations.
The 116th Panzer Division was charged with defending the city
of Aachen. The Kampfkiommandant of Aachen with attached troops was
subordinated to 116th Panzer Division, as were all elements of
353d Infantry and 526th Reserve Divisions in the sector: 8th, 12th,
19th Luftwaffe Battalions and the 453d Grenadier Training Battalion
(253d Grenadier Training Regiment).* The armored elements of 116th
TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 2350 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen3Operations-Befehle [Operational Orders], 1.IX. - 30.IX.44. Referredto hereafter as A Gp B KTB, Operations-Befehle; Daily Sitrep, 116thPz Div, 1925 on 21 Sep 44, LI~XI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
U L A 8 3 FIE
lG L, S[D 15
Panzer Division were to fall back to the West Wall only in the face
of superior American pressure while the attached forces would move
into the fortifications ahead of the main body in order to complete
the improvement of the positions.*
Order, LXXI Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.
The 9th Panzer Division, with attached remaining elements of
105th Panzer Brigade, was assigned to the defense of the-sector
between 116th Panzer Division and the boundary with LXXIV Corps --
the Stolberg Corridor and northern Wenau Forest. All elements of
353d Infantry and 526th Reserve Divisions in this sector of the
West Wall were attached to 9th Panzer Division. These were Headquarters
253d Grenadier Training Regiment (Colonel Feind) ana the 328th and
473d Replacement Training Battalions.* The division was authorized
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1500 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to IXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
The geographic location of the 9th Panzer Division sectorfated this division to bear the brunt of the Battle of the StolbergCorridor. Never possessed of organic elements sufficient for anadequate defense, the division also sustained very heavy lossesin this action. Thus it had to be shored up regularly by all kindsof reinforcements, sometimes of a very dubious value. The designation"9th Panzer Division" became a collective term for a veritablehodgepodge of unrelated armor, antitank, infantry, and artilleryunits.
to withdraw its organic elements to the West Wall only in the face
of overwhelming American attacks. In the West Wall the main effort
U CLASSIFIED 16
of resistance would center around the roads leading toward the
fortifications from the south and south'est.
The divisions were ordered to station strong outposts forward
of the MLR, equipped with heavy infantry weapons and antitank guns,
who were to do all in their power to delay the American advance.
In the sectors of 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions this outpost line
was to extend from west of Germenich - west of Hauset - east of
Raeren to west of Roetgen.
The 353d Infantry Division received orders to relinquish con-
trol of the Scharnhorst Line and all elements committed tnere to
116th and 9th Panzer Divisions. Three Landesschuetzen Battalions
(1/9, 11/6, and III/6) remained temporarily attached to 353d Infantry
Division for special assignments.*
Landesschuetzen Battalions I/9 and III/6 were attached to 9thPanzer Division two days later.
Following its arrival in the LXXI Corps zone the anxiously
awaited 394th Assault Gun Brigade (six or seven assault guns) was
to assemble in the vicinity of Brand. In corps reserve, this assault
gun brigade would be ready to participate on snort notice in counter-
attacks with both 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions.
Artillery Group Aachen, composed of the artillery regiments of
116th Panzer and 353d Infantry Divisions and the Flak Gruppe Aachen*
Antiaircraft Artillery Group Aachen, a reserve antiaircraftregimental headquarters.
INCL ASSFI E 17
was placed under the command of Colonel Pean (Commander, 116th
Panzer Artillery Regiment) and received orders to collaborate closely
witn 49th Infantry, 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions in co-ordinating
its fire with the main effort of defense.*
Order, LXII Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LX3XI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div.
The night from 12 to 13 September passed quietly. During the
small hours of the morning the 8th, 12th, and 19th Luftwaffe Fortress
Battalions were attached to the Kampfkommandant of Aachen in order
to be committed at daybreak in a counterattack against the American
penetration of the Scharnhorst Line at Brandenberg Hill south of Aachen.*
Mng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, D~UXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.
At 0600 on 13 September 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions assumed
command of their new West Wall sectors. 'With some local defense
units in the front line, General von Schwerin disengaged the organic
forces of 116th Panzer Division -- badly in need of regrouping and
some rest -- in order to assemble them in the Richterich - Yuerselen
area northeast of Aachen. That move made it impossible to commit
these forces against the penetraticn at Brandenberg Hill before
afternoon. "In addition, if the enemy continued to advance and
exploit his success, which had to be expected in any event, he could
not be prevented from entering the town [of Aachen] from tne south
During the night from 12 to 13 September the city of Aachen
had been in the grip of chaos. Since General von Schwerin was to
assume control on 13 September, he drove into Aachen the evening
before on the way to his command post at Laurensberg. He found
the population in panic. It was the picture Hitler had made all
too familiar in Europe -- but now, for the first time, the shoe was
on the other foot. "Women, with small children and babies, had
loaded their last possessions on small hand carts and prams and
walked into the night without having ahy idea where to go; they
were driven only by fear and the threats of the Party that every
person who did not leave the town would be shot as a traitor...."*
EThINT 18 (Schwerin).
Stirred by humane motivations and worried about the effect of
the panic and the jammed roads on the morale and mobility of his
troops, von Schwerin decided to put an immediate stop to the dis-
organized flight. When he sent his officers out to contact the
police with orders to halt the evacuation, they returned to him
with the shocking news that the entire police force and all govern-
ment and Party officials had left Aachen; not one police station
SGLASSBI~ED•ra~
19
was occupied.* Thereupon General von Schwerin took matters into
Ibid.; Report, MIodel to 0B3 VST, 2230 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Ltr, Gen Mattenklott to Reichsfuehrer SS HeinrichHimmler, 15 Sep 44, LX II Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
General der Infanterie Franz TMattenklott commanded Wehrkreis VI,the military district which included the Aachen area.
his own hands. He sent his officers out once more to persuade the
frantic populace to return to their homes. In so doing he exposed
himself to the grave charge of having countermanded a Fuehrer order
commanding the evacuation of Aachen. In the morning of 13 September
the city was nearly calm again; for the time being all signs of
panic had disappeared. All buildings housing the Party and municipal
administration were deserted.
South of the city Kampfkommandant Colonel von Osterroth launched
another 'counterattack against the American penetration at Brandenberg.
Osterroth's attempt of the night before to restore the situation
had failed. The Americans were now in possession of Bunkers 160
and 161 and were feeding additionalforces into their salient. All
morning attempts by the weak forces under the command of Colonel
von Osterroth to seal off the penetration remained inconclusive.*
ETHITT 18 (Schwerin); Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LJ=I Corps,1140 on 13 Sep 44, LXX!I Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep,
116th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
As mentioned above, General von Schwerin's organic forces
were executing a maneuver which prevented them from participating
~LhI ILDa
UNCLASSIFIE20
in the fighting southwest of Aachen before late afternoon. He be-
lieved that the American penetration at Brandenberg Hill would
develop into a main effort attack against the city, and he knew
that the Luftwaffe battalions would be no match for their opponents.
Convinced that the Americans would have Aachen occupied in a matter
of hours, von Schwerin privately thought this the best solution for
the old city.* After much searching through empty public buildings,
ETmTT 18 (Schwerin). In desiring to spare Aachen the terrorsof becoming a battleground, von Schwerin deviated sharply fromHitler's avowed determination to turn the city of Charlemagne intoa fortified stronghold where each house would be fanatically de-fended to give the Allies a foretaste of what to expect insideGermany.
von Schwerin finally found one man still at his post, an official
of the telephone service. To him General Schwerin entrusted a letter,
written in Ehglish, which the official promised to take to the com-
manding officer of the American forces as soon as they had occupied
Aachen. The letter read as follows:
I stopped the absurd evacuation of this town; therefore, Iam responsible for the fate of its inhabitants and I ask you, inthe case cf an occupation by your troops, to take care of theunfortunate population in a humane way. I an the last GermanCommanding Officer in the sector of Aachen.
Signed: SC.F7BRIN*
Ibid.; Rpt, Model to 03 IEST, 2330 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle.
Consequences to Count von Schwerin arising from his interferencewith the evacuation of Aachen and the discovery of this letter bythe Nazis will be discussed later in this study.
rtean. vhile, however, the tactical situation had changed.
Gradually it dawned on the Germans that the Americans were not going
UtLA~ffl0
UO CLASSFIEP-1 21
to exploit their opportunity to walk into Aachen but that they
intended, rather, to envelop the city by driving up the Stolberg
Corridor in the direction of Esdaweiler. By noon on 13 September
von Osterroth's men had finally succeeded in sealing off the American
salient south of Aachen. Colonel von Osterroth thought he could
hold the line against the American tanks if the assault guns of
394th Assault Gun Brigade just detrained at the Aacnen-Nord Railway
Station could be committed against them.* LXXXI Corps ordered
T17X , Col von Osterroth to 116th Pz Div, 1315 on 13 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Meidungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div,13 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
116th Panzer Division to wipe out the American penetration at
Brandenberg Hill at all cost.* Unwillingly von Schwerin ordered
Rad, LeXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1230 on 13 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
his division, which had just arrived in the Richterich - Wuerseien
assembly area, to turn around, march back to the other end of
Aachen and assemble there for the counterattacc,. Although some re-
placements had arrived in the morning, and the battalions had an
average strength of about three hundred men, the fighting power of
the division was stiil low. Only about thirty tanks and assault
guns were operationally fit, and the troops were tired and battlewearyo*
ETHINT 18 (Schwerin).
UNCLASSIF E
U9t4(N '' I & -
Von Schwerin ordered the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to march
through the city while the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment bypassed
Aachen on its soutnern periphery. At 1600 the division jumped off
against the American salient at Brandenberg Hill.* It made some
headway against American armored reconnaissance which had advanced
to the outskirts of the city. The armor withdrew to the break in
the German MLR, and 116th Panzer Division was able to close the
gap, without attempting to recapture the American-held pillboxes
after darkness had set in.*
Ibid.; Rad, 116th Pz Div to IXXI Corps, 2235 on 13 Sep 44,MLXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, A p B, 0100 on14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen, Tagesmeldungen, 1.IX. - 15.X.44.Referred to hereafter as A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Shortly after noon on 13 September U.S. 3d Armored Division
resumed its drive up the Stolberg Corridor. South of Rott the
Americans cracked a number of bunkers and at 1225 achieved a
penetration in the MLR. American armor advanced up the road toward
Rott, filling in the antitank craters in its path.* Less than an
Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LIXeI Corps, 1225 on_13 Sep 44, LDOXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
hour later U.S. forces were within one mile of Rott, and 9th Panzer
jMCLA r IE P
22
(
Division mustered all its available forces for a counterattack to
be launched from Kornelimuenster. General Mueller asked the
LXXXI Corps Operations Officer to move all available corps reserves
to Xornelimuenster.* Realizing that the Stolberg Corridor, rather
Tel Conv, Gen Mueller to LXXXI Corps, 1340 on 13 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
than the Aachener Stadtforst [Aachen Municipal Forest south of
Aachen], was the scene of the VII Corps main effort in his sector,
General Schack ordered 116th Panzer Division to transfer half the
assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade to 9th Panzer Division
at Kornelimuenster. *
Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1420 on 13 Sep 44, andLXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1430 on 13 Sep 44, LXXCI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.
The 3d Armored Division drive up the Stolberg Corridor wasin
two-pronged, with one group attacking/the direction Schleclheim -
Kornelimuenster, the other toward Rott and Mulartshuette. At 1630
ten American tanks appeared before Rott while other U.S. forces
had already bypassed the village and were located east thereof.*
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1630 on 13 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Headquarters and headquarters company of 9th Panzer Division sped
.y^^^^^SH^H~tt^
unc - I
to Rott in an effort to hold the line there.* Other forces of
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1730 on 13 Sep 44, LXICICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
the division attempted to screen off at ziulartshuette by means of
obstacles and demolitions.
In the early afternoon American tanks and infantry penetrated
a German strongpoint south of Schleokheim and continued /their ad-
vance toward that village.* A race was now on between U.S. armor
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1420 on 13 Sep 44, LXKXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
and three assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade driving on
Kornelimuenster from different directions. At 1600 eight American
tanks were observed on the road from Nuetheim to Kornelimuenster.
The German assault guns were expected in Kornelimuenster at 1800.*
Ibid.
They arrived on schedule, and a battalion of 9th Panzer Division,
reinforced by these three assault guns and a few 75-mm. antitank
guns which the division had picked up, began to establish a line
of resistance from the northern periphery of Schleckheim via the
northern edge of Nuetheim to the southern periphery of Kornelimuenster.
Of the first eight U.S. tanks, four were knocked out by Panzerfaust,*
Hand-operated antitank grenades.
llNC1ASSHIED
24
25
but fifteen more tanks wheeled off to right and left in an effort
to roll up the 9th Panzer Division line.*
Tel Conv, LIXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1830 on 13 Sep 44, LXIKICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, L XICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At 1845 fifteen U.S. tanks broke through the line of bunkers
and 'dragons teeth at Oberforstbach, while American infantry advanced
along the road north of the Aachen Reservoir (Langfeld - Nuetheim -
Kornelimuenster). Five American tanks attacked Bunker 109 on this
road about halfway between the reservoir and Nuetheim.* Somewhat
Tel Conv, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1915 on 13 Sep 44, IX0XICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
later the Germans reported American forces before Kornelimuenster,
near Mulartshuette, and in Hahn. At Rott Headquarters Company of
9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade launched a counter-
attack in an effort to halt the American drive on Mulartshuette.*
German engineers hastily began to demolish all crossings over the
Vicht River between Stolberg and Zweifall.*
Tel Cony, LXCrXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2030 on 13 Sep 44, LIXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
At LXXXI Corps headquarters American intentions emerged more
... I E
26
clearly. The corps operations officer called General Mahlmann of
353d Infantry Division to inform him that "... the enemy will probably
launch a drive bypassing Aachen from the penetration area near
Kornelimuenster and Hahn ... toward the second band of defenses
[Schill Line]." The three Landesschuetzen battalions under the
command of 353d Infantry Division were alerted to stand by for
action.* I=KXI Corps also ordered 116th Panzer Division to transfer
Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Gen Mahlmann, 2040 on 13 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
the 8th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and one battery of artillery
to 9th Panzer Division.*
Tel Conv, L XXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2320 on 13 Sep 44,UXOXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
As 13 September 1944 drew to a close, the American advance
against the LXXCI Corps sector had been checked temporarily. The
salient north of Hauset was wiped out. The penetrations on both
sides of Walheim had been sealed off in the line Kornelimuenster -
Hahn. The southern prong of the 3d Armored Division attad which
had advanced across Rott, had been checked at Iulartshuette.*
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0100 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
The night from 13 to 14 September 1944 passed quietly in the
entire LXXXI Corps sector. The Germans observed strong American
UNL IED27
infantry and armored forces assembling in the Schleckheim - Walheim
area but found Oberforstbach unoccupied.*
Lag Sitrep, LXI I Corps, 0650 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
In the southern outskirts of Aachen American reconnaissance
in the morning of 14 September probed the 116th Panzer Division
front line at "Bildcnen" toward Bunker 189 and Grenzhof. Then
American infantry with strong artillery support jumped off against
the entire division front and broke through the bunker line in many
places. The bunkers were bypassed singly and fought down from
flank and rear by U.S. infantry while American tanks followed up
the attack.* After noon the bunkers at "Bildchen" and "Koepfchen"
Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz -Diy,'C14Sep 44, L XI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
(southwest and south of Aachen respectively) were in American hands.
The 116tn Panzer Division forces were now defending a semicircle
around Aacnen, from Vaelser Quartier west of Aacnen to the boundary
with 9th Panzer Division southeast of the city. Their intentions
were to defend this line and to counterattack southward whenever
possible. *
Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1255 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
Iy 4A1 HE liBN a n^^ I§
A short time later the division was forced to admit that all
attempts to regain the belt of bunkers had failed because the
densely wooded terrain (Aachen Municipal Forest) made adequate
tank support and artillery observation impossible.*
Rad, 116th Pz Div to LeXXI Corps, 1340 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
As American forces drew closer to the city, the panic in Aachen
reached a new high. According to General von Schwerin conditions
were "catastrophic." No police or civil authorities had yet re-
turned to Aachen. The old museum director of Aachen, accompanied
by a few city officials who had stayed at their posts, came to see
von Schwerin to tell him that a group of leading citizens had chosen
him, the museum director, to form a provisional city government.
The general gave orders for the evacuation to proceed, provided rail
and motor transport were available, but emphasized that it would
only result in clogging up vital thoroughfares.
In addition to having to cope with the frantic civilian
population, 116th Panzer Division, which on 14 September assumed
direct command of all German elements in its sector, also had
trouble with the Luftwaffe. In totaldisregard of the division
commander's orders the Luftwaffe attempted to pull its ~iatiaircraft
batteries out of Aachen. Field Marshal Gerd von Rtndstedt (Commander
in Chief West) himself had to interfere, reminding Luftwaffe anti-
aircraft troops that they were to take orders, like everybody else,
iaLu&iH[D
LwiL~ly
Sae29
from the superior headquarters to which they were attached. General
von Sonwerin also complained that his Luftwaffe fortress batta-
lions had a tendency to desert their positions in the face of
even minor attacks.*
Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Gen von Schwerin, 0930 on 14 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Rpt, A Gp B to OB WEST, 1200 on 14Sep 44, OB VWEST KTB; Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1310 on 14Sep '44, L XK Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; ETBINT 18 (Schwerin);MS # B-058 (Voigtsberger).
Generalmajor Heinrich Voigtsberger commanded the 60th PanzerGrenadier Regiment. When Count von Schwerin was relieved of thecommand of 116th anzer Division on 15 September 1944, GeneralVoigtsberger became acting division oommander until the new com-manding officer, Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg, arrived on19 September.
Early in the afternoon of 14 September strong American infantry
and armored forces rolled up the bunker line from tne direction
of Brand, Niederforstbach and Oberforstbach. By 1500 they had
gained a line extending from Beverbach Creek via "Linzenshaeuschen"
(on tne Eupen - Aachen Road) to Friedrichsberg Hill. The 116th
Panzer Division, attempting to hold the line from the West Wall to
south of Vaelser Quartier, from there to north of Friedrichsberg
Hill - "Linzenshaeuschen" - Beverbach Creek, had lost contact with
9th Panzer Division on its left, southeast of Aachen. The Germans
noted that their opponents were employing new tactics to crack
West Wall bunkers: the Americans would launch strong infantry
attacks covered by smoke screens while the tanks followed to back
up the attack and to support the infantry in knocking out the bunkers
u« 'y ^ i l ^^j^
.30
one by one. The Americans made heavy use of artillery and smoke
screens.*
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1500 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 14 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Southeast of Aachen in the sector of 9th Panzer Division the
American combat commands resumed their drive up the Stolberg Corridor
in the morning of 14 September. Having taken Oberforstbach and
Niederforstbach, they captured Kornelimuenster at 1030 and Breinig
at 1100.* American tanks were observed shortly after noon con-
Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
tinuing northeastward from Kornelimuenster toward Buesbach.* About
TWX, 116th Pz Div to LEXxI Corps, 1250 bn 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
the same time the Germans reported an American tank driving from
Mulartshuette northeastward toward Zweifall.* A few hours later --
Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1420 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
at 1715 -- American infantry, tanks, and armored cars entered
Zweifall. After fifteen minutes the infantry had captured the
first four bunkers (Bunkers 330, 334, 335, and 336) in the second
ANN 0sfl E
UMCL + rFIE
band of West Wail fortifications, and the task force continued
eastward through the breach in the direction of Vicht and Mausbach.*
Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 1715 and 1720 on 14Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2000 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
In view of the American breakthrough at Zweifall LXXXI Corps ordered
9th Panzer Division to take command of the second band of the West
Wall along with the Landesschuetzen battalions (III/6 and 1/9) com-
mitted there. Headquarters 353d Infantry Division would be dis-
engaged to receive another assignment.* Reinforced by the three
Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div and 353d Inf Div, 1740on 14 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade, 9th Panzer Division married
these assault guns to a company of motorized infantry and committed
these forces in a counterattack against the American tasK force
driving on Mausbacn.* LXXXI Corps issued strict orders to 9th
Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1745 and 1810 on 14 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Panzer Division to throw back the Americans before the end of the
day and to regain full controlof the second belt of West Wall bunkers.*
Tel Cony, L EXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2000 on 14 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
4ier IE
32
The front line of 9th Panzer Division now extended from the
southern edge of Brand - southern edge of Buesbach - east of Zweifall
to. the West Wall east of Roetgen.* At 1800 the Germans reported
Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1930 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen,Letzte Meldung [Final Sitreps], 10.VIII. - 30. IX.44. Referred tohereafter as A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
that at least two hundred American tanks had assembled in
Kornelimuenster. Additional columns were seen moving north fron
Walheim. Up front the American spearhead reached the southern
outskirts of Stolberg at 2000. Apparently the Americans then de-
cided not to continue their advance toward Stolberg and Eschweiler
that evening.* Instead, they worked on their encirclement of Aachen
Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 2030 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,KanpFverlauf.
in the area between Aachen and Stolberg.
Late in the afternoon American forces broke through the 116th
Panzer Division line between Beverbach Creek and Lindert, two miles
west-southwest of Brand, and stabbed into the flank of the 60th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
was committed in support of the division's flank southeast of the
Aachen Municipal Forest.*
Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 14 Sep 44, LXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldun gen.
.as H[L Af~
American tanks and armored cars driving north from the
Walheim - Oberforstbach - Niederforstbach area pushed through
Brand at 1830.* Less than an hour later -- at 1915 -- American
Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXI Corps, 2030 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI
Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
tanks captured Eilendorf and the steel plant at Rothe Erde ["Red
Earth"] east of Aachen.* The city was now ringed on three sides.
Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep 44, IEI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
LWXXI Corps received reports that sizeable elements of 116th Panzer
Division, Antiaircraft Group Aachen. and the Kampfkommandant were
withdrawing to the northeast, supposedly in line with an order
issued by Colonel von Osterroth. General Schack immediately ordered
that all withdrawing elements be rallied and committed in a counter-
attack from the u''erselen area southward toward Rothe Erde.
Contact between 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions was to be re-established
at all cost through the efforts of all able officers of the 116th
Panzer Division Headquarters. A rear area fortress engineer head-
quarters received orders to block the Autobahn to Cologne.*
Rpt on Situation in Aachen area, Gen Schack, 2145 on 14 Sep 44LXXI Corps KTB, Kamnpfverlauf.
By special repeat order from Hitler Aachen was to be evacuated --
if necessary, by force' The 116th Panzer Division was ordered to
S34
support the evacuation measures by regulating traffic. The police
would also be available after 0100 on 15 September. They were
finally returning to Aachen.*
Tel Conv, L~ I Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2345 on 14 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
The mission of 116th Panzer Division on 15 September was to
hold the Schill Line at all cost and to make an effort to wipe out
the American' penetrations at Rothe Erde and Eilendorf. In spite
of General Schack's orders the projected counterattack against this
salient had not yet been launched at daybreak.*
NLg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 0550 on 15 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
The semicircular front around Aachen remained intact from
Vaelser Quartier to Steinebruect in tne morning of 15 September
but buckled just east of Steinebrueck when American infantry and
armor pushed the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion back to
the railroad leading out of Aachen northeast of Burtscheid. Re-
inforced by the 34th Machine Gun Battalion, which had been rallied
after an earlier attempt to withdraw, the reconnaissance battalion
established a defense line along this railway embankment.* The
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0100, 0840 and 1130on 15 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
U~gtLArIH
UN; I l ED 35
attackers did not immediately attempt to breai through this line.
The Americans devoted a large part of the day to the concentration
of strong forces in the area south of Burtscheid. Judging from
the movements they observed and from American artillery fire, the
Germans estimated that at least one infantry division was assembling
East of the city, in and south of Eilendorf, American tanks
and motor transport also continued to assemble until, according to
German estimate, U.S. forces there had been brought up to the
strength of about one armored division. In view of the American
build-up the Germans expected that VII Corps would launch its all-
out attack against Aachen on 16 September.* Although ground operations
Ibid.
seem to have been limited to reconnaissance while this build-up south
and east of Aachen was in progress, American artillery subjected
Aachen and suburbs to heavy fire. The West Wall bunkers north andthe
south of/Aachen - Stolberg road in particular received strong rocket
projector fire.*
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0915 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
U1NCLASSIF FiI $36
At 1530 on 15 September American infantry began to infiltrate
the bunker line south of Rothe Erde in the direction of Geisberg
Hill. The Landesschuetzen battalion there abandoned its positions,
but seven German assault guns held the line behind the pillboxes.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1540 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1700 on 15 Sep44, LIXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At 1700 American forces jumped off in simultaneous attacks from
the "Buschhaus" toward Burtscheid, and from Eilendorf north and
northeast in the direction of Verlautenheide and Geisberg Hill.
The defenders were able to repulse both attacks. Thirty American
tanks rolling northward from Eilendorf were forced towithdraw in
the face of concentrated German artillery fire; the Germans claimed
the destruction of two U.S. tanks.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1718 on 15 Sep 44,iXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 2100on 15 Sep 44, LXIXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
In turning back the American drive on the Aachen suburb of
Burtscheid, the Germans had narrowly prevented the invader from
venturing into the streets of tne old Imperial City for the first
time. To 116th Panzer Division General Schack relayed the Hitler
order demanding the fanatic defense of "Fortress Aachen": "In the
event of an enemy penetration of Aachen, each and every house will
be defended. A strategic withdrawal from the southern to the
northern periphery of tne city is out of the question."*
ddLAJRN lE
- 37
TWX, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1718 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.
Shortly after midnight on 15 September General Schack had re-
peated his order to 9th Panzer Division that the Americans must be
forced out of the second band of West Wall bunkers near Iausbach
at all cost. During the remaining hours of darkness 9th Panzer
Division made ~such preparations for the counterattack as it was
capable of. One replacement battalion was en route to the division;
in addition ten tanks were moving up to the front. In the small
hours of the morning the Landesschuetzen battalion committed on
the division's southern wing (probably 1/9) abandoned its positions;
it was necessary to move up another battalion (probably 328th Re-
placement Training Battalion) from Scheveriuette in order to plug
the gap.*
Tel Cony, IXOXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 on 15 Sep 44, L XIICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Rad, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0353 on15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.
The division launched its attack against the American salient
at dawn and was able to drive away U.S. armor south of Mausbach.
Some bunkers were apparently recaptured in the first assault; two
bunkers remained in American hands.* Two hours later the division
TWX, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0534 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
U CLASSIFI ED37
headquarters had no news on the outcome of the counterthrust toward
Vicht and Zweifall otner than the report that the two bunkers
south of Mausbach had not been captured yet.* For the third time
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0740 on 1.5 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
LXXXI Corps ordered: "9th Panzer Division armor will attac the
enemy and throw him back behind the West Wall. There is no time
to lose'"*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0925 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
In the early afternoon the division was able to report that
as a result of its counterattack all bunkers of the MHR from northeast
of Buesbach to Zweifall were once more in German hands. An American
attack on Buesbach had been repulsed by four tanks of 105th Panzer
Brigade and four assault guns of the division's antitan cmnpany
committed there earlier in the day.* The German success, however,
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 15 Sep 44,A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
was very shortlived. Throughout the day 9th Panzer Division had
watched the American build-up with growing apprehension. In the
early morning the division had expressed concern about the assembly
of two hundred U.S. tanks in Kornelimuenster to which more were
steadily being added. At 1500 a German runner reported a con-
centration of eighty U.S. tanks in Breinig.*
Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 and 1500 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps K'B, Kampfverlauf.
In the early afternoon the German attack bogged down in the
face of the American artillery preparation. Under the heavy American
artillery, tank, and mortar fire the division sustained serious
losses and was unable to execute any movements. The Germans sensed
that the American attack was imminent.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1655 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At 1550 on 15 September American tanks and infantry jumped
off from their assembly area at Breinig and headed for Mausbach.
A furious battle ensued in which the Americans lost six tanks, but
were finally able to capture Mausbach and Weissenberg Hill. An
attempt to continue the drive was stopped by a German counterattack
launched from Gressenich.*
Tel Convs, IXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1600 on 15 Sep 44, andLXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2045 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At 1600 the Americans threw a second punch against 9th Panzer
Division. Forty tanks jumped off from the Eilendorf - Brander
r E 0
ICLS FID 39
Forest assembly area and rolled east. Fifteen minutes later they
faced the German obstacle wall. Although they were unable to achieve
a penetration there, 9th Panzer Division- had to report that "our
infantry was smashed in the Mausbach area as well as east of
Eilendorf. "*
Tel Cony, LI~CI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1650 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kempfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1700 on 15 Sep44, Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB,Tage sme ldun gen.
On the extreme left [southern] wing of 9th Panzer Division,
where the 328th Replacement Training Battalion had occupied the
Scharnhorst Line, American forces also achieved a penetration at
1730 and captured one strongpoint. In the right and central sectors
of 9th Panzer Division weak organic elements of the division,
105th Panzer Brigade, and two training battalions (473d Replacement
Training Battalion and March Battalion Zorn) held the second belt
of West Wall fortifications except for the American penetrations
east of Eilendorf and at Mausbach.*
Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 15 Sep 44, -KXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
In the 116th and 9th Panzer Division sectors the front lines
had not changed mucn over the previous day. Nevertheless, fighting
had been extremely bitter on 15 September, and botdsides had suf-
fered heavy losses. The 9th Panzer Division alone had accounted
&&LM SIHFEDU L 8
4 P 8WA SFH P
for forty-two U.S. tanks.*
Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1345 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung.
The Germans had also sustained serious casualties. Army Group B
issued an order for all battleworthy elements of 9th Panzer Division
still in the assembly area at St. Wendel to move up. to the front
immediately. *
Order, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps (relaying Order, A Gp B toSeventh Army), 2340 on 15 Sep 44, L I Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeres-gruppe, Armee, usw.
ULINtA rIU10
UiIN~i
The LXEXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944*
The following study of the German situation in the LXKI Corssector omits mention of 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions. Althoughsubordinate to LXXXI Corps, these divisions did not participate inoperations against U.S. VII Corps at this time. Several days later275th Infantry Division was shifted to the southern wing of LX XICorps to plug a gap between LXXXI and LXXIV Corps. The divisionwill ie described when it enters into this story. See below, p. 73
On 16 September 1944 the organic fighting forces of 116th
Panzer Division consisted of the 50th and 156th Panzer Grenadier
Regiments and the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion: a total
of five battalions with a combat strength* of roughly 1,600 men.
The term "combat strength" is employed here in translationof the German Kampfstaerke, defined to include only men actuallyengaged in the fighting or in immediate support of front line fightersforward of a battalion command post. The term Gefechtsstaerke,rendered as "fighting strength," applies to all men who fight orsupport fighters forward of a regimental headquarters. See:Gen Order Nr. 1/2000/44 g., 25 Apr 44, OKI/Gen St d H/Org Abt.
In addition the 12th and 19th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions, the
453d Grenadier Training Battalion, and possibly other elements were
attached to the division. The 302d Infantry Training Battalion,
en route to the front, was about to join these forces under the
command of 116th Panzer Division.
Division armor on 16 September was reduced to two Mark IV
tanks and one Panther (Mark V). The division had one assault gun
left; four assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade were attached.
Five assault guns of 217th Assault Gun Brigade and elements of 902d
6 LA ~ IIC
Sf I
42
Assault Gun Brigade were en route to the division. In other anti-
tank weapons the division possessed nine 75-mm. antitank guns, of
whLich one was self-propelled. Five additional 75-mm. antitank
guns were said to be en route from Koenigsberg in East Prussia.
The 116th Panzer Artillery Regiment had three batteries of
150-mm. howitzers and one battery of 105-mm. howitzers. Two other
150-mm. howitzer batteries were attached -- 2d Battery, 992d
Artillery Regiment and 3d Battery, 997th Artillery Regiment.*
Tabulation of Armored Vehicles, 116th Pz Div, 16 Sep 44, andT ~ [Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44], LXXXI Corpsto Seventh Arpy, 22 Sep 44, LXX I Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;Tabulation of Tanks and Antitank Weapons, IXII Corps, 2200 on 17Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Report on Trip, GenBrandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, BefehleHeeresgruppe, !rmee, usw.; Tel Cony, FM Model to CofS, SeventhArm , 1350 on 16 Sep 44, and Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to Cmdr, 13thLuftwaffe Fortress Bn, 1850 on 17 Sep 44, and Entry, 17 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
The 116th Panzer Division also expected the 13th LuftwaffeFortress Battalion and tne 107th Panzer Battalion. The latter,though intended for the Aachen sector, was shifted instead to theArnhem - Nijmegen area when Operation MARKET-GARDEN got underway.As for the 13th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion (645 men), it waseither never attached to 116th Panzer Division despite orders, orremained with that division for only a few days before appearingon the roster of units of 9th Panzer Division.
Since its arrival in the LXXXI Corps area General Mueller's
9th Panzer Division had been reinforced by additional rganic units
as well as by the attachment of miscellaneous other forces. On
15 September 1944 the committed organic strength of 9tbPanzer Division
consisted of the Battalion Schemm* made up of the remaining elements
Schemm seems to have been the commander of 11th Panzer GrenadierRe giment.
C L 'A F~f
UN E43
of 10th and 11th Panzer Grenadier Regiments. This battalion had
a combat strength of 5 officers and 136 enlisted men.
Between 11 and 15 September 1944 the following'infantry batta-
lions had been attached to 9th Panzer Division:
Headquarters of 253d Grenadier TrainingRegiment with 328th Replacement TrainingBattalion and 473d Replacement TrainingBattalion;
Landesschuetzen Battalion I/9;Landesschuetzen Battalion 11I/6;8th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion;Replacement Battalion Nagel;Replacement Battalion Zorn;Remaining Elements of 547th Security Battalion.
Of organic armor and. antitank forces 9th Panzer Division had
the 2d Company, 33d Panzer Regiment, with fifteen Panthers (of
which only eight were operationally fit), and elements of 50th
Antitank Battalion with six assault guns and about fifteen 75-mm.
antitank guns. Attached were remaining elements of 105th Panzer
Brigade with five Panthers and three assault guns, the 105th Panzer
Grenadier Battalion, and three assault guns of 394th Assault Gun
Brigade. In addition 9th Panzer Division expected six assault guns
of the 217th Assault Gun Brigade and ten tanks which were supposedly
en route to Dueren.
The organic artillery of 9th Panzer Division consisted of two
batteries of 150-mram. howitzers, the 2d Battalion, 102d Panzer
Artillery Regiment with three batteries of five 105-mm. howitzers
each, and one reinforced battery of the 287th Flak Battalion with
one 88-mm., three 37-mm., and three 20O-mm. antiaircraft guns, two
of which were quadruple-mounted.
ULnilEU "" I f
U r:AiSf rFr 44
Attached to 9th Panzer Division artillery were one battery
of 12th SS Panzer Division with five 105-mm. howitzers and the
490th Heavy Howitzer Battalion* -- three batteries with a total of
The Germans call 150-mm. howitzers "heavy howitzers" [schwereFeldhaubitzen ].
nine 150-mm. howitzers.
As for engineer forces, the 2d Company, 16th Panzer Engineer
Battalion was attached to 9th Panzer Division.*
Strength Rpts, 9th Pz Div to X~ I Corps, 16 and 21 Sep 44,and Comments on Strength Report of 9th Pz Div, LXXXI Corps G-3 Off,16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldingen der Div.; Tabulation of Tanksand AT Weapons, LXXXI Corps, 2200 on 17 Sep 44, DJXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Report, Gen Brandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; Tel Conv,LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1500 on 15 Sep 44, and Tel Cony, FMModel to CofS, Seventh Army, 1350 on 16 Sep 44, and Entry, 17 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; TWX (Weekly Strength Report asof 1200 on 16 Sep 44), LXXiI Corps to Seventh Army, 22 Sep 44, andTabulation of Armored Vehicles, LXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div. usw.; TWX, A Gp B to OB lEST, 2350 on 22 Sep44, A Gp B KTB, Operations-Befehle.
To sum up: on 15 September 1944 9th Panzer Division with
attached units had an infantry combat strength of roughly 2,500
men, approximately 200 machine guns, 13 Panther tanks, 12 assault
guns, about 15 75-mm. antitank guns, 15 150-mm. howitzers, Zu 105-mm.
howitzers, 1 88-mm., 3 37-mm., and 3 20-mm. antiaircraft guns.
As a result of the highly inadequate signal communications,
the frontage of 9th Panzer Division had proved too wide for effective
exercise of command. To remedy this condition LXXXI Corps committed
LE1E[1lflE
iNCLBSSITIED 45
Headquarters 353d Infantry Division with two companies of Landes-
schuetzen (possibly Landesschuetzen Battalion II/6) in the southern
half of the 9th Panzer Division sector. The new boundary between
9th Panzer and 353d Infantry Divisions extended from Schevenhuette -
Jaegerfahrt (north of Zweifall) - Vennwegen - Hahn - Schmidthof to
Raeren. In the south the new sector of 353d Infantry Division was
defined by the boundary between LXXXI and LXXIV Corps.*
Tel Convs, LX CI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 2310 on 14 Sep 44,and 1510 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
For the defense of this sector some elements of 9th Panzer
Division were attached to 353d Infantry Division: Headquarters of
253d Grenadier Training Regiment under Colonel Feind with the 328th
Replacement Training Battalion, Replacement Battalion Nagel, re-
maining elements of the almost completely smashed Landesschuetzen
Battalion I/9 and of the 547th Security Battalion, a heavy weapons
company, about eight 75-mm. antitank guns and one battery of three
150-mm. howitzers. With these forces the combat strength of 353d
Infantry Division rose to roughly seven hundred men. The 9th Panzer
Division was left with a combat strength of 56 officers and 1,941
enlisted men, organized in two Kampfgruppen under the command,
respectively, of Major Volker and Colonel Max Sperling (presumably
commander of 33d Panzer Regiment).*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Divi,-1500 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf;TWX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200
uJiLLAf HEP
UNCLASSFI IE 446
on 16 Sep 44), A Gp B to OB WEST, 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44,and Report, Maj Volker to 9th Pz Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.
The rear area functions of 353d Infantry Division were assumed
by Gruppe Jungklaus, a rear area headquarters subordinate to LEXXI
Corps, with orders to rally all stragglers in the communications
zone and to begin work on a blocking line between the Geilenkirchen -
Rheydt Rail Line and the left boundary of LXXXI Corps -- the Roer
Position or Schlieffen Line.*
Order, LXXI Corps to Gruppe Jungklaus, 1830 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
Late in the evening of 15 September General Schack received
the cheering news that the first elements of 12th Infantry Division
would arrive at Juelich and Dueren during the night and. that the
transport of the entire division would be completed some thirty
hours later.* LJXXI Corps ordered the division to assemble in the
Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 2015 on 15 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
area. As elements of the division arrived, they were to be readied
immediately so as to be available at any time for counterattacks
in a southerly and southwesterly direction. Corps, however, assured
mnessF~
UNCLASSiFiED47
Colonel Gerhard Engel* that there was no intention to commit his
Colonel Gerhard Engel, Commander of 12th Infantry Division,was military adjutant to Hitler from 1937 until 1944. In 1944 hejoined the 12th Infantry Division to command the 27th FusilierRegiment and then rose to the position of division commander. Atwar's end he had attained the rank of brigadier general.
division before it was fully assembled, unless developments compelled
a piecemeal commitment of these forces.*
Order, IXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2300 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.
Arriving among the exhausted and understrength forces of
LXXXI Corps, 12th Infantry Division made a deep impression on both
military and civilian population. Here was the first full-strength,
rested and fresh division, composed of young, healthy and well-
trained men, that the Germans in the West had seen in a long time.
The appearance of this division greatly boosted the morale of the
troops and the civilians in the area.
Organized along the lines of a "Type 1944 Infantry Division",
12th Infantry Division numbered 14,800 men, of whom roughly one
quarter (about 3,800 men) were combat strength. This infantry
strength was divided among the 27th Fusilier Regiment, the 48th
and 89th Grenadier Regiments, and the 12th Fusilier Battalion.
The division was fully equipped except for its twenty authorized
assault guns (Field Marshal Model ordered seventeen assault guns
of 102d Assault Gun Brigade attached to 12th Infantry Division).
UC LASSIFI 48
. ~48
The 12th Artillery Regiment had its authorized strength of nine
batteries of 105-mm. howitzers and three batteries of 150-mm.
howitzers. The division's antitank battalion possessed twelve
75-mm. antitank guns.
In view of the desperate situation in the Aachen area, Field
Marshal von Rundstedt had requested they 12th Infantry Division be
moved at top speed. Thanks to this priority and the prevailing
misty, rainy weather the division had been able to travel across
Germany (from East Prussia to the Aachen area) undetected and un-
attacked by Allied aircraft and had thus maintained intact the
all-important element of surprise.*
Report, A Gp B, 1335 on 14 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB; Tel Conv, FMModel to Seventh Army, 1350 on 16 Sep 44, LX0CI Corps KTB, Kampf-verlauf; TWX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44), "IXI Corps, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; DailySitrep, A Gp B, 0230 on 17 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS# A-971 (Engel).
In his "Order for the Conduct of Operations and Order of
Battle in the West Wall" of 16 September 1944 General Brandenberger
wrote: "The enemy is expected to continue to make his main effort
in the penetration area east of Aachen.... Seventh Army will de-
fend the positions from northeast of Maastricht to Aachen and the
West Wall to the last man and the last bullet. The penetrations
achieved by the enemy will be wiped out. The forward line of
bunkers [Scharnhorst Line] will be regained...."*
Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 16 Sep 44, UC=K I Corps KTB,Befehle: Heeresgrupoe, Armee, usw.
49
Specifically the mission of LXXXI Corps was twofold. First,
its forces were to wipe out American penetrations of the Schill
Line east of Aachen. This achieved, the Germans would counter-
attack on a large scale to throw U.S. forces out of the area east
and south of Aachen and to regain full control of the Scharnhorst
Line. For this purpose 12th Infantry Division had been attached
to LXXXI Corps. For greater effectiveness the LIXI Corps sector
was shortened: 353d Infantry Division with attached elements was
now subordinated to LXXIV Corps so that the new boundary line be-
tween the two corps extended now from Eupen via Zweifall and Dueren
to Cologne.
Thus on 16 September opposite U.S. VII Corps General Schack
had at his disposal 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions and the elements
of 12th Lnfantry Division now arriving in the area. After 1Eth
Infantry Division was fully committed, intentions were for 116th
Panzer Division to be disengaged and assembled around Eschweiler
as-corps reserve. Then 9th Panzer Division also would be relieved
and assembled in the area southeast of Dueren at the disposal of
Seventh Army.*
Ibid. As matters turned out, this relief did not take placeuntil 246th Volks Grenadier Division arrived on the scene.
L i; ASSF IFED
gt A LASSIFIF $
LCXXI Corps: Counterattack and Stalemate
After a strong artillery preparation during the night from
15 to 16 September American forces infiltrated the 116th Panzer
Division lines south of Verlautenheide in ,the morning of 16
September and achieved a penetration by capturing several bunkers
just south of the village. The division charged bitterly, "Local
defense units and stragglers committed in West Wall fortifications
have no combat value, no ability to stand their ground...."* While
MAng Sitrep, LIXXI Corps, 0520 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Mng Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 0545 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
the Americans pushed into Verlautenheide and captured the village,
another U.S. armored force jumped off from south of Eilendorf and
drove eastward into Atsch at 0515.*
Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1445 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Tel Cony, CILXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0550 on 16Sep 44, LXKXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
In the Stolberg Corridor American tanks and infantry assembled
during the night between Mausbach and Diepenlinchen while heavy
American artillery fire hit the area north of Mausbach and the
vicinity of Eschweiler. The Germans also reported American tanks
southwest of Schevenhuette and at a hunting lodge south of Zweifall
(LXXIV Corpo). From these signs the Germans predicted "a very wide
push north and northeastward" at daybreak aimed toward Eschweiler.*
' ib
51
U " L ?1 I I E B
Tel Conv, L;XCI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0325 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Mg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 0520 on16 Sep 44, L.KXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At Mausbach and Weissenberg Hill there was little American
ground activity during the morning. The Germans stopped some re-
connaissance patrols probing northeastward from Mausbach toward
IWerth and Gressenich.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1400 on 16 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Noon Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 1445 on 16Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TVX, 9th Pz Div to LXXXICorps, 2100 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
Early in the morning of 16 September the eagerly awaited first
elements of 12th Infantry Division arrived. The situation was now
too critical for LXXXI Corps to keep its promise to Colonel Engel
to give him an opportunity for assembling his entire division before
it was committed. In view of the American penetration in the
Verlautenheide - Atsch area and the imminently expected drive on
Eschweiler, General Schack ordered the 27th Fusilier Regiment to
go into action straight from the railroad station. As soon as its
1st Battalion and antitank company had detrained at Juelich, they
were moved to the Verlautenheide area by all military and civilian
means of transport available -- personnel carriers, mail trucks,
buses, and the like. The 3d Battalion, arriving in Dueren, 're-
ceived orders to move from Eschweiler to the edge of the woods
southwest of Schwarzenbruch (Wuerseler Forest). The 12th Infanty
.3 5 f. 9 <r g ^ .
AUS]FIFP 52
Division artillery was not expected until 2200 on 16 September.
Until then the 27th Fusiliers had to rely on co-operation with
9th and 116th Panzer Division artillery.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0850 on 16 Sep 44, andOrder, LIXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1015 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.
In the sector of 116th Panzer Division the counterattack of
the 27th Fusilier Regiment took U.S. VII Corps forces by surprise
and was successful. The 1st Battalion pushed the American spear-
head out of Verlautenheide and captured the strategically important
high ground around this village. The battalion continued its drive
toward Eilendorf and recaptured most of the bunkers along the
Verlautenheide - Eilendorf road. Before reaching Eilendorf,
however, the attack bogged down in the face of American resistance.*
Tel Conv, ULXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1800 on 16 Sep 44, andTel Conv, IX!XI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2130 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Shortly after noon on 16 September the Americans resumed their
drive toward Eschweiler. A two-pronged attack from west and south
converged on Buesbach, capturing the village. American forces
exerted pressure against the Stolberg area with attacks on Hamm,
Schneidmuehle, Muensterbusch and the southern outskirts of Stolberg
itself.
From the salient at Mausbach and VYeissenberg Hill U.S. armor
jumped off in a northerly and northeasterly direction. In bitter
U CLASS F ED
tV.iI
tank battles which lasted throughout the afternoon VII Corps forces
achieved their deepest penetration of the Stolberg Corridor to
date when they captured Diepenlinchen and Gressenich, Krewinkel and
Schevenhuette. *
Evg Sitrep, LKXXI Corps, 1700 on 16 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,L XXI Corps, 2140 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen;T'X, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 16 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.
The 3d Battalion of 27th Fusilier Regiment had moved rapidly
through Escbweiler toward the endangered Stolberg area. The batta-
lion captured Atsch at 1330.* Continuing south, the battalion was
Evg Sitrep, LDXXXI Corps, 1700 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
able to regain control of Buesbach -- but only for a few hours.
By evening Buesbach was once more American. In the face of the
strong American assault in the Stolberg Corridor the forces of
27th Fusilier Reginnt did not suffice to re-establish a coherent
German front from Stolberg to Zweifall and to wipe out the American
bridgeheads across the Vicht River. The big German countertnrust
had to wait until 12th Infantry Division could move its own artil-
lery and its other two infantry regiments into the combat area.
In the meantime 27th Fusilier Regiment could do no more than seal
off the latest American penetrations with the aid of the remaining
elements of 9th Panzer Division. In view of the very critical
&" vuA fl E
54
situation in this sector German forces were consolidated under
one coTrland.
Renamed Kampfgruppe Sperling, the remaining elements of 9th
Panzer Division temporarily lost their division status. Effective
2000 on 16 September, Kampfgruppe Sperling was attached to 12th
Infantry Division with the proviso that its forces would be re-
leased once 12th Infantry Division was fully committed.*
Tel Cony, XXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1725 on 16 Sep 44,-L I I Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs,2000 on 16 Sep 44, LX..XI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; Report, GenBrandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle:Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.
There was another motive for attaching the elements of 9thPanzer Division to 12th Infantry Division. In the morning of 16September 1944 General Brandenberger had visited the 9th PanzerDivision command post and had asked routine questions regardingthe German G-2 estimate of the American situation in the divisionsector, the location of the 9th Panzer Division front lines, dis-position and strength of 9th Panzer Division forces, etc. Inattempting to answer these auestions General Mueller revealed him-self as ignorant of the situation in his own sector, whereuponGeneral Brandenberger relieved him of his command on a charge ofincompetence.
The senior regimental commander, Colonel Max Sperling, assumedcommand of 9th Panzer Division until evening of 16 September.
In this study the designation 9th Panzer Division will con-tinue to be used in reference to these units.
Colonel Engel now commanded the former sector of 9th Panzer
Division from the Verlautenheide area to the LDXXI Corps southern
boundary. By capturing the strategic high ground of Verlautenheide,
12th Infantry.Division had established a coherent front on its
right and had firm contact with 116th Panzer Division. On the left,
however, the German flank lay exposed all the way to Schevenhuette.
L~eSS~ h
The most important immediate task was to establish contact with the
northern wing of 353d Infantry Division in the Zweifall - Huertgen
area. The combat mission of 12th Infantry Division .was to launch
a major counterattacx from the Eschweiler - Wenau line to regain the
second band of West Wall fortifications from Geisberg Hill to Zweifall.*
Order, LXI Corps to all divs, 2000 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div.
South of Aachen, minor American attacks toward the city on 16
September were warded off by the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
A small American penetration south of Steinebrueck was wiped out
when the 453d Replacement Training Battalion counterattacked late
in the day and recaptured two bunkers.*
Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tages-meldungen; Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2350 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Police and Party had returned to Aachen during the night from
14 to 15 September, and the evacuation was once more in full swing.
General von Schwerin was in big trouble. When U.S. forces had failed
to capture the city contrary to his expectatior( his compromising
letter to the American comrander had fallen into the hands of Nazi
officials. Because of boththis letter and his effort to stop the
chaotic exodus from Aachen, von Schwerin was relieved of his command
and ordered to stand trial before Hitler's "People's Court." Rather
I N AS S IF I
56
than comply, von Schwerin decided to remain with his division until
the fall of Aachen. He felt that his men would know how to protect
nim against Nazi henchmen. While his senior regimental commander,
General Voigtsberger, assumed the duties of division commander until
the arrival of General von Waldenburg, von Schierin hid out in a
farmer's home in Kohlscheid, northeast of Laurensberg. The recon-
naissance platoon of 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment s~urrounded the
farmhouse with a cordon of machine guns. No police detachment
trying to arrest their division commander would have escaped alive.
WVhen the capture of Aachen did not materialize, General von Schwerin
finally decided to present himself at Seventh. Army headquarters to
appear before a military court.*
Report, FM Yodel to OB 1VEST, 2330 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Tel Cony, G-1 to G-3, IXXI Corps, 1045 on 16Sep 44,. and Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 1945 on 17 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; 201-File on Generalleutnant GrafGerhard von Schwerin; ETHINT 18 (Schwerin).
Apparently Field Marshal von Rundstedt interceded on Generalvon Schwerin's behalf and even proposed -- in vain -- that the latterbe reinstated as Commanding General of 116th Panzer Division. Aftersome months in the OK Officer Pool [doghouse], von Schwerin wasappointed Commanding Officer of 90th Panzer Grenadier Division andlater Commanding General of LX~II Panzer Corps in Italy.
Early in the morning of 17 September the 27th Fusilier Regiment
of 12th Infantry Division, committed in the Verlautenheide - Stolberg
area, resumed its attack to regain the West Wall positions southeast
of Eilendorf. In this endeavor the regiment failed. After gaining
insignificant ground and recapturing a few bunkers, the regiment
bogged down in the face of heavy American artillery fire and suffered
U#GLF ° IED
57
UNCLASSIFIED
considerable casualties. It also ran short of ammunition and was
forced to assume a defensive role for the rest of the day. In the
defense it was more successful. Its 1st Battalion strengthened the
contact with 116th Panzer Division at Verlautenheide, while the 3d
Battalion, on the left, came to the aid of the remaining elements
of 9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade who had orders to
hold Stolberg at all cost. Between Verlautenheide and Stolberg the
27th Fusilier Regiment, 9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade
repulsed all American attacks launched from the Eilendorf area on
17 September and thus enabled the other regiments of 12th Infantry
Division to carry out their counterthrust against the Mausbach salient
without danger to their right flank.*
Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0845, 1150, 1340, and1610 on 17 Sep 44, L2MXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, C CXICorps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17Sep 44, LKXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).
During the morning hours of 17 September first the 48th and
shortly afterwards the 89th Grenadier Regiments detrained in Dueren.
With these forces 12th Infantry Division was supposed to recapture
Mausbach and to restore a coherent German front from Stolberg to
Zweifall.*
Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 1150 on 17 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
The 89th Grenadier Regiment received orders to assemble southeast
of Eschweiler and to launch its attack via Hastenrath - Scherpenseel
PAC~ 'ITD
II t
toward Werth, Weissenberg Hill and Diepenlinchen. The mission of
48th Grenadier Regiment was to move through Heistern - Venau - Hamich,
and to jump off from Hamich toward Gressenich and Krewinkel, capture
Mausbach and reach the Stolberg - Vicht road.*
MS # A-971 (Engel).
According to orders the 48th Grenadier Regiment jumped off from
Hamich and captured Gressenich, holding it against immediate American
counterattacks from the direction of Schevenhuette.* The battalion
Evg Sitrep, tLCXI Corps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep 44, LXWXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
on the left attacked toward Krewinkel but ran into determined re-
sistance and developed a temporary ammunition shortage so that it
was forced to halt its attack.* The battalion on the right, driving
Tel Conv, IXKXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1305 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
toward the Mausbach - Diepenlinchen line, had a stroke of unusually
good luck. At a point halfway between Mausbach and Diepenlinchen
it smashed into the flank of an American attack launched from Mausbach
apparently in the general direction of Eschweiler. Coming from an
unexpected direction the assault took the Americans by surprise.
The 48th Grenadier Regiment was able to knock out nine U.S. tanks
and to capture fifty-seven Americans including one colonel (a
4NLAASSJtFEP
}
59
regimental commander, according to German sources). But after
achieving this success the German attack bogged down just east of
Diepenlinchen in the face of tenacious American resistance.*
Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).
The 89th Grenadier Regiment had meanwhile launched its attack
from the Hastenrath - Scherpenseel area. Instead of waiting foronly
all its forces to assemble there, it umped off at noon with/one
battalion in order to meet the threatening American drive on Eschweiler.
The battalion pushed south through ,Werth; in exceedingly bitter
fighting it captured Weissenberg Hill at 1330 and reached the eastern
periphery of Diepenlinchen an hour later. There it also encountered
such strong American resistance that its attack bogged down.*
Sitrep, 12th Inf Div to LXXI Corps, 1340 on 17 Sep 44, and TelCony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1535 on 17 Sep 44, LXX{I CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, ILXII Corps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, andDaily Sitrep, LXI Corps,2145 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).
In view of strong American pressure from Krewinkel and probably
also the threat to its left flank from Schevenhuette and the 1Wenau
to shift its weight from right to left and to make its main effort
through Krewinkel rather than through Diepenlinchen. Permission was
asked and granted to call off the attack while the German forces
U CLASS IFt 60
regrouped.*
Tel Convs, IXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1610 and 1730 on 17Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
By this time the second battalion of 89th Grenadier Regiment
and additional artillery and antitank forces had arrived on the
battlefield.* Thus reinforced the Germans resumed their attack
Tel Cony, 3DOL I Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1940 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXCXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep44, I~OI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
at dusk. The main effort drive on the left pushed through the
Krewinkel woods into Krewinkel, while on tne right the forces pressing
south from Veissenberg Hill and the vicinity of Diepenlinchen
penetrated the northern part of Mausbach. This achieved, 12th Infantry
Division halted for tne night.* On 18 September 27th Fusilier
Tel Cony, L~I Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2230 on 17 Sep 44,LXCI Corns KTB, Kampfverlauf.
Regiment was to continue its efforts to capture additional bunkers
near Muensterbusch, while the 89th Grenadier Regiment, which had
suffered heavy casualties, would regroup and hold its line.*
MS -# A-971 (Engel).
The day's events proved that 12th Infantry Division would not
find it easy to dislodge the Americans from their salient beyond the
3s rs
61
Schill Line, Once tney had recovered from tne initial surprise of
being nit by unexpectedlyr formidable German forces, the Americans
lost no time before launching powerful, well-supported counterattacks.
After American artillery had shot the Germans out of Mausbach and
Diepenlinchen during the night, two American task forces launched
an attack at midnight from tne M.ausbach area toward Stolberg.
,'hile a hail of artillery fire pounded the 1st Battalion of 48th
Grenadier Regiment east of Tausbach with apparent intent to secure
the American right flank, U.S. forces advanced to tne southern and
southeastern outskirts of Stolberg. They captured Hamn.erberg Hill,
Burghoizerhof, and the W'est 5Wall bunkers along the Vicht River as
far as Dinsfeld at 000 and continued their drive toward Donnerberg
Hill.*
Tel Conv, LLXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0400 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorrs KTB, IFampfverlauf; Mng Sitrep, LX2XI Corps, 0605 on 18 Sep44, 1DX.I Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 19 Sep44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Another U.S. combat command jumped off toward Stolberg frca
the Brander Forest and drove as far as the church in Muensterbusch,
just west of Stolberg.* Perceiving the threatening double envelopment
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kanpfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LCXXI Corps, 1625 on 18 Sep 44,DOO Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
of Stolberg, Colonel Engel decided not to continue the Mausbach -
Krewinkel attack (which no longer looked like an easy thing, anyway)
ii:>IHF
62
in the morning of 18 September, but rather to shift his main effort
against the Americans driving on Stolberg. LXXI Corns irnediately
approved his new intentions.*
Tel Convs, LXXXI Coros to 12th Inf Div, 0400 and 0425 on 18Sep 44, LXJDI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
As a result German resistance in the Stolberg area stiffened.
Though the Germans were unable to gain more than insignificant
ground, they successfully stopped all American attacks. During the
morning the 27th Fusilier Regiment repulsed a minor American attack
against Verlautenheide, while German artillery hit U.S. positions
on Geisberg Hill. The American drive on Donnerberg Hill was thrown
back with heavy losses; the German counterattack recaptured two
bunkers on Hammerberg Hill. The Germans in Stolberg also repulsed
an American attack against the southern periphery of the town at
1200, but not before some streets of Stolberg had become a battle-
ground for the first time.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, L=0XI Corps, 1625 on 18Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Near Diepenlinchen on 18 Septemberlmerican forces badly mauled
the 89th Grenadier Regiment. Its 1st Battalion had orders to attack
through Diepenlinchen and penetrate the woods west of that village.
Earlier in the morning strong American forces had moved into
UNC IF 63
Diepenlinchen after U.S. artillery had swept the Germans out of
there. The Ist Battalion suffered very heavy casualties in the face
of the American batteries. After a bitter battle the Germans suc-
ceeded in capturing Diepenlinchen again, but under murderous artil-
lery fire their attack bogged down just west of the village. Relentless
American fire reduced the 1st Battalion of the 89th Grenadier Regiment
to one hundred men -- about a fifth of its initial combat strength.*
Mng Sitrep, LKXII Corps, 0605 on 18 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 1625 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TelCony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44, LXIXI CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.
At 1730 an American counterattack was able to capture Diepenlinchen
once more. An American attack from Schevenhuette tovward Gressenich
was repulsed.*
Daily Sitrep, LXXI Corps, a 00 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Tagesme ldungen.
According to MSS # A-971 (Engel) and B-816 (Schack) the 2dBattalion of the 48th Grenadier Regiment launcned an attack towardSchevenhuette just before dawn on 18 September and surprised Americantroops there just as they were being relieved by new forces. Thusthe Germans were able to capture Schevenhuette in furious house-to -house and hand-to-hand fighting. By an immediate counterattack,however, the Americans surrounded the two German companies inSchevenhuette; the Germans dug in but were unable to hold out. Aftersuffering heavy losses, they finally fought their way back to their
own lines. By evening Schevenhuette was in American hands againand continued to threaten the flank of 12th Infantry Division.
The story of the above operation has been relegated to thisfootnote because the writer entertains serious doubt as to whetherit ever took place. It seems highly probable that Generals Schackand Engel, on whose postwar accounts this story is based, confusedit with a very similar operation which definitely took place on 22
~~~LA6 6ME
Ei 1 ) &6# F
September. The German contemporary documents contain no record ofany German operations in Schevenhuette on 18 September beyond onesolitary hint, in one document, of a later date, which speaks of"... losses sustained in Schevenhuette on 18 September...." Butfor this single straw, the writer would have simply dismissed thestory as one of many historical inaccuracies to be found in theGerman postwar accounts -- and it may well be just thatL
In the evening of 18 September the 12th Infantry Division front
line extended from the southern periphery of Verlautenheide - Harmm -
western edge of Stolberg - Hammerberg Hill - Niederhof - Weissenberg
Hill - Gressenich.* By evening the division had also assembled its
Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 18 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
fusilier battalion and its engineer battalion. The attack on
Diepenlinchen would continue -- "perhaps a regrouping period of
twenty-four hours will be required first...."*
Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Col Engel, 2045 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf. /
Late in the evening of 18 September the Germans outlined their
plan for further operations against the Mausbach salient. Since
Stolberg was the key to 12th Infantry Division operations, all
elements of 9th Panzer Division would be comnitted against the
American forces w"ich had penetrated the factory areas north and
west of Stolberg. After careful reconnaissance the 12th Infantry
Division engineer battalion would jump off at daybreak on 20 September
1944 through the woods toward Schevenhuette.
MOW.~lSE
UNCLASSIFE B65
With both flanks (Stolberg and Schevenhuette) thus secured,
both battalions of 89th Grenadier Regiment were to attack south-
westward across Diepenlinchen. The Fusilier Battalion supported by
ten PAnthers would proceed southeast from the Stolberg area and
wheel into the West Wall toward Mausbach. Then all forces were to
converge and attack along the West Wall (Vicht River) toward Zweifall.*
Tel Cony, LXXII Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2230 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
On the Aachen front American forces made no serious attacks
toward the city on 17 and 18 September. Aside frema minor attacks
at Steinebrueck and Burtscheid, which were repulsed by 116th Panzer
Division, they contented themselves with an almost ceaseless barrage
of artillery fire against German positions in and around the city.
The scene of American operations against 116th Panzer Division was
shifting northward where U.S. XIX Corps was engaged in its effort
to envelop Aachen from the north [Cf.: Chapter IV]. The division's
armor situation was improved on 18 September by the addition of
fifteen assault guns of the 902d Assault Gun Brigade. The division
also counted a new American jeep among its vehicles -- a German
prisoner of war had escaped his captors in the stolen jeep. No
doubt the man was cock of the walk in his company that day.*
Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 17 Sep 44, and 1925 on 18 Sep 44,IXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
U CLASSFIE
66
The events of 19 September 1944 -- similar to many days of
fighting on the Western Front -- were shaped by the fact that the
Germans were in the habit of attacking early in the morning, while
the Americans chose the afternoon to launch their operations.
The main actions of the day took place in the Stolberg area.
At 1100 forces of 9th Panzer Division and 12th Infantry Division were
able to recapture the factory belt west of Stolberg as well as three
bunkers on Hammerberg Hill southeast of that town. Sporadic fighting
in the area continued past noon.*
Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1200 on 19 Sep 44, LMXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 1620 on 19 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
Shortly thereafter the Americans began the usual very heavy
artillery preparation signalling their impending attack. The American
operation in the afternoon of 19 September was two-pronged and aimed
at an envelopment of Stolberg. On the [American] left strong infantry
and armor jumped off from a Muensterbusch - Buesbach base line in
a northeasterly direction toward Stolberg. This attack succeeded
in recapturing the factory area and in achieving some penetrations
in the western part of Stolberg proper. On the [American] right
other U.S. forces launched their attack from the woods northwest
of Mausbach and captured Niederhof, Burgholzerhof, and some buners
on Hammerberg Hill. In the face of heavy American artillery fire
ranging as far as Hastenrath elements of one 12th Infantry Division
battalion and six Panthers launched a flanking counterattack from
~M@%BSI LU
INCLASSFIED
the woods southwest of Hastenrath and drove down the road via
Hochwegerhof toward Niederhof.*
Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1800 and 2010 on 19Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Knmpfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,2215 on 19 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
This counterattack apparently was less than successful, for
during the night American troops supported by five tanks were able
to extend their gains northeastward when they captured Hochwegerhof
(about one mile north of Diepenlinchen) at 0200 on 20 September.*
Mng Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 20 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.
West of Stolberg, on the other hand, the see-saw battle con-
tinued: late in the evening of 19 September German troops managed
to retake three bunkers. Two of these were located near the rail-
road running along the southeastern edge of the W'uerseler Forest
(just east of Hamm and Kohlbusch) while the third was at the western
end of that forest.*
Ibid.
sectorThe Aachen/was rather quiet on 19 September. Early in the morning
116th Panzer Division reported increased American reconnaissance
activity northwest of Rothe Erde, but aside from that the Americansartillery
limited themselves to harassing/fire against the German MLR and rear
iL L HA
68
areas for the remainder of the day.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0415 on 19 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kanpfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2215 on19 Sep 44, 3X1 Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
All day on 19 September the fate of the 12th Infantry Division
counterattack, planned for the morrow, hung in the balance. For
one thing, the division faced a serious ammunition shortage.
Delivery of at least 6,100 rounds of 105-mm. ammunition was essential
before the division could carry out its projected attack. Since
LXKXI Corps was unable to supply this ammunition, it turned to
Seventh Army for help. The army transport officer reported that
an ammunition supply train was expected at Dueren during the night
fran 19 to 20 September, but that its contents were unknown.*
Tel Conv, LX:XXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0200 on 19 Sep 44, andTel Convs, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 0310 and 04)0 on 19 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
It is not clear whether or not this train evetually helpedto ease the shortage, since the attack was called off, anyway, andthe reasons are complex, involving, among other factors, a changein command at the corps command level.
To complicate matters further, 9th Panzer Division, whose forces
were needed to help restore the situation around Eilendorf, was
short of fuel. Nevertheless, in the evening of 19 September plans
still called for 12th Infantry Division to go ahead with its attack,
although General Schack remarked that "the attack by 12th Infantry
Division tomorrow morning will have little success."*
UNCLASS SEC
69
Tel Convs, Gen Schack to CofS, LXXXI Corps, 1100 and 2230 on19 Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 19 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
In addition to its other problems 12th Infantry Division already
faced a personnel shortage. In the morning of 20 September Colonel
Engel oriented his new corps commander, General der Infanterie
Friedrich J. M. Koechling* about the situation. In stressing the
On 20 September 1944 General Schack was relieved as commanderof LYJKI Corps (in connection with the Schwerin affair) and was re-placed by General Koechling.
gravity of his situation, Colonel Engel stated that only four
hundred men of the 89th Grenadier Regiment were still available for
the defense of the sector east of Stolberg. One engineer company
of 12th Infantry Division, intended to close the gap near Duffenter
(American salient at Hochwegerhof) had not arrived and its where-
abouts were still unknown.
In view of the critical operational and logistical situation
the new corps commander countermanded General Schack's order for a
large-scale 12th Infantry Division attack on 32 September and stated
that, "in view of the heavy losses sustained and the mightymaterial
superiority of the enemy, he will, in the future, order an attack
only when it promises more success; aside from that the main mission
will be to hold the line and to avoid unnecessary losses."*
Tel Cony, Gen Koechling to. Col Engel, 0700 on 2u Sep 44, LXXIICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
K, 6 L lEPE
UN ~iiPFEDf 70
All nignt long American medium and heavy guns shot harassing
fire against the entire LXXI Corps sector. In the sector of ll6th
Panzer Division an American combat patrol, favored by the early morning
mist, attached the German MLR south of Burtscheid at 0800 on 20
September and was repulsed. Aside from that, action in the Aachen
sector was again limited to an artillery duel which lasted all day.*
Between Muensterbusch and Gressenich the forces of 12th Infantry
Division spent a very busy day trying to defeat American endeavors
to envelop Stolberg and to push further up the Stolberg Corridor
toward Es chwe ii er.
American operations on 20 September began with an armored in-
fantry drive from Diepen±inchen northeastward toward Werth. Fearing
a penetration at the boundary between 89th and 48th Grenadier Regiments,
Colonel Engel ordered an immediate counterattack. This attack,
launched at noon on a fairly broad front, succeeded not only in
turning back the American attack toward Werth but also in closing
the gap between Stolberg and Duffenter and sealing off the American
penetration at Hochwegerhof east of Duffenter. The 12th Infantry
Division established a coherent front line from the southern edge
of Stolberg - Duffenter - eastward on tne Duffenter-Werth road as
far as Hochwegerhof - southward to Weissenberg - southern periphery
of Gressenich - northern periphery of Schevenhuette.*
UJJ U L AlED
IIEC LAS-SltL1
Tel Convs, LXXXI Carps to 12th Inf Div, 1140 and 1400 on 20Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,2155 on 20 Sep 44, I3XI Corps KTB, Tsgesmeldungen..
Later in the afternoon American forces embarked on the inevitable
daily assault on Stolberg. Again they attacked on both sides of the
German-held town. West of Stolberg American forces achieved a
penetration at the site of the Stolberg Gun Factory. Driving north-
ward from the Buesbach area American tanks and infantry attacked
Donnerberg Hill, held by one and a half companies of the 12th
Engineer Battalion.* The engineers were able to halt the American
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1845 on 3) Sep 44, DIXICorps KTB, Kampfrerlauf.
attack at first, but soon U.S. forces had thrown a ring around
Donnerberg Hill. Two German combat patrols, one from the northwest,
the other from the northeast tried to crack this ring but failed.
American forces fanned out from Donnerberg Hill: U.S. infantry at-
tacked from Donnerberg Hill westward toward Stolberg while U.S.
tanks sat on the western slope of the hill spewing fire at the city
below.*
Tel Cony, .XXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 20 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
In the meantime other American forces had driven north from
the vicinity of Muensterbusch and soon their tanks were plowing up
6, L A IS'E
72
the small vegetable gardens west of the Stolberg factory belt.* As
Tel Conv, LIXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 20 Sep 44,LXKII Corps KT B, Kampfverlauf.
The gardens mentioned were in all likelihood smal "Victory"type gardens cultivated by factory workers and owned communally.This institutuon is found all over Germany in peace and war and iscalled "Schrebergarten."
the day changed to night, American troops entered Stolberg, and the
situation developed into confused, disorganized house-to-house
fighting in the city.*
Ibid.
At dawn on 21 September American armor was observed assembling
south of Donnerberg Hill preparatory to a renewal of the attack.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0700 on 21 Sep 44, LiXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
When it came the Germans were ready and stopped the American attack,
launched mostly by infantry with some tanks in support, at 0800.*
Two hours later U.S. forces in battalion strength attacked
northeastward toward Duffenter. In conjunction with this drive
American troops captured the remaining bunkers on Hammerberg
CU NLA SS fIE
Hill.* With this strategic height in American hands, southern
Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1120 an 21 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to Col Engel, 1530 on 21 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampf erlauf.
According to the 9th Panzer Division official report on theBattle of Stolberg, 23 September 1944, IXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div., U.S. forces on 0- September 1944 had knocked out eight ofthe twelve bunkers on Hammerberg Hill by means of demolition chargesand heaviest caliber artillery fire. In most instances the bunkershad had to be destroyed along withtheir garrisons, which had refusedto surrender.
Stolberg was extremely vulnerable to a U.S. assault from the east.
In the event that the southern half of the town could not be held,
the German forces in Stolberg (9th Panzer Division with attached
units) proceeded to establish a switch position across the center
of the town, from the Stolberg Mill west of Stolberg cutting across
tne town to the road junction southwest of Duffenter.
The Germans were able to repulse one attack against the southern
edge of Stolberg and knocked out two U.S. tanks in the process.
Late in the afternoon the expected major attack came out of the east,
and came so fast that the forces of 9th Panzer Division (Kampfgruppe
Volker) in the southern part of Stolberg were cut off before they had
had a chance to withdraw northward to the switch position. In very
bitter fighting in the streets of Stolberg these elennts finally
battled their way out of the pocket and joined Kampfgruppe Schemm
at the defense line cutting across Stolberg.
Half of Stolberg was now in U.S. hands and the attacks, mounting
in intensity, continued into the evening. West of the town strong
L A L U~sE
I NO P. L A S I F I F ;
74
American forces achieved new penetrations in the factory belt while
to the east the Americans gained the western slope of Donnerberg
Hill -- as on the previous day -- and immediately wheeled northwestward
to attack the switch position which barred their way into northern
Stolberg.
American successes on both sides of Stolberg threatened to
envelop the Stolberg .ill - Duffenter Line, and the Germans feared
the final collapse of their Stolberg front. Later in the evening
the American envelopment (especially the prong west of Stolberg)
forced them to withdraw to a new switch line cutting across the
northern sector of Stolberg from the vicinity of Schneidmuehle-Atsch
soutneastward to the village of Donnerberg.*
This account of operations in the Stolberg area on 21 September1944 is based on the following sources:
Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1530 and 2015 on 21Sep 44, LUXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, IXXXI Corps,21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Off Rpt on Battle ofStolberg, 9th Panzer Div, 23 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.
South of Aachen the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 116th
Panzer Division consolidated its defense line on 21 September to
free some reserves. The front line of the regiment was re-establishe d
to extend from Vaelser Quartier (probably point of contact pdth
60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) - half a mile north of Hill 321 -
half a mile north-northeast of the Steinebrueck railroad station.
This move disengaged the 453d Replacement Training Battalion which
was to take over a part of the 12th Infantry Division sector in
accordance with LXXXI Corps orders. In relieving the 1st Battalion
of 27th Fusilier Regiment, 453d Replacement Training Battalion of
116th Panzer Division took over the sector from Verlautenheide to
the railroad overpass one mile west-southwest of Verlautenheide in
the evening of 21 September. From there the LXXI Corps front line
continued past the northern edge of the Stolberg factory belt, along
the switch position across northern Stolberg to the northern edge
of Donnerberg Hill; from there via Duffenter along the Duffenter-
Werth road to half a mile west of Werth - Weissenberg Hill - western
and southern edge of Gressenich - nortnern edge of Schevenhuette.
The new boundary line between 116th Panzer and lath Infantry
Divisions extended, in the combat zone, from Eschweiler (12th Infantry
Division) via the railroad overpass one mile west-southwest of
Verlautenheide to Brand (116th Panzer Division*
TMng Sitrep, LIXXXI Corps, 0525 on 21 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,116th Pz Div, 1925 on 21 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep, LIXXI Corps, 21Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TVX, LKXXI Corps to 116thPz Div, 1520 on 21 Sep 44, and TRX, LXXXI Corps to all divs,1515 on 21 Sep 44, L=XXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
Immediately following its relief by the 453d Replacement Training
Battalion, the 1st Battalion of 27th Fusilier Regiment was moved by
motor transport to Eschweiler where it was to assemble for a counter-
attack, to be launched out of movement with intent to close the gap
between Stolberg and Donnerberg. During the night considerable
reconnaissance activity took place on both sides. The Germans spottedin
numbers of U.S. tanks everywhere and noted much digging/and improvement
'I CLA S IFIE D
tiSM B A 76
of positions in the vicinity of Hochwegerhof and Niederhof.* At
Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Report, 12th Inf Div to ICXXI Corps, 0430 on 22 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
0330 12th Infantry Division repulsed an attack by five U.S. armored
cars against Bunker 708 on Donnerberg Hill. Panzerfaust destroyed
two. of the armored cars.*
Mng Sitrep, LXXI I Corps, 0505 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tage smedungen.
At 0730 on 22 September one American armored company (one tank
and a few armored cars) was able to exploit the early morning fog
to bypass the Stolberg switch position between Stolberg and Donnerberg
and to push north as far as Zinkhuette (zinc mine) and Birkengang
east of Stolberg.*
Noon Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 1120 on 22 Sep 44, and aily Sitrep,12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Off Rpt,Battle of Stolberg, 9th Pz Div, 23 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.
At the same time, U.S. forces launched repeated attacks with
about fifty tanks from the south, southwest, and southeast toward
Duffenter and the southern slope of Donnerberg Hill. After the un-
successful attempt earlier in the morning to capture Bunker 708, ten
U.S. tanks lumbered up to tne bunker and surrounded it. They stayed
there for several hours without being able to crack the pillbox.
U L ASIFIEP
NAL ASSIf IE 077
Massed German artillery fire finally destro.red one tank and forced
the rest to withdraw. German fire was also effective against
American assemblies south and southwest of Donnerberg Hill.*
Ibid.
The Germans who had but one Panther and one assault gun on
Donnerberg Hill this morning were afraid the counterattack of 1st
Battalion, 27th Fusilier Regiment, would come too late to plug the
gap. The 9th Panzer Division cried for antitank weapons. This
division, which had been promised relief days ago, was still de-
fending the battered ruins of Stolberg as best it could; it took a
terrible beating in the process. In only forty hours -- from 1800
on 20 September until 1200 on 22 September 1944 -- the division had
lost 841 men, 18 of whom were officers.*
Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0850 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXICorps K B, Karnpfverlauf; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 22 Sep44, LXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.
At noon on 22 September the factory belt west of Stolberg was
once again in American hands. With its last reserves 9th Panzer
Division established an antitank defense line facing west and running
parallel to the main streets of Stolberg. American attacks at
Don nerberg and southwest of Duffenter continued.*
Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1230 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
w LV
SSIHi78
In the nick of time the reinforced 1st Battalion of 27th
Fusilier Regiment arrived from its assembly area at Eschweiler and
in a surprise attack descended on the U.S. forces which had penetrated
to Zinkhuette and Birkengang early in the morning. Attacking at
1300 the German battalion jumped off from the woods east of Birkengang
on a broad front toward Birkengang and the village of Donnerberg.
Despite heavy American fire the Germans were able to recapture these
places rapidly and to continue their attack against the Americans
on the western slope of Donnerberg Hill.* Once more 12th Infantry
All through the afternoon American forces continued to hurl
themselves against the German line, but in vain. Jumping off at
1430 U.S. forces attacked from the south into the city at Stolberg.
The exhausted elements of 9th Panzer Division were able to repulse
them in bitter street fighting. At 1700 twelve U.S. tanks renewed
their efforts to break through the switch position in the city and
achieved a local penetration. But on the whole the Germans held
fast. On that day they inflicted on the Americans the loss of ten
tanks, two armored cars, and two 210-mm. self-propelled guns in the
Stolberg soctor.*
Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, and Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,22 Sep 44, ;II Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B,0315 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
'1Bek~~sEm.
79
While the battle for Stolberg reached a climax in intensity,
the central sector of the 12th Infantry Division front was quiet
except for a German artillery barrage aimed at smashing U.S. con-
centrations in the Diepenlinchen - Mausbach area.* At the eastern
Tel Conv, DLXI Corps to 12th Tnf Div, 1230 on 22 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
end of the front, however, fighting was as bitter as in Stolberg,
with the difference that here the Americans, on the defensive, also
demonstrated the ability to stand their ground and to inflict
terrific punishment on the attacking enemy.
Before dawn on 22 September the 2d Battalion of 48th Grenadier
Regiment had jumped off from Gressenich on a mission to wipe out
the American bridgehead at Schevenhuette.* Following a thorough
See footnote, pp. 63 - 64.
artillery preparation the two German infantry companies executed
an elaborate enveloping maneuver and attacked Schevenhuette from
the northeast and southeast. The American outposts on the eastern
perimeter of the village offered such tenacious resistance that the
Germans had to kill them to the last man. Upon penetrating the
eastern part of the village, the Germans were immediately engaged
in such bitter and bloody fighting that they sustained murderous
losses. VT.hen all efficers of the battalion had been killed or wounded,
the Germans were forced to discontinue the attack and to withdraw
CLASSFE 0~
ufc 3ass .IFED 80
from the eastern part of Schevenhuette, which they had briefly
captured. Back in Gressenich the survivors reported that U.S.
forces had converted Schevenhuette into a veritable fortress, fully
secured by minefields and barbed wire and tenaciously defended by
On the basis of this experience General Koechling decided that
the gap between Gressenich and the boundary with LXXIV Corps merited
special attention. The arrival several days earlier of 183d Volks
Grenadier Division and its commitment in the Geilenkirchen area on
the northern wing of LXXXI Corps made it possible to disengage the
remaining elements of 275th Infantry Division and to commit them,
somewhat reinforced, to close the gap on the corps' southern wing.*
Tel Conv, Seventh Army to L=XXI Corps, 1130 on 17 Sep 44, L0XICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, L=XI Corps, 22 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
The 275th Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Hans Schmidt) spent
the night from 22 to 23 September in disengaging its forces from
the front and moving them to Dueren for assembly. These elements
consisted of about 1,800 men combat strength, eleven 75-mm. antitank
guns, one organic batter;r of 105-mm. howitzers and three attached
batteries of 105-mm. howitzers.* In its new sector in the Wenau
TWX, (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44), LXXXICorps to Seventh Army, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div..J h ii
Forest the following forces were to join the division: one SS
guards company, one battalion of Flemish troops, formerly attached
to Gruppe Jungklaus, Ka.pfgruppe Riedl, and the personnel of 668th
Heavy Antitank Battalion.* The 275th Division artillery was reinforced
Having lost its weapons, this battalion was to be equipped withshort-range antitank weapons (bazookas and Panzerfaust) until thearrival of new guns. No information is available about the com-position of Kampfgruppe Riedl.
Divisionby the so-called "Russian Artillery Group" of 49th Infantry con-
sisting of two batteries eqUipped with Russian 76.2-mm. infantry
cannon and one battery with Russian 122-mm. guns.
The division received orders to commit its organic troops and
Kampfgruppe Riedl in the front line to plug the gap between 12th
Infantry Division and 353d Infantry Division (LXXIV Corps) while the
troops attached from Gruppe Jungklaus were to improve the bridge-
head positions at Dueren. The new boundaries of 275th Infantry
Division were: in the north with 12th Infantry Division --
Arnoldsweiler - Birkesdorf - Schlich - Schevenhuette - Vicht; to the
south with LXXIV Corps:: south of Dueren to south of Zweifall.*
Order, LXXXI Corps to 275th Ihf Div, 1730 on 22 Sep 44,LKXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
On 23 September 1944 275th Infantry Division established its
command post at Dueren and occupied its new sector. Late in the
afternoon its troops had all but closed the gap, having secured
UNCLASOFE l
U CLASS FI[U82
contact with 12th Infantry Division, but were still marching the
Wenau Forest for contact with elements of 353d Infantry Division.*
TrX, 275th Inf Div to XXXI Corps, 1930 on 23 Sep 44, LXXXICores KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
The day brought localized fighting in the Aachen and Stolberg
sectors, as did the days to follow, but all actions remained in-
conclusive. The German front, as established on 22 September, held
against all attacks.
The crescendo at Stolberg on 22 September in fact marked the
end of the VII Corps "reconnaissance in force" in the DCKI Corps
sector. The Americans had deeply penetrated both bands of the West
YWall, especially in the Stolberg Corridor, but on the whole the
Germans had scored a defensive success in denying VII Corps a de-
cisive breakthrough via Eschweiler to Juelich, Dueren and Cologne.
The Germans had both emotional and materialistic incentives for
offering such tenacious resistance in this particular area. They
were defending the famous Virest 'rall, their ow nome soil and such
historic cities as Aachen. At the same time the contested area
was highly industrialized and contained many vital war production
plants. For instance, a plant in the little town of Weisweiler
(two miles east of Eschweiler) produced 40% of the national output
of an alloy essential tcfthe entire German steel production. "From
this point of view also the situation demands that the enemy penetration
east of Aachen be wiped out...." wrote General Brandenberger in a
VNLASSIFIED
83
report to Field Marshal Model.*
TV X, Gen Brandenberger to A Gp B3, 1100 on 29 Sep 44, A Gp BKTB, Anlagen, Lagebeurteilungen - Viochenmeldungen [SituationEvaluations - Weekly Sitreps], 15.V. - 11.X.44.
1Much of the credit for the German defensive success undoubtedly
belongs to German communications and logistics. Had the exhausted
elements of ICOI Corps vtich fell back to the West 'tall about mid-
September been left to shift for themselves, there can be no doubt
that American forces would have broken through to Cologne in a very
short time. But in spite of the extremely heavy losses the Germans
suffered, their situation on 23 September was actually much better
than it had been one week earlier.
In the space of that week the Germans had accomplished the
extraordinary feat of moving three full-strength divisions to the
Aachen area. Of these divisions, the 12th Infantry and 183d Volks
Grenadier Divisions had arrived and been committed. A third, the
246th Volks Grenadier Division, entrained on 23 September in Bohemia
with the mission to relieve -- at long last -- 116th and 9th Panzer
Divisions.* This relief was scheduled to get under way on 23 September,
Order, A Gp B to Seventh Army, 1315 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operaticns-Befehle.
even before the arrival of 246th Division, with replacement units
going into the line. The 116th Panzer Division received orders to
assemble in the Juelich - Dueren area as Army Group B reserve.
84
Thanks to the relative quiet in the sector of 116th Panzer
Division during the week from 16 to 23 September, this division had
not sustained any appreciable losses and had been rehabilitated to
some extent while still in the line. Attachment of six battalions
had more than doubled its organic combat strength. There were five
times asmany tanks and assault guns as there had been a week earlier.
The fuel situation, on the other hand, was critical, with division
reserves down to about five hundred gal Ions; as a result divisi on
armor and motor transport were nearly immobilized.*
T\" (Weekly Strength Report), ILE I Corps to Seventh Army, 1200on 23 Sep 44, [LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; TWX, 116th Pz Divto LXXI Corps, 2300 on 22 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen derDiv.
On 23 September 9th Panzer Division also received orders to
disengage its forces but to leave its armor with 12th Infantry
Division.* The 9th Panzer Division, with 105th Panzer Brigade and
Tel Conv, LXXMI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1330 on 23 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.
miscellaneous attached units, had taken the worst beating of all
the German divisions in the area. In one week -- from 14 to 22
Seotember -- the division had lost 21 officers and 1,040 enlisted
men. These casualties made up over two thirds of the combat strength
of Kmnpfgruppe Sperling (9th Panzer Division less forces attached
to 353d Infantry Division on 15 September 1944 On 22 September 1944
the combat strength of the Kampfgruppe was down to 35 officers and
.,Y L
796 enlisted men. These forces were exhausted and suffered from
severe combat fatigue, as evidenced by the fact that they abandoned
their positions frequently even when supported by armor, and were
quite impervious to dire threats from their superiors. The out-
standing factor responsible for the heavy Geran casualties and the
shattered combat morale of the survivors, according to German
observers, was the murderously efficient American artillery fire.
Some units had been wiped out almost completely in three weeks of
fighting. Thus, for example, the 105th Panzer Grenadier Battalion
had gone into the line on 3 September 1944 with 22 officers and 716
enlisted men. Most of this strength -- 11 officers and 611 enlisted
men -- had been lost from 3 to 22 September, leaving the battalion
with 11 officers and 105 enlisted men.*
TWX, (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 23 Sep 44), IOXXICorps to Seventh Army, 24 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;Rpt, Maj Volker to 9th Pz Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.
The 12th Infantry Division had also taken terrible punishment
during the week from 16 to 23 September. In that single week the
division had lost half of its combat strength: from a combat strength
of 3,800 men it was down to about 1,900. According to General Engel
the heaviest casualties had been incurred during the first two days
(17 and 18 September) on the Aachen front. In those two days of
German counterattack the 89th Grenadier Regiment had lost one third
of its combat strength. The 2d Battalion of 48th Grenadier Regiment
UWL ~I IE
ED 85'J rJL
86
lost half of its strength in Schevenhuette. The heavy losses were
due chiefly to the massed and well-directed American artillery fire
and to the bloody street and house-to-house fighting in Verlautenheide,
Stolberg, and Schevenhuette.*
TX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 23 Sep 44), LXXICorps to Seventh Army, 24 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;IMS f-A-971 (Engel).
In summing up his division's first week of action on the
Western Front General Engel writes that the division adjusted
rapidly to the different conditions in that theater. He finds the
reasons for the relatively successful defense in the high morale
and physical fitness of 12th Infantry Division.*
IMS 7 A-971 (Engel); Tel Cony, Seventh Anmy to IX=I Corps, 0940on 21 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.
~nkss~~
LXXIV Corps
Defense of the Lammersdorf Corridor and the West Wall
Although the Battle of the Stolberg Corridor definitely con-
stituted the VII Corps main effort from 12 to 23 September 1944,
this study of tne German side would not be complete without an
account of the forces facing U.S. 9th Infantry Division and 4th
Cavalry Group in the Lamnmersdorf - Monschau - Elsenborn area.
This sector of the West Wall had been assigned to LXXIV Corps,
under thie command of General der Infanterie Erich Straube.* VThen
Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, ILXXI Corps KTB,Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).
VII Corps launched its reconnaissance in force on 12 September, the
elements subordinate to LXXIV Corps were still fighting forward of
the West Wall fortifications. These forces consisted of the ex-
hausted remnants of two divisions, 89th Infantry Division commanded
by Colonel Roesler, and 347th Infantry Division under Generalleutnant
Wolf Trierenberg.
The 89th Infantry Division had hardly any organic forces left.
Its 1055th Infantry Regiment had been completely destroyed in France.
Of the 1056th Infantry Regiment about 350 men were all that remained.
The division had lost its entire artillery in France. The artillery
men, engineers, signal and service troops had long ago been absorbed
into the infantry.
Shortly before 89th Infantry Division reached the West Wall,
LveSSFL
ug s8
a so-called "Ost-Bataillon" [East Battalionj of Russian "volunteers"
was attached. This battalion consisted of 400 - 500 men, was well-
trained, fairly well equipped and possessed four Russian 122-mm.
howitzers. In addition a Landesschuetzen battalion vhich had done
railway guard duty in Belgium was attached to the division. Like
all such battalions it was composed of middle-aged, untrained, and
poorly armed men.
A little later the division also received two companies
composed of stragglers and one platoon of military police.
The West Wall sector assigned to the division lay in the
northern half of the LXXIV Corps sector. The division boundary in
the north was identical to the LXXIV Corps boundary with LXXI Corps:
Zuelpich - Schmidt - Roetgen. In the south the 89th Division
boundary with 347th Infantry Division extended from south of
Schleiden via Arenberg to about Camp d'Elsenborn. Until the arrival
of 89th Infantry Division the West Wall was occupied by the 416th
Grenadier Training Regimnent (526th Reserve Division). This regiment
consisted of 1,200 - 1,500 infantry replacements of all shades of
value and fitness. Its artillery situation wasso poor as to appear
comical. The regiment boasted one German 105-mm. howitzer and one,
Italian medium (ca. 150-mm.) hcwitzer. There was only one prime
mover to pull both guns. After two days in action the Italian piece
ran out of ammunition and from then on served psychological warfare
as a "phanton gun". Whenever the prime mover was nct needed for
more important rurposes, the Italian howitzer was hitched on and
dragged around the front to be shown off to the enemy.
i t 89
When 89th Infantry Division took over the West Wall sector, the
416th Grenadier Training Regiment was attached to the division.*
Intent on building up its strength to two infantry regiments-again, 89th Infantry Division maintained the regiment as a unit andlater made it organic. On that occasion the 416th Grenadier TrainingRegiment received the designation of the late 1055th Infantry Regiment.
In addition to this regiment, the 5th, 9th, and 14th Luftwaffe Fortress
Battalions were attached to 89th Infantry Division. In antitank
weapons the division had fourteen 75-mm. antitank guns.*
TVaX, A Gp B to OB V5EST, 2350 and 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; _S I B-793 (Neitzel).
Colonel Hasso Neitzel was Operations Officer, 89th InfantryDivision.
The southern half of the LXXIV Corps sector was assigned to
347th Infantry Division. The remaining organic combat strength of
this division consisted of one hundred men of the 860th Infantry
Regiment and thirty men of the 861st Infantry Regiment. On 10
September 1944 this little band was reinforced by forty men of a
bicycle company. These elements were organized into a Kampfgruppe
under the connand of Colonel von Rochow, probably commander of 860th
Infantry Regiment. After reaching the yest +Wall, Kampofruppe von
Rochow was redesignated 3d Battalion, 860th Infantry Regiment, and
was gradually rehabilitated to serve as nucleus for a full-strength
regiment. Besides these infantry elements 347th Infantry Division
still possessed two organic self-propelled 150-mm. infantry cannon.
ICA S F E
SNCLASSIF o90
When 347th Infantry Division took over its West 1Wall sector,
the 536th Grenadier Training Regiment (526th Reserve Division) with
about 1,200 infantry replacements, the 7th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion,
and the "Stomach Battalion"* were attached to the division. It also
All officers and men of the Stomach Battalion suffered fromailments of the digestive tract and received a special diet.German testimonies regarding its value in combat differ so widelyas to contradict one another.
received additional artillery with the 76th Artillery Reserve Battalion
(six 105-mm. howitzers and three 150-mm. howitzers). In antitank
KTB Entry, 1320 on 12 Sep 44, LOXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf;TW~, A Gp B to OB 'EST, 2350 and 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; IJS 7- B-563 (Trierenberg).
The 347th Infantry Division may be dealt with very briefly here
because it saw very little action during the last half of September
1944. On 14 September Kampfgruppe von Rochow was able to break out
of an American encirclement near Camp d'Elsenborn, throw American
forces out of Rocherath, and assume command of its West -Wall sector.
Aside from reconnaissance and combat patrol activity centering
around Losheimergraben, the sector remained quiet enough for the
division to devote itself to the urgent task of rehabilitation and
reorganization. *
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen;MS # B-563 (Trierenberg).
UIULWSSIFIE
91
The sector of 89th Infantry Division was the scene of U.S. 9th
Infantry Division's effort to drive through the Lammersdorf Corridor
and gain the Roer River in September 1944. On 12 September the
elements of 89th Infantry Division, split up in isolated groups, were
committed from west of Muetzenich to southwest of Kalterherberg.
Both flanks of the division were exposed but American pressure was
so minor that Colonel Roesler saw no compelling reason to withdraw
to the YWest YWall.* On 13 September the division reported that
MS j B-730 (Brandenberger).
American armored spearheads advancing along the Eupen - Monschau
road toward Monschau had reached the edge of the woods north and
south of Neu-Hattlich.* The next day other U.S. forces pushing north
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0100 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen
from Buetgenbach in the sector of 347th Infantry Jivision reached
the southern periphery of Kalterherberg at 1100. Elements of 89th
Infantry Division established a screening line in Monschau and Hoefen*
Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
Vrhile fighting began in Kalterherberg, 89th Infantry Division repulsed
an American attack on Lammersdorf.*
Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1930 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
MUMASlsE
ui A,
The U.S. 9th Infantry Division's push had begun. Konzen fell
into American hands, and along the Eupen - Muetzenich road American
armored units attacked toward the Zollhaus [customs house] at
Muetzenich.*
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0a)0 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
An American pincer movement aimed at the capture of Monschau
emerged clearly, with one prong driving east on the Eupen - Monschau
road while the other pushed up on the Buetgenbach - Kalterherberg
road. Both drives made progress on 14 September. In the evening
of 14 September American forces captured the customs house at
Muetzenich and crossed the German border. U.S. infantry captured
Kalterherberg and continued in a north-northeasterly direction toward
Monschau while behind them American tanks and armored cars rumbled
up the winding road from Kalterherberg to Monschau during the night
from 14 to 15 September.*
Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0800 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B iTB, Letzte Meldung.
On 15 September 89th Infantry Division decided to withdraw all
its elements to the West Wall. The 416th Grenadier Training Regiment
(later redesignated 1055th Infantry Regiment) was committed in the
northern half of the division sector -- Lammersdorf - Monschau area --
while the remaining elements of the 1056th Infantry Regiment were
committed in the Hoefen - Alzen sector. The Russian battalion secured
i
a ,: a;, t~ ~~P
P ' IIL~t
d TL ASS rF- 93
the division's northern flank and boundary with 353d Infantry Division.
The Landesschuetzen were committed on the southern flank and boundary
with 347th Infantry Division. The Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions
were not considered battleworthy and, hence, were employed to man
the Schill Line, at this time still well to the rear of the division
combat zone.*
MS # B-793 (Neitzel).
The American pincers continued to close on Monschau. Late in
the afternoon on 15 September American forces which had advanced
up the road from Kalterberg entered Monscnau. While a battle
ensued in the town, American armor on the Eupen - Monschau road
crossed the railroad tracks east of Muetzenich and headed for a
juncture with U.S. forces in Monschau.*
Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 15 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep, A Gp B,1900 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
The town fell to the Americans during the night from 15 to 16
September, and 9th Infantry Division achieved its first penetration
of the West Wall when its forces thrust northeastward from Monschau
toward Lmgenbroich. Then the Germans rallied to the defense. They
recaptured Konzen and Bicierath and reported that they had knocked
out one American tank at Muetzenich.*
Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0810 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
LLASSIFIED
94
On 16 September 353d Infantry Division with its sector was
attached to LKXIV Corps.* In the sector of 89th Infantry Division
Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1345 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung. See above, p. 45.
the day was uneventful except for an American attack west of
Lammersdorf which the Germans repulsed. In the Monschau area the
Americans were apparently busy consolidating their gains and con-
tented themselves with continuous and very heavy artillery fire on
the German MLR (West Wall).*
Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1915 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;MS # B-793 (Neitzel).
During the night U.S. forces renewed their attack in the northern
sector of 89th Infantry Division and this time succeeded in penetrating
Lammersdorf. In the south American troops entered Hoefen. The see-
saw fighting -vhich now began lasted for several days. In the small
hours of the morning on 17 September the Germans launched counter-
atcacks to wipe out these penetrations.* In both areas they achieved
Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0730 on 17 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.
initial successes.
By morning on 17 September their counterattack had regained
the first line of bunkers near Larersdorf.* At noon, however, the
Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1300 on 17 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB.
_tLHs NY
-95
Americans renewed their drive north of Lamnersdorf with strong in-
fantry and armor and achieved fresh penetrations in the Scharnhorst
Line. Another U.S. attack, at Pa-stenbach south of Lamnersdorf, was
repulsed. *
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0400 on 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
At Hoefen fighting was very bitter. The village changed hands
several times during the day. By evening elements of 89th Infantry
Division had captured the southern part of Hoefen. Their counter-
attack continued: on 18 September in the morning only one bunker
north of Hoefen remained in American hands; by noon the Germans had
regained the complete bunker line at Hoefen and had captured four-
teen Americans.* But their success was shortlived. At 1600 on 18
Ibid. Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1530 on 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Letzte I eldung.
Sc:ptember fifteen to twenty American tanks broke through the MLR at
Hoefen from the north and achieved a penetration east and south of
Hoefen. The Germans were able to seal off this penetration byevening.
In the north of the 89th Infantry Division sector two American
battalions supported by tanks launched an attack about 1700 and
broke through the West Wall at Lammersdorf, penetrating three miles
in a south-southeasterly direction to the Kall River valley. There
this penetration also was sealed off.* The Americans renewed their
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0230 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
A 6LAjf I Er
UGASS I FI E96
attack southeast of Lammersdorf at 0930 on 19 September but ran
afoul of a German fortified road block established during the night
at the road junction half a mile southeast of Lammersdorf. Here
this attack ground to a halt,. Another American attack at Paustenbach
was also repulsed. There 89th Infantry Division destroyed two U.S.
tanks and recaptured a ounker.*
Noon. Sitrep, A Gp B, 1420 on 19 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep, A Gp B,2045 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte ieldung.
The Germans noted that the Americans were building up their
strength in Monschau. Additional forces including fourteen tanks
had moved into the town.*
Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 2045 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp 3 KTB, LetzteVMeldung.
The Germans were very well-informed about what was going on be-hind the American lines in this sector. In S NS B-793 Colonel Neitzelgives a rather amusing account of the constant traffic across tneGerman MLR into and out of American-held territory. German soldiersin civilian clothing paid regular visits to Rbet en and Monschau.From the American prisoner collecting point at Roetgen these visitorsusually managed to bring back one or two German prisoners of waralong with some American rations. From Monschau every move theAmericans made was reported back to the G-2 section of 89th InfantryDivision.
On 20 September U.S. 9th Infantry Division launched two armored
attacks against Paustenbach. The Germans repulsed both and inflicted
heavy losses on the attackers.* Action in the LXXIV Corps sector
Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1800 on 20 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
dJ tdiU"F97
shifted to the north where tne Battle of the Stolberg Corridor fanned
out southward to draw 353d and 89th Infantry Divisions into its
orbit.
At 1630 on Z0 September American tanks jumping off from south-
west of Zweifall penetrated to the monument located about three miles
east of that village. Both 89th d 353d Infantry Divisions immediately
launched a counterattack against this salient.* The Americans,
Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.
however, were not to be dislodged easily. On 21 September a U.S.
tank attack in the woods east of Zweifall threw the Germans back to
the Weisser-Veh Creek one mile west of Huertgen. A few American
tanks reached Germeter.
To help restore the situation as soon as possible, Seventh Army
ordered 341st Assault Gun Brigade shifted from LCKXI Corps to 353d
Infantry Division. During the night from 21 to 22 September the
division intended to move this assault gun brigade, one infantry
and one engineer battalion, one artillery battery and five 75-rm.
antitank guns to the area with plans to counterattack on 22 September.*
Tel Cony, LJXXI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 1720 on 21 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps,1940 on 21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee,usw.; Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1840 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0110 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Tagesme ldungen.
ifwll U0L A.' S~
I CLASSiFIE98
The German counterattack to wipe out the first American
penetration of the Huertgen Forest apparently did not make any
spectacular headway on 22 September. On the second day of the attack
(23 September 1944) the forces of 353d Infantry Division pushed the
Americans back. to within three miles southeast of Zweifall and re-
captured one bunker. Three American tank attacks lauocned in the
Rollesbroich - Huertgen Forest three miles northeast of Larmersdorf
were beaten back. As for the Russian "Volunteers" comrmitted here,
the first encounter with U.S. tanks proved to be too much -for them.
After an appeal by several Russian deserters who rode American tanks
into the Rollesbroich Forest and broadcast to their countrymen over
a public address system, two thirds of the Russian battalion went
over to the Americans in a body. This incident decided the Germans
that they were through experimenting with "Osttruppen" [Eastern Troops].
The remaining Russians were moved to the rear where they were disarmed
and employed as laborers.*
1'rIg Sitrep, A Gp B, 0830 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 24 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen;MS # B-793 (Neitzel).
During the last week of September American combat activity
gradually died down in the LXXIV Corps sector. The first American
drive for the Roer had been stopped. No one -- friend or foe -- as
yet anticipated the tragic significance which the name "Huertgen
Forest" would acquire in the bloody battles for the Roer River Dams