THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. DOES EUROPEAN …

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. DOES

EUROPEAN SECURITY MODEL WORK FOR

OTHER REGIONS?

Theses of Alexey Gromyko, Director, Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of

Sciences

Trialogue Club International Meeting

in the hall number 5, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy of the

Russian Foreign Ministry, Bolshoy Kozlovskiy pereulok, 4 building 1

November 6, 2019

Does European security model work for other regions?

I think that today it does not work even for itself and there is no template to emulate for other regions.

However the history of the European security model can be of outmost interest, for example, for the

Middle East and the Persian Gulf. You know that recently Russia put forward a formal proposal on a

security system in the Middle East modeled to some extent on Helsinki process. But of course we

hope that sooner or later we will return to substantial discussions on the modern European security

model. But not for the time being.

So what is going on with the European and global security?

The future of international and European architecture of security and system of arms control is in the

most uncertain state since the end of the Cold War or, to be more precise, since the 1960s.

We have to admit that the legacy of cooperation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the

USA, generated on the basis of strategic stability, has been almost entirely exhausted. The

Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 was abandoned by Washington in 2002 and the Intermediate

Nuclear Forces Treaty - in 2019.

Not a single NATO state ratified the Agreement on adapted Treaty on conventional forces in Europe,

after which Russia in 2007 suspended its own participation.

The prolongation of the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-3) in February 2021 or its

replacement by a new agreement is jeopardized by Washington’s general nihilistic attitude towards

arms control. It cannot be ruled out that the next indirect victim of the USA approaches to global

security may become the Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, signed in 1968.

In the more immediate jeopardy, as we have found out recently, is the Treaty on Open Skies.

There are many factors explaining such a regrettable state of affairs. It is difficult to judge otherwise

but the state of minds in the White House, State Department and Pentagon regarding the

dismantlement of arms control is not a negotiating position but the philosophy, rooted in the current

American worldview. It seems that the sacking of John Bolton is not slowing dawn the inclination of

the US to interpret in a very specific way its own sense of security.

Tremendous processes are reshaping our planet, leading to the emergence of polycentrism and the

redistribution of global power. The increase of competition and counterbalancing is used by admirers

of hard power to justify increasing reliance on force. During the Cold War the architecture of strategic

stability was rooted in the interests of two superpowers. Nowadays the number of leading players is

much higher and China is a special actor.

An important factor – invention and production of new systems and types of weapons, both nuclear

and conventional, which blurs the border between them, as well as cyber technologies, which are

strangers in the traditional sphere of arms control. Clearly, this requires adaptation.

The corrosion of global stability also stems from the internal political situation in certain countries,

first of all in the United States, where the foreign policy to a big extent is captive of a harsh political

warfare between a significant part of the American political class and Donald Trump.

Proliferation in the context of polycentrism of transregional powers, which claim their share of

responsibility in international affairs, has not yet led to stabilization of global governance.

China is emerging as the third military superpower. For obvious historical reasons Beijing is not

bound by agreements on antiballistic systems, strategic offensive weapons or medium and short-

ranged missiles.

The European Union, being a strong economic player, is passive or confused on issues of strategic

stability. The EU, having declared the strategic autonomy as its goal, has been in effect, to put it

mildly, timid in its response to the behavior of the US, which withdrew from the ABM treaty and

now from the INF. Moreover usually it prefers to repeat American arguments, justifying the US

actions. Not only in the US but increasingly in the EU it is fashionable to accuse Russia and more

and more often China of all the evils.

Against this backdrop the probability of a new missile crisis in Europe, mirroring the events in the

80s, is growing. At the same time there is nothing what might resemble the antiwar movement of that

times. Instead there is a disturbing mass obsession with climate change no matter how important it is.

There is also a lively dispute getting more and more agitated on broader principles of international

rules and conventions including the United Nations and international law. Nowadays you often hear

that the UN Security Council is almost paralyzed because of the contrary positions of its members.

In this context the notions of rules-based order and multilateralism are repeatedly used. In my humble

opinion, rules-based order is not exactly conventional international law and multilateralism is not

exactly conventional collective actions.

This is true that the workings of the Security Council in many respects has been extremely politicized.

But when this observation feeds the narrative that the SC and the UN as a whole is an obsolete

institution, which can be circumvented if necessary, you find yourself on a very slippery slope.

The truth is that even in our difficult times most issues on the agenda of the Council are resolved

positively and consensually. For example, this year up to the 29th of October the Council has adopted

42 resolutions and not a single one has been vetoed. Sometimes it seems that a rules-based order starts

to emerge as something like the UN Charter PLUS or the postwar international order PLUS. In a

more common language one can use another expression — to be More catholic than the Pope. By the

way, the categories “rules-based order” and “multilateralism” are not used a single time in the UN

Charter.

At the same time, the EU Global Strategy makes it clear that the rules-based order is something bigger

than the conventional international order. I quote from the Strategy: “Guided by the values on which

it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the

principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting

access to the global commons. [So far so good. But then the quote goes on] This commitment

translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system.” Close

quote. I think it is very revealing.

In the better times of the Cold War, in the 70s, both sides reached the high degree of mutual

understanding and even trust with respect to the concept of coexistence. It was not an idealistic but a

realistic approach to the matter of strategic stability, equilibrium, checks and balances, ability to

compromise.

The Cold War, if to simplify, consisted of two periods - before 1962 and after. In the aftermath of the

Cuban crisis the USSR and the United States began to create the system of strategic stability and arms

control. Stepping stones on that way were the test-ban treaty, NPT, ABM and SALT-1 and SALT-2

treaties, Helsinki Final Act.

1987 was a special year when the USSR and the USA signed the INF treaty. Its uniqueness consisted

in the fact that for the first time in the postwar history major powers decided not only enhance the

arms control mechanisms but to destroy a whole class of weapons – medium and short-ranged

missiles.

In 2002, the USA abandoned the ABM treaty and proceeded with practical steps. In Romania they

deployed Ageas-ashore, which includes Mark-41 Vertical Launching System and Standard Missile

3. That was the first building block of the European ground segment of the US global anti-missiles

system. It should be remembered that the MK-41 launcher was invented for Tomahawk cruise

missiles capable to carry nuclear load. That was a clear violation of the INF as was the use of target

missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles or combat drones.

What was the American official justification for deployment of Ageas-ashore? The nuclear

programme of Iran. In 2015, with the signing of Joint Comprehensive Action Plan this problem was

solved. At least we thought that it was solved. But the US did not change their policy directed against

arms control. They put forward a new reason for scrapping the INF. This time it was Russia, which

ostensibly violated the INF by testing the 9М729 cruise missile. This missile, according to Russian

officials, is the modernized version of 9M723 for Iskander-M complex. It was tested in September

2017 and covered the distance of 480 km.

All attempts by Moscow to prove the US wrong fell on deaf ears and were ignored both by Americans

and by their European allies. Lets apply common reason. Russia has Iskanders, which cover the

distance of up to 500 hundred km. Russia has ship- and submarine-launched cruise missile “Kalibr”

with the range of 2500 km. It also has Tzirkon hypersonic sea-launched missiles with the range of

over 1 ths km and 8 or 9 Mach speed. Russia has powerful air-launched long distance strike

capabilities. Why on Earth would Russia be interested in violating the INF?

More than 10 years ago the Medvedev’s proposal on a European Security Treaty was either ignored

or even ridiculed.

In this connection I would like to recall much more distant but telling episode. It took place in 1955

in Geneva at a meeting of the heads of governments of the USSR, USA, Britain and France. The first

deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko was participating together with Khrushchev,

Bulganin, Molotov and Zhukov. In order to prove its sincere intentions the Soviet delegation

announced that the USSR was willing to join NATO.

According to Andrei Gromyko, it was hard to describe the effect this announcement had on the

Western delegations. They were so stunned that for several minutes none of them said a word.

Eisenhower’s usual vote-winning smile vanished from his face as he leaned forward for a private

consultation with Dulles.

After the meeting Dulles asked Gromyko: Was the Soviet Union really being serious?

Gromyko replayed that the Soviet Union does not make unserious proposals.

Eisenhower came up and said to Gromyko: We must tell you, Mr Gromyko, that the Soviet proposal

will be carefully examined by us, as it is a very serious matter.

Gromyko was recalling that at later meetings the Western delegations did not wish to discuss the

Soviet proposal further and they simply steered clear of it, giving, I QUOTE, mysterious, oracular

smiles whenever it was mentioned. The fact was that NATO simply did not know how to deal with

it.

This episode from my grandfather’s memoirs has been coming to my mind recently when on several

occasions I was discussing with western colleagues Vladimir Putin’s letter to NATO countries about

moratorium on deployment of ground-based medium and short-range strike missiles. I was seeing the

same smiles, which were produced in 1955. One senior figure even told me that this letter was a bad

move.

The latest example of a clear unwillingness to redress the dangerous course of affairs has been

deliberation in the US to scrap the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies. By the way, these days Russian planes

are carrying out two Open Skies flights over Germany and Italy. As to the USA, prior to the latest

developments they had announced intentions to conduct 21 flights over Russia in 2020 in comparison

with 16 flights in 2018.

What is the current situation? On 2 August 2019 the USA withdrew from the INF. For the Old

World from the Atlantic to the Pacific it means the following. The risks of a nuclear escalation have

increased.

The prospects to prolong START-3, which expires in February 2021, or to replace it with a

modernized treaty have sharply deteriorated. The NPT is in jeopardy.

The INF did not cover sea-based or air-based missile platforms. But clearly it was playing an

outstanding constraining role for 30 years. If to assume that new American ground-based medium

range missile are deployed at the border of Russia, for example in the Baltic region or Poland, their

fly-in time to Moscow will consist of 3-4 minutes instead of 10-12 minutes for Pershing 2 in the

1980s. What does it entail? There will be no time for the Russian military and political leadership, in

case enemy rockets are launched, to assess the situation and to take a decision. Then the concept of a

counter strike may have been replaced by the concept of preemptive strike, which will change

fundamentally the strategic calculus.

Russia has announced that it will not deploy systems of medium and short-ranged missiles in any

region unless it is done by the USA. Washington has not reciprocated saying only that for the time

being they do not harbor such plans. By the way, when critics of Putin’s letter say that ostensibly

Russia has already 4 rocket battalions with the prohibited missile, they overlook that the letter

contains proposal on verification mechanism.

As was noted before, today in Europe there is nothing similar to the anti-war movement of the 1980s.

There are other factors, which aggravate the situation, firstly, the expansion of NATO and the above-

mentioned potential to deploy new ground-based missiles much closer to Moscow then before.

Another factor are the new types of weapons including hypersonic boost-glide systems, as, for

example, re-entry vehicle “Avangard”. Recently John Sullivan stated that START-3 can be prolonged

under the condition that all 5 new weapons systems should become a part of negotiations. As far as I

understand, Sullivan meant Avangard, Sarmat, Poseidon, Burevestnik and Kinzhal. Such an attitude

is very alarming. One can say that this is a good sign, which shows the willingness of the US to

negotiate. But I am more pessimistic as I interpret it as a harbinger of American preconditions, which

can torpedo not buttress negotiations.

Militarization is popular these days and there has been not a single antiwar demonstration in any of

NATO countries in response to the military budgets’ increases across the board. Instead the masses

are obsessed with the climate change. Moreover, there are countries, which apparently will be happy

to host new systems of ground-based missiles in case the US decide to deploy them.

Poland has put its stakes on the strategic relationship with the US. Especially this has become obvious

after the referendum on Brexit. This is a kind of a second issue of special relationship, this time not

between the U.K. and the United States but between Warsaw and Washington.

What is worrying is that Poland has not just taken a decision to enthrall Trump with investments in

the military-industrial complex of the USA but is pushing the most anti-Russian buttons in

Washington. Why? 1) to keep its role as a leading country in Eastern Europe and 2) to have more

leverage in its disputes within the EU.

For the US the real reason to abandon the INF is not the issue of 9M729. The real reason is China.

This country is seen in the American strategic thought as the key competitor and foe of the USA in

the 21 century. The Chinese GDP in PPP has already exceeded the American one by a quarter. Beijing

owns the biggest arsenal of medium and short-ranged missiles, which unlike the case of other official

members of the Nuclear Club constitutes the cornerstone of its deterrence potential. Chine on its part

has no intention to participate in any talks similar to the INF in a situation when the US treat it as an

enemy.

In this extraordinary situation it is regrettable that while the US make havoc in the sphere of arms

control, the EU pretends that it is Russia that is a threat to peace and security. This is a very

disingenuous, short-sighted and self-defeating approach. Some hope remains that common sense will

prevail and European politicians and the public will join Russia in its calls for preservation of the

remnants of the arms control regime, including START 3, and against deployment of land-based

intermediate and short-ranged missiles in Europe.

What another steps can be taken?

The next year we will mark anniversaries of the UN Charter and of the Helsinki Final Act. In this

context the idea of Helsinki-2 should not be forgotten. The indivisibility of the European security is

not Russian propaganda but one of the Helsinki process’ pillar.

It is a must for Russia and NATO to negotiate a security agreement in the Baltic region to prevent

military accidents.

We should launch international dialogue on common norms and rules in cyberspace and on a ban on

cyberattacks.

All sides should support steady and step-by-step implementation of the Minsk Agreements, supported

by the Resolution 2202 of the Security Council.

All responsible parties of JCAP should stand against escalation of tensions with Iran and to make real

not window-dressing efforts to preserve the nuclear deal.

For the sake of the Middle East we should support the latest developments in Syria and the workings

of the Syria Constitution Committee in Geneva.

Thank you for your attention!