The failure of the War on Drugs

1

The failure of the

War on Drugs

Investigating the impacts of US prohibitionism

upon human rights and security

With particular reference to Colombia and Mexico

Avinash Tharoor

1POL699

B.A. International Relations (Honours)

University of Westminster

2013

2

Contents

Introduction p.1

Methodology p.4

The Origins of Prohibitionism p.5

Colombian Prohibitionism: A Multifaceted Threat p.13

The Militarisation of Mexico: A Failed Response to Drug Trafficking p.20

Alternatives to Prohibitionism p.27

Conclusion p.34

Bibliography p.36

3

Introduction

“Prohibition... goes beyond the bounds of reason in that it attempts to control mans'

appetite through legislation and makes a crime out of things that are not even

crimes..." Abraham Lincoln, 18401

The United States government has implemented federal laws that outlaw

certain narcotics since the early 20th Century. The implementation of such policies is

known as prohibitionism, and has been characterised by government suppression of

the cultivation, manufacturing, trafficking and consumption of a number of drugs2.

This illegality was instituted into international law by the United Nations in 1961, and,

since then, the United States has advocated this prohibitionism as a prominent part of

its foreign policy agenda3. This dissertation aims to identify and investigate the

impacts of these policies upon basic human rights and security. In this context, ‘human

rights’ are deemed to be the internationally recognised set of rights outlined in the

UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ‘Security’ is perceived as the safety and

survival of the state or governing body; in this context, national security and regional

security are encompassed by this term. In this dissertation it will be argued that

prohibitionism has directly caused a severe deterioration of human rights and national

security.

US prohibitionist policy has taken a number of forms, including the support for

militarised counter-narcotic endeavours. This policy has caused extreme intrastate

violence in Latin America, particularly evident with the conflation of terrorism and

drug trafficking. This militarisation of prohibitionism is explored throughout this

dissertation, and may be considered to be the reasoning behind the word ‘war’ in the

idiom ‘the War on Drugs’; a phrase coined by Richard Nixon when state violence

against drug traffickers began to develop4.

To analyse the effectiveness of prohibitionism, it is essential to investigate the

origins of such policy. Chapter One will involve an investigation into the roots of

1 Drowne, Kathleen. Spirits of Defiance: National Prohibition and Jazz Age Literature. 2006. p165 2 Inciardi, James. The Drug Legalization Debate. 1999. p9 3 Zepeda, Roberto. Drug War Mexico. 2012. p36 4 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs. 2008. p22

4

domestic prohibitionist policies in the United States, as these were the principal laws

upon which global prohibitionist regulations were based. Subsequently, this chapter

will focus on the transition of prohibitionism into international law, and will provide an

explanation and analysis of how the United States government was, and continues to

be, the primary driver of the intensification of the War on Drugs, particularly in Latin

America. The primary argument put forward by this chapter will be that prohibitionism

originated from a bigoted and oppressive rationale, and that these connotations

continued as it progression into the international realm. It will also be argued that this

discriminatory foundation is partially responsible for the inherent flaws within

contemporary international prohibitionism.

The proximity of Latin America to the United States has allowed the former to

become the primary cultivation region of the two most prevalent illegal drugs used by

Americans: marijuana and cocaine. In the 1980s, Colombia emerged as the

predominant producing nation in the hemisphere, and Mexico became the principal

transit route of illegal drugs into the US5. Since, Colombia and Mexico play vital roles in

the drug trade, Chapter Two and Three will analyse the important, but distinctly

heterogeneous, impacts that the War on Drugs has had upon human rights and

security in these two nations respectively. Chapter Two addresses prohibitionism in

Colombia; analysing the success of policies – including crop fumigation and the

conflation of counter-narcotic and counter-terror efforts – and the repercussions upon

the government and citizens. In contrast, Chapter Three will address the widespread

corruption and empowerment of cartels that have resulted from prohibitionism in

Mexico, as well as assessing the effectiveness of US involvement in the nation. These

case studies are used to argue that prohibitionism, particularly the militarisation of

drug policy, has caused severe destabilisation to both Colombia and Mexico’s national

security, as well as a marked increase in human rights abuses; fuelling social, economic

and political instability in both a local and regional context.

Following this disclosure and scrutiny of the consequences of prohibitionism,

Chapter Four will outline an alternative framework for controlling drugs. The concepts

of legalisation and decriminalisation will be defined, and the potential for their success 5 Cook, Colleen. Mexico’s Drug Cartels.2007. p7

5

will be considered by referring to recent examples of drug policy reform, as well as

theoretical perspectives. This chapter will put forward the argument that a legal and

regulated system for the cultivation, distribution and consumption of drugs is superior

to prohibitionism for the protection of human rights and national security.

Additionally, it will be argued that legalisation is the most appropriate course of action

at both the national and international level.

6

Methodology

The research undertaken for this piece has been gained from an array of books,

journals and online articles.

To investigate various opinions on the drug war, the technique of discourse analysis

has been employed; a dissemination of the language used by government figures,

authors of certain selected texts, and the consideration of issues that may have

influenced such rhetoric. To ensure a degree of impartiality, the choices of literature

include authors arguing from multiple sides of the drug policy debate, including those

supporting continued prohibitionist militarism, decriminalisation and legalisation.

Qualitative information has been gleaned from the publications of foreign policy and

drug policy experts, some of whom have widely contrasting ideological viewpoints.

Quantitative data is an important element for this piece, as it has allowed for a

statistical illustration of the effects that policies have upon the abundance of

cultivated or trafficked narcotics and the degree to which human rights are violated. In

an attempt to defend impartiality, sources of such information have included NGOs, as

well as relevant governments. Using such diverse publications has allowed an analysis

into the reliability of different sources, preventing a focus on one-sided figures.

Despite an attempt to project fair and accurate information, widely varying statistics

suggest that there is no way to deduce if one single source is truly accurate.

The use of online material has been necessary to ensure the inclusion of fresh data, for

example, the recent reduction of US aid towards Colombia in March 2013 has led to a

significant change to prohibitionism. Additionally, the use of books from the 1980s and

1990s have been highly useful, as some offer a unique perspective, due to being

written at the peak of domestic prohibitionist efforts in the US and Colombia.

7

1

The Origins of Prohibitionism

"As long as the government can arbitrarily decide which substances are legal

and which are illegal, then those who remain behind bars for illegal substances are

political prisoners" - Paul Krassner6, US journalist

Most illicit drugs undeniably have negative effects on human health, which has

commonly been the primary argument of those who advocate prohibitionism.

Incidentally, alcohol and tobacco pose serious health threats, and medical researchers

have deemed that these two popular legal drugs are more harmful and addictive than

many common illegal substances7. However, unlike alcohol and tobacco, several illegal

substances, including cocaine, LSD, marijuana and opium, have medically proven

benefits891011. Some severe health problems caused by illegal drugs – such as the

contraction of HIV from needle sharing, or sudden heart failure caused by the pre-

purchase mixing of powdered drugs with unknown dangerous substances – stem from

the lack of regulation over their distribution and production.

Such dangerous medical implications of prohibitionism raise the question: Why

are some deadly substances legal while others are not? This chapter will investigate

the original rationales for outlawing certain drugs, and examine the consequences of

such laws reaching the international sphere.

Part I – The Inception of US Prohibitionism

In the United States, from the beginning of the twentieth century, state and

federal authorities began to impose legislation to outlaw the production and

consumption of marijuana, cocaine and opium. The normative understanding of these

6 Button, Graham. The War on Drugs. University of Denver: Denver. 2011. p1 7 Nutt, David. Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of potential misuse. 2007.

p1050. 8 Sawada, H. Cocaine and Phenylephrine Eye Drop Test for Parkinson Disease. 2005. p293

9 Kramer, John C. Opium Rampant: Medical Use, Misuse and Abuse in Britain and the West in the 17th

and 18th Centuries. 1979. p377 10

Krebs, Teri. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) for alcoholism: meta-analysis of randomized controlled

trials. 2008. p994–1002 11

Kalant, Harold. Clearing the Smoke on Cannabis. 2012. p6

8

laws is that they were intended to protect the population from risks to their mental

and physical health. However, with a closer examination of official rhetoric and

circumstances at the time, a more clandestine purpose becomes clear; to bolster laws

of racial persecution and oppression and Towards the end of the nineteenth century

and the beginning of the twentieth, the recreational use of certain narcotics in the US

began to flourish among immigrants and minority races. Samuel Gompers, the first

president of the American Federation of Labor, supported the prohibition of opium.

He reasoned that “thousands of our American girls and boys who have acquired this

deathly habit [are] innocent victims of the Chinamen’s wiles”12. Soon after, the

Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909 was implemented to tacitly criminalise and

persecute Chinese immigrants13. Yet opium was not the only substance to face a

prohibitionist policy with a racially discriminatory subtext in the ‘land of the free’; the

use of cocaine was also portrayed as a race issue. Decades after The Coca Cola

Company began to utilise the coca plant derivative in their popular drink recipe, use of

powder cocaine grew in popularity across the US – including among minority races.

This supposed threat towards White society began cause alarm. In 1914, Dr Edward

Williams published a report in The Medical Record where he noted that “the negro

who has once formed the [cocaine] habit seems absolutely beyond redemption”, and

championed the statement of a US police officer: “the cocaine nigger is sure hard to

kill”14. Due to such claims by the media, government officials, and other supposed

experts, support for prohibition was easy to gain from the majority Whites, and the

1914 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act outlawed non-medical consumption of cocaine.

Similarly, in 1937, Harry Anslinger, the first Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, drafted the Marihuana Tax Act - which eventually progressed into the

modern norm of marijuana prohibition. Anslinger argued that the “primary reason” to

outlaw this plant was “its effect on the degenerate races … [as it] causes white women

to seek sexual relations with Negroes… [and it] makes darkies think they’re as good as

12

Brown, Richard. The Opium Trade and Opium Policies. 2003. p29 13

Holloway, Johnny. Fear and Loathing in Perpetuity: Racism, Nativism, Jingoism and the Staying

Power of America's Drug War. 2003. P4 14

Holloway, Johnny. Fear and Loathing in Perpetuity: Racism, Nativism, Jingoism and the Staying

Power of America's Drug War. 2003. P10

9

white men”15. Additionally, the federal government sought to ease White anger

towards Mexican labour immigrants, so, surreptitiously, “anti-marijuana legislation

effectively served as anti-Mexican legislation”16.

The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States’ constitution outlines that

neither “slavery nor involuntary servitude” can be enforced upon Americans. However,

the amendment was purposely conditional; stating that slavery was illegal “except as a

punishment for crime”17. Following the aforementioned popularity of certain narcotics

among ethnic minorities, the criminalisation of the use of such substances allowed the

federal government to legally enslave such citizens if they were convicted of drug

possession; a concept known as penal labour. Essentially, drug control legislation

became a governmental tool to hinder the social mobility of certain racial and cultural

groups. The inherent injustices within US drug policy continue to this day, including

penal labour, and the matter has been criticised by numerous academics. Civil rights

scholar Michelle Alexander has described modern US drug control laws as a tacit

extension of ‘Jim Crow laws’ - the set of US regulations that ensured Black Americans

would remain economically, educationally and socially disadvantaged in comparison to

White Americans18. Today, minorities remain the primary target of US domestic drug

policy. A recent Human Rights Watch report detailed that, despite White and Black

Americans engaging in drug use at similar rates, Black Americans were around 6.5

times more likely to be arrested for such crimes19. Due to the prevalence of forced

labour as an aspect of criminal punishment, the discriminatory factors that led to the

creation of drug control legislation continue to covertly exist, as the US government

criminalises thousands of citizens; restricting their prospects, and sometimes forcing

them into servitude.

Aside from the perceived threat of ethnic minorities, ideological opponents of

the government have also been targeted by contemporary drug policies. Relatively

newer illegal narcotics, particularly LSD, MDMA and psilocybin mushrooms, were

15

Open Doors SRI. The Cost of Marijuana Prohibition in Rhode Island. 2010. p4 16

Helmer, John. Drugs and Minority Oppression. 1975. P24 17

Thirteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, 1865, Section 1. 18 Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. 2010. p5 19

Human Rights Watch. Decades of Disparity. 2009. P1

10

outlawed during the second half of the 20th Century. These substances gained much

association with the cultural revolts, hippie movement and anti-war protests of the

1960s and 70s; Brown suggests that this “linkage of drug use and cultural change”

allowed the suppression of such by implying such individuals were ‘immoral’. This

notion correlates with the aforementioned racially motivated drug policies, as it

indicates the repression of certain socioeconomic groups opposed to the actions and

opinions of the ruling elite; continuing upon the theme of restricting social mobility for

ideological reasons.

Part II - The Rise of International Prohibitionism and the ‘War on Drugs’

The progression of US drug polices to an international level were far more

covertly executed. On the 28th of June 1919, the formal state of war between Germany

and the Allied powers came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

Aside from the segments that promoted peace, individual freedom and human rights,

a small note was included in Part 1, Article 23 of the Treaty: “[signatory nations] will

entrust the League [of Nations] with the general supervision over… the traffic in opium

and other illegal drugs” – this single sentence set a precedent for almost a century of

international prohibitionism20.

After World War II revealed the incapability of the League, it was dissolved, and

the newly-founded United Nations acquired the role of promoting international law. In

1961, the UN introduced the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (SCND) - formalising

a list of substances to be classified as internationally illegal. This half-century-old

convention remains the legal backbone of modern drug policy. Unlike typical UN

rhetoric, it includes highly subjective phrasing, including the description of drugs as a

“serious evil”21. During the next few decades, acceptance of the SCND grew around

the world, and eventually prohibitionism became a significant element of domestic

policy in almost every nation, though some were reluctant to implement it. Despite UN

requests for prohibition implementation in many nations, the United States

government has been, and continues to be, the primary sponsor of such legislation –

20

The Treaty of Versailles: 1919. Part 1, Article 23. 21

Bewley-Taylor, David & Jelsma, Martin. Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drug.

2011. P1

11

by exerting both economic and diplomatic pressure. To understand the methods of

prohibition implementation espoused by the US, it is necessary to examine the varying

policies of the ten US presidents who have served in office since the introduction of

the SCND.

Despite being in office at the time the SCND was introduced, John F Kennedy

and his administration were denied the chance to enact policies to strengthen

prohibitionism due to his untimely death. The US animosity towards drug use that was

seen earlier in the century continued to exist, notably with the aforementioned Harry

Anslinger becoming the sole US representative to the UN Narcotics Commission in

1962. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B Johnson, began introducing several legal changes,

including the establishment of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD).

This institution was created to focus on domestic law enforcement; Johnson’s

presidency was arguably the last time that the US government framed drugs as a

primarily domestic problem22.

The turning point came with the inauguration of Richard Nixon in 1969; he

described drugs as a “serious national threat”, and by 1970 his administration had

implemented legislation to ensure stricter penalisation of Americans involved in drugs,

as well as rhetoric demonising foreign producers and traffickers. Nixon coined the

term ‘War on Drugs’ – in stark contrast to the ‘War on Poverty’ promised by Johnson23

- and described drug abuse as “public enemy number one”. In 1971, Nixon gained

significant Congress funding allowances for the “training of foreign narcotics officers”,

as well as to help other governments “end drug trafficking”. Nixon’s proposals

included an “international goal” of ending opium production and the cultivation of

poppies; an intention of directly abetting or imposing counter-narcotic policy upon

other sovereign nations. In order to reach this goal, Nixon successfully requested a

modification to the SCND by the UN; in 1972, an amendment was made which resulted

in several major consequences for prohibitionism. A requirement was instituted for

nations to seize and destroy any illicitly produced substances from the “opium poppy,

22 Inciardi, James. The War on Drugs IV. 2007. P12 23 Germany, Kent. War on Poverty. 2007. p1

12

the coca bush or the cannabis plant”24, and any states who failed to effectively

implement this faced a threat of economic sanctions25.

Thus, with the clout of US diplomatic and economic power, the United Nations

entrenched the illegality of a number of substances throughout much of the world. In

1973, to empower the US in its new role as the world-leader of prohibitionism, Nixon’s

administration merged the BNDD into the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the

highly-funded and militarised federal agency that pursues counter-narcotic activities

around the world to this day.

The implementation of these policies continued during the remainder of

Nixon’s presidency, and under the administration of his successor, Gerald Ford.

However, after being inaugurated in 1977, Jimmy Carter began to provide a more

sympathetic and less intrusive approach to the international drug trade. The counter-

narcotic policies proposed and implemented by his administration are distinctly

different from those of all other presidents since the introduction of the SCND. He

demonstrated a sense of compassion rarely seen in the discourse of US prohibitionism,

including a request for the development of an “alternative source of income for the

impoverished farmers” in cultivating regions26. With an ostensible safeguarding of

human rights in place, the Colombian and Mexican governments began crop

eradication programmes following pressure from Carter’s administration27.

From the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981, the impact of US

prohibitionism upon Latin America – particularly Colombia and Mexico – began to

grow exponentially. The creation of the Task Force on South Florida successfully led to

the “shutting down [of] South Florida as a drug importation centre”28, although this

led to the US-Mexico border becoming the primary point of entry for drugs. In 1986,

Reagan began to militarise prohibitionism across Latin America, particularly when

24 United Nations. 1972 SCND Amendment. Article 22 25 Ibid. Article 20 26 Strategy Council on Drug Abuse. Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention. 1979. p62 27 Youngers, Coletta. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. 2004. P103 28 Munsing, Evan. Joint Interagency Task Force-South. 2011. p7

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drugs became associated with the Cold War29. An element of coercion became evident

when Reagan ratified a 1986 national security directive, proclaiming that Latin

American nations that did not comply with prohibitionism would “lose their eligibility

to receive US aid”30. Additionally, militarisation was manifested in a series of attacks.

In 1986, ‘Operation Blast Furnace’ led to the destruction of Bolivian cocaine factories

in what was - according to drug policy expert, Coletta Youngers - “the first major

antidrug operation on foreign soil to publicly involve US military forces”. Reagan’s

administration set a precedent in the War on Drugs, as previously the US had only

funded or encouraged foreign prohibitionism.

George H. W. Bush, who promised that his government would create a “kinder,

gentler America”31, began his presidency by requesting an extra $1.2billion from

Congress in military spending to combat the War on Drugs32. He then continued

implementing counter-narcotic policies in Latin America similar to those of the Reagan

administration. As the 1990s progressed, the amount of cocaine trafficked into the

United States from Colombia steadily increased. In 1998, Bill Clinton’s administration

formed an agreement with Colombian president Andrés Pastrana that has been

colloquially referred to as Plan Colombia. A vital part of the deal was the provision of

huge amounts of aid for the implementation of counter-narcotic operations by the

Colombian military and police, peaking at $765million in 200033. The impact of the

deal upon human rights, security and the stability of Colombia during Clinton’s

presidency has been controversial, especially as the amount provided for other

domestic issues was relatively minimal. In 1998, $112million was provided for the

military and police, while just $520,000 was earmarked for social development34.

By the dawn of the 21st Century, when George W. Bush had ascended to

presidency, drug trafficking through Mexico, and the associated violence and

corruption, had reached endemic levels. It was estimated that around 90% of cocaine

29 Parry, Robert. Reagan Lashes Sandinistas for Alleged Drug Trafficking. 1986. [online] 30 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia. 2008. p168 31 Caputi, Mary. A Kinder, Gentler America. 2005. p2 32 Baxtrom, Wayne. America Hanging By a Thread. 2007. p148 33 Veillette, Connie. Plan Colombia: A Progress Report. 2005. P2 34 Ibid. p2

14

in the US had entered through Mexico35. Towards the end of his term, Bush responded

to this growing crisis by creating a bilateral agreement known as the Mérida Initiative.

The deal involved the US government providing Mexico with around $1.6billion of

military training and equipment, intelligence provision, and funding for social

development – including human rights issues. Despite this assistance, Mexican

trafficking continues relatively unabated, and the number of deaths caused by related

violence seems to be increasing exponentially36. Under Barack Obama’s administration,

the Mérida Initiative continues to be in effect, with almost $900 million provided

during 2011 37 . Similarly, Obama’s administration has allocated $319million for

Colombia to combat drug-traffickers and related armed groups38.

The impacts of US-sponsored prohibitionism in Latin America have varied

greatly in different regions. The following chapters will analyse the distinct

consequences that have become apparent in Colombia and Mexico during the past

few decades.

35 Cook, Colleen. Mexico's Drug Cartels. 2007. P7 36 Sherman, Christopher. Mexico's drug war death tolls a guess without bodies. 2013. [online] 37 Pace, Julie. Obama, Calderon Pledge Cooperation On Drug wars. 2011. [online] 38 O'Gorman, Joey. Obama cuts funds to combat Colombia's drug trade. Colombia Reports. 2013. [online]

15

2

Colombian Prohibitionism: a Multifaceted Threat

“Many people know that the government won't help the people in what they need.

Many people come to us to collect money, debts on cars, debts for drugs, basically

anything.” - Anonymous Colombian drug trafficker39

The implementation of much counter-narcotic activity in Colombia is assisted –

if not entirely funded – by the United States; therefore it is vital to explore the bilateral

relationship between the two states when understanding the War on Drugs. This

involvement in the Latin American nation has been dubbed ‘Plan Colombia’, although

this term is vaguely defined – simply referring to related legislation enacted by the US

government. The chief aspects of the Plan are the suppression of drug-trafficking, and

the conflation of counter-narcotic and counter-insurgent activity. The human rights of

the Colombian people, as well as the security and stability of the Colombian state have

endured significant changes as result of this. As one of the most prominent source

nations in the international drug trade, Colombia has endured the repercussions of

interventionist US governments, international agreements, and aggressive domestic

organisations. The Colombian government’s focus on counter-narcotic and counter-

insurgent issues, while often neglecting the social priorities of the citizens, has been so

damaging to the state that it could lead to collapse 40.

In Colombia the aggressive militarisation of the War on Drugs has displaced

over three million people since 2000, in what one human rights report describes as

being “the most serious human rights crisis in the Hemisphere”41. The reasons for this

destitution are complex, although prohibitionism is undoubtedly a root cause. State

corruption associated with the drug trade is rife in Colombia. This was most

prominently exemplified in 1998, when outgoing President Ernesto Samper admitted

that his successful election campaign was partially funded by drug trafficking42.

39 TIME. Quotes of the day. TIME World. 2012. [online] 40 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P22 41

Bailey, John. Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative. 2009. P9 42 BBC News. Samper admits drug money used for polls. BBC. 1998. [online]

16

Corruption at the state level is undoubtedly a major contributor to the failure of the

state to protect civilians, as powerful government institutions receive bribes from

groups of violent criminals. This in turn diminishes the stability of the state, as citizens

seek representation and redress for their problems from alternative sources,

particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist

guerrilla organisation that has engaged in bloody conflicts with the national

government since 1964. The murders of numerous Colombian political figures have

been attributed to such groups, including three candidates in the 1990 president

elections alone43; indicating the detriment to democracy and political development

caused by the traffickers empowered by prohibitionism. Conversely, ethical politicians

who oppose corruption create an alternate problem for citizens, as a primary focus on

the suppression of drug trafficking has led to social issues such as healthcare,

education and employment being overlooked44.

In his 2002 book Narco-Terrorism, author Douglas Davids described how drug

trafficking has “helped support terrorism and military insurgencies throughout the

world” by financing terrorists and guerrilla forces45. Essentially, ‘narco-terror’ refers to

the blurring of the relationship between violent ideologically-motivated organisations

and drug traffickers into a multi-faceted threat. Davids infers that, by serving as the

primary source of illegal drugs to the US, Latin America is the predominant location of

narco-terror. He recommends a number of controversial measures to combat this

scourge, including the extradition of US drug users to the source-nation of their

chosen narcotic due to their inadvertent funding of terrorism46; a radical notion in

terms of human rights and international law. However, some of his more judicious

suggestions have recently become more evident in US foreign policy, particularly

increased funding and militarisation of Latin American nations47. Davids highlights

Colombia as the Latin American state most impaired by and vulnerable to narco-terror,

43 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P20 44 CNN Wire Staff. Five facts about Colombia’s FARC rebels. CNN. 2012. [online] 45 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. p.xiii 46 Davids, Douglas J. Narco-Terrorism: A Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist

Menace. 2002. p72 47 Ibid. p90

17

calling for increased US and multinational action. He claims that “to leave Colombia to

fight […] narco-terrorism by itself […] is leaving the State to die”48.

In her 2001 analysis of the War on Drugs in Colombia, Arlene Tickner claimed

that the primary reason for the belligerent counter-narcotic strategies espoused by

the US government (and Davids) is that such policies are framed within realist dogma.

This notion is exemplified by the perceptible US belief that the state is the primary

rational actor in the War on Drugs, and that the lawlessness of terrorism and drug

trafficking is due to an anarchy caused by the lack of over-arching authority in the

international system49. Indeed, there is no greater power instituted to protect the

Colombian state from the dangers caused by trafficking groups. However, the policies

implemented and recommended to deal with this disorder seem to further weaken

the security of the Colombian state. In turn, this insecurity erodes human rights of

Colombian citizens; militarised prohibitionism and the intrastate violence it generates

have led to increased poverty and illnesses, as well as the arbitrary detainment and

deaths of thousands of civilians50.

The relationship between counter-narcotic activity, and security and human

rights is exemplified by the intensive US-funded crop fumigation programme

conducted between 1994 and 1998. Poverty grew among peasants, particularly due to

the inadvertent eradication of legal food crops and soil being rendered unusable –

including in agricultural areas being funded by the United Nations51. Huge protests

were staged at this destruction of agrarian land, and the hazardous effects of

fumigation upon human health 52 . Consequently, anti-government forces gained

increased popularity among civilians. Even to those who saw crop fumigation as a

legitimate weapon in the War on Drugs, this action was a failure. According to a UN

48 Ibid. p87 49 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P4

50 Zalph, Ruth. The many casualties of Colombia’s war on drugs. The New Observer.

2013 [online] 51 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P25

52 Latin American Herald Tribune. Thousands Protest Aerial Fumigation of Coca in

Colombia. LAHT. 2000 [online]

18

survey, Colombian cocaine production more than doubled during the period of

fumigation; from 300 metric tonnes in 1996, to 680 metric tonnes by 199953.

The failure of the fumigation campaign can be viewed as a microcosm of the

War on Drugs in Colombia. The prohibitionist policy in the country is often

implemented with the intention of reducing drug production – with few efforts made

to maintain the livelihood of citizens or improve social development. This government

indifference leads to the strengthening of FARC, due to citizens losing faith in

authorities to protect their interests. According to political scientist Russell Crandall, in

response to the increased popularity of FARC, right-wing paramilitary forces have

“launched an undeclared war” on civilians perceived to be sympathetic to FARC and

other left-wing guerrilla groups54. The UN reported in 2008 that around 80% of killings

in Colombia were undertaken by paramilitaries – many of which have direct ties with

the Colombian national government55. Therefore, some of the US aid provided to

Colombia is used to fund extrajudicial killings, torture and kidnappings of drug

traffickers, members of left-wing groups, judges, journalists and sympathetic civilians

by paramilitaries56 - despite being wholly contrary to the stipulations of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights which the US and Colombian have ratified. In many cases

of the implementation of prohibitionism, Colombian efforts have actually increased

the power of drug traffickers, increased instances of intrastate violence, and

diminished the Colombian state’s “monopoly” over the use of force57. These results

relate back to the failure of realism as a framework to combat drug trafficking; Tickner

corroborates this notion by asserting that “the state’s instinct for self-preservation

reduces its institutional capacity to provide security and well-being for the population

at large, leading to the increased vulnerability of society as a whole”58. Essentially, the

53 UNODC. Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. 2008. P90

54 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia. 2008. P1

55 Latin American Herald Tribune. Thousands Protest Aerial Fumigation of Coca in

Colombia. LAHT. 2000 [online]

56 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia. 2008. P1

57 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P20

58 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P30

19

failure of the government to appropriately handle the socioeconomic repercussions of

prohibitionism has severely undermined human rights, and this has directly led to a

weakening of national security.

Despite such consistent failures of prohibitionism occurring in Colombia in the

1990s, the US has continued to vigorously pursue the War on Drugs in the nation since

then, albeit with a different – and arguably more detrimental - approach. Following

the attacks of September 11th 2001, the administration of George W. Bush began to

refocus foreign policy in Colombia more towards counter-insurgency. Meanwhile, the

Colombia government began to concentrate on subduing “left-wing Marxist

insurgents”, especially as such groups often gained revenue and power from the drug

trade59. This politicised approach grew from the fact that both the US and Colombian

governments have characterised themselves as staunchly anti-communist. In 2002,

Bush was successful in convincing the Congress to ease restrictions on Colombian aid,

allowing for the provision of half-a-billion dollars for combined counter-insurgent and

counter-narcotic military efforts60.

The rejuvenated funding resulted in the Colombian army engaging in a major

offensive against FARC, a repeated increase in aerial crop fumigation61, and - for the

first time - the direct involvement of US troops in the nation. This controversial

programme to train Colombian soldiers was introduced in 2003 under the guise of

countering the drug trade and combating insurgents. According to the BBC, however,

the “principal US aim... [was] to ensure that the oil [in the region] can be exported

northward” 62. Crandall argues that, between the 1990s and today, the drug war has

become “institutionalised” within US government policy, and therefore precipitates

continuous funding for a plethora of counter-narcotic agencies. This war, he claims,

will “continue regardless of its success in actually reducing the amount of illegal drugs

that enter the United States”, as, paradoxically, drugs do not seem to be the sole

59 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia. 2008. p3 60 Lobe, Jim. Bush approves Colombia funding despite paramilitary ties. The Monitor. 2002. [online] 61 Crandall, Russell. Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia. 2008. p7 62 BBC News. US troops engage further in Colombia. BBC. 2003. [online]

20

motivation of the War on Drugs. The US appears to be using prohibitionism to battle

ideological enemies, and to gain resource control.

Some commentators suggest that the most appropriate response to the

failures of contemporary prohibitionism is the intensification of militarised aggression;

Davids argues for the creation of an “inter-regional” multinational force to counter

trafficking cartels and associated guerrilla groups63. Although the multinational aspect

has not come to fruition, the increased militarisation certainly has; and the results

have evidently been dangerous and destabilising for Colombia. Additionally, the

consequences are no longer restricted to Colombia – the effects are felt across Latin

America as a whole. Kidnapping and violence has occurred against residents along the

Venezuelan border, while an influx of displaced Colombian people has fled to Ecuador,

creating a strain on the nation’s government. In the past two decades, Venezuela, Peru,

Ecuador and Brazil have vastly increased security along their borders to prevent

further “spillover effects” 64 . Although the White House reported that cocaine

production in Colombia dropped by 25% between 2010 and 201265, neighbouring Peru

encountered a 5.2% rise in cocaine production in 2012, the sixth consecutive year of

an increase in that country66. A new problem has emerged; when cultivation land and

trafficking routes are suppressed, those involved simply move operations elsewhere.

This activity has been recognised by the US government as a flaw in policy. Dubbed

“the balloon effect”, the traffickers’ response is likened to the transition of air from

one part of an inflated balloon to another when pinched67.

63 Davids, Douglas J. Narco-Terrorism: A Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist

Menace. 2002. P101 64 Tickner, Arlene B. Local and Regional effects of the US ‘War on Drugs’ in Colombia. 2001. P26 65 Los Angeles Times. White House: Peru displaces Colombia as top cocaine

producer. LA Times. 2012. [online]

66 UNODC. Coca bush cultivation increases in Peru. United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime. 2011. [online]

67 Seelke, Clare. Latin America and the Caribbean: Illict Drug Trafficking and US Counterdrug Programs. 2011. p26

21

Despite existing social and political problems prior to the War on Drugs, such

conditions in Colombia have undeniably been worsened by US-sponsored

prohibitionism. Crop eradication programmes – particularly aerial fumigation – have

failed to ultimately reduce production, and the anti-government sentiment produced

by this has stifled elements of Colombian democracy. The illegality nature of the drug

trade allows cartels to operate in an entirely unregulated manner, causing corruption,

political violence and intrastate conflict. The huge profits made by many involved in

the trade allow for the easy creation and funding of armed militia and guerrilla groups.

Such violence poses a significant threat to the stability of Latin America as a whole –

undermining the region’s economic capabilities, as well as governments’ abilities to

protect and advance the interests of their own citizens. The US holds much

responsibility for such issues due to its historic financial support and coercion aimed at

the Colombian implementation of prohibitionist policies.

As the US government is the primary international actor countering the Latin

American drug trade, it is vital to follow the route that drugs take to that nation.

Mostly originating in Colombia and neighbouring nations, the vast majority of illegal

substances then enter the US through Mexico – where distinctly different threats have

arisen towards human rights and security.

22

3

The Militarisation of Mexico: a Failed Response to Drug Trafficking

“"The [cartels] go for a person, kill their mother, kill their brother. They kill lots of

innocent people. They killed my father. It just keeps spreading out and it's mostly

innocent people” - Cristina Roman, Mexican civilian68

The movement of illegal substances from Mexico to the US is not a recent

trend. In the 1930s, Mexico was the primary provider of Americans’ preferred illicit

drug – alcohol. Following the legalisation of liquor, the cross-border trafficking

continued of other illegal substances continued. This remained at a low, though steady,

level until the 1980s when trafficking rose sharply. The successful effort made by

President Reagan to counter Colombian cocaine importation in South Florida led to

Mexico becoming the primary narcotic trafficking route into the United States. This

coincided with a period of heightened cocaine demand in the US69. With the demise of

several Colombian cartels in the 1990s, Mexican trafficking groups began filling the

power vacuum70. To address this change, the 21st Century saw the beginning of an

intensified strategy of prohibitionism in the nation; as in Colombia, this

implementation was mostly financed by the US government.

In 2006, President Calderon initiated Mexico’s first military-led assault on drug

cartels, in which 50,000 counter-narcotic troops were deployed in the southern state

of Michoacán. Due to the lack of success with this strategy, in 2008, the US

government began providing Mexico with hundreds of million dollars to fund such

efforts. This financing was resultant of the US-Mexico bilateral agreement for targeting

drug cartels, known as the Mérida Initiative, which has aimed to increase the

militarisation of domestic Mexican prohibitionism. This has had dramatic impacts on

the security and stability of the Mexican state – such as corruption and intrastate

68 Hernandez, Daniel. Mexican drug war's innocent victimes: 'They tried to kill me with

my kids'. The Guardian. 2013. [online]

69 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P35 70 Borderland Beat. Mexican Drug War. Borderland Beat. 2010. [online]

23

violence. Additionally, the livelihoods and human rights of civilians have suffered

considerably due to state repression. Yet, despite this increase in counter-narcotic

action, Mexico arguably remains the most significant nation in the process of drug

trafficking; a recent report noted that around 90 per cent of cocaine entering the

United States transits Mexico71.

The fight against drug cartels has not just been a military campaign, ordinary

citizens bravely stood up to traffickers too. In 2008, María Santos Gorrostieta, a 32-

year-old mother of three, was elected mayor of a small Michoacán town called

Tiquicheo. Gorrostieta was hailed as a “heroine of the 21st Century” for taking a stand

against cartels, and refusing to be enticed by bribery or corruption. She was attacked

and intimidated on numerous occasions by armed groups, and in 2009, her husband

was shot and killed in front of her. She later published graphic photos of her own

injuries in a national magazine, declaring "I wanted to show you my wounded,

mutilated, humiliated body because... it is the living testimony that I am a whole and

strong woman, who, despite my physical and mental wounds, continues standing". In

2012, while driving her young daughter to school, María Santos Gorrostieta was

kidnapped, beaten, and killed. She was just one of 30 Mexican mayors killed since the

beginning of the Mérida Initiative; fifteen were assassinated in 2010 alone72. The

unremitting frequency of violent deaths among Mexican politicians believed to be

defying trafficking groups has largely been attributed to drug cartels and their

associates; an anti-democratic trend preventing politicians from being truly

representative of their voters’ wishes and creating a culture of fear. Cases like that of

Gorrostieta are just a small part of the detrimental results the on-going drug war in

Mexico. Yet evidence suggests that such insecurity and violence is actually being

perpetuated by prohibitionism.

During the past three decades, as Mexican drug trafficking groups grown in size

and number, cartels have used violence to compete with one another, and to vie for

increased state influence73. As in Colombia, the abuse of human rights correlates with

71 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P30 72 Ibid. P38 73 Ibid. P36

24

the weakening of national security – particularly due to a changing relationship

between drug cartels and elected representatives; unlike Gorrostieta, many political

figures have submitted to corruption. In a recent journal article regarding Mexican

trafficking, Professor Stephen Morris described corruption and organised crime as

“inherently linked” – emphasising the power endowed to cartels by corrupt lawmakers

and law enforcement agencies74. Journalist Charles Bowden goes further, claiming that

“in over a half century of fighting drugs… Mexico has never created a police unit that

did not join the traffickers75”. This corruption has reached the highest echelons. In

2007, the head of the Mexican Interpol office, as well as the former director of the

government’s organised crime division, were found to be covertly collaborating with

drug cartels in the country 76 . Corruption remains a problem, but unlike its

manifestation among Colombian state officials, corruption in Mexico appears to occur

more broadly across all levels of law and governance77. Morris refers to the indictment

or prosecution of “prison officials, military and police commanders, governors […],

district attorneys, mayors and city officials, and hundreds of municipal police” for

involvement in the drug trade78. Calderon has described corruption within Mexico as

“a cancer” that has fuelled “insecurity and violence”, and his ratification of the Mérida

Initiative was indicative of his aim to clamp down on such unethical behaviour79. The

corruption powered by the drug trade has emerged as a multi-faceted threat to

national security. Morris describes how it effectively weakens state efforts to “control

or contain” drug trafficking cartels80 by removing the state’s ability to enforce law, and

bolsters public distrust towards the government.

Unlike the numerous guerrilla and paramilitary groups involved in Colombia’s

drug trade, there are only two significant domestic participants in the Mexican War on

Drugs: the cartels and the government (including the police, legislators, and other

officials). However, alike in Colombia, the violent and corrupt relationship between

74 Ibid. P30 75 Bowden, Charles. Murder City. p109

76 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P30 77 Ibid. P31 78 Ibid. P30 79 Ibid. P30 80 Ibid. P34

25

these actors seems to have a cyclical nature. This recurring pattern is evident in the

paradoxical interaction between the government and cartels; when the government

concentrates its aggression on a certain cartel, rival cartels are then strengthened. A

synchronised attack on all cartels is currently infeasible, particularly due to the

inherent corruption in government agencies and their surreptitious alliances81. Indeed,

the 2006 attempt to aggressively target all cartels in a certain region was a failure that

spawned an “unprecedented level of insecurity”82.

Calderon’s policy of involving huge numbers of Mexico’s military servicemen in

fighting the internal threat of drug traffickers has had a catastrophic result on civilian

well-being83. Around 35,000 people have died84, and the number of human rights

complaints increased more than eight-fold between 2006 and 200985. US political

scientist Robert Leiken described the use of soldiers, who “are trained to employ all

necessary force to attack and eliminate an enemy”, as being detrimental to the cause.

Their readiness to kill, he argues, conflicts with the need for officials to “interact with

civilians” and “support prosecutions”86. This lack of engagement with civilians and in

non-military law enforcement contributes significantly to the abuse of human rights

and extrajudicial killings conducted by Mexican troops. Approaching drugs as a matter

of law enforcement, rather than as a matter for the military, seems to be more

befitting for the protection of civilians; the police are better trained to handle the

“day-to-day requirements of the drug war”87. A key criticism made by Morris of

militarised prohibitionism is that, even when it is occasionally successful, the

implementation of such violence begets further violence; effective government attacks

upon powerful cartels have “expanded the power vacuum”, simply increasing

aggression between competing groups, and against the state88. The interdiction of

drugs has also led to traffickers seeking additional alternative sources of income.

81 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P39 82 Ibid. P40 83 Ibid. P37 84

Nieto, Nubia. Political Corruption and Narcotrafficking in Mexico. 2012. p1 85 Olson, Eric. Shared Responsibility: U.S.—Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. 2010. P23 86 Leiken, Robert. Mexico’s Drug War. 2012. P12 87 Ibid. P15 88 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P38

26

Cartels are now involved in “kidnapping[s], human trafficking, [involvement in] the

protection/extortion racket, theft” and other lucrative forms of criminal activity.

US policy has exacerbated the violence of Mexican prohibitionism, both

directly and indirectly. A prominent example was the 2004 lifting of the national US

ban on civilians owning assault weapons, when a massive increase of arms crossing the

border vastly empowered cartels89. Calls have been made by US politicians and

analysts to increase the presence of US troops along the Mexican border to improve

security and bilateral cooperation. Such military involvement, it has been argued,

would “send a signal of long-term commitment that law-enforcement simply does

not”90. Military collaboration has been effective since the Mérida Initiative, with the

US providing much training to the Mexican army, and the two nations sharing a vast

amount of “equipment, assistance, and intelligence”91.

The control exerted by cartels over particular regions, and the intrastate

violence caused by this, prompted the Former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to

describe modern Mexico as “looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years

ago”92. Leiken accentuates a discrepancy between Mexican and US rhetoric regarding

drug traffickers; the former referring to it as a “national security threat”, and the latter

as a “criminal insurgency”93. Such discourse illustrates a highly politicised element of

US-sponsored prohibitionism; the depiction of drug traffickers in Mexico as anti-

government rebels is particularly effective at mustering support for militaristic funding,

particularly in the midst of the US’ War on Terror.

Despite certain Mérida Initiative provisions for the improvement of Mexico’s

socioeconomic development, the primary focus of US assistance has been the

suppression of cartels. Between 2008 and 2012, the US provided around $100million

to support economic development, compared to a staggering $1.8billion for military

financing and counter-narcotic law enforcement94. Developmental aid has been used

89 Ibid. P36 90 Leiken, Robert. Mexico’s Drug War. 2012. P7 91 Ibid. P11 92 Ibid. P1 93 Ibid. P2 94 Seelke, Clare. US-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond. 2013. p8

27

for a variety of domestic initiatives, including attempts to reform the judicial system95,

although, few substantial constructive results have been seen. A Human Rights Watch

report noted alarmingly low levels of judicial involvement in serious violent crimes;

between January 2008 and January 2011, less than two thousand investigations were

launched into the killings of the estimated 35,000 people allegedly linked to organised

crime96. Despite US assistance, the Mexican government’s efforts to appropriately

safeguard its citizens’ rights continue to be mired in corruption and conflict.

The implementation of militarised prohibitionism in Latin America has often

resulted in the conflict spreading into different nations or even expanding across

whole regions – particularly in the case of Colombia. However, different ‘spillover’

effects have been exhibited during the Mexican drug war; the increasingly wealthy and

powerful cartels have expanded cultivation operations in nearby Central American

states, and the inherent violence has inevitably followed in their wake97. Guatemala,

the sole nation separating Mexico from the rest of Latin America, has become a

battleground between two of the most dominant drug cartels – Los Zetas and the

Sinaloa - and has led to the deaths of many civilians and government personnel. The

‘balloon effect’ in Colombia and Peru, in which operations are simply moved from

where the pressure is applied, has not happened in Mexico. Regardless of government

aggression, cartels cannot afford to stop operating in the country, as it is their sole

viable gateway to the United States. The situation in Mexico could be more accurately

described as a ‘boiling effect’, where friction between law enforcement and traffickers

has led to spiralling violence, with national insecurity and human rights abuses rapidly

increasing too.

The lack of legal regulation over the drug trade is undoubtedly the primary

factor in the massive wealth and power of Mexican cartels. These benefits that the

trafficking groups enjoy have endowed upon them the financial and logistic abilities to

effectively counter government and military suppression in particularly violent means;

the outcome of this clout has been dreadful for the livelihood of many Mexican

95 Leiken, Robert. Mexico’s Drug War. 2012. P9 96 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P33 97 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P39

28

citizens and officials, and has hugely destabilised the nation – undermining the

authority of the government.

The Mexican government has made little progress in suppressing drug

trafficking, as the quantity of illegal substances crossing the US border continues to

rise98. The efforts made have evidently increased instances of violent attacks in

numerous regions – both by cartels and the military. The US government holds

considerable responsibility for this – due to its financial and diplomatic support of the

policies. As in Colombia, this backing has been bolstered by a desire to protect US

interests – curtailing the problems of drug trafficking from entering the United States.

It is apparent that, as in Colombia, policies of prohibition in Mexico have failed, and

have generated further insecurity and human rights abuses. The concluding chapter

will propose alternative policies and solutions that could reduce many of these

dangers.

98 Beckhusen, Robert. As Deadly Mexican Cartel Loses Control, Heroin and Meth Trafficking Rise. 2013.

[online]

29

4

Alternatives to Prohibitionism

“The prestige of government has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the

prohibition law. For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the

law of the land than passing laws which cannot be enforced.” - Albert Einstein99

The goal of drug policy, as with other social policies, should be to maximise the

safety and security of the public and the nation as a whole. As has been seen in the

previous chapters, prohibitionism fails to support this goal, and even undermines it;

the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy concluded in 2010 that the

policies of prohibitionism had been a “lost war”100. Human rights and national security

have often deteriorated when prohibitionism has been implemented. Due to these

evident failures of prohibitionism, an alternative strategy is vital. Legalisation and

decriminalisation of drugs are the primary suggestions for policy reform within

contemporary discourse, although these are not strictly defined terms, and there are a

number of interpretations. It will be argued that legalisation is vastly superior to

prohibitionism due to the reduction in human rights abuses and increased protection

of national security that it offers. This will be illustrated with a consideration of

academic predictions, as well as an analysis of recent drug policy reforms.

James Inciardi, co-director of the Centre for Drug and Alcohol Studies, suggests

that opposition to the prohibition of alcohol and tobacco is primarily due to the

widespread belief that adults have “the right to choose what substances they will

consume and what risks they will take” - and that the financial cost of enforcing

abstention would be “enormous”101. However, due to the commonly made moral

distinction between illegal drugs and alcohol or tobacco, policy reform has gained little

international momentum102. Additionally, it has been argued that legality condones

99 Sarat, Austin. Law and the Stranger. 2010. p222-223 100 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P108 101 Inciardi, James. The Drug Legalisation Debate. 1991. P25 102 Ibid. P34

30

the use of physiologically harmful substances103. A fear has also been voiced that

policy reform could increase violence; a 1986 study by Paul Goldstein in the Journal of

Drug Issues concluded that a decline in the systemic violence of prohibitionism would

be accompanied by an increase in psychopharmacologic violence – the aggression

sometimes caused by narcotic use. The fact that certain societal problems are caused

by drug abuse has led to allegations against advocates of policy reform - that

legalisation is an “elitist and racist” strategy to legitimise increased drug dependence

among the poor and the “chemical destruction of an urban generation and culture”104.

Several proponents of this argument describe legalisation as a socially destructive

force targeted at further marginalising minorities, ironically akin to the motivation for

the original US implementation of prohibitionism. However, this view fails to consider

the complexity of legalisation, as well as the various policy reforms that offer different

ways to counter such negative repercussions.

There seems to be a slow shift away from militarised prohibitionism in certain

parts of Latin America. A number of nations, including Mexico and Argentina, have

decriminalised the possession of a small amount of certain narcotics for personal

use 105 . Decriminalisation, however, is distinctly different to legalisation. In the

framework of the former, drug possession and usage remains illegal, although

violating that law is considered an “exclusively administrative violation” rather than a

criminal offence106. Since the 2001 decriminalisation of all drugs in Portugal, treatment

of drug users by the state has improved. Within the first four years, the number of

heroin users in the nation dropped by 28 per cent, while drug-associated diagnoses of

HIV decreased by over 70 per cent. The incarceration of individuals purely for drug

possession immediately ended, with the resulted savings being partially utilised for the

rehabilitation of addicts. Decriminalisation in Portugal has also prevented users of low-

harm, non-addictive drugs such as MDMA or marijuana from facing prosecution –

therefore protecting the prospects of non-violent ‘criminals’107. Despite fears that such

103 Ibid. P52 104 Ibid. P65 105 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P108 106 Greenwald, Glenn. Drug Decriminalization in Portugal. 2009. P1 107 Ibid. P7

31

leniency would encourage drug use, evidence from the Portuguese Institute for Drugs

and Drug Addiction indicates that, within the first five years of decriminalisation, there

was a significant decrease in youth usage of cannabis, cocaine, MDMA, LSD, heroin,

psilocybin mushrooms and methamphetamines108. It is interesting to note that the

percentage of individuals who have used cocaine in the United Kingdom is more than

six times higher than in Portugal – despite the UK threatening incarceration of up to

seven years for simple possession109. This would suggest that prosecution, and the

threat of prosecution, have little bearing on public drug use.

Yet decriminalisation is not without challenges. One serious drawback is that,

despite improving certain human rights issues, it does not tackle the issue of drug

trafficking, the greatest drug-related threat to national security. Since trafficking

remains illegal, criminal gangs continue to profit from the sale of drugs. Consequently,

decriminalisation does not offer a solution to the violence and power of cartels, the

militarisation of counter-trafficking policy, or to other problems caused by

prohibitionism – such as corruption. Stephen Morris argues that a better form of drug

policy would be focussed on reducing violence and tackling the “underlying social and

economic causes” of drug use and trafficking, rather than directly countering

trafficking with violence110. The militarisation of the War on Drugs in Latin America has

had little long-term success “in the direction of eliminating or even reducing the drug

phenomenon”111. However, if drug production was regulated and traders operated

within a legal and professional framework – rather than through illegal and violent

means – a militarised counter-force would become unnecessary.

Indeed, the implementation of prohibitionism, academic Juan Tokatlian argues,

is at the very origin of such organised transnational crime 112 . Therefore, the

undermining of democracy, social injustice, financial costs, and corruption that result

from such organised crime are directly caused by prohibitionism. If narcotics were not

illegal, the political strength and financial wealth of organised criminals would be

108 Ibid. P12-13 109 Ibid. P24 110 Morris, Stephen. Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico. 2012. P40 111 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P106 112 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P107

32

hugely reduced. Perhaps most importantly, the violence and narco-terror that

threaten national security would diminish, as these organisations would lose a key

source of income. An analysis of the income of ‘terrorist’ organisations illustrates this.

FARC earns around a half a billion dollars annually from drug trafficking, while profits

from opium funded the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan in the early 2000s113. Thus,

as well as reducing violence between the state and cartels, legalisation would vastly

undermine the capabilities of certain guerrilla organisations and rebel groups. A

reduction in intrastate violence would improve national security and potentially

enhance the livelihoods of civilians, particularly in Latin America.

In contemporary discourse, a range of implementations have been suggested,

including the suggestion that the government should have no restrictions over the

production and sale of these substances114. However, the legalisation approach that

has garnered the most acclaim is that of an efficiently regulated system that tackles

the social problems caused by drug use, as well as the violence, corruption and human

rights abuse that result from the drug trade. Inciardi succinctly described the

application of such policy reform: “It is [a strategy] in which government makes most

of the substances that are now banned legally available to competent adults, exercises

strong regulatory powers over all large-scale production and sale of drugs, makes

drug-treatment programs available to all who need them, and offers honest drug-

education programs to children”. At the time of publishing - in 1991 – Inciardi

estimated that such a strategy could result in savings of $10billion to the US economy.

This figure is now dwarfed by modern estimates, such as the 2010 projections of the

libertarian Cato Institute, which anticipated an annual expenditure reduction of

around $41billion if legalisation were implemented115.

The case for legalisation is demonstrable in the context of the public policies

that characterise Latin American prohibitionism. These include crop eradication, the

militarisation of conflict against trafficking groups, and the criminalisation of the

113 Peters, Gretchen. How Opium Profits the Taliban. 2009. P5 114 Inciardi, James. The Drug Legalisation Debate. 1991. P19

115 Miron, Jeffrey. The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohibition. P1

33

“entire domestic chain” of drugs116. The militarisation of the War on Drugs has hugely

deteriorated the relationship between the military, the government and the public in

affected nations. A recent analysis found that human rights abuses and the deaths of

“thousands” of Colombian citizens were treated with impunity as violators were

protected by the military courts117 . Legalisation would significantly reduce this

seemingly unfettered aggression, and could potentially decrease the prevalence of

corruption found in clandestine affiliations between cartels and certain armed

forces118. Ending crop eradication, particularly aerial fumigation, would reduce the

detrimental effects of such chemicals on human health, as well as the persecution of

impoverished farmers – certainly progress for human rights too. Additionally, this lack

of interference would likely lead to a reduction in anti-government sentiment in rural,

agricultural areas; therefore, an end to source suppression would diminish support for

violent ideological enemies of the state, such as FARC, that threaten the security and

stability of the state119.

Nations seeking policy reform have found the attainment of transnational

support to be unlikely, particularly due to the international obligation of adhering to

the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The United Nations has therefore become a

major obstacle for policy reform. The institution consistently lauds prohibitionist

efforts, despite such implementations often conflicting with basic rules and rights

advocated by the UN itself. This has been clear with the United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime praising Iran for having “one of the world’s strongest counter-

narcotic responses” 120 in the same year that the Iranian regime executed almost 200

people for “drug offences”121; this case is particularly poignant as a large portion of the

116 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P103 117 Aviles, William. Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia. 2006. p6 118 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P106 119 Ibid. P104 120 Sanei, Faraz. Don’t praise Iran’s warn on drugs. The Guardian. 2011. [online]

121 Mail & Guardian. SA grills Iranian dignitary on ‘excessive’ executions. Mail &

Guardian. 2013. [online]

34

funding for Iranian counter-drug policies is provided by the United Kingdom122 – a

Security Council member. Similarly, another permanent Security Council member – the

United States – funds the special “counternarcotic” police force in Bolivia; a group that

Human Rights Watch condemns as having “arbitrarily” searched, stolen from, arrested,

detained and physically attacked civilians 123 . Yet this clearly violates Universal

Declaration of Human Rights’ ban on “arbitrary arrest [or] detention”. It appears that,

in many cases, the UDHR’s opposition to “inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment” has been overlooked in favour of upholding prohibitionism. If the United

Nations accepts legalisation as a valid and viable alternative to prohibitionism, it would

no longer be acceptable for such gross abuses of human rights to occur under the

guise of the War on Drugs.

A tenet of legalisation that has been particularly debilitated by international

opposition is the concept of ‘harm reduction’. Harm reduction policies treat drug-

addicts as medically ill, and ensure the provision of healthcare and therapy to treat

this, as well as a safe consumption environment. Inciardi claims that harm reduction

policies focus upon justice, equity, health, education, and employment124; factors that

are vital for the protection of human rights. As legalisation frameworks traditionally

portray drug abuse as a “symptom” of complex societal issues, a reformed approach

should therefore consider “social, political, cultural and economic forces” rather than

merely criminality.

The effectiveness of such policies can be seen in Portugal, where harm

reduction has led to a decrease in diseases acquired through needle-sharing, and an

overall reduction in drug abuse. Despite success in Portugal and several other states,

the benefits of such initiatives have not yet gained UN recognition or advocacy. The

United Nations has consistently refused to support harm reduction treatment partially

due to economic pressure; the United States government has threatened to cut all

122 Doward, Jamie. UK aid to Iran’s war on drugs has led to rise in hangings, UN warns.

The Guardian. 2012. [online]

123 Human Rights Watch. Bolivia: Human Rights Violations and the War on Drugs. The

UN Refugee Agency. 1995. [online]

124 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P110

35

funding for the UNODC if the body were to advocate such policies. As the largest single

donor to the UNODC, the US government uses its economic clout to ensure that the

tenets of US prohibitionism are upheld at an international level.

To counter the human rights and national security issues caused by

prohibitionism, two key factors of policy reform must be in place. Firstly, there must

be a regulated and taxed system of production and distribution. Secondly, harm

reduction treatment must be offered. This would yield the benefits of

decriminalisation, such as decreased youth incarceration and disease rates, while

reducing some of its problems, such as continued violence. There are many obstacles

to drug legalisation and decriminalisation in terms of international law, the United

Nations and the United States. Consequently, the path to policy reform for any state

can be a difficult one. Yet, within the source and transit regions of Mexico and

Colombia, as well as consumer nations such as the United States, the potential for

success is immeasurable.

36

Conclusion

“Most of the harm that comes from drugs is because they are illegal."

- Milton Friedman

Overwhelming evidence indicates that the greatest detriment to human rights

and national security comes from drug prohibitionism – not consumption. The origins

of prohibitionism are discriminatory and little has improved since then. In the US,

domestic prohibitionism continues to stifle the potential and success of certain social

groups, while the international prohibitionism sponsored by the US government

continues to threaten the national security of certain regions of the world. Although

the US is not the only instigator of international prohibitionism, it remains the most

prominent and influential advocate. Although drug use is far more prevalent in

developed nations, it is the developing ‘source’ countries that bear the brunt of

prohibitionism’s repercussions.

Prohibitionism has destabilised several nations in Latin America, caused

suffering among citizens, and capped the region’s potential for further economic

success. As a source nation, Colombia has considerably suffered with the ramifications

of prohibitionism – both US-backed and domestically supported. Colombian security

was significantly weakened by prohibitionism due to existing social, economic and

political problems in the nation. The corruption, violence and instability generated by

prohibitionism allowed for a more rapid decline in state power, with ‘narco-terror’

contributing heavily towards this. Colombia also serves as a prime example of the

human rights abuses generated by prohibitionism. From actual policies, such as crop

fumigation, to consequences of policies, such as the numerous civilians caught in the

crossfire of intrastate violence. Similarly, the primary reason for human rights abuses

and national insecurity in Mexico is the implementation of prohibitionism. Following

huge prohibitionist pressure on Colombia, drug production began to decrease in that

state and spill over into bordering nations. However, there is no alternative route from

Latin America to the United States apart from through Mexico. The problems of drugs

in Mexico therefore persist – and even increase – despite the swelling militarisation of

prohibitionism.

37

Decriminalisation of drugs would address a number of prohibitionism’s

unwanted consequences. However, decriminalisation does not sufficiently tackle the

violence and power of the trafficking groups that exploit the lack of regulation. Instead,

legalisation appears to be the only effective alternative to prohibitionism, since it

would elicit public support for the government and weaken the powerbase of violent

groups. In addition, legalisation would protect rural farming communities, provide

improved healthcare and treatment for drug users, prevent indiscriminate

incarceration, and uphold the principle of individual freedom.

Prohibitionism has proved to be destructive to human rights and security, and

ineffective at decreasing the trafficking or consumption of narcotics. All the facts point

to the accuracy of the statement by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and

Democracy: that the War on Drugs has been a “lost war”125.

It has been asserted that the War on Drugs has been “led by the United States,

has not been challenged by the European Union nor contested by emerging powers

around the world, has been assimilated by Latin America, and has been internalised by

the United Nations”; essentially, prohibitionism has become an international norm126.

This international obligation is the primary obstacle between governments and drug

policy reform, nevertheless, it is not an impassable issue. If governments wish to

minimise the harms that drugs have upon society, it is essential for prohibitionism, and

the violent anarchic system it brings, to be replaced with a safe, legal and regulated

system.

125 Tokatlian, Juan. Drugs: towards a post-prohibitionist paradigm. 2010. P108 126 Ibid. P102

38

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