The Expressivist Challenge 2 PHIL2315 Value Theory Dan Marshall Seminar 3 4 February 2013 1
The Expressivist Challenge 2
PHIL2315 Value TheoryDan MarshallSeminar 3
4 February 2013
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Admin
Required reading for this seminar: Smith, Ch 2Optional reading: Ridge, ‘Moral Naturalism’ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism‐moral/
Required reading for next seminar: Smith, Ch 3, Sections 3.1‐3.5
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What Smith means by ‘motivation’
As Smith uses ‘motivation’, if someone intentionally does A, then they are motivated to do AIn Chapter 3, Smith will defend the claim (3a).(3a) An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means‐end beliefBut (3a) is rejected by Platt’s who argues that (3a) is false since someone might do A because they think it’s right, even though they don’t want/desire to do it.
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The moral problem (Smith, p. 12)
1. Moral judgements of the form ‘It is right to φ’ express a subject’s beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do [from the objectivity of moral judgement]
2. If someone judges that it is right that she φs then, everything else being equal, she is motivated to φ[from the practicality of moral judgement]
3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means‐end belief, where belief and desire are distinct existences [from the Humean theory of pyschology]
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Argument that (1‐4) are inconsistent
(1‐3) entail that moral beliefs are necessarily connected to certain desires
(3), however, tells us that there is no such connection.
Therefore (1‐3) are inconsistentSmith: Even though (1‐3) appear inconsistent, aren’t really inconsistent since his solution to the moral problem renders (1‐3) all true!
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How to make Smith’s (1‐3) truly inconsistent
• Replace ‘everything else being equal’ with ‘given she is rational’;
• Add (4)(4) For any rational person x, provided x’s beliefs stay the same, x’s basic desires can be replaced by any other set of basic desires, and x will remain rational(4) follows from Hume’s theory of psychology.
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Argument that (1‐4) are inconsistent
It follows from (1‐3) that for certain means‐ends beliefs B and basic desires D(i) Necessarily, for any rational person x, x has the
belief that it is right to φ and means‐ends beliefs B iff x has basic desires D
But (i) conflicts with (ii), which follows from (1, 3‐4).(ii) It is possible for a rational person x to have the belief that it is right to φ and means‐ends beliefs B, but lack the desires D
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Strategies to solve the moral problem
Michal Smith solution rejects (4).
The expressivist solution, which we are looking at today and last seminar, seeks to reject (1) by providing an independent reason why it is false.
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Naturalism vs. Non‐naturalism
Naturalism: moral properties and propositions are naturalistic properties and propositions
Non‐naturalism: moral properties and propositions aren’t naturalistic properties and propositions
Def: A property or proposition p is naturalistic iffit can be expressed wholly by expressions that belong to the vocabulary of the natural and social sciences
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A second argument against non‐naturalism
P1) Everything we know about can be explained by ScienceP2) Therefore, there is no reason to believe in anything that is not part of scienceC) Therefore, we should not believe that there are any non‐natural properties
See Ridge, ‘Moral Naturalism’ for further discussion.
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Definitional vs. non‐definitional naturalism
Naturalists claim that, that for each moral predicate M, there is a predicate N containing only naturalistically acceptable expressions (ie expressions in the vocabulary of the sciences) such that the analysis (4) is true.(4) The property of being M = the property of being N
Definitional naturalists hold that analyses like these analyses are a priori
Non‐definitional naturalists hold that they aren’t a priori
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Analogy with water and H2O
Non‐definitional naturalists use the case of water and H2O as an analogy
The property of being water = the property of being H2O
But this truth is not a priori since we needed science and experiments to discover it
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Why do ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ expressed the same property?
A sketch of an answer (based on Kripke’s Naming and Necessity): It is part of the meaning of ‘water’ that it expresses the property that is (most) causally responsible for our use of ‘water’
Science tells us that this property is the property of being H2O
Therefore: the property of being water = the property of being H2O
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Challenge to non‐definitional naturalists
Can non‐definitional naturalists give a similarly good account of how F and G express the same property?
The analogous account for ‘good’: i) It is part of the meaning of ‘good’ that it
expresses the property (most) causally responsible for our use of ‘good’
ii) The property (most) causally responsible for our use of ‘good’ is a naturalistic property
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Argument against this account of ‘good’
Two communities meet: The missionary community and the cannibal community
By a strange coincidence, they both have the word ‘good’ and they both use it as the most general adjective of commendation: that is, they both use it to express approval.
However, they apply it to different things: the cannibals apply it to bold killers, while the missionaries apply it to meek pacifists
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Argument against this account of ‘good’ (cont)
It seems like the missionaries and cannibals might disagree with each other over who is good.
However, according to the non‐definitional account of good, they aren’t disagreeing when they apply ‘good’ to different things.
Hence this account appears to conflict with the objectivity of moral practice
Claim: All other non‐definitional accounts suffer the same problem
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Two ways of understanding a predicate F
Direct competence with F: You are acqaintedwith the property F expresses
Indirect competence with F: You only know which property F expresses under a description (such as ‘the property that is most causally responsible for our use of ‘water’’).
(This is my terminology.)
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Example: ‘red’
The following is prima facie intuitively plausible:i) A well sighted person is directly competent with
‘red’ since they are aquainted with redness: they know what it is to be red
ii) A blind from birth person is only indirectly competent with ‘red’. This competence consists in merely knowing that ‘red’ expresses the property most causally responsible for our use of ‘red’. Such a person does not know what it is to be red
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Ayer’s open question argument against definitional naturalists
Definitional naturalists holds that, for each moral predicate M, there is a predicate N containing only naturalistically acceptable expressions such that the analysis (4) is a priori true, because they hold that we have direct competence with M and N.(4) The property of being M = the property of being N
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Ayer’s open question argument against definitional naturalists (cont)
But given we know what it is to be M, and we know what it is to be N, then we shouldn’t be able to doubt (4).
However, for all proposed definitional analyses, it is possible to doubt (4). Hence, for all of these proposed analyses, (4) is false.
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Examples of proposed definitional analyses that can be doubted
General subjectivism: The property of being right = the property of being approved by the general masses
First person subjectivism: The property of being right = the property of being approved by me
Utilitarianism: The property of being right = the property of being an action that produces more pleasure in the world than any relevant alternative possible action
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Response
We might have direct competence with ‘N’ and ‘M’, and these might express the same property p, but we might not realise that (4) is true because we grasp p in different ways when we use ‘N’ and ‘M’.
Therefore, Ayer’s open question argument fails.
Another reason to reject the open question argument: If it works, it works against all proposed analyses in philosophy!
Smith’s conclusion: Non‐naturalism and non‐definitional naturalism fail, but definitional naturalism survives!
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Analogies
Analogy 1: ‘equilateral triangle’ and ‘equiangular triangle’ express the same property, but someone might not realise this.
Analogy 2: ‘has 11 friends’ and ‘has 1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1 friends’ express the same property, but someone might not realise this.
Note: These claims are controversial
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Open Questions
Q1) Given definitional naturalism, what is the correct naturalistic definitional analyses?Q2) How can the moral problem be solved, given the truth of (1)?
Smith doesn’t provide an answer to Q1.
In chapter 6, however, he does give an answer to Q2 which involves a non‐reductionist analysis of ‘right’.
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