The expansion of participatory governance in the environmental policies of developing countries: the example of Madagascar

164 Int. J. Sustainable Development, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2004

Copyright © 2004 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

The expansion of participatory governance in the environmental policies of developing countries: the example of Madagascar

Géraldine Froger, Philippe Méral and Vestalys Herimandimby C3ED UMR IRD/UVSQ n°063, University of Versailles Saint Quentin, 47 bd Vauban, 78047 Guyancourt Cedex, France (e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected])

Abstract: The notion of governance is often considered to be essential, particularly by international institutions in developing countries, to improve the efficiency of policies and to strengthen the legitimacy of the aid. This article aims to clarify the various meanings of this notion and to analyse the policies for devolution of management of natural resources to local communities. The participatory practices involved supply some advantages: appropriation of the management of resources and policies by local actors, the intention to make these actors responsible, etc. But they do have limitations: an ‘idyllic’ vision of community-based management; the risk of being ‘captured’ by local community leaders; conflicts of interest and of temporality that are not discussed, but which do exist. The range and the limitations of this environmental governance, which we qualify as being participative, are illustrated by the case of Madagascar.

Keywords: environmental policies, forestry resources, governance, international institutions, local actors, Madagascar.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Froger, G., Méral, P. and Herimandimby, V. (2004) ‘The expansion of participatory governance in the environmental policies of developing countries: the example of Madagascar’, Int. J. Sustainable Development, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 164–184.

Biographical notes

Géraldine Froger (PhD in Economics) is associate Professor at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-En-Yvelines. She is researcher at the UMR C3ED (Centre of Economics and Ethics for the Environment and Development) with wide experience in the ecological economics field. Her papers have been published in such journals as Ecological Economics, Journal of Socio-Economics, Sciences de la société, Economie appliquée, and Economie et sociétés. She has been involved in several European and French research projects on sustainable development. Her research focuses on rationality and decision-making, decision-support tools in environmental policy, participatory processes, global governance and environmental policies in developing countries.

Philippe Méral (PhD in Economics) is currently a researcher at the IRD (French Research and Development Institute) and appointed to the UMR C3ED. After a Post Graduate Diploma in environmental and resources economics from the Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris) in 1992, he worked on non-monetary valuation issues. During his PhD dissertation, his research

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moved towards equity, ethics and economics. Since 2001, he has lived in Madagascar, where he leads a programme related to the implementation of sustainable development policies in poor countries. More precisely, his research focuses on economic causes of Malagasy biodiversity losses and on the socio-economic issues related to the implementation of alternative activities.

Vestalys Herimandimby is currently a researcher at the Centre of Economy and Ethics for the Environment and Development in Madagascar (C3EDM). He teaches at the College of Agronomic Sciences (ESSA) of the University of Antananarivo. He specializes in rural development and in community-based management of renewable natural resources.

1 Introduction

One of the most remarkable facts to emerge in recent years is that of taking into account the social dimension for the implementation of sustainable development. Whereas the first attempts that aimed to make the concept of sustainable development operational focused on the economic and environmental dimensions (Arrow et al., 1996), many works today try to associate this concept with social sustainability (Markandya et al., 2002).

Social sustainability can be approached from two complementary angles: a policy that is to be socially sustainable must avoid an increase of serious social dysfunctions (social exclusion, increase of poverty, reduction of capacity and of access to resources, etc.), and it must favour preventive solutions elaborated by the social actors in order to be in a position to avert these risks of dysfunction, a policy that acknowledges the concepts of empowerment and social capital (Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Pretty and Ward, 2001; Jones, 2004).

Another facet of social sustainability refers to the legitimacy and to the social acceptance of the decisions and/or of the policies. In this context, better sustainability can occur only by associating the interested parties with the decisions that concern them, and thus an explicit reference to the various modalities of governance, such as:

The whole process by which collective rules are elaborated, decided, legitimized, implemented and controlled.

(Lamy and Laïdi, 2002, p. 200)

The participation of civil society then becomes the main theme. Since the Rio Conference in 1992, participative approaches have grown in popularity

as mechanisms of governance that help to treat complex questions linked to sustainable development (Renn et al., 1995). For developed countries, participatory governance in the area of environment has been recognized from an institutional point of view, particularly through Agenda 21, the Aarthus Convention [1], the White Paper on European governance (European Commission, 2001), the 6th Environmental Action Programme (European Communities, 2002), the European Council of Göteborg (European Commission, 2001), and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.

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Setting up the participatory process in developing countries resulted in failures, as much in the centralized management of public affairs, as in the structural adjustment programmes that were imposed throughout the 1980s and 1990s by the international organization experts [2] (Woods, 2000). What concrete methods of governance are required in developing countries with policies oriented towards sustainable development? Who or what are the key actors that contribute to elaboration of these policies? What is the balance of power? What are the effects of these policies?

This article aims at explaining the significance of the notion of governance and at analysing the policies of devolution of management of natural resources to local communities, using the example of Madagascar. Using the views expressed by some international organizations (UNDP, World Bank), we will come back to the various interpretations of the notion of governance in developing countries. We will also analyse the extent and the limitations of participatory governance in the area of environment, particularly forestry. In a second section, the extent and limitations are illustrated through the study of the case of Madagascar, where involvement of the local populations in environmental management and in public choices related to the environment is promoted.

2 Sustainable management of natural and forestry resources and environmental policies in developing countries: challenges and principles of governance

Without going into the details of the post-Rio strategies and the international debate on sustainable management of forests, we can affirm that they introduced many considerations concerning governance. Pierre and Peters (2000) provide several explanations for the renewed interest in governance that was observed during the 1980s and 1990s: financial crises of governments; ideological change of policy towards the commercial sphere as a regulatory space; globalization with the development of transnational institutions and the increased power of non-governmental actors; criticisms of the State and its failures in managing collective issues; the concept of New Public Management; social change and increasing complexities; the growing importance of modes of regulation at regional and international (or global) levels, and the international institutions undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. Owing to these manifold roots, governance is a word with many meanings and multiple uses [3]. Before analysing how this concept has altered the methods of natural resources management, as well as environmental and forestry policies in developing countries, it is necessary to discuss this notion.

2.1 What does governance mean in developing countries?

Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.

(UNDP, 2000, pp. 36–37)

In this sense, governance integrates the methods of coordination between various actors including the State (represented by political institutions and administrative bodies), the private sector (private companies including the informal sector), and so-called civil

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society (non-governmental organizations (NGOs), associations, etc.). According to the definition given above, governance is exercised at three levels: political, administrative and economic. Political governance concerns the interactions between political bodies through the political decision-making process and/or policy development and implementation. Administrative governance concerns the interactions between the deciding levels of the administrative sphere; it also relates to the ‘bureaucracy’ that arises in the design and implementation of policies set down by the political sphere. Economic governance refers to the multiple interactions between actors in the decision-making processes that have an impact on the economic sphere; it is linked with political governance, because political authorities are involved in economic policy decisions, and also with administrative governance, because administrative authorities are involved in economic management.

The word ‘governance’ can also be used in the field of environment and natural resources. Environmental governance designates the interactions between diverse actors through decision-making processes that have an impact on the ecological sphere. It is based on elements of political, administrative and economic governance insofar as political, administrative and economic authorities are involved in environmental management and/or in the elaboration of environmental policies.

Beyond the area of application of governance, there are several modes of governance that differ through the structure and organization of institutions, the nature of relationships between the actors, and the rules governing their actions. Two modes of governance exist in developing countries.

The first mode, described as ‘authority governance’, refers to the operational principles and procedures of governance; it is founded on the omnipresence of the State and centralized management of public affairs. In this context, governance can be interchanged with ‘government’. This mode of governance was criticized by international organizations following the debt crisis and the implementation of structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s. Authority governance also refers to the technocratic and top-down action of international organizations; Püzl and Rametsteiner (2002) write about hierarchical governance.

International organizations favour the second mode, called ‘good governance’ (World Bank) and ‘democratic governance’ (UNDP). The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), internalized one element of the criticism that accused them of neglecting the participatory dimension while developing their programmes (Long, 2001). The implementation of participatory processes introduces a new type of conditionality to development aid. Based on internal evaluation reports on development projects and programmes that they had financed, the BWIs recognized that any attempt to impose change from without is very likely to engender resistances from within, and to create barriers to change instead of facilitating it (World Bank, 1998). Consequently, participatory processes in the formulation of development strategy should contribute to building a consensus around the strategy elaborated. The international donor agencies emphasize the importance of resorting to civil society and participatory development [4] so that countries receiving development aid do not lose sight of their responsibility, and to promote the ownership of policies by the citizens and those who govern them.

First, the World Bank strategy relates to the good management of public affairs: good governance, which constitutes an integral part of the ‘new’ philosophy of structural

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adjustment, presumes the existence of: (i) a constitutional state, which means that the security of citizens and the respect of law are guaranteed, in particular through the independence of magistrates; (ii) good management, which means that public expenditures are properly and fairly managed by public institutions; (iii) accountability, which means that political leaders are accountable to the population for their actions; (iv) transparency, which means that information is readily available to all. The ‘new’ philosophy of structural adjustment represented by good governance and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) justify bringing civil society and participatory development to the forefront [5]. Nevertheless, the new participatory mechanisms promoted by the BWIs have proven to be problematical for several reasons (Levinsohn, 2003). The BWIs always play a dominant role in establishing priorities and setting objectives, as well as in selecting the policies to be implemented. This process is often characterized by lack of time and transparency, and also lack of access to information. It generally amounts to information and consultation processes with very limited influence. Participation is centralized and highly selective (problems of representativity and legitimacy of actors having access to participatory mechanism), etc.

Second, the UNDP’s strategy relates to democratic governance based on the participation of citizens in the management of public affairs [6]. Its most important characteristics include (i) transparency and accountability: information is readily available; decision-making is open; and public authorities account for their actions with regard to the use of resources and the achievement of objectives; (ii) participation and devolution: the proximity of decision-making centres promotes the participation of citizens, hence the need for involving the population in the design and implementation of policies and for fair delivery of public services; (iii) redefining the role of the State: on the one hand, the State’s involvement in the direct delivery of public services must be reduced, and on the other hand, the State must focus on creating an environment that is favourable to economic activity and to the developing capacities of actors, hence the beginnings of a decentralized management of public affairs. Democratic governance differs from authority governance by:

(i) the revitalization of participatory processes; (ii) the liberalization of information as well as political life in order to promote transparency and accountability; and (iii) market liberalization.

(UNDP, 2000, p. 41)

This approach encounters the same limitations as those identified with good governance. Despite their specificities, democratic governance and good governance display the

same vision of governance, which is based on devolution and participatory processes, but they do not address the systems of coordination based on cooperation networks aimed at resource and land management. In the field of environmental policies, the decentralized governance of renewable resources became the common reference expressed by international organizations or donor agencies and many NGOs during the 1990s [7]. It is based on the idea that participatory institutional arrangements could mitigate the negative effects of the concurrent use of renewable resources by all interested parties. Participatory governance necessitates the recognition of new principles and new methods of collective action to address dysfunctions in hierarchical collective action. It involves redefining the State’s role, as well as new modes of regulation based on permanent exchange, conflicts, negotiations, mutual adjustments, and coordination by autonomous networks and public-private partnerships. The State should become a

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facilitator, an adviser for local actors. NGOs and agricultural or environmental services would follow-up on environmental actions.

How – and in what forms – is the expansion of participatory governance concretely reflected in the environmental policies of developing countries? What are the implications of participatory governance as a new mode to regulate public action? What are the limitations it is confronted with? We will use forestry resources as an example of environmental resources.

2.2 Implications of participatory governance for forestry management and forestry policies in developing countries

We have identified two major implications that would prove to be paramount in Madagascar, namely participatory management of forests and participatory processes in the determination of public choices in the forest sector. Before illustrating them with the case of Madagascar, we will first describe some key principles.

2.2.1 What is participation?

A participatory approach aims to take into account the points of view of local actors, who are regarded as the managers of the forest lands that they use in their activities. What is meant by participation? To participate in a decision is to be ‘associated’ with the decision. It does not mean that it is you who will decide and it does not inevitably guarantee a better quality of the decision made. In fact everything will depend on the level of participation considered. There are three levels of participation: passive participation, active participation and responsible participation [8].

Passive participation is characterized by a series of consulting practices. Within this framework, local actors are consulted to obtain their opinion on the current situation and on the actions to be undertaken, with no guarantee that their opinion would be taken into account in the final decision. They are also ‘associated’ with the decision from the moment the decision-makers (forestry services, experts) inform them of the projects that concern them.

Active participation leads to ‘increased’ contribution of local actors in the decision-making process. It is justified in situations where decision-makers do not have a concrete and rapid solution to address a given issue, especially when local conflicts are important. Within the framework of a given project, some actors can be asked to contribute more than others; they can participate at the beginning (to inform) and/or at the end (to legitimize the project); they can also participate in the formulation of technical choices and/or principles of action, the objective being their ownership of decisions or projects.

The corollary is responsible participation, which is characterized by the autonomy of local actors in charge of managing the resources under consideration. Within this context, management authority is transferred to the actors. Such transfer may concern only restricted control and policing powers, or be broadened to include development and management rights (Muttenzer, 2001).

The trends observed demonstrate a willingness to promote the involvement of local actors, e.g. responsible and active participation. This is evident both in forestry management and in forestry policy formulation.

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2.2.2 Participatory forestry management and participatory formulation of forestry policies

An example of forest management that requires responsible participation is community forestry management [9], which developed in the 1990s. The idea of local governance and transfer of management of renewable resources to local communities (community-based management) grew after the Rio Conference. Community forestry management was promoted at a time when, on the one hand, international institutions were faced with a serious crisis of legitimacy, and on the other hand, the State action in developing countries was severely criticized for its natural resources management. International institutions, aid organizations and NGOs, considered the possibility of establishing participatory processes in order to involve local communities in land and species conservation (Wells et al., 1992).

The idea was to make local actors using the woodlands acknowledge their responsibilities, by transferring to them a set of rights and duties relating to the management of these lands, the latter being defined and registered under a new statute. The transfer of competences essentially concerns forestry land management, but may also be connected to ownership, though not necessarily [10]. The implementation of community-based management goes hand in hand with the existence of a legal structure that represents the community or local actors. Consequently, the existence of a law on decentralization that defines the areas of public action assigned to local entities, and specifies which local legal and administrative institutions would be responsible for decision-making and implementation becomes a prerequisite. This system would contribute to ‘better’ local governance or ‘better’ decentralized governance of forestry resources.

The international debate on sustainable management of forest resources also modified the standards of design and evaluation of national forest policies in developing countries (Pülzl and Rametsteiner, 2002). It recognized the need to implement processes of negotiation of public choices in the forest sector through participatory governance (FAO, 1994, 1998; World Bank, 1992). In this case, governance would include modes of regulation enabling local actors to set priorities in terms of public choices, in order to legitimate and ensure the success of policies implemented.

Within this context, the negotiation procedures no longer relate to the mechanisms of management transfer, but rather to prioritizing forestry policies. The procedures are characterized by the confrontation of different views expressed by the actors who are directly or indirectly concerned by the policies to be implemented. They seem to be appropriate for the forestry sector, which is multi-functional. The process starts with the actors (or their representatives) expressing their expectations in matters of forestry policy, in order to select those measures most likely to be implemented later on as they would be ‘legitimized’ by the actors. Next, the diverse views are discussed and adjusted collectively until a compromise is reached. Such a compromise would specify the objectives and the means of the public policy to be implemented.

This approach implies that public choices result from taking into account social expectations, as well as the requests and interests of actors. It underlines the importance of negotiating a compromise in order to define the forestry policy, because the public authority is responsible for ensuring application of its terms [11]. It is part of the new philosophy of aid programmes represented by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

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(PRSPs), promoted by the BWIs, which stipulate that the environmental dimension must be taken into account from now on (World Bank, 2001).

Prior to further analysing the methods of implementation of participatory governance in Madagascar, we would like to emphasize a number of general limitations to participatory management of forests and participatory determination of forestry policies.

2.2.3 Limits to participatory governance in the field of environment in developing countries

Although community forestry management, an example of participatory management, offers certain advantages (Pierce Colfer and Byron, 2001), the ambiguities of this kind of governance should be underlined.

A policy that takes minorities into account presents inherent determinisms. Platteau and Abraham (2001, p. 198) point out clearly:

Communities are not always the ideal social organizations we suppose. They have inherent flaws likely to decrease their aptitude to resolve issues.

A local community is composed of diverse users of forest lands. For this reason, the expression of individual interests that may not necessarily coincide with the general interest. The local balance of power is very clearly expressed and conflicts of interest are multiple. Specific points of view (those of dominant groups or local community leaders) will be imposed to the detriment of others (those of weak or excluded groups) in order to settle such conflicts. According to Buttoud (2001, p. 64):

Not only is the local community inclined to deny the rights of users from outside the village or the commune, but it also tends to consolidate the rights of founder families to the detriment of newer arrivals. By extension, they deny certain requests emanating from the groups that are least defended by customs, such as women or young people.

Community forestry management may even go against sustainable management of resources insofar as it is not necessarily more equitable or environmentally sound than centralized management or management imposed from the outside.

As we observed above, several international organizations and donors have advocated community-based management. Nevertheless, for the international aid community, increasing the responsibility of farmer communities in order to conserve forests is an attempt to internalize the costs of establishing control over territories and resources, given that financial resources are becoming scarce (Babin and Bertrand, 1998). Furthermore, their strategy aims more at recommending the withdrawal of the State from the forestry sector than really supporting local management by transferring true decision-making power to local structures [12]. This strategy may affect efficiency in local resource management and governance.

In addition, the process of negotiation that is the basis of participatory management of forests and participatory determination of forestry policies has inherent limits and determinisms. First of all, negotiated procedures are characterized by the existence of diverse balances of power, which influence the final outcome despite attempts to redefine them during the discussions. Generally, the individual interests of dominant actors or those of local community leaders are better represented. Therefore, these actors are in the best position to influence not only the course of negotiation but also its outcome. In this

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context, participatory governance gives them a legitimacy that they would not have if it had not existed [13]. Other actors find themselves excluded from the negotiations.

There are several angles to the negotiation process. The procedure is possible only if others consider all the interests expressed by some to be legitimate, which is not always the case. The views expressed by the actors should not be regarded as non-negotiable, as this would result in the exclusion of some requests that may seem legitimate. It may also introduce some forms of retention of information that go against determining negotiated solutions.

If negotiation corresponds to a process that combines conflicting positions into a common position, the rule for decision being unanimity, it would very likely come to nothing. If it corresponds to a repetitive process with no final result, the negotiation of a compromise leading to a redefinition of the positions and expectations of each and everyone, as well as the renegotiation of a new compromise and so on, it may entail a loss of stability of the institutions responsible for implementing public decisions.

Lastly, while the participatory processes resulting from the determination of public choices in the forestry sector aim to ensure ownership of policies and projects at local and national levels, they are very likely to be biased by the conditionality of assistance and the weakness of institutional capacities. Temporality conflicts exist: the time for appropriation and participation, which implies the installation of new social and political regulations (a long time) is not that of conditionality (a short time to obtain results) (Froger and Andriamahefazafy, 2003). Hufty and Muttenzer (2002, p. 295) point out:

The national conservation programs of the South are copied on the foreign aid model. They are characterized by conditionality, programs and projects ‘imposed’ on the governments of weak states, technical support provided by foreign specialists, artificial creation of ‘local’ NGOs, participatory ideology, etc.

Participatory processes can lead to programmes that do not take national and local aspirations into account although they satisfy donors’ requirements.

For a comprehensive study of the evolution and the limits of participatory governance in developing countries, it is interesting to focus on a specific country, namely Madagascar, to analyse induced changes in matters of environmental policies for development or sustainable development in its full meaning.

3 Methods of participatory governance in Madagascar’s environmental policies

The features of Madagascar are both its persistent economic poverty (141st out of 174 countries in the UNDP Human Development Report – UNDP, 2000), and its wealth in terms of biodiversity (ONE, 1999). However, this biodiversity, and more generally the environment, has been threatened for many years (Marcus and Kull, 1999). Since 1990, Madagascar has received international assistance for the implementation of policies that target sustainable management of the environment, and more specifically new systems of environmental governance (Falloux and Talbot, 1993).

As stated in the first section, the development of participatory environmental governance partly results from prevailing tendencies at the global level. The concept was received favourably in Madagascar because the Malagasy culture is traditionally based on

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the fihavanana, a principle of exchange, alliance and family solidarity, held in place by a system of beliefs, prohibitions and taboos (Razafindrabe, 1996; Randriamanalina, 2003). In this context, many local public goods, including forestry resources, were ‘managed’ by local communities. Relying on this latent potential, Madagascar’s environmental policy endeavoured to promote a responsible participatory governance right from the start.

Participatory forest management was the spearhead of the country’s environmental policy, although, for many reasons, it seems to leave room for participatory determination of development priorities and public choices.

3.1 Participatory forestry management: between reaction to State regulation and revival of traditional practices

At the end of the 1980s, the administration was regarded as the primary actor responsible for environmental damages caused in particular during the colonization (1896–1960) and socialist (1975–1990) eras. During these periods, the successive governments nationalized the country’s natural resources and managed them centrally. This authority governance was considered to be: (i) centralizing because resource management was a monopoly of the State and the public services; (ii) interventionist in the sense that the public services, through their agents, kept an eye on every move of communities and individuals connected with renewable natural resources; (iii) repressive because the judicial and administrative system in place was essentially based on prohibitions, penalties and imprisonment measures; and (iv) exclusive because communities as well as individuals did not have access to any form of formal decision-making in the management of renewable natural resources (Razafindrabe, 1996). Owing to limited human and logistic means in particular, this mode of natural resources management rapidly ground to a halt, resulting in (i) open access to resources through the non-observance of regulations in force, (ii) the loss of the sense of responsibility of local populations and communities vis-à-vis the natural environment, and (iii) the conflict between local principles (and practices) with the principles of public administration.

In order to remedy this situation, the National Environmental Policy (NEP) developed in the 1990s, at the instigation of donors, was based on the search for implementation networks that could provide some alternative mechanisms to authority governance (Brinkerhoff, 1996). The National Environment Charter (Law No. 90-033), which constitutes the general framework for execution of the National Environmental Policy, was developed with a view to ‘practice communication and dialogue rather than hierarchical transmission of injunctions’ (RdM, 1990, p. 35). As far as environment and resource management are concerned, the decision-making process must be ‘conducted jointly by the State, the decentralized communities, regularly constituted non-governmental organizations, economic operators and all the citizens’ (RdM 1990, p. 2) [14].

Madagascar’s environmental policy comes within the scope of alternative mechanisms to authority governance. Through the creation of parallel structures under donors’ direct financial control, such as the National Environmental Office (ONE – Office National pour l’Environnement), and the promotion of decentralized natural resources management, the model of governance became essentially participatory. For instance, although actions aimed to enhance efficiency within the country’s forestry services were developed, including the training of forestry agents, and making

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information available to the public concerning the delivery of permits for logging or development, efforts were mainly focused on the participation of local actors in forestry management [15]. The most significant example of participatory management of forests is the law on protected local management called the Gelose (Gestion Locale Sécurisée or Secured Local Management). This law was enacted in 1996 to provide a legal basis for community management of renewable natural resources in Madagascar. Its objective is to promote the sustainable use of resources by local communities through formalized transfer of management entered into by contract between the forestry services and the representatives of local communities, with the support of environmental NGOs. The contract would restore the legitimate right of traditional authorities to manage the resources within their native lands.

Consequently, the Malagasy fihavanana may be regarded as the crystallization of this principle of exchange between the members of the same community, who are bound by solidarity ties and by a system of reciprocal rights. This solidarity also reflects community management of the native land goods that are used commonly (…) The Gelose Law can be implemented by revitalizing the basic communities through the management of renewable natural resources. It would then be a question of reviving the principle of exchange.

(CERG2R and CIRAD-Forêt, 1997, p.10)

These contracts concern conservation, user rights, exploitation, development or extension through the transfer of the management of resources including forests, lakes, coastal and marine resources, and pasturelands.

The first contracts signed were concerned with areas that were geographically located in the periphery of the protected areas, in those zones where attempts at managing the land under the Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) had failed, mainly through lack of participation of local actors. The Gelose contracts aim to achieve responsible participation. Sophisticated institutional mechanisms that associate native land zoning with recourse to external mediators, were set up to achieve autonomy of local actors through a management contract (Hufty and Muttenzer, 2002). Unfortunately, in most cases, such mechanisms created a process that was both complex and slow, thus reducing the participation of actors to only the initiated. For all the others, the community management project was often compared to an initiative of the fanjakana, e.g. the authority or the government whose ‘power obeys a different logic, almost totally disconnected from village sphere’ (Fauroux, 2003, p. 3).

The methods of participatory management initially developed in the Gelose process are essentially connected to the political and administrative aspects of governance, and lack emphasis of the economic aspect (Maldidier, 2001). Consequently, the challenges of negotiation were interesting for local people who hold political or administrative powers, but were unattractive to farmers who were denied access to income-generating resources and received no financial compensation.

The link between the economic dimension of participatory governance and the level of effective participation seems to be one of the features of the new community management mechanism, namely the contractual management of forest resources (GCF – Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts). The new mechanisms target participation not only at contractual level, but more specifically at the level of management and economic development of forestry resources (Miray, 2002) [16]. Initially, the forestry law enacted in 1997 (Law No. 97-017), specified that ‘the State may delegate the management of

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national forests to other public or private persons’ although in a rather restrictive approach that limited the transfer of management to ‘traditional individual or collective user rights to public forests.’ The new texts specifying administrative management rules render the participation of local actors effective in the economic development of forestry resources beyond simple user rights. In accordance with Decree N° 98-782 regarding forestry development, the local communities are entitled to directly develop all or part of their forests, or grant such right to approved forest developers under a management contract. In the same way, the Decree 2000-383 regarding afforestation entitles the communities to benefit from measures of incitement, in their quality of ‘afforestation operators’.

Although it is still too early to assess the relevance of this mechanism, we observe that this form of participatory forest management shows the actors’ intention to better identify the economic development potential of their native land, a phenomenon that should promote a model for the determination of development priorities by local populations.

3.2 Emergence of a strategy for determination of development priorities by local populations

This mechanism of transfer of management is only one of the features of Malagasy environmental policy. The division of the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) into three phases and the objectives defined for each phase reflect the country’s concern for a progressive decentralization of environment management at regional and local levels (Rajaonera et al., 2000). In this spirit, the ONE, mainly through the unit in charge of providing assistance to regionalized management of environment and spatial approach (AGERAS – Appui à la gestion régionalisée de l’environnement et à l’approche spatiale) worked to develop an inter-communal planning process based on the bottom-up approach in each administrative province of Madagascar. The process, called sub-programme planning, aims to:

Identify a coherent set of integrated and/or complementary actions in order to handle environmental issues in a given eco-region. The philosophy of a sub-programme is thus based on three major strategies (…): capacity building including concerted planning capacity of local and regional actors; (…) commitment of actors to implement actions that contribute to achieving the objectives of sustainable management of resources;(…) project financing mechanisms, including the level of management and the level of securing appropriate financing resources.

(SAGE, 2001, p. 3)

The development of this concerted planning process relies on an original institutional arrangement implemented with the establishment of a series of local dialogue structures at fokontany (villages) level, and communal and inter-communal levels within the eco-region. These structures are expected to formulate sustainable development priorities at their respective levels. In practical terms, the representatives of villagers establish a list of projects likely to develop their village within the local dialogue structure. Then, within the communal dialogue structure, the representatives of each fokontany collect the subjects selected at the lower level, and lexicographically identify the priorities of the commune. Lastly, communal priorities are discussed within the inter-communal dialogue

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structure. At the inter-communal level, priorities are integrated into a classification by major subjects. As such, the priority-setting undertaken at communal level is particularly useful for the representative of the commune in defining areas of intervention at inter-communal level. The more the type of project is well classified at the communal level, the more the representative will work for its inclusion in the inter-communal list. In the end, the sub-programme of an eco-region is the result of a process of identification of public choices as regards the natural environment – forestry resources in most cases – based most of the time on a bottom-up approach.

If, initially, the objective was to set priorities in matters of sustainable management of resources, the planning concept and the bottom-up participatory process led to dealing with subjects that are far beyond the simple framework of forestry and environment. Thus, in a forest eco-region in the south-west of Madagascar, the planning process set up to achieve conservation and biodiversity development objectives, led the local actors to favour projects of a purely economic (54%) and social (33%) nature, to the detriment of projects of directly environmental nature (13%) such as Gelose contracts. This fact illustrates the view often expressed, that when the initiative for the definition of development criteria is left with the local actors themselves, the economic and social dimensions often prevail over ecological ones, even in the presence of a damaged environment. This finding is all the more surprising considering that the institutions at the origin of such actions come from the environmental administration.

This way of proceeding is interesting as the result, and even less the priorities, remain unknown before the process is implemented. Razafindralambo (2001, p. 14) points out:

The main advantage of this tool is the participation of villagers in all stages of the planning process. As a matter of fact, communal or village planning, as the case may be, promotes an exchange of views and concerns which would never have been identified if the process was not conducted. In addition, it is at the same time a didactic tool as it helps farmers to see the realities of their conditions for themselves.

Therefore, in principle, it allows a true negotiation of public choices in the forestry sector that relegates the instruments of participatory management of forest to alternatives like many others, in the same way as reforestation, the valorization of neglected resources.

Unlike participatory management, which is about a management-transfer project, the determination of public choices is expected to provide a list of potential areas of intervention. In theory, the level of participation should be higher, but in reality, this process does not prevent certain important villagers from taking control of the situation in order to give priority to their preferred subjects (or areas) of intervention. As a result, the weak actors have difficulties to make themselves heard. In other words, the risk of moving from a participation of all the villagers, to active participation of local community leaders and passive participation of the rest of the population, is also important here.

The challenge is important, as the determination of forest choices constitutes an integral part of a planning process whose objective is to provide outside contributors with a list of subjects of intervention desired by the local populations. To some extent, it is about redefining the balance of power between outside contributors and local populations, and guaranteeing true participatory governance. As the AGERAS (2001, p.1) puts it:

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[the sub-program] will be a tool for negotiation with the donor agencies and a tool for collaboration with regional and/or national partners, for the inter-communal dialogue structure of the region or FIMAMI [Fikambanan’ny Mpiaro ny Alan’ny Mikea - Friends of the Mikea Forest]. It will also help the FIMAMI follow up the impacts of actions and contribute to sustainable development.

3.3 The determination of public choices as the main trend in participatory governance in Madagascar

The evolution observed in the way in which environmental governance is handled in Madagascar reflects a marked orientation towards the determination of public choices as regards development policy in general. Two other policies currently concentrate the priorities of cooperation institutions, namely the Rural Development Action Plan (PADR – Plan d’action pour le développement rural) and the enforcement of the law regarding decentralization and province autonomy through the Communal Development Plans (PDC – Plans de développement communaux).

The PADR was implemented during the period 2000–2001 at the instigation of donors that were responsible for the follow-up of the former Policy Framework Paper, now PRSPs. The objective of the PADR is set up ‘a participatory process of identification, planning and priority-setting for rural development actions’ (Prime Minister’s Office, 2001, p. 5). The main feature of this action plan is decentralized organization. The PADR covers 20 agro-ecological regions, each led by a Rural Development Working Group. This group is responsible for developing a regional system of reference, as well as a Regional Rural Development Programme. This group is also the legal authority through which the populations participate in the development of their region and in the sustainable management of natural resources in their territory. The populations are represented within the five groups composing the Rural Development Working Group, including (i) local authorities and elected officials, (ii) farmers’ organizations, (iii) programmes/projects and NGOs, (iv) economic operators, and (v) decentralized services.

Although it is still too early – owing to the political crisis in 2002 – to undertake a primary assessment of the plan, everything indicates that as far as governance is concerned, the level of participation is higher than in the environmental planning process described above. In the communal planning implemented by the ONE, the participation of local populations is the primary element of a bottom-up mechanism, which is translated by the creation of local dialogue structures. In the PADR, even if the local populations must carry out participatory diagnoses on ongoing projects and development priorities, the institutional arrangement is not as important at local level as it is at regional level. In fact, the PADR is a process of negotiation and coordination between all the actors intervening in a given region. By turning to the key actors of the rural world, the PADR works to develop a less local but more active participation [17]. In this governance process, the concept of community is replaced by a more technical approach for better integration and relevance of rural development projects, including forest lands.

Decentralization is the second main trend observed in Madagascar as regards the determination of public choices by local populations.

Decentralization and province autonomy require that communes assume more responsibilities. Being the basic structures responsible for governance, more

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precisely for proximity administration and therefore for development, the Constitution as well as relevant organic laws, allocates critical responsibilities to the communes in the field of local development.

(SEDDPA, 2002, p. 1)

This strategy, which brings to mind the democratic governance promoted by the UNDP, has been official since 2000, although the communes undertook concrete actions only in 2002, through the implementation of communal development plans.

A Communal Development Plan (PCD – Plan communal de développement) is ‘a framework document that identifies the development goals of the commune, along with the strategy, programs and projects to be implemented to achieve such goals’ (SEDDPA, 2002, p. 2). According to the Malagasy authorities, this management plan is not an end but a means to promote dialogue at communal level in view of a collective development project. It is based on a two-fold negotiation. First, at the time of plan development, the local community (fokontany, associations, groups) is provided an opportunity for ‘communicating its request to the commune and negotiating the approval of the investment proposed’ (SEDDPA, 2002, p. 3). Second, the PCD must enable the communes to ‘negotiate with financial partners (foreign, national or local) any potential partnership in the implementation of actions’ (SEDDPA, 2002, p. 3). Once again, this communal planning is expected to be a participatory process insofar as development priorities, in terms of infrastructure and development projects, must be negotiated within a communal development structure. As such, the approach is almost similar to communal planning conducted by environmental authorities. The first difference between the decentralization law and the environmental planning process is that all the communes of Madagascar must supply a PCD document. There is no longer a charter of responsibility for sustainable management of resources, but long-term programming of communal investments. The second difference is connected to financial aspects. The management plans promoted by the decentralization law precisely specify the amounts of financial investments. For instance, in a commune of 19 thousand inhabitants located on the southwestern coast of Madagascar, the PCD estimates a total investment of MGF 6.8 billion (€1.02 million) for a period of five years. Once again, 86% of this amount represents social investments (education, security, health and transportation). The progressive disappearance of environmental themes attained such proportions that, in 2003, the Malagasy State and the donors elaborated a platform to integrate the environmental dimension into the PCD.

Lastly, the area of application of participatory governance is no longer limited to the management of forestry resources but includes any local development project. This evolution results from changes in the World Bank priorities. If, at the beginning of the 1990s, priority was given to environment, now it relates to the reduction of poverty. Consequently, the aid programmes of such institutions as the World Bank emphasize more local development than environmental management itself. The second reason is more structural. The enlarging priorities to include subjects other than environmental ones is a result of the implementation of participatory governance itself. By promoting responsible and even active participatory governance, those institutions provided local populations, particularly their representatives, with the opportunity to define their development priorities themselves.

This new trend may translate significant progress in the establishment of governance principles in developing countries. Even so, this trend is regarded by some people, such

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as Stiglitz (2000), as the promotion of a model of merchandizing of international aid according to a principle of clientage. If taken to the extreme, this subsidiary principle would then have two counter-productive effects. First, the strategy of local authorities would consist in defining the development priorities of their commune according to growth issues likely to generate substantial financing, although such priorities differ from those of the population, and do not correspond to ecological, health or other needs, which may be acute in some cases. Second, this trend would entail a loss of coherence at national level, which would create difficulties in the implementation of appropriate sectoral policies, and limit national economic forecasting which is essential according to sustainable development principles.

4 Conclusion

The evolution of participatory governance methods in developing countries in general, and in Madagascar in particular, indicates that the policies of devolution of the management of natural resources to local communities leads to tackling local development policies as a whole. Encouraged by donors, developing countries such as Madagascar are looking to promote a participatory democratic model (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000). This intention to involve the local population in collective choices, independently of the study of conditions for success of collective action – cultural, economic and social homogeneity/heterogeneity; size of the group; the local context; the degree of trust and reciprocity (Jones, 2004) – expresses a change in the perception of participation, from being seen as a ‘means’ it is now being perceived as ‘an end’.

The participatory approach may appear to be a good idea when it is promoted by local actors (e.g., farmers’ organizations). However, in order to efficiently support participatory planning of the management of natural resources, this requires the ability to analyse and understand the strategies and the interests of the various groups, taking into account the tactics of dissimulation or even of systematic distortion of information, as well as local power relationships. The local actors (farmers, users) may have a real interest in protecting and managing their natural resources, such as forestry, in a sustainable manner, if they can earn regular income from them (in comparison with an uncontrolled situation), and if the State is prepared to delegate the land or management of natural resources in free access. But setting up general negotiation platforms with all the actors does not appear to be realistic (the risk exists of possible ‘capture’ by local community leaders); this presumes strong support from the State and a solid and efficient judicial-legal system that permits respect of negotiated agreements, yet these conditions rarely exist in most developing countries. Another approach would rely on combined action-research carried out with small farmers and industrialists, and direct negotiations with the Government and provincial services. For Castellanet and Jordan (2002), this approach may be useful in situations where the national Government and the majority of the local populations share a common interest, e.g. the improvement of the management of natural resources, even if the local leaders have opposing interests. However, this approach remains subject to several limitations if the local leaders are all powerful and sufficiently independent vis-à-vis the Government to be able to block measures taken by such a coalition. It would be interesting to continue research to analyse how participatory

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Endnotes 1 Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to

justice in the area of environment, Aarthus, 1998. 2 The structural adjustment programmes failed in the ‘worn out’ context of aid (budgetary

difficulties encountered by developing countries, discussions about the efficiency of the aid). During the 1990s brutal and profound crises affected several emerging countries that were in transition. Even the ‘Asian miracle’, shown as an example to other developing countries, was questioned: the international financial institutions were first accused of not foreseeing the Asian crisis, and then of not having curbed it. Besides this, these programmes that were imposed from the exterior, have caused dramatic social consequences with the persistence and the aggravation of poverty in most developing countries since the 1980s.

3 Governance designates several stylized facts: public networks (Rhodes, 1997), public management (Hood, 1991), the methods of coordination of economic sectors (Hollingsworth et al., 1994), public–private sector partnerships (Pierre, 1998), business governance (Williamson, 1996), good governance as a reform objective promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Leftwich, 1994), global governance in international relations (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), etc.

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4 Participative development has several meanings. For Shihata (1995), it refers to the reinforcement of non-governmental actors, including grassroots people movements and NGOs (p. 59), or it translates the need for transferring technical expertise to local specialists (p. 61), or it implies a necessary ownership of policies by the local populations (p. 62).

5 In the language of the PRSP Sourcebook of April 2001, PRSPs should be: ‘Country-driven and owned, based on broad based participatory processes for formulation, implementation and outcome-based monitoring; results-oriented on outcomes that would benefit the poor; comprehensive in scope, recognizing the multidimensional nature of the causes of poverty and measures to attack it; partnership-oriented, providing a basis for the active, coordinated participation of development partners (bilateral, multilateral, nongovernmental) in supporting country strategies; based on a medium and long term perspective for poverty reduction, recognizing that sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved overnight.’ (Levinsohn, 2003, p. 2).

6 UNDP’s first World Human Development Report in 1990 insisted on education and health investment, and fair economic growth. In the 2002 report, UNDP also put emphasis on a third pillar of human development strategy, namely the promotion of participation via democratic governance.

7 For example, ‘since the mid-1990s, international organizations (FAO, IBPGR, ICRAF, IFPRI, CIFOR), the donors (World Bank, national development agencies, Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation), important NGOs (WWF, IUCN, CI, TNC), and even professional forest organizations (ITTO) are implementing the concepts of participatory management, adaptive co-management, consolidation of local institutions for better local governance (social forestry projects supported by the Ford Foundation; systematic integration of local populations in national park management plans supported by the WWF); adaptive co-management projects developed with the support of the CIFOR; the WWF-UNESCO People and Plants’ project , etc.).’ (Michon, 2002, p. 189).

8 In this sense, there are various degrees of participation: (i) simple attendance of meetings, (ii) participation in activities by supporting part of the costs necessary to their realization, (iii) involvement in activities through management or decision-making, (iv) empowerment.

9 ‘It is about collective management in which a group of actors (village, rural district including several villages) has the capacity to decide on management alternatives and to implement them. Community forest management is based on a preliminary transfer of management capacities of forest lands (and even their ownership) from the government to a local authority organized into a legal institution with legal personality and often financial autonomy. In this type of management, the local actors decide by right, with the faculty of asking the opinion of government technicians who act as simple advisers, at least in theory.’ (Buttoud, 2001, p. 61).

10 Community forest management may be associated with the maintenance of government ownership of forest lands. In this framework, a management contract must be signed by the State and the local entity in order to define the latter’s responsibilities, and especially to determine if the local entity should exert control and sanction powers, or if the State will continue to do so.

11 The negotiation of a compromise is a difficult (sometimes impossible) exercise in the forest sector because of the multiplicity of expectations and the existence of conflicting interests.

12 Some local communities were allocated degraded forest lands as a result of past commercial exploitation financed and controlled by the Forest Services.

13 In addition, negotiation generally goes hand in hand with mediation: a mediator is thus responsible for leading the negotiation and for this reason he has significant power on its development and its outcome. Consequently, it is recommended to define safeguards to avoid a certain number of biases: for example, the mediator must be neutral to the extent possible, and for this reason, he should not be affected by the outcome of the negotiation …, but this is not always the case.

14 The Charter also contains a comprehensive description of environmental policy, and presents in operational terms the orientations defined including rational management of natural

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resources and biodiversity conservation and management. The National Environmental Policy was implemented through the development of a 15-year National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) divided into three five-year programmes. The ‘Environmental Programme 1’ mainly addressed the organizational aspects of the NEAP, by creating or allocating new prerogatives to the different institutions concerned. The ‘Environmental Programme 2’ focused on the development of field projects. The ‘Environmental Programme 3’, which began in 2003, aims to decentralize the actions undertaken by national institutions for greater legitimacy and better effectiveness.

15 For a discussion on good governance modalities under the National Environmental Policy, see Rajaonera et al. (2000).

16 The GCF and the Gelose differ on several points. Regarding the implementation of the transfer of management, the Gelose is based on a process of mediation and land security that is not obligatory within the framework of the GCF. Regarding the purpose of the transfer, the GCF exclusively focuses on forest resources whereas the Gelose is concerned with the native land and community heritage. Lastly, the GCF puts more emphasis on the economic valorization of these forest resources whereas the Gelose is actually restricted to the management of access to those resources, i.e. the organization of user rights at basic community level. Beyond these differences, the two types of contract show the same willingness to transfer the management of resources to local populations. According to their institutional position, certain analysts consider that the GCF complements the Gelose, whereas others underline their competing character (Maldider, 2001).

17 The participation is meant to be more active insofar as it is not about seeking the participation of all the stakeholders but only those having decision-making powers in rural areas: decentralized authorities, project leaders, NGOs, …