The Evolution and Identity of Confucianism: The Precedence Principle in Reforming Tradition

Chapter 6

The Evolution and Identity of Confucianism:

The Precedence Principle in Reforming Tradition

Chenyang Li

According to the Hanfeizi, the school led by Confucius

divided into eight groups after his death: the Zi Zhang

School, the Zi Si School, the Yan School, the Mencius School,

the Qidiao School, the Zhongliang School, the Sun School, and

the Lezheng School.1 Although we do not know exactly what all

these schools were up to, there is no reason to doubt that

they existed, although clearly most of these schools did not

survive for long. In modern times, varieties of Confucian

philosophies are as numerous as in ancient times, ranging from

liberal, to moderate, and to conservative.2 As we read these

differing versions of Confucianism, we cannot help but wonder

whether there is an authentic version that represents the true

spirit of Confucianism. Is there one Confucianism, or many?

Does Confucianism have some essential characteristics that all

versions must share to deserve the name of Confucianism? Or

simply, does Confucianism have an essence? If yes, what can

that possibly be? If no, does it follow that anything can pass

for Confucianism?

The purpose of this essay is to investigate issues

related to the identity of Confucianism as a cultural

tradition. The identity of a cultural tradition to a large

degree depends on its self-interpretation and

reinterpretation. Ancient texts are subject to varied

elucidations as the context evolves and hence present new

possibilities for hermeneutical understanding, even though

interpretation is by no means arbitrary. I will argue that

Confucianism does not have an essence and it is open to

endless possibilities, but that does not mean anything can

pass for Confucianism at any given time. On the basis of the

notion that a cultural tradition is a shared community, and of

the Confucian notion of precedence (xu), I make the case that

the common identity shared by members of a cultural community

takes precedence over new self-understandings until the latter

are justified. Because shaping a cultural tradition depends

largely on conscious efforts of conscious advocates to

interpret and re-interpret the tradition, reformers departing

from Confucianism in its traditional forms bear the burden of

2

justifying such moves to their fellow community members within

the tradition. As such, my thesis is at once radical and

conservative, and hence it is subject to objections from both

sides. Some may insist that Confucianism possesses some

essential characteristics which it will never do without,

whereas others may reject any rule or principle for inventing

new forms of Confucianism. Nevertheless, I believe such

discussion must be launched and will defend my thesis. This

topic is particularly important today as Confucianism once

again faces the real possibility of radical departures from

its traditional basis. The intended audience of my thesis here

are people affiliated with the Confucian tradition, even

though it may have implications for other cultural traditions.

Cultural Tradition as Community

Confucianism is a living cultural tradition, with its

origin traceable to ancient times. Adherents of a cultural

tradition, says A. S. Cua, “comprise a community in that they

are actuated by sensus communis”.3 Sensus communis is the common

sense shared by members of the same cultural community. It

gives people a common purpose and common understanding, as

3

well as shared values and evaluative instruments within the

same cultural paradigm. Although sensus communis evolves over

time, at a given time it retains relative stability, except

during rare periods of rapid social changes.

A cultural community differs from an academic community.

Scholars studying Confucian philosophy, for instance,

constitute an academic community. Some of them gather

regularly at academic conferences to share thoughts, exchange

ideas, and even enjoy scholarly camaraderie. They do not

constitute a cultural community, however, because these people

may not share the same value commitment to the Confucian

tradition and may not endorse the same way of life. Members of

an academic community need only to ensure that the subject of

their study persists, which may or may not be a living

tradition, even though their paradigm of research may change

over time. To members of a cultural community, it is of vital

importance that the tradition lives on, not only formally but

also materially, in that it carries substantial value contents

from previous times. Belonging to a cultural community is not

merely a matter of social identity but also a value

commitment. Commitment to the values of a cultural community

4

is also a matter of identity, of course, but at a deeper

level. It concerns the worth of people’s identity in the

“politics of recognition,” to borrow the phrase from Charles

Taylor.4 In asserting the worth of their way of life, members

of a cultural community not only present what they have been,

but also what they think they ought to be. They seek to

maintain the tradition and do so by re-interpretation and re-

invention. Regardless of the past of the tradition, through

their action and choice current members of a cultural

community have the final say on who they are and what the

tradition has become. In this sense, they are the producer of

the knowledge of their tradition as it stands. A cultural

community and an academic community can overlap, of course, as

a cultural community may include scholars who participate in

the academic community, and vice versa. Furthermore, the two

communities may influence each other. Ideas from the academic

community may help shape the cultural community; new

developments of the cultural community naturally interest the

academic community. Like most communities, the precise

boundaries of these communities may not be always clearly

drawn. As a matter of fact, most times the boundaries will

5

likely be vague, particularly in the case of Confucianism,

which has never been a membership-based tradition. That,

however, does not invalidate the existence of these

communities, cultural or academic.

My focus here is cultural community. Members of a

cultural community are persons, but they are not merely

discrete individuals. As fellow community members, their

actions inevitably affect on the community as a whole,

including future members of the community. The English word

“tradition” comes from the Latin traditio, a noun from the verb

tradere, which means to transmit, to hand down, to give for

safekeeping. Being part of the tradition implies transmitting

something important from earlier generations to later

generations. The Song Confucian thinker Zhang Zai (1020-1078)

proclaimed famously that it was his mission to continue the

learning tradition passed on from previous generations. In the

Confucian tradition as it has hitherto evolved, a person has

an obligation to continue the family heritage, an obligation

owed to one’s ancestors, even though they no longer exist.

Similarly, we may say that contemporary Confucians have

obligations to continue the tradition established and

6

transformed by previous generations. Being a Confucian today

implies sharing Confucian values and dedicating to its cause,

including its continuity and renewal.

The evolution of a tradition comprises many elements.

Intellectual pursuits occupy a prominent position in the

process. According to Alasdaire MacIntyre,

A tradition is an argument extended through time in which

certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined

in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and

enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at

least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and

those internal, interpretative debates through which the

meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come

to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is

constituted.5

A living tradition like Confucianism is subject to both

kinds of debates, external and internal, as MacIntyre

describes. The distinction between these two kinds of debates

is an important one. Those engaged in internal debates,

7

through words or action or both, are adherents of the

tradition. Their choice and practice shape the tradition as it

evolves in its large social context. Through their actions

they (re)produce and (re)define the tradition and consequently

others’ possible knowledge regarding it. Within a tradition,

internal debates often present themselves in the form of

(re)interpreting shared concepts and, at times, introducing

new concepts into the tradition’s conceptual reservoir. In

such processes, some people may be more reformative whereas

others are more conservative in interpretation. MacIntyre may

have overstated it when he claimed that, “to be an adherent of

a tradition is always to enact some further stage in the

development of one’s tradition.”6 Whereas reformers attempt to

introduce new ideas—though not always good ones—into the

tradition and to enact some further stage, conservatives and

traditionalists tend to put a brake—not always wisely—on such

modifications which are perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be

too radical or destructive. Being a reformer does not

necessarily mean making a positive contribution to the

tradition. Being a conservative does not necessarily mean

backwardness. Conservatives participate in enacting a further

8

stage only in the sense that their forces serve as a factor in

the shaping of a new stage. For this reason, internal debates

as described by MacIntyre are extremely important to every

living tradition. Both reformers and traditionalists have

important roles to play in the healthy development of a

tradition.

In Confucianism, the notion of a continuing tradition has

been discussed in terms of daotong.7 The idea of daotong can be

traced to Mencius. In the Jixin B of the Mencius, Mencius outlined

successions of a tradition from the sage kings Yao, Shun, and

so forth to King Wen, and then to Confucius.8 The Tang

Confucian scholar Han Yu explicitly articulated the idea of a

tradition that was passed on from Yao to Shun, to Yu, Tang,

Duke Zhou, then to Confucius and Mencius.9 The Song neo-

Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi coined the term “daotong” to

denote the process of successions of this continuous

tradition.10 We may think of a cultural tradition as a river,

with many turns and branches. At the turning points and

branching forks are impactful historical events and

influential thinkers. Although a river is never a straight

line, usually there is still such a thing as the main river

9

despite its offshoots. As a cultural tradition, Confucianism

has its own “main stream,” too. Unlike a river, which (mostly)

depends on natural forces, the contour of a cultural tradition

is influenced and shaped largely by adherents’ active pursuit,

promotion, and advocacy. While there are often factors beyond

individuals’ reach, there is no denial that conscious efforts

of cultural advocates play an important role in shaping a

tradition. Changes in a tradition inevitably affect current

and future members of the cultural community. In this context,

we can say that today’s reform-bent Confucian thinkers owe

their fellow cultural community members justifications for

revising the tradition shared by others. Hence, it is useful

to look into considerations in modifying the tradition and

meaningful to consider reasonable principles for modifying a

cultural tradition.

The Endless Possibilities of a Tradition

Faced with numerous challenges in modern times, Confucian

thinkers have attempted in various ways to come up with viable

responses. Some of these responses would require Confucianism

to transform far from its traditional base. My question

10

regarding the identity of Confucianism arises out of concerns

over the risk of this tradition transforming its core values

too rapidly and becoming disconnected with its past. A

tradition disconnected with its past cannot maintain its

identity.

But, why would that be problematic? Why shouldn’t

Confucianism change drastically? Does it have an essence to

hold it back? Confucianism does not have an essence. In the

Aristotelian sense, “essence” means indispensable properties

that serve to characterize or identify an entity. The term,

via the Latin coinage of essentia, comes from Aristotle’s phrase

of to ti ên einai, literally “the what-it-was-to-be” for a thing.

Essence is what it means for something to be that thing.

Without it, a thing ceases to persist. Aristotle applies

essence primarily to natural objects. Non-natural objects,

presumably, do not have essences. The Aristotelian notion of

essence obviously does not apply to Confucianism. Saying that

Confucianism has an Aristotelian essence amounts to saying

that Confucianism has some natural properties without which it

cannot exist. Even though Confucianism has its traditional

core values, these values do not constitute its essence, as I

11

will explain shortly. Confucianism is not a natural object; in

the Aristotelian sense, Confucianism has no essence.

Furthermore, even if we extend the Aristotelian notion of

essence to non-natural objects, we still cannot say that

Confucianism has essential features. Confucianism is not

Confucius-ism. By “Confucius-ism” I mean a philosophy that

belongs to Confucius. The study of Confucius-ism (Kongzi xue) is

the study of his philosophy. It includes teachings primarily

found in the Analects (and any other works that future

excavations may reveal). Regarding Confucius’s own philosophy,

even though some issues are debatable, it is undeniable, for

instance, that humanity (ren) is one of its essential features.

Without it, Confucius-ism is no longer what it is.

Confucianism, however, is a different matter. The term

“Confucianism” was coined in the 19th century West after

“Confucius,” the Latinized name that 16th century Jesuit

missionaries gave to Kongzi (“Kong Fuzi”).11 “Confucianism” has

been used to denote the Chinese cultural tradition and

philosophy commonly referred to as “rujia.” “Confucian classics”

or “Confucian canons” mean rujia classics rather than Confucius’

classical writings. (To be sure, the neologism “Confucianism”

12

could have been used more appropriately to denote “Confucius-

ism,” as many of today’s China scholars would prefer using the

more appropriate term “Ruism” for the tradition in place of

“Confucianism.”) The Chinese term “rujia” does not bear

Confucius’s name. It has been used in China to designate the

tradition associated with Confucius and his followers such as

Mencius and Xunzi. The philosophical ideas and ideals promoted

by this school, however, were not invented by Confucius or his

immediate followers; Confucius said that he was “transmitting

rather than inventing (she er bu zuo)” a philosophy--even though

he undoubtedly contributed to it greatly. In this regard, I

have to disagree with the prominent New-Confucian philosopher

Liu Shu-hsien’s claim that,

The Confucian message must be traced back to Confucius as

the Christian message must be traced back to Jesus the

Christ…It is through a study of the ideals Confucius

embodied that we may hope to find the continuity between

Neo-Confucianism and classical Confucianism.12

It seems to me, the Confucian message—if there is such a thing

as “the” Confucian message—has to be traced back to a cluster

of thinkers and texts during the pre-Qin (and perhaps the

13

early Han) period, with Confucius as an important source. In

fact, Confucian thinkers of various stages in history have had

differing views on which cluster of thinkers and texts

constitute Confucian philosophy. In the Warring States period,

Confucian classics comprised the Six Classics, namely the Book of

Changes, Book of History, Book of Odes, Book of Rites, Book of Music, and the

Records of Spring and Autumn. The bulk of these texts predate

Confucius according to historical records. During the Tang

period, the number of texts in the cluster was expanded into

nine. When it came to the Song era, the number had been

gradually increased to thirteen, in addition to the Book of

Changes, Book of History, Book of Odes, Book of Rites, it also included Book

of Rituals, the Rituals of the Zhou, the Zuo Commentary of the Spring and

Autumn, the Gongyang Commentary of the Spring and Autumn, the Guliang

Commentary of the Spring and Autumn, the Analects, the Classic of Filiality, Er-

Ya, and the Book of Mencius. During the same period, Zhi Xi

selected the Analects, the Book of Mencius, and the chapters of Great

Learning and Zhongyong from the Book of Rites, to compose the

Confucian “Four Books,” which have served as the main texts of

Confucianism for general readers. This evolution of Confucian

14

classics is itself a good indication of differing

understandings of the Confucian tradition at various stages.

The above shows that, as a cultural and philosophical

tradition, Confucianism has an origin as well as a

developmental history. The development of a tradition can take

it quite far from its starting point. It is difficult to draw

a line and claim that passing a given point the tradition is

no longer what it is. If we compare various stages and

versions of a cultural tradition over a long period, we likely

find their “family resemblance” rather than essential

features. After all, the “jia” in the “rujia (Confucianism)” just

means “family.” The Wittgensteinian concept of “family

resemblance” becomes more suggestive for our purpose here when

we consider resemblance not merely as horizontal relationship

across “family members” synchronously, but more importantly as

a diachronic relationship across different generations in the

same family. While retaining some of their ancestors’ cultural

genes, later generations have also picked up new genes to keep

up with the changing environments.

One good example for a radical departure of a tradition

from its origin is Zen (Chan) Buddhism. Buddhism as taught by

15

the Buddha has its own doctrines, notably the Four Noble

Truths and the Eightfold Path. Zen Buddhism, however, does not

believe in doctrines. It styles itself as “a separate

transmission outside the scriptures, not dependent on words

and phrases,” and it describes its teachings as “transmitted

from mind to mind.”13 Unlike traditional Buddhism which

searches for nirvana through studying and practicing Buddha’s

teachings transmitted in scriptures, Zen Buddhists do not

believe in studying scriptures or following any specific

teachings, as suggested by the Zen Koan that “if you see the

Buddha, kill him.” As a matter of fact, should the Buddha come

back to this world, he may well not be able to recognize Zen

Buddhism as a school within the tradition that he himself once

founded.

Even though it departs considerably from early Buddhism

in India, Zen Buddhism is undoubtedly a form of Buddhism.

Then, why is it so? The key to this question, I suggest, lies

in distinguishing Buddhism from what we may call

“Sakyamunism.” Although the term may have been used otherwise,

by “Sakyamunism” here I mean the teachings offered by the

historical person Siddhārtha Gautama. If historical records

16

are reliable, we can be reasonably certain of his core

teachings, which would include, for instance, suffering and

nirvana. Buddhism as a tradition, however, is different, in

part because a tradition can develop and can move into new

phases and even open new paths. Zen is such a case. What makes

Zen a version of Buddhism rather than an entirely new

philosophy/religion is mainly its historical connection. In

the historical narratives of Hui Neng and Sheng Xiu, we see

how understandings of Buddhism shifted from its earlier

form(s) to the substantial stages of Zen. It did not invent

itself from nothing, nor did it completely cut off itself from

its earlier tradition.14

Drawing on the above discussion, we can say that

Confucianism has no essence and that new versions of

Confucianism, including such brands as “new-Confucianism” and

“post-neo-Confucianism,” can still be forms of Confucianism.

It is not the case that, just because some version does not

retain a particular feature or value, it is no longer

Confucianism. In this view, the Confucian “daotong” or its

“constant Way (yiguan zhidao) has to be seen as a continuing

process of development and expansion of the Confucian Way. If

17

Confucianism is taken to be a fixed doctrine or practice as it

first appeared two thousand years ago, then Joseph Levenson

may have been correct that today it can exist only in

museums.15 But Confucianism, like many other living traditions,

should not been taken as a static set of doctrines or

practices. It continues to evolve through development and

renewal. Development is, of course, not baseless. It may take

various forms. For instance, Confucian classics are vastly

diverse texts. There are varied and sometimes contradictory

ideas and ideals, which are subject to configurations and re-

configurations. Through interpretations and re-

interpretations, Confucianism can be presented in differing

forms. New social conditions often call for re-interpretations

in response to new challenges. Not to mention that new

discoveries of classic texts also affect how Confucianism is

configured and represented. For instance, the discovery of the

Guodian Bamboo Text entitled “Xing zi ming chu,” which places more

emphasis on the concept of feelings (qing) than other known

classic Confucian texts, has led scholars to reevaluate the

role of feelings in Confucian philosophy.

18

One may object, could Confucianism continue to exist

without such key ideas of propriety (li), humanity (ren) and the

family (jia)? It is indeed difficult to imagine a Confucianism

without these notions. A close look, however, reveals that

these notions have been shifting in meanings throughout the

history of Confucianism. Although both li and ren are traceable to

the per-Qin period, the emphasis of contemporary New-

Confucianism is evidently on ren, not li. The meaning of ren has

shifted considerably since antiquity. For Confucius, ren is

based directly on filiality. Song-Ming Confucians stress the

extended capacity of ren to embrace the entire universe. Some

post-Confucian thinkers today, represented notably by such

authors as Liu Qingping, have been presenting a sort of

Kantian interpretation of ren, making it a universal virtue

applicable equally to all humanity (and beyond).16 What ties all

these conceptions of ren together is more or less a generic

covering term rather than a substantive concept, even though

each conception has its own substantive meaning. While these

shifts by no means prove that ren is not a core value in

Confucianism, it is conceivable that further shifts could take

it so far from its original meaning that it becomes a vague,

19

covering notion for human kindness in general. Should that

happen, having ren in such a general sense as a core value does

not really mean anything because virtually every ethical

tradition contains such a notion at its core, though presented

in varied forms. Emphasis on the family has been undoubtedly a

key feature of the Confucian tradition. Family life, however,

is evidently not the trend of modern society. Suppose in the

next millennium the family becomes completely marginalized in

society. Would that mean the end of Confucianism? I think not.

I believe that while Confucianism will continue to strive for

the integrity of the family, it could survive without it as

the tradition evolves with society.

This view of Confucianism as something without essential

characteristics will take us afar from the usual view of

changes in a tradition. It is different from minor deviations

of the norm in the tradition. A. S. Cua, for example, uses the

Confucian concepts of the constant, the norm (jing) and moral

discretion (quan) in accounting for stability and changes in a

tradition. He writes,

20

In the Confucian community of interpretation, there are

always entrenched, established interpretations comprising

jing, the normal or constant practice of dao. These

interpretations are paradigms learned in the course of

moral education. These paradigms are followed

unquestioningly by ordinary members of the community.

Paradigms, Cua argues, however, do not entirely exhaust the

significance of the possible meanings of dao:

Given the lack of clear and determinate guidance in some

situations in the moral life, ordinary agents committed

to the ideal of dao may wonder about the right thing to

do. Unavoidably, quan is exercised in such cases.17

Such practice of quan as described by Cua occurs on a

daily basis and it is a constant phenomenon in life. For Cua,

while the Confucian dao is a generic term which denominates a

unifying perspective in the Confucian community, such key

concepts as humanity (ren), propriety (li) and rightness (yi) are

the general specifications of dao and are subject to modified

21

interpretations.18 Cua’s description is more applicable to

periods of the Confucian tradition that are relatively stable

and without major transformations. What I am considering here

is something far more radical. It is the issue of departing

far from a traditional base. It is a matter of changing some

of the jing, basic elements in a tradition. I suggest that even

such a major departure does not preclude it from remaining

within the same tradition, as the case of Zen Buddhism

indicates.

Absence of an essence, however, does not preclude that a

tradition possesses core ideas or core values at each stage of

its development. “Core values” refer to those values that

members of a tradition hold as so important to their way of

life and identity that they cannot give up without

significantly changing their self-image and self-

understanding. Core values, however, can change over time,

usually through reinterpretations of classic texts and

historic events, as well as reconfigurations of traditional

values.19 The idea of the “unity of Heaven and Humanity”

figures prominently in Han Confucianism and Song-Ming Neo-

Confucianism and has become a core idea or core value, but

22

this was not the case in pre-Qin Confucianism. Core values at

a particular stage of a tradition represent the identity of

the tradition of the time. Commitment to core values is an

important criterion for being members of a cultural community.

Upholding core values is a sign of loyalty to the tradition.

Core values, however, are not self-dependent. They are rooted

in the tradition and they help community members cope with

social reality. When social reality changes, some core values

need to be re-configured, re-articulated, and even replaced.

Now, if Confucianism has no essence and if its core

values shift over time, does it follow that anything can pass

as Confucianism?

The Need for Justification and the Precedence Principle

In the following discussion, I presume that any self-

proclaimed new version of Confucianism carries with it at

least some affinity to its traditional forms, or it should not

be taken seriously by its practitioners. In fact, it is

reasonable to suppose that whoever claims to present a new

version of Confucianism in a serious way must maintain at

least some continuity with the previous version of

23

Confucianism, which it sets out to modify or replace. I will

apply the Confucian notion of precedence (xu) and argue that,

although there are no fixed criteria for authenticity in the

development of a tradition, a new version that departs

considerably from its predecessor bears the burden of

justifying its moves to fellow community members. On such an

account, new versions of Confucianism not only need to prove

superiority over their predecessors on a comprehensive basis,

but also provide adequate continuity with the tradition in

order to remain part of it.

The Confucian notion of precedence has been used in the

relationship between the old and young, one of the five

cardinal relationships in Confucianism. It is primarily about

relationships between older and younger brothers, but can also

be extended to that between older and younger people in

general. The idea is that, in taking responsibilities and

making decisions in the family, older brothers should take

precedence over younger brothers. This also applies to such

domestic matters such as scheduling marriages and allotting

living quarters. Other things being equal, consideration is

given first to older brothers before younger brothers. Beyond

24

the family, this notion of precedence implies that younger

people should pay deference to older people, other things

being equal. Precedence is built on the natural course of

things. There is a seniority factor at work. Obviously, older

brothers usually mature before younger brothers; their needs

and ability to take responsibility come before younger

brothers. Being natural does not necessarily mean being good

or that something should be maintained. Reasons, however, are

needed for changing the natural course of things. Similarly,

precedence does not mean that the order can never be reversed.

It does not mean, for instance, that younger brothers can

never take primary family responsibilities before older

brothers, or that younger brothers cannot get married before

older brothers. It is just that, when this sort of thing

happens, it reverses the natural order and, therefore,

requires justification. In other words, the burden of proof is

on the younger brother or his representative when he needs to

reverse precedence. I will call this stipulation “the

precedence principle.” By this principle, of all versions of

contemporary Confucianism, those closest to the most recent

traditional version of Confucianism have prime facie precedence

25

in claiming authenticity and, therefore, legitimacy as its

heir than other, newer versions of Confucianism.

In accordance with the precedence principle, if someone

comes up with a new version of Confucian philosophy with

characteristics (particularly core values) different from

traditional forms, she or he bears the burden of proof to

demonstrate that the new version has sufficient advantages

over previous versions to warrant a departure from its

traditional form. Such a burden is derived from the

responsibility one owes fellow members of the same cultural

community. It is something fellow community members owe one

another. This kind of obligation is not enforced from outside

by an authority but self-imposed on responsible members within

a cultural community. For instance, a contemporary Confucian

scholar may propose that Confucianism should abandon its

traditional emphasis on “graded love (ai you cha deng),” and

should replace it with universal love. Such a move cannot be

ruled out simply on the basis that traditional mainstream

Confucianism has emphasized love with distinctions, because

the past does not necessarily prove what the future holds.

However, he or she does bear the burden of persuading others

26

in the cultural community of the advantages in such a move. It

is not just additional strengths such a move may bring to

Confucianism, it also has to be justified in a balanced way.

Namely, it needs also to show that what losses such a move may

bring to Confucianism and that, on the balance, the advantage

of this move is a net gain for this tradition. Specifically,

such a justification as a form of “internal debate” (per

MacIntyre) should cover the following elements.

1. The new version must better address new challenges.

While modifications of a tradition are often prompted by the

need to answer new challenges, not all new proposals are

better than the traditional. Therefore, new versions of a

tradition must undergo careful scrutiny in proving its

superiority.

2. New versions must maintain adequate continuity to the

tradition, and carry adequate coherence with it. Sometimes,

proposed versions may cause too much internal damage to the

tradition; a quantum leap may result in beginning a new

tradition rather than a continuation of an old tradition.

3. The new version fares better than other possible new

alternatives under both considerations of 1 and 2.

27

First, all continuing traditions will face new challenges

as they move forward with time. Addressing new challenges

calls for new ideas. How to incorporate new ideas and

reconfigure values appropriately affects the fitness of a

tradition in a new age. For a long period of time, for

instance, Confucians failed to promote gender equality. The

Ming Confucian thinker Li Zhi (1527-1602) was among the first

to begin advocating gender equality in Confucianism.20 After

several centuries of internal (and external) discourse, now

gender equality is accepted and promoted in Confucianism. In

this regard, the tradition has transformed itself so it can

better accommodate a social need.

Second, new changes to a tradition, particularly changes

in cultural values, may affect other values in the tradition.

As values are related and often exert tension with one

another, a change of one value often affects the configuration

of other values in the tradition. Therefore, any proposed

modification of a tradition must take into consideration

possible negative impact on the tradition via changing the

systematic configuration of values in the tradition. Lin Anwu,

for example, has proposed to use a contractual model of social

28

relationship to replace the traditional familial model of

human relationship on Confucianism.21 As contemporary feminist

scholarship has shown abundantly, however, the contractual

model of human relationship is infested with all kinds of

problems.22 For instance, it rests the entire human

relationship on a business model and fails to adequately

elucidate moral relationships between persons. We have to ask

whether replacing the familial model with a contractual model

of human relationship would cause too much damage to the

entire Confucian conceptual framework. We need to take a

holistic view of such proposed changes and evaluate their

overall impact on the tradition before embracing them.

Continuity with the existing form of the tradition or the

lack thereof cannot be precisely quantified. It is not the

only criterion in evaluating new revisionist proposals. At

times, major changes are needed that may move the tradition

quite far from its previous position. The precedence principle

requires more justification of proposals that would move

further away from the tradition’s existing form than those

closer to it. Between two modification proposals, the one

29

demanding more changes bears a larger burden of justification

than the modest one.

The precedence principle helps us assess the

acceptability of new brands of Confucianism as we deal with

the ongoing development of Confucianism. It allows us to

engage actively in the creation and renewal of culture and

history. At this point, versions of Confucianism that are

closest to its current form have prime facie precedence in

claiming authenticity and therefore legitimacy. New versions

have to justify their authenticity and legitimacy.

Justification is not a monologue of apologia. It calls for both

the reformers and those resist reforms to engage in “internal

debates” as MacIntyre has described (or prescribed). There may

not be a formal “verdict” to each debate, though it is

conceivable that some new proposals may not survive careful

scrutiny; the process itself paves a way for the tradition to

move forward. Furthermore, as new modifications are proposed

to answer contemporary challenges, often there are different

ways of responding to the same challenge. Therefore, before we

embrace one modification, we should consider other

alternatives, possibly more superior ones.

30

The process of justification as “internal debates” also

gives those proposing new modifications a much needed

opportunity to reflect and apply equilibrium in developing,

affirming and reaffirming revisions to the tradition. It

provides an opportunity for revisionists for persuade their

fellow dao-seekers within the same tradition. However, even

though sometimes reformers can be successful in persuading

others, convincing contemporary community members is not a

necessary condition for new proposals to move forward. Which

brand of Confucianism can continue the Confucian legacy

depends on whether it possesses stronger living force and

consequently can carry on the tradition in a meaningful and

influential way into the future. Paradoxically, the legitimacy

and vitality of a new brand can be ultimately verified only by

history in hindsight. History is not necessarily rational

(pace Hegel). It is influenced and even shaped often by

fortuitous events. If the fifth Zen patriarch Huineng had not

been illiterate, for instance, (subsequent) Zen Buddhism may

not have eschewed the reading of Buddhist scriptures.

In the same way, a branch of a cultural tradition that

first appeared insignificant may nevertheless gain traction

31

later and become a major episode in the tradition. This

possibility applies to Confucianism, too. Mou Zongsan

famously claimed that Zhu Xi’s version of Confucianism grew

out a non-mainstream branch of this Confucian tradition (bie zi

wei zong), namely the younger of the Cheng Brothers. According

to Mou, the then-mainstream Confucian philosophy belonged to

that of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, and the older Cheng brother.

Zhu Xi, however, took his source from the younger Cheng and

developed it into a mainstream Confucian philosophy.23 If we

accept Mou’s judgment, the younger Cheng and Zhu Xi stand as

good examples of how a minor branch became a major episode of

a world tradition (even though Mou was critical of Zhu).

Indeed, without Zhu Xi’s profound influence in China, Korea,

and Japan, the history of Confucianism would have been

radically different. After all, only those brands of a

tradition that actually succeeded in history can effectively

assert legitimacy of their existence. Of course, people can

still debate over the validity of a surviving brand of a

tradition (as Mou did in the case of Zhu). That kind of

debate, of course, belongs to a different sort of issue.

32

We may call this consideration in assessing the

development of a cultural tradition the “success principle.”

This principle states that the ultimate judgment of the

suitability and legitimacy of a new version of a cultural

tradition lies in its historically proven success. It is

perfectly conceivable that a new version of a tradition is not

immediately accepted and receives much challenge from

contemporaries, yet it moves on to succeed and becomes

embraced heartedly by later generations. The success principle

recognizes the fortuitous nature of human history, and

provides at least some hope to individuals who have strong

convictions toward their new revisions but who have met with

strong resistance from their contemporaries. It is possible,

of course, that a new theory is pre-mature when it is proposed

but becomes a welcome brand of a cultural tradition later when

the time has come.

If in the developmental history of a cultural tradition,

ultimately the “success principle” always trumps the

“precedence principle,” why do we need the “precedence

principle”? We need it because it enables us to exert

conscious efforts in directing the future directions of our

33

own cultural tradition, rather than leaving it entirely to

historic fortuity. It enables us to be more reflective and

more responsible in reforming the tradition. The passage of

history is a combination of various forces, rational and

irrational, well-designed and accidental. Conscious efforts in

applying the precedence principle helps reduce irrational and

accidental factors in history and enable members of a cultural

community to exercise more control of the development of their

tradition. Confucianism carries with it a long tradition for

its thinkers to take responsibility in promoting dao. The dao

is always embodied in the cultural tradition. From this

perspective, consciously shaping the future tradition is the

most important way to promote dao. Our goal should be to

promote success through the precedence principle, to bring

these two principles to coincide as closely as possible.

Summary

As a living cultural tradition, Confucianism has

unlimited potential for transformation and development.

Reformers, however, bear the burden and responsibility to

justify their moves and their superiority over previous

34

versions of the tradition to their fellow cultural community

members. This kind of justification requires not only proving

additional force in appealing to society, but also its

sufficient continuity with its predecessor in the tradition

which it claims to carry on. Although history ultimately

honors the “success principle,” as cultural advocates, to the

extent we wish to influence the shaping of the further of a

tradition, we should follow the precedence principle so we can

maintain a tradition as consciously as possible.

35

1 Er shi er zi (Twenty-two Masters) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1986),

1185.

2 For an excellent study of the varieties of contemporary

Confucianism in greater China, see

John Makeham, Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Asia Center, 2008).

3 A. S. Cua, “The Idea of Confucian Tradition,” Review of Metaphysics 45

(1992): 803-40.

4 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism:

Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-74.

5 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana:

University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 12.

6 Ibid, 11.

7 For a discussion of recent debates on the meaning of “tradition” in

China, see Gloria Davies’ chapter in this volume.

8 Shi san jing zhu shu (Thirteen Classics with Commentaries) (Beijing: Zhongguo

shudian, 1985), 2780.

9 Han Yu, “Yuan dao,” in Zhongguo zhexueshi ziliao jianbian: lianghan—

suitangbufen, eds. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking

University (Beijing: Zhongguo shuju, 1963), 542.

10 Zhu Xi, “Zhongyong zhangju jizhu (shang),” in Si shu wu jing (The Four

Books and Five Classiscs) (Beijing: zhongguo shudian, 1985).

11 See Lionel M. Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and

Universal Civilization (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1998), 4. According to

Lionel Jensen, the term was coined in 1862.

12 Shu-hsien Liu, “The Problem of Orthodoxy in Chu Hsi’s Philosophy,”

in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-Tsit Chan (Honolulu: University

of Hawaii Press, 1986), 442.

13 W. T. de Bary, ed., The Buddhist Tradition in India, China, and Japan (New

York: A Vintage Book, 1972), 208.

14 Its social organizational form undoubtedly also contributed to

Zen’s continued identity with early Buddhism.

15 See Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958,

1964, 1965).

16 Qingping Liu, “Confucianism and Corruption: An Analysis of Shun’s

Two Actions Described by Mencius,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6,

no. 1 (2007):1-19.

17 A.S. Cua, “The Idea of Confucian Tradition,” 837.

18 Ibid., 822.

19 For a discussion of the concept of value configuration, see

Chenyang Li, “Cultural Configurations of Values,” World Affairs: The Journal

of International Issues 12, no. 2 (2008): 28-49.

20 See Pauline Lee, “Li Zhi and John Stuart Mill: A Confucian Feminist

Critique of Liberal Feminism,” in The Sage and The Second Sex: Confucianism,

Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open

Court, 2000), 113-32.

21 See Lin Anwu, Ruxue zhuanxian: cong xinruxue dao houxinruxue de guodu

(Taipei: Student Press, 2006).

22 See Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1994). See also Virginia Held, Morality: Transforming

Culture, Society, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

23 Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu Xingti (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe

1999), 42-44.