The Evolution and Development of the Australian Light Horse, 1860-1945

The Evolution and Development of the Australian Light Horse, 1860-1945

Jean Bou

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW@ADFA

2005

Abstract

Despite the place that the Light Horse occupies in Australia’s military history and the national

martial mythology, there has not yet been a scholarly attempt to investigate the evolution and

development of Australia’s mounted branch. This thesis is the first attempt to fill this gap in our

knowledge and understanding of the history of the Australian Army. In doing so it will consider the

ways in which the Light Horse evolved, the place it had in defence thinking, the development of its

doctrine, its organisational changes and the way in which that organisation and its men interacted with

their society. This thesis firstly analyses the role and place of the mounted soldier in the British and

colonial/dominion armies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before going on to

examine what effects the debates about this had on the development of Australia’s mounted troops. It

will find that in the nineteenth century the disparate mounted units of the Australian colonies were

established mainly along the organisational model of the mounted rifleman. Influenced by social ideas

about citizen soldier horsemen and a senior officer with firm views, this model continued to be used

by the new Light Horse until well into the First World War. During that war it was gradually

discovered that this military model had its limitations and by the end of the war much of the Light

Horse had become cavalry. This discovery in turn meant that during the inter-war period cavalry

continued to be part of the army. Analysed in depth also are the many organisational changes that

affected the mounted branch during its existence. Some of these reflected doctrinal and tactical

lessons, and others were the result of various plans by the government and military authorities to

improve the army. It will be seen that regardless of these plans part-time citizen horse units continued

to have many problems and they rarely came to be what the government wanted of them. That they

were as strong as they were was testimony to the efforts of a dedicated and enthusiastic few.

Certificate of Originality

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no

materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material

which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other

educational institution, except where due acknowledgement in made in the thesis. Any contribution

made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly

acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of

my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception

or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Mr. Jean Bou

i

Table of Contents

Page

Acknowledgements

ii

Abbreviations

iv

Author’s note

viii

Key definitions

ix

Introduction

1

Chapter 1: British Cavalry Doctrinal Debates, 1860-1915

9

Chapter 2: Australia’s Pre-Federation Mounted Troops, 1803-1899

35

Chapter 3: The South African War, 1899-1902

70

Chapter 4: Foundations of the Australian Light Horse, 1901-1904

90

Chapter 5: Unfulfilled Promise, 1905-1914

122

Chapter 6: Mounted Troops and Society, 1850-1914

148

Chapter 7: The Light Horse at War, 1914-1919

178

Chapter 8: The Light Horse at Home, 1914-1944

221

Conclusion

261

Bibliography

267

ii

Acknowledgments

It is both customary and completely deserving to begin a thesis by thanking one’s supervisors.

In this respect I would firstly like to offer my heartfelt thanks to Professor Peter Dennis and Professor

Jeffrey Grey. I am indebted to Peter for his wise counsel, help, cheer and, as this thesis was somewhat

long in its coming, his gracious forbearance when circumstances brought my work to a standstill. That

it was resuscitated and brought to a successful conclusion is testimony to his ability to combine

understanding with the occasional crack of the whip. Offering one of your PhD students lodging in

one’s home for a few weeks in order to help get things going again must surely rate as service above

and beyond that required of a supervisor. Landing in Peter’s office in 1997 as a new honours graduate

with not much of an idea as to what I was getting myself in for can only be described, from my point

of view, as most fortuitous. Jeffrey stood in when Peter was not available, offered his fair share of

authoritative advice and, perhaps most importantly, suggested the Light Horse as a thesis topic when

my original plans threatened to bore me to distraction. For a graduate student with an interest in

military history it is difficult to conceive of having two better men to act as guides, advisors and

mentors in such an undertaking as this one.

I also owe thanks to a number of other historians. Peter Stanley of the Australian War

Memorial provided useful advice when this thesis was in its infancy (even if he only just recalls the

instance, now so long ago). Craig Wilcox, now also of the Australian War Memorial, helped me out

with several queries regarding Australia’s citizen soldiers over the years and most helpfully provided

me a copy of an unpublished paper on mounted riflemen he gave in London several years ago.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ian van der Waag of the Department of Military History at the University of

Stellenbosch very kindly fished through the Afrikaans sources in order to provide me with a view of

the Boer that went beyond the myth. At the Chief of Army’s History Conference in 1999 Stephen

Badsey first pointed out to me that even in the early twentieth century cavalry was not necessarily a

byword for anachronism. By allowing me to draw on his PhD thesis and by being willing to answer

my email questions he made a significant contribution to this work. During and after the same

conference Michael Ramsey also offered useful advice. By pointing me in the direction of some key

archival sources that I had missed, and through a series of increasingly arcane email exchanges, James

Morrison helped me to refine my thinking on the inter-war Light Horse. Many librarians and

archivists helped me over the years, though Christopher Dawkins of the ADFA Library deserves

particular mention for his assistance with finding sources.

During the early days of this thesis, when I was still in Canberra, I shared my post-graduate

experience with a number of other students and post-doctoral researchers who provided both

companionship and beneficial advice. Thus to Dayton McCarthy, John Connor, Stephen Clarke, Al

Palazzo and Caroline Pappas I express my gratitude. Stephen also passed me some of his notes

iii

regarding mounted troops and the colonial commandants, and my pre-federation chapter is much the

better for it. John’s general helpfulness, good cheer, enthusiasm and knowledge made working in

what was then the School of History much more enjoyable and fruitful.

However the greatest debt is to my wife, Renae. In 1997 she took a chance by following me

to Canberra and has since had to endure a very elongated period waiting for the final product. Her

patience (sorely tested at times) and support have been crucial to the successful conclusion of this

thesis. That she has been able to offer all this while at the same time dealing with the very difficult

problems of owning and running her own businesses, and also study for an MBA, is testimony to her

strength, fortitude, grace and care. She now threatens to do her own PhD and if that occurs perhaps I

will then understand some of what she has been through. I am very lucky to have such a partner in

life.

iv

Abbreviations

1st AH 1st Australian Horse

AC Armoured Car/s

AG Adjutant-General

AAG Assistant Adjutant-General

ADC Aide de Camp

Adjt. Adjutant

ADMS Assistant Director of Medical Services

AHQ Army Headquarters

AIC Australian Instructional Corps

AIF Australian Imperial Force

AIR Australian Infantry Regiment

A&I Staff Administration and Instructional Staff

AMF Australian Military Forces

ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

A&NZ Mtd. Div. Australian & New Zealand Mounted Division

AQMG Assistant Quartermaster-General

Aust. Mtd. Div. Australian Mounted Division

AWM Australian War Memorial/(Record Series)

Bde. Brigade

BM Brigade Major

Bn. Battalion

Brig-Gen. Brigadier-General

Bty. Battery

Capt. Captain

Cav. Div. Cavalry Division

CGS Chief of the General Staff

CMF Commonwealth Military Forces

CO Commanding Officer

Col. Colonel

Col. Off. Colonial Office

Cpl. Corporal

Coy. Company

v

CSC Colonial/Chief Secretary’s Correspondence - NSW

CSO Chief Staff Officer

DAG Deputy Adjutant General

DAQMG Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General

Des. Col. Desert Column

Des. Corps Desert Mounted Corps

Div. Division

DMT Director of Military Training

DQMG Deputy Quartermaster-General

EEF Egyptian Expeditionary Force

FM Field Marshal

Gen. General

GHQ General Headquarters

GOC General Officer Commanding

HQ Headquarters

ICC Imperial Camel Corps

IG Inspector-General

Imp. Mtd. Div. Imperial Mounted Division

LH Bde. Light Horse Brigade

LHR Light Horse Regiment

Lt. Lieutenant

Lt-Col. Lieutenant-Colonel

Lt-Gen. Lieutenant-General

Maj. Major

Maj-Gen. Major-General

MD Military District

NAA(A) National Archives of Australia - Adelaide Office

NAA(C) National Archives of Australia - Canberra Office

NAA(M) National Archives of Australia - Melbourne Office

NCO/NCOs Non-Commissioned Officer/s

NLA National Library of Australia

NSW New South Wales

NSWL New South Wales Lancers

NSWMR New South Wales Mounted Rifles

vi

NZ & A Div. New Zealand and Australian Division

NZEF New Zealand Expeditionary Force

NZMR New Zealand Mounted Rifles

OC Officer Commanding

ORs Other Ranks (ie, all soldiers below the rank of Lieutenant)

Pl. Platoon

PRO-AJCP Public Record Office - Australian Joint Copying Project

PRO-WA Public Record Office of Western Australia

QDF Queensland Defence Force (Pre-Federation)

Qld. Queensland

QM Quartermaster

QMG Quartermaster-General

QMI Queensland Mounted Infantry

QSA Queensland State Archives

Regt. Regiment

RHA Royal Horse Artillery

RMC Royal Military College, Duntroon

RO Regimental Order/s

SA South Australia

SAMR South Australian Mounted Rifles

SASR South Australian State Records

Sen. Senator

Sgt. Sergeant

SRNSW State Records of New South Wales

Sqn. Squadron

SSgt. Staff Sergeant

Tas. Tasmania

TMI Tasmanian Mounted Infantry

TNA:PRO The National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office

Tp. Troop

Tpr. Trooper

Vic. Victoria

VMR Victorian Mounted Rifles

WA Western Australia

vii

WAMI West Australian Mounted Infantry

WO Warrant Officer

Yeo. Mtd. Div. Yeomanry Division

viii

Author’s Note

Throughout its history there was no set way to write or abbreviate titles of the Light Horse,

Light Horse regiments or Light Horse brigades. Different officers and men wrote in reference to

themselves, their units, or their formations, either of the Australian Light Horse, or more simply the

Light Horse. Similarly brigades or regiments described themselves by appending their structural titles

to these two common choices. Abbreviations were presented in a plethora of variations. A regimental

title could be abbreviated, for example, to ALH Regt., Aust. LH, ALHR or LHR, to list just a few.

For ease of reading and a sense of uniformity I have throughout this thesis used only the terms Light

Horse Regiment (abbreviated as LHR), and Light Horse Brigade (abbreviated as LH Bde.).

Similarly during the period the Light Horse existed it was common to describe any officer

holding a command appointment, up to at least brigade command, as the Officer Commanding. At the

risk of anachronism, but in order to maintain clarity, I have instead opted to use the modern

conventions of the Australian Army in describing officers holding command appointments. These

being:

Description Appointment

Commander Brigade or divisional command

Commanding Officer (CO) Unit command (regiment)

Officer Commanding (OC) Sub-unit (squadron)

ix

Key Definitions

This thesis will make continual reference to three types of mounted troops that existed in the

British and dominion military forces of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Unfortunately

they were, and still are, subject to much confusion and ill-considered interchangeability. Though this

thesis will further explain the differences and definitions of them, the following definitions of the

terms within the British imperial context are included to ensure clarity.

Cavalry: Traditional horsed soldiers, usually, but not always, of a professional nature. They

were capable of conducting reconnaissance, outpost duties, attack and defence either mounted and, by

the First World War, dismounted. Their point of differentiation was their extensive training and skill

with a bladed weapon in the form of the cavalry sword or lance. In the years just before the First

World War a process of cavalry reform meant that dismounted action with the rifle (and machine gun)

was considered as important as mounted action with the sword and that either mode of fighting could

be seamlessly taken up without prejudicing the other. By that time also mounted tactics emphasised

fire and manoeuvre, and relatively dispersed formations.

Mounted Infantry: Soldiers that were trained to fight exclusively on foot but which were

provided animals only as a form of locomotion. Their origins were as small ad hoc units raised in

Britain’s colonial wars to provide mobile infantry and to sometimes take up some of the outpost and

reconnaissance duties of cavalry if they were not available. By the First World War, however, they

were strictly defined as mobile infantry to be used in the same tactical way as traditional infantry

except in extremis.

Mounted Rifles: Horsed soldiers often, but not always, of the citizen soldier variety, trained

to undertake the same duties of cavalry, that being reconnaissance, outpost duties, attack and defence,

with a firearm only. Organised along the same lines as cavalry (i.e. in squadrons and regiments rather

than companies and battalions) they were intended as a replacement for cavalry when it was not

available or as a cavalry auxiliary if they were. They existed because of the contemporary debates

about horsemen and firepower, and because creating full cavalrymen from part-time citizen soldiers

was thought to be too difficult. Mounted rifles generally used a simplified cavalry drill and doctrine,

and are best conceived of as a sort of abbreviated cavalry. Though intended for dismounted use they

were not the same as mounted infantry in their tactical application. A mounted rifles unit or formation

was, at best, about half the size of its infantry equivalent and thus could not develop the mass, depth

or firepower of infantry in either the attack or defence. Mounted rifles, like dismounted cavalry,

tended to skirmishing, rapid fire and manoeuvre, surprise attack and putting every available rifle in

the firing line in an attempt to quickly overwhelm the enemy. A long firefight was generally an

anathema and was to be avoided. The differences between mounted rifles and cavalry were small and

during the First World War a number of pre-war mounted rifles organisations, including the Canadian

x

Mounted Rifles, the Yeomanry and most of the Australian Light Horse equipped with the sword and

made the relatively small final step to becoming cavalry.

The difficulty in using these terms, particularly mounted infantry and mounted rifles, was and

is their frequent misuse. Mounted rifles, despite their cavalry like role, have often been

misrepresented as mounted infantry. To confuse the two, however, is to misunderstand their

respective operational employment and underestimate the value that soldiers themselves place on their

role in defining themselves. Others, such as Sir Harry Chauvel, referred to mounted rifles (much more

accurately) as cavalry.1 Compounding the confusion was that in colonial campaigns the distinctions,

most notably during the Boer War, tended to break down. In Australia the demarcations between the

three mounted branches were clearly set out just after federation by the General Officer Commanding,

Major-General Sir Edward Hutton. Unusually, and because of Hutton’s keen interest in the area, this

was somewhat ahead of practice in Great Britain. It was not until just a few years before the First

World War that the British Army introduced similarly clear definitions. Though mounted infantry did

not see service on the Western Front during the First World War it did see employment in the Sinai

and Palestine in the form of the Imperial Camel Corps.

1Lt-Gen. Sir Harry Chauvel, Preface, in H.S. Gullet & Chas. Barrett (eds), Australia in Palestine (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1919), p. ix. In this he wrote: “The disastrous defeat inflicted on the Turkish arms at Romani, and the pursuit which followed, not only demonstrated the inestimable vale of the horsemen of Australasia as cavalrymen...”

1

Introduction

The mounted soldier is one of the most evocative symbols in Australian military history.

Though by no means negligible, the military achievements of such men were restricted largely to the

veld of South Africa, the trenches of Gallipoli, and more famously the sands of the Sinai and the

rocky hills of Palestine. In purely military terms the contribution of the Australian Light Horse to the

general victory in the First World War seems relatively minor compared to the efforts of rest the

Australian Imperial Force (AIF) fighting on the Western Front. There the Australian Corps took part

in some of the largest battles of the war and played their part in the final battles that brought Germany

to seek an armistice. By comparison the campaign in the Middle East was something of strategic

backwater, but it was a seemingly cleaner and less vicious war where the front line moved, where

battles produced more than long casualty lists, and where bravery and boldness might still, as

evidenced by Beersheba, sway the day. The men who fought on the Western Front have hardly been

forgotten, but it was the actions of their mounted military compatriots in the Palestine theatre that,

when combined with a continuing romantic ideal of mounted soldiers, has gone on to capture a

remarkable place in the collective memory.

This memory of the Light Horse has found a number of popular manifestations that no other

arm of the Australian Army has come close to emulating. When the Reserve Bank of Australia chose

to put the visage of the soldier and engineer John Monash on its $100 note, it selected as its key

design elements a field gun with crew, an image of Simpson and his donkey and no less than three

separate images of Light Horsemen. During the First World War Monash commanded first an infantry

brigade, then an infantry division and as the commander of the Australian Corps had no more than

one Light Horse regiment under his hand. That a representation of him should then be surrounded by

mounted men who mostly fought in a completely different theatre, and contain no images of the

infantrymen he did in fact command, is incongruous to say the least, but it does give an idea of how

pervasive is the romance and remembrance of the Light Horse. Similarly in cinema the charge of

Beersheba has been recreated twice for major feature films, first in Charles Chauvel’s 1940

production of Forty Thousand Horsemen and again in 1987 for The Light Horsemen. The Battle of

Beersheba, a one-day affair brought to a dramatic conclusion by a charge by two regiments of Light

Horse, is undoubtedly well suited to a cinematic presentation, but it is interesting to compare this

double telling of a mounted action in Palestine with the complete dearth of film representations of

Australians fighting on the Western Front. The 1980s television mini-series 1915 and Anzacs are as

2

close as anyone has come to doing something similar to treat the infantry and artillery actions of

Gallipoli, France and Belgium. Even Peter Weir’s Gallipoli is constructed around the disastrous

dismounted charge of the men of the Light Horse at the Nek.

Perhaps the most remarkable example of the continuing popular appeal of the Light Horse,

however, is the habit of an apparently growing group of people who spend their weekends taking part

in the activities of Light Horse re-enactment groups. At present there are approximately thirty-five

such groups around the country whose members keep horses, dress in Light Horse uniforms and

spend their spare time tent-pegging, taking part in parades and otherwise ensuring that the Light

Horse is not forgotten.1 These groups operate under the overarching guidance of the Australian Light

Horse Association, which has as its aim: “To preserve the History and Tradition of the Australian

Light Horse and its predecessors.”2 To this end it maintains a web site with a discussion forum,

produces a member magazine, as well as its own manuals of riding and dress. Though there are other

re-enactment groups there seems to be nothing as organised or sizable as that which is trying to

preserve the traditions of the army’s long extinct mounted branch.

Given this popular fervour the historiography of the Light Horse and its predecessors is, if not

thin, then remarkably incomplete. The literature is still dominated by Henry Gullet’s Volume VII of

the Official History, The AIF in the Sinai and Palestine.3 To this book can be added the two, much

dryer, British Official Histories written in the 1920s by George MacMunn and Cyril Falls which deal

with the total efforts of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and, it must be said, are not regularly

referred to by Australian students of the campaign. Gullet’s work, like all the volumes of the Official

History, is a thorough and detailed examination of the contribution of the AIF to the First World War,

however, as was noted some ten years ago of Charles Bean’s volumes it is perhaps “more frequently

referred...to than actually read.”4 The inevitable consequence of which is that, though pervasive, its

influence has possibly now become more impressionistic than detailed. The commonly held, oft

repeated, and incorrect contention that the Light Horse were mounted infantry has a number of

contributing historical threads but the ubiquity of the idea can be traced to an uncritical acceptance of

Gullet’s simplification of the Light Horse’s military role.5

1Phillip Hammond, ‘Civilians Give History a Gallop’, The Courier-Mail, 29 Jun. 2005, p. 19.

2The Australian Light Horse Association Ltd., www.lighthorse.org.au/light.htm

3H.S. Gullett, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. VII: The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914-1918 (St. Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1984, first published 1923).

4‘Bean, Charles’ in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, et.al., The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 89.

5Gullett, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, 1914-1918, p. 29.

3

Alec Hill’s biography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Chauvel, Chauvel of the Light Horse,6

provides a valuable and readable insight into the life of the officer most commonly associated with the

Light Horse. As such it gives much useful incidental detail and revisits the Palestine campaign but as

a biography it understandably does little to advance our knowledge of the broader history of

Australia’s mounted branch. R.J.G. Hall’s small 1968 book, The Australian Light Horse, is a useful

narrative overview of the Light Horse and provides some very valuable appendices tracing the

organisational changes, but provides little beyond this.7 Ian Jones’ volume of the Time-Life series

Australians at War, The Australian Light Horse is based on detailed research into the wartime Light

Horse and is a good introductory book, but targeted at juvenile readers and prone to heroic language it

has its limitations.8 More generally there are a large number of unit histories that can be drawn on by

those with an interest. The first of these are the regimental histories of the AIF units written largely in

the 1920s that vary in quality and scope. Westralian Cavalry in the War, for example, is a worthy

history of the 10th Light Horse Regiment (AIF) and was written by one of the unit’s Commanding

Officers.9 Nulli Secundus does much the same thing for the 2nd Light Horse Regiment (AIF), though

the 1993 history of the 3rd Light Horse Regiment (AIF) is little more than a polished version of the

unit’s war diaries.10 Doug Hunter’s recent My Corps Cavalry is similarly based on war diaries but is

an almost unique example of regimental history with something new to say in that it details the now

obscure history of some of the Light Horsemen who did not fight in Palestine and went to France as

corps mounted troops.11 In this sense it does much to counter the common idea that cavalry on the

Western Front did little more than exercise their horses, direct traffic and escort prisoners.

Covering some of the same territory but also providing a broader view of Australia’s mounted

units are the regimental histories of those units of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps that trace

their lineage through Light Horse and earlier mounted units. David Holloway’s Hooves Wheels and

Tracks is, at some 750 pages of text, a huge work that traces the history of Victoria’s 4th/19th Prince of

6A.J. Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1978).

7 Major R.J.G. Hall, The Australian Light Horse (Blackburn, Vic: W.D. Joynt & Company Pty. Ltd., 1968).

8Ian Jones, The Australian Light Horse: Australians at War (North Sydney: Time-Life Books, 1987).

9Lt-Col. A.C.N. Olden, Westralian Cavalry in the War: The Story of the Tenth Light Horse Regiment, A.I.F., In the Great War, 1914-1918 (Sydney: Bennet, 1985, originally published 1921).

10Lt-Col. G.H. Bourne, ‘Nulli Secundus’: The History of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment, Australian Imperial Force, August 1914 - April 1919 (Swanbourne, WA: John Burridge Military Antiques, 1994, originally published 1926), & Lt-Col. Neil C. Smith, The Third Australian Light Horse Regiment 1914-1918: A Short History and Listing of those Who Served (Gardenvale, Vic: Mostly Unsung Military History Research and Publications, 1993).

11Douglas Hunter, My Corps Cavalry: A History of the 13th Light Horse Regiment 1915-1918 (Rosebud, Vic.: Slouch Hat Publications, 1999).

4

Wales’s Light Horse Regiment from the first mounted units of that colony through to the 1980s.12

Somewhat wordy it nevertheless contains much valuable information on peacetime mounted units, as

does Winty Calder’s much slimmer books on Colonel Tom Price and the Victorian Mounted Rifles.13

P.V. Vernon’s history of the New South Wales Lancers is, compared to Holloway’s work, concise and

eminently readable if sometimes weak in its treatment of the peacetime history of this once grand

citizen regiment.14 Inevitably the quality of such unit histories is uneven and one regimental history

(published in the late 1980s but not listed here) is so riddled with plagiarism as to be useless. The

more successful efforts warmly delve into the regimental records and the recollections of individuals

who had an association with the units but usually stop at war diaries, the official history, and wartime

unit histories. Generally ignored are the masses of other primary sources to be found in archival

repositories and the results are, like so much unit history, often tinged with parochialism, and there are

sometimes significant gaps. Without them, however, this thesis would have been much more difficult

to prepare than it was.

Aside from these sources there is a continuing stream of more popular works that deal with

some aspect of the Light Horse during the Palestine Campaign. Some of this, such as Lindsay Baly’s

Horsemen, pass by is admirable in itself but makes little overall contribution to the historiography.15

The Duchess of Hamilton’s recent First to Damascus draws on romantic traditions and language to

produce a narrative history that does nothing more than perpetuate Light Horse and digger

mythology.16 At the most extreme can be found the barely literate rambling of Col Stringer, an

evangelical pastor whose book title of 800 Horsemen: Australia’s Place in Bible Prophecy neatly

indicates what he sees Light Horse history as being about.17

More reassuringly there is an ever-growing list of scholarly history that deals with the

Australian military experience but not that of the Light Horse specifically. Jeffrey Grey’s A Military

History of Australia is an erudite and effective one volume work even if its brief summary of mounted

12David Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks: A History of the 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment and its Predecessors (Fitzroy: Regimental Trustees, 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment, 1990).

13Winty Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen: Colonel Tom Price and the Victorian Mounted Rifles (Melbourne: Jimaringle Publications, 1985).

14P.V. Vernon (ed), The Royal New South Wales Lancers 1885-1985: Incorporating a Narrative of the 1st Light Horse Regiment AIF 1914-1919 (Parramatta: Royal New South Wales Lancers Centenary Committee, 1986).

15Lindsay Baly, Horsemen, pass by: The Australian Light Horse in World War 1 (East Roseville, NSW: Simon & Shuster, 2003).

16Jill, Duchess of Hamilton, First to Damascus: The Story of the Australian Light Horse and Lawrence of Arabia (East Roseville, Kangaroo Press, 2002).

17Col Stringer, 800 Horsemen, God’s History Makers: Australia’s Place in Bible Prophecy (Robina: Col Stringer Ministries, 1998).

5

operations in Palestine perpetuates the idea that Light Horse were mounted infantry and makes

questionable assertions about the value of cavalry in 1918.18 His volume of the Australian Centenary

History of Defence, The Australian Army, similarly deals with the key aspects of the army’s

development and organisation, as does Al Palazzo’s book of the same year with a similar title, The

Australian Army.19 Craig Wilcox’s PhD thesis and subsequent book, For Hearths and Homes,

underestimates the effects of Universal Training on the Light Horse, but has given a badly needed and

thorough insight into the history of pre-Second World War citizen soldiering.20 His more recent

efforts in writing Australia’s Boer War represents the most authoritative work on that war from an

Australian perspective yet to appear.21

British historians too have produced a number of books and articles that are of use to a

student of the Light Horse. One of the best is Ian Beckett’s The Amateur Military Tradition, which

looks into the history of Britain’s part time soldiers from the sixteenth century through to the end of

the Second World War.22 A vital point of reference for anyone researching part-time citizen soldiers

in the British Empire, his book nevertheless admits that there is much yet to be understood about the

Light Horse’s British equivalent, the Yeomanry. The Marquess of Anglesey’s multi-volume A History

of British Cavalry helps in this regard somewhat by touching on key elements of the Yeomanry’s

existence through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its treatment of these part-time cavalrymen

is, however, intermittent and sometimes as frustrating in its brevity as it is illuminating.23 More

recently Phillip Talbot has provided some colour to Beckett’s sketch of the Yeomanry in the Journal

of the Society for Army Historical Research, though these mounted soldiers still await their dedicated

historian.24 Stephen Millar’s research and writing on Britain’s citizen soldiers and the South African

War of 1899-1902 (or the Boer War) highlights to the knowledgeable student the yet to be fully

investigated parallels between Britain and Australia’s mounted men of that period, as does Will

18Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999 originally published 1990), p. 114.

19Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume 1: The Australian Army (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), & Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001).

20Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945 (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998).

21Craig Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899-1903 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2002).

22Ian Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 23The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of British Cavalry, 1816 to 1919, Volumes 1-8 (London: Leo Cooper, 1973-1997). 24Phillip Talbot, ’The English Yeomanry in the Nineteenth Century and the Great Boer War’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 79:317 (Spring 2001) 45-62.

6

Bennett’s Absent Minded Beggars.25

Among all this work, however, there is yet to appear a history that deals specifically with the

Light Horse as a military organisation through its entire existence. That which does exist is confined

to the Light Horse at war or only goes beyond the war at the regimental level. There has thus far been

no effort to delve into the long term development of Australia’s mounted military forces, to analyse

how they evolved, to consider what place they had in defence thinking, to look at the development of

their doctrine, or to address the way in which they interacted with the society around them. This thesis

is an effort to fill this gap in the historiography and examine the evolution and development of the

Australian Light Horse from the raising of its colonial antecedents in the mid-nineteenth century

through to the disbandment of the last regiment during the Second World War. In doing so it will

consider a number of themes. Key among these is to look at the development of the military role and

doctrine of Australia’s mounted troops. The Light Horse came into existence and had its crowning

military moments at a time when the role and very existence of mounted troops was increasingly

being questioned. As such the thinking that evolved regarding its employment and doctrine reflected

many of the broader trends in military thought from around the British Empire. How such thinking

impacted on the Light Horse and other mounted troops, and what the consequences were, is central to

this thesis.

Also under analysis, and related to the last consideration, is charting the organisational

developments that affected mounted troops from the first hesitant steps in the nineteenth century, to

the establishment of the Light Horse upon federation, through to developments during the First World

War and beyond. Such organisational changes reflected not just doctrinal thinking but also beliefs

about what place mounted soldiers had in schemes for Australia’s defence and expeditionary forces.

For much of the late nineteenth century and during the first years after federation mounted units were

seen as central to military planning because of the way in which they blended mobility with the rifle

based firepower that dominated battlefields of the time. This centrality to defence planning did not

last but, in combination with the demands from the War Office, it meant that Australia’s contribution

to the Boer War was almost exclusively one of providing mounted riflemen to fight on the veld. By

the time of the First World War defence planning had returned infantry to its rightful place as the

centre of force structures, but the Light Horse remained important. When the war came their

organisation into divisions in a theatre where mobility still counted meant they still had a useful role

to play. Organisational changes after the war reflected both the lessons of the Palestine and Western

Front campaigns as well as a growing realisation that mechanised forces were going to play an

increasingly important place on the battlefields of the future. When that future arrived further reforms

25Stephen Miller, ‘In Support of the “Imperial Mission”? Volunteering for the South African War’ Journal of Military History, 69:3 (2005), 691-713, & Will Bennett, Absent Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 1999). It should be noted that Craig Wilcox’s work, at least, has taken up some of these comparative challenges.

7

to the Light Horse had to be considered and addressed.

Not coincidental to the important place allocated to mounted troops before and just after

federation was a common belief that mounted soldiering was Australia’s military forte. That the men

of the bush, already capable of providing a horse and riding it well, could be given a rifle and the

barest military training before being able to outfight an invader or the hidebound regulars of Britain’s

imperial enemies. Such ideas proved largely fanciful but remained part of the martial mythology, and

how these ideas affected military thinking will be analysed. As will the way this mythology came

about, and how the Light Horse and other mounted troops both represented and interacted with the

wider society from which they came.

To undertake this analysis this thesis will take a broadly chronological approach and the first

chapter to deal with Australia’s mounted troops will look at the first colonial units of the nineteenth

century and trace their developments until the eve of federation. Following this a chapter on the South

African War of 1899-1902 analyses the nature of the Australian contribution to this war and what

lessons were, or were not, learned in regard to the modern employment of mounted troops. This war

had a profound impact on the post-federation military structures, and how the nation’s various

mounted units were recast into the Light Horse under the command of a determined and opinionated

senior officer is the subject of Chapter 4. The creation of the Light Horse was not without its

difficulties and the way in which it and the other defence structures were put in place just after

federation soon caused their own problems. For the Light Horse too there was a gradual realisation

that, despite the lessons of South Africa, mounted troops may not have been the best troops to make

the centrepiece of defence planning and there followed a period of change and adjustment. Chapter 5

will examine these adjustments as well as a series of organisational and doctrinal challenges the Light

Horse faced in the years just before the First World War.

At this point the thesis will break its chronological order to take a thematic look at the social

aspects of mounted troops, their units and the wider society up to 1914. This chapter will also appraise

the ideas surrounding horse soldier mythology as well as the role that mounted units played in aid to

the civil power actions in the late colonial period. The next section, Chapter 7, will return to the

chronology and examine the experience of the Light Horse during the First World War. Aside from

the organisational and operational aspects it will give extended consideration to the tactical lessons

learned on campaign and how those lessons either supported or disproved many of the ideas that had

been percolating regarding the employment and place of mounted troops in modern warfare. What

impact, if any, these lessons had on the post-war citizen Light Horse in Australia is a key subject of

the final chapter, as is how the Light Horse did and did not respond to the increasing imperative of

modernisation and mechanisation during the inter-war period.

What must, however, be kept in mind throughout this thesis is that the Light Horse, for all its

obvious national characteristics, was also a local manifestation of empire wide doctrinal and

organisational ideas on mounted troops in the British, colonial and, later, dominion militaries. The

8

nature of these ideas and how they affected the Light Horse and other Australian mounted troops is

central to this thesis. As alluded to above, the Light Horse existed during a period that proved to be

horsed cavalry’s last years as a significant part of the military landscape. By the middle of the

twentieth century horsed cavalry, apart from a few isolated examples, had been consigned to history.

Such a development had been foreshadowed as long ago as the middle of the nineteenth century when

the rifle had first replaced the musket as the standard infantry weapon. The result was that in the years

before the First World War there was an ongoing, and at times heated, debate about the future of

mounted soldiering. This debate was firstly about whether horsed soldiers could even continue to exist

on increasingly dangerous battlefields, and secondly, that if they could, what methods of operational

and tactical action they should use. Until the invention, perfection and the successful military

application of the internal combustion engine the answer to the former question was that only horse

mounted soldiers could provide the necessary battlefield mobility. The latter question, however,

proved much more difficult to answer. As to whether cavalry could still engage in charge tactics

seemed in doubt, though wars continued to provide enough examples to suggest that dismissing them

completely may be rash. Would be reformers of various guises came to the opinion that cavalry

should dispose of their swords and lances and embrace modern firepower as an alternative to shock

action. That Britain had found hastily raised ad hoc mounted units equipped only with rifles useful in

its many colonial wars added another dimension to the debate. Despite frequent appearances to the

contrary, this debate was far from completely polarised and views varied widely from the extremes of

either end to the full spectrum of opinions in-between. Perhaps the most influential were those who

believed that cavalry could use both shock and fire tactics and become what one British historian,

Stephen Badsey, has termed a cavalry ‘hybrid’.26 Because the Light Horse existed during the time this

debate was occurring, and because it was in many ways an antipodean extension of an imperial

military organisation, these arguments had a direct impact on the development of Australia’s mounted

troops, and in the work to follow there is much discussion about doctrine and cavalry action as it

applied to Australia’s military experience.

Reflecting this state of affairs, and to outline many of the key ideas of cavalry and other

mounted troops that were being debated during the Light Horse’s existence, this thesis will begin with

a chapter dealing with these debates within the British Army (broadly defined to embrace the empire)

and what they meant for the development of mounted troops in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries.

26Stephen Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword: The British Army and the Arme Blanche Controversy, 1871 - 1921', PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981. passim.

9

Chapter 1 British Cavalry Doctrinal Debates

1860-1915

By the end of the nineteenth century the position of cavalry on the European battlefield was

by no means certain. The adoption of new, more accurate and longer ranged, firearm technology cast

a shadow over the role and place of horse mounted soldiers. What should be done in response to such

developments proved to be a hotly debated subject in both Britain and elsewhere right up to the eve of

the First World War. As with most such debates there was to be found the full spectrum of opinions.

Some die-hard traditionalists were dismissive of any need for change. Other cavalrymen saw the need

for reform though how much reform was needed or what shape it should take generally depended on

individual views and experience. There were others, of varying degrees of radicalism, who believed

that traditional cavalry was an unredeemable anachronism and that though horsemen still had a place

in battle, it should be in a significantly different form. The debates revolved around different ideas of

how or if the traditional cavalry charge should continue to be used, and more significantly whether

cavalry should in some way embrace the new rifled firepower being developed.

The idea that a horseman might be combined with the power of gunpowder in some way was

not a new one. For a time in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cavalry had largely abandoned

charges with bladed weapons, otherwise known as the arme blanche, and evolved drills such as the

caracole, that aimed to replace shock action with complex evolutions designed to bring pistol or

carbine fire to bear on enemy formations. A comparatively ineffective tactic, it was eventually done

away with when it was realised that it was the shock of a mass of horsed soldiers carrying bladed

weapons attempting to ride down the enemy that did more damage.1 The dragoon too had been an

early attempt to combine the mobility that a horseman enjoyed with the utility of the musket-equipped

infantryman. In theory at least, infantrymen made more mobile by the addition of horses could move

quickly to avert a battlefield disaster or cap a victory. The dragoon emerged in the middle of the

sixteenth century and would remain, in name at least, part of the European battlefield until after the

end of the Napoleonic wars, but the notion that infantry could use horses or that horsemen could act as

infantry was one that did not sit easy with European armies.

There were a number of reasons for this but key among them were social factors. European

1 The re-emergence of shock tactics dates to the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Gustavus Adolfus ordered his cavalry to form three ranks and gallop into the ranks of the enemy with cold steel after the front rank delivered a pistol volley. Hans Delbruck, The Dawn of Modern Warfare: The History of the Art of Warfare, Vol. 4. trans. by Walter Renfroe Jr. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), passim, (originally published 1920) The practice was also revived during the English Civil War and used by Cromwell.

10

cavalry had managed to maintain some of the romantic and social aura that had been associated with

the medieval mounted man-at-arms. It was an aura most closely associated with heavy cavalry, a type

of force that since their resurgence in the late seventeenth century was designed to attack the enemy

by shock action with the sword or lance. The charge of massed ranks of heavy horsemen, still often

partly armoured, evoked a notion of chivalric glory and tended to attract as its officers men of a higher

social standing and greater wealth who could afford the time and supply the chargers needed of a

horsed officer.2 The general view of these cavalrymen was that putting infantry on horseback, by

implication, sullied the reputation of cavalry, as would making cavalry get off their horses to use a

firearm. This social prestige created among dragoons, as well as light cavalry, the desire to emulate as

much as possible the heavy cavalry. The result was that as time went on “whatever new roles had

been found for the cavalry...had been gradually abandoned and the regiments concerned grew into the

likeness of the socially superior, sartorially more ornate heavy cavalry...”3 This likeness eventually

incorporated the required tactics so that gradually dragoons often also saw their battlefield purpose as

being able to deliver a massed charge rather than being a type of mounted infantry.4

There were also technical difficulties in making use of dragoons. For some there was a

psychological incompatibility and questions were raised about the difficulty of trying to integrate two

modes of fighting in one soldier. The French Napoleonic veteran, General Rogniat, was moved to

exclaim:

How absurd is the manner of training our Dragoons! When mounted they are taught that no infantry can resist the impetuosity of the their charges; when drilling on foot they are taught to consider themselves invulnerable against cavalry. It is from these causes they are despised by both Horse and Foot.5

The problem of being a ‘jack of all trades and a master of none’ was often exacerbated when

on campaign by the necessity to often also undertake the light cavalryman’s tasks of reconnaissance

and skirmishing. Dragoons also suffered from a limitation with their weapons. The short range of the

2It was an attraction that cavalry managed to maintain for a long time yet. In 1915 Field Marshal Sir John French, the British Army's top cavalryman, most vocal cavalry defender, and at this time Commander of the British Army in France, felt of cavalry officers that "I think their officers are better" [italics in source] due to their social background. See Richard Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, Sir John French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), p. 156.

3Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1968), p. 8

4Ibid., pp. 7-9.

5Cited in Wood, Gen. Sir Evelyn. Achievements of Cavalry with a Chapter on Mounted Infantry (London: George Bell & Sons, 1897), pp. 243-4. General Rogniat was a Napoleonic Engineer who, in 1817, wrote Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre and who was also a figure in nineteenth century French military debates and the fortification of the French frontier. See: Paddy Griffith, Military Thought in the French Army, 1815-51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).

11

dragoon’s smooth-bore musket meant that, if fighting dismounted, the critical stage of the battle

would come at relatively close quarters. If forced to disengage they then faced the prospect of moving

to the rear to their handled horses before mounting and beginning their move away, during which

period they would be highly vulnerable to being overrun.6 In combination these factors militated

against the dragoon so that, in the British Army at least, by the late eighteenth century to be a dragoon

was to simply be a heavy cavalryman.

The place of the heavy cavalry and their preferred tactic of the mass knee to knee-to-charge

was, however, dramatically called into question in the mid-nineteenth century by a revolution in

firearm technology that was to last until the beginning of the twentieth century and reach its apogee

with the widespread adoption of the machine gun. It began on the eve of the Crimean War with the

invention of a new bullet by the Frenchman, Charles Claude Minie, and the resulting general adoption

of the rifle soon after by European armies.7 In the age of the smooth bore musket attacking cavalry

would most likely face one, probably largely inaccurate, volley from defending infantry in their

attempt to charge home. Now faced with ever improving rifled weapons with a far greater range and

accuracy, cavalry would have to survive more accurate fire for a greater amount of time over a far

greater range in order to ride down infantry.8 The rifle clearly gave more firepower to the defender

but it was still a matter of conjecture what impact this would have on cavalry.

It has become a common assertion that traditional cavalry played almost no part in the

American Civil War and that virtually every mounted soldier effectively fought that conflict as a

mounted rifleman. That on both sides they fought, more often than not, dismounted with a rifled

carbine and when mounted they preferred the new revolver. This was, however, only partly the case.

During the early stages of the war many American cavalrymen seemed to think the sword little more

than an encumbrance and preferred their firearms.9 British military men who made their way to

America to observe the war tended to be unimpressed. Lieutenant-Colonel James Fremantle,

Coldstream Guards, wrote:

6Colonel George T. Denison, A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times: With Lessons for the Future (Reprint of Macmillan 1913 2nd ed. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 430-2. (1st edition published 1877.)

7 W.H.B. Smith & Joseph E. Smith, Small Arms of the World: A Basic Manual of Military Small Arms. 7th ed. (Harrisburg, Penn.: The Stackpole Company, 1962), p. 23. The Minie bullet and rifling system was introduced into British Service in 1851. Minie received £20 000 for it from the British Army.

8Conical in shape and small enough in its pre-fired state to slide down a rifle barrel like a musket ball, and thus capable of being fired at the same rate as a smooth bore musket, the Minie bullet had a steel cap in its base. When the weapon was fired the expansion of the gases forced the steel cap into the base of the lead bullet thus expanding the bullet to the diameter of the barrel and allowing the bullet to grip the rifling of the barrel. This meant the bullet made full use of the expanding gases trapped behind it and could be imparted with spin by the rifling of the barrel, thus greatly improving range and accuracy.

9Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Denison, Modern Cavalry: Its Organisation, Armament and Employment in War (London: Thomas Bosworth, 1868), pp. 61-7.

12

Every impartial man confesses that these cavalry fights are miserable affairs. Neither party has any idea of serious charging with the sabre. They approach one another with considerable boldness until they get within about forty yards, and then, at the very moment when a dash is necessary, and the sword alone should be used, they hesitate, halt, and commence a desultory fire with carbines and revolvers...Stuart’s cavalry can hardly be called cavalry in the European sense of the word.10

Another British observer contemptuously declared that American “cavalry on both sides, but more

especially the Northerns [sic], are merely mounted infantry.”11 Captain (later General Sir Richard)

Harrison felt “they looked more like a disorganised mob of infantry, than the cavalry they are meant

to represent.”12 Critics, often adherents of the idea that cavalry should use shock, not fire, tactics,

tended to dismiss the American Civil War and its lessons as aberrations that resulted from the unique

circumstances of the American volunteer armies and their peculiar natural environment.13 This was

partly true of American cavalry. The volunteer nature of their armies did not easily permit the time-

consuming and intensive task of producing highly trained conventional cavalry but as the war

progressed so did American cavalry. In the early 1890s a member of General J.E.B. Stuart’s staff

wrote to a senior British cavalryman who was frustrated at the characterisation of American cavalry as

mobile infantry:

I confess to be rather surprised that military men of such science as you name in your letter should be of the opinion, that the cavalry as well of the Southern as of the Northern States during the last great American struggle, had been regarded on both sides exclusively as mounted infantry and had been mostly used as such...[J.E.B.] Stuart delighted in the charge with sabres drawn...I have conversed with many officers and men who took an active part in the cavalry fights of the other prominent cavalry leaders of the South...and I know that these Generals led their men in many glorious charges against cavalry as well as infantry...I am not at all averse to the use of cavalry as sharpshooters.14

Some claimed that the lessons from that war could be dismissed due to the peculiar local

factors but others were aroused by the way that the Americans had made effective strategic use of the

mounted soldier. Formations of cavalrymen equipped with firearms and accompanied by horse

artillery had operated independently and mounted large raids deep into enemy territory, or had

10Cited in Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 21.

11Cited in ibid., p. 28.

12Cited in ibid.

13Ibid., p. 46.

14Heros von Borcke, member of J.E.B. Stuart's staff, cited in Badsey, 'Fire and the Sword’, pp. 112-3.

13

operated separate from, but in support of, another force. Being equipped with effective firearms had

meant they also generally withstood any effort to destroy them.

It was this combination of strategic mobility and the way that American mounted troops had

dealt with the problem of increased firepower that inspired the production of the first British work

exhorting substantial cavalry reform by Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Denison.15 His 1868

publication of Modern Cavalry propounded a reassessment of the place of cavalry:

The improvements which have taken place of late years in the weapons of modern soldiers have rendered necessary a certain amount of change in the tactics of the different branches of the service; and the following pages are written with the view of advocating certain alterations in the organisation, armament, and employment of cavalry in modern warfare.16

At the time Commander of the Governor-General’s Body Guard in Canada, Denison had

corresponded with a number of American cavalry officers from the Civil War and, after combining

these with his own observations and analysis of that war and the subsequent wars of the 1860s in

Germany, had concluded that whilst modern firearms had greatly improved the value and power of

infantry and artillery, cavalry had yet to learn how to make use of the advantages these weapons

offered and should do so quickly lest its battlefield value decrease beyond any reasonable value.17 He

felt cavalry organisation and tactics must be altered to take into account the changing circumstances

of warfare so that the arm could again become the “most powerful, as well as the most useful, portion

of the armies.”18 Correctly recognising that it was speed and mobility that still made horse mounted

soldiers useful, and citing Napoleon’s dictum that any body of troops would be twice as effective if

could move at twice the speed, he claimed that cavalry still had a vital role to play.19 The majority of

cavalry should, however, be made up of mounted riflemen who still possessed speed of manoeuvre

15Denison was preceded by Sir Henry Havelock who discussed cavalry reforms in his Three Main Military Questions of the Day, published in 1867, and by Captain L.E. Nolan in 1853 with his Cavalry: its History and Tactics. Havelock advocated using mounted riflemen, but Nolan was essentially a traditionalist and his efforts to encourage reform had more to do with modifying horse management and the method of handling mounted squadrons than in trying to change the fundamental way cavalry worked. Nolan later had the dubious honour of being the first man killed in the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava after playing a controversial, if unclear, role in the transmission of the order to charge. See: H. Moyse-Bartlett, Louis Edward Nolan and his Influence on British Cavalry (London: Leo Cooper, 1971), passim. For Havelock see: A.W. Preston, 'British Military Thought, 1856-90', Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 80:1 (1964) 66.

16Denison, Modern Cavalry, p. v.

17Ibid., p. xvii. Denison's book includes as an appendix a selection of letters written to the author by American respondents. These are identified as Colonel Jenyn, General Fitzhugh Lee, Stephen D. Lee, General Thomas L. Rosser and a fifth writer, listed only as a 'General Officer of the CSA.'

18Ibid., p. xx.

19Ibid., pp. 10-1.

14

but who were capable of defending a position, acting in all forms of terrain and of attacking an

entrenched enemy position.20 Still, he was a reformer, not a revolutionary, and qualified this with the

statement that “there can be no doubt that it is carrying the principle too far to say that these

improvements are to do away with cavalry proper for ever.”21 Whilst it was generally clear that

modern infantry had firepower on its side he still believed that:

[W]hen the ground is open and clear, when there are no obstacles to prevent the rush of the advancing squadrons, no shelter behind which infantry can protect themselves, but a fair field between the two arms, then cavalry carefully trained, properly armed, and with a strong esprit de corps, riding at infantry will, with their minds made up to go in, will always succeed...The shock should be as the crash of the thunderbolt, and although many may fall, all will not, and the survivors will win a glorious victory, and amply avenge their comrades.22

That this was still a possibility on a conventional European battlefield was further questioned

following the experiences of cavalry in subsequent wars across the Atlantic. Traditionally infantry

used hollow square formations to repel cavalry attacks. By doing so they created a block of fire and

bayonets that cavalry found difficult to destroy. At the Battle of Gitchen in the Austro-Prussian War

of 1866, however, Prussian infantry, equipped with the Dreyse breech loading rifle, were happy to

dispatch an attack by Austrian Hussars using only the fire effect of their rifles in the line formation

traditionally used only against infantry.23 The experience was to be recreated regularly in the Franco-

Prussian War.24

Cavalry made only one successful major charge during that war. During the afternoon of 16

August 1870 at Mars-la-Tour the commander of the German III Corps, Constantin von Alvensleben,

faced with a growing French force, being pounded by French artillery and out of infantry reserves,

called on the cavalry brigade of Major-General von Bredow to charge the French guns and ease the

pressure on his corps. Von Bredow’s six squadrons used a covered approach that led them to within a

20Ibid., p. 11.

21Ibid., p. 72.

22Ibid., pp. 162-3. Denison believed the correct weapons for troops trained as “cavalry proper” was a sword or lance as the primary weapon for the charge, with a revolver for use in the melee. p. 73. It was a view that changed in his next book published in 1877.

23Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 397, & Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword', p. 29.

24For example German infantry received a French cavalry charge by about 1000 horsemen at the Battle of Woerth without changing from their line formation, ibid., p. 405. It was a tactic quickly becoming part of recognised doctrine. For example, the British Army infantry manual of 1870 informed its readers that receiving cavalry in line was a correct tactic providing it was on ground where there was no chance of cavalry suddenly appearing (eg. a plain). Field Exercises & Evolutions of Infantry as revised by Her Majesty's Command, 1870 (Sydney: Thomas Richards, Government Printer, 1870). The same instructions were issued as part of the 1884 & 1885 revisions of the manual.

15

few hundred yards of the enemy and successfully charged the French gun line, and its already

weakened infantry support, until checked by two brigades of French cavalry. The charge had achieved

its aim but the cost had been high. Von Bredow’s Death Ride, as it became known, had commenced

with about 800 soldiers, of which only 420 returned.25 More typical of the war had been the charges

made earlier in the day by French Lancers and Cuirassiers. Two regiments, one of each, had attempted

to charge the German infantry who with a “few volleys reduced each splendid unit in turn to a line of

kicking, bloodstained heaps...”26 Von Bredow’s charge had been a success, but a costly one, and it

would become a matter of keen debate whether it was proof of what cavalry could still accomplish or

evidence that neither new tactics nor bravery would “compensate for the enormous superiority of the

breachloader [sic] when in the hands of a brave and well-trained infantry...”27

Charging infantry was proving to be a much more difficult proposition than hitherto, but

cavalry had performed some other very valuable service in 1870. During the advance into France,

German cavalry had proved their worth by conducting thorough reconnaissance and screening duties

ahead of the main German armies. It was one of the traditional roles of cavalry and so successful had

they been, and so poor at the same job had been their mounted opponents, that the French rarely knew

where the Germans were, let alone what they were up to. Students of the war pointed to this success

and it was this role that would become the chief cavalry raison d’etre for the next fifty years. It was a

lesson that made it across the English Channel. Colonel Lumley Graham, in his 1872 translator’s

preface for A.V. Boguslawski’s Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, told his English

readers that cavalry’s “...chief vocation [is] now... not to fight, but to secure the army of surprise, to

cover its operations preparatory and subsequent to battle, to reconnoitre, to gain information and to

harass the enemy.”28 As part of this role there was an implicit requirement to be able to fight for

information or to overcome low-level localised resistance. With their reliance on the arme blanche it

had been this that Prussian cavalry had been unable to do well in the Franco-Prussian War. Both

Boguslawski and his translator were clear in their belief that cavalry should be armed with long range

firearms and trained to use them efficiently whilst dismounted. By doing so cavalry would be able to

meet any type of enemy on equal terms.

Denison had much the same message in 1877 with his second book on cavalry. A History of

Cavalry from Earliest Times: With Lessons for the Future took into account what he saw as the

lessons of the Franco-Prussian War and emphatically stated that infantry now had the ascendancy, and

25Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, pp. 156-7.

26Ibid., p. 156.

27Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, pp. 35-6, & A.V Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, trans. by Colonel Lumley Graham (London: Harry S. King & Co., 1872), p. 94.

28Colonel Lumley Graham, 'Translator's Preface' to ibid. p. xv.

16

that cavalry must "...give up attempting to apply an old and exploded system... now that the conditions

which alone made it so successful in the past have all changed."29 He too propounded the idea that the

main value of cavalry was in carrying out reconnaissance and outpost duties and pointed out that

German cavalry only lost its effectiveness in the latter stages of the war when French resistance had

become little more than the guerilla style war of the franc tireurs. In this stage of the war, Denison

believed, German cavalry would have maintained its effectiveness if it had been equipped and trained

to use a modern firearm capable of equaling the French chassepot. This was a lesson the German

army should have learnt from North America.

A careful study of the method of arming and employing cavalry in the American Civil War should have shown the Germans that if their horsemen had been armed with rifles or carbines they could have done equally well or better all that they performed in the early part of the war, and would have been fully capable of coping with all that the Franc tireurs that they were likely to meet in warfare.30

In light of the recent wars Denison repeated the recommendation from his earlier book and

asserted that three-quarters of a modern cavalry force should be made up of light cavalry of a mounted

rifle type. These mounted rifles would be used in the classic light cavalry roles of gathering

information, convoying, screening and protecting the main force of an army; as well as Denison’s

evidently favourite American Civil War action - the cavalry raid.31 When battle was joined these

troops would be used to make turning movements, fight dismounted in the defence and be prepared to

take up another classic cavalry manoeuvre, the pursuit.32 All this would be done in conjunction with

the "cavalry proper" that would make up the other quarter of the cavalry force. As in his first book,

Denison still felt that traditional cavalry would occasionally be useful on the battlefield. In contrast,

however, he abandoned his previous position in regard to their armament and argued that the arme

blanche should be done away with and be replaced with the revolver. He based this on the traditional

belief that the real weapon in a cavalry attack was the charge itself and the shock it produced, but he

also claimed that in the ensuing melee the sword or lance were relatively ineffective weapons.33 He

claimed the pistol was a much more lethal weapon at close range than any form of bladed weapon,

and produced some remarkable evidence to support it.

Denison began with the official figures produced by the German medical staff from the

29Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 418.

30Ibid., p. 413.

31Ibid., p. 439.

32Ibid., pp. 438-40.

33Ibid., pp. 420-9.

17

Franco-Prussian War. Out of a German total of 65 150 killed and wounded, 218 were casualties of

sabres and clubbed muskets, of which six were killed. In the German cavalry, of 2236 casualties only

138 were due to the sabre. Therefore, in all "the cavalry fighting at Woerth, at Vionville [Mars-la-

Tour], at Sedan, in the battles in the Loire and in the Northern provinces; in all the outpost service,

extending over almost half of France, the only deaths caused by 40 000 cavalry with the sabre, in six

months campaigning....", amounted to, at most, six deaths!34 This was compared to a relatively small

example of a single cavalry battle in the American Civil War where pistols were the primary weapon.

A Confederate guerilla cavalry force of about a hundred men, serving under a Colonel Mosby,

attacked a Federal cavalry force of about the same strength in Virginia in 1864. The Federal losses

were twenty-four men killed, twelve wounded and sixty-two prisoners and horses.35 Denison, drawing

on these examples and others, was increasingly scornful of the value of the arme blanche as a both a

physical and moral weapon:

The writer has heard the sneer made that the American cavalry would not charge boldly with the sabre, and that the reason that they did not use that method of fighting was because they dreaded the cold steel. We would ask the reader which system, tested by the results, is the most deadly, or requires the most pluck - that in which, in a paltry skirmish of a few minutes duration, 24 men were killed out of 100, or that in use in the Franco-German War, in which the deaths from the sabre in six months' campaigning, amounted to an average of one a month, out of 60,000 cavalry?36

The sword still had a place as a secondary weapon, Denison argued, but "cavalry proper" should use

the pistol in the charge, and elsewhere, as its primary arm.37 For Denison the firearm was the key to

cavalry both retaining its traditional role and to staking a claim on the battlefield of the future. It was

an argument that had a mixed reception and the idea that the pistol was good substitute for the arme

blanche would never gain much support. More generally those with more a reactionary bent would

dismiss his arguments. Others considered it and used it as tool in their efforts to reform Britain’s

mounted troops. Also under consideration was a series of uniquely British experiences gained by its

continual colonial campaigning.38

Mounted soldiers in the colonies performed different roles from those who stayed in Britain

preparing for the next European war. In the colonies the British Army was faced with the dilemma of

34Ibid., p. 426.

35Ibid., p. 423 & 426.

36Ibid., p. 426. Denison also drew on examples of other battles where major cavalry exchanges had taken place with only a paltry number of casualties produced. ibid., pp. 423-6.

37Ibid., pp. 427-8.

38Hew Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, 1815-1854 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 88-90.

18

patrolling and controlling often very large tracts of territory, usually with a minimum of manpower at

its disposal. Because cavalry regiments were expensive to maintain this task, as often as not, fell to

infantry regiments. But the necessity of having horse mounted troops remained and in order to cover

these large expanses local commanders and Governors often used the expedient of mounting part or

all of an infantry unit to accomplish the task.39 In Australia a portion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot was

mounted on horses as early as 1825 to combat bushrangers and it was a practice often used in the

Cape Colony.40 The light company of the 75th was mounted in the Cape in 1835 to be followed by a

company of the Rifle Brigade in 1846-7, and the 45th Foot in 1849-50. It was here in 1827 that the

first dedicated mounted rifle unit in the British Army was raised when the Cape Mounted Rifles was

formed out of the mounted elements of the Cape Regiment. They were:

[A] well mounted and very serviceable corps, well adapted for the work which they were intended, viz., skirmishing and patrolling through the large tracts of country which we included in our frontier possessions....They wore a rifle uniform, with the addition of cavalry accoutrements, and were armed with double barrelled Victoria carbines...A cavalry sword completed their equipment. They were taught to act mounted and dismounted as occasion required, [and] were admirable skirmishers...41

Cavalry too were compelled to vary their methods when on colonial service. Sent to Canada in 1838

the 7th Hussars and the King’s Dragoon Guards were issued with carbines and the commanding officer

of the latter regiment stressed the importance of skirmishing and outpost duties for cavalry.42

Similarly the 7th Dragoon Guards were issued rifles and bayonets for their Cape service in 1843 and

reportedly became highly efficient as de facto mounted infantry.43 Colonial garrisons mounted on

horseback and equipped with a firearm could patrol more widely and more quickly. They were well

suited to the type of skirmishing that usually took place with colonial malcontents and natives, and

enabled a generally over-stretched British Army to employ whatever troops were at hand.

The reason that mounted soldiers equipped with a rifle were so useful in the colonies was that,

as Denison had pointed out, the rifle could give the horseman a battlefield presence that the arme

blanche never could. British colonial experience and the American Civil War had demonstrated that

mounted troops equipped with rifles and accompanied by artillery could operate independently and

39Ibid., p. 88.

40 Peter Stanley, The Remote Garrison: The British Army in Australia 1788-1870 (Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1986), p. 32.

41T.J. Lucas, Camp Life and Sport in South Africa: Experiences of Kaffir Warfare with the Cape Mounted Rifles (Johannesburg: Afracana Book Society, 1975 reprint of 1878 ed.), pp. 49-50. This is a description of the regiment from about 1848 but it appears applicable to the spirit and form of the unit in earlier days.

42Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava, pp. 88-9.

43Ibid., p. 89.

19

make up large columns to launch themselves deep into enemy territory. Alternatively they could

operate separately from, but in support of, another force. Being equipped with effective firearms

meant that they were more likely to withstand efforts to destroy them or could attack any type of force

of appropriate size. The ability to operate independently and swiftly over long ranges was a vital

element to the British requirements for keeping control in its colonial possessions and this made the

idea of self sufficient ad hoc mounted infantry units quite attractive.44 As General Sir Evelyn Wood

put it in 1897:

There can be no doubt that, for the British Army, which must necessarily be employed more frequently in savage warfare, and over extensive tracts of country, such as are found in South Africa, trained and picked Mounted Infantry will prove of immense advantage, to the Army generally, in the future as it has done in the past...45

Mounted infantry had proved to be of value in the Zulu War of 1879, the first Boer War of 1881 and

the Egyptian War of 1882. In these locations it had primarily been a case where 'the legitimate cavalry

[had] to be arranged for, and where any available means on the spot [had] necessarily to be utilised for

that purpose."46

From these colonial experiences and experiments there were efforts to apply a new

nomenclature to the different forms of mounted soldier that were beginning to appear in the British

Army and its colonial offshoots. Cavalry was a term applied to the type of organisation it had for

centuries, that is, mounted squadrons that were armed primarily with the arme blanche. Though in its

various forms it could be made responsible for the wide variety of tasks that cavalry traditionally

fulfilled, it trained with the mounted charge as its primary action. Mounted rifles was a term used

most often to describe troops that, though equipped primarily with a rifle, was designed to be used in

the traditional roles of the light cavalry - such as skirmishing, scouting and screening. Mounted

infantry was traditionally just that: regular infantry mounted as an expedient for a particular duty or

campaign. Organised on traditional infantry unit guidelines, for these troops the horse, or whatever

other form of beast they were given, was simply a means of speedy locomotion from which they

would alight to fight the battle as standard infantry. Unfortunately for all concerned the terms of

mounted rifles and mounted infantry were terms subject to confusion, were often used

interchangeably, and were the subject of much confusion and abuse by partisans in the debates. That

the roles of the two branches often overlapped in campaigns where there were no other mounted

troops available and where mounted infantry had to fulfill the role of cavalry or mounted rifles made

44Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 103.

45Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, p. 250.

46Major. E.T.H. Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', Journal of the Royal United Service Institute XXX:CXXXV (1886), 696.

20

it all the more difficult.

The early ad hoc arrangements for mounted infantry on campaign had been sufficient for

some time but with its colonial commitments, and with a cautious eye on the possible utility of

mounted infantry in European warfare, the British Army became increasingly interested in

formalising the mounted infantry organisations. The calls began early but it was some time before the

reality caught up.47 It was 1888 before the then Adjutant-General, Viscount Wolseley, originally

sceptical about mounted infantry, but by now something of an enthusiast influenced by Denison,48

established two schools of mounted infantry in Britain for the training of infantry detachments drawn

from regular army battalions.49 The detachments trained at the schools before returning to their

battalions where they could be drawn upon should a campaign require it. Wolseley had concluded that

an army possessing mounted infantry "and whose leaders know how to handle it, will have an

enormous advantage over an army that adheres exclusively to the stereotyped employment of cavalry,

infantry and artillery."50 He was concerned, however, that if cavalry was to be recast, even partly, as

mounted riflemen then they would fall into the old dragoon trap of being a "jack of all trades and a

master of none". In Wolseley’s vision a strong independent corps of mounted infantry could be

created from the volunteer cavalry forces that had been established in the early 1860s in response to a

French war scare.51 Many of the mounted corps of the Volunteer movement were already established

as Mounted Rifle Volunteers, and their contemporaries, the Light Horse Volunteers, were similar

organisations.52 Additionally, he believed, mounted infantry units could be quickly made up from the

men of the militia, volunteer infantry and from those with previous military experience.53 Though it

was not done before the Boer War, at least one other keen mounted infantry proponent was also

advocating the conversion of the Yeomanry, traditionally militia cavalry, into mounted rifles.54

47General Sir Evelyn Wood claimed to have been calling for the establishment of a permanent mounted infantry corps as early as 1874. Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, p. 247.

48Preston, 'British Military Thought, 1856-90', p. 66.

49Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, p. 50. The schools were at Aldershot and Curragh.

50Comments by Viscount Wolseley in Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', p. 737.

51Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, p. 50.

52William Y, Carmen, Light Horse Volunteers and Mounted Rifle Volunteers 1860-1901 (Farnham, Surrey: Arrow Press, 1995), p. 2-3. The first Mounted Rifle Volunteer corps had appeared in about 1860 and evidently took as their inspiration the Cape Mounted Rifles. The first Light Horse Volunteers followed soon after and were similar, though they evidently felt themselves to be a bit more 'cavalry'. Though both types carried swords only the latter only carried carbines whilst the former focussed on their rifles.

53Comments by Viscount Wolseley in Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', p. 736.

54Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', p. 708-9. It was an idea that Yeomanry were not terribly keen on if it meant getting rid of their swords. See the discussion at the United Service Institution in Lieutenant-Colonel E.T.H. Hutton, 'The Mounted Infantry Question in its Relation to the Volunteer Force of Great Britain'. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution XXV:160 (1891) 798-814.

21

Wolseley believed that in the event of an invasion the broken terrain in the south-east of Britain was

unsuitable for cavalry and that citizen forces with a significant mounted infantry element would be

very useful in the event of an invasion.55

As the army of a great colonial power, however, the much focus remained on the use of the

army away from home. Here the place of mounted infantry and mounted rifles was still somewhat

ambiguous despite Wolseley's limited establishment of mounted infantry in the regular army.

I believe that in wars of the future, not only will Mounted Infantry be employed, in combination with other arms, on the Continent, but that England, with its comparatively small population, and its enormous Colonial possessions, must inevitably be forced to employ, more and more every year, animals of some kind to convey infantry soldiers to the spot at which they are required to fight on foot.56

Mounted infantry was almost a colonial necessity but its place in a potential European war was less

clear. The idea that they may form some type of flying column to sweep into an enemy’s flank or rear,

whilst good for the colonies, was largely dismissed in a European context. It was felt, probably

correctly, that in the tight confines of a crowded European battlefield such columns would be unlikely

to find the necessary gaps to slip through. Thus a large part of the strategic value that mounted

infantry could bring was dismissed as not applicable. The regular army tended to see the role of

mounted infantry as to support traditional cavalry in its operations. General Wood believed that the

greatest value of mounted infantry in all arms operations would be to provide escorts to the artillery,

particularly the horse artillery that would accompany a cavalry division. Thus protected the artillery

commander could act more boldly in support of the horsemen who would do the real work, the

cavalry.57 Because mounted infantry were seen, due to their armament, as an essentially defensive

force the best they could hope to do was provide a firm base from which cavalry could act

offensively.

Cavalrymen tended to be generally disparaging about mounted infantry. Upon hearing that the

mounted infantry would be removed from the Cavalry Division fighting the Boers in South Africa in

1900, the then Major Douglas Haig, Chief of Staff to Major-General Sir John French, commander of

the division, wrote that "we don’t regret this, for the MI are a useless lot, and seem as soon mounted

to cease to be good infantry."58 The experiences of mounted troops in South Africa will be further

investigated in a later chapter but the circumstances of the Boer War meant that cavalry there

55Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War, p. 50.

56Wood, Achievements of Cavalry, p. 248.

57Ibid., pp. 249-50.

58Cited in The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816 to 1919: Volume 4, 1899 to 1913 (London: Leo Cooper/Secker & Warburg, 1986), p. 165.

22

eventually became just another form of mounted troops operating on the expanses of the veldt. Their

horses collapsing from poor condition and faced with an enemy who used the full range of their rifles

and who saw no point in facing lances or swords, the men of the Cavalry Division soon "became

inured to resigning and resuming almost hourly the roles in turn of cavalry and mounted infantry....'59

Similarly the ever growing numbers of other mounted troops soon found themselves successfully

carrying out the roles that had traditionally been the purview of the cavalry. The day before the British

capture of Johannesburg in late May 1900 the mounted infantry, under the command of Major-

General Edward Hutton, managed to cut off the Boers attempting to escape to Pretoria. It was "one of

the few instances during the whole war in which a direct pursuit resulted in a sizable capture - and it

was not made by the cavalry!'60

The nature of the war in South Africa provided anyone with a partisan view on the future of

mounted troops with enough examples to support their particular view for the coming years to see the

debate heat up considerably. Regular mounted infantry had proved to have their limitations but once

they gained enough experience they, or the irregular colonial mounted rifle units, often performed as

well as cavalry on campaign. Though not as anachronistic as sometimes written of there was some

truth to the observation that the cavalry had shown themselves to be:

Big men on increasingly undersized mounts, too heavily equipped and armed with carbines much inferior to the enemy’s rifles, prevented from conforming to their original tactics, yet loath to abandon them to new methods, were now shown without any doubt to be powerless to exert any real influence on the course of the fighting.61

From late October 1900 the commander in South Africa, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, ordered that the

cavalry’s inadequate Martini-Metford carbine be withdrawn and replaced with the standard infantry

rifle. Soon also column commanders were discouraging the cavalry from carrying their swords and

lances.62 For the rest of the war in South Africa the cavalry regiments of the British Army became

mounted riflemen, though enough successful charges were made at places like Elandslaagte and Klip

Drift to ensure that its utility was not forgotten.63

Once back in Britain Roberts, now Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, took up a

59Official historian cited in ibid., p. 200.

60Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 173.

61Ibid., p. 206.

62Ibid., p. 236, & Badsey. ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 164. The rifle was the Lee-Enfield .303, the immediate forerunner to the rifle that armed the British Army until after World War Two. It was sighted up 2800 yards whereas the extreme range of the Martini-Metford carbine was only about 1200 yards. The Mauser rifle carried by the Boers had a maximum range of about 3000 yards.

63Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 124-72.

23

programme of cavalry reform and attempted to make general an abolition of the lance. With an Army

Order in March 1903 Roberts abolished the lance for all but ceremonial and sporting events and

decreed that:

In issuing these instructions, the Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon all ranks that although the cavalry are armed with the carbine (or rifle) and sword, the carbine (or rifle) will henceforth be considered as the Cavalry soldier’s principal weapon.64

For some this was a step in the right direction. The young Member of Parliament, Winston Churchill,

a past cavalryman himself, hoped that "the Government will go boldly forward and do away with

'ironmongery' altogether".65 Others were, however, less than impressed at the implication that the

arme blanche was irrelevant. Lieutenant-Colonel F.N. Maude, claimed in his 1903 book, Cavalry: Its

Past and Future:

I have shown that since the Middle Ages to the present time cavalry have always gone into action against infantry with the preconceived impression that 'cavalry cannot charge unshaken infantry,' an impression sound enough when the object to be charged was a solid twelve deep block of foot-soldiers protected by 16-feet pikes - an insuperable physical obstacle that no flesh and blood could overcome until its order had been loosened by fire-effect. But with fire improvement in weapons this physical obstacle has grown less and less...for in order to derive the full advantage of the improvements in the fight of infantry against infantry, the fighting formations of the latter have been progressively reduced in density, the actual number of bullets per yard of front to be encountered remaining practically unchanged.66

Views such as Maude’s were not a foolish as it may seem. It reflected an ongoing debate between

those who sought to use so-called scientific methods of analysing the effects of modern fire and those

who sought to use historical examples as the basis of analysis. Those with a scientific bent could take

into account the theoretical maximum ranges of weapons, factor in rates of fire and target size to

produce theoretical casualty figures for the attacking forces. Such calculations, however, were

extremely crude and made little or no allowance for the notorious vagaries of battle where rates of

fire, and more importantly accuracy, very rarely lived up to anywhere near the theoretical models.

Tests done to support such thinking could produce widely varying results.67 One 1895 test with a

Maxim machine gun found that 90 percent of the fired rounds hit a 6 feet by 8 feet target at 1000

64Army Order 39, March 1903, cited in Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 392.

65Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, April 1904, cited in ibid., p. 391.

66Lieutenant-Colonel F.N. Maude, Cavalry: Its Past and Future (London: William Clowes & Sons Ltd., 1903), pp. 258-9. Almost the first statement of this book is an attack on the Army Order abolishing the lance. p. vii.

67Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, pp. 16 & 110.

24

yards. Yet another three years later using average marksmen in a firing party of 34 riflemen and one

Maxim gun found that on a target representing 100 infantry and a gun crew, at 700 yards, the rifles

scored only nineteen hits and the Maxim gun just nine.68 This was still an impressive hit rate, but it

did not take into account the pressures on men in battle and clearly scientific models had to be

approached with caution. Those using a historical examples were not necessarily better off, however,

and as is often the case in such situations there was a noticeable tendency to pick and chose examples

to back up the varying views.69 Historical examples perhaps offered a better view to the utility of

cavalry for those who approached them with a critical eye, but it was not uncommon to find such

views undermined by ill considered expressions of faith in cavalry rather than colder analysis. Maude,

who made useful and serious observations on the question of cavalry, probably did little to help his

arguments when he wrote that the reason cavalry still existed despite frequent predictions to the

contrary was a suggestion that there was "the existence of some natural law in their favour".70

Regardless, there was by the end of the nineteenth century a generally diminishing belief that

cavalry could still hope to charge infantry except under exceptional circumstances. The key rationale

that adherents of the arme blanche used for justifying the retention of the lance, sword and charge

tactics was a belief that they were still vital instruments for the destruction of the enemy’s cavalry.

Since the Franco-Prussian War all European cavalry had focused on the tasks required for being the

eyes and ears of an army. Implicit in this task was the requirement to clear the area of campaign of the

enemy cavalry who would be trying to conduct the same operations for their army: to conduct what is

today termed 'the counter-reconnaissance battle'. It remained the firm opinion of cavalrymen that this

battle would be fought on horseback with the arme blanche and shock tactics. Only by destroying the

enemy by shock could the moral ascendancy be achieved.

Thus many cavalrymen were concerned when Roberts went further than his Army Order and

attempted to have a preface written by him placed in the new edition of the cavalry training manual.

The new Cavalry Training, written under the supervision of Douglas Haig, was provisionally

published in 1904 with Roberts' preface in which he said:

But what does the development of rifle fire consequent on the introduction of the long range, low trajectory, magazine rifle mean? It means that instead of the firearm being an adjunct to the sword, the sword must henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle; and that cavalry soldiers must become expert rifle shots and be constantly trained to act dismounted. Cavalry officers need have no fear that teaching their men to fight on foot as well as on horseback will in any way interfere with that Élan which is so essential for cavalry soldiers to possess. It will, I am satisfied, only serve to increase their

68Ibid., p. 110.

69Ibid.

70Maude, Cavalry: Its Past and Future, p. 267.

25

confidence in themselves and their branch of the service....71

What Roberts had not properly realised, however, was that there had been within the ranks of

cavalry officers since the latter part of the nineteenth century an active group of reformers. This group

of officers, loosely aligned and in contact with each other but by no means homogeneous in their

views, had realised as early as the 1870s that cavalry had to embrace firepower and modernise its

approach to the new tactical situation. What made their views different from the sort of reform

advocated by George Denison or some of the other proponents of mounted firepower was their belief

that cavalry could be reformed to accommodate both mounted and dismounted action.72 That they

could successfully become the jack of all trades disparaged for so long. They generally believed that

firepower had to be embraced and that by using rifles and machine guns as fire support (in an

extension of the long established idea of horse artillery), the possibilities of mounted action might be

again opened to them.73 There were a number of officers with such views but perhaps the two best

known were the two men who would command the British Expeditionary Force during the First

World War, John French and Douglas Haig. Haig's views in 1890 were that:

Every cavalry soldier must thoroughly understand that his proper place is on horseback, his proper mode of action the charge. Only in cases where cavalry cannot obtain its object by executing a charge, should men be dismounted in order to use the carbine...[but] unless a cavalry force is by instruction and practice ready to fight on foot its usefulness will be curtailed and it cannot be considered efficient.74

By the 1890s the idea that cavalry should act both mounted and dismounted depending on the

situation had become commonplace. Many regiments took their shooting seriously and spent more

time practising their skirmishing tactics. Charge tactics were changing too and there was less of the

traditional knee-to-knee variety and more focus on open formations.75 The changes were, however,

uneven as more reactionary officers refused to countenance the changes. One officer of the 1890s

recalled the somewhat ridiculous contrast between a reformist regiment and a couple of traditional

ones when they went into the field together:

We wore [khaki] serge coats and khaki pants with Indian putees...Our helmets and belts were rubbed over with red clay to harmonise with the colour of the ground, and

71Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, pp. 396-7. Anglesey claims Roberts wrote the preface to balance the conservative tone of Haig's influence.

72Badsey, 'The Fire and the Sword’, pp. 48-9.

73Ibid., pp. 48-9 & 104.

74Douglas Haig, 1890, cited in ibid., p. 107.

75Ibid., pp. 116-9.

26

our steel was all dulled. The squadrons of the Inniskillings and the 15th Hussars adopted quite a different style; they were as spick and span as could be, with helmets and gloves white and clean, and steel and brass work all sparkling in the sun. It was a queer contrast altogether, and represented two widely different schools of military opinion.76

Roberts wanted cavalry reform but he differed from the cavalry reformers in believing that

the rifle had supplanted the arme blanche, whereas reformist cavalrymen like Douglas Haig believed

that the sword and lance were central and the rifle, though vital, was a supplement to the bladed

weapons. The gap between the two was, in reality, quite small but personalities clashed and the

differences would come to appear huge as the debate erupted out of the officers mess, the service

journals and the War Office into the public sphere of books and letters to The Times. Roberts' efforts

were vigorous but short lived as at almost the same time as the release of the provisional Cavalry

Training manual he lost his job with the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief. In February the

following year when the final version of Cavalry Training 1904 was produced the preface was not

included. This removal was largely at the instigation of the man who had commanded the Cavalry

Division in South Africa, now Lieutenant-General, Sir John French, who was currently commanding

the 1st Army Corps at Aldershot.77

French was the most vocal and influential of the defenders of the cavalry and the arme

blanche during this debate. He had opposed the reforms that Roberts had attempted and had allowed

the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot to continue carrying their lances on field training when he

commanded there.78 He began his public opposition to Roberts, and others with a bent for cavalry

reform that had no place for the arme blanche and shock tactics, by contributing a preface to a book

written by a Frenchman identified only as P. S.. The author reflected the prevalent orthodoxy by

asserting that scouting and screening duties were the first tasks to be conducted by cavalry on

campaign.79 For this cavalry should be prepared to use both shock and fire effects to achieve its end

"without neglecting one of them, either singly or in combination with each other."80 As a reformer

French had seen the effects that fire could produce in South Africa and elsewhere and was a firm

76Herbert Compton, cited in ibid., p. 81.

77Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 395. The Army Council did, however, maintain the abolition of the lance. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, p. 159.

78Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, p. 159-60. The continued carrying of the lance at Aldershot also had much to do with the commander of the Brigade at the time. French, however, did nothing to stop this practice. Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 410.

79P.S., Cavalry in Action: In the Wars of the Future, trans. by John Formby (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1905), p. 10. The translator was a Lieutenant-Colonel in a Liverpool Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Anglesey believes P.S. was 'almost certainly Colonel Brevete P. Silvestre.' A History of British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 415.

80Ibid., p. 15.

27

believer that firepower did have an important place in the cavalryman’s bag of skills. He remained,

however, firmly of the opinion that only shock tactics and the arme blanche would defeat the cavalry

of a continental enemy. He therefore chose to emphasise this aspect of the book in his preface.

Put tersely and briefly, we are told that the first objective is the enemy’s Cavalry, that everything must first conduce to its overthrow and defeat, and then a brilliant field of enterprise is open to the Cavalry soldier in his role as a mounted rifleman. But any, or all, of these enterprises will surely be paralysed by a powerful opposing Cavalry, which must therefore be first absolutely disposed of.

Whilst a well posted squadron or two of dismounted men in a favourable position may greatly assist the action of Cavalry against its own arm, it must never be forgotten that it is only by the employment of "shock action" and the superior moral [sic] of the highly trained horseman wielding sword and lance, that decisive success can be attained.81

It was a position he again took in 1906 when he again contributed an introduction to a translation of a

book written on the continent. Lieutenant-General Frederick von Bernhardi's Cavalry in Future Wars

was originally written in 1899 and had been aimed at stimulating some debate, and possibly reform, in

the German Army.82

As a potential reformer Bernhardi wanted cavalry to work out for itself the principles of

action that he believed would be useful in the future.83 To this end he hoped to convince his primarily

conservative and German audience that mounted and dismounted action were now of equal

importance to cavalrymen.84 He believed that there were certain cavalry operations where it was

impossible not to use firearms, notably when securing or defending a defile, when attacking the

enemy’s lines of communications, in the pursuit against defending infantry, and when setting cutoffs

to contain withdrawing enemy forces.85 Indeed he felt that the firearm had so changed the nature of

warfare for cavalry that he believed that cavalry must now be prepared to engage, not just in

occasional dismounted duties, but in persistent and prolonged dismounted action, including the

attack.86 Still, he remained convinced that it remained "the fact that the combat with cold steel

remains the chief raison d'etre of the Cavalry..."87 As he had with P.S., French agreed wholeheartedly

81Lieutenant-General Sir J.D.P French, 'Preface' to ibid., pp. v-vi.

82He hoped his book 'might incite others to both thought and exertion'. Lieutenant-General Frederick von Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, trans. by Charles Sydney Goldman (London: John Murray, 1906), p. xiii.

83Ibid., p. 8.

84Ibid., p. 294.

85Ibid., pp. 50-1.

86Ibid., pp. 49, 52-3

87Ibid., p. 62.

28

with Bernhardi on this subject.88 Fire action had a place but it was the charge with the arme blanche

against enemy cavalry that was the central cavalry act and the act with which cavalry could assert its

moral superiority on the battlefield.89 Only when shock action had cleared the enemy cavalry from the

field could cavalry begin to act as mounted riflemen.90

French was supported by many key British cavalry officers. Haig, now a Major-General and

between 1903 and late 1906 the Inspector-General of Cavalry in India, expressed his belief in the

1907 book, Cavalry Studies, that the role for cavalry on the modern battlefield would in fact increase

because:

1. The extended nature of the modern battlefield would give the cavalry a greater choice of cover to favour its approach. 2. The increased range and effectiveness of modern weapons and the greater length of battles would lead to moral exhaustion, which in turn will render cavalry attacks more likely to succeed. 3. Rapidity of movement for cavalry will become more necessary because of better weapons used by the infantry. 4. The small-bore rifle bullet had less stopping power against a horse than older large bore bullets did.91

These observations have been heavily criticised over the years, one historian of British cavalry has

concluded that they were in fact largely "nonsensical", but this is overly harsh.92 The first point seems

unlikely looking back after the First World War and the trench warfare of the Western Front, but

before that conflict is was a reasonable proposition. The second was somewhat hopeful but the third

was quite sensible and as later chapters in this thesis will show proved to be the case. The final point

has perhaps been considered the most controversial, but veterinary testing during the period had

shown that bullets, unless they struck the brain, heart or broke a bone, had little immediate physical

effect on a horse. Testing had shown that the .303 Lee-Metford bullet was powerful enough only to

immediately bring down a horse at the relatively short distance of fifty yards.93

That cavalrymen with views similar to French and Haig were in the ascendancy was amply

evidenced by the production of the new training manual, Cavalry Training 1907. The manual was

88"Personally I have never known the 'Case for Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently," wrote Lieutenant-General Sir J.D.P French, 'Introduction', to ibid., p. xxiii.

89Ibid., pp. xxiv-xxv.

90Ibid., p. xxii.

91Major-General Douglas Haig, Cavalry Studies: Strategical and Tactical (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1907), pp. 8-9.

92Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 389

93Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 111.

29

fully willing to concede that there would be numerous occasions when dismounted cavalry action

would be the only course of action open to cavalry, even in the attack "when the situation imperatively

demands it."94 But still mounted action remained central to cavalry employment:

It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of the cold steel. For when opportunities for mounted action occur, these characteristics combine to inspire such dash, enthusiasm, and moral ascendancy that cavalry is rendered irresistible. It is this that explains the success of many of the apparent ‘impossibilities’ of cavalry action in the past...Experience in war and peace teaches us that the average leader is only too ready to resort to dismounted action which often results in acting defensively.

This section has, as one historian has noted, become notorious as a supposed example of incorrigible

cavalry conservatism.95 There was undoubtedly a touch of reaction to Roberts and his attempt at

reform in this manual, but it still made it clear that dismounted action was vital and that using the rifle

and arme blanche was a matter of balance and the tactical situation.96

Roberts, though now retired, still had strong doubts about the directions of cavalry training

and was willing to say so publicly. In an introduction to a book on cavalry he took aim at new term

that Bernhardi had coined, 'cavalry spirit', and confessed that "I cannot follow the train of thought

which insists upon Cavalry requiring a 'spirit' for 'shock action'...."97 He wondered what 'spirit' cavalry

required other than the normal 'soldierly spirit' that infantry, artillery and the engineers required to

undertake their duties on campaign and in battle. Conceding that charging the enemy required 'dash',

but not a 'spirit', he believed the excitement produced by galloping with one's comrades was more

than enough to carry a cavalry trooper forward. Referring to his own experience and the other roles of

cavalry he had "no hesitation in saying that scouting and reconnoitring try the nerves far more

seriously than charging the enemy."98 Expressing his concern at the way that Cavalry Training 1907

was in favour of the arme blanche and shock action he was convinced from his own experience, and

arguments of the book that he was introducing, that the "the only possible logical deduction from the

history of late wars is, that all attacks can now be carried out more effectively with the rifle than the

sword."99

94Cavalry Training 1907 (London: H.M.S.O., 1907), pp. 186-7 [italics in original].

95Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, pp. 247-8.

96Ibid., p. 247 & Cavalry Training 1907, p. 187.

97Field Marshal Earl Roberts, 'Introduction' to Erskine Childers, War and the Arme Blanche (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), pp. xiv-xv.

98Ibid., p. xv.

99Ibid., p. xii.

30

Roberts was introducing War and the Arme Blanche by Erskine Childers, whose earlier books

include a volume of the Times History of the War in South Africa and the German invasion novel The

Riddle of the Sands.100 The main purpose for Childers' book was "to submit to searching criticism the

armament of Cavalry."101 Both Childers and Roberts were incredulous that British soldiers seemed

more than willing to accept the notion that the Boer War was 'abnormal' and that no lessons of

significance could be drawn on in preparation for fighting a continental enemy.102 In a direct reference

to French and Bernhardi, Childers attacked the tendency of British cavalrymen to take their lessons,

not from South Africa where they had learned them first hand, but from a German drawing on the

Franco Prussian War and who, by his own admission, was writing to reform a cavalry force "whose

tactics training and organisation...were, and seemingly are still, so dangerously antiquated in the

direction of excessive reliance on steel as to present no parallel to our own Cavalry."103 For Childers

the Boer War had provided ample proof that the arme blanche was next to useless. If it had not, then

why had the nearly three years of campaigning on the veld produced on both sides a virtually single

type of useful soldier, the mounted riflemen?104 Like Denison before, him Childers was scornful of

the battle value of the sword and lance, pointing out that in South Africa the arme blanche was

responsible, at most, for about 200 casualties and prisoners in a war where the combined casualties

totaled about 30 000.105

Childers' book was highly polemical and not written in a fashion to keep those who he was

trying to convince on his side. Nevertheless, he was making an unabashed appeal to the intellectual

faculties of his audience.

Above all, I want them [thinking men] to examine the case made for the theory by Cavalry men themselves, and to judge if that case rests upon an intelligent interpretation of new and valuable experience, or, rather, upon stubborn adherence to an old tradition whose teaching they have indeed been forced to modify, but have not the good sense to abandon106

100Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 416. Childers had served in the City Imperial Battery of the Honourable Artillery Company during the Boer War and would serve in the RNAS and RFC in the First World War before joining the IRA in 1922. In that year was captured and executed by Free State soldiers.

101Erskine Childers, War and Arme Blanche (London: Edward Arnold, 1910), p. 1.

102Roberts, 'Introduction' to ibid., p. ix, & Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p. 57.

103Childers, War and the Arme Blanche, p. 2 & passim.

104Ibid., p. 262.

105Ibid., p. 261-2. Childers admitted in this book that he was being generous. In his next, more pointed, book he revised this estimate down to about 50 casualties and 50 prisoners. Erskine Childers, German Influence on British Cavalry (London: Edward Arnold, 1911), p. 6.

106Ibid., p. 3.

31

Its biggest problem was it had in many ways been overtaken by events. He did not object to the

charge (contending that mounted charges with firearms would be useful) so his critique was simply

one regarding the value of the sword and lance accompanied by a heated argument in favour of

mounted riflemen. What he failed to take into account was the reforming trend present among

cavalrymen themselves who were now embracing both mounted and dismounted tactics, and in the

process subsuming the role of the mounted riflemen and questioning whether mounted infantry were

worth the effort.107

The same year that saw the publication of War and the Arme Blanche also saw the translation

of a second book from Bernhardi to which French again contributed a preface. French took direct aim

at Childers and Roberts, worrying that some "prominence has lately been given in England to

erroneous views concerning the armament and tactics of cavalry."108 In defence of the faith in the

arme blanche he then went on to say:

But I am convinced that some of the reactionary views recently aired in England concerning cavalry will, if accepted and adopted, lead first to the deterioration and then to the collapse of cavalry when next it is called upon to fulfill its mission in war. I therefore recommend...to read and ponder this book, which provides a strengthening tonic for weak minds which may have allowed themselves to be impressed by the dangerous heresies to which I have alluded.109

French, with some validity, pointed out that by drawing on the opinions and examples emanating from

continental Europe, British soldiers could avoid leaving themselves open to the "ignorance and

conceit" of believing that their own war experiences were the "sum of military wisdom".110

Such public theoretical debates were, however, starting to draw to a close. Childers wrote

another book, the German Influence on British Cavalry, but its tone was too vitriolic and Roberts

refused to be associated with it.111 Not surprisingly in the world of cavalry doctrine he was ultimately

considered too didactic and his unwillingness to concede that cavalrymen could be trained to

tactically use two weapons meant his views held little sway.112 Regardless of Childers' and Roberts'

public attacks the key reformist cavalrymen had gone on without them to change their branch of the

service, a process helped by the occupation of key appointments by persons with an interest. Since

107Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 264 & passim.

108General Sir J.D.P. French. 'Preface' to Freheirr von Bernhardi, Cavalry in War and Peace, trans by Major G.T.M. Bridges (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1910), p. v.

109Ibid., p. vi.

110Ibid., pp. xviii-xix.

111Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 271.

112Ibid.

32

1906 Sir John French had been the Commander-in-Chief designate for the British Expeditionary

Force and was Inspector-General of the Forces from 1907 until made Chief of the General Staff in

1912. Douglas Haig, after finishing a turn in India as Inspector-General of Cavalry, was made

Director of Military Training until 1908 when he was made the Director of Staff Duties. In 1911 he

ascended to the key command of the Corps at Aldershot.113 The Inspector-General of Cavalry from

1903 to 1907, Robert Baden-Powell, despite being an early advocate of mounted infantry, had

eventually sided with the cavalry in the debates and did his best to maintain the arme blanche in the

British Army.114 General Sir Evelyn Wood, another past proponent of mounted infantry, also worried

about the disappearance of cavalry spirit.115 Outside the army these men were ably assisted by the

military correspondent of The Times, Colonel Repington, who believed that cavalry armed only with

the rifle was "chicken trussed for the spit".116

As the First World War approached the matter had largely been settled in favour of Britain’s

cavalry. In 1905 there was consideration given to converting the ad hoc regular mounted infantry into

a permanent standing force but it was not taken up. With the cavalry having been equipped with the

infantry rifle and their tactics modified to encompass dismounted work their seemed to be an ever

diminishing reason to continue with its maintenance. In 1908 and 1909 the Mounted Infantry Schools

in Egypt and India were closed and the remaining two in Ireland and England met a similar fate on the

eve of the First World War.117 That the mounted infantry no longer had high ranking patrons meant

that there were no particular efforts made to save the force. In September 1913 the Army Council

decided that mounted infantry would not be used in a European war and the two existing Mounted

Brigades, a mix of cavalry and mounted infantry, were broken up.118 This was not to say that

horsemen armed only with rifle did not have a place. Drawing on colonial experience and the long

understood difficulty of producing fully trained cavalrymen, the part-time citizen horse soldiers

around the empire had been converted to mounted riflemen. That is they were horsemen organised

along the lines of cavalry and undertook cavalry roles, but their training was limited to using the rifle

and not shock action. Britain’s Yeomanry had been unhappy with this change but since the Boer War

it had largely been training to this template, as had the mounted soldiers of Australia, New Zealand,

113Gerard DeGroot, Douglas Haig, 1861-1928 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 103.

114Tim Jeal, The Boy-Man: The Life of Lord Baden-Powell (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1990), p. 357. Baden Powell did much fence sitting on this topic and his initial preference in favour of fire tactics after the Boer War was changed to support for shock by 1904.

115Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, p. 159.

116Ibid., p. 414.

117Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, pp. 252-4.

118Holmes, The Little Field Marshal, p. 162.

33

Canada and South Africa. In Britain cavalry modernisation continued - fire and manoeuvre tactics

were improved and machine guns were introduced so that every cavalry regiment had two in its

organisation, doing much to boost firepower. French also moved at various times to censure cavalry

officers when pro-mounted attitudes sometimes got out of hand. In his reports following the 1908,

1909 and 1910 annual manoeuvres French criticised the mediocre dismounted performances of the

cavalry.119 Proving that cavalry officers were far from of one mind, Haig wrote in his diary following

the 1910 manoeuvres that French, having spoken of rifle fire as cavalry's most important tool in battle,

had gone too far and given "vent to some terrible heresies".120 In 1912 a new edition of Cavalry

Training appeared without the ideological statements that had made the previous editions so

contentious.121 The strident tones were abandoned for more calmly and usefully set out principles. It

told its readers that the principle characteristic of cavalry was its "power to move with rapidity, to

fight when moving, to seize fleeting opportunities, and to cover long distances in a short time."122

Whether that should be done by sword or rifle seemed now a discretionary matter. The balance

between fire and shock action that had been in the previous editions but that had been obscured by the

rhetoric came to the fore. Regimental and formation training emphasised reconnaissance and

protection duties and, building on the trends of the last ten or more years, work on the range took up

much time - some units had better shooting results than some infantry battalions.123 The upshot of this

was that in 1914 British cavalry were most willing to dismount and use fire when it was called for.

There would be numerous mounted actions by British and dominion cavalry during the First World

War and many cavalrymen would continue to see mounted action as the defining role of cavalry,124

but their ability to act effectively dismounted gave them a flexibility that was of much value. Once on

campaign in France in 1914 one British cavalry officer was willing to comment of his French

colleagues that "their weakness lay in the small attention that had been given to fighting on foot, and

119Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 4, p. 421.

120Haig cited in Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 272.

121Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 270, & Cavalry Training, 1912 (London: HMSO, 1912), passim.

122Cavalry Training, 1912, p. 230.

123Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 273.

124For example there is the charge by a squadron of the 12th Lancers against dismounted German Dragoons at Cerizy in August 1914, the charge by a squadron sized mixed British cavalry force at Collezy during the German March offensive of 1918, and the highly successful charge by the Yeomanry of the 6th Mounted Brigade at El Mughar on 13 November 1917. This list is by no means exhaustive, nor were all charges as successful as these. Three days before the charge at El Mughar another controversial charge was made, unsupported by other arms, at Huj by 120 men from two Yeomanry regiments, the Worchesters and the Warwicks, which, though successful, made between 70 and 90 of these men casualties. The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816 to 1919: Volume 5, Egypt, Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1919 (London: Leo Cooper, 1994.) p. 181.

34

for this work the carbines they carried were an inferior weapon".125 In an indication of how far British

cavalry had been reformed since the late nineteenth century, a private pamphlet produced in 1915 for

the benefit of the new cavalry officers of Britain’s New Armies confidently confirmed that fire and

shock tactics had equal place yet, whilst it contained three lectures on fire action, it contained no

lectures on shock action.126

The increasing lethality and range of modern weapons presented cavalry with a profound

challenge. The response to this challenge, in combination with colonial experiences, made it clear that

Britain’s mounted troops had to modify their tactical action in order to adapt. What form that adaption

should take had proved a matter of keen debate. Mounted infantry seemed to some a suitable

alternative but its maintenance as an ad hoc force brought into existence only as an expedient in

colonial wars meant it never gathered the institutional strength to become a serious alternative, and

there remained in the eyes of some questions as to whether it would prove tactically flexible enough.

That cavalrymen saw their own path of reform and embraced dismounted action as a key aspect of it

meant that, in the end, there seemed little reason to continue with mounted infantry as a substitute.

Mounted infantry did not disappear completely, however, and would play their part on camel-back in

the Middle East during the First World War. British cavalry would face significant challenges during

the First World War but when there were those periods or campaigns where mobile operations were

undertaken the reforms would come to prove their worth. Britain had seen the most heated debate

about the future of mounted troops but as with most things in an empire the results were not confined

to there. Across the empire the consequences of the new thinking would flow and have their own

effects, though the results were not necessarily the same. It is with the mounted troops of one of the

dominions that this thesis is concerned and how the mounted soldiers of Australia reflected and

responded to ideas about modern mounted warfare will be a key theme of the chapters to follow.

125Major Archibald Home cited in Holmes, Riding the Retreat, p. 163.

126Major W.J.R. Wingfield, Lectures to Cavalry Subalterns of the New Armies (London: Forster Groom & Co. Ltd., 1915), p. 62 & passim.

35

Chapter 2 Australia’s Pre-Federation Mounted Troops

1803-1899

Throughout much of the nineteenth century Australia's military forces were small,

organisationally unstable and often short lived. Before the middle of the century the military

experience was largely restricted to interactions, for good or ill, with the red-coated imperial garrison

troops sent out by London. Local expediency produced other forms of mounted semi-military bodies

but these were largely raised for the purposes of policing the populous, free and convict, and to do

their bit for white expansion on the frontiers. When, in the middle of the century, it became necessary

for the colonies to think about their own defence mounted troops came, inevitably, to be part of the

forces that were raised. The place and role of these mounted troops would be the subject of

considerable debate but by the end of the century they had assumed a large, perhaps dominant, place

in the defence forces of several of the colonies.

First Steps - Colonisation to 1884

The first formation of mounted soldiers created in Australia, formed in 1803 by Governor

King, was commonly referred to as the Governor's Body Guard.1 Dressed in the uniform of the 3rd

Light Dragoons this body was made up of well-behaved convicts with military experience until 1810

when soldiers drawn from the garrison took over. Though called a body guard, the chief value of this

small corps (only fourteen strong in 1810) was its ability to quickly move messages and information

around the young colony. Governor Macquarie thought it "a very useful Establishment for conveying

Intelligence from one part of the country to another" [sic].2 During the uprising of 300 Irish convicts

in March 1804, however, the guard was despatched by Governor King to reinforce the sixty man post

at Castle Hill. One of the Guard's members, Thomas Andlesack, accompanied Major George Johnson

on horseback and, the both of them outpacing the infantry with them, was directly involved with

apprehending the ring leaders of the uprising at Vinegar Hill.3 Generally frowned upon by London

authorities who viewed it as something of a colonial extravagance, the force survived long enough to

be amalgamated with the Mounted Police in the mid-1840's, from which establishment it was finally

1Peter Stanley, The Remote Garrison: The British Army in Australia 1788-1870 (Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1986), p. 58. 2Cited in ibid., p. 58. 3Ibid., pp. 21-2.

36

disbanded in 1860.4

The actions at Vinegar Hill gave an early illustration of the value that a mounted military

corps could have in a colonial context. Conferred with the speed and mobility of horses the small

body of mounted troops in the colony could extend its influence over a much larger part of the colony

than would otherwise have been the case. It was this requirement for rapid mobility that led Governor

Brisbane to mount a portion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot (The Buffs) on government cart horses in

1825 to combat the growing problem of bushrangers in the Sydney, Newcastle and Bathurst regions.

The rugged country the bushrangers operated in, and the fact that most of them were themselves

mounted, meant that hitherto they had been largely free of interference from the local authorities. So

successful was this anti-bushranging experiment that the initial force of a dozen men was increased to

about 100 by 1830. Later given the name of Mounted Police this corps was particularly successful in

chasing bushrangers and escaped convicts.5 The men were drawn from the infantry regiments posted

to Australia and as an administrative arrangement were transferred from the roll of any regiment

departing the colony to the roll of that coming out to replace it. Also used against Aborigines, the

Mounted Police were increasingly seen as the most important troops in the colony.6 In the early 1830s

the Sydney Morning Herald proclaimed them "the germ and basis of all our future military

institutions" and Governor Ralph Darling viewed them "of more importance than all the other troops

put together".7 As the historian John Connor has recently highlighted, the use of horse mounted

soldiers and policemen completely revolutionised military activity on the colonial frontiers and made

what had been the hitherto difficult job of quelling troublesome Aborigines a great deal easier.8 So

useful were mounted troops generally considered in policing the colony that when bushranging again

became a serious problem in the late 1830s it was strong rumour in the colony that a cavalry regiment

would be sent out to quash the threat.9 When the 40th Regiment arrived in Melbourne in 1852 to police

and protect the new Victorian goldfields one of its companies was soon mounted and equipped with a

field gun for gold escort duties and anti-bushranger use.10

4Ibid., p. 58. 5Ibid., p. 32. 6Ibid., pp. 38-9 & 50-1. For example the Mounted Police were used against aborigines in the Hunter Valley in 1826 where there were reported to be a number summary executions carried out against the aborigines, and a group of Mounted Police under Major Nunn were responsible for the Slaughter House Creek massacre in January 1838. 7Ibid., p. 46 for the Sydney Morning Herald & p. 33 for Governor Darling’s view. 8John Connor, The Australian Frontier Wars, 1788-1838 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2002), passim. 9Stanley, The Remote Garrison, p. 50. 10G. R. Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria 1854-1967 (Melbourne: Central Army Records Office, 1970), Ch.

37

These duties by the 40th Regiment were, however, among the last mounted duties performed

by British regular army troops in Australia as the colonial authorities sought to find a more

sustainable local source for order in the colonies. Providing men from regular infantry regiments

caused a dilemma in that the provision of good and reliable men to the police reduced the regiment's

effectiveness, whilst doing the opposite tended to reduce the effectiveness of the police.11 With this

problem in mind, Governor Sir George Gipps sought a different recruiting source in 1838 and formed

the Border Police to take up many of the policing duties on the frontier of white expansion. By all

accounts a thoroughly disreputable unit made up largely of army deserters from the Cape Colony and

India, it was disbanded in 1846.12 Recruiting for the Mounted Police also changed, though not

necessarily for the better, and the detachment that was present with the mounted men of the 40th

Regiment at the Eureka uprising in Victoria in 1854 was made up mostly of ex-convicts from

Tasmania.13

The first mounted military force raised in an Australian colony from its citizens for the

purpose of defence rather than policing was the 1840 formation of the South Australian Volunteer

Cavalry, part of the South Australian Volunteer Militia Brigade. In effective existence for little more

than six months and with under 80 men on its books, 'brigade' was something of an overstatement. A

poor colonial economy and other disturbances meant that training had ceased by the middle of its first

year but a return from 1842 shows it still had some organisational presence.14 In that year the colony,

in addition to a company of infantry and the small imperial garrison, still maintained two top heavy

troops of cavalry totalling nine officers, one non-commissioned officer and thirty-three rank and file -

on paper at least. As no cost had been incurred by the young South Australian administration for

maintaining this body in the previous year, it must be assumed that they were an unpaid force rather

than partially paid militia.15 The precise fate of this early unit is unclear but it is unlikely that it

managed to survive until 1855 when the Adelaide Mounted Rifle Corps superceded them as the

mounted troops for South Australia.16

1, p. 6. 11Ibid., p. 36. 12Stanley, The Remote Garrison, p. 56. 13Ibid., p. 71. 14Anon. 'Reedbeds to Regiment', Cavalry in SA: To Commemorate the 150th Anniversary of the First Cavalry Squadron in South Australia. 'A' Sqn, 3rd/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles & Army Museum of South Australia, undated. 15Return for militia 1842, SRSA, GRG 24/51/2 16Peter Burness, 'Australian Colonial Forces: A Sketch', Australian War Memorial History Conference, 11-13 February 1982, pp. 1-11. This early unit is sometimes also called the South Australian Mounted Rifles, but this is a title more accurately applied to a later colonial unit.

38

The Adelaide Mounted Rifles was but one of a number of colonial units raised around

Australia in response to the Crimean War and the widespread colonial concern that a Russian naval or

marine force may be despatched to attack the relatively unprotected Australian colonies. In September

1854 a group of Sydneysiders gathered in George Street to form the Yeomanry Cavalry Corps of New

South Wales.17 Victoria contributed to the cause by passing in 1854 a Volunteer Forces Act that,

though aimed mostly at establishing infantry units, facilitated the raising of the Victorian Yeomanry

Corps in the second half of 1855.18 This body was originally to be a company of the Melbourne (or

Victorian) Volunteer Rifle Regiment but the demand to enlist being too high, it was decided to form

this mounted unit in addition to the two infantry regiments already established.19 The fervour of the

war scare of 1854-5 seems to have faded quickly for some however. The Adelaide Mounted Rifles,

not even two years old, was disbanded in 1856. The Victorian Yeomanry, however, seems to have

survived long enough to provide assistance to the number of Victorian mounted units that sprang up

from 1860.

Again it was the prospect of security troubles for the Empire, this time emanating from a

scare that Napoleon III was about to attempt an invasion of Britain, that motivated Australian

colonials and their governments to encourage the formation of volunteer military units. In September

1860 residents of Kyneton, Victoria, held a town meeting to canvas support for the formation of a

local mounted corps. The local newspaper, The Observer, reported that:

Dr. Mackenzie said it was scarcely necessary to allude to the news that had just arrived from England, which shewed that the state of affairs in Europe bore a very threatening aspect. England itself was falling back on the public spirit of her citizens to organise troops in self defence, and it was very proper and desirable for the colony to imitate the mother country in this respect.20 [sic]

Kyneton was able to produce the names of fifty men who were willing to enrol themselves in the new

local corps and the government, having recently passed an amendment to the Volunteer Act to

encourage mounted corps, agreed to provide them with uniforms and some accoutrements should they

attain an acceptable standard of basic drill.21

It was with meetings like this that keen citizens could make the first move towards emulating

their volunteer cousins in Great Britain who were also increasingly active at this time. Typically at

17Peter Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry 1854-1935', Sabretache XVI:4 (Feb. 1975), 246. 18T.B. Millar, 'The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and the Colony of Victoria 1836-1900', M.A. Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1957. pp. 78-9. 19Ibid., p. 79 20 Kyneton Observer, 13 Sep. 1860 cited in Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 4. 21Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, pp. 3-5.

39

these meetings, held either in a local hall or sometimes at the home of a key supporter of the idea, the

issue would be discussed, the need for the establishment of a volunteer unit affirmed, a roll of those

intending to join created to be sent to the government along with the proposal to form the corps. In

1860, for example, the Reedbeds Cavalry of South Australia was formed following meetings at the

homes of two interested local men. The second of these meetings was public and thirty-one men

enrolled themselves and undertook to march to Adelaide to take the required oath of loyalty.22

Government attitudes to such bodies were varied but generally they were supportive if the cost to the

government could be kept to the absolute minimum. As with the Kyneton corps, basic uniforms,

equipment and arms could sometimes be expected, but it was an inviolable rule that governments

wanted no part of buying, or helping to maintain, expensive horseflesh and saddlery.

The Kyneton corps and the Reedbeds Cavalry were by no means the only volunteer units to

be raised in the early 1860s. In Victoria the Kyneton corps and the surviving Victorian Yeomanry

Corps were soon accompanied by the Castlemaine Dragoons and troops at Sandhurst (now Bendigo)

and Maryborough. Each set themselves up with different uniforms, different notional military roles

and different rules of service.23 In order to ease the administration and to achieve some general

uniformity these disparate corps were reorganised by the Victorian government into the Royal

Volunteer Cavalry Regiment in 1862. The following year, in honour of the marriage of the Price of

Wales, the name was changed to the Royal Volunteer Cavalry Regiment (Prince of Wales's Light

Horse Hussars).24 In Queensland the government announced in The Moreton Bay Courier that

February of their intention to enrol at least one troop of mounted rifles to serve as cavalry alongside

two small companies of infantry. Weapons and ammunition were to be supplied by the government

but almost everything else was to be provided by the members.25 Tasmanians also made an effort with

the 1860 formation of the First Light Cavalry Corps (sometimes called the Launceston Mounted

Rifles).26 In Western Australia the Pinjarrah Mounted Volunteers were raised in 1862.27

Of these units, however, only those raised in prosperous and well populated Victoria seemed

able to maintain any degree of stability or be able to build on their small success in the early 1860s. In

1867, for example, men of the various Victorian volunteer units, including the mounted troops, were

22Robert Gray, 'Reedbeds Mounted Volunteers (Reedbeds Cavalry)', Despatch 4:11 (Nov 1969), 4. 23T.B. Millar, 'The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District', p. 90. 24Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, pp. 7-8. 25D.H. Johnson, Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901 (St. Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1975), p. 24. 26Major D.M. Wyatt, A Lion in the Colony: An Historical Outline of the Tasmanian Colonial Volunteer Military Forces 1859-1901 (Hobart: The 6th Military District Museum, 1990), pp. 4-5. 27George F. Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia 1861-1903 (Perth, W.A.: Patterson Brokensha Pty. Ltd., 1966), p. 30.

40

able to conduct a large scale sham fight at their annual Easter encampment that also incorporated

regulars of the imperial 14th Regiment.28 In 1874 Victoria could boast to having nearly 300 mounted

volunteer soldiers with troops in Kyneton, Ballarat, Geelong, Sandhurst and Melbourne.29 In contrast

the mounted corps that had emerged in the other colonies in 1860 quickly degenerated. In South

Australia the Reedbeds Cavalry had twenty-five members in 1860 and by 1863 had managed to

increase its numbers to thirty-seven.30 By 1868, however, the Reedbeds had declined to the point that

they were integrated into the rather grandly named Duke of Edinburgh's Light Dragoons, a unit that

had its origins in the 1866 formation of the Regiment of South Australian Volunteer Cavalry. The

amalgamation evidently did little to arrest the decline as the combined unit was gradually, but totally,

disbanded through 1869-70. The remaining members of the original Reedbeds Cavalry, without a

regiment, formed a rifle club in 1869 and fulfilled their martial inclinations that way.31 The

Queensland Mounted Rifles were perhaps the least successful, lasting only until 1863. In that year the

Port Curtis and Brisbane troops were disbanded and the remaining troop at Ipswich was renamed the

Queensland Light Horse, but it too was disbanded in 1866. One author has described the unit as "the

most irregular corps of an unorthodox army."32 Within three months of its foundation The Moreton

Bay Courier was already rumouring its disbandment.33 The initial excitement of 1860 had faded

quickly and when the Brisbane corps was disbanded in 1863 the Government Gazette could only state

that the troop was no longer required as "the whole of the officers and most of the men [have]

resigned."34 Efforts in Tasmania met with initial success with the corps at Launceston as its numbers

gradually increased to forty-three in 1862, but within a year it was down to thirty members and in

1865 its services were finally dispensed with.35 Another attempt was made at Launceston in 1879 with

the formation of the Tasmanian Volunteer Light Horse but it too folded in 1883.36 Western

Australia’s Pinjarrah Mounted Volunteers, formed in 1862, managed to survive until 1882 but its

28Millar, 'The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District', p. 91. 29Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 13. 30Return of volunteer attendance 24 Nov. 1860, SRSA, GRG 24/51/67 & Report by Major Blyth to the Governor of South Australia, 1 Mar. 1863. SRSA, GRG 24/51/114. 31Gray, 'Reedbeds Mounted Volunteers', p. 4. 32Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 29. 33Moreton Bay Courier, 28 Jul. 1860, cited in Ibid., p. 29. 34Queensland Government Gazette, 14 Feb. 1863, cited in Ibid., pp. 41-2. 35Major Douglas Morris Wyatt, With the Volunteers: A Historical Diary of the Volunteer Military Forces of the North-West and West Coasts of Tasmania, 1886-1986 (Tasmania: Self-published, 1987), p. 65. 36Ibid.,p. 65.

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gradual decline had been evident since 1874.37 It had been joined in 1870 by the Union Troop of

Western Australian Mounted Volunteers but this corps, commanded by an ex-officer of the Royal

Horse Artillery, was converted to a troop of horse artillery in 1872.38 The Wellington Mounted

Volunteers was another West Australian corps also briefly in existence between 1877 and 1882. The

Yeomanry Cavalry Corps of New South Wales was disbanded in 1862.39

To maintain the enthusiasm and numbers of men beyond the first exciting years of a volunteer

corps proved to be one of the most difficult tasks facing colonial military authorities. By the early

1880s even the more successful Victorian mounted corps were beginning to struggle. In 1884 the

Victorian government disbanded all the mounted volunteer detachments except the troop at Sandhurst

and, renamed the 1st Squadron Victorian Cavalry it lasted until 1892. With their origins in the

numerous war scares that periodically swept Australia and the Empire during the second half of the

nineteenth century, volunteer corps found that men were often very willing, initially at least, to join

their local corps out of a desire to defend their homes and homeland. As the threat of war receded

however, this basic driving force soon tended to recede also. Left with little likelihood of an actual

conflict to motivate the men, volunteer units had to trust that the training they conducted, and the

public events they attended, would be enough to maintain the interest of officers and the other ranks.

Often, however, the corps, with minimal official backing and scanty organisation, were not up to the

task. Queensland’s volunteers of 1860 were discovering by 1862 that the only interesting activities

were range practices and the occasional ceremonial parade.40 The Queensland Mounted Rifles found

that though they had "provided a measure of dash and pageantry at ceremonial openings of

Parliament...this [had] scarcely [been] enough to maintain interest, and the numbers fell off rapidly."41

This situation tended to be general through the volunteer system and by no means restricted to the

mounted corps. The gradual decline in the Launceston Mounted Rifles in the first half of the 1860s

had been matched by an equal general decline in numbers throughout the whole Tasmanian volunteer

system. Able to field 957 volunteers throughout the colony in 1862, the Tasmanian Volunteer Force

could find no more than 421 on its roll books by the end of 1866.42 Victoria, more willing to

encourage its volunteers than most colonies, tried to arrest the decline in numbers by enacting a land

37Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, pp. 31-2. 38Ibid., p. 32. The Officer Commanding was Captain Blundell and the new corps was called the West Australian Troop of Volunteer Horse Artillery. 39Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', p. 246. 40Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 30. 41Ibid., p. 41. 42Wyatt, A Lion in the Colony, p. 18.

42

grant scheme for volunteers in 1865.43 The scheme offered volunteers with five years service a land

certificate worth £50 that could be used to buy crown land after a further five years service. When the

first certificates were issued in 1870, however, it was soon found that many volunteers, not willing to

wait a further five years for their land, were selling the certificates to squatters for less than their face

value. An ensuing public outcry meant that the only certificates issued were those of 1870.44

Mounted troops in particular were also often burdened with considerable personal financial

expenses in order to be a volunteer. The degree of government support offered varied from time to

time and colony to colony. South Australia’s Volunteer Act of 1865, for example, had tried to firmly

establish the principle that their volunteers would receive compensation for their time as well as have

most of their equipment needs met at the government’s expense, but this was a principle that was

adhered to less and less as time went on.45 Victoria’s mounted volunteers had been offered arms,

uniforms and basic accoutrements, but Queensland had offered only arms and ammunition to its 1860

volunteers.46 All the military items, therefore, that were required of the volunteer and not paid for by

the government, had to be paid for out of the pocket of the soldier or, if he were lucky, by funds

otherwise raised by the committees that managed many volunteer corps. A mounted soldier could

easily be faced with the high cost of providing his own uniform, sometimes his equipment, and

always his own saddlery and horse. They were also frequently required to meet the regular cost of

transporting themselves to the place where they were to drill each week. It is not surprising, therefore,

that in the early 1860s the Sandhurst Troop of the Victorian forces, at least, was beginning to

complain of the "irksome" expenses attached to their chosen pastime.47

Conditions within the corps themselves or within the area from which they recruited could

also have considerable affect. Most mounted units were raised and maintained in rural areas with

limited population bases. A new corps could usually draw on the enthusiasm of the local men, but as

these initial enlistments grew tired of their commitment and left there remained in the district an ever-

diminishing pool of men who had not been part of the unit and who were willing to try soldiering.48

The result was that most corps tended to quickly shrink after the initial spurt of enthusiasm had spent

itself. The role and attitude of the officers and non-commissioned officers could also be crucial.

Though commissions were confirmed by the government, in most cases positions of rank in volunteer

43Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria, Ch. 4, p. 29. 44Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 12. 45H.J. Zwillenberg, 'Citizens and Soldiers: The Defence of South Australia 1836-1901', M.A Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1970, p. 178. 46Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 24. 47Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria, Ch. 4, p. 27. 48Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, pp. 31-2.

43

corps were filled by a ballot of the members and, not surprisingly, those who filled key positions were

not always those most suitable. Though enthusiasm, some study and a degree of natural authority

could go some way to making the military experience more definite and rewarding for the citizen

soldiers under command, the lack of proper training or the indifference of a key officer could severely

affect a corps. The decline of the Western Australian Pinjarrah Mounted Volunteers after 1874 has, in

part, been attributed to the waning interest of its commander and local notable, Captain Fawcett.49 At

the end of the century Colonel J.M. Templeton, a long serving citizen soldier and a member of the

Victoria’s Local Committee of Defence, could recall of his early days as a volunteer that:

[The] great difficulty was to get efficient officers...Just at the first, officers had to be chosen, more for their social position and influence, than for their military knowledge and ability to manage men. On the occasion of one of our field days, while I was still very young in years and soldiership, I heard Major-General Chute...use most terrible language to some of our senior officers, and then at the top of his voice shout out, "Very well, men, very well, men, if only you had officers to command you."[sic] 50

Men who could only exercise poor standards of command soon found that they were having difficulty

maintaining the attendance and enthusiasm of their subordinates. Broader social trends could also

have their influence. Captain Pitt of the Royal Artillery told the Queensland Joint Select Committee

on the Defence of the Colony in 1866 that the Queensland volunteer system had been a failure due to:

[T]he apathy evinced by the Colonists generally; to the migratory nature of the population, and to the want of interest shown in the movement by persons of position. The papers, too, in this Colony have invariably sneered at Volunteering.51

Popular opinion in general, and that of the press in particular, could be very scathing and

mounted corps were by no means exempt. When the newly raised, and only partially uniformed,

Sandhurst Troop made its first public appearance the Advertiser commented that they were:

Mounted, for the most part on hacks of the sorriest and most bare boned rozinante description, one trooper in uniform, another with a sword, a third with a sabretache slinging a stick, and all in their ordinary habiliments, the Sandhurst troop, if they did not recall to collection a famous troop which a great Shakespearian captain flatly refused to march through Coventry with, certainly merited the suggestion of a bystander that they ought to be sent there.52

49Ibid., pp. 31-2. 50Colonel J.M. Templeton, The Consolidation of the British Empire: The Growth of Citizen Soldiership and the Establishment of the Australian Commonwealth (Melbourne: Sands McDougall Ltd., 1901), pp. 26-7. Publication of a lecture given at the Melbourne Town Hall 29 Jul. 1900. 51 Cited in Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 48. 52Advertiser, 9 Aug. 1861, cited in Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria, Ch. 4, p. 25.

44

The Moreton Bay Courier was just as harsh on their Queensland counterparts:

The beginning was grand and imposing, a resounding name to the Cavalry Corps, where every week, very bad riders on very questionable cattle arranged themselves in a row on the cricket ground and tried to look like the hope of the country. A very little of this went a great way...[but now] when a call to drill is responded to only by a Lieutenant, a sergeant, a corporal and two full privates the farce is nearly at an end. Now we do not think that any sensible person can regret the closing up of so very stupid an enterprise as trying to persuade the people of Queensland that it was ever meant to leave the farm, the shop, the office, the work bench, to go and play soldiering. Some will do anything for the sake of wearing cloths of an extraordinary cut and colour...it is the only way they can secure the admiration of small boys and serving girls.53

Of significant import for these early mounted corps also was the far from definite role they

would play in the defence of the colony should they be required to do so. There was evidently no

rationale established by the colonies themselves as to what sort of mounted forces they wanted. Given

the reliance on the fervour of their citizens governments seemed prepared to accept whatever was on

offer provided the strain on the exchequer was not too great. As is evidenced by the bewildering

variety of names used to title and describe them, the units tended to take on whatever military form

their members fancied. Not surprisingly many of these colonial soldiers were quite keen to ape their

cousins in Britain in both form and function. The Pinjarrah Mounted Volunteers, in one of the more

blatant displays, chose to adopt the uniform of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), which was a

"very spectacular dress but very unsuitable and difficult to obtain".54 Their short-lived compatriots,

the Union Troop of Western Australian Mounted Volunteers reportedly adopted a hussar uniform.55

The troop at Kyneton adopted a no doubt very glamourous, but fairly unserviceable, uniform of dark

blue with light blue facings and peaked cap.56 Purported military roles could be just as haphazard,

even within individual colonies. The Kyneton Corps had offered their services to the Victorian

government as mounted riflemen but their compatriots in Sandhurst were keener on being traditional

cavalry and managed to procure some obsolete police swords from the government.57 The Pinjarrah

Mounted Volunteers, in keeping with their dragoon inspiration, equipped themselves with some light

53Moreton Bay Courier, 12 Mar. 1862, cited in Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 31. 54Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, p. 30. The inspiration for this choice presumably lay with the Officer Commanding who was an ex-Cornet of that regiment. 55Ibid., p. 32. 56Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 5. 57Ibid., pp. 5 & 7.

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cavalry swords and a few carbines.58 Despite their colonial context units that took the title of mounted

rifles were often also imitating the trends of the home country where various mounted rifle volunteers

corps had been established after 1860, themselves often in imitation of the Cape Mounted Rifles.

Compounding this chaotic grassroots approach was an often unclear view about the place of

mounted troops emanating from the government and their military administrators. Official opinion on

the role and place of mounted troops in the colonial military forces varied considerably. In 1858 one

South Australian parliamentarian had told the house that there was little value in using coastal

fortresses to defend the coast against the most likely form of attack, a landing party from a frigate or

privateer, and that a body of irregular horsemen "might be readily brought to the coast in case of an

emergency."59 There:

If they were not in a position to fight, they could run away - (a laugh) - and even in the last extremity if they became invisible to the enemy, it would clearly show them that they had not been exterminated...[W]ith fifty men such as he had described, they would be able to stop a force of 200 invaders.60

For some even such a basic scheme was too much. In 1865 the Chairman of a South Australian

commission into the colonial defences, John Hart, and P. Egerton-Warburton, a volunteer Major and

also the Commissioner of Police, wrote in a dissenting opinion to the final report of the commission:

We are opposed to all expenditure on cavalry, being scarcely able to see the remotest probability of such an arm being required; on an attempted invasion, a few mounted orderlies would be useful, but a slight augmentation to the present Mounted Police would be sufficient.61

It was view that the now Colonel P. Egerton-Warburton would repeat in a similar 1876 report when

he had become the Colonial Commandant of the Volunteer Military Forces in South Australia.62 An

1881 New South Wales Royal Commission expressed a similar view when, after declaring that a body

of cavalry was necessary "in connection with the defences" of the colony, it expressed interest in a

suggestion from the Inspector General of Police that 300 Mounted Policemen could be used for

58Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, p. 30. 59The Hon. Mr. Baker, South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 21 Sep. 1858, Column 175. 60Ibid., Column 176. Mr. Baker's complete statement to the house would indicate that he himself was the member of a new, unnamed, mounted corps that had recently failed to gain government approval. 61South Australia, Report of Commission Appointed by the Governor-in-Chief to Report on Colonial Defences, 1865. SRSA, GRG 24/90/413. 62South Australia, Report of Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Whole Question of the Defences of the Province, 1876, p. vii. SRSA, GRG 24/90/232.

46

vedette and outpost duty if required.63 In contrast to this sort of official indifference to mounted

troops, one unofficial Tasmanian source, displaying notable clarity, wrote in 1860 of the mounted

rifles in Tasmania that:

It is not expected that [they] will ever be employed as regular cavalry; indeed in a country like Tasmania, densely wooded and full of broken ground and mountain gorges, regular cavalry would be almost useless, but as irregular cavalry and scouts the services of Mounted Rifles would be invaluable, and as such we rejoice at the addition which has been made to our defences.64

Given these military and social circumstance it is hardly surprising that the mounted corps

that had been born in the long series of war scares from the mid-1850s and the late 1870s were in

complete decline by the early 1880s. With the disbandment of the remaining units in West Australia

and Tasmania in 1883 only South Australia and Victoria maintained any mounted troops as part of

their colonial forces. Victoria’s forces were, however, in an advanced state of decay and when a new

government with an active Minister of Defence, the volunteer artilleryman Major (later Lieutenant-

Colonel) Frederick Sargood, finally acted in 1883-4 on the findings of an 1875 Royal Commission,

only the Sandhurst Troop survived.65

Crystallisation - 1885 to 1889

The depleted colonial ranks were again replenished from 1885 when a new war scare, this

time stemming from Anglo-Russian tension on the Afghan frontier, brought a new wave of military

enthusiasm. Fed also by the war Britain was fighting in the Sudan and the sending of a New South

Wales contingent to that conflict during the same year, there followed a new wave of mounted units

across almost all the colonies. The large and popular Victorian Mounted Rifles joined the lone troop

of the Victorian Cavalry that year. In New South Wales the government found itself faced with

applications from all over the colony to raise and equip troops of volunteer cavalry, including one

offer from a cattle station owning family in the colony's north, the Chauvels, to raise a cavalry force

for actual service on the North-West frontier of India, the seat of the Anglo-Russian tensions. Their

offer was declined but they were invited to raise a corps for the colonial defence forces.66 Five

63New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Military Defences Inquiry Commission, 1881, pp. 24 & 67. There were also a number of minority of opinions in favour of establishing a body of cavalry or mounted rifles in New South Wales but no agreement could be reached on this. 64Launceston Examiner, 22 Nov. 1860, cited in Wyatt, A Lion in the Colony, pp. 4-5. 65Millar, 'The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District', passim & p. 153. 66Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', p. 247.

47

mounted infantry corps were also raised in Queensland in 1885, though three folded within the year.67

South Australia’s existing Adelaide Mounted Rifles converted to lancers in 1886 and were joined in

the same year by the South Australian Volunteer Mounted Rifles. Only in Tasmania and Western

Australia did no new mounted units come into existence between 1885 and the end of the decade.

What is significant about the mounted corps raised in the eastern colonies and South Australia

during this period, however, is that these bodies were, in contrast to earlier efforts, broadly successful

and managed to survive as viable organisations. Though they were by no means free of the problems

that had beset earlier corps, in these bodies it is possible to recognise the beginnings of the units that

were eventually formed into the Australian Light Horse after federation. The relative success of the

mounted corps of the 1880s and 1890s owed much to changing views towards colonial defence in

general, and mounted troops in particular, that began in the second half of the 1880s and would last

until the end of the century. Of considerable importance also was the basis on which these new corps

were raised and organised.

The Victorian Mounted Rifles, raised in 1885 by the Victorian born but Indian Army trained

Colonel Tom Price, was established on a large, though unpaid, scale. Its establishment of 1000

members was organised into forty-five detachments in nine companies spread throughout Victoria and

linked by the public rail network.68 Of greatest significance for the continued success of this unit,

however, was the permanent staff that made up a significant part of its command and training

structure. The commanding officer, the adjutant and eighteen sergeant-majors made up the permanent

staff paid by the government and were able to commit their full time and energy to the efficient

operation of the unit.69

New South Wales' effort was led in early 1885 by the Sydney Light Horse Volunteers which

made their first public appearance in March of that year when they were part of the parade to mark the

departure of the New South Wales contingent to the Sudan.70 Towards the end of that year the

Colonial Commandant, Colonel Richardson, converted them to lancers after his return from the

Sudan, so that some "pomp and circumstance" might be added to the troop that was now regularly

acting as the Governor’s escort.71 By the end of 1886 this Sydney troop had been joined by another

67Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 128. 68Winty Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen: Colonel Tom Price and the Victorian Mounted Rifles (Melbourne: Jimiringle Publications, 1985), p. 26. 69Ibid., p. 20. 70The Sydney Light Horse Volunteers were gazetted in 1885 under the Volunteer Force Regulation Act, 1867 and received only arms, cavalry bridles and saddle cloths from the government. P.V. Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers 1885-1985: Incorporating a Narrative of the 1st Light Horse Regiment, A.I.F. 1914-1919 (Parramatta, NSW: Royal NSW Lancers Centenary Committee, 1986), p. 5. 71Ibid., p. 7. From this point the troop was regularly referred to as The Sydney Lancers. The troop also adopted the uniform of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers.

48

seven troops of cavalry around the colony and collectively they were known as the New South Wales

Cavalry Brigade Reserves, under the command of Captain Malcolm Macdonald, one of the founders

of the Sydney Light Horse and a veteran of Indian frontier fighting where he had been the one time

commander of the Poona Horse.72 The organisation was a loose one with each troop wearing different

uniforms and carrying varying types of arms. This force was added to in 1888 when a number of

companies of partially paid mounted infantry were raised throughout the colony to be organised as the

Mounted Infantry Regiment under Major H. Lasseter, late of the 80th Regiment of Foot, during

1889.73 Only briefly in existence and made part of this regiment was the Corps of Permanent Mounted

Infantry. Raised in 1888 it was intended as a training school for the supply of horses and men for the

instructional purposes of officers, but was removed from the establishment in July 1889 as a cost

cutting measure.74 The cavalry, after being made to abandon their colourful old-British style uniforms

for more a serviceable brown one in 1889, were taken on to the partially-paid establishment in

January 1890 thus doing much to assure their future.75

In Queensland the two mounted infantry corps still surviving at the end of 1885, and some

additional corps that were raised soon after, began to find some stability from 1887 by converting

from volunteers to part-paid militia.76 In the late 1880s Queensland maintained mounted infantry

corps around Brisbane, Bundaberg, Gympie, Mackay and Charters Towers. The Darling Downs

Mounted Infantry was added in 1890 and a further reorganisation in 1897 rearranged all of

Queensland’s mounted units into the Queensland Mounted Infantry.77 South Australia, despite

wishing to spare itself the cost of paying for mounted troops and keeping them on a largely volunteer

basis, was able to maintain the small corps of lancers and the mounted rifles throughout the late 1880s

and into the mid-1890s when the two were amalgamated into the South Australian Mounted Rifles in

1895.78 Tasmania was unable to find the personnel or money for any mounted troops at this time and

would not have any again until after the first Tasmanian troops had sailed for South Africa and the

72Ibid., pp. 4-7. The troops in 1886 were Illawarra, West Camden, West Maitland, Ulmarra, Grafton, Upper Clarence (2 x troops). 73Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', p. 248. 74Ibid., pp. 247-248. & Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 11. The companies of mounted infantry were at this time located at Tabulam, Bega, Queanbeyan, Picton, Campbelltown and Inverell. See also, Anon. A Short History of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, 1888-1913 (Sydney: Marchant & Co., 1913, pp. 7-8. 75The change to the partially-paid establishment took place on 1 Jan. 1890. Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 14, NSW cavalry retained considerable colour on their uniform for some time yet, however. Through the 1890s the lancers wore uniforms with large red facings. 76Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, pp. 128 & 132. 77A.J. Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 7. 78Zwillenberg, 'Citizens and Soldiers', p. 147.

49

Boer War in 1899. Western Australia, similarly short of cash, laboured on with its volunteer force and

its mounted arm was made up of small, relatively token, corps through the 1890s.79 However, those

mounted formations in the mainland eastern colonies that had been established on a relatively stable

basis were now in a position to capitalise on a significant shift in defence thinking in Australia in the

decade to come.

Colonial defence concerns of the nineteenth century stemmed from the development of steam

powered warships in the middle of the century. Steam warships, not being reliant on traditional wind

and trade routes, could potentially avoid the Royal Navy and operate close to Australian shores where

they might be in a position to raid the main coastal cities or hold them to ransom.80 Concerns that the

Royal Navy may not be able to protect the colonies as they once might have meant that any

ambiguous action by one of Britain’s imperial competitors, when combined with the relatively

unprotected nature of the colonies, often produced a marked sense of anxiety, or sometimes a virtual

panic, in the Australian colonies. Governor Bowen of Queensland had written to the Secretary of State

for the Colonies in 1860 that:

On my assumption of office as Governor of Queensland [I fear]...a collision with a Great Power which maintains a naval and Military establishment at New Caledonia [France] only three days sail from Moreton Bay was considered in some quarters to be far from impossible. Yet I found that Brisbane and Ipswich, the two principal towns of this Colony, each containing a large amount of British property in its banks and warehouses, could easily be sacked, or laid under contribution, by the boats of a single man of war. [sic]81

This particular concern was no doubt made more acute by the then current apprehension about a war

between Britain and the France of Napoleon III. As one author has put it, there was "an almost

eighteenth-century flavour to fears of bombardment and threats of extortion."82 The fear of the naval

gunnery of Britain’s imperial competitors ensured that defence thinking during from the 1860s until

the late 1880s was focussed mostly on the construction, maintenance and manning of coastal

fortresses. This was especially so as much early colonial defence planning had relied on British

officers of the Royal Engineers, Colonel William Jervois and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Scratchley in

particular being prominent.83 Scratchley had been involved in building fortifications in the

79According to one source there is evidence that a number of West Australia’s infantry corps may have unofficially established their own small mounted infantry detachments in order to maintain some mounted capability during the 1890s. No official body was again sanctioned, however, until 1900. Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, p. 58. 80Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 19 81Governor Bowen to Secretary of State for Colonies, 10 Apr. 1860. Cited in Ibid., p. 22. 82Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 191. 83Ibid., pp. 115-122.

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Australasian colonies as early as the late 1850's and was appointed Jervois' assistant for an inspection

tour of the defences of the Australian colonies during 1877-78. Though he viewed mobile land forces

as having an important role in supporting forts and stopping any enemy that might try to land away

from the fixed defences, the reports submitted by Jervois placed fortifications at the centre of colonial

efforts at defence. In general these were the views that shaped almost all colonial defence thinking for

much of this period, but by the late 1880s there was more attention being paid to the idea that the

mobile field forces could play a more than supporting role and represent a significant defence asset in

their own right.

Contributing to this changing view was the fact that by the early 1890s the range of modern

naval guns was becoming such that ships could now bombard key colonial cities from deep water

instead of having to run the gauntlet of fixed defences as they would once have had to do.84 Of more

significance, however, was a growing view that a form of citizen soldiery could be an effective

method of defending the colonies. It was an idea that had been gestating for some time. For example,

Captain Bagot, parliamentarian and member of the South Australian forces, had told that colony's

parliament as early as 1858 that:

What they wanted was an armed population. They all knew very well the value of the guerilla in Spain. They had caused more support to British arms than was thought. Then, again, as an evidence of what untrained men could do, there was Bunker's Hill, where pitchforks were the principal weapon in use. They must not attempt to drill the people. They would not submit. It must be their own act to use the arms as they pleased. If there was any alarm every man would seize his pitchfork or matchlock, as he thought fit, and do good service. They could from behind houses or any other shelter oppose a most formidable, even though irregular, resistance.85

The problem with a guerilla model such as Bagot's was that it was more suited to combating a long

term foreign occupation than a determined raiding force on land for a limited time. It was also not a

model to impress imperial officers, or locals who thought about defence, as a particularly reliable

method of deterring or defeating any potential enemy. The general concept that citizen soldiers could

be an effective means of defence had been a significant factor in the outbursts of volunteer enthusiasm

in the preceding decades, but was to receive particular reinforcement during the 1880s.

Considerable attention was given during that decade to the outcome of the First Anglo-Boer

War of 1880-81. During that brief war the citizen-based Boer army had twice beaten the British

regular army in the field, first at Laing's Nek and then more famously at Majuba Hill. In doing so the

fledgling Boer Republic had maintained its independence from Britain. The example of Boer farmers,

who had little training apart from their life of shooting and riding on the veldt, defeating the famed,

84Zwillenberg, ‘Citizens and Soldiers’, p. 138. 85South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 21 Sep. 1858, Column 176.

51

disciplined regulars of the British Army was one that led many Australian citizen soldiers, and their

supporters, to feel more strongly that a force of citizen soldiery was the perfect model to emulate. It

was not a view necessarily confined to the Australian colonies. In Guild Hall in London one of

Britain’s most prominent soldiers, General Sir Frederick Roberts, had told an audience of what he saw

as the great the value of citizen soldiers that were highly proficient as marksmen and capable of using

the terrain to their advantage.86 Citizen forces in both Britain and Australia could take heart from such

experiences and the statements of men like General Roberts.

Mounted troops could take particular comfort from the actions in South Africa as the Boers

had fought the war essentially as mounted riflemen. Equipped with a rifle and made mobile by their

small and hardy veld raised horses there were obvious comparisons to be made with the growing

number of mounted rifle and mounted infantry bodies being raised throughout the Australian colonies.

These too, being mostly based in rural areas, could see themselves as farmer-soldiers ready to grab

their rifle and horse in order to spring to the defence of their homeland with the natural skills they had

acquired in their life in the bush. This combined with a view, with a growing number of local and

British adherents that mounted infantry and mounted rifles were an increasingly important arm of the

British Army, particularly in colonial situations. Observations on the American Civil War also played

their part and the writings of the cavalry theorist, George Denison, were certainly known to

Australians with an interest.87 One parliamentarian considered:

[M]ounted infantry as the most important force of the future. This view had been borne out by Lieutenant-Colonel Denison in his prize work on cavalry tactics and the history of cavalry. This writer pointed out that during the civil war in America mounted riflemen in many cases actually won battles against three times their number of cavalry. The great advantage they possessed over infantry was that they were armed with the same weapon, and had at the same [time] the mobility of cavalry. Even in charges these mounted infantry, with their revolvers and rifles were superior to the ordinary cavalry men with their sabres... [What South Australia] wanted was 200 or 300 mounted riflemen in the neighbourhood of Adelaide...88

Drawing, rather selectively, from these overseas experiences colonial mounted rifle and infantry corps

increasingly began to practice what was called skirmishing tactics. That is "being proficient in

marksmanship in the field, highly mobile, and capable of taking advantage of natural cover."89 The

sort of tactics and skills that had long been the lot of the light cavalry, that the Cape Mounted Rifles

86Zwillenberg, ‘Citizens and Soldiers’, p. 147 87Ibid., p. 146. 88The Hon. A. Catt. South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 4 Sep. 1889, Column 796. It was his opinion that this Adelaide force should be raised as the current mounted rifles, being based in country districts, was too far from Adelaide to be effective if required. 89Zwillenberg, ‘Citizens and Soldiers’, p. 148.

52

had been practising since the 1820s in a colonial context, and that were gaining increasing currency at

this time among the established armies of Europe in light of the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War.90

One historian has contended that Tom Price was given command of the Victorian Mounted Rifles

because his experience in India had taught him the skills and value of the irregular tactics employed

there by mounted rifle style units.91 This developing attitude towards the citizen soldier in general,

and mounted rifle and mounted infantry units in particular, was to become all the more important

from the late 1880s after the visit of a high ranking British officer to conduct a review of the defence

of the Australian colonies.

Major-General J. Bevan Edwards visited all the Australasian colonies in 1889 in order to

review the forces and advise the respective governments as "to the uniform organisation of their local

forces with a view to enabling them to co-operate effectively in the event of joint action becoming

necessary..."92 He recommended a variety of reforms to each of the colonies including the major one

of establishing a broadly common structure of forces throughout the colonies, which could be brought

together in time of emergency so that "30,000 or 40,000 men could be rapidly concentrated to oppose

an attack upon any of the chief cities..."93 This combined force would have the dual purpose of

creating a greater deterrent for any prospective attacker and creating a greater sense of security in

these distant colonies, thereby hopefully reducing the number of "unseemly scares which take place

whenever the relations of the mother country with a foreign power are somewhat strained."94 This

focus on a combined defence effort acted as a counter to the traditional favour towards local defence

and fortifications. Edwards recommended that defence of the Australian colonies should now be

based on a mobile forces brigaded in such a way that, upon hostilities breaking out, they could be

formed into divisions without regard to the colony from where the brigade originated.95 These mobile

brigades were to be balanced forces made up of all arms in which mounted troops would play an

important, but by no means dominant, role. Generally, however, he conceived that the mounted forces

of the various colonies were important assets for their defence and urged Tasmania, devoid of any

90Howard, 'Men Against Fire', passim. 91Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 17. In colonial services these types of bodies would often be termed 'irregular cavalry' or ‘auxiliaries’. 92Lord Knutsford to the Governors of the Australian Colonies 17 Jun. 1889, Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies By Major-General J. Bevan Edwards. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1890, Vol. 49, p. 6. 93Maj-Gen. J. Bevan Edwards, Memorandum on the Proposed Organisation of the Military Forces of the Australian Colonies, Serial 11, Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies By Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1890, Vol. 49, p. 22 94Ibid., p. 22. 95Ibid., p. 22.

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mounted troops, to raise a corps quickly as without "mounted troops, the field force would be liable to

be surprised, because you would have no means of gaining information of the enemy’s movements,

nor could you delay his advance."96

Of significance for the mounted troops also, was his evident preference for the colonial

mounted rifle and mounted infantry corps over the local cavalry corps. The cavalry of New South

Wales, already 420 strong, represented a force of reasonable size that could perhaps be made use of,

but Victoria and South Australia’s small corps received no particular encouragement.97 In the same

report he recommended the cavalry corps of New Zealand would "be of greater use if they were

drilled and equipped to act as mounted infantry."98 Indeed his proposed organisation for the mobile

brigades contained no provision for any traditional cavalry at all.99 In contrast mounted rifles or

infantry received considerable encouragement. He reported to Victoria that no "part of your force will

be of greater use in war than the Mounted Rifles, and it is the arm most suited to the defence of

Australian Colonies..."100 South Australia was encouraged to make their mounted rifles partially-paid

and reorganise them into a regiment "as it would take the place of cavalry in time of war."101

Queensland too was urged to give "every encouragement...to this important branch of your forces."102

To New South Wales he recommended that the small Permanent Corps of Mounted Infantry should be

disbanded as a cost saving measure, but that the establishment of the partially paid mounted infantry

should be dramatically increased from its current 297 personnel to over 1000 organised into three

regiments complete with permanent staff as administrators and instructors.103

The proposals made by Edwards in his reports of 1889 were never carried out to their full

extent. The establishment of a 30,000 to 40,000 soldier field force was still beyond the organisational,

technical and financial resources of the colonial military forces and, as yet, also beyond Australian

political development. London had also taken a relatively dim view of some the aspects of his reports.

The Colonial Defence Committee, though generally agreeing with the report, took the view that he

had grossly overplayed the likely threat to Australia, declaring, quite realistically, "there is no British

96Ibid., p. 16. 97Ibid., p. 9. Edwards recommended the NSW Cavalry be made partially paid militia so that they may 'then form a very economical force of cavalry.' p. 9. For Victoria see p. 11 & South Australia see p. 18. 98Ibid., p. 27. 99Ibid., p. 22. 100Ibid., p. 12. 101Ibid., p. 18. 102Ibid., p. 14. 103Ibid., p. 8.

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territory so little liable to aggression as that of Australasia."104 Still, the spirit of his report remained

and large all arms field forces remained part of Australian defence thinking until well after federation.

Edwards' interest in the mounted troops of the colonies and mobile field forces would leave a

long legacy in Australian military circles. His evident preference for mounted rifles and mounted

infantry over traditional cavalry in the colonial context also had ramifications for the mounted troops

of the colonies. His view did not set off a heated debate equivalent to what was happening in Britain

at this time, but it did provide a backdrop to the development of mounted troops in Australia through

the 1890s. Furthermore, the focus he placed on mobility gave mounted troops an increasingly

significant place in the military organisations of the late pre-federation period.

The 1890s

The value and place of mounted troops in general, and of mounted rifles and mounted

infantry in particular, was reflected during the late 1880s and 1890s by the increasing number of

manuals produced locally for their training purposes. The other branches of the colonial forces were

generally content to make use of the many relevant manuals produced in Great Britain for their

training.105 Cavalry corps too were generally happy to use the current version of Cavalry Drill from

the War Office. Mounted rifle and mounted infantry corps were, however, becoming more interested

in making some modifications to what was on offer from London. The move was gradual and often

reflected the confusion, by no means isolated to Australia, surrounding the military roles of mounted

rifles and mounted infantry. In the late 1880s the Victorian Mounted Rifles, evidently seeing

themselves as mounted infantry regardless of their title, were content to train primarily from infantry

manuals.106 South Australia made moves during the same period to produce a number of mounted

manuals for the instruction of its own troops. The 1888 publication of a mounted rifle manual that

outlined the mounted rifleman as fulfilling a similar role to the cavalryman was followed the next year

by the Regulations and Field Service Manual for Mounted Infantry.107 Given that at this time South

104Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee to the Proposed Organisation of the Military forces of the Australasian Colonies, Enclosure to Serial 12, Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies By Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1890, Vol. 49, p. 31. 105These imperial manuals were either brought out from Great Britain or reproduced without modification locally. For example, two versions of Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry, 1870 and 1885, both had local print runs, the first in Sydney, the second in Melbourne. 106Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 40. The key manuals being used in 1887 were: Queens Regulations, Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry, Infantry Sword Exercise, Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, Regulations for Mounted Rifles, and Mounted Rifles - Miscellaneous Duties. A copy of Field Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry, 1885 held in the Australian War Memorial is marked on the inside cover as belonging to the Victorian Mounted Rifles. 107The correct title of the 1888 manual is unclear. The original cover and title page of the copy in the possession

55

Australia only had some lancers and was in the process raising some mounted rifles, the publication of

a mounted infantry manual is somewhat confusing, especially as it was quite adamant that:

Mounted Infantry are usually called into existence in order to provide picked Infantry soldiers capable of acting with the Cavalry, and of using their rifles and bayonets to the greatest advantage when great rapidity of movement is requisite.108

Without any corps of mounted infantry, this description did not sit well with the form of mounted

troops that South Australia then had at its disposal, though it is possible that they had in mind an

imperial model and were contemplating mounting some infantry as an expedient should the situation

demand it. Any doctrinal confusion seems to have been cleared up in 1891 when a new Manual of

Drill and Field Service for Mounted Rifles was produced.

Though produced in South Australia these manuals were essentially reproductions of the

relevant imperial manuals. There was little or no modification for what might have been seen as local

conditions. Queensland, however, produced a manual for its mounted infantry in 1892 that had a

significant local content. The drill and regulations section was based on British manuals but, rather

than adopt a complete manual, what were deemed as useful sections were taken from a number of

different sources, Mounted Infantry, 1889 and Infantry Drill, 1890 in particular. Furthermore,

Queensland’s Staff Officer for Mounted Infantry, Major Percy Ricardo, added an introduction that

clearly stated the Queensland conception of what mounted infantry were and how they were to be of

service to the colony if required.

The following should be kept constantly in view by officers and men of Mounted Infantry:- 1. That as there is no cavalry in the Queensland Defence Force, Mounted Infantry may sometimes be called upon to perform work which would other wise fall to the lot of cavalry, but it must be impressed on the men that they are in no sense cavalry, their horses being provided merely as a means of locomotion. [italics in original] 2. That it must be clearly understood that, whereas in the Imperial Service recruits for Mounted Infantry are picked Infantry Soldiers, in the Queensland Defence Force, on the contrary, Mounted Infantry are chiefly composed of horse owners who can ride, but who have little or no knowledge of infantry drill.109

Queensland was adamant that their mounted troops would, despite being recruited and trained as

of the State Library of South Australia is missing and the work is simply titled Mounted Rifles, 1888 for catalogue purposes. This may be the original title but it is unlikely. The manual clearly outlines as the role of mounted rifles as the sort of roles that are traditionally light cavalry duties, essentially outpost and screening. 108South Australia, Regulations and Field Service Manual for Mounted Infantry (Adelaide: H.F. Leader, Government Printer, 1889), p. 5. 109Queensland Defence Force, Drill Regulations and Field Exercises for Mounted Infantry, Issued with General Orders, 16 Apr. 1892 (Brisbane: James C. Beal, Government Printer, 1892), p. 5.

56

horsemen, remain strictly in the role of mounted infantry. Any attempt by mounted infantry to become

even vaguely like cavalry was to be resisted. A few years after the publication of this manual one

Queensland official was concerned there was "great danger of Mounted Infantry forgetting their real

function - of Infantry provided with horse to carry them - and [becoming] a kind of Cavalry."110

Queensland at least, seemed to know what it wanted from its mounted troops. South Australia

had been somewhat confused but by the early 1890s had evidently chosen a path for its mounted

troops. New South Wales too had to undergo a period of discovery and reform, but in this case it was

driven by an imperial officer with a clear vision for mounted troops who would make the mounted

forces of New South Wales the most complete and well organised in the Australian colonies.

Edward Hutton, a Colonel in the British Army but with the local rank of Major General,

arrived in New South Wales to take up the command of the colony’s forces in late May 1893.111 With

considerable colonial war experience in various parts of Africa, Hutton was also, importantly for New

South Wales, one of the British Army’s foremost proponents of mounted infantry. Having

commanded the mounted infantry made up from the King’s Royal Rifles in the Egyptian War of 1882,

he had also been involved with the raising and running of the instructional Mounted Infantry School,

established at Aldershot in 1888 under the auspices of Lord Wolseley.112 He had long been an

advocate of this branch of the British Army, speaking on it at the Royal United Service Institution in

London as early as 1886.113 He was an officer firmly convinced of the value of rifle equipped

mounted soldiers:

When the great area over which modern battles must extend, the vast range of fire, the accuracy and deadly nature of modern firepower, are considered, it follows that rapidity of movement and the power of covering distances at a rapid pace by the advanced bodies of troops becomes a necessity.114

Like many officers of his generation and doctrinal inclination he had been influenced by

110Notes on W. Okeden's memo. QSA PRE/20. This item is undated and its author unknown but probably dates from late 1893 or early 1894. The file deals with attempts to reduce defence costs through cuts to the mounted infantry. 111He arrived in Sydney by train from Melbourne on Sunday 28 May 1893 and took up his appointment the following day. Warren Perry, 'Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in New South Wales 1893-96', The Australian Quarterly 28: 4 (Dec. 1956) 67. 112E.T.H. Hutton, 'The Evolution of Mounted Infantry', Empire Review 1:4 (May 1901) 374. Hutton had served in the Zulu War of 1879, South African War 1880-1, Egyptian War 1882, and the Sudan War. 113Major E.T.H. Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution XXX:CXXXV (1886) 695-738. 114Major-General Sir E.T.H Hutton, 'Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War', The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1902), p. 8. This chapter of this 1902 publication was originally given as a lecture at the United Service Institution of New South Wales on 28 Aug. 1894.

57

interpretations of the American Civil War and the First Anglo-Boer War, the latter experienced at first

hand. Though he never acknowledged him directly, it is not difficult to identify the influence of

George Denison in his views on mounted troops. During this stay in Australia he developed the belief

that it was the mounted troops of the Australian colonies that were their greatest military resource. He

told an audience to a lecture at the Military Society at Aldershot in 1896 that:

Good as the Infantry and Artillery are, the arm of the country is undoubtedly the Mounted branch...A contingent of such men as served in the Mounted Rifles and Lancer Regiment in New South Wales during 1893-96 would be worth their weight in Westralian gold upon any campaign in which British troops may be engaged.115

Upon his arrival in Sydney Hutton found two mounted elements under his command. The

New South Wales Cavalry, partially paid since 1890, was still organised on a relatively loose basis

with different detachments sometimes carrying different types of weapons, though the lance was

quickly becoming the preferred weapon and they now had a single, relatively drab uniform. The

Mounted Infantry too had a single uniform, but were organised on a more homogeneous basis

throughout the colony. The two bodies were of about the same size with 420 cavalrymen and 418

mounted infantrymen in the colony in 1892.116 Together this total body of mounted troops, called the

Mounted Regiment, could contain up to 900 personnel depending on how the various detachments

around the colony were maintaining their numbers. Hutton thought that a body this size needed a

more thorough organisation so that it could become an efficient force for the colony.

Hutton outlined his proposed reorganisation to the New South Wales government in June

1893. Firstly, he considered that the control of a single body of 900 horse mounted personnel by one

man, as was then the case, was "beyond the capability of any one Commanding Officer...and is

inconsistent with all precedent."117 He therefore suggested a number of reforms. The Mounted

Regiment would be renamed the Mounted Brigade and placed under the unpaid command of the now

Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm Macdonald of the Cavalry Regiment. The two branches of the mounted

forces would form units of this brigade, in each case to be commanded by a Major. Significantly from

a general doctrinal point of view, and in reflection of Hutton’s conception of the forms of mounted

units, the Mounted Infantry would be renamed the Mounted Rifle Regiment as the former, was "a

misnomer in the sense that it is understood in the Imperial Service."118 Hutton had long standing

views of the relative roles and places of mounted rifles and mounted infantry. He had told the Royal

115Major-General Sir E.T.H Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1902), p. 47. This is a reprinting of a lecture he originally gave at Aldershot on 24 November, 1896. 116Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 18 117Maj-Gen. Hutton to The Principal Undersecretary, 28 Jun. 1893. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6139, Item 93/8407.

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United Service Institution in 1891 that:

Mounted or Mobile Infantry are infantry soldiers pur et simple, who are so organized, equipped, and trained as to be capable of receiving any available means of rapid locomotion to enable them to act as infantry soldiers with the greatest rapidity and mobility... Mounted Rifles on the other hand, are defined as horsemen trained to fight on foot, men who are mounted and intended to perform all the duties of cavalry, except that which may be best described as 'the shock.' It is expected of them that they should perform all the outpost, reconnoitring, and patrolling of an army in a manner similar to cavalry; the only difference being that they must rely solely upon their fire powers for defensive and offensive action.119

These definitions are worth noting because they would have long term and profound implications for

the future development of Australia’s mounted troops. Hutton took the opposite view to his

Queensland counterparts and decided that the men of the now Mounted Rifles Regiment, being

recruited as horsemen and horse owners, should not be classified as infantry trained to ride, but as

horsemen trained in certain cavalry and dismounted duties. It was an organisational and operational

template that would have a long influence in Australia.

Hutton’s final recommendation for the re-organisation was the appointment of an imperial

officer to the position of Second in Command of the Mounted Brigade. Hutton was of the opinion

that:

There is no Officer of the knowledge, experience or organising capacity for the control of Mounted Troops to be found in this Colony. With the best intentions Mounted Troops, except Commanded by an able and experienced Officer are useless; and without such an Officer my efforts to place the Mounted Troops of the Colony in a satisfactory condition will be paralysed.120

Hutton presented this as a way to improve the efficiency of the brigade and as way to train a suitable

local officer to succeed the imperial officer, and the ageing Colonel Macdonald, at the end of an

appointment of three years.121

This was the one of his suggested reforms that was never carried out.122 The remainder was,

118Ibid. 119Lieutenant-Colonel E.T.H. Hutton, 'The Mounted Infantry Question in its Relation to the Volunteer Force of Great Britain', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. XXXV:160 (Jun. 1891) 787. 120Maj-Gen. Hutton to The Principal Undersecretary, 28 Jun. 1893. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6139, Item 93/8407. 121New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony: Report for the Year 1894 by Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, New South Wales Legislative Council Journal, 1895, Part 2, pp. 10-1. 122Though parliament voted money for the filling of the appointment by an imperial officer for a number of years, no British officer ever took the position up. In 1896 the government decided that the appointment should be filled by a local officer. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6351, Item 96/18506. Hutton had tried to get an officer from

59

and an order in July 1893 created the New South Wales Mounted Brigade with Colonel Macdonald as

Colonel Commandant of the brigade. Major A.J Dodds was given command of the Cavalry Regiment

and Major H. Lassetter retained command of the new Mounted Rifle Regiment. More than just an

administrative arrangement the two mounted regiments were also supported within the brigade by

elements of the Field Artillery, Engineers and Service Corps. Generally the balance between the

mounted rifles and the cavalry was maintained with each contributing equally to the brigade. Despite

his being an advocate for mounted infantry and mounted rifles there was never any suggestion that he

considered the New South Wales Cavalry Regiment a useless part of his forces. He wrote highly of

the mounted troops generally, but of the cavalry in particular in his report for 1893.

It would be impossible to speak too highly of the spirit which animates all ranks, the horsemanship, and the physique of the mounted troops generally. An excellent degree of practical efficiency has been reached, especially in the Lancers.123

Hutton had never advocated the disposal of traditional cavalry in his writings and had generally seen

other types of mounted troops as being complimentary to British cavalry, only fully replacing them in

colonial situations where regular cavalry could not be obtained.124 The New South Wales Cavalry

Regiment, being over 400 strong, was also decidedly viable as far as colonial units went, and was the

only successful body of cavalry in the Australian colonies. Without any doctrinal or administrative

reason to dispose of it the future of the New South Wales cavalry was assured until after federation.

Hutton’s attempts at reforming Australian mounted troops were not just confined to New

South Wales, however. In 1894, at his instigation, the officers from a number of the colonies met at

Victoria Barracks, Sydney, to consider the creation of a training manual to be used by all the mounted

troops of the Australian colonies.125 Hutton considered that the "want of a Manual for drill and interior

economy suited to the Mounted Troops of Australia had for some time pressed itself upon the

attention of all the Commandants of the Australian Colonies."126 Colonel Joseph Gordon, late Royal

Artillery and Commander of the South Australian Forces, agreed, telling his government that the

"preparation of a Drill Manual for Mounted Rifles is very necessary and it is most desirable the

India, Captain Marling VC, to fill the job with the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1894, but Marling declined. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6225, Item 15258 & Item 94/2182. 123New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony: Report for the Year 1893 by Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, New South Wales Legislative Council Journal, 1894-5, Part 3, p. 10. 124Hutton, 'Mounted Infantry', pp. 698-701. 125This was not Hutton's only effort at influencing the troops of the other colonies. In 1894 he attended the Victorian camp at Langwarrin and put the Victorian Mounted Rifles through its paces. The Adelaide Observer, 25 Jan. 1896, p. 12. 126New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony: Report for Year 1895 by Major-General E.T.H. Hutton. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6257, Item 95/4827.

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Mounted Rifle Corps of the several colonies should be instructed on similar lines."127 Major-General

Alex Tulloch, the Victorian Commandant, was also in agreement, especially as the relevant imperial

mounted infantry manual was out of print and not obtainable either in Britain or the colonies.128 The

committee, made up primarily of Hutton, Gordon and Tom Price of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, met

at the conclusion if the Inter-Colonial Defence Conference, that October.129 Hutton forwarded the

report of the committee to the New South Wales Government in late 1894 and the resulting manual

was being prepared for printing shortly after the New Year.130

The Manual of Drill for the Mounted Troops of Australia contained, like the earlier

Queensland mounted infantry manual, a preface that stated a conception of the role that mounted

troops would play if they were required. This time, however, it was written by Hutton and it

represented a clear statement of what he considered the function and place of mounted troops, not just

in New South Wales, but in Australia as a whole. The opening paragraph stated that:

In no country in the world will a mounted force be found more necessary for military operations than in Australia. Distances are so great, transport away from the great lines of rail so difficult, that, as in America at the commencement of the great war of Secession, 1862-65, [sic] so in Australia would success be to that force which had the best and the most completely equipped mounted force. It was entirely due to the magnificent force of improvised mounted troops which the characteristics of its inhabitants enabled the Southern States to put in the field that their initial success was due, and it was not until the Federal States, with their far greater resources, following in the footsteps of the South, similarly provided themselves with a powerful and efficient mounted force that the tide of success finally turned in their favour. So will, undoubtedly, be the result of any warlike operations which may in the future be conducted on this continent. Success will be to that army which can turn to account the splendid inherent resources which the Colonies of Australia possess in the supply of horsemen, who, while hardy and of an independent character, have all those British characteristics which have made and are now making an Empire and race without parallel in the history of the world.131

127Emphasis in original. Col. Joseph Gordon to Chief Secretary, 19 Jun. 1894. SRSA, GRG 24/6/657/1894 128Maj-Gen. Alex Tulloch to Victorian Secretary of Defence, 4 Jun. 1894. Copy held in QSA. COL/A 785. 129Queensland’s Commandant had contemplated sending Major Percy Ricardo but the Queensland Government had not felt disposed to do so, probably for reasons of economy. Note attached to telegram, J. Brinker, Chief Secretary of New South Wales, to Premier of Queensland. QSA. COL/A 785. Captain G.L Lee of the NSW Mounted Brigade acted as the committee’s secretary with two other assistant secretaries, RSM R. R. Thompson and J.W. Neisigh. 130New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony: Report for Year 1895 by Major-General E.T.H. Hutton. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6257, Item 95/4827. Once the conference report was approved by the New South Wales Government it was also circulated among the other colonies. 131Maj-Gen. E.T.H. Hutton, 'Preface', in The Manual of Drill for the Mounted Troops of Australia, 1895 (Sydney: F. Cunningham & Co., Government Printer, 1895), p. iii. Parts of this preface were taken directly from a lecture Hutton delivered to the New South Wales United Service Institution in 1894 on the 'Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War'.

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Despite the fairly simplistic summary of the American Civil War and the expression of the idea that

Australians made excellent natural horse soldiers (of which more will be said in a later chapter), this

was a succinct summary of Hutton’s views on mounted troops and how he saw them in the Australian

context. It is also a clear indication, given the comments on the American Civil War, of the influence

of Denison. In the preface Hutton even went as far as to use the same basic premise that Denison did

in his works and point out Napoleon’s belief "that the value of troops in war...is in inverse ratio to

their rapidity of movement. This axiom is more especially true of mounted troops."132 He then, like

Denison, went on to advocate the strategic use of self-sufficient mounted formations capable of

independent operations that are also able to withstand the assaults of the enemy through their use of

rifle based dismounted tactics and field artillery.133 Hutton had written the manual so it was suitable

for all the forms of mounted troops in Australia. Cavalry, mounted rifles and mounted infantry were

all given tactical roles in the manual, though the basic drill for all was essentially the same. However,

the focus on dismounted tactics by all forms of mounted troops and the important place given to

mounted rifle style units reveal that it was these types of units that Hutton was directing the manual

toward and that were his main concern.

Hutton was not the only person to be pushing mounted riflemen as the ideal Australian

mounted soldier. One New South Wales parliamentarian, Edward O'Sullivan, produced a pamphlet in

1894 to support the development of mounted rifle formations in Australia. His pamphlet, The Power

of Mounted Riflemen, was dedicated to Hutton, Major H. Lassetter of the Mounted Rifle Regiment,

and the officers and men of the Queanbeyan company of that regiment, who were among his

constituents. The author of this work felt that:

It is a happy coincidence that we have in Major-General Hutton, the Commander of our Defence Forces, a gentleman who, next to Sir Evelyn Wood, has done perhaps more than any other man to establish Mounted Riflemen as a popular and effective branch of the British Army.134

Like Hutton, O'Sullivan, also evidently influenced by Denison, looked upon the example of American

mounted riflemen in the Civil War as worthy of emulation, in particular the Battle of Five Forks near

the end of the war when Union mounted soldiers had played an important role against General Lee's

fast fading Confederate army.135 O'Sullivan was more interested, however, in the performance of the

132Ibid., p. vi. 133Ibid., p. vi-viii. Like Denison, Hutton did not dismiss the role of traditional cavalry but the emphasis is definitely on mounted rifles style troops. 134E.W. O'Sullivan, The Power of Mounted Riflemen: Illustrated by the Performances of the Boers in the Transvaal War and Sheridan’s Mounted Regiments in the Great Civil War in the United States (Queanbeyan, NSW.: Age Office, 1894), p. 3. 135Denison had written of the actions of Union cavalry under General Sheridan at Five Forks in his A History of

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Boers against the British in 1880-1 at Majuba Hill, Laing's Nek and Bronkhurst Spruit.136 His reason

for focussing on the performance of the Boers was as much social as military. His pamphlet is perhaps

the clearest expression from this period of the parallels that could be drawn between the Boer farmer

and his Australian counterpart. For him the Boers were "graziers and farmers, who correspond almost

in every particular to our selectors."137 They had "shown clearly that in forest or bush warfare the

colonial soldiers are superior to the best trained troops in the world, and it indicates the kind of tactics

which our volunteers should resort to if New South Wales is ever invaded..."138 Thus in the mobile

warfare that was likely to take place after the landing of any enemy expeditionary force it was

mounted riflemen that would be of great value due to the skills in horsemanship and shooting that

they, like the Boers, supposedly possessed.139

O'Sullivan and Hutton were by no means the only people in the Australian colonies to look

favourably upon mounted rifles. Major-General Sir Charles Holled-Smith, an imperial officer and

Military Commandant of Victoria 1894-1899, was of the opinion that:

We want as many mounted rifles as we can get...You don’t want cavalry, for there are any amount of wire fences and other obstacles to the proper and efficient use of cavalry, but Mounted Rifles are absolutely the most important force in the defence of the colony, always excepting an adequate force of artillery at the Heads to work the guns. I cannot help thinking...how absurd it was in our campaign against the Boers in the Transvaal to employ such a large proportion of infantry. The Boers were practically mounted rifles and as such were, of course, able to outmarch our infantry everywhere. They were what mounted rifles should be - good shots and good riders.140

Hutton’s successor in New South Wales, Major-General George French, imperial officer, artilleryman

and late Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, held a similar view towards the relative

utility of cavalry and mounted rifles in Australia. In his report to the government for 1897, after

pointing out that Australian horses were generally suited for mounted rifle, but not cavalry work, he

explained his favour for mounted rifles over cavalry in detail.

The main point for us to consider is, taking into consideration all the circumstances of

Cavalry, pp. 390-1. It seems likely that this was the source for O'Sullivan's interest in this example of American mounted troops using mounted rifle style tactics to great success. 136O’Sullivan, The Power of Mounted Riflemen, passim. 137Ibid., p. 7. 138Ibid., p. 19. 139Ibid., pp. 2-3. 140The Adelaide Observer, 25 Jan. 1896, p. 12.

63

this country, what form our Mounted Forces should take - 'Cavalry' or 'Mounted Riflemen'? (a) That the country along the coast, which must be the seat of war, is quite unsuited for the action of Cavalry in large bodies. (b) An enemy could not bring any number of Cavalry here, and horses so landed would, in many cases, be unfit for immediate service; consequently Cavalry will not be required to repel Cavalry. (c) The main reliance of an invading force must be in its Infantry, which can be carried in large numbers in modern vessels. Infantry have little to fear from Cavalry; but would be sorely pressed if mounted men with magazine rifles, and well able to use them, attacked them at pleasure in front, flanks or rear. (d) Finally, we can turn out excellent Mounted Riflemen in thousands; but the number of properly trained and Mounted Cavalrymen would be few. (29) For the above reasons, I have no hesitation in advising that any extension of our Mounted Forces should be in the direction of Mounted Riflemen...141

He then went on to exhort the government to encourage the formation of mounted rifle volunteer

corps to supplement the existing partially paid regiment, as well as request that the existing body

should be 'enlarged and extended'.142 It is likely that French's pro-mounted rifle attitudes were based

on his experiences in Canada where, in 1873, he had been appointed the first commissioner of the

North West Mounted Police.143

That Australia was good source for mounted riflemen was a view also shared by the Governor

of Victoria of the late 1890s, Lord Brassey.144 An enthusiastic publicist on naval and maritime

affairs,145 he wrote to Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1897 advocating

the establishment in Australia of a partially paid reserve force of 5,000 mounted rifles, to be paid for

by the British Government on condition that the force would be available for service anywhere in case

of war.146Evidently impressed by the contingent that the Victorian Mounted Rifles had recently sent to

Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations, and probably influenced by Holled-Smith and other

colonial commandants,147 Brassey wrote to Chamberlain claiming that "there can be no question as to

141New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony. Report for the Year ending 30th June, 1897, By Major-General G.A. French, RA, CMG, Commanding Military Forces, p. 5. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6395, Item 97/15032. Emphasis in original. 142Ibid., pp. 5-6. 143R. Sutton, 'French, Sir George Arthur', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 8: 1891-1939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), pp. 586-7. 144Lord Brassey was Governor of Victoria 1895-1900. B.R. Penny, 'Brassey, Thomas, first Earl Brassey', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 7: 1891-1939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), pp. 391-2. 145Ibid., p. 391. 146Lord Brassey to Joseph Chamberlain, 23 Aug. 1897, Appendix to: Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Secret No. 126M, Mounted Rifles for Imperial Service in War, 5 Feb. 1898. TNA:PRO, CAB 8/2. 147Stephen Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum: British Army Officers and Military Commandants in the

64

the efficiency of the men, especially for irregular warfare and in hot climates."148 In support of this he

pointed out that the "military spirit here is strong, and horses incredibly cheap."149 The Colonial

Defence Committee considered the proposal and there was a general warmness to the whole idea of

getting a colonial contribution to imperial defence, but there were a number of problems that ensured

the scheme foundered. Firstly, there was a concern about the costs involved, in particular as to

whether Britain would get value for money from a non-regular colonial force. There was also a

feeling that regular cavalry was still more valuable, "even in native wars", than 'irregulars' serving

under officers and non-commissioned officers whose training may well be deficient in comparison.

Finally, the committee was worried that forming an Australian corps, and possibly using it in

unpopular campaign, could be detrimental to the broader aims of imperial co-operation, not to

mention Australian federation. Lord Brassey was asked to consider his proposal further but the idea

was never to come to fruition.150 This was the first plan to use Australian mounted troops for imperial

service since 1885 when Victoria, trying to match New South Wales, had unsuccessfully offered 400

mounted infantry to London for service in the Sudan, but it was not to be the last.151

While mounted rifle and mounted infantry units were receiving particular encouragement

during the 1890s, the few remaining cavalry units in the Australian colonies were, with some notable

exceptions, finding it difficult to survive. In Victoria the last remaining troop of cavalry, at Sandhurst,

had been removed from the establishment in 1892 and there seemed no inclination on the part of

Victorian government or its military officials to encourage any other bodies of cavalry. An attempt

had been made to establish a volunteer cavalry troop in Melbourne in October 1890, but the

Department of Defence saw no value in the idea. Apart from the difficulties of raising a volunteer

troop in what was now a largely militia system, the minister saw other difficulties with the idea of

having cavalry in Victoria.

As regards their wish to be enrolled as Cavalry he [the minister] cannot recommend their application to the government. It would be unwise of the Defence department [sic] to encourage the formation of an arm of the service which was not likely to be valuable. What the colony required was an efficient and well-drilled body of men

Australian Colonies and New Zealand, 1870-1901', Ph.D. Thesis, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 1999, pp. 263-4. 148Lord Brassey to Joseph Chamberlain, 23 Aug. 1897. Appendix to Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Secret No. 126M, Mounted Rifles for Imperial Service in War, 5 Feb. 1898. TNA: PRO, CAB 8/2. 149Ibid. 150Memorandum by the Colonial Defence Committee, Secret No. 126M, Mounted Rifles for Imperial Service in War, 5 Feb. 1898. TNA:PRO, CAB 8/2. 151Sir Henry Loch, Governor of Victoria, to Earl of Derby, 30 March 1885. Correspondence Respecting Offers by the Colonies of Troops for Service in the Soudan, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1884-85, Vol. 52, Item 14. See also: Telegram sent to Adjutant-General, 17 Feb. 1885. NAA(M) B3756, 1885/1395.

65

able to move rapidly about from place to place for purposes of locomotion (but fighting on foot). The Regt. of Mounted Rifles fulfills these conditions and he [the minister] would advise them to consider whether it would be wise to join this body. The opinion of the highest authorities at home as well as those in command here are strongly against Cavalry.152

When the last remnants of the Adelaide Lancers were incorporated into the South Australian Mounted

Rifles in 1895 only the cavalry of New South Wales remained.

As pointed out earlier the New South Wales Lancers (an evolution of the New South Wales

Cavalry), having become partially-paid, were able to maintain their numbers and maintain their

viability through the 1890s. An 1892 New South Wales Royal Commission into military affairs had

commented that the "high state of efficiency to which this force has attained is a strong inducement to

the Colony to maintain it."153 Yet, as Major-General French’s comments in his annual report above

highlight, it was not necessarily the favoured form of mounted troops in the colony. The Sydney

Morning Herald commented those remarks had "hurt the feelings of cavalrymen".154 Even Hutton,

who had praised the Lancers for their enthusiasm in his report for 1893, had not been totally content

with their approach to training. In the same report he pointed out that he had to make "some necessary

changes in the method of carrying the firearms, and some alteration in tactical training, so as to

develop the power of dismounted action..."155 Evidently he must have felt that his cavalry regiment

needed some encouragement to modernise their methods so they would get off their horses and use

their firearms when the situation demanded it. It would seem this reform had little effect as French

later complained that "with fine contempt for the carbine, they were not expert riflemen."156

Some within the Lancer regiment itself did not, however, evidently share this skepticism

about their value. Detachments of the Lancers had sailed to England to compete in the Royal Military

Tournaments in 1893 and to take part in the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897, on both

occasions exciting considerable comment at home and in Great Britain.157 After the 1897 trip there

arose within parts the regiment a desire to build upon these experiences by going on active service.158

In 1897-8 the commanding officer of the New South Wales Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel James

152Unsigned notes 10 Dec. 1890 attached to letter, Victorian AAG to E.J. Dye, 24 Nov. 1890. NAA(M) B3756/0, 1890/3749. 153Cited in Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 18 154The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Jan. 1902, p.6. 155New South Wales, Military Forces of the Colony: Report for the Year 1893 by Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, New South Wales Legislative Council Journal, 1894-5, Part 3, p. 10. 156French cited in The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Jan. 1902, p.6. 157Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 18-20 & 25-30. 158Ibid., p. 30.

66

Burns, sought to give his regiment some realistic overseas experience by offering a lancer force of

about 100 for service in India where the Indian Army was then engaged against the Afridi tribes on

the North-West Frontier.159 Opinions about the motivation for this offer have been mixed. The

regiment’s historian, P.V. Vernon, has followed the lead of the journalist Frank Wilkinson who wrote

a small book on New South Wales cavalry in 1901,160 and claimed that Burns only wished to "make

his regiment efficient - efficient in the only true meaning of the term, through knowledge of the

rigours and realities of active service." Major-General French seems to have been broadly of the same

opinion at the time, urging the government to pass the offer onto London and drafting a suitable cable

to facilitate this.161 It is worth noting however, given French's attitudes about cavalry, that he

recommended to the government that recruiting for such a force should not be restricted only to the

lancer regiment.162 The then Premier, George Reid, was more concerned about the idea, commenting

when he rejected the proposal that he "did not wish to see a spirit of unrest and military adventure

grow up in this country."163 Another historian of the regiment, Barry John Bridges, has also looked

askance at the lancers' expressed motivations:

When 'training' requires the killing of foreigners far from home, especially their own land, without any immediate relation to the defence of one's country or concern for the issues of the conflict it is absurd to suggest that this is anything but naked militarism...[A]t least a substantial part of the NSW lancer regiment was spoiling for a fight and willing to take one wherever it could get it...They [wanted to go]... out of a desire for adventure, to 'prove' their manhood, or from patriotism usually of the unreasoning, morally bankrupt, 'my country right or wrong' variety.164

This opinion is undoubtedly a harsh one and also highly polemical (and perhaps more than anything

reflects a view of military matters in the 1970s), but it does highlight that the regiment’s purported

reasons for seeking active service have not always been viewed as benignly as it might have liked.

Regardless, with Reid unwilling to entertain the idea the lancers instead began to focus on sending a

training detachment to England in 1899 and would have to wait for a conflict in South Africa for a

159Barry John Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902', M.A. Thesis, University of South Africa, 1975, pp. 27-8. 160Frank Wilkinson, Australian Cavalry: The N.S.W. Lancers Regiment and The First Australian Horse (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1901), passim. 161Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 264. 162Ibid. 163Cited in Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 31. 164Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War', pp. 28-9. It should be noted that Bridges makes these comments in light of this offer and also in light of the way in which efforts were made to get lancers to South Africa in 1899. This will be covered in a later chapter.

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chance to try their hand at war.

A sense of military adventurism also pervaded another pre-Boer war proposal by a New

South Wales cavalry officer to use Australian mounted troops on imperial service. Lieutenant-Colonel

James Mackay had started his citizen soldiering in 1885 when he had been involved with the raising

of the West Camden Light Horse, but in 1897 he took the opportunity of the revival of volunteer units

in New South Wales to found his own unit, the 1st Australian Horse. A pastoralist and New South

Wales parliamentarian he was also something of an author, producing numerous short stories, ballads

and novels, among which was the Chinese invasion novel, The Yellow Wave.165 Mackay drew on the

remote country districts not currently utilised by the New South Wales forces to recruit his regiment

and he was always keen to promote it as a force of bushmen.

This regiment I have raised myself and it purely a bush organisation, the men being either Shearers, Station hands, Farmers, or Squatters, and officers, in nearly all cases, sons of old squatting families. These men are all natural riders and good shots, and are accustomed to roughing it as part of their daily life...166

Despite the general preference for mounted riflemen Mackay chose instead to fashion his new unit as

cavalry. When, in July 1899, Mackay made his proposal to the New South Wales and British

governments to establish a regiment of "auxiliary cavalry in Australia to be subsidized by the Imperial

Authorities, and to be used for the defence of the Empire when and where required", he was firm on

what shape it should take:167

As my proposed recruiting grounds are the homes of men who practically live in the saddle, it is absolutely necessary to respect the sentiment which makes these men love the Cavalry branch of the before all others, therefore I cannot too strongly advocate that they be called 'Cavalry', and not 'Mounted Infantry', or 'Rifles'. The arms I would suggest are the Lee Enfield short Rifle [sic] - recently adopted in Cape Colony; Cavalry Sword and Frog attached to saddle; and revolver to be carried on the person. Armed in this way all the dismounted work done by Mounted Rifles can be accomplished, and, at the same time, the sword will give them the extra advantage possessed by Cavalry; and, what is far more important, the prestige and pride which belongs peculiarly to that weapon, and which appeals in a singular degree to all men who love their horses and know how to ride them.168

165Peter Burness, 'Mackay, James Alexander Kenneth', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 10: 1891-1939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986), p. 294. When he began recruiting for this unit Mackay was still only a Captain in the NSW Forces. He was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1898. 166Lt-Col. Mackay to Governor of New South Wales, Earl Beauchamp, 18 Jul. 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP. 167Ibid. 168Ibid.

68

The sense of prestige surrounding traditional cavalry was an important factor for Mackay and his offer

of imperial service should be seen in this light. As one recent scholar has put it, this "was a scheme

proposed by a colonial swashbuckler who fancied himself at the head of a cavalry charge on the plains

of India or the veld of southern Africa."169 In pushing this proposal Mackay seems to have completely

bypassed the commandant, French, and taken the idea directly to the Premier, George Reid, and the

Governor, Earl Beauchamp.170 Given French’s attitudes to cavalry this may have been a wise move as

it received a warm welcome from the latter two. Reid gave it his "hearty support", and when passing it

on to London the Governor asked for it to be given "the most favourable consideration."171 Reid’s

earlier opposition to military adventurism was probably overcome in this case by the prospect of there

being no requirement for his treasury to foot any of the bill for the regiment.172 The Colonial Defence

Committee considered the proposal, and despite there being some evidence they considered that it was

a "much more detailed and practical looking scheme than [Lord] Brassey's",173 it was felt in London

that any such proposal should wait until after federation and until the lessons about using colonial

troops in the now raging war in South Africa were digested.174

The late century attempts to have Australian mounted troops made part of imperial

campaigns, even as auxiliaries, was testimony to a growing confidence among the local corps. That

enthusiasm reflected both a degree of naivety and the real developments that Australia’s mounted

troops had made since the middle of the century. Then mounted units were typically the direct result

of panic following one of Britain’s war scares, be it with Russia or France. Each scare saw local men

establish that they should do something and like their cousins in Britain that something was often

raising a volunteer corps of cavalry or mounted rifles. Whether it was cavalry or mounted rifles

depended as much on whim as anything else. Such early efforts were severely hampered, however, by

the intrinsic weaknesses of the units that were founded and also by an almost complete lack of

colonial government direction and spending. After 1885 colonial governments had become mature

and financially stable enough to begin to shape the enthusiasm of its martially inclined citizens and

the units that were established after this time, at least in the eastern mainland states and South

Australia, reflected this government involvement. With such government involvement came a need to

better define the role and place of mounted soldiers in colonial defence schemes. The key part of any

169Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 275. 170Ibid., p. 276. 171Earl Beauchamp to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, 9 Aug. 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP 172Clarke, ‘Marching to Their Own Drum’, pp. 275-6 173Minute by E.H.M 14 Sep. 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP 174Maj. W. Nathan to Sir E. Wingfield, 21 Feb. 1900. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP

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colonial defences were the forts and their armaments, but should the enemy land away from them then

mounted troops were clearly going to be important. Edwards’s proposals for a inter-colonial Field

Force were overambitious but reflected one effort to address this problem. Cavalry retained enough

institutional strength in New South Wales to continue existing, but because of the limited training

time that citizen soldiers could provide their governments, the shape of most units came to be that of

the mounted rifleman. By requiring less training, it was thought, and combining mobility with

firepower this was the most flexible and useful type of mounted force that the colonies could create.

These practical notions were reinforced with a growing military-social idea that Australian bushmen,

like the Boers of South Africa, made excellent natural soldiers. The next chapter will look into how

these ideas withstood the test of battle.

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Chapter 3 The South African War

1899-1902

Though the figures are subject to dispute, the Australian colonies and, after 1901 the new

federation, sent approximately 16 000 men to fight in the South African War, or Boer War, of 1899-

1902. New South Wales alone sent perhaps 6200 men, at about 3500 Victoria sent nearly half as

much. The smallest colony, Tasmania, sent just 800.1 However, as many men volunteered more than

once for different contingents and others made their own way to South Africa to join one of the many

units raised there, or were there when the war started and did much the same thing, such figures are

indicative only. The most recent and authoritative history of Australia’s war estimates that perhaps 20

000 Australian men were involved in fighting it in one way or another.2 Almost all of them did so as

mounted soldiers. The war that broke out in South Africa in 1899 came at a time when the mounted

troops of the Australian colonies, for all their faults and weaknesses, had become relatively mature.

The confused and hesitant steps of the mid-nineteenth century had been left behind and the mounted

corps of the late colonial period generally possessed, with or without justification, a surety about

themselves, their military role and their martial abilities. Except in New South Wales where cavalry

continued to have an institutional strength, all the colonies that maintained mounted troops had opted

to maintain them on a variation of the mounted rifles or mounted infantry model. Every mounted

body, regardless of doctrinal inclination, was imbued with ideas of the bushman as soldier, and South

Africa would provide an acid test for both these social ideas and broader military theories about

mounted troops in modern warfare.

Despite the predominant colonial view favouring mounted rifles and mounted infantry it was

to be a detachment of the New South Wales Lancers that would be the first Australian mounted troops

to go to war. Unable to get any colonial government support for their proposals to send a lancer force

to the North-West Frontier the regiment had instead conceived of a plan to send a squadron of 100

men to train with the regular cavalry in Britain for six months. The colonial government had no

interest in this proposal either, but when Earl Carrington, the colony’s ex-Governor and the

regiment’s Honorary Colonel, obtained practical government support in London and enough money

1Max Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, 1899-1902: A Map History (Canberra: The author with the assistance of the Army History Unit, 1999), p. 88. A primary source provides other figures: NSW: 4756, Vic.: 2445, Qld.: 2056, SA: 1038, WA: 923, & Tas.: 555, for a total of 11 773 men sent overseas: Return of all Military Contingents to South Africa. NAA(M) B168, 1901/3438. Another return in another file gives slightly different figures. NAA(M) B168, 1901/4678

2Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. xiii.

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was raised to underwrite the venture, the New South Wales government allowed them to go provided

it did not have to foot any of the bill. Arriving in England in late April 1899, the trip was an imperial

public relations triumph but it seems that its value as a training experience was limited.3 Nevertheless

when the political situation in South Africa began to deteriorate mid-year some of the detachment,

particularly its commander, Captain Charles Cox, began to think of volunteering their military

services. There was some tension within the detachment about who would and would not go on active

service, and it seems that a number of the waverers were pressured to sign up.4 Despite this not all of

the men proved willing to volunteer and because others were not medically fit enough, or were too

young for the New South Wales government to let them go, in early November only sixty-nine lancers

disembarked at the Cape to fight the Boers.5 Those who returned home faced perhaps a more difficult

fate and were subjected to a regimental inquiry, and such public and press opprobrium, almost

regardless of how valid had been their reasons for not going, that all who could subsequently

volunteered for later contingents for South Africa. One of them reportedly told another lancer that he

had to come back to South Africa because the pressure on him had been such that "a man couldn't live

in Sydney".6

The lancers would not, however, be Australia’s only military contribution to the war for long.

Queensland had been the first Australian colony to offer troops to London, and had done so as early as

July. Though not all of them were as enthusiastic, the other colonies soon began to think along similar

lines and the telegraph cables between London and the colonial capitals saw more military traffic than

usual over the next months. At the urging of the Victorian government the colonial commandants met

in Melbourne in September to discuss the possibility of sending a combined Australian contingent.

They suggested sending a combined arms force of over 2000 men, but this hesitant step towards

military unification was soon overtaken by events in South Africa and succumbed also to growing

inter-colonial rivalry. London sealed it when it made it clear it wanted smaller contingents that could

be subsumed into the larger imperial forces.7 The now infamous cable of 3 October told the colonies:

Firstly, units should consist of 125 men; secondly may be infantry, mounted infantry, or cavalry; in view of numbers already available, infantry most, cavalry least

3Bridges, 'The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War', pp. 30-6.

4Ibid., p. 46.

5Ibid., pp. 89-90.

6Tpr. Bert Barclay cited in ibid., p. 73.

7Stephen Clarke, 'Manufacturing Spontaneity? The Role of the Commandants in the Colonial Offers of Troops to the South African War’ in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Boer War, Army Nation and Empire: The 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial History Conference (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), pp. 133-44.

72

serviceable.8

The subject of much later criticism, this cable appears to have been largely the result of a hasty

decision in London by General Sir Redvers Buller rather than British obtuseness about Australia’s

supposed military forte.9 The cable had little affect on Queensland’s plans as its offer of a contingent

of 250 mounted infantry had already been accepted. New South Wales included the lancers already on

their way to war into their contingent and recruited more to fill out the small numbers already

committed.10 The 1st Australian Horse and New South Wales Mounted Rifles were also allowed to

raise contributions (eventually increased to squadron size) for the force and a company of infantry

provided the arm that London seemed keenest on. Victoria too raised a squadron from the Victorian

Mounted Rifles and added it to an infantry company for its first contingent. South Australia, Western

Australia and Tasmania provided infantry as per London’s request.11 There proved to be enough

enthusiastic militiamen to fill the ranks of these first units except in South Australia and Queensland

where men outside the forces had to be resorted to.12 Major Percy Ricardo could only find 123

members of the Queensland Mounted Infantry who were willing to join and after scouring another 25

men out of the artillery had to resort to "men who said they were, or had been, members of the

Queensland Defence Force."13 Men enlisting in the New South Wales contingent had to pass an exam

concerning discipline, be pronounced medically fit, pass shooting and riding tests, be over twenty-one

years old and not be articled or apprenticed to a profession.14 Similar conditions applied in the other

colonies.

These first contingents embarked for the war in November and began arriving in December

just in time to greet the news of Boer victories at Colenso, Stormberg and Magersfontein, the reverses

of Black Week. The new arrivals were sent forward to where the army wanted them but back home

8Despatch by Colonial Secretary to Canada, South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria, 3 Oct. 1899, cited in: Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa (London: H.M.S.O., 1903), p. 77. Hereafter referred to as the Elgin Commission Report.

9Elgin Commission Report, pp. 76-8.

10Barry John Bridges, 'New South Wales and the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902', PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, 1981, p. 70, & Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 389.

11Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 389-413, & Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, pp. 30-2.

12Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 22. As with so much else relating to contingents to this war this is also subject to dispute. One source claims that the New South Wales Mounted Rifles could not find a full quota and had resort to public enlistments, see: Bridges, ‘New South Wales and the Anglo-Boer War’, pp. 157-8.

13Report by Maj. P. Ricardo cited in Rex Clark, First Queensland Mounted Infantry Contingent in the South African War (Canberra: The Military Historical Society of Australia, 1971), p. 8.

14Bridges, ‘New South Wales and the Anglo-Boer War’, pp. 159-60.

73

the defeats brought out a swelling imperial loyalism that soon produced another series of colonial

contingents. London’s taste for infantry had disappeared and now they were happy to accept mounted

men, but still only relatively small bodies of them. Raised and despatched to the war through

December 1899 and January 1900 they generally joined, and in some cases subsumed, the smaller

first contingents already campaigning.15 Black Week also spurred on a number of wealthy men to

approach both London and the local colonial governments about raising a new force of colonial

soldiers recruited from the bush - the sort of men who could, theoretically at least, match Boer farmers

on their own terms. An empire wide movement with its eventual equivalents in Britain, Canada and

New Zealand, the resultant mounted Australian contingents became known as the Bushmen. Financed

in part by public subscription they were, in the words of one historian, "a curious blend of gentlemen's

sons and roughnecks".16 The number of volunteers for these new contingents were huge but all the

colonial efforts were hampered by a lack of suitable officer material, many of the best permanent and

citizen soldier commanders having already been sent across the Indian Ocean.17 London, keen for

manpower seemingly regardless of its military quality, sought more such material and asked the

colonies to produce more Bushmen (to be known as the Imperial Bushmen) for which it would carry

the costs.18 Like the Bushmen before them, who had left in February and March 1900, they were

largely intended for service in Rhodesia, though in the event many would disembark at the Cape or

Durban when they arrived in May and June 1900.19 Later, in early 1901, the new states of the

Australian federation stepped in where the new national government could yet not, and they raised

another round of contingents (generally referred to as the Draft contingents), again as agents for the

imperial government.20 These waves of volunteers, roughly linked by the methods of their raising,

financing, and the timing of their despatch, were also separated by colonial loyalty and origins, as

well as by a certain degree of organisational idiosyncrasy, as is evidenced by the confusing array of

unit and contingent titles used to label them. To learn their names and track their respective

movements takes a not inconsiderable amount of time and a very reliable reference work. It would not

be until the new federal government was able to organise its own contingents in early 1902 that

organisational uniformity would characterise Australia’s military contribution to the war in South

Africa.

The war that these men fought has traditionally been separated into two distinct phases. The

15Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 25-30.

16Ibid., p. 31, & Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, pp. 32-3.

17Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 33-5.

18Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, p. 33.

19Ibid., pp. 33-4.

20Ibid., pp. 35-6.

74

first commenced in October 1899 when the Boer commandos of the South African Republic (the

Transvaal to Britons) and the Orange Free State crossed into Natal and the Cape Colony. After the

difficulties and defeats that year British fortunes began to recover the following February with their

new commander, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, and by mid-March they had taken Bloemfontein, the

capital of the Orange Free State. There followed a pause there during April, but Roberts again

commenced an advance on 3 May taking Johannesburg at the end of the month before entering

Pretoria in early June 1900.21 President Kruger of the South African Republic had fled and though

there had been no surrender, Roberts and others thought the war effectively over at this stage. The

Boer commandos had withdrawn eastwards from Pretoria towards Portugese East Africa and were

gradually dispersing under continuing British pressure. Kruger left Africa for European exile in

October and despite some significant fighting into the second half of the year the war was changing

into a guerilla campaign. Roberts went home in November, convinced that little more than tidying up

and policing remained to be done, and left his ex-Chief of Staff, General Lord Kitchener, to carry out

this work. There followed, until the final peace settlement on 31 May 1902, an increasingly bitter

guerilla war where mobile columns swept the countryside occasionally sparking a pitched battle, but

more often small skirmishes. Lines of block houses sprung up alongside the railway lines, and then

across the countryside, to provide something to pin the mobile Boers against, and a policy of enforced

relocation of Boer women and children to camps was pursued in order to remove one of the enemy's

key logistic and moral supports .22

The various Australian contingents found themselves involved in both phases of the conflict.

The first small arrivals were dispersed to various parts of the Cape Colony as the circumstances

required. The New South Wales Lancers found themselves split upon arrival with the bulk joining the

regular cavalry under General Sir John French at Colesburg. A smaller detachment of twenty-nine

men was sent to join Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen's division further to the west as it worked up

the railway line towards Kimberley.23 The Queensland Mounted Infantry was entrained for Belmont

and took part in a small battle at nearby Sunnyside on 1 January 1900 which, as the first notable

victory after Black Week, became a moment of some public and military celebration. It was notable

also because Victor Stanley Jones, a soldier with the Queenslanders, became the first man in an

Australian uniform to die in battle.24 It was also the first battle for a Captain with the Queenslanders,

Harry Chauvel, later to win fame in the Middle East as the Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps.

The infantry companies sent by the colonies soon found themselves mounted on horses and unhappily

21Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, pp. 7-11.

22Ibid., pp. 13-26, & Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 162.

23Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 58.

24Ibid., pp. 63-4.

75

amalgamated into the Australian Regiment under the command of a Victorian, Colonel John Hoad, as

part of Lord Roberts' plan to drastically increase the number of mounted troops at his disposal. All of

these early contingents served as part of Roberts' dual advance on Bloemfontein.25 Here the Australian

Regiment was disbanded and along with all the other Australians, except the Lancers and 1st

Australian Horse who stayed with French's Cavalry Division, were reorganised in to a mounted

infantry brigade under the command of the ex-New South Wales Commandant, Major-General

Edward Hutton. Hutton, long enthusiastic about the military potential in the colonies, thought it a

portentous moment in imperial history. He wrote to his wife that the "responsibility is very great,

quite as much political and imperial, as it is military."26 So organised they took part on the advance

into the Transvaal and onto Pretoria before the last operations of 1900 and heading back to Australia

at the end of the year.27

Many of the Bushmen and Imperial Bushmen contingents, when they arrived, were put into

the new Rhodesian Field Force and, leaving Beria in Portugese East Africa, moved down through

Bulawayo and into the Transvaal from the north where some Queenslanders were present at the relief

of Mafeking. At Elands River in the first half of August 1900 500 men, three hundred of which were

Australian Bushmen, withstood a siege for twelve days.28 These men and the contingents that

followed found themselves involved in the guerilla war that had replaced the more conventional

fighting that the first contingents had taken part in. They became part of the mobile columns that

conducted the incessant 'drives' across the Transvaal, The Orange Free State, Natal and the Cape

Colony until the end of the war.

Mounted Troops and the South African War

On the other side were the citizen Boer riflemen of the two republics along with a few foreign

idealists and those Boers in the British colonies of the Cape and Natal who were inclined to throw in

their lot with them. Again it is impossible to know how many fought but one South African source

estimates that the two republics put 90 000 men into the field during the course of the war.29 These

men were organised around the commando system that was both a social and military feature of Boer

25Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, pp. 47-50.

26Edward Hutton to wife, 2 Apr. 1900. Hutton, Edward T.H. Letters and Press Cuttings, 1900-1904, MS 1215.

27Chamberlain, Australians in the South African War, pp. 47-50.

28Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 119-27.

29Maj. G. Tylden, The Armed Forces of South Africa (Johannesburg: City of Johannesburg Africana Museum, 1954), p. 19.

76

life.30 A relatively loose military organisation it was officered by landholders and other local notables

elected to their posts and depended on the willingness of the lesser farmers and bywoner (men with no

land but movable property such as cattle) who made up its rank and file to go on campaign.31 Much of

its military heritage stemmed from the sort of colonial warfare against black Africans that had

characterised conflict in the region since the arrival of white settlers, but the victory against the British

in the short war of 1880-81 had been a recent military triumph.32 Apart from a small force of

permanent artillery, most Boers fought as the archetypal mounted riflemen. Using their small hardy

horses for mobility they dismounted to fight with their rifles, were more inclined to skirmish than

close for the assault, and like many citizen armies were disinclined to incur too many casualties.33

Though men with forceful personalities and proven battlefield nous could command great respect and

loyalty as leaders, many commandos had loose standards of discipline and Boers could leave their

comrades and head home without apparent concern if they were so inclined.34 Perhaps their greatest

asset was their knowledge of the country they were fighting in and their ability to exploit it.35 Captain

John Antill of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles reported that their defensive positions were very

good, "being almost impregnable..." and were "very difficult to see...".36

The countryside where much of the fighting took place was the South African veld, the high

open grassy plateau between 5000 and 7000 feet above sea level. The summer months were wet and

provided useful pasture but rivers were frequently flooded and virtually impassable. During winter the

rivers became passable and the ground hardened as there was little rain, but pasture disappeared and

drinking water became scarce.37 The clear air and open terrain allowed the observer wide

uninterrupted views and also allowed the possessor of a weapon to begin firing at their mark at

extreme range. To consider such long range rifle fire as genuinely aimed would be overly generous,

but at 2500 yards a Boer Mauser bullet could still kill and the experience of men being hit by unseen

30Lt-Col. Ian van der Waag, 'An Overview of the Nature, Origin and Development of the Commando System in South Africa, 1715-1899', unpublished notes drawing on Afrikaner sources provided to author. p. 6. Hereafter referred to as ‘An Overview of the Commando System'.

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33Tylden, The Armed Forces of South Africa, p. 17.

34van der Waag, ‘An Overview of the Commando System’, p. 8.

35Wilcox, Australia's Boer War, p. 12.

36Capt. John Antill, OC NSWMR to AAG NSW Forces, 7 Jan. 1900. AWM1, 4/8.

37Ian Beckett, ‘The South African War and the Late Victorian Army' in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Boer War, Army Nation and Empire: the 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial Military History Conference (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), p. 36.

77

riflemen at long range gave much to a belief that Boers were excellent marksmen.38 Boer shooting

could be very accurate and was enhanced by their knowledge of the country and practice at judging

distances. The Australians defending at the Elands River post in August 1900 found the shooting of

De le Ray's commando very accurate indeed.39 But in a military system that relied on the attitudes of

individuals as to how much they should practice their skills, Boer shooting standards were inevitably

uneven. Queensland’s Percy Ricardo noted in a letter after one skirmish near the Vet River that "we

were within 500 [yards] when he opened fire on us with shrapnel and Mauser, luckily the fire was

very wild..."40 During the peace negotiations following the First Boer War in 1881 a British cavalry

regiment, the 14th Hussars, had challenged a group of Boers to a shooting match and found they

outshot them at 300 and 500 yards.41

To counter the Boers Britain sent just over 5500 mounted men to South Africa in 1899, about

2 percent of the total force deployed. This was made up of about 4500 regular cavalry, and 1100

Mounted Infantry made up of men drawn from line regiments who had largely received instruction at

the Mounted Infantry Schools before the war.42 To this it hoped to add about another 8-10 000

irregular horsemen at the Cape and in Natal.43 The demands of the campaign, however, meant this

number was soon considered deficient. Faced with a mobile enemy organised as mounted rifles and

forced to patrol vast tracts of territory just to properly secure their own forces, let alone secure the

British colonies, meant that more mounted troops were soon needed. Despite the logistical problems

that increasing the numbers of horsemen would bring, the disasters of Black Week had been caused in

large part by poor British reconnaissance due to a lack of mounted men.44 The result was a call for

more mounted men that overturned the "infantry most, cavalry least serviceable" attitude of the early

days.

The regular cavalry had an early success in October 1899 when the 5th Dragoon Guards

managed a charge against a withdrawing Boer force at Elandslaagte. As the war progressed most of

the cavalry was organised into the Cavalry Division under Major-General John French. At Klip Drift

it charged through defending Boers to lift the siege of Kimberley. But charging was not all that the

38Ibid, & Stephen Badsey, 'Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, Sandhurst Journal of Military Studies 2 (1991), 15.

39van der Waag, ‘An Overview of the Commando System’, p. 8, & Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 125.

40Maj. Percy Ricardo to brother, 14 & 19 May 1900, Ricardo Papers, 1900-1927, MS 1928.

41Badsey, 'Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 15.

42Iain G. Spence, 'To Shoot and Ride: Mobility and Firepower in Mounted Warfare', in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Boer War, Army Nation and Empire: the 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial Military History Conference (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), p. 119.

43Ibid.

44Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 16.

78

cavalry could do and as the Boers withdrew from here towards Bloemfontein they were overtaken by

one of French’s brigades which dismounted and, through the effects of its fire, forced the Boers to dig

in and endure a brief siege at Paardeberg before surrendering about ten days later.45 The regulars of

the Mounted Infantry proved, at least in the early stages of the war, a mixed blessing. Products of the

pre-war theory and practice of improvising mounted troops from the ranks of plentiful infantry, they

provided the extra numbers that were wanted, but poor horse riding and horse management skills

meant their value, at least in the early months, was debatable.46 The vast bulk of the mounted troops

eventually raised and used in South Africa, however, were best referred to as mounted riflemen. They

were differentiated from the mounted infantry by the fact that they were not, generally, regular

soldiers and were also, generally, horsemen to start with. In earlier wars, but also frequently in this

one, they would have been referred to as 'irregulars' or 'auxiliaries'. They took on all the roles of

cavalry from scouting to closing with the enemy and did it, not with the arme blanche, but by using

rifle fire. There was no clear organisational or doctrinal template for these mounted units and the term

covered everything from the Imperial Yeomanry, that shared part of its name and some its personnel,

but none of its organisation, with Britain's Yeomanry Cavalry, to the full range of colonial mounted

units be they the Imperial Light Horse, the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, or New Zealand Rough

Riders.

What happened on campaign however, was that the distinctions between these forms of

troops eventually disappeared. Cavalry, their valuable, large and powerful horses destroyed by poor

logistics and poor horse management, were, after the first months, unable to contrive to charge and

thus use the arme blanche.47 Regular mounted infantry, through the necessity of campaigning and the

difficult process of on the job training, learnt how to ride and make use of mounted tactics. Their title

of infantry largely became token. Like the Boer enemy all British and colonial mounted troops

effectively became mounted riflemen for most of the war. After the war the report of a Royal

Commission into the war, the Elgin Commission, noted:

In practice there was no real distinction between the use of 'Mounted Infantry' and 'Mounted Rifles' and, in the later part of the war, the cavalry were armed and employed in much the same way.48

Just as French’s cavalry had manoeuvred around the Boers at Paardeberg so too had the mounted

infantry and mounted rifles under Edward Hutton at Vet River when in a long outflanking move,

45Ibid., pp. 16-7.

46Ibid.

47Ibid., p. 18.

48Elgin Commission Report, p. 49.

79

followed by an attack across the river, they restarted Roberts' advance on Bloemfontein.49 The value

of mounted riflemen for the British Army was not so much their tactical model but their sheer

numbers.50 The large increase in mounted troops that had been required after Black Week, a need

which the drives of the guerilla war only amplified, could only be adequately provided by large

numbers of hastily raised units made up mostly of men who had, until a few months previously, been

civilians. Such men, with little military training, could not be brought up to the standards of regular

cavalry but, reflecting the ideas of the time about citizen horse soldiers, they could be organised into

the sort of rough military material that was good enough to deal with an enemy that was, in many

ways, much the same thing.

It was this rough military equation that saw traditional cavalry eclipsed, not tactical

obsolescence. As noted above cavalry had successfully charged Boers at Elandslaagte and at Klip

Drift. They also did so successfully, led by Major-General French himself, against Boer riflemen at

Zand River. At Diamond Hill eighty-five men of the 12th Lancers successfully charged uphill only to

lose sixteen of their number to flanking fire whilst rallying after the charge.51 Charges continued to be

part of the war and were even used in a modified form by the Boers themselves towards the end of the

war. Boer 'rifle charges' made no use of the arme blanche but usually consisted of an open order

charge towards their objective with men firing from the saddle. Typically they dismounted at close

range and commenced a firefight but on more than one occasion Boer horsemen rode into or through

their British opponents.52 One observer noted that British cavalry leaders eventually "used to gallop

any position with mounted troops in loosely extended order, and almost invariably with success."53

What was something of a revelation to cavalrymen was that they, like mounted riflemen, could charge

at a point, dismount there and hold ground.54 By combining mounted and dismounted tactics, and

more fire and manoeuvre, cavalry were developing greater tactical flexibility and learning new ways.

This flexibility, however, was frequently undermined by the quality of the horses they were

riding. Cavalry came to fight like mounted rifles not, as indicated above, so much because of tactical

developments, but because, after the first few months of the war, their horses were not up to the effort

required of them. Despite the believed necessity, the decision to expand the number of mounted

troops put a severe strain on an already creaky logistic system and this, when combined with poor

horsemastership and the general difficulty of trying to keep horses in a climate not suited to them,

49Craig Wilcox, 'Citizen Mounted Riflemen and the South African War of 1899-1902í, p. 15.

50Ibid, pp. 11-2.

51Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 17.

52Ibid., p. 19.

53L.S. Amery cited in Ibid.

54Ibid., p. 17.

80

soon led to such horse casualties that the efficiency of all mounted troops was affected.

Most of the horses used by the British Army in South Africa, including those used by the

Australian contingents, were imported for the war. Many of them were of excellent quality. British

cavalry took their trained and groomed troop horses. The New South Wales Lancers drew their horses

from the New South Wales Mounted Police and they were probably as good as anything that came

with the regular cavalrymen. Some officers of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles took their own

and their men had the best mounts that could be bought from men in the regiment at home.55 It should

be noted, however, that as the war progressed the Australian contingents found it increasingly difficult

to get good horses at home. Yet whatever their quality it was necessary for them to begin their war

service by being transported by ship to South Africa. Life aboard ship could be treacherous for horses

and introduction into a new climate proved to be a decidedly difficult process. Australian horses sent

to India as part of the imperial remount trade required up to year to recover from the voyage and

acclimatise to their new surroundings.56 A process that required long, continuous and graduated

exercise along with appropriate feeding.57 That process was a luxurious peacetime one but it was

generally accepted in South Africa that at least 2-3 months acclimatisation was necessary and that 4-6

months was better.58 No horse to accompany either an Australian contingent or be sent as a remount

ever got anything like this sort of treatment upon arrival in South Africa. Horses sent with a

contingent, like their riders, generally found themselves sent onto operations at the first opportunity.

The horses of the New South Wales Lancers despatched from Sydney were being used in action

within a week of their arrival in 1899,59 those of the 1st Australian Horse within five days of theirs.60

The time allowed each contingent varied but it was never enough for their mounts.

Thus disadvantaged from the start of their work in a new country horses had little hope of

dealing with the difficulties they would face. Perhaps the greatest of these challenges was finding

enough to eat. The veld offered poor grazing and the onus thus fell on the logistical system to provide

enough horse fodder. The system, however, was unable to cope and as early as November 1899

British commanders were forced to cut horse rations in order to reduce the burden on the supply

55Bridges, 'New South Wales and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 162.

56Anon., A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (London, publisher unknown, 1910), p. 230. Later published as F. Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (London: H&W. Brown, 1919). Hereafter referred to as Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 1910 edition.

57Ibid.

58Ibid., p. 239.

59Maj. G. Lee, OC NSWL, Diary entry, 8 Dec. 1899. AWM1, 4/6. The NSWL had disembarked on 2-3 Dec. 1899 and received their first operational tasking, and enemy fire, on 8 Dec.

60Maj. G. Lee, OC NSWL, Diary entry, 23 Dec. 1899. AWM1, 4/6.

81

services and South Africa’s relatively primitive rail system.61 Roberts' decision to dramatically

increase the number of horsemen in his army thus proved to be a logistical gamble. It would provide

him with the mobility he wanted but the time it could be maintained for would be limited and when

his supplies ran out the affect of the mounted arm would be catastrophic. Captain John Antill of the

New South Wales Mounted rifles noted in a report to Sydney in February 1900 that though the men

were well fed, thanks to captured stock, the horses were restricted to 6 lbs. of mealies and 6 lbs. of

chaff each day. This, he believed, was good enough for the smaller local horses but was only about

half of what his large walers needed.62 A month later he noted that this had been reduced to just 4 lbs.

of grain a day, the result being the horses were "becoming very weak and [there is] a good deal of loss

from starvation, the grazing being very bad..."63 The demands of horses on campaign were

considerable being required to work all day carrying rider, food and military equipment, and be

expected to gallop if the situation demanded it. If its rider was required for night time outpost duty

then even this period of rest was denied to them. When in the horse lines they were usually tied so that

the opportunity to stretch or lightly graze was also withheld.64 Even if they could graze, however, it

could not make up for the lack of regular feeding of more substantial fodder. For a horse to graze 12

lbs. of grass as a substitute for grain took five hours of every day, and such spare time was not to be

found on campaign.65 The decision to expand the mounted arm meant that well before the army

reached Pretoria horse wastage, a euphemism for equine death and debility, along with the generally

poor condition of the horses meant that the mounted forces were effectively collapsing. At Poplar

Grove the two Boer presidents were able to escape the British Army because the cavalry were unable

to get their horses up to the speed needed to conduct a pursuit. The change to the guerilla war made it

impossible to reorganise the remount and logistical system to address the problem as the need to keep

columns on the move, often well away from the rail lifelines, militated against the necessary pause in

operations. The result was that horses continued to die at staggering rates. It was not until late 1901

that the remount system was able to recover from the collapse of early 1900 and start to again provide

useful horses to the army.66

Exacerbating this already dire situation was the fact that South Africa was an unhealthy place

for horses. As mentioned the grazing was poor and in any case most imported horses, not properly

61Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 16.

62Capt. J Antill, OC NSWMR to AAG NSW, 8 Feb. 1900. AWM1, 4/8.

63Capt. J Antill, OC NSWMR to AAG NSW, 12 Mar. 1900. AWM1, 4/8.

64Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 15, & Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 133.

65Spence, 'To Shoot and Ride: Mobility and Firepower in Mounted Warfare', p. 125-6.

66Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 18.

82

acclimatised, seemed to dislike the peculiar South African grass.67 Some of the grazing was deadly

and Lieutenant Granville Ryrie, a New South Welshman with the Rhodesian Field Force, noted in

letter home that eight horses died in one night near Mafeking from eating a poisonous weed.68

Parasites did their bit and Ryrie wrote in another letter that "our horses are suffering greatly from

ticks, there are thousands of them and the brush or curry comb won't take them out."69 More

dangerous was what one man described as "the mysterious horse sickness".70 Now known to be an

insect borne viral disease, African Horse Sickness (also referred to as Blue Tongue at the time) is

common in the African tropics and often spreads south into low lying temperate regions during

summer. Spread by midges an infection of the lungs can, after incubating for a few days, kill a horse

as quickly as half an hour after the first outward signs of infection.71 With a mortality rate of 95

percent for respiratory infections such a disease could, and did, decimate a regiment’s mounts with

alarming rapidity. The chaplain with a New South Wales Bushmen contingent, James Green, wrote of

the dangers for horses in one of their early camps:

It is about the same level as Beria, and there is water anywhere within two feet of the surface; consequently it very fever stricken, and the dreaded horse sickness was common. There was a paddock full of mules here, and every day some died. Every morning a truck-load of dead horses was taken up the line to be burnt. Amongst these was the very best, which had been given to the Bushmen by their friends in Australia. Unfortunately my own horse died here before he had been used at all.72

In counter to these problems most units had a veterinary officer or two and these men no

doubt did much in difficult circumstances despite the fact that the support veterinary services were

poorly organised,73 but of more import on a day-to-day basis was the individual and collective

practice of horsemastership. A horse soldier’s art of horse management was described by one

historian as "a mixture of country wisdom and veterinary science".74 Its routine covered everything

67Beckett, ‘The South African War and the Late Victorian Army', p. 36.

68Lt. Granville Ryrie to wife, 13 Aug. 1900. Sir Granville Ryrie, Letters, MS986.

69Lt. Granville Ryrie to wife, 30 Jun. 1900. Sir Granville Ryrie, Letters, MS986.

70James Green, The Story of the Australian Bushmen: Being the Notes of a Chaplain (Sydney: William Brooks and Co. Ltd., 1903), p. 168.

71African Horse Sickness, http://www.vet.uga/vpp.gray_book/FAD/ahs.htm, & Ian M. Parsonson, Vets At War: A History of the Australian Army Veterinary Corps, 1909-1946 (Loftus, NSW: Australian Military History Publications, 2005), pp. 23-4.

72Green, The Story of the Australian Bushmen, p. 24.

73Parsonson, Vets At War, p. 20.

74Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 15.

83

from knowledge about saddling, to rest, feeding, watering and load carrying. All that was required to

keep a horse alive and working well on campaign. A key practice was regularly getting off the horse

and walking beside it so that its load was relieved. Horsemastership was a skill, however, that most

British and colonial soldiers knew little about before they were committed to operations, and learning

it thereafter proved difficult and costly in horseflesh.75

The net result was astounding equine death rates. A veterinary history of the war noted that in

each month of 1901 the British Army in its entirety killed 11 600 horses and 1200 mules, and that

another 41 400 were either so sick, debilitated or tired as to be considered useless for military

purposes.76 During the whole war the army took on about 520 000 horses and with a death rate of

nearly 67 percent destroyed 326 073 of them.77 Though an inadequate logistic system, a rushed

remount system and overwork were the root causes of it all, the general ignorance of horsemastership

made matters far worse. It was generally held after the war that the regular cavalry regiments, thanks

to limited pre-war training, maintained the best practices but they were the best of a very bad lot. One

regular regiment, the Inniskilling Dragoons, took on 4290 horses over its two and half years of active

service and managed to expend 3750 either through death, destruction, abandonment or return to the

veterinary or remount services. The result was "the equivalent to the whole regiment being re-horsed

ten and a half times."78 Such figures were not exceptional, and the regular mounted infantry were

worse. At least those that had been through the Mounted Infantry Schools before the war could ride

reasonably well but the mass of improvised units could not, at least at first, and neither class were

much good as horsemasters.79 One such unit in 1901 received 1048 horses over a five month period

and at the end of it had only 43 fit for service.80

Nor was there any comfort to be drawn from the horse management skills of the colonial

troops, including the Australians. Despite the idea that bushmen could take their civilian skills to war,

Australians proved just as capable of destroying horseflesh as their imperial cousins. The Inspector-

General of Remounts noted in early 1900 "the M.I. [mounted infantry] go through ponies at a fearful

rate, colonial corps especially - 15 per cent. has been the average per month so far." [sic]81 The

Marquis of Tullibardine, who recruited many Australians for his Scottish Horse, noted that:

75Badsey, 'Fire and the Sword', p. 233.

76Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 1910 edition, p. 186.

77Ibid., p. 226, & Spence, ‘To Shoot and Ride: Mobility and Firepower in Mounted Warfare’, p. 121.

78Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 1910 edition, p. 227.

79Badsey, ‘Mounted Combat in the Second Boer War’, p. 18.

80Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 1910 edition, p. 186.

81Assistant IG of Remounts, to IG of Remounts, War Office, 8 Feb. 1900, cited in ibid., p. 143.

84

The Australian knew most about horses, but owing to their being accustomed to getting a large supply of horses in their own country were apt to use them up too quickly. Had they been less good horsemen they would have been better horsemasters, but the best Australians left nothing to be desired in this respect.82

Colonel Douglas Haig, Chief of Staff of the Cavalry Division, similarly believed that the "over-sea

Colonials were good horsemen, but bad horsemasters."83 His commander, Sir John French, agreed and

noted how the squadron of the 1st Australian Horse was reduced to just 10 fit horses after its first

month of campaigning, but that during the same period the squadrons of the regiment it was attached

to, the Scots Greys, had each kept at least 30 horses fit.84 That the 1st Australian Horse had been in

action so soon after landing may have skewed these figures but certainly French was nonplussed at

Australian horsemastership. James Green recalled how upon their arrival in Rhodesia one bushman

pointed to walking infantry and commented "[w]We couldn’t do that; it would break our hearts."85 But

to save their horses they should have been doing it regularly and because they did not they would

eventually do a lot more walking than planned. Similarly one of the causes of dissatisfaction among

the men of the 5th Victorian Mounted Rifles were orders requiring them to walk when horses with sore

backs were found in their column.86 Such orders were needed as in just over a month’s trekking in

early 1901 this unit had reduced their number of fit horses from 1038 to just 450.87 The surviving

Orders Book of the Queensland Imperial Bushmen is replete with instructions trying to improve the

treatment of the unit’s horses. Men were told that sick horses had to be reported, that their mounts

should be tied properly so animals were not injured, that saddle fitting had to be checked and that

grazing and feeding be properly conducted.88 But it was to no avail, poor management and horse

illness soon meant that the daily preoccupation of these Orders Books was how to administer an ever

growing number of dismounted men.89

Some, of course, were better than others. Captain John Antill of the New South Wales

Mounted Rifles made his men get off their horses and walk up to one-third of any given march they

82Evidence of the Marquis of Tullibardine, Elgin Commission Report: Minutes of Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 451.

83Evidence of Col. Douglas Haig, Elgin Commission Report: Minutes of Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 403.

84Evidence of Lt-Gen. Sir John French, Elgin Commission Report: Minutes of Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 301.

85Green, The Story of the Australian Bushmen, p. 128.

86Spence, ‘To Shoot and Ride: Mobility and Firepower in Mounted Warfare’, p. 123.

87Max Chamberlain, ‘The Wilmanrust Affair', Journal of the Australian War Memorial 6 (Apr. 1985), 49-50.

88Orders Books 5th Qld. Imperial Bushmen, 15, 22 & 23 Apr. 1901 NAA(M) MP744/14/05.

89Orders Books 5th Qld. Imperial Bushmen, various dates. NAA(M) MP744/14/05.

85

had to make.90 Major George Lee of the New South Wales Lancers wrote home that upon reaching

Pretoria in 1900 they still had about a dozen of their original horses with them. He believed that "not

many of the squadrons that started work at the same time as we did can say this..."91 Such attrition and

the arrival of remounts soon meant that a unit’s horses became a motley bunch. Percy Ricardo wrote

to his son that the Queensland Mounted Infantry "have got all sorts of horses now, ponies and draught

horses and all colours, this is a frightful country for horses, the mules are the only thing that do well

here..."92 All big horses, proved, ultimately, to be not suited to South Africa, they ate too much and

required too much work to keep them fit. By the end of the war the ones most desirable, and not

incidentally the ones most likely to have survived thus far, were the small compact ones, not

dissimilar to what the Boers rode. It was small Australian horses, known locally as 'nuggets', not the

big walers, that were considered the most useful Australian mounts, but they were not very common.93

Just as Australian soldiers in South Africa proved indifferent horsemasters, so too did their

general military skills prove patchy. It became commonplace at the time, and the idea has continued,

to express an opinion of the great value of colonial troops in South Africa. One New South Wales

officer wrote to the military authorities in Sydney in early 1900 that:

There seems to be a general opinion that our Colonial mounted men are the very class required. They appear to be able to fight the Boer with his own weapons. The Boer will not come into the open and have straight fight. He changes position under cover and sits down and smokes and waits. When forced out he retires independently to another[,] the range of which he has fixed.94

The same man believed that they were "sadly in want of mounted troops, and are sighing for mounted

rifles...I have worked my men up very well. Pity there is not 1000 of them."95 Both implicit and

explicit in these sort of expressions were criticisms of regulars and a faith in the looser military model

of the citizen soldiers of the British empire, Australia included. A few years after the war Colonel

John Lyster, who had commanded Australians in South Africa, wrote of how:

90Capt. J. Antill, OC NSWMR to AAG NSW, 16 Jan. 1900. AWM1, 4/8.

91Maj. G. Lee, OC NSWL to CSO NSW, 8 Jul. 1900. AWM1, 4/6.

92Maj. Percy Ricardo to son, 29 Sep. 1900. Ricardo Papers, 1900-1927, MS 1928.

93Marquess of Anglesey, A History of British Cavalry, 1816-1919: Volume 4, 1899 to 1913 (London: Leo Cooper & Secker & Warburg, 1986), p. 316, & Smith, A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 1910 edition, pp. 230-32.

94Capt. J. Antill, OC NSWMR, to AAG NSW, 16 Jan. 1900. AWM1, 4/8.

95Capt. J. Antill, OC NSWMR, cited in R.L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War (Canberra: The Australian War Memorial & the Australian Government Printing Service, 1976), p. 64.

86

Regular armies are pliable, and obedient machines, possessing qualities essential to their existence and success in war, but in bringing them to such a stage of perfection, the cultivation of individuality, and intellectual training, has been overlooked. In war the Regular soldier has been found wanting in intelligence, although in other respects suitable, for the strain imposed upon him.96

The supposed strengths of Australia’s mounted men rushed into military service was by no means

completely mythological. As the Elgin Commission noted many British officers spoke highly of their

"physique, intelligence, courage, instinct for country, and powers of individual action and initiative."97

But their value was often described as their military potential rather than what they actually achieved.

Lord Roberts believed that if they could be better trained "they would be still more valuable, for they

are most valuable material." Colonel Rimington, one of the most successful column commanders in

South Africa, would have liked to "take good Australians and make them into very good Cavalry in a

month if one were allowed to work there in Australia; they are good horsemen." It was generally

noted, however, that their value increased after they had gained enough experience not to embarrass

themselves. So poor was the military performance of some of the Imperial Yeomanry that it was joked

that their abbreviation, I.Y., was said to stand for "I'm yours", a reference to the supposed ease with

which the more skilful Boer could capture them.98 No Australian contingent was as poorly viewed as

the British townsmen of the later Imperial Yeomanry contingents, but it was a common observation

that all the specially raised mounted rifles corps took the better part of a year to become genuinely

efficient, at which point they were usually lost to the army through their limited enlistments.99

A key criticism of the Australian contingents, however, particularly the later ones, was the

virtually untrained nature of so many of their officers. The early contingents drew on the best of the

permanent and militia officers each colony had at their disposal but this small pool was quickly

exhausted. Even with these men, however, performances were inconsistent. Some, like Harry Chauvel

of the Queensland Mounted Infantry did well, others like the ex-Indian Army officer Henry Airey of

the New South Wales Citizen Bushmen, did not.100 Granville Ryrie wrote to his wife complaining of

how his colonel, the New South Wales permanent officer Haviland Le Mesurier, was "very

weak...and afraid to say boo to any of those over him. It is very sickening to have to be under...[him]

96Col. J.C. Lyster, 'Commonwealth Military Forces in New South Wales: The Standard of Efficiency of the Commonwealth Military Forces', delivered at the United Service Institution, Sydney, 12 May 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1906/1604.

97Elgin Commission Report, p. 79.

98Badsey, 'Fire and the Sword', p. 138.

99Elgin Commission Report, p. 80.

100Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 375-6.

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when you know he is incapable of leading men..."101 Even so Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton

testified to the Elgin Commission on the "difference between the first contingents under Colonially

trained officers and the latter contingents which came out with untrained officers."102 In May 1900

Granville Ryrie was incredulous at news that there were more Australian contingents on the way: "I

don’t believe it. I don’t know where they are to get their officers from. I think we pretty well

exhausted the supply."103 Senior officers remembered that the efficiency of colonial troops tended to

improve greatly if they were attached to formations under the command of a regular officer.104

Appointing virtually untrained men to command, of course, had its consequences as Reverend James

Green candidly admitted of his Bushmen contingent:

With the exception of a small but efficient nucleus, his officers were civilians who had to learn everything military by experience, and in the face of the enemy; and shall I say, as must, in honesty, be said in every such case, at the expense of the health and the lives under the men under their charge.105

Latter contingents often had officer appointments unfilled when they departed Australia so that men

considered suitable and already serving in South Africa could fill them upon arrival, though this

source too often proved indifferent.106

Not coincidentally those later contingents with such questionable leadership were often not as

useful as the earlier ones with more qualified commanders. The early contingents drew heavily on the

militia and volunteer regiments at home and even if their skills were at times questionable and they

were naive, at least they knew something of soldiering and approached their new duties with a certain

amount of professional vigour under the command of men who had some idea of what they were

doing. The latter contingents tended to recruit adventurers and opportunists, few of whom had much

military experience. Though elementary training was conducted in camp in Australia it was usually

brief and despite more work being done on ship across the Indian Ocean there was usually little

opportunity once in Africa to further hone individual and collective skills. Quickly sent into the field,

the relatively undisciplined and untrained rankers, and undertrained and untried officers, were often

not up to the task.107 This had its consequences in battle at places like Koster River and Wilmarust

101Lt. Granville Ryrie to wife, 30 Aug. 1900, Sir Granville Ryrie, Letters, MS986.

102Elgin Commission Report, p. 80.

103Lt. Granville Ryrie to wife, 22 May 1900, Sir Granville Ryrie, Letters, MS986.

104Elgin Commission Report, p. 80.

105Green, The Story of the Australian Bushmen, p. 62.

106Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, p. 191.

107Craig Wilcox, ‘Citizen Mounted Riflemen and the South African War of 1899-1902’, p. 18, & Wilcox,

88

where Australian troops performed far from well. More mundanely it meant that such troops required

constant supervision. The Queensland Imperial Bushmen had to a appoint one officer and four men

each day when on operations simply to pick up significant amounts of ammunition left by careless

men in camp each night.108 One similar camp inspection conducted by the NCOs of the same unit in

1902 collected four horses, three saddles, twenty-three pairs of spurs, a bandolier full of ammunition

and seventeen mess tins, among other things.109 Such simple neglect did not auger well for military

efficiency in more demanding circumstances.

These sorts of problems were never totally overcome and even the quite well organised units

of the federally raised Australian Commonwealth Horse contingents of 1902 were similarly beset.

Despite the large numbers of veterans that could be recruited most of the men of these last units (three

in four) were new to the military and finding enough competent officers remained a problem.110 These

last units mostly arrived in South Africa too late to see the war but they are worth noting because in

their organisation of about 500 men divided in to four or four and a half squadrons of mounted

riflemen, it is possible to see an organisational stepping stone to the post-federation Light Horse. This

structure had been set out by the War Office and the colonial commandants had taken the first steps to

towards their creation, but from early 1902 the responsibility for their raising and despatch belonged

to man who had already had a marked effect on Australia’s mounted troops, and who would soon

have an even greater one, Edward Hutton.

The Australian military experience in South Africa was one of contradictions. What was seen

by many as Australia’s military niche, the citizen mounted-soldier, was both vindicated and

questioned. Tactically there was no doubt that mounted soldiers had proved to be the most useful form

of troops during the war. Mounted riflemen had come to dominate operations on both sides of the

conflict and this fact would come to be used by advocates of this form of soldiering and fighting to

support their case in the years ahead. That cavalry too had become mounted riflemen was seen by

many as further proof that they were a military anachronism that should be drastically reformed or

perhaps even abolished. Conversely cavalry defenders and reformers would remember the successes

they had, including the mounted ones, the tactical lessons they had learned, and the logistic failures

they had been forced to endure, and take a strongly differing view. As highlighted in a previous

chapter its sequel in Britain was to be a tempestuous process of cavalry reform that would last until

the eve of the First World War. In Australia too it would have its consequences for the remaining

cavalry units though the results would be far less contested. The outcome of the test of the ideas about

Australia’s Boer War, p. 191.

108Orders Book 5th Qld. Imperial Bushmen, 3 Aug. 1901. NAA(M) MP744/14/6.

109Orders Book 5th Qld. Imperial Bushmen, 31 Jan. 1901. NAA(M) MP744/14/6.

110Wilcox, Australia’s Boer War, pp. 325-7.

89

bushmen as natural soldiers proved far more ambiguous. Despite the shortcomings of the undertrained

Australian contingents the idea that men could be taken from the farm or shop, given a rifle and a

uniform, and be sent to fight was a persistent one and did not disappear with the end of the war. Upon

returning home the New South Wales Mounted Rifleman, John Antill, told a crowd that "in my

opinion so long as we have men who are good riders and shooters we do not want any defence force

at all...Teach them to ride and shoot, and that is all you want to do. That is all the Boer can do."111

Perhaps what made such mythology so persistent was that like all good myths it had some basis in

fact. Despite all their shortcomings and difficulties the Australian contingents had, broadly speaking,

been good enough to do what was required of them. For all the misgivings of British officers about

the quality of the colonial troops what the colonies and the new federation sent to South Africa was

exactly what the War Office had asked them to send. Australia’s contingents were rough instruments,

but in the end it was a colonial war with a colonial enemy and such wars had often been fought with

rough instruments. Nevertheless it was clear that hastily raised mounted soldiers, including

Australia’s, had faced numerous problems in South Africa. Problems of poor training and discipline,

severely exacerbated by poor officer standards, had shown anyone interesting in investigating it that

units made up of such material were not the most reliable of forces. Should the enemy be more

determined or more militarily competent the consequences could be dire. Australian horsemastership

had proven to be weak and any future mounted force that the country raised would have to pay serious

attention to this or its military value would prove to be merely a fraction of its potential. This was a

problem not easily fixed and definite organisational and training steps were needed as the corrective

for both Australia’s forces as well as Britain’s. Despite a common view that Australia’s men had done

what was required of them, and done it admirably, there were numerous officers who had seen the

weaknesses and took a different view. Many of them would take steps in the next decade or so to

ensure, even if with some difficulty, that the new Australian forces relied on more than mythology to

shape their character. Yet, in part, because mounted riflemen had proved so valuable in South Africa,

and because the man who would have charge of Australia’s military in the next few years keenly

supported them, mounted soldiers would come to assume a key position in the post-war Australian

military. How that came to be so is the subject of the next chapter.

111Maj. J. Antill cited in Bridges, ‘New South Wales and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 603.

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Chapter 4 Foundations of the Australian Light Horse

1901-1904

While soldiers from Australia were still fighting in South Africa the six Australian colonies

formed a new federation with effect on 1 January 1901. As part of this new federation the

responsibility for defence passed from the colonies to the new Commonwealth Government, then

temporarily established in Melbourne, on 1 March 1901. After having some trouble filling the

appointment the government of Sir Edmund Barton announced in December 1901 that Sir Edward

Hutton had accepted the appointment of General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Military Forces

of the Commonwealth of Australia.1 Hutton, no stranger to Australian soldiering after his experiences

in New South Wales and South Africa, was faced with the considerable job of creating a single

Australian military force from the various colonial defence forces and set out upon his arrival in late

January 1902 to formulate his plan for this new force, including its mounted troops.

Hutton presented his plans for the military forces of Australia to the government the

following April in his Minute Upon the Defence of Australia. In its strategic basis this document

perpetuated the extant thinking on Australian defence, namely that no part of the British Empire was

less likely to be attacked by a foreign power than Australia due to its geographical remoteness and the

naval hegemony of the Royal Navy.2 Nevertheless Hutton, like his colonial predecessors, considered

it possible that a foreign power might attempt a raid that included the temporary landing of an armed

force, or, if naval conditions allowed, the landing of a sizable force backed by transports and a

substantial fleet of warships. He also asserted that in considering its defence the new nation must also

consider the defence of "Australian interests", broadly defined as its trade routes and the markets for

its goods. Hutton believed it was "inconsistent with the present development of Australia as a young

and vigorous nation to neglect her responsibility for defence outside Australian waters..."3

Consequently Hutton organised his defence plan for, firstly, the defence of Australian soil,

and secondly, for the defence of Australian interests, wherever they might be threatened. For the

former role Hutton would create two elements. The Garrison Force would be made up of troops

possessing only limited mobility destined to provide protection for "strategical centres and places of

1Warren Perry, 'Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in the Commonwealth of Australia: 1902-04’, The Victorian Historical Magazine 29:1 (Feb. 1959), 36-37. 2Maj-Gen. Sir Edward Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, 7 Apr. 1902, p. 1. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. 3Ibid., p. 2.

91

commercial importance...", mainly the capital cities and selected ports. The Field Force was,

conversely, intended to be highly mobile and well trained, and prepared to move to threatened areas to

engage the enemy where and when it should appear. Should the government desire it so employed,

this force was also designed to be deployed beyond the national shores for service in the protection of

Australia’s interests. Reinforcing both these forces was a small Permanent Force of regulars to

provide the skilled personnel for the technical corps, such as garrison artillery and submarine mining,

as well as provide an instructional and administrative cadre to support the militia and volunteer

forces.4

The Garrison Force was to be made up mostly of garrison gunners, specialist engineers and

unpaid voluntary infantry, and in essence was little different from pre-federation fortress troops. The

number of mounted troops in this force was to be limited and intended only for use in local mounted

tasks. The Sydney garrison would have two half-squadrons at its disposal but all other garrison

stations would have just a single half-squadron.5 These half-squadrons of the Garrison Forces were to

be added to the establishment of nearby Field Force regiments for peacetime maintenance.

The mobility required of the Field Force meant that a very high proportion of it would be

made up of mounted troops. Of the nine brigades involved six (10 485 men) would be made up of

mounted troops, the remainder (15 534 men) infantry. Hutton justified what he saw as such a high

proportion of mounted troops on the grounds that it was a reflection of the lessons from South Africa,

a war that, he believed, any Australian campaign would be likely to resemble.6 Though not

specifically stated in his Minute it was also, perhaps, a reflection of a belief he had previously held

that mounted forces would be particularly useful given Australia’s relatively poor transport

infrastructure.7 Echoing what he had done with the Mounted Brigade in New South Wales in the

1890s, all the brigades were to be combined arms forces that included integrated artillery, engineer

and the required service branches. Reflecting what he had long advocated as the proper role of

mounted troops the intention was that the Field Force, or a component of virtually any size drawn

from it, could operate independently or in concert to counter any enemy incursion or attack on

Australian interests. Self sufficient in every military way its role could be either tactical or strategic.8

Units were to be spread and used over the country rather than concentrated on the major population

4Ibid., pp. 1-6. 5Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia, Jul. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1904/185. 6Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, p. 4. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. 7Hutton, 'Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War', p. 20. See also: Maj-Gen E.T.H. Hutton, 'Preface', The Manual of Drill for the Mounted Troops of Australia, 1895, p. III. 8Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, pp. 3-4. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. See also Hutton, ‘Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War’, pp. 15 & 19 for his views on the role of mounted troops.

92

centres as the Garrison Forces were.9 Organised so that when required it could expand dramatically,

the Field Force was constituted so that during peace it held nearly its full complement of officers and

noncommissioned officers but would have only roughly half of the intended other ranks. Essentially

this was to fulfill the government’s greatest requirement, to keep defence spending as low as possible,

but it was rationalised that upon mobilisation the trained and experienced men of the standing Field

Force, stiffened with the men of the Permanent Force, would be in a position to quickly bring new

drafts of recruits up to the required standards and thus rapidly create a large trained force.10

Hutton’s plans had, in part, been motivated by a desire for Australia to make a contribution to

imperial defence. Calls for Australia to make a firm military commitment to the empire had not abated

with federation or the Boer War. Lord Brassey, who had called for an Australian mounted regiment to

be raised for imperial service when he was Governor of Victoria, had continued with similar calls in

the House of Lords after returning home.11 In 1901 the Colonial Defence Committee had also

expressed a hope that Australia might do something along the same lines and when it saw Hutton’s

plans thought such a large force could only be designed for potential imperial use. At the Imperial

Conference of 1902, however, Australia’s first Prime Minister, Sir Edmund Barton, moved quickly to

inform London that, though Australia could be counted on in an emergency, to earmark any

Australian force for imperial use was contrary to the principles of self government. Accordingly when

the Defence Act was passed in Melbourne in 1903 it explicitly denied any role for Australia’s existing

forces outside of Australia.12 Hutton had little choice but to accept this decision and continue

preparing for continental defence.

Apart from his imperial intentions, Hutton’s plans setting out a Garrison and a mobile Field

Force differed little in principle from the plans Major-General Edwards had first put forward in 1890

and that the various colonial commandants, including Hutton in New South Wales, had pursued as

policy throughout the 1890s.13 Much of the challenge for Hutton would be melding the disparate pre-

federation colonial forces into one coherent organisation.

The mounted forces that Hutton inherited from the pre-federation colonies were not very

9Hutton to Minister of Defence, 8 Jul. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688 Item 6.

10Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia, Jul. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1904/18, & Militia and Volunteer Peace and War Establishments, pp. 6-7. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. A Light Horse Regiment of four squadrons would have find six officers, three Staff-Sergeants, sixteen Sergeants, twelve artificers and 250 rank and file in order to bring itself up to war establishment. For the financial motivations see: Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 23. 11Col. E.G.H. Bingham, 'The Australian Soldier', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, XLV:284 (Oct.1901), 1169. 12Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 22 & 32. 13Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', p. 157.

93

different in kind from the forces he had seen when he had served in New South Wales.14 The main

difference lay in the numbers he would have at his disposal. The outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War had,

like the various imperial wars and war scares of the nineteenth century, brought a revival in the

interest of ordinary Australian men in soldiering.15 Mounted units, benefiting from the nature of the

conflict in South Africa, were particularly attractive and this enthusiasm had been used by all the six

colonies to boost the number of mounted troops in their forces.16 Western Australia, after struggling to

maintain a number of small and unsuccessful mounted corps through the 1890s, was able to raise a

new mounted detachment at Bunbury in 1900 that, after being gazetted in June of that year, formed

the basis of the West Australian Mounted Infantry.17 By mid-1901 it could boast 300 mounted

infantrymen organised in three districts, easily making it the most successful mounted corps yet raised

in that colony. The local commandant considered it "eminently suited to the country and I strongly

urge that every encouragement should be given to the formation of Mounted Infantry units ..."18

Tasmania, without any mounted forces since 1883, had gazetted the Tasmanian Mounted Infantry four

weeks after despatching its first troops to South Africa.19 The first detachment was raised at

Ulverstone and was followed by others in at least four locations, including Hobart. The unit,

unfortunately, was not all that could be wished for as in mid-1901 it could only boast of having 137

men on strength despite having an authorised establishment of 369 soldiers.20 An attempt to raise a

detachment in the colony's north in 1900 had failed completely due to it not being able to gather any

local support.21 South Australia expanded its mounted arm and increased the authorised establishment

of the South Australian Mounted Rifles from 368 men in 1898 to around 700 men by 1902.

Interestingly South Australia was the only colony to match the expansion of its mounted branch with

a commensurate increase in part-paid infantry, as all the eastern colonies, at least, kept to pre-Boer

14Aside from his experiences in South Africa Hutton had maintained other connections with Australia’s mounted troops and was, since 1896, the Honorary Colonel of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles. Anon, A Short History of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, 1888-1913', Despatch XVIII:2 (Aug. 1982), 34-35. 15Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army', pp. 105-6. 16Ibid., p. 110. 17Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, p. 58. 18Col. G.H. Chippindall, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of West Australia for the Twelve Months ending 30th June, 1901. NAA(M) B168, 02/5748. West Australia had briefly considered a cavalry officer to command their forces in 1898 due his possible value in creating a local mounted force but did not pursue the matter. Governor G. Smith to Sir John Forrest, 26 Mar. 1898. PRO-WA, WAS 527, Item 1505/1895. 19Wyatt, A Lion in the Colony, p. 51, & Wyatt, With the Volunteers, p. 65. 20Establishments and Strength of 12th LHR. NAA(M) B168, 1903/1489 Part 8. 21Wyatt, With the Volunteers, p. 68.

94

War levels for that arm.22

In Queensland there was also heightened interest in enlisting and the acting commandant

reported to his government in January 1900 that many "offers of service have been received from

residents, in various Towns throughout the Colony, who desire to form Corps of Mounted Infantry."23

The existing Queensland Mounted Infantry was maintained but the clamour to join meant that the

previous arrangement of twelve scattered companies was no longer up to the administrative task and

the colonial commandant recommended that the force be expanded with the addition of another

fourteen companies and their organisation into four battalions.24 The result was a near doubling of the

establishment from 619 men in 1898 to nearly 1200 men in 1901.25 In doing this the commandant

pointed out to the government that:

The great advantage of Mounted Infantry is that they can perform all the duties of Infantry and are mobile. They are also able to carry out a portion of the duties of cavalry. Such as scouting and reconnaissance work for which they are eminently suitable.26

The considered value of this mounted organisation was such, and the recent example of South Africa

so persuasive, that in late 1899 Queensland went out of its way to cancel the appointment of a new

imperial officer as colonial commandant and requested instead the services of a cavalry officer.

Queensland’s representative in London asked the Colonial Office to consider that:

[T]he Mounted Infantry are not only the most important, but the most popular branch of the service and which obtain the largest number of recruits. They are not only valuable to the defence of the Colony itself, but as recent events are proving are the most suitable auxiliary forces for the defence of the Empire.27

For its efforts Queensland received the services of Colonel Henry Finn, late of the 21st Lancers,

veteran of the charge at Omdurman, as its new colonial commandant.

Victoria’s main mounted unit remained the Victorian Mounted Rifles. The outbreak of the

22Return of Establishment of Military Forces (Militia), 1898-1902. AWM 3, 02/673. NSW infantry establishments for the period stayed at about 2500 men, Victoria at about 1900 men and Queensland between 1200-1300 men. 23Col. J.S. Lyster, Acting Commandant QDF, to Chief Secretary, 29 Jan. 1900. QSA, PRE/19. 24Ibid. 25Return of Establishment of Military Forces (Militia), 1898-1902. AWM 3, 02/673. 26Ibid. 27Agent-General for Queensland to Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 12 Dec. 1899. QLD 34638, Colonial Office 234/69, PRO-AJCP

95

Boer War had seen the government inundated with no less than sixty-two applications to raise new

detachments of the regiment. Only willing to allocate an additional £3000 to the unit an increase of

250 men was authorised and this went towards one new company at Wangaratta and the fleshing out

of the other existing companies.28 The government, keen to harness the martial fervour but unwilling

to open the treasury any further, channeled the surplus popular energy into raising what were

ununiformed 'Mounted Rifle Clubs' requiring only funds for their rifles.29 Even without this extra

recruiting source the two battalions of the regiment could together maintain over 1100 men on their

books and it remained one of the most successful mounted units in the country. Unfortunately, its

continued reliance on unpaid service (apart from its small permanent cadre) and a tight colonial

government hold on the budget reduced its effectiveness. A 1901 report pointed out that, though the

unit could easily be expanded, many detachments could not carry out the musketry course due to not

having good enough rifle ranges and that their practical tactical training was of a generally poor

standard.30

The Victorian Mounted Rifles had recently been joined by a small unpaid volunteer force of

cavalry that had managed to convince the government to allow its raising despite the opposition of the

then colonial commandant, Major-General Sir Charles Holled Smith.31 Indeed, the anomalous creation

of the Melbourne Cavalry and its subsequent progression to the control of the federal forces may well

be the most brazen episode of 'buck passing' in Australian military history. Though first suggested to

the Victorian government in 1900 it was not until the 28 February 1901, the day before all pre-

federation forces would become part of the new Commonwealth Military Forces, that a deputation

from the proposed "Metropolitan Cavalry Corps" managed to arrange a meeting between themselves

and the Victorian Minister of Defence. At that meeting the minister, displaying plenty of care but little

responsibility, agreed to their idea and later that day facilitated the passing of an Order In Council

authorising the establishment of the volunteer corps of fifty men.32 The new Commonwealth

government thus found itself, the next day, in the possession of a small, marginal military

organisation with less than fifty soldiers and no administrative authorisation or support other than a

hastily organised Order in Council from a government that had released its defence responsibilities

within twenty-four hours of passing that order! When he arrived Hutton was unimpressed with what

he had been given, commenting that "this particular Corps... is, under its present organisation, of little

28Minute regarding VMR enrolments, 2 Jul. 1900. NAA(M) B3756, 1900/6576. 29Victorian Commandant, date unknown, 1900. NAA(M) B3756, 1900/6576. 30Report on Victorian Military Forces to Secretary of Defence, 30 Jun. 1901. NAA(M) B168, 02/5748. 31Hutton to Minister of Defence, 13 Nov. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 32Minutes of Meeting between Victorian Minister of Defence, Colonial Commandant & Deputation for Metropolitan Cavalry Corps, 28 Feb. 1901. AWM 3, 02/479.

96

military value."33

New South Wales had continued the maintenance of its Lancer and Mounted Rifles regiments

throughout the Boer War and these units had been augmented in 1897 with the raising of the 1st

Australian Horse. Initially a volunteer regiment of cavalry it was quickly brought onto the partially-

paid establishment and remained under the command of the state parliamentarian and invasion

novelist James Kenneth Mackay. Aside from the small Melbourne Cavalry, the New South Wales

Lancers and the 1st Australian Horse were the only colonial mounted units established as traditional

cavalry equipped with the arme blanche. New South Wales' two cavalry regiments also benefited

from the enthusiasm brought on by the Boer War and the Lancers had their establishment raised from

428 men in 1898 to 678 by 1902, and the 1st Australian Horse, part-paid from 1900, had its initial paid

establishment set at 628 men. The New South Wales Mounted Rifles was perhaps the only major

colonial unit not to benefit from the Boer War and in 1902 its Commanding Officer wrote

headquarters in Sydney complaining about the poor morale in his regiment due to the suspension of

recruiting and promotion while the new defence scheme was being finalised and implemented. This

situation, he believed, had exacerbated "disorganisation" in the unit dating from 1901 when many of

its officers and best men had been absent in South Africa.34 Perhaps this was the reason behind why,

despite the authorised expansion elsewhere, the Mounted Rifle Regiment was restricted to an

establishment of just over 400 men throughout the entire Boer War period.35

Reflecting a previous attempt in 1888, the New South Wales government had also recently

authorised the establishment of a permanent half-squadron of mounted troops to be used for

instructional purposes. With the title of Permanent Cavalry it was gazetted for establishment in mid-

1900 and disbanded in December 1901.36 Like its 1888 predecessor its impact appears to have been

minimal. Also briefly in existence was the Border Scouts, a small mounted unit raised on along the

Queensland/New South Wales border from station managers and their sons, solely for the purpose of

bush scouting. Gazetted for establishment in January 1901 it had a Commanding Officer nominated in

April 1902 but did not survive the coming military reforms.37

Aside from the differing colonial organisational models there were also considerable

differences in regard to the conditions under which the men in the various colonies served. All

33Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 17 Mar. 1902. AWM 3, 02/479. 34Lt-Col. Onslow, CO NSWMR to AAG Sydney, 24 Oct. 1902. AWM 3, 02/2809. 35Return of Establishment of Military Forces (Militia), 1898-1902. AWM 3, 02/673. 36Chief Secretary's Office to the Governor & Executive Council, 13 Jun. 1900. SRNSW, Box 5/6550, Item 00/11902, & J.K. Haken, Lineage and Development of NSW Military Forces. Unpublished manuscript, AWM, PR MF 43, Section 117. 37Information on the NSW Border Scouts, Brig-Gen. Finn, NSW Commandant, to Lt-Col. W. T. Bridges, AQMG, 23 Jun. 1903. AWM 3, 03/677, Part 2.

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mounted troops in New South Wales were partially paid and a private soldier of the Lancer Regiment

could receive up to £6 annually for his service with another £2 horse allowance paid to those deemed

efficient. A lieutenant of the same regiment received £15 annually plus an extremely generous £52 per

annum horse allowance.38 In Queensland a private, if he attended all his scheduled training

commitments, received £6.10.0 in base pay, £1.2.0. of uniform allowance and an additional £3.15.0 in

horse allowance.39 South Australia’s soldiers also received pay in compensation for their time but to

their east the Melbourne Cavalry and Victorian Mounted Rifles got virtually nothing from the

government aside from some of their military equipment (excluding horses or saddlery) and

uniforms.40 Tasmania’s and West Australia’s newly raised mounted troops also defended their colony

gratis.41

Aside from pay the attention and resources allocated to defence forces in general also varied

widely from colony to colony. For example New South Wales was willing to spend nearly £24 for

each soldier in its forces per annum in 1901, but Tasmania spent only just over £7 for each soldier on

strength.42 Victoria’s defence budget was the largest of all the colonies in 1900-01 with an annual

expenditure of £244,747 but with that sum the government chose to maintain only 6657 men in

uniform (of which only about 2500 were permanent soldiers or part-paid militia) along side a further

21,000 in ununiformed rifle clubs. In contrast New South Wales spent £232, 821 in 1900-01 to keep

9905 men in uniform (over two thirds of whom were paid), but decided to maintain only 1908 men in

rifle clubs.43 Policy decisions such as these meant that the numbers, and as will be seen the quality, of

mounted troops that each of the colonies contributed to the new federal mounted forces would, in

most cases, be very different. That the larger and more populous colonies would necessarily provide

many more was not, however, a given. As revealed below in Table 1, Queensland, with fewer

economic and population resources, was able to provide nearly as many mounted troops to the

Commonwealth as Victoria.

38Rates of pay for NSW Lancers Regiment. NAA(M) B168, 1901/3425. 39Extract of QDF Regulations attached to, Commandant QDF to Minister of Defence, 8 Nov. 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/4387. & Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 209. 40Rates of Pay for Victorian Forces, 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/3425 41Federal Military Committee, 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/4532 42Figures derived from: Strength of the Commonwealth Forces, 1 Jul. 1901, Federal Military Committee, 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/4532, and Costs of Defence, Year ending 30 Jun. 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/3716. 43Strength of the Commonwealth Forces, 1 Jul. 1901, Federal Military Committee, 1901. NAA(M) B168, 1901/4532

98

Table 1: Strength of the Mounted Troops of the Commonwealth (inherited from the six

colonies), 1 July, 190144 NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas

Cavalry Part-paid &

Permanent

1269 - - - - -

Unpaid

Volunteer

- 55 - - - -

Mounted

Rifles/Infantry

Part-paid &

Permanent

430 12 1185 728 - -

Unpaid

Volunteer

50 1132 - - 449 137

State Totals 1749 1199 1185 728 449 137

Total 5447

How these pre-federation mounted forces would be integrated into the new army organisation

quickly became clear. As Hutton’s plans were being formulated there were calls for Australia to

maintain more than one type of mounted troops, and at least one commentator advocated the raising

of another cavalry regiment in New South Wales so that a complete cavalry brigade could be

maintained there.45 Australia’s first Minister of Defence, Sir John Forrest, did not favour this course,

however, and had written to Hutton to set out, among other things, his thinking about the mounted

troops. He wrote:

I shall also, with a view to economy, be glad to be advised as to whether it is practicable to restrict [the] reorganisation of the Mounted Troops to one Arm, i.e., not to maintain as at present the several Corps of Mounted Rifles, Lancers, Cavalry and Australian Horse, but to have one uniform organisation and equipment for Mounted Troops in Australia.46

This implied that, should he have wished, Hutton could have advocated, and possibly achieved, the

maintenance of more than one type of mounted troops in Australia. But in reality there was never

much likelihood that Hutton was going to support the continued existence of cavalry in Australia.47

There were a number of reasons for this.

44Figures drawn from ibid. 45Frank Wilkinson, 'Australian Army Reorganisation', C. Kinloch Cooke (ed), in The Empire Review, Vol. IV (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1903), pp. 77-8, see also, Wilkinson, Australian Cavalry, p. 45. 46Minister of Defence to Hutton, 18 Dec 1901. NAA(C) A2657 Volume 1. 47Jean Bou, 'Modern Cavalry: Mounted Rifles, the Boer War and the Doctrinal Debates', in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Boer War, Army Nation and Empire: The 1999 Chief of Army/Australian War Memorial Military History Conference (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), p. 113.

99

Firstly there was an imperial aspect. Following the war in South Africa, and the perceived

relative performance of cavalry and mounted rifle units, there followed an empire-wide movement

that did away with citizen soldier cavalry units and replaced them with mounted rifles. In Britain the

Yeomanry, after decades of resistance, were forced to discard their swords and apply themselves to

rifle training, while the mounted troops of Canada and New Zealand also underwent a thorough

conversion.48 Secondly, and related to the first idea, there was the long standing guiding principle,

pointed out by George Denison and well understood in Australia before federation, that it took far less

training to create an effective mounted rifleman than it did to create a cavalryman. Thus it was

believed that part-time citizen horse soldiers were more suited to being trained as mounted rifles.49

The third reason was that Hutton, a long-standing proponent of mounted infantry and mounted rifles

theories, was convinced that South Africa had shown the limitations of the arme blanche in modern

war, particularly in the hands of non-regulars, and was never going to let the opportunity to create a

whole new mounted force in his own doctrinal image pass by.

Having been intimately involved in the mounted infantry movement in the British Army since

the mid-1880s he was intent that Australia’s mounted troops would conform to the his long-

propounded ideal of the mounted rifleman. In 1901 he had written an article extolling the virtues of

the mounted rifles and mounted infantry that had served the empire in South Africa and called for

increases to the Mounted Infantry Schools of Instruction in Great Britain as well as the official

establishment of three regular mounted rifle regiments, as part of the cavalry, for the purposes of

training the Yeomanry and colonial mounted corps.50 This proposal received no consideration by the

British Army, but in Australia Hutton would have a remarkable opportunity to put his ideas into

practice. Soon after his arrival in Australia he organised the publication of a compilation of a number

of lectures he had given in Britain and Australia since 1894. Including two articles propounding

imperial cooperation in defence issues, it also contained, as its first chapter, a lecture he had first

given in Sydney in 1894 pointing out the central importance of mounted troops in the defence of

Australia. This lecture was dedicated to arguing the strategic role that mounted units could fulfill in

modern warfare through the use of firearm-equipped mounted soldiers accompanied by suitable

artillery and support troops.51 It was in essence what George Denison had advocated in his books, the

sort of force that Hutton had tried to create in the 1890s with his Mounted Brigade in New South

Wales, and it reflected the fundamental thinking that lay behind the mounted Field Force brigades he

was now moulding for the Australian government.

48Wilcox, 'Citizen Mounted Riflemen', p. 19. 49Denison, Modern Cavalry, p. 13. 50Hutton, 'The Evolution of Mounted Infantry', pp. 376-78. 51Hutton, ‘Tactical and Strategical Power of Mounted Troops in War’, pp. 16-7.

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In 1894 he had seen a place for some traditional cavalry, as long as they could also use a

firearm effectively. When commandant in New South Wales Hutton had been generally supportive of

the Lancer Regiment, even if he did encourage them to pay more attention to their carbines, and his

public pronouncements and articles before the Boer War had always made the significant proviso that

the arme blanche should not be done away with entirely. But after his experiences in South Africa he

seemed less sure, claiming in an article that:

Seldom has it occurred that a military development has been so completely vindicated...It is undeniable that strategical successes, and in a large measure the tactical successes, of the campaign in South Africa have been achieved by the correct appreciation of the power of mounted troops handled upon the principles zealously maintained by the promoters of the mounted infantry movement.52

In the same article he dismissed the idea that continental cavalry, armed primarily with the arme

blanche, would easily defeat mounted troops intent on using firepower. It was undoubtedly his view

that "success in the next great European struggle will belong to that nation which first adopts the

principle of mobile fire power, and trains...its mounted troops accordingly."53 Perhaps most telling is

what he wrote in private correspondence at about this time:

The collapse of the Cavalry I always anticipated, but that it would be so complete and so patent even I had hardly realised. So far as I can recall there is not a single Leader of first class capacity among the Cavalry who has come to the front in this Campaign except French.54

Though he never advocated the complete disposal of the arme blanche for British regular cavalry he

had, at best, an ambivalent view of the traditional mounted arm, and given the dominant imperial

trend, Hutton ensured the new mounted units of the Commonwealth Military Forces, christened the

Australian Light Horse, would be raised based on his own, long-prepared, mounted rifle template.

There is no surviving direct evidence why the name Light Horse was chosen for Australia’s

mounted troops, or who chose the name. It seems most likely that the title was chosen by Hutton, if

not thought of by him, as it appears in the very earliest documentation relating to his scheme of

defence. Considering Hutton’s interest in the area and his unique place as General Officer

52Hutton, 'The Evolution of Mounted Infantry', p. 373. 53Sir George Chesney quoted in ibid., p. 377. Hutton would, after leaving Australia, again take a more diplomatic position in the cavalry and mounted rifle/infantry debates. In a 1906 article he attacked "some enthusiasts" who believed that well-trained regular cavalry could be completely replaced by mounted infantry. Dominion provided mounted rifle units could, however, be used as a valuable support to regular cavalry. It was a neat tying together of two of his long standing hobby horses, imperial defence cooperation and the dominion mounted rifles organisations that he had such a hand in fostering. Maj-Gen. Sir Edward Hutton, ‘The Cavalry of Greater Britain’, The Cavalry Journal 1 (1906), 24. 54Hutton to Lt-Col. E.F. Williams, 14 Jul. 1902. Hutton Papers. 50097, Vol. XX, 1901-03.

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Commanding, which gave him a degree of military and bureaucratic control over the military forces

unequalled by any other officer to serve the Australian government, it is unlikely that anyone else

could have given the force the title. Light Horse was not a new name by any means. A number of pre-

federation Australian mounted bodies had used the term in their title, the Queensland Light Horse and

the Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Hussars being just two examples. Nor was it a particularly

Australian appellation, the Imperial Light Horse and South African Light Horse had been two well-

known units in South Africa and some of Britain’s volunteer mounted units of the 1800s had used the

title of Light Horse Volunteers.55 The American Confederate General Robert E. Lee's father had

carried the nickname of Harry 'Light Horse' Lee after his association with a mounted body in the

American Revolution. Though not a common title it had been used regularly enough that it had an

increasing association with mounted rifles units, and more generally, light cavalry, a form of cavalry

that, with its origins as irregular horsemen from central Europe, traditionally performed the roles of

reconnaissance, screening, foraging, patrolling and the protection of communications. Not co-

incidentally, these types of activities had taken up much of the time of mounted riflemen in South

Africa and, apart from his vision of grand strategic mounted raids and turning movements, this was

much the role that Hutton had in mind for the new Australian mounted force. Certainly later in the

decade at least one Australian officer would be able to see a similar lineage:

Hutton...always held that the irregular horsemen of Australia were capable of, and would have to perform, duties of more extended nature than those within the power of Mounted Infantry, and he gave them, therefore, the title of Light Horse.56

The Light Horse were not to be mounted infantry, but a form of cavalry, differing only in their lack of

a bladed weapon that could be used from horseback, the archetypal mounted riflemen that Hutton had

been advocating since the early 1890s. If used in the defence of Australia they were a replacement for

cavalry, if used imperially they could be either a replacement for or an auxiliary to regular cavalry.57

The unit organisational titles of company or battalion that had been used for the mounted troops in

some colonies before federation were banished for the Light Horse and they were now to be organised

into the traditional cavalry bodies of squadrons and regiments. Anyone holding the appointment of

bugler now found themselves given the cavalry title of trumpeter. Though large by British standards,

at four instead of three squadrons, Light Horse regiments were still only just over half the size of a

55Carmen, Light Horse Volunteers and Mounted Rifle Volunteers, passim. 56Capt. C.B.B. White, 'Light Horse of Australia: Their Organisation and Training', The Cavalry Journal IV (1909), 80. 57Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688, & Hutton, 'The Cavalry of Greater Britain', p. 24.

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new Australian infantry regiment (later battalion).58

These mounted regiments were all to be partially-paid, even the half-squadrons of the largely

volunteer Garrison Force, and were established on a regional basis. It was, however, the sub-unit, the

squadron, that was considered most important in the new scheme and it was to be maintained as the

key "tactical and administrative unit, capable of independent service at all times".59 Squadrons were

further divided into four troops, again required to be able to serve independently, and these troops

then divided into permanent sections of four men.60 Each troop was to be recruited in the same

locality and the greatest pains were to be taken to maintain them intact.61 The idea was that basing the

organisation on a single locality would provide a comrade system that would provide much needed

unity on the battlefield.62

In peacetime regiments could be commanded by either a Major or Lieutenant-Colonel,

depending on the officers available in the district, but upon mobilisation and expansion to the war

establishment regimental command became a Lieutenant-Colonel’s appointment. A commensurate

arrangement was made for Captains and Majors at the level of squadron command.63 Squadron

Commanders were deemed to be entirely responsible for the instruction, drill, equipment and "interior

economy" of their organisations and this principle was to apply also at the troop level.64 Regimental

and permanent instructional staff were intended to give guidance and assistance but not interfere

unnecessarily in the day-to-day operation of sub-units. This decentralisation and the pushing down the

ranks of responsibilities was intended foster individual action and the independence of thought of men

holding command positions.65

58Militia and Volunteer Peace and War Establishments. pp. 7 & 19. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. A Light Horse Regiment of four squadrons had a war establishment of 581 personnel all ranks, an infantry regiment 1010 all ranks. Neither figure includes the prescribed attachments. 59Ibid., p. 5. 60Ibid., pp. 5, 8-9. A Light Horse Squadron at peace establishment would total 72 personnel, with 16 in each troop and another 8 fulfilling squadron command or integral support functions (trumpeters, farriers, armourers etc.). The war establishment would expand the squadron to 135 personnel with 31 in each troop and 11 in squadron command or support appointments. In neither establishment was a specific permanent squadron headquarters allowed for, and the distribution of command and support appointments was discretionary in order to "best meet local conditions." The half-squadrons allocated to the Garrison Forces would remain on the peace establishment upon mobilisation. 61Australian Regulations and Orders for the Military Forces of the Commonwealth. Provisional Edition, 1904. Part VIII, Section 8. NAA(C) A2657 Volume 1. 62Ibid., Part VIII, Section 10. 63Militia and Volunteer Peace and War Establishments. pp. 6-7. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688 64Australian Regulations and Orders for the Military Forces of the Commonwealth. Provisional Edition, 1904. Part VIII, Section 11. NAA(C) A2657 Volume 1. 65Ibid.

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These responsibilities for officers and non-commissioned officers were to be exercised at

least sixteen days per year. This was to be the annual training requirement for Light Horse, Infantry

and most supporting arms except for the Artillery and Engineers, who would do more.66 City and

town based units, mostly the Infantry, were required to spend one four-day period in a camp of

continuous training with the rest spent in a mixture of night, half-day and full-day parades throughout

the year. Country units, in effect nearly all the Light Horse, were expected to conduct their training

mainly in continuous periods and one eight-day continuous camp was prescribed. For these camps

regiments or even brigades would be expected to concentrate in one location and the time of year was

discretionary to suit local conditions. The remaining time was to be broken up into a series of whole

and part-day parades conducted in local areas where nothing greater than squadron concentration, if

that, was to be expected. The conclusion of a musketry course and an annual inspection by the

relevant state commandant were part of this calendar.67 Part-time officers would also have to pay

attention to their professional military training. Hutton instituted Schools of Instruction for all

branches of the service and saw that passing examination for promotion was made a requirement for

advancement through the ranks. Also introduced was a system of "Staff Rides upon Field Conditions"

that required officers to consider and provide solutions to tactical problems presented to them in the

field.68

To provide the guidance for this training Hutton had printed in late 1902 a new training

manual for mounted troops. His Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian

Commonwealth was based on a manual he had prepared for the Yeomanry in Britain the year before,

which was in turn "to all intents and purposes a revised edition" of the 1895 manual whose creation in

Australia he had overseen.69 The manual had been modified for use in Britain, somewhat to Hutton’s

disgust, but he found no impediment to its publication in Australia. He noted in a personal letter:

I have been amused to see the Yeomanry Training 1902 - which is an emasculated form of my Manual. I hardly expected that my Manual would be published as it stood. It was too advanced for the British Cavalry. I had the C-in-Chief’s [Lord Roberts] permission to publish the Manual in Australia however, and am doing so.70

Never short of self-confidence he told another correspondent that the British cavalry "were too

66Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, p. 5. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. 67Ibid. & Australian Regulations and Orders for the Military Forces of the Commonwealth. Provisional Edition, 1904. Part VIII, Section 37. NAA(C) A2657 Volume 1. 68Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, p. 5. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. 69Hutton to DQMG, 6 Sep. 1902. NAA(M) B168, 1902/6660 70Hutton to Lt-Gen T. Kelly-Kenny, 4 Aug. 1902. Hutton Papers. 50097, Vol. XX, 1901-03.

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conservative in their tendencies to accept the system of drill and manoeuvres just yet."71

Hutton’s manual was intended to replace a large selection of publications used up to that time

and provide one source for all training of mounted troops.72 Following his own precedent from 1895,

and in line with what military reformers were also doing in Britain, he added a preface that set out his

guiding doctrinal principles. Its opening words were:

Important as the dismounted fire action of mounted troops has always been held to be, the recent improvement in firearms, and above all the introduction of smokeless powder, has given the fire action of mounted men a power which, in future, must materially modify, if it does not revolutionise, the tactics of the field of battle and the strategical combinations of a campaign.73

With fire action at the centre of his thinking Hutton believed that the preliminaries of "every skirmish

and every engagement" must depend on the actions of mounted troops and that those mounted troops

trained to fight on foot with the rifle:

[A]re peculiarly adapted to the requirements of this service, and the value of such troops has been enhanced by the experiences recently obtained in South Africa to an extent that bids fair to be little short of revolutionary.74

He did not completely dismiss the role of arme blanche carrying cavalry but asserted that their

opportunities would be limited and implied that their effective use required a high level training that

was not likely to be within the capabilities of Australia’s part-time soldiers.75 The greatest importance,

however, was attached to "strategical" operations that would see mounted troops organised as self-

sufficient all arms formations striking at an enemy’s flanks, rear or lines of communication.76 These

troops had to be a "complete fighting unit and be capable of dealing in dismounted action with an

enemy’s infantry in a manner which no cavalry, organised and trained as modern European cavalry,

can ever hope to do."77 By definition these troops had to be mounted riflemen or mounted infantry in a

formation organised along the lines of the Field Force brigades and it is these sorts of troops who, he

71Hutton to Lord Dundonald, 26 Apr. 1904. Hutton Papers. 50098, Vol. XXI, 1904 - July 1908. 72Hutton to DQMG, 6 Sep. 1902. NAA(M) B168, 1902/6660. The manuals it was to replace were Instructions for Encampments, Musketry Regulations, Rifle Exercises, Cavalry Drill, Infantry Drill, Kings Regulations, and the Field Service Manual for Engineering Services. 73Maj-Gen E.T.H. Hutton, 'Preface', Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth (Sydney: F. Cunninghame & Co., 1902), p. ix. 74Ibid., p. x. 75Ibid., pp. x-ix. 76Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

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contended, would do much to shape the character of future wars.

The manual did note a place for mounted infantry in Australia and it is clear that Hutton saw

the infantry brigades of the Field Force as equally suitable for either traditional dismounted use or for

use as mounted infantry.78 Hutton’s manual was also published under the alternative title of Mounted

Service Manual for Australian Light Horse and Mounted Infantry and, though it may have been in use

earlier, in 1904 the manual (under one or both of its titles) was issued to selected companies of the

Field Force infantry regiments.79 The necessity to adopt drill suited to men on horses reportedly

created some dismay among town-based infantry who had to imagine the presence of horses in their

ranks.80 Hutton was, however, clear that the two forms of mounted troops were distinct in their nature

and military roles. Mounted infantry was limited in its conception and characterised merely as normal

infantry "temporarily provided with increased means of mobility or rapid locomotion."81 They were

not horsemen, simply infantry with extra mounted training. Their duties when so organised were no

different from their duties when dismounted. Though intended to be made up from the best shooting,

hardiest and smartest troops in the infantry, and suitable for use either as the small mounted

component of a largely dismounted infantry force or for concentration as a large mounted infantry

body, their utility outside their assigned role was limited. The manual stressed that they could only be

used for more demanding, Light Horse type, tasks only "after prolonged training and practice in the

field" [emphasis in the original].82 Alternatively the mounted riflemen of the Light Horse had to be

"daring and bold horsemen" who possessed the "cohesion and individuality which are only begotten

of a sound organisation and of true discipline."83 As a type of cavalry they were tasked with fighting

on foot as required in both the offence and defence, the performance of reconnaissance and screening

duties, as well as to provide protection from surprise for all bodies of troops.84

With the defence scheme formulated and the doctrine for the Light Horse set out there

remained only the task of actually creating the regiments and brigades that would play such an

important role in Australia’s defence. In his Minute Hutton had pointed out that the large proportion

77Ibid., p. xiv. 78Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 164 & 199. 79Secretary of Defence to The Authorising Officer, Military Forces Sydney, 6 Sep. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1902/6660. 80Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 199. 81Hutton, ‘Preface’, Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth, p. xii. 82Ibid., pp. xii-xiii. 83Ibid., p. xii. 84Ibid.

106

of mounted troops his scheme required meant that a significant number of country based infantry units

had to be converted into Light Horse. Hutton was certainly not concerned at such a change, believing

that the decision was "consistent with the characteristics of the Australian people" recently

highlighted in South Africa.85 In pure defence terms this was hardly controversial given the lessons of

South Africa and the doctrinal tenor of the time. That mounted troops were of great value in modern

war received support from many quarters including local officers, and not just in relation to South

Africa. In 1904 Colonel John Hoad, a permanent officer from the Victorian forces, traveled to Asia to

observe the Russo-Japanese War. His reporting included comments that stressed the importance of

cavalry and mounted infantry in modern warfare.86 In terms of the Australian character, however,

Hutton, was tapping into a long-evident but recently reinforced notion that men from the bush made

excellent natural material for horse soldiering. One journalist and recent war correspondent thought

Hutton was on the right track and believed converting country infantry units would be easy given, in

his opinion, most country men owned horses anyway and rode them into town to attend their infantry

parades.87 It was not only journalists who expressed this view. Colonel E.G.H. Bingham, a British

artillery officer who had served twice in Australia, told the audience at the Royal United Service

Institution in 1901:

We have now to deal with a most valuable adjunct to the defence forces of Australia. I refer to the Mounted Infantry Volunteers. This force, which is represented in all the states, consists of men living up country all of whom are good riders....It is a treat to see them riding at full gallop over ground which an ordinary man would take at his horse at a walk....[A force raised from them] would possess all the qualities characteristic of the Australian bushmen, including good horsemanship, self-reliance, experience in the management of horses under service conditions, and the habit of living in a wild country. It would be vain to look for such a combination in English recruits.88

Not everyone was of the same opinion. Senator and Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Neild, a New South

Wales citizen infantry officer, bemoaned "Horsetralia" and the advocates of "gallop and shoot":

[T]he people of Australia have now an ingrained belief that an Australian, astride anything with four legs, is, if possessed of a rifle and a pillow case full of cartridges, a match for an indefinite number of the best trained soldiers of any nation under heaven. This unhappy mania is shared and propagated by Members of Parliament and

85Hutton, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, p. 4. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688. 86Comments by Col. J. Hoad attached to an addendum to his Report on the Russo-Japanese War, 14 Dec. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1904/32(4). 87Frank Wilkinson, ‘Australian Army Reorganisation’, p. 77 88Bingham, 'The Australian Soldier', p. 1169.

107

Ministers of the Crown.89

Neild was probably closer to the mark but Hutton’s changes would, nevertheless, go ahead and have

the greatest affect on Victoria and New South Wales as they had to support two Light Horse brigades

each, which was considerably more than the roughly one brigade of mounted troops that each had

maintained before federation.90 In New South Wales the changes were to be effected by reducing the

pre-federation establishment of ten companies per infantry regiment to eight. These surplus

companies, located in rural areas remote from their wartime stations, were to be urged to convert to

Light Horse or disbanded. In Victoria the plans called for the conversion of much of the Victorian

Rangers, an unpaid volunteer infantry regiment with detachments based in the larger country centres

of Victoria. Hutton believed that as many Victorian Rangers had served mounted in South Africa this

conversion in particular was likely to be successful, a feeling reinforced as one detachment had

already expressed a desire to serve in a mounted capacity.91

Despite Hutton’s view the conversion of infantry to Light Horse in order to meet the

requirements of the scheme became a fraught process. In Victoria the change commenced in July

1903 when the affected company commanders received orders to disband their companies and ask the

men to enroll in the Light Horse regiments that were now being raised in their areas. Particular

opposition to this change was heard from the Ranger detachments at Echuca and Kerang, whose men

were not of the opinion that the pay of a Light Horse soldier, at £7.8.0 a year, was sufficient to

compensate for the costs of owning a horse.92 Though by late August significant parts of the

companies at Sale and Dandenong had signed onto the books of the 9th Light Horse Regiment, only

twelve men had done so at Kerang and none at Echuca.93 By September the Kerang Times had taken

up the cause and the local federal member had spoken on their behalf in parliament.94 During a visit to

the area in August the new Minister of Defence, James Drake, heard complaints that the conversions,

and the financial requirements of owning horses, were an unfair impost on men who had already

rendered effective service as infantry and who wished to continue to do so.95 By late September the

89Senator Lt-Col J.C. Neild, The Naval Defence of Australia. NAA(M) B168, 1902/2688 (7). 90Victoria would not initially have to support two complete brigades as one of the regiments of the 4th ALH Brigade, the 12th LHR, would be raised in Tasmania. Only later in the decade would Victoria’s establishment be increased to two full brigades. NSW would support a full six regiments from the start. 91 Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 159. 92Ibid., pp. 200-2. 93Ibid., p. 202. 94Extract of the Kerang Times, 22 Sep. 1903, in NAA(M) B168, 02/2688 95Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 203.

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opposition of the men and the sympathetic attitude of the Minister forced Hutton to relent and he

decided that the companies at Kerang and Echuca, though not those at Sale and Dandenong, were to

continue serving as infantry.96

The Echuca company had been earmarked for conversion partly because it was isolated from

other companies of the Rangers and was far from its wartime concentration place in Melbourne.97 In

New South Wales an infantry company in Cooma was in a similar position being over 400 kilometres

from its concentration point in Sydney. Lacking a qualified commanding officer and with few of its

soldiers deemed efficient, it was planned to combine the men of Cooma with existing detachments of

the 1st Australian Horse in the Monaro region to form a new Light Horse squadron.98 Again local

politicians and press became animated in their defence of the infantrymen. The Cooma Express,

giving the affair a democratic bent, cried that it was an effort by the "Aristocratic Hutton" to deny

common working men the chance to serve in favour of the social elites in the cavalry.99 Again the

crux of the matter was whether men who were serving in infantry units were able or willing to afford

the purchase and maintenance of horse flesh in order to continue soldiering. In this case it seemed that

many of the men involved were in fact willing to do so. Despite the complaints the Cooma company

was disbanded, but thirty to forty men put their names forward to join the Light Horse, of which about

twenty actually bought horses.100 Unfortunately for many of these men the commanding officer of the

Light Horse squadron, Major Granville Ryrie, had more applicants from the full squadron area than he

needed and was thus able to judge some of the Cooma men as unsuitable material. Also of concern

was who would command in Cooma. The New South Wales Commandant, Brigadier-General H.

Finn, believed that though two were needed, only one suitable troop leader could be found in Cooma

and that nearby Bredbo had much better material for light horse soldiers and officers.101 In the end,

and despite further loud complaints, Ryrie accepted only one troop’s worth of men from Cooma, all

from the original infantry company, and established the other troop in Bredbo.102

It was not only remote infantry companies that were unhappy with conversions. Disquiet was

also heard about Hutton’s plans from the cavalry units of New South Wales and from the small

Melbourne Cavalry. The Melbourne Cavalry’s concerns were first aired in the Melbourne Age in June

96Ibid. & Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 19 Sep. 1903, NAA(M) B168, 02/2688, Item 4. 97Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 203. 98Ibid., pp. 205-6. 99Cited in ibid., p. 207. 100Ibid., pp. 204 & 208. 101Brig-Gen. H. Finn, Commandant NSW, to DAG Melbourne, 28 Oct. 1903. AWM 3, 1710. 102Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 208-9.

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1903 and stemmed from anxieties about its command as the existing officers, though having passed

examinations, had not been confirmed in their appointments. The corps, the newspaper reported, felt

they were "not merely neglected but snubbed; and have come to the conclusion that they are to be

discouraged to the point of disbanding."103 The State Commandant, Brigadier-General Joseph Gordon,

reported to headquarters that the lack of confirmed appointments was in fact a general restriction

resulting from the federal re-organisation rather than any attempt to kill off the corps.104 Hutton, ever

one for military propriety, in turn pointed to the unit’s unorthodox origins as a unit unwanted by the

pre-federation commandant and believed such beginnings "could only end in discontent and

irregularity among the personnel of the detachment."105 Lieutenant Alex Rushall, the officer

commanding the Melbourne Cavalry, then wrote to the military authorities in mid-July outlining the

corps wishes for their future. Aside from continuing their complaint about officer appointments they

also expressed their desire to remain cavalry, to remain volunteers, to remain "under their own distinct

command" and to expand the size of the unit to over seventy personnel.106 The Minister intimated to

Hutton that as the small corps were already in existence and were willing to continue as unpaid

volunteers then perhaps their wishes might be accommodated.107 Victoria’s commandant disagreed

and rightly pointed out that doing so would create a unit that effectively existed outside the whole

defence scheme of organisation.108 Evidently irritated by the whole affair Hutton held much the same

opinion and, despite some evidence the Minister was going to get his way, he brought the whole

episode to an end by slating the unit for inclusion in the Garrison Troops of Victoria. Made into the

attached 6th Squadron of 10th Light Horse Regiment they were allowed to maintain their name as a

unit sub-title and keep their existing full dress uniform for "the present".109 The Minister expressed

some dismay that instead of getting a free squadron of cavalry he now had another partially-paid

Light Horse squadron to fund, but the matter rested there.110

103Extract of the Age, 19 Jun. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 104Brig-Gen. J. Gordon, Commandant Victoria, to Col. J. Hoad, DAG & CSO, 20 Jun 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 105Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 3 Jul. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631 106Lt. A. Rushall to District Headquarters, Victoria, 17 Jul. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 107Secretary of Defence to Hutton, 27 Jul. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 108Brig-Gen. Gordon to DAG & CSO, 10 Aug. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 109Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 20 Oct. 1903, NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. The only evidence that the Minster was going to succeed in keeping the Melbourne Cavalry is from a portion of an undated surviving minute to the AAG & CSO of Victoria that queried a number of administrative matters of how it was to be managed in regard to resources and instruction. Hutton was evidently nonplussed to see the minute and scrawled across it a blunt reprimand to the author concerned, through the DAG, about its improper tone. Portion of Minute, undated, to AAG & CSO Victoria, NAA(M) B168, 02/1631. 110Minister of Defence to Hutton, 6 Nov. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 02/1631.

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The Melbourne Cavalry’s desire to continue serving as cavalry was echoed loudly across the

border in New South Wales. There the Lancer Regiment in particular was unhappy about losing their

unique status as Australia’s only lancers. Though they were concerned about the change in title to

Light Horse and the fact they were to be split to facilitate the creation of two full Light Horse brigades

in the state, there were also loud concerns aired about their armament.111 The regiment’s commander,

still Colonel James Burns, expressed his strong views on these matters to Hutton in 1902 and wrote to

his officers expressing his wish that they would be able to "follow the English lancer regiments in the

carrying of the rifle [in an acceptable way, and] then the whole difficulty of the position disappears

and I assume that all will gladly and loyally adhere to the regiment to with which many of us have

been so long and so happily associated."112 Hope was held out that Hutton would allow the Light

Horse to carry their rifles in buckets on the saddle rather than on their backs, thus leaving room for the

lance to also be carried.

The Lancers and the sword-carrying 1st Australian Horse found public support for their cause

from a number of sources. The imperial cavalryman, Major-General Henry Finn, Queensland’s

commandant who had stayed on in Australia after federation, apparently expressed his views in

support of the lance in some quarters, though how influential he was is not clear.113 Other support

came from the same journalist who had advocated the maintenance of a separate cavalry brigade in

New South Wales. Frank Wilkinson, picking up on the anti-cavalry sentiments expressed during Boer

War, produced a small history of the two New South Wales cavalry regiments in 1901 that loudly

defended the military utility of cavalry. He attacked those who had come to the "unsound conclusion

that because Cavalry - qua Cavalry - have not been a pronounced success in this campaign, therefore

the days of Cavalry are numbered...as though one could transplant the kopjes of South Africa to all

future battlefields."114 He believed strongly that arme blanche equipped horsemen had a distinct moral

advantage and condemned the "modern tendency...to extravagantly magnify the virtues of the New

and Experimental to the detriment of most things which have stood the test of time."115 Repeating a

then popular refrain, he contended that any form of mounted soldier without an sword or lance would

quickly find himself at the mercy of traditional European cavalry.116

111The splitting of NSW units was not restricted to the Lancer Regiment. Both the NSW Mounted Rifles and 1st Australian Horse were also to be split. From the NSW Lancers would come the 1st & 4th LHRs, the NSW Mounted Rifles would provide the nuclei of the 2nd & 5th LHRs and the 1st Australian Horse that of the 3rd & 6th LHRs. Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', pp. 249-50. 112Col. Burns to NSW Lancer Officers, 1902, in Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 66. 113The Hon. Sir John Forrest, 30 Apr. 1902, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XI, p. 12099. 114Wilkinson, Australian Cavalry, p. 2. 115Ibid., p. 41. 116Ibid., p. 44.

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There were, however, opposing voices heard. The leader of the Labor opposition, John

Watson, derided the Lancer regiment in parliament:

In New South Wales the Lancers - another arm of the service more obsolete than cavalry, as ordinarily understood - are encouraged to prance around in fine uniforms with a pig-sticking instrument on their arm. But what value would that instrument be in time of war?

When informed by Forrest that Finn thought it very useful, as demonstrated at Omdurman, he

continued:

Against the black fellows whom the British had to fight there...no doubt the lance would be an excellent weapon. But fighting black fellows is very different from fighting the white people whom we might expect to invade us, and who would not be foolish enough...[to] allow us to stick them with lances...General Hutton’s own dictum in relation to this matter ought to be accepted...that mounted infantry [is] the proper arm of defence for Australia.117

This type of support may have been welcome but was hardly necessary. Hutton had paid little heed to

pro-cavalry arguments such as Wilkinson’s over the years and was not about to do so now. By the

end of 1902 it was clear even to the Lancer Regiment that they were not going to get their way and

Hutton eventually decided against rifle buckets and decreed that the Light Horse were to carry their

rifles slung on their backs. The Lancers and 1st Australian Horse were restricted to using their lances

and swords largely for ceremonial occasions and military tournaments.118 Some took the decision with

more equanimity than others. One historian has claimed that the Lancer half-squadron at Lismore lost

twenty-three men through resignation in one day in protest at the decision.119

Other changes caused more problems in Victoria. In 1903 Hutton caused considerable

consternation in the upper ranks of the Victorian Mounted Rifles (VMR) when, upon the transfer of

the long-serving Colonel Tom Price, he had appointed Colonel George Lee, a decorated permanent

officer who had served and commanded in South Africa with the New South Wales Lancers, to

command the regiment at that year’s Victorian Easter camp. The two battalions of the Mounted Rifle

regiment would be combined with an artillery battery to create, for the first time in that state, a de

facto Light Horse brigade, thus introducing new tactics and the new mounted system.120 By placing

117The Hon. John Watson, 30 Apr.1902, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XI, p. 12099. 118Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 66-7. 119Martin Buckley, Sword and Lance: The Story of the Richmond River Horsemen (Lismore, NSW: Self-published, 1988), p. 202. According to the author this mass resignation took place in March 1903. 120Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 189, & Perry, ‘Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in the Commonwealth of Australia: 1902-04’, pp. 44-5.

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Lee in command Hutton had rejected the services of the now senior officer of the Victorian Mounted

Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel William Braithwaite. Braithwaite, a popular but corpulent long serving

volunteer, had no war experience.121 Hutton, along with the State Commandant, Joseph Gordon,

judged him incapable of commanding a Light Horse brigade.122 Braithwaite objected to his being

superseded by a junior, and to what he saw as the apparent quashing of a citizen officer’s right to

command his own unit, and appealed to Sir John Forrest. Things quickly worsened when an article

appeared in the Melbourne Herald decrying the decision as "the most insulting order...that has ever

seen the light since the Mounted Rifles Regiment was formed...For the order implies that the senior

officers of the Regiment are not fit for their posts."123 When it came to Hutton’s attention that the

news editor of the Herald was none other than Lieutenant-Colonel W. Reay, commander of the

Victorian Mounted Rifles' 2nd Battalion, he demanded of Reay if he had anything to do with the

article. Reay refused to give a clear answer. Hutton immediately placed him on leave and demanded

that he tender his resignation.124

With the problem in the public domain it quickly became an issue for all and within a week of

the article appearing the matter had gone before federal cabinet and the official correspondence was

considerable. Hutton, for his part, was outraged at the possibility that his appointment of Lee might be

overturned by cabinet. He wrote a heated private letter to the Minister:

My dear Sir John, I am sending Lieut-Colonel Braithwaite’s protest with an appropriate minute. I can only say that if the Cabinet decide against the appointment of Lieut. Colonel Lee in favour of Lt. Colonel Braithwaite I shall ask Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Kingston to come and command the Light Horse. Seriously, I will not answer for the consequences either to the discipline and well being of the forces generally or for the indignation which the men themselves will feel at being made fools of by an incompetent and ignorant leader. If the Cabinet think that the Troops, more especially, the Mounted Troops, desire to be placed under the command of a weak and ignorant and inexperienced leader (merely because accident had caused him to be senior), they very seriously misunderstand the practical good sense of the Australian Soldier.125

Forrest wondered why Colonel James Burns, who was "not an expert", had been left to command his

Brigade under similar circumstances in New South Wales and whether Hutton could "not avoid all

121Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 189. 122Ibid, pp. 189-90. 123Extract of the Melbourne Herald 18 Mar. 1903, included in correspondence. NAA(M) B168/0, 1903/849 Part 3. 124DAG & CSO to Commandant Victoria, 20 Mar. 1903. NAA(M) B168/0, 1903/849 Part 3. 125Hutton to Sir John Forrest, 25 Mar. 1903. Hutton Papers. 50084/2E, Vol. VIII, 1893-1916.

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trouble by [following] a similar course in Victoria."126 After extensive consideration and

correspondence Forrest and the Prime Minister, Sir Edmund Barton, considered that Hutton was right

to have appointed Lee and upheld his decision, but were nonplussed at Hutton’s handling of the issue.

A reprimand was given to Hutton on the grounds that he should have gained ministerial approval

before appointing Lee and that when dealing with citizen officers "exceptional tact and discretion are

required, particularly during the inauguration of a new system."127 The issue died away when

Braithwaite and Reay asked to be put on the retired list and the camp proved a success.128

The success of these camps was a vital aspect of Hutton’s plans. As the organisational

difficulties of 1902-03 were left behind, Hutton’s reforms for the mounted troops at last began to take

shape and matters of training could become the focus of activity. Hutton undoubtedly saw the eight-

day continuous training camp as the centre-piece of Light Horse training. Since his first command in

Australia he had held the view that a reliance on theoretical training without adequate field training,

particularly for officers, had been a serious deficiency in Australian training.129 Now that the first

eight-day camps had been held he believed that the decision to hold them had been vindicated.

The duration of these camps for a period of eight days in the case of the Light Horse has proved even more successful than anticipated. It has been frequently pointed out that it is impossible to provide effective military training for mounted troops under other circumstances than in camps, as the most important portion of the cavalryman’s duties can only be learnt when concentrated in considerable bodies.130

The experiences of South Africa dominated training at this time. As early as 1900, following

his visit to South Africa, the Victorian Commandant, Joseph Gordon, had organised a local exercise

that specifically sought to demonstrate the capacity of a relatively small group of mounted men with

rifles to hold a position and keep a larger force at bay.131 This trend was continued upon Hutton’s

arrival and the 1903 Victorian camp was held at Sunbury because of its resemblance to Natal. During

the manoeuvres tactical mounted training emphasised operations in extended order across rough

126Sir John Forrest to Hutton, 26 Mar. 1903. Hutton Papers. 50084/2E. Vol. VIII, 1893-1916. 127Sir Edmund Barton, Prime Minister, to Sir John Forrest, Minister of Defence, 31 Mar. 1903, communicated to Hutton, 2 Apr. 1903. AWM 3, 03/677, Part 2. 128Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 192. 129Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain’, pp. 27-8. 130Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Second Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton (Melbourne: Robert S. Brian, Government Printer of Victoria, 1904), p.13. 131Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 163.

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country.132 Again in 1904 the Victorian camp was held in a location that "lent itself by appearance and

physical configuration to illustrate the South African high Veldt, which was the scene of many similar

combats during the war."133 The tactical operations there were again "intended to illustrate the tactics

pursued by the Mounted Troops during the recent campaign against the Boers."134

It was not only in training and the selection of exercise areas that the influence of South

Africa was felt. In the concluding report for the 1904 Victorian camp Hutton expressed his pleasure

that most of the tasks given to the 3rd and 4th Light Horse Brigades had been carried out effectively

and intelligently. This success, he believed, was due largely to the competence and experience of the

senior officers present who had served on campaign in South Africa and elsewhere. That there was a

significant number of junior officers and men in the ranks who had fought in South Africa or served

in the Victorian Mounted Rifles for an extended period had also been helpful.135

Despite this success the 1904 Victorian camp revealed that the Light Horse was not an

organisation without its problems. In the report for these manoeuvres Hutton had felt it necessary,

after praising the skills of the South African veterans, to:

[I]mpress most strongly upon all concerned the fact that, although the operations in themselves, speaking generally had so successful a result, it was due to the ...[presence of veterans and experienced citizen soldiers] rather than to the great bulk of troops themselves, who, for the most part, possessed but small experience and only elementary knowledge. It would be unreasonable to suppose that under ordinary circumstances, and with leaders less experienced, so satisfactory a result would be possible...136

While the general adoption of an eight-day camp for the Light Horse represented a significant

improvement to the usual pre-federation four day Easter Camp, it was hardly a period of time in

which to create truly knowledgeable or competent soldiers. The problem was exacerbated by the

generally low level of skills held by most officers and soldiers in an organisation that had undergone

rapid change and expansion in the previous few years. Hutton always praised the zeal and general

determination of the Australian citizen-soldiers under his command, but in a military system where

the vast majority of soldiers were part-time, training opportunities limited, and the government intent

on keeping a tight rein on spending, there were always going to be deficiencies. Aside from soldier

training at the 1904 Victorian camp Hutton complained of a variety of problems. Some of these were

132Ibid., p. 193. 133Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division...and Remarks Thereon By Major-General Sir Edward Hutton. p. 6. NAA(M) B168/0, 1902/618. 134Ibid. 135Ibid. 136Ibid.

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merely the teething problems of a new system, others undermined the notion that the Field Forces

could take to the field against an enemy with any hope of even sustaining itself.

Hutton first expressed confidence that the squadron-based system was working quite well but

that regimental administration and routine left "much to be desired."137 The supply system was

effectively nonexistent and without any proper system of supply columns established it was "useless

to suppose that the...troops can be effectively utilised for Field Operations."138 Men had attended the

camp in a wide variety of uniforms and many were in fact soldiering in their plain clothes. Hutton

conceded that the period of transition made it difficult to attain a reasonable level of clothing

uniformity but also complained that the small number of personnel on his headquarters staff "rendered

impossible" the effective and timely distribution of uniforms.139 There was an insufficient number of

the modern M.L.E. .303 magazine loading rifles issued to the Light Horse brigades present (most had

the old single shot L.E. .303 rifles) and at least two squadrons had arrived at camp without any rifles

at all. There were no machine guns available, a deficiency considered grave for mounted troops.140

These problems were largely generic and could well have been repeated anywhere throughout

Australia in regard to any troops of any arm at this time, but there were additional problems noticed at

this camp that were peculiar to the Light Horse, though not peculiar to Victoria.

Hutton noted with evident concern that a significant number of horses brought to camp were

too small and below the standard set out in general orders. He reminded his mounted arm that small

horses that were "incapable of carrying out the role of Light Horse and of doing quick and rapid work

are useless for the purpose for which Light Horse exists" [emphasis in original].141 This was followed

by a reminder that they were no longer mounted infantry and that their role, as Light Horsemen, had

been extended considerably. Compounding this concern was that the civilian colonial pattern saddle

widely owned and used by the men was unsuitable for military use. There was little Hutton could do

about this. Until the government approved the funds to provide every Light Horseman with a suitable

military saddle, a planned but expensive and unprecedented step for any Australian government, the

pre-federation practice of men using their own saddles had to continue. The affects of this for the

efficiency of the force was, however considerable. After just one and a half days of vigorous peace

time manoeuvring at this camp "a very considerable proportion of horses were incapacitated for

137Ibid., p.7. 138Ibid. 139Ibid. Hutton's staff when GOC was strictly limited by the government. He had hoped to have a staff of thirteen including three imperial officers. He was restricted to one of eleven, including himself, and no imperial officers. This staff was in fact smaller than the one he had when he had been commandant in NSW. Maj. Warren Perry, ‘Australia’s Immediate Post-Federation Military Forces', Army Journal 328 (Sep. 1976), 35-6. 140Ibid. 141Ibid. Italics in the original. The relevant order was: Para. 1 of G.O. No 247 (sub-para. 4), 27 Oct. 1903.

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further use during the camp by reason of sore backs and galls."142 The implications for any real

wartime use of the force were obvious.

An effort to keep Boer War veterans, particularly officers, in the ranks of the citizen forces

was one of the ways seen to improve the general situation. As early as 1902 the Minister of Defence

had tried various ways to keep the skills and experience of veterans at the force’s disposal. An

'unattached list' of veteran officers was one method suggested to keep a connection between the

desirable men who had already left the service of their colonial or Commonwealth contingent and not

joined the new forces.143 Men who had maintained a connection after returning home were given

encouragement by having their South Africa promotions confirmed as honorary rank. Hutton had

mixed feelings about this and had tried, unsuccessfully, to have this rule only selectively applied. He

was well aware that promotions granted in South Africa were often made for "local reasons and quite

apart from any personal efficiency or any meritorious service."144 It therefore followed that any South

African promotions did not necessarily constitute "any claim for distinction or reward for valuable

services performed."145 But, as his replacement of Braithwaite in 1903 and his assessment of the 1904

Victorian camp had shown, Hutton clearly felt that in this largely inexperienced force some returned

officers were very valuable indeed.146

If Hutton and the government were hoping that the leavening of South African veteran

officers was going to provide the much needed boost to the citizen soldier Light Horse, as well as the

other arms, they were hoping for much from a very few. Even in 1904, with the war only just over,

the number of officers serving in Light Horse regiments who had war experience was small. A review

of the surviving officer evaluation reports for that year from New South Wales reveals that the 1st

Light Horse Regiment had just four out of twenty officers who had active service experience, none of

them holding a rank higher than Captain. The 2nd Light Horse Regiment had just two out of twenty

five officers. The 3rd Light Horse Regiment fared best with six out of twenty-one, including one

Squadron Commander, Granville Ryrie, and the Commanding Officer, Kenneth Mackay. The 2nd

Brigade fared no better and the 4th Light Horse Regiment could boast only one officer, who had

served in South Africa as a trooper, out of eleven who had war experience. The 5th Light Horse

Regiment had only two from fifteen and the 6th Light Horse Regiment one South Africa veteran and

142Ibid. 143Minister of Defence to Hutton, 25 Nov. 1902. NAA(M) B168/0, 02/6411 144Hutton to Minister of Defence, 15 Feb. 1902. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1930/1/12 145Ibid. 146Hutton believed that the decision in 1903 by the Prince of Wales to accept the position of Honorary Colonel of the Australian Light Horse was a recognition of the services performed by Australian mounted troops in South Africa. Report of Hutton’s speech at the Melbourne Lord Mayor's Banquet in extract of The Age, 10 Nov. 1903. NAA(M) B168, 6238.

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one veteran of both South Africa and the 1885 Nile Expedition, Colonel Harry Lassetter, out of eleven

officers.147 If considered as the 17.5 per cent of the officers available that it is, this may seem a

reasonable total, but the numbers were not evenly spread and in a system where citizen officers lost

interest in their martial pastime, had civilian commitments that overcame their military pursuits, got

sick, were retired through age, or moved their homes outside recruitment areas, these small raw

numbers could be eroded quickly. Considering that not all officers who served in South Africa had

performed well the value of this sprinkling is even more questionable. Given that Hutton believed that

New South Wales and Queensland had the best of it in quality and numbers when it came to the

veteran officers, things did not bode well for the forces in some of the other states.148

The inequalities between the states dating from before federation was a constant source of

consternation for Hutton. When considering the skills of Boer War veteran officers he told the

Secretary of Defence that in New South Wales and Queensland the pre-federation "system of military

organisation generally and military instruction has been, especially in the case of New South Wales,

far in advance of that in the other states."149 In his 1904 annual report he complained about the

comparative spending and instructional standards that had been allowed the mounted troops of the

various colonies.

It would not, therefore, be fair to the troops concerned to draw comparisons of the mounted troops of those States who have in the past been generously treated as regards finance, and who have been trained with fair results, with those who have been financially starved and in the past denied proper means of instruction. The knowledge of the officers varies more especially. The inequality of the efficiency of the Light Horse Regiments generally...will unquestionably be changed for a more satisfactory condition of things in the next and ensuing years.150

Upon his initial inspection of South Australia in March 1902 Hutton had been alarmed to discover

that the whole state, due to colonial government spending, had only two permanent instructors to

instruct non-commissioned soldiers. He immediately ordered the despatch of another ten instructors

from other states that could better afford the loss, including three for the Mounted Rifles, so that the

"defect in instruction under which the South Australia Force has hitherto laboured may by this means

be gradually removed."151 Victoria, with its long reliance on unpaid volunteers, was also deficient in

147Confidential Officer Reports, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 LHRs, 1904. NAA(M) MP84/1, 430/2/44 148Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 Nov. 1902. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1930/1/12. 149Ibid. 150Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Second Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton (Melbourne: Robert S. Brian, Government Printer of Victoria, 1904), p.13. 151Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 Nov. 1902. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1930/1/12.

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Hutton’s eyes and when criticising the poor performance of most officers and soldiers at the 1904

manoeuvres he made the qualification that not much could be expected given "the limited knowledge

and small extent of military training which the Light Horse Regiments of Victoria have hitherto

received."152 Similarly Hutton, emphasising that the Light Horse were not mounted infantry, criticised

Tasmania’s Light Horse officers following a 1904 Staff Ride because they had yet to "grasp the

enlarged scope of their duty as Cavalry."153

Problems with equipment also played their part in making life in the Light Horse difficult.

Within months of his arrival Hutton had noted that "there is little if any satisfactory equipment for

Light Horse available in the Commonwealth."154 As mentioned the lack of a suitable uniform saddle

was considered a major problem and as part of his first draft estimate for expenditure in 1903-04

Hutton had proposed spending £10 263 on saddlery. When told by the Minister that his total budget

was not to exceed £50 000 for that year he was compelled to reduce the saddlery expenditure to just

£90 simply for the production of twelve sample saddles.155 The reduction in spending affected more

than just the Light Horse and Hutton expressed is concern that it was "impossible now to state any

definitive date by which the Military Forces of the Commonwealth are likely to be effectively

equipped..."156 Also affected was Hutton’s decision that the Light Horse must, after their rifles and a

bayonets, have a secondary weapon.157 Possibly inspired by the writings of George Denison he had

decided that most Light Horsemen should be equipped with a pistol. Believing the imperial Webley

pattern revolver unsuitable he requested the government provide the funds for a simple trial pistol to

be made locally. Included in his estimates for 1904-05 the double barrel pistol, with a flat head bullet

and a smooth bore based on the Whitworth principle, never made it to general issue, and secondary

armament for the Light Horse would be an ongoing, unresolved, concern right up to the outbreak of

the First World War.158 Even finding bayonets for the Light Horse proved a problem and in 1905

consideration was given to converting old triangular bayonets held in stocks to a more modern rapier

bayonet that could be issued to the Light Horse. It would at least have given the Light Horse some

152Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division...and Remarks Thereon By Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, p. 6. NAA(M) B168/0, 1902/618. 153Narrative of a Staff Ride by the Commonwealth Military Forces of Tasmania...18 & 19 February 1904, and Remarks Thereon By Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, p. 6. NAA(C) A1194, 12.42/4796 154Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 29 Jun. 1903. AWM 3, 03/624. 155Secretary of Defence to Hutton, 1 Jun. 1903, & Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 8 Jul. 1903. AWM 3, 03/624. 156Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 2 Jun. 1903. AWM 3, 03/624. 157Hutton to Minister of Defence, 8 Apr. 1903. AWM 3, 03/624, & Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth (Sydney: F. Cunninghame & Co., 1902), p. 15. 158Correspondence between Hutton and The Minster of Defence, A. Dawson, 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1903/4892, & Hutton to Minister of Defence, 8 Apr. 1903. AWM 3, 03/624.

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form of secondary weapon, but as the conversion process would have actually been more expensive

than buying new purpose made bayonets the program was never undertaken.159 Other complaints

about unsuitable belts and bandoliers were heard from Queensland.160 One West Australian

regimental commander, presumably feeling the chill on camps, was still waiting for the issue of great

coats in 1905.161 Uniform supply was a recurring problem and stemmed mostly from an inadequate

supply and administration system. A number of New South Wales Light Horse commanders ruefully

wished for the return of their old system whereby they organised and paid for uniforms out of

allocated unit funds rather having to wait on a centralised bureaucracy to deliver their needs.162

Other complaints flowed from the nature of the new post-federation army uniform itself.

Units that had previously had more colourful uniforms disliked the new plain khaki affair and those

who had plain pre-federation uniforms were disdainful of the necessity to add coloured facings, braid

and aiguillettes to make it presentable for occasions requiring full dress.163 The selection of white

facings for the Light Horse was scorned as a particularly foolish decision. The Melbourne Herald at

least was puzzled about "issuing to a Bushman a jacket with white facings and a white collar, and

when in full dress to have white shoulder straps and white chords, which are supposed to be an

ornament."164 In 1905 the infantry managed to have scarlet coats and white helmets reintroduced for

full dress occasions but the mounted regiments were restricted to the existing arrangements.165 One

Brigade commander asked to have the facings reconsidered as white was "found to be a most

unserviceable colour for Australian Mounted Troops, whose work is largely carried out on the dusty

roads of country districts."166 When asked other brigade commanders agreed but they, and the military

authorities, believed the change not worth the trouble.167 Certain New South Wales regiments,

desiring to maintain their traditions, simply continued to wear their pre-federation uniforms. Paying

for the uniforms out of regimental funds the 1st Light Horse Regiment continued to wear the Lancer

159Col. H. Le Mesurier, Chief of Ordinance, to Secretary of Defence, 30 May 1905. NAA(M) B168/0, 04/6604. 160Commandant Qld. to Secretary of Defence, 20 Jul. 1905. NAA(M) B168/0, 04/6604. 161Comments by Maj. N.J. Moore, CO 18th LHR, Western Australia: Meeting of Commanding Officers, 1 May, 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678. 162Comments by Colonels Lasseter and Carrington, New South Wales: Commanding Officer's Conference, 16 Mar. 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678. 163Melbourne Herald, 13 Jun. 1903 cited in Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 198. 164Melbourne Herald, 13 Jun. 1903, cited in ibid. 165Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 260-1. 166Lt-Col. D. McLeish, CO 3rd LH Bde., to AAG & CSO, 23 Aug. 1907. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1977/2/25. 167Military Board Decision of 31 Mar. 1908 minuted to Chief of Ordnance, 13 Apr, 1908. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1977/2/25.

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uniform for full dress occasions and the 3rd Light Horse Regiment continued to wear the myrtle green

affair of the 1st Australian Horse for both service and full dress occasions at least as late as 1908.168

Hutton faced plenty of difficulties when serving in Australia and the above problems were but

just some of them. He was, however, out of time to address them. Hutton’s tenure in Australia

finished at the end of 1904 and he sailed from Melbourne that November. For the mounted troops of

Australia there had been much change since federation. Brought, not without difficulty, into a uniform

structure they were now organised and trained to a single plan. Hutton had been pleased with what he

had achieved with the Light Horse and had told London so:

The Reorganisation Scheme and new Military System is beginning to work out most satisfactorily. The Troops, especially the Light Horse Regiments and Brigades, have responded in the most enthusiastic manner to the increased demands made upon them.169

An article by him in a 1906 edition of the Cavalry Journal expounded the virtues of the Light Horse

and, not surprisingly, highlighted what he saw as its strengths.170 He believed these strengths

stemmed from its territorial organisation, its establishment around independent brigades and its use of

both peace and war establishments as a basis for expansion when required. Whether these facets of the

Light Horse’s organisation were the strengths that Hutton thought they were would be tested in the

years ahead. Certainly, there could be little doubt that the Light Horse, beset with the problems of

brief, unequal and sometimes mediocre training, poor or nonexistent equipment, and devoid of any

true logistical system, was not yet the force it was meant to be.

Yet, despite the problems, there was no doubt that Hutton had achieved a great deal in the

three years he had been General Officer Commanding, and his creation of the Light Horse was

perhaps one of his greatest successes. The remarkable nature of what Hutton created with the

Australian Light Horse should not be underestimated. Restricted only by the broadest of government

guidelines and the depth of his government’s exchequer (which was not very deep) he was, to all

intents and purposes, handed the opportunity to create a distinctive mounted force that reflected what

he had been thinking and writing about for nearly a quarter of a century. The Field Force brigades,

and specifically the Light Horse, were the direct result of Hutton’s experiences as a proponent of

mounted rifle and mounted infantry theory. Animated by his own position in the mounted firepower

debates and, in his view, vindicated by recent events in South Africa he created a force that owed its

168Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 67 & 72. It is not clear when this practice stopped, though it seems unlikely that it would have continued after the introduction of Universal Training in 1912. 169Hutton to Secretary of the Army Council, Col. Sir Edward Ward, 5 Jun. 1904. Hutton Papers. 50098, Vol. XXI, 1904 - July 1908. 170Hutton, 'The Cavalry of Greater Britain’, pp. 25-6.

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heritage to certain interpretations of mounted warfare in the late nineteenth century and Britain’s

recent colonial warfare experiences. By way of Hutton the theorising of George Denison, analysed

through the prism of South Africa, had, in one of Britain’s most remote dominions, borne fruit. The

Light Horse, trained and equipped as the archetypal mounted rifleman, organised into permanent self-

sufficient brigades capable of both tactical and grand strategic use, was a force, on paper at least, that

was extraordinary. Indeed, the Australian Light Horse was a remarkable demonstration of the

theorising of Denison turned into doctrine and physical form.171 This was of no concern to Hutton as

he believed that South Africa had confirmed what he saw as the direction of modern warfare and that

any wars to come would find his mounted rifles of great value. Helped by the empire-wide trend to

make all citizen-soldier mounted forces into mounted rifles and the decision by Lord Roberts to allow

him a free hand in local mounted doctrine, Hutton went a fair way to creating an Australian force in

many ways unique in the British Empire. In doing so, however, he had also set the stage for a number

of problems.

171Jean Bou, 'Modern Cavalry: Mounted Rifles, the Boer War and the Doctrinal Debates', p. 113.

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Chapter 5 Unfulfilled Promise

1905-1914

Hutton’s efforts in Australia were not without controversy. Certainly the government, echoing

the reforms to the British Army’s control then being undertaken in London, decided it would not

appoint another General Officer Commanding to replace Hutton. Partly this was a response to the

friction that had occurred between a powerful and opinionated General Officer Commanding, Hutton,

and the government, but more fundamentally it was an effort by the government to gain access to a

wider basis of advice in defence matters.1 As a result the appointment was replaced with a committee,

the Military Board, that would now oversee the Commonwealth Military Forces. The Light Horse and

defence scheme as whole owed a great deal of its current shape to the singularity of Hutton’s vision as

General Officer Commanding. With a more corporate approach being put in place it would now

remain to be seen how Hutton’s vision would survive and develop. Many of the problems that Hutton

had not been able to address, and some that would stem directly from his plans, would cause

difficulties for the Light Horse in the decade ahead.

What was quickly being discovered was that the defence scheme itself was not always

particularly helpful in maintaining stability in much of the Light Horse. The low peacetime

establishments set out by the authorities for units meant that unless units were concentrated for large

scale collective training the work achieved was often minimal and the sense of progress

correspondingly weak. In Tasmania Light Horse officers in early 1903 were exhorted by their

superiors to strive to get as many men as possible to camp "as it is practically the only occasion in the

year when Regiments and in many cases Squadrons can be brought together for higher training."2 One

West Australian officer complained of the dispersed local 'home training', "that if there were only

sixteen men in a Troop and four were away, it was only a farce."3 Attempting to make training more

realistic the Mounted Service Manual instructed squadrons to have their men train holding extended

ropes as "by this means four men can be made to act as a Troop."4 This somewhat strange practice

1Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 34.

2RO No. 3, TMI, 29 Jan. 1903. AWM1, 19/1.

3Comments by Maj. N.J. Moore, CO 18th LHR, Western Australia: Meeting of Commanding Officers, 1 May 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678.

4RO No. 19, 12th LHR (TMI), 28 Jul. 1904. AWM1, 19/1.

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was certainly used but can hardly have been very satisfying.5 The problem caused by the difference

between war and peace establishments was exacerbated by the fact that due to the government

keeping a tight rein on defence spending the authorised establishments of units did not, in most cases,

even approach the restricted levels of Hutton’s proposed peace establishments. A reduction in the

defence estimates for 1903-04 meant that Light Horse squadrons in New South Wales and

Queensland were restricted to three instead of four troops.6 In Tasmania the 12th Light Horse

Regiment was restricted to two squadrons of two troops and one squadron of one troop, and South

Australia's regiments also faced similar restraints on size.7 Things did not necessarily improve as time

progressed. In 1907 Tasmania's Light Horse regiment was still restricted to a peace establishment of

256 men all ranks - still forty men short of what Hutton had wanted in 1902.8 The 5th Light Horse

Regiment in New South Wales was limited to just 152 men during the same period.9 Not surprisingly

frustrations were vented and one Victorian officer expressed his desire that the establishments should

be increased, but had to also admit that reaching even the existing establishment could be

challenging.10 This seemed to be less of a problem in some states than others and in 1903 the

Queensland Commandant reported that he was encountering no difficulties raising the authorised

Light Horse detachments. In New South Wales the commander of 3rd Light Horse Regiment in 1905,

apparently chafing at his limits, advocated the raising of the peacetime establishment of a squadron to

100.11

Certainly Tasmania was having considerable difficulty with its Light Horse contribution.

Hutton’s scheme had converted the Tasmanian Mounted Infantry into the 12th Light Horse Regiment

that would, in wartime, round out the 4th Light Horse Brigade in Victoria. Hutton’s scheme and

defence unification could not, however, try as it might, escape the same problems that had affected

part-time citizen forces for decades. Tasmania had always been a marginal area for recruiting

mounted troops and the record of the nineteenth century is one of unsuccessful and failed units.

5Ibid.

6Lt-Col. W.T. Bridges, AQMG, to Qld. Commandant, 3 Jul. 1903. AWM3, 03/677, Part 1, & Lt-Col. W.T. Bridges, AQMG, to Secretary of Defence, 14 Sep. 1904. AWM3, 03/600.

7Lt-Col. W.T. Bridges, AQMG, to Tas. Commandant, 3 Jul. 1903. AWM3, 03/677, Part 1, & HQ Melbourne to SA Commandant, 3 Jul. 1903. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2.

8RO No. 3, 12th LHR, 31 Jan. 1907. AWM1, 19/2, pp. 111-2.

9Annual Establishments of the Commonwealth Military Forces of NSW, 1906-7. AWM1, 16/2.

10Comments by an unnamed Light Horse Officer, Victoria: Meeting of...Officers with the Minister of Defence, 23 Feb. 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678.

11Acting Commandant Qld., Lt-Col. W. Plumer, to DAG & CSO Melbourne, 19 Dec. 1903. AWM3, 03/677, Part 22, & Comments by Lt-Col. Granville Ryrie, CO 3rd LHR, New South Wales: Commanding Officer’s Conference, 16 Mar. 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678.

124

Things were little different now and in 1904 the 12th Light Horse Regiment could boast a strength of

only 146 soldiers.12 In 1905 the Military Board tried to correct this deficiency. Echoing events of

1902-3 across Bass Strait they recommended that the 12th Australian Infantry Regiment give up two

of its country-based companies in favour of raising extra Light Horse detachments. Not surprisingly

the infantry commanding officer objected to losing two companies on the grounds that they were

among his best and that most of the affected men had no means to meet the requirements of joining

the Light Horse, that is the owning of a horse. In his view the two relevant recruiting areas were

"essentially infantry and not light horse districts" and trying to recruit Light Horse squadrons would

be a time-consuming and difficult process.13

The characteristics of recruiting areas could, as before federation, have significant impact on

the viability of local detachments. Though not perhaps as traditionally strong an area as Queensland

or New South Wales, even South Australia, with its successful record of viable units in the nineteenth

century, had difficulties reaching its Light Horse manning requirements. In mid-1904 both the 16th

and 17th Light Horse Regiments reported to Melbourne that many of their squadrons were still far

below their establishment.14 In other areas it proved necessary to abort efforts to maintain

detachments. In 1904 the authorities were forced to disband a squadron at Gunnedah as "attendance at

parades has dropped to less than [twenty] and is likely to get lower as there is an absence of life in the

Squadron."15 Here there were no further recruits offering their services. The only officer, a Second-

Lieutenant, had left the district and there was no apparent replacement available. Even the full-time

presence and efforts of a permanent instructor had been unable to reverse the decline.16 Similarly in

1905 a troop of the 11th Light Horse Regiment, located at Casterton in Victoria, faced disbandment

due to poor recruiting. The officer commanding wondered why his brigade headquarters had stopped

recruiting efforts for his detachment as he believed "the Casterton Troop was one of the best in the

Regiment."17 The reality was that this troop had only been able to get, on average, two soldiers of all

ranks, of the twenty-three enrolled, to attend local half-day parades in the last quarter of 1903. In early

1904 this non-attendance had been followed by a flood of discharges and further non-attendance so

that only Captain Little, one troop leader and one sergeant could be said to be regularly attending

12Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources, 31 Dec. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1903/1489 Part 8.

13Lt-Col. Martin, CO 12th AIR, to Military Board, date unknown. NAA(M) B168/0, 1903/1489 Part 8.

14Lt-Col Reade, SA Acting Commandant, to DAG Melbourne, 1 Jul. 1904. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2.

15NSW Commandant to DAG Melbourne, 13 July 1904. NAA(M) B168, 02/2688 (4).

16Ibid. See also: Anon, 'Some Notes on the Regiments of New South Wales (continued)', Despatch XIII:2 (Aug. 1977), 27. Reprinted article from the Evening News, 23 Nov. 1910.

17Capt. Little to Commander 4th LH Bde., 17 Feb. 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/9151(2)

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parades.18 No new men were forthcoming and not surprisingly Captain Little's pleas fell on deaf ears.

He was placed on the Unattached List and his detachment ceased to be. Other proposed detachments

were not even able to be raised in the first place. The 17th Light Horse Regiment in South Australia

found this in 1906 when a contemplated troop at Georgetown failed as "the anticipated response from

the young men of the District...[was not] forthcoming."19

There were also other concerns with the federal defence scheme, of a far different nature, that

a number of Light Horse officers wanted addressed. New South Wales, long a vigorous stronghold of

mounted soldiering, was proving keen to maintain a key tradition that Hutton’s reforms had quashed.

Despite the primacy of firepower set out in Hutton’s doctrine it was clear that not all of Australia's old

cavalrymen looked upon the arme blanche as something consigned to history. Within a few years of

his departure Hutton’s Mounted Service Manual was a cause of some concern. The infantry had never

been particularly enamoured of it and the infantryman and Senator, J. C. Neild, had dismissed its

contents as the "bastard mounted drill".20 By 1906 the government had agreed with London on a

process of imperial standardisation and the infantry and other arms returned to imperial manuals for

their guidance.21 With the infantry change to imperial manuals there followed the effective demise of

any notions of continuing with mounted infantry training in Australia and the Light Horse now

became the sole mobile arm of the Commonwealth Military Forces.22 The Light Horse manual had

been exempted from standardisation but Hutton’s doctrine was now proving troublesome. A 1906

committee convened to consider military organisation believed that the Mounted Service Manual was

"unsuitable for the Light Horse of Australia" and recommended the immediate compilation of a new

18Return of parades by Casterton Detachment attached to correspondence, Victorian Headquarters to Captain Little, 6 Feb. 1906. NAA(M) B168, 1905/9151(2)

19Inspector-General’s Report on his Visit to 1 Squadron, 17th LHR on 17 Mar. 1906. NAA(M) B168/0, 1906/5262.

20Senator J.C. Neild in Parliament, 1 Dec. 1904, cited in Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', p. 199.

21Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 251.

22The only challenge to this position came from two directions. The first was from Kenneth Mackay who in 1910 unsuccessfully advocated the recruitment of a volunteer force of mounted men drawn from men ineligible to serve in the Light Horse for a variety of reasons, including age. The model for this force was more the Boer Commando than anything in the existing forces. Col. Kenneth Mackay to AAG & CSO Sydney, 2 May 1910, forwarded to Secretary of Defence. NAA(V) MP84/1, 1970/1/65. The second was from the periodic calls to expand the role of cyclist troops in infantry regiments. In 1905 the Secretary of the NSW League of Wheelmen had written to the Minister of Defence asking that he consider the creation of a 1000-strong regiment of cyclists in NSW. "These men", he wrote, "by virtue of their magnificent physique, and the constant physical training they undergo, and the long, hard road contests raced in all weathers, combine to produce a race of men equal to all the hardships of the Battlefield." As with most such proposals it foundered on costs. A. O’Brien, Secretary of the NSW League of Wheelmen, to Minister of Defence, 16 Jul. 1905. NAA(M) B168/0, 05/10849. Later the Military Board also proposed expanding the use of cyclists. Military Board Meeting, 19 Jul. 1907. NAA(C) A2653, 1917-1908 Volume 2, p. 58. Though cyclists were used valuably in communications roles their utility as mobile infantry never seems to have been of particular interest to the authorities.

126

manual based "as far as possible on Imperial text-books."23 The primary concern seemed to be that

Hutton’s drill and ideas, having been permitted by Lord Roberts for use in Australia but not without

modification in Britain, were so far removed from imperial practice that any attempt to combine the

two was exceedingly difficult. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cox, commanding the descendant of the

Lancer Regiment, the 1st Light Horse Regiment, wrote to his Brigade Commander complaining that

the Mounted Service Manual did not cross reference with imperial sources and that the many

corrections and additions made for confusion. He strongly recommended the adoption of the imperial

Cavalry Training for Australia's mounted troops.24

Cox's letter became the leading effort in an attempt by New South Wales officers to have

Cavalry Training, with its potential place for the arme blanche, reintroduced. Despite Hutton’s

expressed views in the Mounted Service Manual, and his decision that the Light Horse would carry

their rifles on their backs, the arme blanche had not been completely proscribed in Australia. It was

certainly allowed for ceremonial uses and the correspondence relating to Hutton’s pistol proposal

indicated that the use of the lance was contemplated as a secondary weapon for a small portion of the

mounted troops during wartime.25 Hutton’s Mounted Service Manual and the 1904 Provisional

Regulations set out that though the magazine loading .303 rifle was the primary weapon for the Light

Horse "the lance and pistol [are] secondary weapons which will be hereafter specified for certain

corps."26 The sword, however, was strictly restricted to ceremonial uses. In 1905 Finn, who was now

the Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Military Forces, had again publicly expressed his

opinion that the sword and lance were by no means passe and would again be successfully used in

23Notes submitted with Report of the Committee of Officers on Organisation of Military Forces, 12 Sep. 1906, p. 27. NAA(M) B173, S06/60.

24Lt-Colonel C. Cox, CO 1st LHR, to Col. James Burns, Commander 1st LH Bde., 22 Oct. 1906. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1903/6/9. This is the same Charles Cox who had commanded the NSW Lancer detachment to Aldershot that had ended up serving as Australia’s first troops in South Africa.

25Correspondence between Hutton and The Minster of Defence, A. Dawson, 1904. NAA(M) B168, 1903/4892, & Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth, p. 15

26Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth, p. 15 & Australian Regulations and Orders for the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, Provisional Edition, 1904. Section 14. NAA(C) A2657, Volume 1. This apparent contradiction with much of Hutton's long standing views, while he was still in command, raises two significant questions. Firstly, why did he continue the possible use of the arme blanche in Australia? Secondly, why perpetuate the lance instead of the somewhat less cumbersome and more handy sword? In regard to the former question the only conclusion I can come to is that perhaps Hutton was once again inspired by Denison. He had advocated the widespread issue of the pistol for mounted troops but had also believed that a small portion of mounted troops equipped with the arme blanche would still occasionally prove useful. This thesis fits the pistol/lance mix advocated, but there is no supporting documentary evidence. That the army under Hutton would countenance the lance over the sword may simply reflect a personal or organisational prejudice. The lance was widely regarded at this time as the most morally intimidating and dignified arme blanche. The corollary of this was that the lance could be an encumbrance to a man acting dismounted and why this did not disqualify it for the Light Horse is curious. Perhaps the organisational strength and determination of the New South Wales Lancers had some affect on the choice. That British sword designs had long been a subject of heated criticism may also have been a factor. The design of the reputedly excellent sword that British cavalry took to war in 1914 was not completed until 1907. All of this is, again, speculative.

127

battle.27 Regardless of these allowances any use of the arme blanche seems to have been restricted.

There is no mention of their use in large camps at this time and it is likely that if the 1st Light Horse

Regiment, if no other, was spending time stabbing dummies or tent pegging they were doing so

quietly at their local parades.

Cox's Brigade Commander was the old Lancer Commanding Officer, James Burns. He

forwarded Cox's letter in favour of Cavalry Training to the Secretary of Defence through the State

Commandant with his strongest support:

For many years the N.S.W. Mounted Regiments worked under this manual and has always been found free from the anomalies of the Australian irregularly published text book...it will be more advantageous and would give better results than would a new edition of the Australian publication.28

Unfortunately for Burns the State Commandant did not agree and when he forwarded the submission

to Melbourne added that he thought that what was needed was "a Manual more on 'Mounted Infantry'

lines than 'Cavalry'."29 The board convened to consider what should be the training text for Light

Horse noted the observations from New South Wales but did not consider them convincing.30 The

result was the 1907 publication of The Light Horse Manual for the Drill Training and Exercise of the

Light Horse Regiments of Australia (hereafter the Light Horse Manual, 1907) and in it neither lance

nor sword training was given any space.31 Perhaps significantly for the arme blanche advocates the

committee had as its president Brigadier-General John Hoad, once a permanent officer of the

Victorian Mounted Rifles. The next senior member was Colonel Percy Ricardo, now the Victorian

Commandant, who, as Staff Officer for Mounted Infantry, had produced Queensland's own mounted

infantry manual in 1892.32 The new manual was, however, a significant departure from Hutton’s

doctrine and a much thinner volume than its predecessor. Gone was his preface and its dictums on

27Maj-Gen. H. Finn, 'With the Cavalry in Afghanistan and in Egypt', Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of New South Wales. XVIII:LIX (1905), 75.

28Col. James Burns, Commander 1st LH Bde., to AAG & CSO Victoria Barracks Sydney, 25 Oct. 1906. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/9.

29NSW Commandant to DAG, 16 Nov. 1906. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/9.

30Proceeding of a Board of Officers at Victoria Barracks Sydney for Compiling a Drill & Training Manual for the Australian Light Horse, 4 Dec. 1904. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/11.

31The Light Horse Manual for the Drill Training and Exercise of the Light Horse Regiments of Australia, 1st January 1907 (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Acting Govt Printer, 1907).

32Proceedings of a Board of Officers at Victoria Barracks Sydney for Compiling a Drill & Training Manual for the Australian Light Horse, 4 Dec. 1904. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/11. The board members were: President - Brig-Gen. J. C. Hoad, DAG; Col. P. Ricardo, Commandant CMF Victoria; Col. J. Rowell, ADC to the Gov-General; Lt-Col. the Hon. R. Carrington (an ex-NSW Lancer), Lt-Col. R. Spencer Browne, Secretary - Capt. R. Holman. The Queensland Commandant had tried, unsuccessfully, to get Harry Chauvel included on the board.

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mounted firepower and gone also were his ideas of grand strategic strokes by mounted forces. The

new manual, apparently influenced by imperial productions and ideas, restricted the Light Horse to

the more prosaic roles of traditional cavalry, except the charge, that had been in the previous manual

but which did not contribute to its grandiosity. One officer, referring to the imperial manuals, later

described it as "more or less a compromise between 'Cavalry Training' and 'Mounted Infantry

Training'."33 Restricted to "skirmishing", "information" and "protection" duties, general principles of

action were outlined, but seemingly unsure of its direction, the manual was surprisingly vague about

many of the duties that would be undertaken when Light Horse took the field and was not much more

than a manual of mounted drill.34

The development of the new Light Horse Manual was, however, far from the most significant

issue then preoccupying the military authorities. In 1907 the Military Board, particularly worried

about the quality of the citizen soldiers it oversaw, felt it necessary to convey their concerns to the

Minister of Defence:

Without expressing any opinion as to the sufficiency of the number of troops provided for the Defence of Australia the Board desires to strongly to call the immediate and earnest attention to the Government to the inadequacy of the time at present given the training of the troops.35

This was particularly worrisome as by this time Australian defence planning had gained a new

urgency. With the Japanese victory in the recent Russo-Japanese War, the signing of the new Anglo-

Japanese Alliance and the rise of German naval power there arose in government circles concerns that

the old guarantee of protection by the Royal Navy may not have been as sure as it once was. The rise

of Japan as a new Pacific power was of particular concern.36 London did not agree with Australian

anxieties and maintained its long-standing view that no dominion was less likely to be attacked than

Australia.37 The second Deakin ministry remained unconvinced and in 1906 a committee formed

under the Inspector-General, John Hoad, recommended that such beliefs should not be relied upon.

Australia should be prepared for at least the temporary loss of sea supremacy by the Royal Navy and

the resulting possibility that a foreign power could subsequently attack with a large and well-trained

expeditionary or raiding force.38 As a result of this moves began to expand the Australian military and

33White, 'Light Horse of Australia', p. 83.

34The Light Horse Manual, 1907, passim.

35Resolution of the Military Board, 10 Dec. 1907. NAA(M) MP84/1 2002/1/22

36Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 39-41.

37Ibid., pp. 40-3.

38Ibid., pp. 43-4.

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introduce universal military training for all able-bodied males. Steps in this directions were made over

the next few years but it was not until 1910, and after a visit by Lord Kitchener, that a scheme was

implemented. In the meantime against this contemplated army wide reorganisation the existing Light

Horse organisation was left to try overcome the problems that it had hitherto faced. The results,

however, were mixed.

Some equipment concerns were gradually being solved and in 1907 automatic weapons were

finally added to Light Horse establishments. In 1908 regiments were able to conduct their first live

firings with their new Pom-Poms and Colt Machine Guns.39 The history of the New South Wales

Lancers records that this first practice by the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades, at least, left much room

for improvement.40 It was, however, a start and rectified a long-standing deficiency that Hutton had

complained about. Both these weapons were replaced in 1912 when Maxim Guns became the

standard equipment of the machine gun sections.41 Standardised bandolier equipment was also issued

in 1907, though the supply of saddles was not yet addressed (and would not be until 1913) and the

Inspector-General, Hoad, judged the new manual to be a successful publication and "well suited for

use by the Light Horse."42 The provision of a secondary weapon for the Light Horse remained a

problem despite periodic calls for side arms to be issued.43 Given the difficulties they faced Hoad was

generally content with the Light Horse. In his report for 1907 he contended that they did "not as a

rule, bearing in mind the number of days training and the instruction available, leave much room for

criticism, and all ranks are keen to improve their efficiency."44

It was, however, this proviso of training quality that was the key to the overall usefulness of

the Light Horse as a military force and that continued to dog the arm. In late 1904 the then Defence

Minster, James McCay, himself a citizen soldier, had made a series of decisions aimed at placating

citizen officers unhappy with Hutton’s reforms. Among them had been a decision that it was no

longer necessary for Light Horse units to spend a full eight-days in camp.45 Hutton’s longer camps

had been a problem for many units but seem to have been a particular cause of concern in Western

39Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 100; Anon, 'A Short History of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles 1888-1913’, Despatch XVIII:2 (Aug.1982), 43, & Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 71.

40Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 71.

41Anon, 'A Short History of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles 1888-1913', p. 44.

42Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, Annual Report for the Year 1907 by the Inspector General of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Government Printer, 28 February 1908), pp. 7-8.

43Notes submitted with Report of the Committee of Officers on Organisation of Military Forces, 12 Sep. 1906, p. 27. NAA(M) B173, S06/60.

44Ibid.

45Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 238.

130

Australia. The commander of the 18th Light Horse Regiment in 1905 had told a meeting of senior

officers in that state that his regiment could not successfully carry out such a training commitment.46

As a result of McCay's decision West Australia's only Light Horse regiment no longer did the eight-

day camps that had been deemed so important and restricted themselves to the pre-federation tradition

of four-day Easter camps.47 Victorian units seem also to have largely restricted themselves to four-day

camps from this time.48 Most other units and formations continued with the eight-day activities but

these could be subjected to a variety of disruptions. In 1908 the two New South Wales brigades found

that their planned May camp had to be aborted when a severe drought saw their rolling stock assigned

to move starving cattle. This proved a major disruption to officers and men who had long laid plans to

attend at this time but a camp organised later that year to coincide with the visit of the American fleet

at least fulfilled the yearly requirement. This longer camp (seventeen days due to the fleet visit) used

up all the training funds for that financial year, however, and as the funds from the previous year had

not been carried over it was January 1910 before they could go into camp again.49 One of these

brigades, the 1st, again found their plans disrupted in 1913 when the Minster of Home Affairs, King

O'Malley, got wind of their intention to hold camp in the "Federal Capital Territory" and had them co-

opted into the ceremonies to be held in connection with the foundation of the new national capital.50

When camps went ahead without such disruptions, as they usually did, attendances could

prove another impediment. At the 1908 Fleet visit camp most of the regiments could field about 300

men, reasonably close to their establishment.51 The long break to the 1910 camp must have had its

affects, however, as at that camp the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments could only attain an average

daily attendance of 262 men against their respective establishments of 346 and 310.52 Things were

considerably worse in Victoria in 1909 with only one regiment, the 10th, able to achieve an average

daily attendance of 80 per cent of their actual strength. When compared with their paper

46Comments by Maj. N. Moore, CO 18th LHR, Western Australia: Meeting of Commanding Officers, 1 May 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678.

47Commonwealth Military Forces of Western Australia, Return of Easter Camp of Training, 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 2002/6/82.

48Commonwealth Military Forces, Victoria, Report on Annual Continuous Training, 1911. NAA(C), A1194, 12.30/4547.

49Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 69-70 & 74-5.

50Minister of Home Affairs to Minster of Defence, 24 Dec. 1913, & Minister of Defence to Minister of Home Affairs, 8 Jan. 1913. NAA(M) MP84/1, 202/4/439. By the time of the ceremonies the 1st LH Bde. had been renamed the 3rd LH Bde.

51Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 74.

52Ibid., p. 75.

131

establishments the figures were even worse.53 In the same year the 18th Light Horse Regiment in

Western Australia, with just a four-day Easter camp to be concerned with, could get only 163 of the

245 men enlisted to attend. Again the figures look inauspicious when compared to the establishment

of 310 personnel. Of the 82 who did not attend only thirteen had managed to obtain leave for the

camp.54 There was some good news, however. Most of the regiments in Queensland managed

attendances of over ninety per cent that year.55

Good attendances were not always what they seemed, however, and one permanent staff

officer, Colonel John Lyster, had in 1905 complained of a tendency to conduct recruiting drives in the

lead-up to camps. This boosted numbers but the high number of new recruits mean that training for all

concerned had to be limited in its complexity and usefulness in order to accommodate the new men.56

Lyster hoped this problem of mixing recruits and more experienced men could be done away with, but

one of the reasons why the 1st Light Horse Brigade decided to camp near the eventual site of Canberra

in 1913 was that the high percentage of new recruits in ranks made attending a larger multi-brigade

concentration at Albury not worthwhile.57

Despite the deficiencies in extended camp training it was the best chance the Light Horse

regiments had of moulding themselves into something like the military organisations they were meant

to be. The 'home training' of evening, half-day and full day parades was increasingly being seen as a

decided weakness of the training scheme. The regional organisation of units and formations had been

meant to provide organisational strength but the reality was that many Light Horse units, spread out

over large areas of sparsely populated rural areas, did not experience the forecast cohesion. One

permanent officer told the readers of the Cavalry Journal this in 1909.

The cohesion implied in the presentation of this organisation on paper is not quite as real as could be wished; for it is to be remembered that the State of New South Wales alone is half as large again as France, and the distribution of the population has made it necessary to raise troops of the same squadron, and squadrons of the same regiment, within circles of very large radii. It will be readily understood that there are

53Commonwealth Military Forces of Victoria, Returns of Camps of Continuous Training, 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 2002/6/82. Victorian attendances against strength for 1909 were poor across the board. 7th LHR - 75%, 8th LHR - 62%, 9th LHR - 64 %, 10th LHR - 80%, 11th LHR - 66%, 5 Sqn 10th LHR (Garrison Force) - 69%, 6 Sqn 10th LHR (Garrison Force) - 82%. Only the two Brigade Headquarters, with strengths of three men each, achieved 100% attendance.

54Commonwealth Military Forces of Western Australia, Return of Easter Camp of Training, 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 2002/6/82.

55Commonwealth Military Forces of Queensland, Returns of Camps of Continuous Training, 1908-09. NAA(M) MP84/1, 2002/6/82.

56Colonel J.S. Lyster, 'The Standard of Efficiency of the Commonwealth Military Forces', A lecture delivered to the NSW United Service Institute, Sydney, 12 May 1905. p. 10. NAA(M) B168, 06/1604.

57Commander 1st LH Bde., 3 July 1912. NAA(M) MP84/1, 202/4/439.

132

great difficulties to be overcome in arranging administration so that the organisation may be something more than a paper one.58

Echoing concerns expressed earlier in the decade the inescapable consequence was that it was "not

often possible to get together sufficient men to make work as valuable and instructive as could be

wished."59 This was born out in Tasmania where the local commandant expressed concern about the

scattered nature of units severely affecting their ability to successfully carry out both home and camp

training.60 In these circumstances the quality and training of officers who had, in turn, to manage the

training of their subordinates was a continual worry. Lyster had criticized the variable attention,

interest and energy displayed by citizen officers and exhorted commanders to ensure that leaders

under their command aimed to stamp out "perfunctory performance."61 The Light Horse were not

exempt and the Brigade Major of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade in 1909 professed concern that while

the men available could be quickly trained to be good soldiers, "the trouble all the time...[was] to get

properly trained officers to lead them."62

These criticisms were undoubtedly justified in many ways. Officer training was far from a

thorough process but it should be borne in mind that it was now far better than before federation when

any form of systematic approach barely existed. Hutton had instituted the uniform Schools of

Instruction and, though relatively brief affairs, they at least gave officers who could afford the time to

attend them (and attendance was a prerequisite for promotion or confirmation in rank) some

instruction on basic tactical, administrative and logistic matters. These courses varied in length and

could be as long as three weeks, but the officers who attended a Light Horse course for promotion in

Tasmania during this period spent a busy nine days learning squadron and regimental drill, the use of

Light Horse in the attack and defence, map reading, musketry instruction, field engineering and troop

movement before taking part in a two day 'tactical scheme' designed to test their knowledge.63

Officers were expected to build on this base with private and unit-based study and, when conducted,

take part in the Staff Rides that Hutton had also instituted. These were tactical exercises without

58White, ‘Light Horse of Australia’, p. 82.

59Ibid., p. 83.

60Tas. Commandant to Secretary of Defence. 10 Dec. 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1 2002/1/47.

61Col. J.S. Lyster, 'The Standard of Efficiency of the Commonwealth Military Forces', A lecture delivered to the NSW United Service Institute, Sydney, 12 May 1905, p. 11. NAA(M) B168, 06/1604.

62Maj. W.F. Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse', Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of New South Wales XXI:LXXXVIII (1909), 99.

63Syllabus for Light Horse School of Instruction, attached to correspondence from Commandant Tasmania to Secretary of Defence, date unknown. MP84/1, 1994/1/44. Schools of Instruction were sometimes of much longer duration. Light Horse officers in Western Australia in 1903 took part in a three week course to qualify for their ranks. Lt-Col. P. Ricardo, Commandant WA, to DAG & CSO Melbourne, 23 Dec. 1903. AWM3, 03/677, Part 2.

133

troops, supervised by a senior officer, that presented participants with military problems to solve.

Though seldom attended by more than a dozen officers at a time, Staff Rides provided an excellent

opportunity for senior commanders to assess the quality and training of officers under their command.

A report on a 1907 Staff Ride in South Australia praised the good quality of reporting and the prompt

passage of information in Light Horse officer reconnaissance reports, but also complained that these

same officers obviously had little skill or experience in preparing and transmitting orders, or in

general staff duties.64 Efforts were made to broaden horizons, however. The once omnipresent

influence of South Africa was slowly being left behind and Staff Rides were sometimes based on

other military campaigns. The 1908 Queensland Staff Ride, organised by Harry Chauvel, was based

on operations in the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War.65 This level of training was

really all that could be achieved under the existing defence system. Further improvements in officer

training would require a drastic reformation of the defence scheme and its training plans so officer

training would remain an imperfect system, and expressions about its inadequacy would continue.

The criticisms were no all one way however, and complaints from citizen officers about their

permanent counterparts were not uncommon. Though they respected and appreciated the large amount

of work that permanent instructors put into their work, citizen officers were periodically moved to

vent frustrations about the variable knowledge and skills of the men who guided, organised and

conducted so much of their training.66 That there were far too few of them did not help.67A scheme to

import more imperial officers and establish a school for instructional staff to improve standards was

proposed just before the First World War but was apparently not taken up.68 Major-General John

Hoad, as Chief of the General Staff, was concerned that staff officers were severely hampered by the

lack of exposure to regimental life and routine that would improve their understanding of private

soldiers and leadership.69 An infantry officer loudly voiced concerns about permanent staff officers

interfering with the higher commands of militia officers.70 There was little doubt that there was a

64Report on Staff Ride held in South Australia under the direction of the Chief of Intelligence in November 1907 (Adelaide: C.E. Bristow, Government Printer, 1907), p. 6. NAA(C) A1194, 12.42/4632.

65Report on a Staff Ride held in Queensland, under the direction of the Commandant, in September 1908 (Brisbane: Anthony James Cumming, Government Printer, 1909), p. 11.

66Report of the Conference of Militia Officers Assembled at Headquarters, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th October, 1912 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, 1912), pp. 9 & 22-3.

67Ibid.

68Resolutions of a Conference of Militia Officers Assembled at Headquarters, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, on October 29th, 30th and 31st October, and November 1st, 1913 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, 1913), p. 9. NAA(C) A1194, 05.44/301.

69CGS to Military Board, 13 Mar. 1911. MP84/1, 1930/2/30.

70Maj. The Hon. R.A. Crouch, ‘The Australian Militia', The Lone Hand 12:71 (1 Mar. 1913), pp. 389-390.

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growing tension between the citizen soldiers who served in and led the regiments of the forces, and

the permanent officers who administered them. In 1912 the Minister of Defence instigated an annual

militia officers conference in order to bring:

[A]bout a better feeling, of creating a better understanding between the permanent officers and the citizen officers, of leading to better co-operation, and creating a better feel with regard to administration.71

In addition to the problems outlined above there is evidence the Light Horse was experiencing

a degree of doctrinal uncertainty towards the end of its first decade of existence. With Hutton’s

departure the trend in defence thinking, particularly since 1906, had been to more closely follow the

example and form of the British Army. The military authorities had made no effort to explicitly

update or clarify the Light Horse role and, despite some changes, technically the Field Force was

much as Hutton had left it in both structure and intent. Hutton had placed mounted troops, in

particular the mounted rifle Light Horse, at the centre of Australian defence and national imperial

military contributions, but with the following of British examples this central role now seemed an

unlikely course. The tone and methods in the Light Horse Manual, 1907, had seemingly placed them

more in the traditional supporting role of cavalry but this conflicted with the defence structure as it

stood. A 1909 lecture published by Major W. Everett pointed to the Light Horse's lack of any kind of

secondary weapon and wondered what they were expected to do on the battlefield. Without a bayonet

or sword, they could neither fullfil successfully the role of mounted infantry or cavalry. His plea was

that the military authorities make up their mind what the Light Horse were:

We are neither equipped nor drilled as Mounted Infantry or Cavalry. We are trained up to a certain point as Cavalry, but have no second weapon....Let us understand exactly what we are, properly equip us, and make us feel we are really part of the defence force, ready to take our place with Imperial troops in the Empire's defence whenever called upon.72

Everett strongly believed that though fire tactics were undoubtedly the essential action of all mounted

troops in modern war, the Light Horse should be equipped with a sword as a secondary weapon so

that its role was confirmed and that the 'cavalry spirit' could be fostered locally.73 The comments made

by other officers following his lecture indicate he was not the only one thus concerned, though even

the supply of a bayonet (presumably without the adjunct of the 'cavalry spirit') would have satisfied

71Sen. George Pearce, Minister of Defence, Address by the Minister in Report of the Conference of Militia Officers, 1912, p. 7.

72Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse’, pp. 99 & 101

73Ibid., p. 100.

135

some.74 Lieutenant-Colonel George Lee summed up the officers' sentiments by pointing out that at the

very least the Light Horse role had to be better defined for only then would they "know what training

is necessary to bring about the efficiency required."75 If nothing else this sort of doctrinal questioning

was some evidence that Hutton’s mounted rifle template had not been as firmly embedded in the

Australian military as he had hoped.

Perhaps these men they felt they received some sort of answer the following year with the

publication and issue of a new Light Horse manual. The result of work done by a board convened in

mid-1909 to consider a revision of the 1907 manual, large portions were taken "word for word" from

the imperial Cavalry Training.76 It meant that in the 1910 edition of the Light Horse Manual training

principles were closer than ever to those followed by British cavalry. Building on the 1907 edition and

reflecting Cavalry Training, it created three types of cavalry operations, those of the independent,

protective and divisional cavalry.77 Only the actions of "independent cavalry" could be considered

closely analogous to what Hutton had in mind for his Light Horse brigades nearly a decade earlier. It

represented a substantial improvement over the 1907 edition and rectified many of the oversights of

the previous version. Perhaps the biggest departure from the previous manuals was the inclusion of

appendices dealing with sword and lance practice. This made it the first manual used in Australia

since 1902 to find a place for the arme blanche in the mounted branch.78 It was not a blank cheque for

wholesale lance and sword training, however, and the lessons on the arme blanche were directed

primarily at individual training for the purpose of participation in tournaments and skill-at-arms

competitions.79

The restrictions on the arme blanche were not, however, as strong as they might have been.

After reviewing a draft copy of the manual the old Lancer, ex-commander of the 1st Light Horse

Regiment, and current commander of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, Colonel W. Vernon, objected to an

explicit ban on squadron and regimental "lance practice" in the manual. It was his opinion that as long

as such training did not interfere with rifle and other training then a commanding officer should be

74Comments by Col. Vernon and others in ibid., p. 103.

75Comments by Lt-Col. George Lee in ibid., p. 102.

76Secretary of Military Board to State Commandants, Composition of Committee for ALH Manual Revision , 23 Jun. 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/40. The composition of the board as it eventually sat was President - Maj-Gen. W. T. Bridges, CGS; Col. J Rowell, Commander 5th LH Bde.; Col. W. Vernon, Commander 2nd LH Bde.; Col. D. McLeish, Commander 3rd LH Bde.; Lt-Col. the Hon. R. Carrington, CO 6th LHR; Maj. J. Forsyth, A&I Staff (Vic); Secretary - Capt. R.C. Holman, A&I Staff (NSW).

77Light Horse Manual for the Drill Training and Exercise of the Light Horse Regiments of Australia (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Government Printer, 1910), p. 212, Section 237.

78Ibid., passim.

79Ibid., pp. 257 & 271.

136

able to exercise some discretion on the matter.80 As the final version included no such explicit ban it

seems his view held and can be seen again as an indication that in New South Wales at least, training

with the arme blanche may still have been some part of unit life. Apart from this behind-the-scenes

debate the new manual also drew some apprehensive comments that imperial drill inappropriate to

Australia’s citizen soldiers had been imported, but in essence it remained a manual aimed at mounted

rifle-style tactics.81

As this manual was being released and adopted for general use the formula for the long

awaited reform of Australian defence was finally arrived at. Following growing concerns about Japan

and Hoad's 1906 recommendations there had been a number of reports and attempts to introduce a

new compulsory military service scheme.82 In 1910, following an inspection and report by Field-

Marshal Lord Kitchener, the Fisher Government introduced a bill that called for mandatory military

service for all able bodied males to commence in the junior cadets at age twelve and conclude at age

twenty-six in the citizen forces.83 For the Light Horse Kitchener's report and the consequent adoption

of Universal Military Training would have a variety of consequences.

Kitchener's report was an organisation-wide review and for the first time since the visit of

Major-General Bevan Edwards in 1889 Australia’s mounted troops hardly rated a mention in an

imperial officer's comments. Given his brief to comment on the suitability of the whole new defence

scheme this was not in itself surprising, but it did emphasise that the time of the Light Horse being the

arm of choice for local and imperial defence was coming to an end. Mention of the Light Horse was

confined to propositions of its organisational structure and its relegation to a traditional supporting

arm role was, to all intents and purposes, complete.84 The high proportion of mounted troops that

Hutton had established would, in effect, be inverted. Under Kitchener's proposals the unpaid volunteer

forces were to be removed from the order of battle and Australia would aim to support eighty-four

battalions of militia infantry fed by universal training and organised into twenty-one brigades.85 The

number of Light Horse was to be increased but with a proposed twenty-eight regiments organised into

seven brigades they were now clearly slated to be used in support of infantry formations.86 Following

80Comments by Col. W. Vernon regarding proof copy of Light Horse Manual. Undated but probably October/November 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1913/6/59.

81Remarks on Light Horse Manual by Maj. F.A. Maxwell, Staff Officer 3rd LH Bde., attached to correspondence, DMT to State Commandants, 3 Aug. 1910. NAA (M) MP84/1, 1913/6/70

82Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 37-45.

83Ibid., pp. 44-5.

84Memorandum on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount of Khartoum (Melbourne: J. Kemp, 1910), passim.

85Ibid., p. 6.

86Ibid.

137

agreements between the Australian government and London at the 1907 and 1909 Imperial

Conferences all Australian forces, with only minor local modifications, were to comply with the

organisational templates set by the British Army.87 The existing Light Horse structure of four

squadrons to a regiment was brought to an end and regimental commanders would now have three

larger squadrons to deploy.88 Hutton’s unique Field Force brigades, structured with their own

integrated artillery and departmental support, and subject of considerable peacetime administrative

concern since 1906, were given their death knell.89 Similarly the large discrepancy between peace and

war establishments was reduced and units could at last recruit to a target nearer to their wartime

strength.90

Also brought to an end was the production and use of local military manuals, and despite the

recent publication of the updated 1910 version, the Light Horse Manual was replaced by the imperial

Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training.91 The imported text brought to the Light Horse a manual of

detail and thoroughness not seen since Hutton’s manual had been withdrawn and included extensive

guidance and training on a wide variety of doctrinal, tactical and field administrative matters. Though

a work aimed squarely at mounted rifle tactics it may have been of comfort to some officers from

New South Wales that the new manual held out the possibility of training with the sword or lance

once other aspects of training had been mastered, and that Cavalry Training also again became

available on limited issue.92 As the rest of the nation's forces had been using imperial manuals from at

least 1906 and the Light Horse was now taking up a role identical in many ways to the Yeomanry, and

even regular cavalry (except shock action), in Great Britain, the change from the local manual was a

positive step. It gave Australia’s mounted arm a clearer doctrinal basis that had been missing for some

years and that now made more sense when read in conjunction with the overarching principles set out

in the imperial Field Service Regulations. Those regulations currently defined the role of the Light

Horse and other mounted rifle units around the empire thus:

87Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 43 & 47-8.

88War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912. NAA(C) A1194, 22.14/6970.

89Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 304 & 312, & General Scheme of Defence for Australia. Report of Committee of Officers Appointed by the Minister of Defence to Consider and Report Upon the General Scheme of Defence for Australia as Submitted by the Committee of Imperial Defence (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Government Printer, 1906), p. 7. NAA(M) B173/0, 506/60

90RO No. 1, 26th LHR (TMI), 21 Feb. 1913. AWM1, 19/3, pp. 139 & 141. Under the new establishments a Light Horse squadron would have 118 men, all ranks, in peacetime, and 154 in wartime. Annual Establishments of Personnel, 1912-1913. AWM27, 301/9 & War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912. NAA(C) A1194, 22.14/6970.

91Commonwealth Military Forces, Military Order 625, 1912.

92War Office, Yeomanry and Mounted Rifles Training, Parts I & II, 1912 (London: H.M.S.O., 1912), passim; & List of Publications on Issue in the 5th Military District, 1913. NAA(M) A2023, A75/4/99.

138

Yeomanry and Mounted Rifles...act chiefly by fire but may, when they have received sufficient training, employ shock action in special emergencies...Mounted Rifles, when cooperating with cavalry assist the latter to combine fire with shock action; when cooperating with other arms their mobility enables a commander to transfer them rapidly from one portion of the field to another, and thus to turn to account opportunities which he would be unable to otherwise achieve.93

The new training guidance was implemented at the same time Universal Military Training was to

commence and the Light Horse regiments were issued a new, centrally created, training syllabus and

schedule in April 1912.94

The organisational expansion of the Light Horse was, however, to face a severe restriction.

Universal Training, based on a regional system with units allocated a number of areas from which

their compelled recruits would come, was not to apply fully to the Light Horse. The compulsory

training areas set out by the scheme were of necessity based on cities and significant towns that could

support the infrastructure as well as provide the men for training. Light Horse regiments existed

largely outside these designated training areas and the men in these localities were exempted from the

scheme because of their distance from the training centres. The government took a fundamental

decision that it would neither buy horses for the Light Horse nor could it compel men to buy them and

this meant that the mounted branch would effectively have to continue with a near total reliance on

voluntary recruiting.95 Only men obligated under the scheme by living within the training areas, and

who owned horses and were willing to volunteer their horses for military service, would face any

compulsion to serve their commitment in the Light Horse. To supplement what was always going to

be a relatively small number from this method, regiments were permitted to continue with voluntary

recruitment from men exempted from the general scheme. There were, however, no particular

inducements offered for men to join the Light Horse. In fact new recruits were offered as

compensation for their time only half the pay (4 s. per day) that soldiers enlisted under the old system

received. Men already in the force continued to get their 8 s. per day but if their engagement ended

and they wished to re-enlist after 1 July 1912 they would have to take a pay cut to the new rate.96 The

old pay had been considered generous when introduced under Hutton but 4 s. per day was well under

civilian rates of pay for the time and men still only received the token £1 per annum horse allowance

93War Office, Field Service Regulations, Part 1, Operations, 1909 (Reprinted with amendments, 1912) (London: HMSO, 1912), p. 15.

94RO No. 4, 26th LHR (TMI), 12 Apr. 1913. AWM1, 19/3, pp. 156-7.

95Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 51 & Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945 (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 59.

96Lt. D. C. Howell-Price (ed). The Light Horse Pocket Book 2nd ed. (Sydney: Angus & Robertson Ltd., 1914), pp.18-9.

139

that had been a periodic source of complaint.97 These conditions of service were not to prove helpful

to the Light Horse in the years ahead.

Other organisational changes were also required. All the Light Horse units and formations

were to undergo a renumbering process. The old state command system was abandoned in favour of

new Military Districts that conformed roughly to state boundaries. The system started with the 1st

Military District based on Queensland and part of northern New South Wales. Most of New South

Wales made up the 2nd Military District and so on clockwise around the country each state was given

a number and formed the basis of a Military District. Regiments and brigades would reflect this

system and the 1st Military District would support the 1st Light Horse Brigade made up of the 1st, 2nd,

and 3rd Light Horse Regiments which were, in fact, renumbered Queensland units. Again this system

flowed around the country so that a unit's number roughly reflected its place on the national clock

face.98 This caused considerable consternation around Sydney and southern New South Wales where

the old 1st Light Horse Brigade suddenly found itself renamed the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. The old 1st,

2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments, the direct descendants of the Lancers, New South Wales Mounted

Rifles and 1st Australian Horse found themselves the 7th, 9th and 11th Light Horse Regiments

respectively. This undoubtedly caused widespread concern in these units and Kenneth Mackay,

commanding this brigade, complained loudly to the military authorities. His view was that this was an

affront to the forces of the oldest state that had always maintained the largest forces. The Military

Board considered his objections but were not moved to alter a massive re-organisation already well

underway.99

Perhaps of some consolation to those offended by renumbering was the official

implementation of Kitchener's recommendation that units be allowed to adopt the titles of their

antecedents or the region they were from. Many units had continued to use pre-federation appellations

in a semi-formal fashion after 1901 but now, advocated as a way to foster unit and regional loyalty,

the practice was officially encouraged for use as unit subtitles. By 1913 all Light Horse regiments had

adopted such a title and the practice sometimes filtered down in a semi-official capacity to squadron

and troop level. Some old titles found new life and, for example, the 7th Light Horse Regiment

97Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 65, & Comments by Maj. N.J. Moore, CO 18th LHR, Western Australia: Meeting of Commanding Officers, 1 May, 1905. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678.

98Despite the principle it was an imperfect system as expansion occurred. Some gaps were left in the numbering sequence to facilitate the later raising of regiments that never occurred due to the intervention of First World War. Other units that were raised, despite where they may have been formed, took a number from the bottom of the stack. For example Victoria would support the 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th and 29th LHRs. See: Hall, The Australian Light Horse, pp. 70-1, for a detailed Light Horse Order of Battle for the time.

99Numerical Order of Brigades and Regiments, Proceedings of Military Board, 1 Aug. 1912. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1937/1/252. That Queensland’s regiments could draw a continuous lineage through the QMI at least as far back as any of these New South Regiments (and considerably further than Mackay's own 1st Australian Horse) did not seem to have been of much consequence to Mackay.

140

became subtitled the New South Wales Lancers, the 22nd Light Horse Regiment the South Australian

Mounted Rifles. Other units looked to their region for something distinctive and new and the 19th

Light Horse Regiment took the title Yarrowee Light Horse, the 28th Light Horse Regiment the

Illawarra Light Horse.100 The expansion in the number of regiments in the new scheme was to be

facilitated, at least initially, by the reorganisation of the extra existing squadrons from the old four

squadron regimental organisation as well as by the conversion of Garrison Force squadrons into the

basis of new regiments.101 As these changes started to take place and new regiments were raised

squadrons could anticipate that the regiment they belonged to could well change as the new units

forced rethinking of existing territorial recruiting and unit boundaries.102

All of this did little to change problems with training, however, and the raising of new units

may have been as much a hindrance as a help as the limited pool of energetic and knowledgeable

officers and reasonably trained men was further diluted into the new organisation. Concerns about the

quality of local home training had not changed and by 1912 the military authorities had effectively

given up on the idea for the Light Horse. The Inspector General, Major-General G. M. Kirkpatrick, an

imperial officer, summed up the problem in his annual report:

As last year, however, most squadrons arrived in camp practically untrained, and I was forced to the conclusion that home training had not been efficiently done. This is corroborated by the results of inspections of Light Horse at home training. Many Squadron Leaders and Commanding Officers have done their best to supervise the troop training, and, after discussion with all Commanding Officers whom I have met, I find the opinion is held that under the conditions existing in the country districts, the home training of the troop and the squadron will always prove unsatisfactory.103

Some units did better than others and Kirkpatrick’s observations when touring the country reflected

this. Visiting the 8th Light Horse Brigade in South Australia his comments reveal numerous problems

with equipment quality due to maintenance, weapon care, standards of "interior economy" and

training, but he could nevertheless see the benefits and promise of work done in the regiments and

give some encouraging comments.104 In contrast a visit to some other units in Victoria revealed both

100Hall, The Australian Light Horse, pp. 70-1.

101Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', p. 250.

102Numerical Order of Brigades and Regiments, Proceedings of Military Board, 1 Aug. 1912. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1937/1/252.

103Annual Report by Major-General G.M. Kirkpatrick, C.B. Inspector-General of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 May 1912 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, Acting Govt. Printer, 1912), p. 8. NAA(A) D845/1 41/1912

104Remarks on 22nd, 23rd & 24th LHRs for Commanding Officers by Inspector-General, 3 Jul. 1913. NAA(A) D845/1, 46/1912.

141

poor standards of equipment serviceability and military competence because of the poor standard of

home training.105 Local experimentation with the time available sometimes helped and in 1908 one

Commanding Officer abandoned brief half and full-day home training parades in favour of small two

and three day camps that allowed better use of the eight days not used by the annual camp. He

reportedly achieved improved results.106

The efforts of enthusiastic officers were, however, (to often) all for nought. The frustrated

pleas for more funds to visit parts of his regiment by one West Australian Commanding Officer of this

period may have been an extreme example, but gives such a clear expression of the problems facing

many units that his minute is worth quoting in extensio.

A. The regiment is scattered over an area of 180 miles by 140 miles. B. In only two cases do two officers reside in the same town, the remainder many miles apart. C. I have no officers in the regiment, not even Squadron Leaders capable of teaching, the majority being 2nd Lieutenants and provisional appointments. D. Although I have visited all Squadron centres on several occasions since assuming command, have carefully inspected all books, assisted with all Squadron training, and done what teaching I could in the limited time at my disposal, and recognise my duty as Commanding Officer to see all officers are taught, and have given up nearly three months in the year to regtl. duties cheerfully, to try and get the necessary time and money privately to train my officers individually. E. Unless the officers are trained the expenditure on the upkeep of the regiment is wasted and it might as well be disbanded. F. The officers could not be taught to lead their men in eight weeks, the time in which the men could be made nearly fit to take the field. G. By regimental tours only can officers be quickly and practically taught duties other than drill. H. Nearly all the officers are busy men, attending to their own businesses, and cannot afford to leave their duties and go away to schools of instructions as often as they would wish... L. I now hold the resignation of my best Squadron Leader because he is not learning as he would wish, and stays on only because I promised to see he was given assistance in his training; two other of my best officers and bushmen have given expression to the same thoughts and intention. M. I cannot remain in Command of the Regiment unless it progresses satisfactorily, and if I am not assisted my efforts to train my officers my own time is wasted as an unpaid administrator.107

It was not only officers who faced difficulties, and reports criticising the quality of NCOs in Light

105Remarks on 16th & 17th LHRs for Commanding Officers by Inspector-General, 28 Jun. 1913. NAA(A) D845/1, 41/1912.

106Lt. T.P. Conway, ‘The Australian Light Horseman', Commonwealth Military Journal 2 (Jun 1912), 520-1. The experiment in home training was made by Lt-Col. Findlater, CO 16th LHR.

107CO 25th LHR to Headquarters, 5th MD, 31 Jul. 1913. NAA(M) A2023/0, A75/4/99.

142

Horse regiments, though not as common, are not hard to find.108

Kirkpatrick reported in 1912 that the consensus of opinion among Light Horse commanders

was that what was needed was not a rejigging of home training, but its virtual scrapping and the

extension of the amount of time spent in camp.109 Returning to Hutton’s template, from 1910 all Light

Horse units were again compelled to make their camps eight days in length.110 From 1913 this was

expanded further and twelve of the sixteen days allocated to annual training were now to be used in

camp with the remaining four split equally into quarterly one-day parades where the military

authorities hoped, perhaps a little optimistically, that time would be well spent teaching officers and

men of the finer details of fire discipline.111 Keeping in mind the problems with citizen soldier leaders

of all ranks the plan stipulated that Light Horse camps should take place at different times of year

from the infantry’s so that they could be properly supervised.112 This plan proved quite successful and

in his report for the following year Kirkpatrick believed that though there were still many areas of

weakness it had improved the standards in the Light Horse regiments.113 Echoing Hutton and others

he reiterated that:

Compared with the Infantry, mounted troops have so much to learn in the short training period, and their efficiency is so vital to success in the field that every effort should be made to extend the period of training.114

Accordingly he advocated that the Light Horse should have its training commitment increased, yet

again, to equal that of the Field Artillery at a total twenty-five days per year, of which seventeen days

should be spent in a continuous camp, four days in a continuous musketry course and four dedicated

to local home training. Kirkpatrick believed that this would enable the mounted arm to take part in

elementary night training and improve their efficiency upon mobilisation. Asked to comment on this

proposal, a militia officers conference in 1913 thought the idea had merit but, perhaps worried about

trying to get Light Horsemen to attend such a long camp, recommended that the idea be put off for

108Conway, ‘The Australian Light Horseman', p. 521.

109Annual Report by Major-General G.M. Kirkpatrick, 1912, p. 8.

110Commonwealth Military Forces, Victoria, Report on Annual Continuous Training, 1911. NAA(C) A1194, 12.30/4547.

111Instructions for Training, 1913-14. NAA(M) MP84/1, 2002/1/133.

112Ibid.

113Extracts of the Annual Report of Major-General G.M. Kirkpatrick, C.B., Inspector General of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia (Melbourne: Albert Mullet, Govt. Printer, 1913), pp. 8-9. NAA(C) A1194, 20.15/6699.

114Ibid., p. 8.

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further consideration at a later time.115 Regardless, what real effect such reform would have had

remains unknown as the intervention of the First World War meant the plan remained an intellectual

exercise only.

The training problems facing the Light Horse were compounded by a worrying organisation

wide trend of the Light Horse falling increasingly short of its establishment. Exacerbated by the

expansion required from the new defence scheme, the most likely cause identified by all concerned

was the pay received by men under the new system and in particular the perpetuation of the paltry £1

per year horse allowance.116 Kirkpatrick noted that the "shortage [in men] is serious and appear[s] to

indicate that the conditions are not sufficiently attractive to induce the Militiaman to keep a suitable

horse."117 Complaints about the horse allowance had been long-standing but had been exacerbated by

the pay cut that had come with the introduction of universal training. The issue had received renewed

attention at a conference of militia officers held in Melbourne in October 1912. There the officers,

attuned to the complaints of the men they represented, recommended the allowance be increased to £5

per year.118 One representative, pointing to the costs of forage, horse-shoes and the like, felt that

nothing less than the continued existence of the Light Horse was at stake.119 The Military Board,

looking at the growing gap between actual strengths and the desired establishments, considered the

proposal in November 1912 and supported an increase to £4 per year.120 This recommendation was for

consideration in the next defence estimates and through 1913 there was an animated correspondence

in the Department of Defence about the issue and in particular how the proposed pay rise could be

accommodated in the defence budget.121 That September the Adjutant-General, Harry Chauvel, was

still trying to convince the Minister that the increase should be approved.122 After an endorsement

from the 1913 militia officers conference it finally was approved late that year, but there were a

number of restrictions. Firstly it applied only to those soldiers who had enlisted since 1 July 1912

under the Universal Training Scheme (those who enlisted prior to that date continued to receive the

old rate of £1 per annum) and was to be paid at a rate of 5 s. per day, up to a maximum of £4 per year,

for mounted parades only.123 Rather than truly addressing the expenses associated with owning a

115Resolutions of a Conference of Militia Officers, 1913, p. 19. NAA(C) A1194, 05.44/3011

116Ibid., p. 15

117Ibid.

118Report of the Conference of Militia Officers, 1912, pp. 15 & 44, Resolution 89.

119Comments by Lt-Col J. Paton, Representing the 2nd MD, ibid., p. 44.

120Recommendation of the Military Board, 17 Dec. 1912. NAA(M) A2023/1, A229/1/1.

121Finance Member of the Military Board to Secretary of Defence, 13 Jan. 1913. NAA(M) A2023/1, A229/1/1.

122AG to Secretary of Defence, 2 Sep. 1913. NAA(M) A2023/1, A229/1/1.

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horse the pay raise in fact merely equalised the discrepancy in pay between those men who had

enlisted before mid-1912 and those who had done so after.

The raise in allowances was welcome but the delay in its introduction made a significant

contribution to continuing problems in Light Horse recruitment and in mid-1913 the Light Horse as a

whole was nearly 3000 men short of what the government wanted from the regiments it had raised

thus far. This was the nadir in a trend that had been evident since 1909 and is illustrated below in

Table 2.

Table 2: Establishments and Strengths of the Light Horse 1906-1913.124

Establishment, All

Ranks

Strength,

All Ranks

Deficiency % of Strength to

Establishment

31 Dec 1906 5184 4723 461 91.0

31 Dec 1907 5734 4664 1070 81.3

31 Dec 1908 5712 5467 245 95.7

31 Dec 1909 5712 5405 307 94.6

31 Dec 1910 6403 5373 1030 83.9

31 Dec 1911 6384 5687 697 89.1

31 Dec 1912 9138 6630 * 2508 72.5

30 Jun 1913 9194 6401 # 2793 69.6

* Includes 931 Trainees under the Universal Training Defence Scheme

# Includes 1064 Trainees under the Universal Training Defence Scheme

Kitchener had thought 28 regiments of Light Horse was necessary and the Australian authorities had

quickly raised this objective to 31 units.125 Defence headquarters, focused on achieving the massive

expansion of the infantry and other arms, seemed to think the Light Horse increase would pose few

difficulties. In 1911 the Quartermaster-General, Colonel J.G. Legge, had told the forces, in a series of

lectures, that the Light Horse increase was "not so marked at first" and would only match the

increases in infantry and artillery once Universal Training was a mature scheme and had been

expanded further into country areas.126 Despite the limited objectives, however, by 1913 only 23

123Resolutions of a Conference of Militia Officers, 1913, p. 17. NAA(C) A1194, 05.44/3011 & RO No. 11, 26th LHR (TMI), 12 Dec 1913. AWM1, 19/3, pp. 176-177.

124Establishments and Strengths of the Light Horse. Attached to correspondence regarding Light Horse horse allowance. NAA(M) A2023/1, A229/1/1.

125Extracts of the Annual Report of Major-General G.M. Kirkpatrick, 1913, p. 15. NAA(C) A1194, 20.15/6699.

126Universal Training in the Naval or Military Forces: Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General, 1911 (Melbourne: J. Kemp, Government Printer, 1911), p. 37. NAA(C) A1194, 12.11/4336.

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regiments had been raised and considering the deficiencies the immediate likelihood that the

remainder would be raised seemed, at best, unlikely.

When, in 1914, the next imperial officer came to visit and inspect the Australian forces the

verdict on the Light Horse could not be anything but mixed. General Sir Ian Hamilton agreed with

almost all previous observers and enthused about the raw material in the Light Horse ranks.127 In an

oft quoted line he wrote the Minister of Defence that "they are the pick of the bunch...they are real

thrusters who would be held up by no obstacle of ground, timber or water, from getting in at the

enemy."128 Less well remembered are the numerous and grave deficiencies he highlighted. There

were, he noted, severe problems with standards of training, unit cohesion and the control exercised by

men in command.129 Tactical planning was elementary and execution often poor. He concluded that in

most cases attempted manoeuvre by anything larger than squadron-sized bodies would quickly

degenerate into "disarray and confusion."130 Against these weaknesses could be balanced the

reassuring assessment that any invader of Australia would of necessity be "very weak in the cavalry

arm" and the Light Horse "would have the time of their lives with [the enemy’s] communications and

with his scouting and foraging parties. When battle was joined they would also play their part..."131

Hamilton was being diplomatic and no doubt thought his remarks encouraging but he had in

fact driven to the heart of the matter in pointing to the value of the Light Horse chiefly laying in its

ability to harass enemy scouts. Despite the huge collective efforts that had been expended on the

mounted branch since federation what the government now had in the Light Horse was in many ways

what the pre-federation colonies had despatched to South Africa, a force of irregular citizen soldier

horsemen that no doubt possessed individuals with drive, knowledge and warlike talent but that as an

organisation in its current state was capable of engaging only in minor warlike activities with any

hope of efficiency. The basis was there but it would take a long and intense period of continuous

training upon mobilisation for the regiments and brigades to reach the efficiency that would be

required of them in war. George Lee, the man whom Hutton had placed in command of the Victorian

ad hoc brigade in 1903, had said as much to a grouping of officers at a lecture in 1909:

It is absolutely impossible to train our mounted troops up to the standard of Imperial cavalry. I don’t think it will be possible for a considerable time to aim for such a

127Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report on an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth by General Ian Hamilton (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, Government Printer, 1914), p. 36.

128Hamilton in correspondence, cited in Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 43, See also Alec Hill, 'Introduction', Gullett, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

129Report on an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth by General Ian Hamilton, pp. 36-7.

130Ibid., p. 37.

131Ibid., p. 38.

146

standard. We can put into the field first-class irregular light horse. If the force is well organised, excels in fire discipline and marksmanship, is thoroughly trained in horse management...then I have no hesitation in saying that with the material we have in Australia an exceedingly useful force can be made available.132

That was all well and good for the last war, but not everyone was so convinced about the next war:

The most important question of all is the training of our officers.... Admitting all the good work done in South Africa by both our officers and men, it must be remembered that we will not have Boers to fight again, and much higher training will be required against European troops.133

During his command Hutton had tried, in effect, to embrace both of these considerations. He always

stressed that Australia’s soldiers had to be well trained and his intention that Australia’s citizen soldier

forces should deploy and fight under its own brigade commanders was an expression of this belief. As

highlighted in the previous chapter the Field Force brigades, and specifically the Light Horse, were

the direct results of the war that had been fought in South Africa. Animated by his own partisan

position in the mounted firepower debates and, in his view, vindicated by events during the Boer War,

he created a force that owed its heritage to Britain’s colonial warfare experiences in the late

nineteenth century.

After his departure, however, the military authorities, increasingly interested in London’s

views on military organisation, were unsure they liked the mounted force they had inherited. As a

result the Light Horse and the Field Force were left to largely drift under the initial impetus from

Hutton. Hamstrung also by general uncertainty about the whole direction of defence thinking the

Light Horse was forced to continue with a system with many inherent weaknesses and under a

guiding doctrine that was regarded as increasingly irrelevant by the military authorities. When a new

defence scheme was at last unveiled in 1910 the Light Horse was given some badly needed doctrinal

direction but the other long-standing problems were given no correction and were exacerbated by the

need to suddenly expand the number of mounted troops available. It was an expansion effectively

beyond the organisation. As revealed above in the tables, Hutton had inherited about 5500 mounted

soldiers from the colonies, and the strength of the Light Horse, surprisingly regardless of the desired

establishment, hovered between 4600 and 5500 for much of the federation period until the

introduction of Universal Military Training in 1912. Total Light Horse strengths for 1912 and 1913

went up to about 6500 men but these figures required an injection of about 1000 men each year under

the Universal Training scheme. With the desire to further expand the number of Light Horse

regiments even this increase was not enough. One of the perverse strengths of the pre-federation

132Comments by Lt-Col. George Lee following, Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse’, p. 102.

133Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse’, p. 99.

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mounted forces was that they were dependent on the demand from citizens themselves to be included

in the defence forces. Colonial governments largely restricted their role to stabilising the offers,

shaping their form and administering what the citizenry gave. The new Commonwealth Government

and the military bureaucracy inverted this relationship and, particularly after 1912, sought to dictate

what forces they would have. This was deemed necessary and was in itself not the problem, but

unaccompanied by any changes to the way the Light Horse was recruited, organised, paid, trained and

led, meant the military authorities would have great trouble escaping the unwritten limits set by men

they relied upon to give their own free time and labour to the mounted branch. Who these men were,

how they rendered service, and how they interacted with their society, is the subject of the next

chapter.

148

Chapter 6 Mounted Troops and Society

1850-1914

The Light Horsemen and their colonial predecessors were almost all part-time soldiers. Only

the few permanent instructors and staff officers employed by the colonies, and later the

Commonwealth, thought about and carried out their military duties as full time professionals.

Australian governments, shielded by the empire, facing no real threat, and loathe to raise and pay for

any permanent forces apart from the small groups of technical troops that manned the guns of the forts

or the submarine mines, were quite content with this. Only when the threat of Japan began to animate

defence thinking after 1905 was an effort made to seriously alter the way that the country was

defended, but even then under the Universal Training Scheme the militia model was merely expanded

rather than replaced and had only limited application to the mounted branch. By making these choices

governments and their military commanders wedded themselves not just to a military training system

but to a complex interaction between the way that their part-time soldiers both trained to defend the

country and then went home to lead normal and varied lives. Armies are products of the society that

begets them, and this is rarely more true than when considering the volunteer and partially paid men

of the mounted forces of late colonial and post-federation Australia.

The early volunteer mounted corps that had been established around the Australian colonies

between the 1850s and the mid-1880s had, as highlighted in previous chapter, a difficult time

remaining viable organisations. Few of these bodies lasted long and, once the spurt of enthusiasm that

had brought about their conception had spent itself, they usually collapsed under the weight of the

problems that beset them. Uneven and poor standards of leadership, the financial strain that being a

volunteer entailed, negative attitudes from bystanders and repetitive or boring training all made their

contribution to the high rates of discharge, and thus eventually corps failure, that characterised the

early mounted units of the Australian colonies. After 1885 the larger mainland colonies adopted larger

and more thorough plans to maintain their mounted forces and with federation an even more complete

plan was adopted. These organisational changes made little difference, however, to many of the

broader characteristics of citizen mounted units themselves, or to the way they interacted with the

society from which they came.

149

Social Interactions

Certainly the way in which colonial governments obtained the services of mounted troops,

applications from local communities, changed little throughout the entire pre-federation period. An

1890 application to the New South Wales government to form a cavalry troop by the martially

inclined men of Lismore provides a typical example:

Sir, I have the honour to inform you that an enthusiastic meeting of the residents of Lismore and surrounding districts was held on the afternoon of the 1st instant and the result was that I was requested to write you and offer you the services of the men whose names are attached to the lists enclosed herein - for the purpose of their being formed into troop of Cavalry under the partially-paid system. I am confident that if the services are accepted that they will drill into a most efficient and enthusiastic body of men.1

The alleged suitability of the men to be enrolled in these new detachments was, not surprisingly, a

recurring theme and was often pitched as a significant selling point. An 1888 application to form a

mounted infantry company in Cooma emphasised that "the nature of the country and climate in this

district has resulted in a race of particularly hardy men calculated to provide an efficient Corps... and

that a similar description is applicable to the horses."2 Others were more utilitarian and a Gundagai

application in 1889 simply pointed out that "the town is connected by rail to the Metropolis, and also

that the District is one of the best in the Colony for Horses." Politicians sometimes sought to lend

what weight they could. An 1891 application from Parramatta was supported by the local

parliamentarian, as was another attempt from Cooma in 18913. A combined application from

Rockdale, Kogarah and Hurstville in the same year was backed by the three relevant mayors.4 Such

support did not always count for much, however, and of these applications only that of Parramatta

was successful.

Applications such as these, if made during a period of military fervour, often exceeded the

requirements (really the budgetary limits) set by governments. When the Victorian Mounted Rifles

was first raised in 1885-6 the authorised establishment of 1000 men was easily reached and

1Mr J. Mc Dougal to OC NSW Regiment of Cavalry, 6 Mar. 1890. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 2Mr. Hudson to Maj-Gen. Richardson, NSW Commandant, 5 Nov. 1888. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 3Letter to Sir Henry Parkes, Colonial-Secretary, 13 May 1891, SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6028, Item 91/6915, & Mr. Hudson to Colonial Secretary’s Office, 19 Jan. 1891. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6014, Item 91/1387. 4Application to form Cavalry Detachment at Rockdale, Kogarah and Hurstville, Sep. 1891. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6044, Item 91/13288.

150

applications to form detachments from a number of districts had to be turned down.5 Similarly in New

South Wales between 1886 and 1889 the government received nineteen separate applications from

districts to form a variety of mounted detachments. Most had to be rejected as accepting all of them

would have cost the treasury “upwards of £37 000”. 6 When informing the applicants of the news the

reasons given varied from a simple statement that the authorised establishment had been reached or,

in the case of the applications from Stroud and German Creek, a more frank admission that there was

not enough equipment in the colony to contemplate further forces.7 Other colonies faced much the

same situation and an 1889 application to form a detachment of the Victorian Mounted Rifles at

Bacchus Marsh was similarly turned down in Melbourne as there was no space left on the authorised

establishment.8

Practicalities relating to location, resources and instructors always played a part in choosing

which districts would get to raise their detachment, but many applications were very similar in nature

and those that were successful often owed their success to a degree of luck as much as the inherent

virtues of their application. The 1891 applications from Liverpool and Camden to form mounted

infantry detachments proved successful as the government at that time desired to raise the

establishment of the Mounted Infantry Regiment to make it roughly equal in size to the colony’s

existing cavalry establishment.9 The 1890 Lismore application was accepted as the existing Sydney

Troop was proving incapable of maintaining attendance levels and this opened up a space on the

establishment. That there were already qualified instructors at the nearby Richmond River Troop who

could easily travel to Lismore proved the final factor in favour of the application.10

Though Sydney was able, with varying degrees of success, to maintain mounted elements

both before and after federation most urban detachments rarely lasted long. The inherent requirement

of mounted troops having to provide their own horses effectively ruled out most town and city

dwellers. Keeping a horse in a city such as Sydney or Melbourne implied the possession of

considerable wealth in order to keep it stabled and otherwise attended to. Hiring a horse from a livery

stable when required, as was sometimes done in earlier years, provided one solution to this problem

but this again implied considerable personal expense,11 and military authorities became wary of this

5Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 20. 6Unsigned, undated note attached to list of applications 1886-9. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 7Colonial Secretary’s Office to Stroud applicants, 14 Feb. 1889. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 8Correspondence relating to application to form VMR detachment at Bacchus Marsh, 1889. NAA (M) B3756, 1889/2705. 9Col. W. Spalding to Principle Under Secretary, 17 Aug. 1891. SRNSW, CSC, Box5/6038, Item 91/10862. 10Correspondence relating Lismore Cavalry Troop application, 1890. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 11David, Eyland, 'The New South Wales Military Forces 1870-1890: Social Composition and Status', B.A.

151

practice for the obvious reason that men who did this may not have access to a horse when needed in

a military emergency. Colonial authorities generally agreed with those in Queensland when they

asserted that "in the case of Mounted Infantry, the suburban and country districts supply the best

men."12 The Victorian, Colonel Tom Price, found that "detachments in large centres such as Geelong

and Kyneton...[were] apt to deteriorate while detachments in the country...[more often kept] up their

strength".13 Perhaps the distractions of town played some role in this, but fundamentally it was only in

country areas that sufficient men owned and kept horses in the course of their normal lives, and only

there could the required mounted detachments be raised with any hope of success. Though the revival

of mounted units in New South Wales in 1885 had started with the Sydney Light Horse Volunteers it

was no accident that by the mid-1890s their successors, the New South Wales Lancers, became

centred on the more suburban environs of Parramatta rather than Sydney proper. In 1903 the New

South Wales commandant, when trying to raise a half-squadron of Light Horse for the Sydney

Garrison Forces, had to admit that "suitable men with horses are most difficult to get in and near

Sydney."14 Even provincial Brisbane proved unable to support more than one troop of Light Horse in

1909.15

City units, when they existed, thus tended to be something of an oddity. The Sydney Troop of

the New South Wales Cavalry Brigade Reserves exemplified this. Of the 69 men engaged with the

troop between 1885 and 1889 it included eleven men, of apparent means and leisure, who simply

stated on the muster roll that their employment was "gentleman". Other prosperous middle class

professions were suitably represented and the rolls included one barrister, four solicitors, three

auctioneers, two architects, one surgeon and one newspaper proprietor with the propitious surname of

Fairfax. The remainder were a cross section of typical urban employments of the time with clerks

being the most represented after the 'gentlemen'.16

More typical of most mounted detachments was the rural make-up of the Illawarra Troop

during the same period. Here the troop was more successful to begin with and was able to recruit 90

men into its ranks between 1885 and 1889. Of these men 47 described themselves as farmers and a

further four as graziers. The remainder of the men enrolled represented a cross section of small town

Honours Thesis, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 1992. p. 20. 12Undated and unsigned Memorandum to Chief Secretary of Queensland. QSA PRE/20. This item probably dates from late 1893 or early 1894. 13Col. Tom Price cited in Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 20. 14Brig-Gen. H. Finn, NSW Commandant to DAG, Melbourne, 30 Dec. 1903. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2. 15Strength and Organisation of 1 & 3 Sqns, 13th LHR, 12 Mar. 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 713/3/10. 16Cavalry Brigade Muster Roll, Sydney Troop 1885-1889, Royal New South Wales Lancers, Records 1888-1956.

152

professions of the time and included five hotel keepers, four store keepers, four bankers and four

butchers. Careers represented by single individuals included, among others, insurance agents,

blacksmiths, clerks, drapers and auctioneers. Only two men described themselves as 'gentlemen'.17

Again because of the requirement to own a horse and have enough spare time available to go

soldiering membership of rural detachments also required an indefinable, but real, level of financial

comfort from the members. Many lowly but respectable township employment categories, such as

drapers or tinsmiths, found themselves in the ranks but the rolls reveal fewer men enlisted who could

be considered rural labourers, such as shearers or station hands. This may merely be a reflection of the

itinerant nature of many of these workers or perhaps the radical labour politics of the time. Pro-labour

publications such as The Bulletin were often dismissive of citizen soldiering.18 The real reasons were

probably more prosaic, however, and after federation one permanent officer thought that the lack of

station hands in the Light Horse was simply due to their employers not releasing them for military

service.19 Thus, though many men involved may well have possessed an air of colonial hardiness and

been worthy of the vague title of 'bushmen', the composition of most detachments was more of a rural

and respectable middle class than the stereotypical rough and ready stockman or boundary rider often

cited. For example in the Casino Troop of the Upper Clarence Light Horse of the late 1880s 38

percent of the men were small land owners or local merchants. In the Ulmarra Light Horse thirty-one

of the forty-six men described their occupation as farmer.20 Of the eighty-eight men who put their

names forward to enlist in the proposed Lismore Troop in 1890 forty-nine were farmers.21 A sample

of the 6th Light Horse Regiment in 1907 similarly reveals that farmers and graziers outnumbered

stockmen and labourers by two to one.22 This was also the case outside New South Wales and in

Victoria about fifty percent of the men enrolled in the Victorian Mounted Rifles were farmers or

graziers.23 When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Tasmanian Mounted Infantry was raised the

colony’s commandant, summing up the requirements, proposed to start it "on the North Coast, where

the farmers are well-to-do, and have the horses necessary for the service."24

17Cavalry Brigade Muster Roll, Illawarra Troop 1885-1889, Royal New South Wales Lancers, Records 1888-1956. 18Bridges, 'The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War', pp. 16-19 19Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse', p. 100. 20Eyland, ‘The New South Wales Military Forces 1870-1890: Social Composition and Status', p. 29. 21Correspondence relating Lismore Cavalry Troop application, 1890. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 22Figures derived from Muster Roll of 6th LHR, 1907-1910, AWM1, 17/3. Sample taken by recording the details of all men with surnames starting with the letters A, B, C & F, 99 in total. Of these 52 (51.48%) were farmers or graziers, 24 (23.76%) were stockmen or labourers. 23Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, pp. 32-3. 24Col. W. Legge to Parliament, cited in Wyatt. With the Volunteers, p. 65.

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Not surprisingly in these circumstances prosperous or prominent land holding families made

large contributions to unit strengths in some districts. The Upper Clarence Light Horse contained no

fewer than five members of the Chauvel family and four sons of the land owner George Smith.25 The

sons of prosperous families, having fewer responsibilities, some financial wherewithal and perhaps

more free time, may well have been an important recruiting source for many detachments. The

founder of the 1st Australian Horse, Kenneth Mackay, wrote that:

Our recruits are almost entirely young bushmen and they are coming mostly from outside the towns - the farmer’s sons to a large extent, and, in the pastoral districts, the squatters and station hands...26 [emphasis added]

Later, when attempting to convince the imperial authorities to support the creation of a local regiment

eligible for service anywhere in the empire, he again pointed out that in his unit the "officers, in nearly

all cases, [are the] sons of old squatting families."27

No doubt attractive to many of these men was the nature of mounted service in Australia

during the pre-federation period which, like everywhere else in the world, carried with it a certain

military cachet. In 1858 one South Australian parliamentarian proposed to the house the establishment

of a corps of horsemen for colonial defence. Among his justifications for it was this:

There was a class of persons, too, to which he belonged, who, though they were not prepared to go and shoulder the musket would if properly mounted and armed, prove a most effective means of defence.28

Similarly when a New South Wales parliamentarian provided support to an 1895 application to raise a

mounted rifle company he commented:

There is a Company of Infantry in Glen Innes...attached to the 4th Regt., but I apprehend that the men who would join a mounted force would not under any circumstances join a foot regiment. There are a number of young men in the neighbourhood of Glen Innes, farmers' sons and others, who would be very glad, I think, to join a Mounted Corps, and who would never dream of serving in an Infantry force.29

25Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 6. 26Lt. Col. James Mackay cited in Peter Burness, ‘The Australian Horse: A Cavalry Squadron in the South African War’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, 6 (April 1985), 37. 27Lt-Col. James Mackay to Governor of New South Wales, Earl Beauchamp, 18 July 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Office 201/629, PRO-AJCP. 28The Hon. Mr. Baker, South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd Session, 1st Parliament, 1858, p. 175. 29F. Wright to J. Brunker, Chief Secretary, 1 Mar. 1895. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6254, Item 95/4126.

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The sense of exclusivity was reinforced, as always, by the practicalities of where the men lived and

what resources they had. The instigator of the above Glen Innes application, when hearing of

opposition to his proposed detachment from the local infantry company due to concerns the town

could not support both corps, pointed out to his local member that:

Most of the infantry men would be unsuited for mounted work as they are principally townspeople. While the mounted Company would be comprised of men from the farms surrounding the town and very few of the townspeople.30

Much of this differentiation was related to horse ownership and the costs associated, but the other

expenses for men to simply belong to a mounted corps, as they had in the earlier corps of the 1860s

and 1870s, remained high. Even those corps eventually put on the partially-paid establishment during

the 1890s in colonies such as New South Wales, South Australia and Queensland started out in the

mid-1880s as unpaid volunteers units. In these corps, and sometimes also in the part-paid units they

became, men were still required to meet the costs of their uniforms, saddlery, and perhaps some of

their military equipment. These expenses quickly added up and were a particularly steep requirement

upon enlistment. A trooper of the New South Wales Lancers (undoubtedly Australia’s most socially

and economically patrician regiment) in the 1890s received perhaps £10 in pay and allowances per

year from the government for his services but was also expected to own and maintain a suitable horse,

provide his own saddlery, pay for some of his equipment including a dress uniform (a £10 cost by

itself, though service dress was now provided by the government), meet his out of pocket expenses

and make a contribution to support the regimental band.31 Also expected of him was paid up

membership to the New South Wales Lancer Association, a body that organised social functions

including the annual ball, assisted injured soldiers and engaged well known Sydney chefs to cook

food in camp.32 No other regiment expected as much of its men as did the Lancers, but, in any unit, to

be a mounted soldier was not a poor man's pursuit.

The social standing of, and affluence in, mounted units was emphasised in the officer ranks.

The costs involved for these men were considerable, particularly if their unit chose to adopt one of the

more glorious uniforms. In 1885 when the Sydney Light Horse Volunteers converted to lancers they

adopted a uniform based on that of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers. Made in England each officer was

required to pay £60 for the privilege of owning one.33 Such dazzling uniforms were rare by the late

1880s as the realities of modern warfare permeated even the forces of the antipodes, but the costs of

30Norman MacDonald to the Hon. F. Wright, 27 Feb. 1895. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6254, Item 95/4126. 31Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, pp. 14-6. 32Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 78-9. 33Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 14.

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being an officer remained high. Many of the expenses placed upon officers were, nominally at least,

voluntary (or more likely the simply expected, but not strictly compulsory, kind of contributions that

officers' messes excel in collecting) and reflected a mixture of patrician attitudes and a kind of

military philanthropy that benefited the corps they belonged to. The New South Wales Lancer band

made its first appearance in 1891 on twenty-four horses supplied at the complete expense of the

officers of the Hunter River Troop of the regiment. When the band required some revitalisation in

1898 fresh horses, saddlery and music were provided and the costs again born by the regiment’s

officers.34 By the end of the century the officers were collectively contributing about £200 per year in

order to maintain the regimental band.35 In another example of the willingness of officers to spend on

behalf of their units, the men and horses of the Upper Clarence Light Horse were able to attend the

cavalry review held in Sydney as part of the Jubilee Year celebrations of 1888 largely because their

commander, Captain Charles Chauvel, paid for all the trip’s expenses except the men's train fares.36

The wealth and military largesse of some officers became somewhat famous and the perhaps

the best known example was the command of the New South Wales Lancers by Colonel James Burns.

A prominent Sydney businessman he was the Burns half of the Burns Philp business empire founded

in 1893. The regimental history records that his involvement with the New South Wales Lancers "was

his main non-business interest and he spent lavishly on it."37 As an indication of what prominence and

enthusiasm could bring a man in the right circumstances he had enlisted in the Parramatta Troop as a

Trooper in early June 1891 but managed to receive a promotion to Captain by the end of the following

month.38 By 1897 he had attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and taken command of the regiment.

He involved himself closely with all aspects of the regiment and used his wealth to help it wherever

he could. The detachment at Parramatta was given almost free access to his house and grounds north

of town and their rifle range was located in a gully on the property.39 Undoubtedly a popular man in

the unit due to his character and contributions to the regiment, his military philanthropy, in certain

circles at least, was held as an example of unselfish patriotism:

Colonel Burns, although a very busy city man, has always found good deal of time to devote to the fine Regiment of which he is so justly proud. Few men in the military world of Australia have proved more unselfishly patriotic, where patriotism spells £.

34Ibid., pp. 15 & 31. 35Wilkinson, Australian Cavalry, p. 10. 36Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 10. 37Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 19. 38Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 398. He enlisted as a Trooper on 6 Jun. 1891 and received his commission as a Captain on 23 Jul. 1891. 39Ibid.

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s. d. and loss of valuable time. The Regiment owes its present Commanding Officer more than it will be able to repay within the next decade or two.40

Burns was a rare example of the confluence of extreme wealth and citizen soldier activity, but

men who could be described as financially comfortable and perhaps prominent in some other way,

typical pillars of society, were part of the fabric of many mounted units. Large landholders were

involved with many units and often commanded detachments, squadrons or even regiments

themselves. In the late 1880s Captain Goodger of the Ulmarra Light Horse and Captain Fanning of the

Casino Troop of the Upper Clarence Light Horse were both prosperous graziers.41 Charles Chauvel,

the founder of the Upper Clarence Light Horse, was also the patriarch of a prominent pastoral family

of northern New South Wales.42 As an indication of how the civilian relationships of landholders

could transfer over to the military sphere his son, Harry Chauvel, was able to form the basis of a

company of the Darling Downs Mounted Infantry in Queensland when the family's employees, who

had made up a troop of the Upper Clarence Light Horse, crossed the border with their employers in

1890.43

That the well-to-do were universally interested in military affairs or service was not, however,

the obvious corollary of the involvement of some men and families of wealth. In 1884 the completely

unpaid volunteer Victorian Forces, then coming to an end of a period of degeneration, was moved to

issue as a General Order this lament:

It is regretted this purely voluntary and honorary service has not received a more hearty recognition from the general public and that the wealthy mercantile, professional and leisured classes...have ceased for many years to belong to or take any active interest in the force, but this only augments the honour of those who...remained...44

Things did not change with federation and in 1909 another officer complained:

Of the men who have most to lose, the large graziers and farmers, with few exceptions, show the least active sympathy with the defence movement, and I can safely say that not more than one percent of the Light Horsemen in the country are station hands...I have known station owners who would not engage men unless they

40Wilkinson, Australian Cavalry, p. 18. 41Eyland, ‘The New South Wales Military Forces 1870-1890: Social Composition and Status’, p. 33. 42Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 6. 43Ibid., p. 7. 44General Order for Victoria, No. 13, 22 Jan. 1884, cited in Lt-Gen. Sir Carl Jess, Report of the Activities of the Australian Military Forces, 1929-1939. AWM 1, 20/9, Part 3.

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were cricketers, but never unless they were willing to join the Defence Force.45

Nevertheless politicians also regularly found their place and in 1855 the South Australian

forces had serving in their ranks four parliamentarians. Two of these served in the Adelaide Mounted

Rifles and one, Captain Edward Gwynne, was its commander. Interestingly this organisation was the

only one in the forces able at this time to attract the services of a surgeon.46 The 1st Australian Horse,

when it was formed in 1897, included among its officer ranks a no less than three parliamentarians.

One raised and commanded the unit, one acted as the Quartermaster and the third commanded one of

the squadrons. Additionally the services of the colony’s Governor were secured as the regiment's

Honorary-Colonel and his Private Secretary, Captain Ferguson of the 2nd Life Guards, took on the

appointment of regimental second-in-command with a local rank of Major.47 The regiment's founder,

Kenneth Mackay, was an influential pastoralist from Gundagai and held enough political clout to gain

a place as Vice President of the colony’s Executive Council in 1899.48 Showing again what social or

political prominence could do he had previously held the rank of Captain from an earlier association

with the West Camden Light Horse, but on being given permission to raise his own unit he

immediately gained a promotion to Major and in 1898 was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.

The financial burdens upon officers meant that only those men willing and able to meet the

expenses could be seriously considered to receive commissions. Men who may have otherwise had

leadership skills but did not have the wherewithal to meet all the outlays could not consider, or be

considered, to take up officer appointments. Many detachments failed because their officers were

unable to continue with their service and no suitable candidates could be found to take their place.49

There was no doubt that suitability had economic as well as military considerations. One officer

claimed that "many of our best young officers are far from being independent, and the cost of

providing for themselves with a complete kit often deters good men from joining our Australian

Mounted Service."50 Hutton was of much the same opinion and after federation hoped that the

45Everett, ‘The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse’, p. 100. 46Andrew & Sandra Twining, South Australian Military Volunteers for 1855 (Kogarah, NSW: The Authors, 1992), p. 21. 47Burness, 'Australian Colonial Forces: A Sketch', pp. 8-9. 48Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 24, &, Brian Dunn & Peter Blundell (eds.), The Boys in Green: A History of the 1st Australian Horse and the Light Horse Units of Harden & Murrumburrah, New South Wales (Binalong, NSW: Clarion Editions, 1997), p. 5. 49Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 20. For example the Murrumbidgee Troop of the New South Wales Cavalry was disbanded in December 1892 when no suitable officer could be found. Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 18. 50Lt-Col. Mackay to Governor of New South Wales, Earl Beauchamp, 18 Jul. 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP.

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introduction of a plain, inexpensive uniform would no longer discourage potential officers "who have

in the past found it extremely difficult to supply themselves with expensive uniform..."51 He also took

a dim view of the New South Wales tradition of officers paying for bands as:

[T]hey entail large subscriptions from the Regimental Officers...which add seriously to the expenses entailed upon officers on joining Mounted Regiments. It is therefore most difficult to obtain suitable candidates for vacant Commissions.52

After Federation various attempts were made to keep the costs of being an officer down but the efforts

seem to have had only partial success. One officer in 1909 thought the problem of expensive uniform

was a "hardy 'bogey' which no amount of substantial facts and solid figures seem to effectively

allay."53 That one year's service would provide enough pay to return the investment seemed to him a

suitable balance. Yet his view was counter to that of the Inspector-General who, just two years

previously, had again raised the problem in his annual report and pointed out that to buy all the

uniforms and accoutrements a new Light Horse officer would be out of pocket by over £41.54 The

costs were even higher for a man taking a commission in the Engineers or Artillery. Messing was

another expense and one Queensland Light Horse officer voiced concern that to attend camps in that

state in 1911-12 cost 10 shillings more than they were paid in allowances. In the same forum Harry

Chauvel, then the Adjutant-General, pointed out that it was worse for permanent officers who had to

attend multiple camps. He contended that his attendance at six camps in Queensland in one year had

left him £20 worse off.55 Maintaining horseflesh remained a key burden. In the first years after

federation officers of Light Horse, emphasising that they must have some means, received no horse

allowance. This deficiency was corrected at some point before the First World War though the

allowance remained a token amount; £1.17.6 for a Lieutenant, £5.12.6 for a Colonel or Brigadier in

1913.56

Accordingly many men who were willing and able to serve as citizen officers made sacrifices

to do so. The authorities were well aware of it and in 1909 the Adjutant-General remarked in a minute

that officers and NCOs "who give their spare time to the service of their country must expect hard

51Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 Dec. 1902. AWM3, 02/2846. 52Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 28 May 1903. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2. 53Adjutant General to Secretary of Defence, 20 Sep. 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1930/2/21. 54Annual Report for the Year 1907, p. 16. 55Report of the Conference of Militia Officers Assembled at Headquarters, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th October, 1912 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, 1912), pp. 15 & 44. 56Price (ed), The Light Horse Pocket Book, p. 19.

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work and considerable personal inconvenience as a matter of course."57 The minutes of an exchange

between a Light Horse commanding officer and the Minister of Defence over horse allowance in 1905

serves to emphasise this:

Major Moore asked why it is that Artillery Officers draw horse allowance and officers of the Light Horse do not. The Minister said that he supposed it was on the same principle that only £1 per annum was to a Private of the Light Horse. Of course he cannot keep one for that... Major Moore said that it cost officers £40 or £50 a year. The Minister said that it showed a very good spirit. Major Moore said it depended on how long they will stand it.58

Despite the costs and the disruptions to their lives a sense of duty and accomplishment motivated

some. One long-serving officer of the Queensland Mounted Infantry recalled:

I gave to my country about twenty-two of my best years organising and training officers and men - the best I had in me. As much time as was given [by me] to the defence organisation as to my private work. We were paid a certain amount, and what I received might have paid for the keep of one horse. That is only an illustration of the spirit, and I am sufficiently immodest to glory in it to-day. Scores of men, busy in civil life, and battling along for bread and butter did the same.59

Such men felt they were giving something to their society by making the sacrifices necessary to

pursue citizen soldiering in the various mounted bodies but the demands on time, effort and finances

meant that most officers did not serve long and the affects had to be carried by the units they served.

Regiments often had to change their organisational structure to accommodate the location and

skills of the men who were willing to serve. In 1888, for example, the commander of 'D' Company of

the Victorian Mounted Rifles, Captain Fawcett, transferred to the reserve and as his replacement,

Lieutenant Nethercote, was resident in Moe the company headquarters had to be moved to that town.

When he in turn received a promotion in 1889 the new commander lived in Warragul and the

headquarters again moved. In 1890 the headquarters of 'C' Company had to be similarly relocated

from Heyfield to Sale when a new commander was appointed.60 In 1903 Hutton was amazed to

discover that though the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments were established in rural New South

Wales their respective headquarters were to be set up in Sydney. The state commandant responded

that as Lieutenant-Colonel Onslow (2nd LHR) was in Sydney two to three times a week and that

57Adjutant General to Secretary of Defence, 20 Sep. 1909. NAA(M) MP84/1, 1930/2/21. 58Western Australia: Meeting of Commanding Officers, pp. 6-7. NAA(M) B168, 1905/1678. 59Reginald Spencer Browne cited in Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', p. 31. 60David Schmitt, ‘The Victorian Mounted Rifles in Gippsland', Gippsland Heritage Journal. 2:1 (1987), 12.

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Colonel Mackay (3rd LHR) actually lived in town it was easiest to have their headquarters there.61

When the council of Gunnedah tried that same year to have a permanent Light Horse headquarters

established there they were informed that one of the key reasons behind choosing a headquarters

location was the "place and residence of the Commanding Officer, Adjutant and Quartermaster of

each Regiment."62

The social function that such units played for the men enlisted in the, often remote,

communities in which such corps existed should not be overlooked. When men went into camp they

did so not only to train but also for the opportunity to socialise. The usual Easter Camps held by the

Victorian Mounted Rifles included not just military training and tactical manoeuvring but time,

usually on the Sunday, to relax and enjoy sports. Martial sports such as tent pegging and lemon

cutting they may have been, and thus another form of military training, but sports nonetheless.

Viewing activities at the camps was a popular pastime for Melbournians looking for a day out and for

these onlookers as well as the men enlisted horse jumping competitions and camp concerts were often

organised.63 The men of the regiment regularly competed for prizes and in 1896, for example, the

Victorian Minister of Defence offered £10 in prize money at the North Gippsland Agricultural Show

for the men of 'C' Company of the Victorian Mounted Rifles to compete in riding skills.64 Similarly, in

1905 the commander of the 12th Light Horse Regiment encouraged his men to enter into a military

sports competition at the Elphin Show Grounds.65 Among the inducements to join the 1st Australian

Horse was the opportunity for men from remote districts to compete at shooting, cricket, polo and

other mounted sports.66 Detachments of cavalry in northern New South Wales during the 1890s often

hosted dances or smoking concerts, and most held annual balls.67 A Victorian newspaper recorded that

the ball held by one Light Horse troop in 1913 was "the very top rung of in the ladder of social life as

far as Minyip was concerned...[and that the] ball was, from every possible point of view, a brilliant

gathering and unanimously voted as such by everyone assembled thereat."68 Displays by detachments

on significant days, such as the Anniversary Day (now Australia Day) cavalry tournament by the

61Brig. H. Finn, NSW Commandant, to AQMG, Melbourne, 14 Oct. 1903. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2. 62Secretary of Defence to The Hon. G. Cruickshank, 8 Oct. 1903. NAA(M) B168,022688, Item 4. 63Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 54. 64Details on prizes for North Gippsland Agricultural Show, 1896. NAA (M) B3756, 1896/2689. 65RO No. 29, 12th LHR (TMI), 20 Oct. 1905. AWM1, 19/2, p. 41. 66Burness, ‘The Australian Horse’, p. 38. 67Martin Buckley, The N.S.W. Northern Rivers Lancers: Light Horse and Motor Regiments 1903-1944 (Lismore: Martin Buckley, 1991), p. 10. 68Unnamed newspaper cited in Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, pp. 102-3.

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Lismore and Casino Troops in Lismore in 1892, were a regular part of local celebrations.69 The 1st

Australian Horse hosted a similar tournament at the Murrumburrah race course for the same

celebration in 1899.70 Communities sometimes got more than simple viewing pleasures and in 1899

the Young and Cootamundra Hospitals were donated £23 by a half-squadron of the 1st Australian

Horse from funds raised from a sports day and ball.71 In the 1890s, an age of growing labour unrest,

some in authority hoped the social life of units would have a soothing effect in their communities. The

New South Wales Commandant, Major-General French, heard that the formation of the 1st Australian

Horse had "an important social aspect on the stations where there are detachments, bringing masters

and men into close intercourse, class prejudice and distrust [are] being supplanted by a feeling of

camaraderie and esprit de corps."72

Despite this, at times, prominent social role in the in the communities they came from, the

mounted corps of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not free of the same sort of

negative comments from bystanders that had bedevilled the volunteer bodies of earlier decades. The

representative of one application to form a cavalry detachment in the 1880s wrote to the authorities

asking their case be expedited so that he and others on the committee no longer would have to "suffer

a great amount of annoyance, [and] unpleasant remarks etc. at the hands of a section of the

community who are always opposing persons or movements of a military character."73 The

parliamentarian Edward O’Sullivan supported the New South Wales Mounted Rifles "not

withstanding the sneers of those who are apt to try to belittle our citizen soldiery."74 Colonel Tom

Price congratulated one of his companies of the Victorian Mounted Rifles for remaining dignified and

disciplined "while being harassed by a lot of people, who are apparently too idle to serve this country

themselves and consider it a generous action to annoy those who do."75 Another Victorian officer

summed up the dual attitudes to citizen soldiers of the time:

For the last twenty years [until the Boer War] Militia and Volunteer Corps have had the respect and confidence of the most distinguished soldiers, but the feeling among the general population has been in sympathy with that of the youngest [regular] army lieutenant; 'Playing at Soldiers' has been the most general expression applied to the

69Buckley, The N.S.W. Northern Rivers Lancers, pp. 4-5. 70Dunn & Blundell, The Boys in Green, pp. 8-9. 71Ibid., p. 12. 72Maj-Gen. French, 1898, cited in Burness, ‘The Australian Horse’, p. 38. 73Letter to OC Northern District Reserves, 28 Dec. 1888. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/5982, Item 90/5944. 74O'Sullivan, The Power of Mounted Riflemen, p. 20. 75Col. Tom Price cited in Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 46.

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really effective work of the volunteers and the partially paid forces.76

An officer of the Casino lancer troop hoped that the service of some of his men in South Africa would

silence those who believed his men would "crawl up hollow logs" if an enemy appeared.77 These

views owed much to an attitude, held with some substantiation, that citizen soldiers, with what in

reality constituted only a small amount of military training, were not much in the way of a defence

force. The Adelaide Observer commented on the South Australian Mounted Rifles after a review that

despite their flair "it could readily be seen where regular drill came in and where it did not."78 In the

Richmond River area the prowess of the lancers was subjected "time and again [to] spiteful

remarks..."79 South Africa may have ameliorated these sort of attitudes as complaints about derisive

comments are scarce after federation but this did not mean communities were always supportive. One

of the reasons behind the failure of a Light Horse troop at Gunnedah in 1904 was that the trustees of

the local School of Arts would not entertain the idea of allowing a small room to be added to their

building for use as an orderly room. As result the men had to drill in the street by moon or lamp-

light.80

Popular views such as these are unlikely to have made service in the late colonial or post-

federation mounted corps more pleasurable. Nor were the other sacrifices men had to make. Most

soon found that the demands were not just financial and those who enlisted discovered, if they had not

before signing up, that they had made a substantial commitment. The time alone required to be an

active mounted soldier was often considerable. If located near a town regular attendance at short local

night and day time drills was the norm. In the late 1890s the men of the Parramatta half-squadron of

the New South Wales Lancers were required to parade two nights a week and also expected to be

available for the many public events the detachment was committed to.81 Members of rural

detachments, though facing perhaps fewer requirements to parade, often had to make long trips to

make it to their destination to attend local or unit training. The men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles

found they regularly faced the requirement of making a significant trip by either foot, horse or train

just to make it to a company parade and the round trip for this gathering could amount to perhaps

76Templeton, The Consolidation of the British Empire, p. 28. 77Captain Fanning, Casino Troop NSWL, 1900, cited in Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 18. 78Adelaide Observer, 26 Jun. 1896, pp. 45-6, cited in Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 73. 79Richmond River Herald, 9 Feb. 1900, cited in Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 18. 80Brig-Gen H. Finn, NSW Commandant to DAG, 13 Jul. 1904. NAA(M) B168, 02/2688, Item 4. 81Bridges, ‘The New South Wales Lancers and the Anglo-Boer War’, p. 24.

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thirty kilometres.82 On top of that if the unit was further concentrating, for an Easter Camp for

example, there was usually a further train trip to where the camp was to be held and by that stage

some men would have travelled almost 300 kilometres with their horse and their equipment simply to

train for four days.83 The obstacles to make it even to the train could be considerable and in the early

1890s the Casino Troop of the New South Wales Cavalry had to ford three rivers simply to get to their

nearest railhead.84 Victorian Mounted Riflemen from Gippsland found themselves marching all the

way to camp in 1890 because the rolling stock supposed to collect them failed to appear.85 These sorts

of difficulties in combination with the demands that the men faced from their civilian employment or

business interests meant that many men soon became disillusioned and unhappy with their military

lot. All of these factors, in combination, meant that the Victorian Mounted Rifles, despite having a

paper strength of between 800-1000 men for much of its existence, only achieved a camp attendance

of 400 men on two occasions. In some years the regiment could not even muster 200 men at camp.86

Even at local parades attendances for this regiment were often poor. In the final quarter of 1897 most

detachments could get, on average, only a third of their men to attend such gatherings. In 'B' Company

the detachment in Shepparton could only get ten of its twenty-seven enrolled men to attend;

Murchison, twelve of twenty-five; Broadford eight of nineteen and Avenel six of fifteen. These

figures are entirely representative of the other companies.87

The changes to conditions of service with federation proved a mixed blessing for the men

who made up the rank and file of Australia’s mounted units. The men serving in South Australia and

Queensland lost horse allowances of £4 and £3.15.0 respectively.88 The new base pay rate of 8 s. per

day meant that, in combination with the £1 horse allowance, soldiers who attended all their training

commitments could receive up to about £8 per annum.89 This meant that the mounted men of

Queensland and New South Wales were slightly worse off under the new regime. The previously

unpaid men of Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania were, of course, much better off. The horse

allowance that enlisted men received after federation was purely token and reflected the idea that

sacrifice was part of the contract of service. What men had to provide themselves, did, however,

82Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, pp. 23 & 26. 83Ibid., p. 51. 84Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 18. 85Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 53. 86Ibid., p. 51. 87Return on VMR Attendance, Dec. 1897, NAA (M) B3756, 1898/1463. 88Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 209-10. 89Wilkinson, ‘Australian Army Reorganisation', p. 77.

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gradually improve under the federal system. They would always have to provide their own "quiet,

active, compact, well-built horse",90 but uniforms were simplified and even if they were sometimes

difficult to get at least the government paid for them. In 1913 all Light Horsemen were finally issued a

set of saddlery, thus fulfilling a long standing need. From 1905 if a man's horse was injured or killed

when using it for military training he was compensated up to £10 or £25 respectively, though the

amount was "not intended to make good the full amount of loss sustained."91 This was an important

condition of service as farmers "often seriously felt the loss of their horses injured on military

service."92 It was not a perfect system, however. At a conference in 1912 one officer thought it

encouraged men to let their injured horse die in order to receive better compensation and another

related a case where a Tasmanian Light Horseman had bought a horse for £11 and obviously tried to

have the horse fatally injured in order to claim the compensation.93

Other changes in conditions had their own affect and the time required to be a mounted

soldier remained appreciable. Hutton, when GOC of the Commonwealth Military Forces, emphasised

that only men who could attend his eight day camps should even contemplate joining the Light

Horse.94 This change caused considerable consternation among some soldiers who had served in the

pre-federation forces and the reorganisation of part of the News South Wales Mounted Rifles into the

2nd Light Horse Regiment was hampered by poor attendance "ascribed to the lengthened duration of

parades and other of the new regulations."95 Despite the pay, getting men to parade in the Light Horse

was an apparently insurmountable problem. One officer, echoing earlier experiences, noted that it was

not uncommon for Light Horsemen to have to ride ten miles, though some may have ridden up to

thirty, to attend a half-day parade. Such demands, he noted, meant that getting men to the drill hall or

training paddock was often difficult.96

Though social interaction was an important part of local parades the focus more often tended

to be purely military in character, particularly after federation. In November 1906 the Hamilton troop

of the 11th Light Horse Regiment spent two half day parades training in mounted drill and dismounted

outposts, as well as two night parades doing a firing exercise, and practising saluting and marching.97

90Price (ed), The Light Horse Pocket Book, pp. 6-7. 91RO No. 8, 12th LHR (TMI), 6 Apr, 1905. AWM1, 19/2, pp. 8-9. 92Comments by Maj. Smith in Report of the Conference of Militia Officers Assembled at Headquarters, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th October, 1912 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, 1912), p. 46. 93Comments by Lt-Col. Grant & Maj. Smith in ibid. 94Hutton, Second Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, p. 13. 95Brig-Gen. H. Finn, NSW Commandant, to DAG, Melbourne, 30 Dec. 1903. AWM3, 03/677 Part 2. 96Conway, ‘The Australian Light Horseman', pp. 519-21. 97Training Schedule, 4th Sqn, 11th LHR, Nov. 1906. AWM1, 18/5, p. 44.

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The program of half-day parades for the 12th Light Horse Regiment two years earlier was a long list of

military training activities ranging from the occupation of a position to field firing with blanks and

reconnaissance duties.98 Because Australian soldiers were "naturally...indifferent horsemaster[s]...",

and highlighting one of the lessons of South Africa, men in longer camps now spent a large amount of

their time learning how to properly tend to their horses.99 Distractions from these routines, though

few, were to be purely wholesome in nature and the sale of cigarettes and alcohol at Light Horse and

other continuous camps was strictly prohibited. An unpopular regulation, this restriction was

generally opposed by most officers who believed that as long the men were 21 years of age they

should be able to partake. One Tasmanian medical officer even warned that "it was dangerous to keep

some away from their beer."100 Leisure was thus largely restricted to sports or perhaps a concert by the

regimental band. Men who did attend their parades often found the training dull or repetitive after a

while. This was largely the result of uneven leadership standards, poor attendances and the high

turnover of men in the ranks. With men missing, or with many new men in the troop or half-squadron,

the training rarely got beyond a basic level. Frustrated men soon left their units, but this exacerbated

the problem for men left behind who had fewer comrades to train with or had to contend with the new

recruits who replaced them.101 Thus a cycle of boredom and discharges was often begun. The ordinary

discomforts of military life no doubt also made their contribution. One Lancer officer wrote to another

that the "drought still continues, but I expect when we go to Camp in few days, the heavens will be

likely to open out."102

Retention of men in the ranks thus remained much the same problem that it had been since the

inception of colonial defence forces in the 1850s. The Adelaide Mounted Rifles found that of the 101

original names on the roll books in 1877 all of them had been struck off by 1881.103 Individual

detachments collapsed as regularly and completely as the disparate volunteer corps of earlier decades

did, but this fact has been somewhat hidden by the larger organisational structures that the successful

mainland colonies had adopted after the mid-1880s. In order to maintain its strength throughout the

pre-federation period the Victorian Mounted Rifles established a staggering 105 separate detachments

98RO No. 19, 12th LHR (TMI), 28 Jul. 1904. AWM1, 19/1. 99White, 'Light Horse of Australia', p. 85. 100Comments by Maj. Smith and other officers in Report of the Conference of Militia Officers Assembled at Headquarters, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th October, 1912 (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, 1912), pp. 16 & 50. 101Ibid., p. 520. 102James Burns to Charles Cox, 27 Mar. 1899, Cox, Charles Frederick 1863-1944, Papers on the South African War, 1897-1933, MS37. 103Len Wilkins, 'The Bated Shining Sword: The Colonial Defence Force as a Mirror of Colonial Society in South Australia, 1836-1901', B.A. Honours Thesis, University of Adelaide, 1983, p. 35.

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between the regiment’s raising in 1885 and when they were subsumed into the federal organisation in

1903. Of this massive total only thirteen were of sufficient integral strength to survive the whole

period without interruption.104 When reading the surviving documents of the period correspondence

such as this from a Victorian Sergeant-Major to one of his soldiers is common:

As you have failed to make yourself effective for the [year] 1895 you have been recommended for discharge. Please forward your kit and clothing either to Lieut. Ross...or to me here.105

After federation, despite the new conditions of service, the situation was little different. Another

Sergeant-Major, a little over ten years later, wrote to one of his soldiers:

I have to remind you that Drill Parades are still held at Dunkeld, and am forwarding herewith a Parade card - you evidently lost the otherone.[sic] It is some time since you have been on parade, and I think you could attend sometimes. I hope you are not losing interest in your Military work.106

A high turnover of men and officers was an inescapable characteristic of Australia’s mounted

regiments. The orders book of Tasmania’s 26th Light Horse Regiment warmly records that it took

twenty-two men onto its books in July 1913 but also noted that on the same day thirty-one were to be

struck off as non-efficient. The roll books of the 6th Light Horse Regiment reveals that about 42

percent of men enlisted in 1907 had left or been discharged by 1910.107

When the number of discharges began to exceed recruiting, as it so easily could in the

relatively sparsely populated rural areas where the only interested men were the ones already

discharging, the failure of detachments was not far in coming. Before federation new detachments

were largely established on the basis of applications from the men themselves to form a new mounted

organisation. After federation the new government continued to receive such applications but as time

went on the role of finding and raising new Light Horse elements began to fall increasingly on state

and military district commandants, and then onto unit commanding officers. The federal schemes of

defence gradually sought to exploit most areas that could support a Light Horse regiment and those

who had to find new detachments were forced to ferret out new sources within their existing unit

boundaries. It sometimes led to peculiarly circular recruiting patterns. In 1908 the 4th Squadron of the

104Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, p. 23. 105Sgt-Major F. Baker, 'H' Coy, 2nd Bn. VMR, to Pte. Brand, 3 Jul. 1895. AWM 1, 18/1, p. 306. 106SSgt. J. Carmody, 4 Sqn, 11th LHR Regiment, to Pte. W. Murch, 7 Sep. 1906. AWM1, 18/5. 107Figures derived from Muster Roll of 6th LHR, 1907-1910, AWM1, 17/3. Sample taken by recording the details of all men with surnames starting with the letters A, B, C & F, 99 men in total. Of these 43 (42.57%) had left or been discharged as non-efficient by late 1910.

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13th Light Horse Regiment, formed in the Lockyer Valley west of Brisbane, maintained troops at

Gatton, Helidon, Laidley and Blenheim. In that year, and the following, both the troops at Laidley and

then Blenheim were disbanded and replaced by troops at Forrest Hill and Ma Ma Creek. By 1912 the

troop at Helidon was also in serious decline and the then commanding officer, having made enquiries,

discovered that there were now again twenty men in Laidley who were willing to enlist. Laidley thus

again became a Light Horse troop centre within four years of being closed down as unviable.108

Detachments failed for plenty of reasons, many of which have been outlined. The Troop

Leader of the above Blenheim troop attributed its failure to the "fact that the young men of the district

take no interest in military matters."109 As in earlier decades, however, the performance or interest of

the officers commanding played an important, often crucial, role in how successful a detachment was.

The loss of an effective commander for the Liverpool half-company of Mounted Rifles was a key

reason, among others, why the New South Wales commandant sought to have it removed from the

establishment in 1895:

The condition of this Half Company has been reported as unsatisfactory after the recent Annual Field Training, and also for some time in the past. The standard of efficiency is bad; the Numerical Strength is much below Establishment; the Non-Commissioned Officers are reported generally inefficient; and above all it is found impossible to obtain Officers of such standing as would justify their selection as such. The Officer recently in Command, Captain Biden, has resigned and their is no prospect of finding any Officer to replace him.110

A detachment of the 17th Light Horse Regiment was wound up for similar reasons in 1904. There the

"officer until recently in charge, Lieutenant Herbert...[had] shown great lack of interest in the

management of his troop, and no suitable gentleman...[could be] found to replace him in

command."111

The 1890s, a decade of economic depression, proved to be particularly hard years for

retention and unit viability. The difficulties were twofold in that men, faced with the problems of

trying to get by, were less likely to give up the time, effort and money to join military organisations,

and governments, faced with diminishing revenues, were soon forced to reduce the amount spent on

defence. The Victorian Mounted Rifles had their establishment slashed from 1000 to 800 men in 1893

in order to reduce costs. The 200 odd men no longer catered for by the government were allowed to

108Correspondence relating to distribution of 13th LHR, 1908-1912. NAA(M) MP84/1, 713/3/2, 713/3/8, 713/3/12 & 713/3/18. 109OC 4 Sqn, 13th LHR to HQ 13th LHR, precise date unknown but mid-1908. NAA(M) MP84/1, 713/3/12. 110Hutton to Principle Under-Secretary, 28 May 1895, SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6268, Item 95/8136. 111Lt-Col. Reade, SA Commandant, to DAG & CSO, Melbourne, 2 Nov. 1904. AWM3, 04/74.

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stay on as supernumeraries but by mid-1894 only fifteen of these men were still on the books.112 In

1894-5 further cuts were made that reduced the number of companies and instructors as well as the

pay of the permanent officers.113 The 1893 cuts had also forced the disbandment of the lone troop of

cavalry at Sandhurst and two metropolitan infantry battalions.114 In New South Wales cuts were also

contemplated and five cavalry and mounted infantry detachments considered too remote from the

metropolis were facing disbandment in 1893, though in this case the cuts did not apparently take

place.115In Queensland the Mounted Infantry were saved from cuts due to their proven reliability

during the Shearers' Strike in 1891, though they did suffer a reduction in their horse allowance.116

Aid to the Civil Power

The role of the Queensland Mounted Infantry in the Shearers' Strike pointed to one reason,

aside from the basic one of defence, that colonial governments chose not to cut deeper into their

mounted defence forces in the mid-1890s. The role of mounted units as defenders of the colony

carried not only the responsibility of seeing off an invader but also the traditional function of aiding

the authorities in maintaining good order. Perhaps the first instance in which colonial mounted troops

were used to help restore order occurred at Kyneton, Victoria, in 1861 when the local magistrate was

faced with an angry and riotous crowd of railway gangers disgruntled over a pay cut. To help restore

the situation he called out the sixty men of the Kyneton District Mounted Rifles Corps and they

assisted with the dispersal of the crowds.117 Mounted units dealing with labour unrest became a

relatively common sight in the early 1890s. During the maritime strike of 1890 two troops of cavalry

and two companies of mounted infantry volunteered themselves for service as special mounted police

in New South Wales. Sworn in as special mounted constables and given police uniforms they were

used to escort non-union labour and wagons to the wharves but were involved in no serious

incidents.118 To the south two hundred men of the Victorian Mounted Rifles were called out due to

112OC VMR to AAG Victoria, 26 May 1893, NAA(M) B3756, 1893/1081, & Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, pp. 27-8. 113Calder, Heroes and Gentlemen, pp. 27-8. 114Vazenry. Military Forces of Victoria, Ch. 2, p. 4. 115Correspondence regarding cuts to mounted troops, SRNSW, CSC, Box unknown, Item 93/471, & Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 21. 116Notes on W. Okeden's memo attached to undated and unsigned memorandum to Chief Secretary of Queensland. QSA PRE/20. This item probably dates from late 1893 or early 1894. 117Millar, ‘The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District', p. 87, & Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 7. 118Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, p. 14, & Anon, 'A Short History of the New South Wales Mounted Rifles 1888-1913', p. 32.

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concerns that a planned mass meeting may turn into a riot. The night before the meeting the men were

issued live ammunition but the event proved peaceful and their services were not required. The

regiment became a subject of considerable controversy, however, when a newspaper reported that

upon the issue of the ammunition Tom Price had addressed his soldiers and exhorted them that should

it prove necessary they were to fire "low and lay them out - lay the disturbers of law and order out..."

Price contended that he had been misquoted and his defenders have pointed to the Queens Regulations

of the time, which stated that when firing during a civil disturbance soldiers were to aim low in order

to lay out the leaders, and opined that he was doing nothing more than reciting the rules.119 Unionists

tended to cast it, rightly or wrongly, as another Peterloo narrowly averted. What Price actually said

remained a moot point but not surprisingly many from the working class and labour politics came to

view Price and the regiment with some suspicion.

Labour politics grew more suspicious of the place of the colonial military the following year

during the Queensland Shearers Strike when the men of that colony’s defence forces were called out

to assist. The first troops called out had been the Moreton Mounted Infantry and they were soon

joined by elements from all the Queensland Defence Forces including most of the rest of the mounted

infantry. Responsible for escorting non-union shearers and transport, protecting remote property and

providing communications in remote districts, the mounted infantry quickly gained a reputation for

endurance, fortitude and reliability.120 The government was so pleased with their service that later that

year, after the strike, the establishment of the mounted infantry was expanded by 180 men.121 When,

later in the decade, the government had to consider defence cuts due to a poor economic outlook

reductions to the mounted infantry were strongly resisted by those who remembered their service. One

official concluded:

The Mounted Infantry although more expensive than the infantry are, far and away, the most dependable and best soldiers we have to rely on for internal protection...The reduction in numbers should, therefore, be principally made in outlying country corps which are certainly not needed either for defence purposes proper or for internal protection.122

When the shearers struck again in 1894 fifty members of the mounted infantry volunteered for service

119Vazenry, Military Forces of Victoria, Ch. 3, p. 37. 120Col. G. French, Commandant QDF, cited in Joan Starr & Christopher Sweeney, Forward: The History of the 2nd/14th Light Horse (Queensland Mounted Infantry) (St. Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1989), pp. 6-8. 121Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, p. 167. 122Notes on W. Okeden's memo attached to undated and unsigned memorandum to Chief Secretary of Queensland. QSA PRE/20. This item probably dates from late 1893 or early 1894.

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as special constables and were sent to Rockhampton as a police reserve.123 Their reliability, and that

of the men in New South Wales and Victoria, probably stemmed from the social origins of the men

who made up the ranks. Originating mostly from the respectable rural and suburban middle class it is

likely that few would have held much sympathy for the political radicals in the trade union movement.

Unionists were certainly wary of the soldiery and after federation the Defence Act, reliant on Labor

Party support for its passage, established the still extant principle that citizen soldiers cannot be used

by governments to break labour disputes.124

Horse Soldier Mythology

The usefulness of mounted troops in helping solve internal disruptions only served to

reinforce the by then growing notion that mounted troops were a particularly useful form of soldiery

for colonial forces to raise. This idea had a firm military basis in the colonial experiences of the

British Army in the second half of the nineteenth century and the related efforts to redefine the role of

horse mounted soldiers in an age of rapid technological change. Encouraged by recent wars, in

particular the First Anglo-Boer War, however, the idea that mounted troops were useful in colonial

situations grew into a strong and resilient myth that Australians, particularly those from the bush who

could ride and theoretically shoot well, with only minimum traditional training, would make excellent

soldiers. The idea received its first airing in the 1850s when the newly self governing colonies,

spurred by war scares, began considering some form of self defence. Not everyone was excited by the

idea and one New South Wales parliamentarian, Reverend John Lang, dismissed it, contending that

the lack of any dangerous natives had not encouraged the warlike tendencies in the Australian

colonies in the same way that it had in North America.125 Views such as these quickly became the

exception rather than the norm, however. A contemporary South Australian parliamentarian believed

there was great value to be held in a "few horsemen properly armed [that] might be brought to the

coast in case of an emergency."126 After the First Anglo-Boer War the idea that mounted men from the

bush were the best form of defence that the Australian colonies possessed gained particular currency.

Perhaps the clearest written enunciation of this idea was in The Power Of Mounted Riflemen, by the

New South Wales parliamentarian Edward O'Sullivan. In this small book he drew a clear parallel

between the performance of the Boer farmers that had used unconventional mounted rifle tactics to

123Johnson, Volunteers at Heart, pp. 167-8. 124'Law, Military', in Peter Dennis, et.al. The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), p, 342. 125John Lang, How to Defend the Colony, being the substance of a speech in the Legislative Assembly of NSW, on Tuesday, 20 December, 1859 (Sydney: John L. Sherriff & F. Mason, 1860), p. 13. 126The Hon. Mr. Baker, in South Australia Parliamentary Debates, 2nd Session, 1st Parliament, 1858, p. 175.

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defeat the regular soldiers of the British Army, and the Australian men serving in mounted rifle units.

His book was published "with the object of showing what colonial soldiers can do when fighting in

mountain or bush country."127 Pointing to the superior shooting of the Boers at the Battle of Majuba

Hill and their mounted rifle style of fighting he argued that Australia’s mounted riflemen and mounted

infantry should be given strong encouragement.128

This arm of the service is one, therefore, that ought to be encouraged. It utilises two of the strongest natural habits of the young Australian - love of horse riding and shooting - and they, therefore, take to the training of Mounted Riflemen with a vim and vigour which promises to make them formidable foes to any body of invaders who may have the temerity to land upon our shores.129

This was a representation of a growing idea that an ability to ride and shoot, combined with a small

degree of military training, would provide all that colonial and imperial authorities could want. The

idea had a strong element of mythology but became a persuasive idea among concerned citizens and

military men in the colonies.

Imperial officers serving in Australia also subscribed to the mythology to some extent though

they would generally have asserted that the proper military training of their men should not be

overlooked. The Victorian Commandant in the late 1890s, Major-General Sir Charles Holled-Smith,

contended that mounted rifles were "essentially the arm for Australia. They know the country to be

operated over, and they can ride."130 The commandant of New South Wales in the early 1890s, Major-

General Edward Hutton, actively promoting mounted rifles and mounted infantry in the British Army

and empire as a whole, enthused loudly about the mounted men of Australia.

Good as the Infantry and Artillery are, the arm of the country is undoubtedly the mounted branch. The Australian is a born horseman. With his long, lean, muscular thighs he is more at home on a horse than on his feet, and is never seen to greater advantage than when mounted and riding across bush or difficult country. The mounted troops (Cavalry and Mounted Infantry) are recruited from the small farmers, the stockmen, and boundary riders who, living in the saddle, seem to take naturally to their military duties. Fine horsemen, hardy, self reliant, and excellent marksmen, they are the beau ideal of Mounted Riflemen, and as such are the equal, if not the superior, of the best that South Africa can boast. A contingent of such men as served in the Mounted Rifles and Lancer Regiment in New South Wales during 1893-96 would be worth their weight in Westralian gold upon any campaign in which British troops may be engaged. Accustomed to shift for themselves in the Australian bush, and under the most trying conditions of heat and cold, they would thrive where soldiers

127O’Sullivan, The Power of Mounted Riflemen, pp. 2-3. 128Ibid., p. 19. 129Ibid., p. 3. 130The Adelaide Observer, 25 Jan. 1896, p. 12.

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unaccustomed to bush life would die.131

He included similar, though less emotively put, sentiments in his preface to The Manual of Drill for

the Mounted Troops of Australia, 1895.132 Such views were, potentially anyway, more than just

hyperbole. In 1896 during the tensions in South Africa over the Jamieson Raid Hutton wrote to

General Redvers Buller: "Don't forget if you want men to lick the Boers...you have a magnificent

description of Mounted Troops here in Australia, but especially in N.S. Wales."133

Such notions made a significant contribution to the efforts of some to have an Australian

mounted regiment formed in Australia for imperial service should they be required. One enthusiastic

New South Welshman, Neil Moffat, wrote to the Premier of his colony in 1896 of the futility of

British authorities trying to raise Mounted Infantry at home when:

[W]e here have some of the finest fighting material in the world going to waste...For rough and tumble, bush, jungle, or mountain warfare there is nothing to beat our Kangaroo and Brumby shooters, nomadic Shearers, Stockmen and Bush bred youths in general. Clean built, wiry fellows used to roughing it, hard as nails, all of whom can ride well and shoot straight. They are the very sort of men John Bull requires for his wars, little or big. There is much too much Starch and Pipeclay, look well on Parade, about the British Soldier, while his riding is wooden and mechanical, that is why he goes down before the Boer every time.134

Mr. Moffat most likely received a polite rebuff but comparable sentiments were behind the efforts of

more prominent men to achieve a similar outcome. The efforts of the Governor of Victoria in the late

1890s, Lord Brassey, to have a regiment of mounted rifles raised and maintained in Australia ready

for imperial service had similarly met with no success, but he too had been partly motivated by the

traits of the bushmen he had seen in Victoria’s mounted men. Rejecting the War Office view that

Indian Cavalry were better trained and more reliable he objected that they "would not be as reliable as

Australian horsemen in irregular warfare, where all would depend on individual energy, resources,

and courage."135

Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Mackay, founder and commander of the 1st Australian Horse,

also had ambitions to promote an Australian mounted regiment, though as cavalry rather than

mounted rifles, for imperial service and the idea that hardy bushmen were an ideal basis also

131Hutton, 'Our Comrades of Greater Britain', p. 47. 132Hutton, 'Preface', in The Manual of Drill for the Mounted Troops of Australia, 1895, p. III. 133Hutton to Gen. R. Buller, 19 Jan. 1896, cited in Clark, Marching to Their Own Drum, p. 303. 134Neil Moffat to Premier of NSW, G. Reid, 18 Mar. 1896. SRNSW, CSC, Box 5/6319, Item 96/4514. The Government's response to Mr. Moffat is not recorded. 135Lord Brassey to unknown, 8 Aug. 1898. TNA: PRO, WO 32/6365.

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permeated his proposals to London.136 His idea similarly met with little success, but the regiment he

did raise in New South Wales was perhaps the most remarkable example of the combination of the

mythology of the martial skills of the bush horseman and official military sanction. In 1895 Kenneth

Mackay had published a novel titled The Yellow Wave, in which an ad hoc unit of mounted bushmen,

the fictional Hatton’s Ringers, had bravely fought against a Russian officered Chinese invasion of

Queensland. In that novel the Asiatic hordes, superior in numbers and military technology, if not race,

had found the undertrained and ill-equipped militiamen and volunteers of Australia’s colonies easy

pickings. The cavalry of New South Wales and the Queensland Mounted Infantry, though brave and

active, never seem to have the same the battlefield presence as the men of the bush led by their natural

and charismatic leader, Hatten.137 The line between fantasy and military reality blurred somewhat

when in 1897 Mackay began raising his new mounted regiment and he went to great pains to form

what he felt was "a distinctly bush force..."138 The motto of his new regiment - For Hearths and

Homes - was even the same catch cry that had run through his novel.139 The link between Mackay's

fantasy and what he was now doing was not lost on contemporaries. One newspaper reported:

It is not often that a novelist has chance to put into practice the precepts he enunciates in his writings. Such a hundred-to-one chance has come to Kenneth Mackay...In his clever novel, 'The Yellow Wave, it will be remembered Mr. Mackay described, under the sobriquet of 'Hatton's Ringers', a troop of irregular light-horse, used in repelling the Calmuck [Chinese] invasion of Queensland. The existing troops of Australian Horse, now being raised by Captain Mackay, is based on the lines of 'Hatton's Ringers.'[sic]140

Enlisting men from the hitherto untapped recruiting grounds of the more remote parts of New South

Wales Mackay stressed that the natural skills of the bush horsemen he was recruiting provided the

ideal basis for the unit. Somewhat ironically the 1st Australian Horse was not established along the

mounted rifle or mounted infantry model then thought so useful and so suitable throughout the

Australian colonies, but was raised as traditional cavalry. The 1st Australian Horse wore a dark green

uniform similar in style to that traditionally worn by hussars and carried as their main armament the

136Lt-Col. Mackay to Governor of New South Wales, Earl Beauchamp, 18 Jul. 1899. NSW No. 24346, Col. Off. 201/629, PRO-AJCP. 137Kenneth Mackay, The Yellow Wave. A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia, Andrew Enstice & Janeen Webb (eds.) (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2003), passim. Originally published as The Yellow Wave, 1895. 138Adjutant 1st AH to Regimental Officers, 18 Feb. 1898, cited in Dunn & Blundell (eds), The Boys in Green, p. 4. 139Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 25. 140The Truth, 1897, cited in Andrew Enstice & Janeen Webb, ‘Introduction’, to Mackay, The Yellow Wave, p. xxii. See also J. Tighe Ryan, ‘The Bush Brigade: Being the Remarkable Story of the ‘First Australian Horse’, The Review of Reviews (15 Jul. 1903), 52 for similar expressions.

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cavalry sword with cavalry carbines on their saddles.

To set the guidelines for how the 1st Australian Horse would operate the regiment’s adjutant,

Lieutenant R. R. Thompson, once the Regimental Sergeant Major of the New South Wales Lancers,

prepared a new manual for the unit - The Bushman's Military Guide. Like some of its colonial

antecedents it was essentially a reproduction of extracts from number of imperial manuals, mostly

Cavalry Drill, with a new cover and a locally written preface.141 It was in this preface that the alleged

parallels between bush and military skills was most actively put forward. Thompson pointed to the

bushman's love of horses and sport as well as his adaptability and contended that "with a small

amount of consistent training, these qualities could be diverted into Military channels and utilised for

Defence purposes."142 The preface opined that there were four key areas in which the bushmen of

New South Wales, at least, were already on the verge of tremendous military utility. Firstly, because a

bushmen could already ride well then there was no requirement to teach him military equitation.

Secondly, that because they often shot kangaroos or other game their marksmanship was already good

and they therefore needed only instruction in military musketry principles to make them excellent

military shots. Thirdly, as real bushmen already had great skill in finding their way through the

country with no artificial aids, they already had the essential skills to be come scouts. Finally, and

perhaps most incredibly, because most knew how to handle a stockwhip with great skill they were

well on their way to wielding a sword from horseback with equal skill.143 As events in South Africa

would soon prove the idea that bushmen could become soldiers without extensive training was

somewhat fanciful but that tough lesson was yet to be learnt.

The hard lessons of the veldt did, in certain quarters at least, put a dampener on such

mythologising. It is not difficult to find instances after federation of writers enthusing about the skills

of the bushmen in the Light Horse. One journalist and veteran of the 1st Australian Horse and Boer

War, J. Abbott, wrote just before the First World War that Light Horsemen had "all the civil training

which South Africa was able to prove to be such advantage in the making of efficient, hardy and

resourceful soldiers."144 Even Edward Hutton, writing in Britain and who in fact knew better, could

141Kenneth Mackay, 'Introduction', in The Bushman's Military Guide (Sydney: William Appelgate Gullick, Government Printer, 1898), p. iii. NAA(C) A1194, 11.00/4855, & Burness, ‘Australian Colonial Forces: A Sketch’, p. 7. The imperial cavalry manual was titled Cavalry Drill up to the 1898 edition. From 1904, when the next edition was issued, it carried the new title Cavalry Training. 142R.R. Thompson, 'Preface', in The Bushman’s Military Guide (Sydney: William Appelgate Gullick, Government Printer, 1898), p. v. NAA(C) A1194, 11.00/4855. Thompson had, in 1894 when still the RSM of the Lancers, acted as the secretary for the inter-colonial committee that had produced The Manual of Drill for the Mounted Troops of Australia, 1895. Perhaps this provided the qualification for arranging the production of this new manual. 143Ibid., pp. vi-vii. 144J.H.M. Abbott, ‘The Light Horse Regiments', The Lone Hand 12:71 (1 Mar. 1913), 403.

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enthuse in 1906 about the remarkable natural abilities of Australia’s horsemen as soldiers.145 Such

comments were, however, remarkably rare after the Boer War compared to before it. Never again

would Australia’s mounted troops be provided as an authorised manual anything like the Bushman's

Military Guide. Comparisons of Australia’s bushmen with Boer farmers, perhaps because they were

now a beaten foe, were now a less common part of the Australian military experience. The notion that

bushmen could be sent to war without significant training was not an idea taken up by the post-

federation military authorities and every effort after 1902 was aimed towards the elusive goal of

making the Light Horse (and the other arms) as efficient and well trained as possible. Hutton, belying

his public comments, had stressed the importance of the Light Horse training as hard and realistically

as they could and later military authorities pushed hard for further extensions to the time spent in

training. Comments by officers during this period served repeatedly to highlight deficiencies and seek

ways to correct them, not to rest on the supposedly innate military traits of the men who filled the

part-time regiments of Light Horse. The concept that Australia’s men of the bush made excellent

natural soldiers remained part of the cultural backdrop and would find a new voice after the First

World War, but the realities of the campaign in South Africa gave the idea a certain amount of rest in

the years after federation, at least amongst those who were most closely associated with soldiering in

Australia.

Regardless of when these ideas found their expression, there had been a tendency to consider

that the apparent utility of frontiersmen making excellent natural horse soldiers was a uniquely

Australian development but many of the same sentiments could be found across the English speaking

world at this time. The same principles applied to cowboys as well as bushmen and Theodore

Roosevelt's Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War were a good example of the same notions

having their sway in North America. Even where there was no frontier the same ideas had their voice

and Britain’s foot and mounted volunteers of the nineteenth century had also been praised for their

individuality and commonsense approach to soldiering.146 Similarly the military forms that Australian

horse soldiers adopted were not confined to Australia and all were more or less directly imported

ideas. Local cavalry corps based themselves on British regulars and Yeomanry in everything from

uniforms and armament to the manuals they used to train themselves. Mounted rifles and mounted

infantry bodies could trace their origins to the model of the European dragoon that had found new life

and refinement in the Cape Mounted Rifles, the American Civil War and a variety of Britain’s

colonial conflicts. The example of the Boers in the First Anglo-Boer War was a particular influence

and acknowledged by some, if not all. The Queensland Commandant in 1892, Major-General John

Owen, apparently forgetting the Indian Army, contended the khaki dress worn by mounted infantry

145Hutton, ‘The Cavalry of Greater Britain', p. 25. 146Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, pp. 27-8, & Wilcox, 'Citizen Mounted Riflemen and the South African War of 1899-1902’, p. 4.

176

units throughout the colonies was "not only smart and soldierlike, but it is a distinctive national

dress."147 Edward O'Sullivan, who deliberately and enthusiastically sought to highlight the potential

similarities between the men of the veldt and the bush, was somewhat more perceptive:

They [the Boers] wear soft felt hats with bands around them, and carry their rifles slung across their backs and their cartridges stuck in belts....The uniforms and equipment of our Mounted Rifles is, in fact, an imitation and improvement of the Boer costume and equipment.148

Many of the men who played significant roles in the development of Australia’s mounted corps had,

of course, received their training in other armies or were imperial officers. Captain F. Fawcett, who

formed West Australia’s Pinjarrah Mounted Volunteers and then commanded them for nearly twenty

years, had once been a Cornet in the 6th Dragoon Guards.149 Malcolm Macdonald prominent in the

mid-1880s raising of cavalry in New South Wales and later commander the New South Wales

Mounted Brigade, had started soldiering in India and commanded the Poona Horse in frontier fighting

there.150 Henry Lasseter, long time commander of the New South Wales Mounted Infantry/Rifles, had

been trained at Sandhurst and served in a British infantry regiment on campaign in the Sudan before

coming to Australia.151 Tom Price, credited by some as the father of the mounted rifle movement in

Australia, had similarly learned his military trade in the Indian Army and reportedly been impressed

there by the Queen’s Own Corps of Guides Cavalry.152 Colonial Commandants like Charles Holled-

Smith, George French and particularly Edward Hutton, who did so much to shape and encourage

mounted units, were all imperial officers and had brought their ideas and experiences from other parts

of the empire.

The connection with, and influence of, officers and men who were either current or past

serving members of the British Army should not be underestimated. It was in men such as these that

Australia’s mounted units often found their genesis and their champions. They brought to Australia a

whole series of experiences and views on mounted troops from around the empire and, even if those

experiences were somewhat removed in time, they had a profound impact on the shape and nature of

Australia’s mounted units. That the local pre-federation units and post-federation Light Horse had

147Queensland Military Forces, Report of the Commandant for the Year 1891-92, QSA, CRS/278. 148O’Sullivan, The Power of Mounted Riflemen, p. 8. 149Weick, The Volunteer Movement in Western Australia, pp. 30-1. 150Vernon, The Royal New South Wales Lancers, pp. 4-5. 151Burness, 'New South Wales Cavalry', p. 248, & Confidential Officer Reports, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 LHRs, 1904. NAA (M) MP84/1, 430/2/44 152Allan Box, Saddle and Spur: A Photographic Record of Gippsland's Mounted Regiments 1885-1945 (Churchill, Vic.: Centre for Gippsland Studies, 1989), p. 1.

177

their overseas equivalents in Britain, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa was not coincidental. In

this regard Australian mounted soldiers had their overseas citizen soldier contemporaries whose

experiences must, in many ways, have been quite similar. Probably not unique to the local experience

were the long standing problems of uneven leadership and its consequences - of getting men to parade

with their units and fulfill their commitments, and of having to deal with the financial and social

burdens of spending one’s spare time mounted soldiering. The mundane and apparently inescapable

tribulations that faced Australia’s mounted men were considerable, and meant that all of their units

and organisations had their share of serious problems. Given the multiplicity and seriousness of those

problems it is remarkable that the militia Light Horse and its predecessors were as successful as they

were. It is testimony to the industriousness and keenness of that minority of men who made citizen-

soldiering a earnest past-time, and stayed in the ranks beyond the brief interlude of so many others,

that mounted soldiering continued as strongly as it did for so long. That many of those men were local

notables and relatively prosperous farmers, rather than their working class employees, gave a most

units a noticeably rural middle class flavour. In the more extreme cases, such as the New South Wales

Lancers, it was capable of breeding an atmosphere verging on the patrician. It is little surprise then

that when they were called upon to do so there was little apparent concern in taking up the mounted

soldier’s long established secondary role of helping to put down civil disturbance. Of little surprise

also is that such rural units proved able to both draw on, and provide the exemplars for, a

contemporary train of thought that hardy countrymen could, with a minimum of training, take to

horseback with rifle on their back and provide all that their society needed in its defence. The Boer

War had undermined that myth to a considerable degree and in the years following there had been a

serious effort to move beyond the mythology and train as hard as could be expected given the

limitations. What affect that training and attitude would have was soon to be discovered in a new war.

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Chapter 7 The Light Horse at War

1914-1919

The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 meant that the Light Horse as an idea

and organisation, thought not the militia units already in existence, was to face its test in war. The last

despatch of Australian mounted troops to a war had been a mixed experience, but since then the

Australia’s mounted branch had undergone significant change. Brought together under a single

national scheme it had trained accordingly and even if there had been significant problems, things had

clearly improved overall. Important too had been the establishment of single clear doctrinal direction.

Started by Hutton and continued over the ensuing years by the Australian authorities this doctrine had

enshrined rifle-based firepower and dismounted action as the key to all Light Horse tactical

employment. The increasing use of imperial doctrine in the years just before the war had made little

difference to this state of affairs as British doctrine had allowed for similar forces to be drawn from

the citizen-soldiers forces of all the dominions. It now remained to be seen how this tactical model

and the Light Horse would respond to the new war.

Formation to Gallipoli

The provisions of the 1903 Defence Act, which forbade the sending of Australia’s existing

part-time units and formations overseas, meant that attention quickly focussed on the raising and

despatch of an expeditionary force composed entirely of volunteers. The resultant Australian Imperial

Force (AIF) commenced recruiting on 10 August to a plan set out by the then Inspector-General, and

soon to be AIF commander, Brigadier-General William Throsby Bridges. The plan required that, by

making use of the existing national military infrastructure, Australia made an initial offer to London

of one Infantry division and a Light Horse brigade, each with the necessary support elements. From

each state the government were to raise forces roughly commensurate to their existing militia

contribution.1 Half of the rank and file were to be recruited from the militia, the remainder from men

who had previous war or militia service but were not presently serving.2 Four regiments of Light

Horse were to be raised, three to make up the 1st Light Horse Brigade, the fourth to fulfill the role of

divisional mounted troops for the 1st Division. This first brigade was made up of one regiment each

1Brig-Gen. W.T. Bridges to Minister of Defence, 8 Aug. 1914. NAA(C) A2657, Vol. 2.

2Ibid.

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from New South Wales and Queensland, with the third being made up of two squadrons from South

Australia and one squadron from Tasmania, the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Light Horse Regiments respectively.

From Victoria came the divisional mounted regiment, the 4th Light Horse Regiment.3 Despite the

conscious decision to draw on the existing militia structures the somewhat contrary decision was

taken not to reflect the rationalized unit numbering system introduced with Universal Training and

few of the regiments of the AIF would have a number that unambiguously reflected any clear militia

or Military District origin.4 Each regiment of this first contingent received, as Hutton had intended

over a decade before, a stiffening by the inclusion in their ranks of four permanent senior-NCOs from

the Administrative and Instructional Staff in key unit appointments.5

The response to the call to enlist was enthusiastic and by the end of the year the Australia’s

total offer of mounted troops to London was three full brigades and two divisional mounted

regiments.6 The effort to recruit as many men as possible from the militia not withstanding, the

general call for recruits meant that the men who enlisted in the AIF Light Horse were not always the

same sort of men who served in the pre-war militia regiments. One study based on the 7th Light Horse

Regiment of the AIF, raised initially in New South Wales, reveals that though country men

undoubtedly predominated in the ranks nearly 20% of the men who passed through this regiment

during the war were from the city, more than half of these being from white-collar or skilled labourer

backgrounds. Of the 1664 men who served, and who came from rural backgrounds, 892 were

unskilled rural labourers, only 362 called themselves farmers or graziers.7 Thus the pre-war social

makeup of the rural Light Horse militia regiments, in which farmers and landowners had made up, in

most cases, well over half the strength of units, and labourers had been the distinct minority, was

effectively inverted in the AIF.

3Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 65.

4There is, as far as this author knows, no extant document that reveals why the AIF numbering system was established as it was. Perhaps the loud complaints that had originated from New South Wales Light Horse units about their loss of numbering primacy during the Universal Training reorganisations had some affect on the decision.

5Brig-Gen. W.T. Bridges to Minister of Defence, 8 Aug. 1914. NAA(C) A2657, Vol. 2. The four NCOs took up the appointments of RSM, RQMS, Sgt. of the Machine Gun Section and Sgt. of the Signal Section.

6Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 63 & Hall, The Australian Light Horse, p. 72.

7Jason Walk, 'Rural Australia and the Great War: Some Social and Economic Aspects', B.A. Honours Thesis, Department of History, University College, The University of NSW, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993, pp. 11 & 55-8. The number of men from the city was 388, or 18.9% of the men who served in the unit.

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Table 3: Territorial Origins of 1st AIF Light Horse Regiments8

State Military District Contribution

Queensland 1st MD 2nd, 5th & 11th LH Regts.

New South Wales 2nd MD 1st, 6th, 7th, 12th & 14th LH Regts.

Victoria 3rd MD 4th, 8th & 15th (1 x Sqn) LH Regts

South Australia 4th MD 3rd (2 x Sqn), 9th & 15th (1 x Sqn) LH Regts.

Western Australia 5th MD 10th & 15th (1 x Sqn) LH Regts.

Tasmania 6th MD 3rd (1 x Sqn) LH Regt.

As the units began to form those men who were coming to the new expeditionary force from the

militia were ordered to bring all of the "personal and public clothing on issue to them."9 The new

regiments looked much as their militia counterparts were meant to look once the peacetime recruiting

limits had been removed and each regiment contained about five hundred other ranks, equipped with

the .303 SMLE rifle, and, initially, twenty-three officers each in possession of a Webley revolver and,

at this early stage still, a sword.10 Soldiers of the lowest rank were enlisted as Privates but were

referred to from the start with the honorific cavalry title of Trooper.11 Each regiment, in line with the

establishment revisions of 1911-12, consisted of three squadrons of four troops and possessed a

machine gun section equipped with two Maxim Guns. As has been the intention since Hutton’s days

wartime unit commanders were Lieutenant-Colonels, and squadron command was given to Majors.

Brigade commanders were only Colonels but these men were later given a step to Brigadier-General

in order to bring the AIF into line with British practice. Though later in the war all AIF officers were

8Territorial Basis of LH Regiments, undated. AWM27, 303/19.

9Instructions in Regard to Clothing of the Expeditionary Force, Aust. Military Forces, 12 Aug. 1914. AWM25, 187/19.

10Table of Equipment for Aust. Light Horse, AIF, issued with AIF Order No. 17, undated. AWM25, 455/64. Unit establishments varied considerably as the war progressed. Through most of 1915 a unit’s establishment was 25 officers and 511 men. According to one unit’s returns, later in 1916 theses numbers would drop to 24 and 450 respectively. Another establishment table, undated but probably from 1916, has a regiment holding 26 officers and 523 men though it seems likely this set up was more for the militia at home than the regiments at war. The removal of Machine Gun Sections in 1916 altered the establishments again and other minor changes would mean that there is not one set establishment figure that covers the entire war though in general about 25 officers and about 450-460 men seems to be representative for 1916-18. Actual strengths were of course much more variable. By 1918 each regiment was allowed, on paper at least, to maintain an in-unit pool of reinforcements above the establishment (though not use them in action) and this again skews the figures. Returns of 10th LHR. 1915-16 & Returns of 10th LHR, 1918. AWM25, 861/5, & Establishments and Equipment for a Light Horse Regiment, undated, AWM25, 905/16.

11It seems unlikely that the use of the term Trooper spontaneously came into use in 1914 but this author has not been able to clearly ascertain whether this title was used in the pre-war Militia of the AMF. The extant records from this period, being largely official in nature, use the title of Private for pre-war Light Horsemen.

181

promoted from the ranks, in these early years the reliance was on the variable skills of citizen officers

from the militia who volunteered. As it had been for South Africa it is clear that the appointment of

these officers sometimes had as much to do with political influence, social standing or simply long,

loyal service in the militia rather than genuine, or at least imagined, military skill.12 The history of one

British mounted regiment notes that in 1914 the unit enlisted a number of "young Australians, who for

reasons their own, did not wish to compete in the political influences pervading their own

contingents..."13

Though some preliminary training was undertaken in Australia the intention had always been

to despatch the expeditionary force to Britain at the earliest opportunity, where training was to be

completed before their commitment to battle across the English Channel. The first contingent,

including the first four Light Horse regiments, sailed from Australia in November and on this voyage,

and those that followed, the untrained nature of the forces meant that time on board ship, as it had

been on the way to South Africa over a decade before, was largely dedicated to training. Despite the

efforts to draw on men with previous military experience it was clear to all that the collective military

skill level was low and that all units and formations had to be constructed virtually from the ground

up. Within the confines of the ships, officers attended lectures on their professional duties, basic

tactical principles, as well as on a multitude of basic but essential tasks such as how to navigate or

write a field message.14 The men they commanded were similarly occupied in learning their new trade

and attending to the horses that accompanied them.

Instead of England the AIF found itself disembarking in the Middle East, largely due the

work of Harry Chauvel who, after inspecting the inadequate facilities on Salisbury Plain had, with the

help of the Australian High Commissioner to London, convinced the War Office that the desert was a

better place for the AIF than Salisbury Plain in winter.15 The 1st Light Horse Brigade disembarked in

Egypt and went into camp at Maadi just south of Cairo. The 4th Light Horse Regiment, as the

divisional mounted regiment, accompanied the 1st Division to its camp at Mena.16 At almost the same

time the new commander of the 1st Light Horse Brigade, Harry Chauvel, arrived from England to take

up his appointment and training began almost immediately. It was a process that the 2nd and 3rd

Brigades were to repeat in the coming months. Building on the work done on the ships, training

started with elementary individual work such as musketry or sentry duties, and gradually built up to

squadron and regimental programmes, generally preceded by a series of lectures for officers and

12Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 86.

13Lionel James, The History of King Edward's Horse, cited in Walk, ‘Rural Australia and the Great War', p. 16.

14Transport A47, Ship Order No. 12, by Lt-Col. J. Antill, 10 Feb. 1915. AWM25, 455/59.

15Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, pp. 45-6.

16Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, pp. 111-2.

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NCOs who often learnt their trade just ahead of the men they commanded.17 In contrast to the

experiences in South Africa, and in a demonstration of how both the British and Australian military

authorities had learnt from their mistakes, detailed and thorough horse care became an abiding

characteristic of life for the men in the mounted arm. As the horses were unloaded their

acclimatization and return to fitness after the long sea journey became a carefully managed process.

At first they were simply watered, fed and led for brief walks, then as their fitness improved taken for

brief rides.18 Eventually they were ridden for longer periods and then used in the increasing number of

unit and eventually brigade training activities. It was the not until the very end of 1914 that the 1st

Light Horse Brigade began to use their horses in their training.19

Despite the bush origins of most men and their familiarity with horses it was clear that

making Light Horsemen good horsemasters was as important anything else they learnt. Men were

taught how to saddle their horses, to constantly check saddlery was properly adjusted, and to regularly

dismount and lead their horses so they were not constantly under load.20 The 3rd Light Horse Brigade

noted in its training syllabus that too "much attention cannot be paid to accustoming the men to

watching the condition and health of their horses."21 It would be this early training and its

maintenance as a field discipline, along with a number of other factors, that would do much to ensure

that the horses of the AIF would earn a remarkable reputation in the campaigns to come. Contributing

also was the establishment of the Remount Units which were raised in response to the demands of

maintaining the Light Horse’s mounts during the Gallipoli campaign. Arriving in Egypt in December

1915 the initial reason for existence had disappeared but made part of the Imperial Remount Service

they contributed to the Australian and New Zealand formations a steady stream of properly

acclimatised, broken and trained horses over the following years.22 The eventual despatch of the Light

Horse to Gallipoli also gave the horses that they left in Egypt a very extended period of minimal work

during which they were properly acclimatised and this, the exact opposite experience of the horses

sent to South Africa, meant that when they were again used in 1916 they were thoroughly used to

their climate and food.23 Once in the field the imbued horsemastership lessons were observed and

173rd LH Bde., Syllabus of Work for Week Commencing 22 Mar. 1915. AWM25, 941/1, Part 11, & Memo on Training 1st LH Bde. to 1st & 2nd LHRs, 23 Jan. 1915. AWM25, 94101, Part 1.

182nd LH Bde., Syllabus of Work, Week Ending 3 Apr. 1915. AWM25, 941/1, Part 11.

19Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 49.

201st LH Bde to 1st & 2nd LHRs, 23 Jan 1915. AWM25, 941/1, Part 1.

213rd LH Bde, Syllabus for Training for Week Ending 10 Apr. 1915. AWM25, 941/1 Part 11.

22David A. Kent, 'The Australian Remount Unit in Egypt, 1915-19: A Footnote to History', Journal of the Australian War Memorial 1 (Oct. 1982), 10-1.

23Ibid., p. 14.

183

Light Horsemen ensured their horses were properly rested whenever tactically feasible. A habit of

walking horses during marches, and avoiding the traditional cavalry habit of trotting, was brought into

effect and this also helped.24 Officers who had to ride their horses hard were allowed to keep multiple

horses so that none were overworked. In 1917 a brigade commander was entitled to five mounts, all

regimental officers except the chaplain, quartermaster and medical officer were allowed three.25

Perhaps most significant, however, and generally ignored when discussing the performance of walers

in the Palestine Campaign, was the maintenance of an efficient logistical system that kept fodder

flowing forward. When conditions militated against effective logistical support, such as after the

capture of Jerusalem in the winter of 1917-18, the horse formations were often relieved to ease the

supply situation. The net result of all this was that, in direct contrast to the experience in South Africa,

horses in the British and dominion forces in Palestine performed extremely well. There has been

much written and said of the alleged superiority of walers over the other mounts,26 and though they

undoubtedly did well, there is little to suggest they were innately superior. Just as there are many

recorded instances of Australian horses performing extraordinary feats of endurance so too are there

similar tales from Yeomanry regiments riding different stock. Following the Beersheba operations of

1917 many horses of the 7th Mounted Brigade went without an adequate drink for eighty-four hours

while working hard.27 Without discounting their genetic constitution, it is clear that what made the

waler such a reputation was a thorough horse management system that benefited all the horses of

every formation in the theatre.

In the meantime, however, upon the arrival of the Australians and New Zealanders in Egypt

both forces were reorganized into the new Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). The

1st Light Horse Brigade found itself part of the New Zealand and Australian Division under the

command of Major-General Alexander Godley, a British regular in command of the New Zealanders.

This resulted in the 1st Light Horse Brigade leaving Maadi and joining its new division in the desert at

Heliopolis. The newly arrived 2nd Light Horse Brigade, under Colonel Granville Ryrie, took its place

at Maadi and the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, when it arrived, joined the 4th Light Horse Regiment at the

Mena camp.28 Both of these new formations, still in the process of creating themselves, were left

outside the new divisional organization and were allotted as corps troops.

In April 1915 the Australian and New Zealand infantry formations began to leave the camps

in Egypt in preparation for the Gallipoli landings on the 25th of the month. By early May the offensive

24Ibid.

25Alterations to Establishment A&NZ Mtd. Div., 31 Jul. 1917. AWM27, 302.97.

26See for example Jones, The Australian Light Horse, p. 21.

27Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, p. 189.

28Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 50, & Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 119.

184

had gained little ground and casualties among the infantry meant the pool of manpower the Light

Horse in Egypt represented was soon being considered for reinforcement of Anzac Cove. The senior

commanders in the Dardanelles, Major-General W. T. Bridges, Commander of the 1st Division,

Lieutenant-General William Birdwood, Commander of the Australian and New Zealand Crops, and

General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, considered that

breaking up the Light Horse formations and using the personnel as individual reinforcements for the

infantry was the best course open.29 Key among their concerns was that bringing in the relatively

small Light Horse regiments was not wise and also that if they came as brigades there would be no

clear role for the extra number of brigade staffs.30 The senior Light Horse commanders were strongly

opposed to such an idea and found an ally in the senior commander in Egypt, General Sir Archibald

Maxwell. Upon receiving the first request for 1000 reinforcements in early May Maxwell gave orders

to despatch the 1st Light Horse Brigade and New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (abut 3000 men) as

complete entities. Birdwood and Bridges were still seeking infantry reinforcements but Maxwell

cabled "I think you had better take this lot as it is.'31 The first two mounted brigades arrived in a

dismounted condition, at Anzac Cove from 12 May and the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades

embarked in Egypt for the same location a few days later.32 In order for the Light Horse regiments to

deploy to Gallipoli to take up a dismounted role it was necessary for them to leave approximately a

quarter of their front line strength behind to adequately care for the horses. The units embarked for

Turkey close to full strength, however, as reinforcements were absorbed to bring the numbers up.33

Prior to embarkation leggings, spurs and other mounted accoutrements were handed in and infantry

webbing, some of it improvised, was issued.34

Upon their arrival the 1st Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, having

well regarded commanders, being quite well trained and also being made up of the best officers and

men that the first contingents had been able to recruit, were easily absorbed into the local

arrangements. The respective brigade staffs were given sections of the line to run and the regiments

soon took their place in the line. The 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, when they arrived, being much

29C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. 1. The Story of Anzac: From the Outbreak of War to the end of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, 4 May, 1915 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press with the Australian War Memorial, 1981, first published 1921), p. 599-600.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.

32Ibid. & C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. 2. The Story of Anzac From 4 May, 1915, to the Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press with the Australian War Memorial, 1981, first published 1924), p. 116.

33Olden, Westralian Cavalry in the War, p. 24.

34Ibid., & Bourne, 'Nulli Secundus': The History of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment, p. 16.

185

newer formations, were of more concern. The commander of the 3rd Brigade, Colonel Frederic

Hughes, was thought too old for his appointment but as he was assisted by a well respected, if prickly,

Brigade-Major, Lieutenant-Colonel John Antill, the brigade was left as it was and given a section of

the line to defend. The commander of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, Colonel Granville Ryrie, was also

deemed an unknown quantity but as his Brigade Major was also of concern the Brigade was broken

up soon after arrival and was not reformed until mid-June with a new Brigade-Major to support

Ryrie.35 In the line the Light Horse took up the same duties as the infantry and were involved in the

fighting in much the same way. Like the infantry they suffered heavy casualties, most notably the near

annihilation of the 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments at the Nek during the 7 August attack.36 The

Light Horse withdrew from the peninsula with the rest of the expedition in late 1915 and returned to

Egypt via Mudros before the end of the year. The mounted men, like their cavalry brethren of the

same period on the Western Front, had been put in the trenches as an expedient to cover heavy

infantry losses, but not properly equipped or structured for such an operation it was not their forte.

There had been much concern that the small Light Horse units were a poor substitute for infantry units

and formations but given the broken terrain of the Anzac position and weakened state of many

infantry battalions when the Light Horse arrived in May there does not seem, if the official history is

correct, to have been many complaints about this once they arrived.

Egypt and Palestine, 1916-17

After the strains of Gallipoli the Light Horse regiments were in a greatly weakened state.

Before departing for Gallipoli the 10th Light Horse Regiment had numbered 520 men all ranks,

awaiting its return to Egypt at Mudros in mid-December 1915 it had been reduced to a strength of

285.37 The huge number of reinforcements awaiting the AIF in Egypt (61 000 men had enlisted

between July and September 1915) soon changed that deficiency, however.38 While awaiting

reorganisation and the establishment of new training depots some units soon found themselves stuffed

with large number of new men, probably for both training and administrative reasons. By January the

10th Light Horse Regiment had 783 men on its roll books and by February that number had increased

to 826. It was several months, and after a huge expansion and reorganization of the AIF, before these

men had been redistributed and the regiment again came back to something near its normal size.39

35Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. 2, p. 292-4.

36C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens (Canberra: The Australian War Memorial, 1983, first published, 1946), p. 153-6.

37Returns of 10th LHR, 1915-16. AWM25, 861/5.

38Grey, The Australian Army, p. 44.

39Ibid.

186

Gallipoli had given all the existing Light Horse regiments and formations a not inconsiderable

amount of battle experience but, as one regimental history notes, many had looked upon "their

dismounted role there as some sort of diversion".40 Required to again become proficient on horseback,

training and re-equipment became the highest priority for the mounted branch in early 1916. This

imperative was particularly strong for the 1st Light Horse Brigade. Soon after their return they were

quickly brought up to establishment, horsed and despatched to prevent raids on the Nile Valley from

the Western Desert by Senussi tribesmen who, stirred up by Turkish and German agitation, would be

a continuing problem, and later require a strong military response, until well into 1917.41 Their

deployment saw no major incidents and was considered successful.42 The training routine became

much as it had been for the new regiments the new year before, with a particular emphasis on

musketry.43 It was hampered, however, until the mass of reinforcements, and a training system to

cater for them, could be properly organised.

The AIF had left Australia without any training arrangements apart from that which could be

found within the regimental environment. During the Gallipoli campaign a number of training units

had been improvised in Egypt, but short on experienced officers, for both command and

administration, they were now groaning under the strain of holding and trying to train the huge

number of reinforcements. One infantry training battalion, containing 2800 men, had, after its

commanding officer, to rely on a 2nd Lieutenant as its next most senior officer!44 Accordingly in

January 1916 it was decided to establish Light Horse Training Regiments to provide trained

reinforcements for each brigade. Each line regiment was linked to one of the squadrons of these

training units,45 effectively creating a depot system from which the Light Horse could draw on as

required. Not all of the personnel policies were, however, to the immediate advantage of the Light

Horse. Drawing on the huge pool of manpower in Egypt the number of infantry divisions was being

expanded from two to five, all of which were imminently destined for France. The expansion saw the

Light Horse raided for men, of all ranks, to make up the numbers in the new formations. The 2nd Light

Horse Regiment lost its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas William Glasgow, to command the

new 13th Infantry Brigade, while the 4th Light Horse Regiment lost many of its new reinforcements to

40Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 119.

41Lt-Col. W.J. Foster, 'Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force', The Cavalry Journal, XII:39 (1921), 7.

42Ibid.

43ANZAC to 1st, 2nd, & 3rd LH Bdes. & NZMR Bde., 30 Jan. 1916. AWM25, 945/1, Part 2.

44Maj-Gen. J. Spens, Commanding Cairo District, to GOC ANZAC, 9 Jan 1916. AWM22, 123/14/30.

45ANZAC to OC AIF Intermediate Base, Cairo, 10 Jan. 1916. AWM25, 455/66.

187

one of the new cyclist companies heading to France.46 There was no shortage of volunteers for

transfers as it was widely believed that the Light Horse was being left in a military backwater and that

promotion prospects were better in the new formations headed for France. Harry Chauvel, having

been in temporary command of the 1st Division, was approached about his willingness to go to France

in command of one of the new infantry divisions.47

Chauvel instead opted to remain in Egypt and take command of the new Australian and New

Zealand Mounted Division (usually shortened to Anzac Mounted Division but more correctly

abbreviated to A&NZ Mounted Division) formed in March 1916. A proposal to form a mounted

division from the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops had first been suggested in late 1914

but had not then been taken up by the War Office.48 Now it was decided to form the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

Light Horse Brigades, along with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) Brigade, into this new

division for the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal.49 No Australian or New Zealand artillery being

available, four British Territorial Horse Artillery Batteries (the Inverness, Ayrshire, Somerset and

Leicester batteries) were attached and would remain so for the remainder of the war.50 The signaller,

engineer, logistic, ambulance, medical and veterinary elements required to support this formation

were raised and their training commenced.51 The 4th Light Horse Brigade, not fully raised when its

members were sent to Gallipoli as reinforcements, was not reformed, but its 11th and 12th Light Horse

Regiments continued as independent units. The 13th Light Horse Regiment had originally been raised

as the divisional mounted troops of the 2nd Division, but the nature of the fighting on the Western

Front meant that the former divisional cavalry were now better utilised at the corps level.52

Accordingly this regiment was now sent to France where it became the corps cavalry regiment for the

new I Anzac Corps.53 Two squadrons of the 4th Light Horse Regiment also went to France where they

were combined with a squadron of the Otago Mounted Rifles to become the 2nd Anzac Mounted

46'Glasgow, Major-General (Thomas) William', The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 269, & The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen Sir H.G. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152.

47Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 66.

48Ibid

49Australian & New Zealand Forces, Circular Memorandum, no. 38. 11 Mar. 1916. AWM27, 302/92.

50Foster, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 8.

51The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen Sir H.G. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152, p. 1.

52War Office to Dept. of Defence, Melbourne, 15 May 1916. NAA(M) B539, AIF264/1/233, & General Staff Circular No. 6, I Anzac Corps, 9 May 1916. AWM27, 303/30.

53Ibid.

188

Regiment, the corps cavalry for II Anzac Corps.54 Following reorganisation of the Australian and New

Zealand troops in late 1917 and early 1918 these latter Australians were kept by General Godley when

he assumed command of XXII Corps. They thus fought most of the last year of the war away from

their compatriots as part of a British formation with the title of XXII Corps Mounted Troops. The

Light Horsemen sent to France did far more than the traffic duty and prisoner escorting than is often

thought of being the lot of cavalry on the Western Front, and they were involved in much heavy

fighting both in the trenches and out of them. Reading their regimental histories one is struck by the

amount of mounted reconnaissance work they did, particularly during when any advances or

withdrawals were being conducted. As with all mounted troops in the British Army they proved their

worth during the relatively mobile operations of the German Spring Offensive in 1918 and during the

allied offensives of later the same year.55 The remainder of the 4th Light Horse Regiment (organized

into two squadrons) remained in Egypt, in what appears to have been something of an administrative

netherworld, training and involved in general patrol duties until a new brigade home was found for it

in early 1917.56

Also created in 1916 was a new camel mounted formation. A force for which, in January,

each infantry brigade was required to provide a section (equivalent to a platoon) towards.57 Some of

the Australian infantrymen who transferred to this new organization had experience in dealing with

camels from before the war, but most were novices. One history of the corps contends that more than

one infantry formation used it as convenient method of disposing of some its more troublesome

members.58 As time went on most of the men for the new Imperial Camel Corps would be drawn from

British Yeomanry regiments, the Light Horse and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles.59 It was these

latter sources, augmented by direct recruiting in Australia and New Zealand, that would keep it up to

strength during the war.60 Later in 1916 the 4th, 11th and 12th Light Horse Regiments were earmarked

for conversion to cameliers, but this did not take place,61 a decision the affected Light Horseman were

probably relieved at as, in Chauvel's later words, there was "no doubt that service in the I.C.C., is very

54Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 147 & Hall, The Australian Light Horse, p. 41.

55Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, passim & Hunter, My Corps Cavalry, passim.

56Holloway, Hooves, Wheels and Tracks, p. 147. 571st Aust. Div. to GOC 1st Inf. Bde, 9 Jan. 1916. AWM25, 157/2.

58George & Edmee M. Langley, Sand Sweat and Camels (Adelaide: Seal Books, 1980), p. 46.

59Correspondence relating to raising of Camel Corps, Jan. 1916. AWM25, 157/2, & Foster, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 9.

60The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 1.

61Extract from RO No. 5, by Maj-Gen. H. Chauvel, 27 Sep. 1916. AWM25, 157/8.

189

unpopular with most Australians..."62

Despite the origins of many of its men in the horse-mounted regiments of the empire the

Imperial Camel Corps bore little physical or doctrinal resemblance to the Light Horse and it worth

outlining their creation to highlight their differences with the Light Horse. Organized, initially, under

the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel, it at first contained ten companies, each of four sections and

two Lewis Guns.63 Initially these companies were employed as needed, mostly against the Senussi in

the Western Desert, but by the end of the year operations against the Turks were of increasing

importance and it was expanded to a brigade of four battalions (each of four companies) and generally

came to be referred to as the Imperial Camel Brigade.64 Doctrinally, its training and organization were

based on the pre-war imperial manual, Camel Corps Training, 1913.65 Though this publication

contained some details on how camel troops should be employed, it largely confined itself to the drill

and handling skills to be used by cameliers.66 For further instruction regarding the tactical role of

camel troops readers of this first manual were told that in battle they would "usually employ the

tactics of mounted infantry."67 Thus Australian soldiers, for the first time since Edward Hutton had

left Australia and the infantry of the Field Force had divested themselves of this unwanted skill, again

became mounted infantrymen. Training notes made it quite clear that there was considerable tactical

difference between the mounted infantry Imperial Camel Corps and mounted riflemen, such as the

Light Horse:

It must be remembered that there is a radical difference between the fire tactics of mounted riflemen and those of the Camel Corps which are infantry. [sic] The infantryman moves comparatively slowly, and once committed, he can rarely be disengaged. He attacks in depth, moving in successive waves. The mounted rifleman, on the other hand relies principally on his mobility. He makes no attempt to advance in depth, except when attacking an immobile enemy in position, which, except in small affairs, is not his usual role. He seeks to obtain a decision by surprise, and by catching the enemy at a disadvantage, endeavouring to bring a crushing fire to bear at once by putting in every available rifle at the start. He avoids, above all, becoming tied down to a face to face fire fight, for by doing so he loses his mobility. He keeps his horses as close as possible, so that

62Chauvel to Maj-Gen Sir A. Lynden Bell, GHQ, EEF, 6 Jun. 1917. NAA(M) MP367/1, 469/6/12.

63Camel Corps (For Service in Egypt) War Establishment, 9 May 1916. AWM25, 157/5.

64Langley, Sand Sweat and Camels, p. 44 & 57-73, & Gullet, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, p. 211. Eventually there would be eighteen Camel Corps companies, but only four of the six British companies would serve within the brigade at one time.

65Report of 4th Aust. Camel Regt., [Nov. 1916?]. AWM25, 157/7.

66Camel Corps Training (Provisional), 1913 (London: H.M.S.O., 1913), passim.

67Ibid., p. 59.

190

if he does not secure success at the outset he can break off the fight, to renew it under more favourable conditions. On the other hand, once committed, Camel Corps can only be disengaged with difficulty.68

Accordingly the Camel Corps were recommended for use on independent missions, as a pivot for

mounted troops and as infantry backing to mounted rifles for commitment once "the situation has

developed."69

The Anzac Mounted Division began its first significant operations against the Turks east of

the Suez Canal about a month after its formation but it would not be until August that it fought its first

significant battle. In the meantime it began a long series of reconnaissances, raids and patrols in the

Sinai Desert aimed at dominating the area and denying the Turks another chance at attacking the Suez

Canal. These activities were often conducted at brigade strength, though augmented squadron and

regimental missions were more common.70 Regularly requiring demanding night marches across the

desert followed by short sharp actions with Turkish outposts in order to bring about their capture or

retirement, the aim of many missions was to either secure water supplies or deny them to the enemy

by their destruction. A reconnaissance, for example, led by a squadron of the 9th Light Horse

Regiment in April 1916 was launched at an objective 52 miles from its start point and the subsequent

attack resulted in 16 Turks killed, 15 wounded, 34 captured and the destruction of the Turkish camp

and water boring equipment located there.71 Mastering the desert proved a key challenge and a patrol

of the 6th Light Horse Regiment to Bir el Bayud, 60 miles from their start point, in temperatures of

126 F (about 52 C) over soft sand found by ten o’clock in the morning that it was unable to continue

and had to retire to where it could rest under the palms. No men were lost to heat exhaustion but four

officers and thirty troopers required evacuation and 500 horses were rendered unfit for use for "some

time”.72 With the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades detached on duties up the Nile and on other parts of

the canal much of this early work in the Sinai fell to the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, commanded still by

Granville Ryrie, and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, now under Brigadier-General Edward

Chaytor. It was not until late May that the 1st Light Horse Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General

Charles Cox, returned to the division and the 3rd, under Brigadier-General John Antill, would not

return until later in the year.73

68The Employment of Camel Corps, issued by the Gen. Staff, GHQ, EEF, 11 Jan. 1918. AWM25, 157/5.

69Ibid.

70Foster, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 16.

71Ibid., p. 7. The mission included a squadron of the 9th LHR plus attachments from the 8th LHR, Camel Corps, Engineers and Camel Transport Corps.

72Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 110.

73Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 71.

191

From late April much of this patrolling activity took place in the north Sinai in the Qatia - Bir

el Abd oasis area. Centred on Romani, at the western end of the oasis, the division continued its active

patrolling while the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), Lieutenant-

General Sir Archibald Murray, consolidated his logistical arrangements by pushing a railway and

water pipeline into the desert.74 This continued until 19 July when a large Turkish force was detected

at the eastern end of the oasis area. The enemy’s main attack developed on the night of 3-4 August

and fell, not against the prepared infantry positions of the 52nd Division, but largely against the 1st and

2nd Light Horse Brigades deployed on the right flank and rear of the Romani defences. The result

being that the Turks had to fight for what had they intended to be the starting point of their attack. The

delays and changes of approach this forced on the attack meant that, in Chauvel’s words, "by the time

the enemy’s troops destined for the main attack had reached the point from which they intended to

launch it, they were already deployed and exhausted..."75 Counter attacks by the New Zealand

Mounted Rifle Brigade, the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry), Light Horse and other units followed,

forcing the Turkish retirement and then skilful withdrawal through a series of defended positions they

had prepared during their advance across the desert. By 12 August the pursuit by Anzac Mounted

Division was exhausted and the enemy was clear of the oasis.76

The battle at Romani had been the first large scale victory for the Light Horse and coming as

it did on the heels of the of the Somme offensive of 1916 was a fillip for British spirits in general.

Congratulations poured in from all over and among them was a message from Edward Hutton, with

whom Chauvel had maintained a warm correspondence over the years, who noted that all "the world

has complimentary remarks to make upon the Australian Light Horse, whether as Infantry at Gallipoli

or as Light Horse in Egypt."77 There followed for the Light Horse a long period of rest, training and

minor operations during which the Anzac Mounted Division, along with most of the other troops

involved in the fighting thus far, was detached from the canal defences. They were made part of the

new Desert Column, itself part of the new Eastern Force, under the command of the British regular

cavalryman, Lieutenant-General Sir Phillip Chetwode.78

Thus arranged the Light Horse again took part in major operations in late 1916 as the Desert

Column crossed the desert in December. The Anzac Mounted Division, after causing the retirement of

a Turkish force at El Arish, then surprised a strongly held position at Magdhaba and, after a difficult

74Ibid., p. 69, & Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, pp. 80-1.

75The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 5.

76Ibid.

77Special Order by Maj-Gen. H.G. Chauvel, Commander A&NZ Mtd. Div., 13 Sep 1916. AWM22, 84/2/2001.

78The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 7.

192

day-long fight, the surrounded position, its major redoubts falling to the 1st Light Horse Brigade,

surrendered.79 Growing Turkish concerns about a British invasion of Palestine led in January 1917 to

the establishment of strong new position at Rafa south-west of Gaza. Chetwode thought this isolated

position "a gift" and on the night of 8-9 January 1917 the mounted troops of the Desert Column set

out from El Arish to take it. A long, difficult, and at times confused, night march was followed by

another difficult day of fighting. Though the enemy was surrounded Turkish relief columns threatened

throughout the afternoon and Chauvel was about to break off the action late in the day when the major

redoubt fell to the New Zealanders.80 Minor operations to clear the remaining small Turkish outposts

from the Sinai ensued and, the railway and pipeline having been brought up as far as Rafa, in March

an attack was mounted against Gaza. Though by the end of the day the 2nd Light Horse Brigade had

penetrated the northern outskirts of the town and the infantry of the 53rd Division had also captured

key locations, Chetwode, unaware of the successes, considered that the threat of Turkish

reinforcements warranted a withdrawal, and during the evening Gaza was left to the enemy.81 Another

attempt was made in April, using gas and tanks, against the strongly reinforced and improved Turkish

defences but this too failed.82

The Anzac Mounted Division played a relatively minor role in this battle, but the new

Imperial Mounted Division had been heavily engaged. In early 1917, in light of the successes of the

mounted troops in the previous months, it was decided to expand the number of horse mounted troops

in the theatre. Two Yeomanry Brigades were brought in from Salonika and this, along with the

reconstitution of the 4th Light Horse Brigade with the 4th, 11th and 12th Light Horse Regiments, meant

that there were now eight mounted brigades in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.83 The Anzac

Mounted Division lost the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and gained the Yeomanry of the 22nd Mounted

Brigade. The new Imperial Mounted Division was formed in February and was made up of the 3rd and

4th Light Horse Brigades, and the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades. British Territorial Horse Artillery

again made up the new formation's fire support. The Desert Column was reorganized to include the

two new mounted divisions, the Imperial Camel Brigade and the infantry of the 53rd Division.84 The

Yeomanry had hitherto been patchy in their performance but by early 1917 their quality was

79Ibid., p. 8 & Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, pp. 87-9.

80The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 9.

81Ibid., p. 11.

82Ibid., p. 11-2.

83Lt-Col. J.. Browne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (continued)’, The Cavalry Journal XII:41, (1921), 223.

84Ibid., & The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 12.

193

approaching that of the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops and Murray intended that this

trend should be reinforced by mixing the British mounted brigades in with the experienced dominion

troops. This decision, along with the decision to appoint a British cavalryman, Major-General H.

Hodgson, to command the new division did, however, raise hackles among a number of Australian

officers.85

The creation of a mixed imperial brigade, commanded by a British officer, fuelled a degree of

nationalist fervour from some in the Light Horse in the Middle East though the disquiet appears to

have been largely limited to a vocal, but influential, few.86 A number of officers, including Granville

Ryrie, wrote to Lieutenant-General William Birdwood, commander of the AIF, expressing their belief

that the four Light Horse brigades should together make up an exclusively Australian division.87 The

commander of the AIF Administrative Headquarters in London, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson,

acting as a conduit for the discontent and doing more than his bit to fan it, also lobbied Birdwood on

the matter.88 Chauvel's biographer, Alec Hill, has suggested that Ryrie, at least, was partly motivated

by personal ambition as the removal of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and its commander, Chaytor,

to another division would improve his chances at advancement, and this may well have been the

case.89 Birdwood, seeing it as essentially a local decision made by men with better understanding of

the situation than he, was loathe to intervene in the matter.90 For its part the Australian government,

fired up in part by Anderson's agitation, signalled disapproval of the new arrangements and cabled

that they "strongly urge that these Brigades should be kept together in one Division..."91 Though this

was resisted in Egypt the whole affair was kept alive by dissatisfaction at the appointment of

predominantly British officers to Hodgson's staff and a simmering belief that though the Australians

had been doing most of the fighting they had not been receiving the credit due to them.92

Chauvel, who had ascended to the command of the Desert Column just after the Second

Battle of Gaza when Chetwode was given the command of Eastern Force, was increasingly concerned

85Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, pp. 96-7.

86Ibid., pp.110-1.

87Ibid., p. 97.

88Brig-Gen. R. Anderson, Commandant AIF HQ, to Lt-Gen. W. Birdwood, GOC AIF, 27 Apr. 1917 & Lt-Gen. W. Birdwood to Sen. G. Pearce, Minister of Defence, 23 Apr. 1917. NAA(M) MP367/1, 469/6/12.

89Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 99.

90Lt-Gen. W. Birdwood, GOC AIF, to Sen. G. Pearce, Minister of Defence, 23 Apr. 1917. NAA(M) MP367/1, 469/6/12.

91Telegram from Secretary of Defence to Admin. HQ, AIF, 21 Apr. 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

92Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 97, & Cable from Admin HQ AIF to Department of Defence, 24 Apr. 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

194

at the tensions. He cabled Melbourne worried that the "agitation for Australian Mounted Division is

running risk of breaking up Anzac Mounted Division which has earned honourable distinction as

such."93 Anderson suggested that taking the Australians from the Camel Corps would free up enough

men for another Australian brigade, and this could then be used to create an Australian division, thus

preserving the Anzac Mounted Division. Chauvel rightly pointed out that this would unacceptably

weaken the Imperial Camel Corps and that, in any case, there was insufficient horses to mount a new

Australian Brigade.94 The whole affair was brought to a merciful end in June when the arrival of more

Yeomanry brigades gave Murray the opportunity to further reorganise his mounted troops.95 Having

learnt that it would be wise to consult with the Australian government when reorganizing its troops he

this time cabled Melbourne asking for their concurrence before he contacted the War Office with his

proposals.96 Accordingly in June the mounted troops of the Desert Column were again reorganized

into three mounted divisions, each of three brigades. The Anzac Mounted Division lost its Yeomanry

and with the remaining Australian and New Zealand brigades would see out the rest of the war with

the same structure. The Imperial Mounted Division, which included the 3rd and 4th Light Horse

Brigades, was renamed the Australian Mounted Division. Murray expressed a desire to form, in time,

another Light Horse brigade from further reinforcements and make this formation truly Australian,

but the manpower surpluses of early 1916 had dried up and the idea remained unfulfilled.97 Instead it

was rounded out with the Yeomanry of the 5th Mounted Brigade who had been campaigning alongside

the Light Horse since early 1916. The 6th, 8th and 22nd Mounted Brigades were formed into the new

Yeomanry Mounted Division.98 The 7th Mounted Brigade, though allotted as army troops, became be

a regular attachment of Chauvel's command.

This reorganization must have been among Murray's last acts in Egypt as later that same

month he was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by the British

cavalryman, General Sir Edmund Allenby. This resulted in further re-organisation. Eastern Force was

done away with as Allenby moved his headquarters eastward to be with his army and Chetwode was

moved to command one of two new infantry corps. The Desert Column also underwent a name

change. Allenby proposed to call it the Second Cavalry Corps but was prevailed upon to maintain a

reference to a formation that earned a reputation for itself and it thus became the Desert Mounted

93Cable from Chauvel to Secretary of Defence, 22 May 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

94Chauvel to Maj-Gen A. Lynden Bell, GHQ EEF, 6 Jun. 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

95The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. pp. 13-4.

96Cable from Gen. Sir. A. Murray, to Department of Defence, 8 Jun. 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

97Ibid.

98Force Order No. 44, by Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, C-in-C, EEF, 17 Jun. 1917. AWM22, 236/2/2000.

195

Corps.99 The new corps, in keeping with its definition, lost its integrated infantry division and the

Imperial Camel Brigade was detached to become army troops.

While all this had been going on the units and formations in the field had continued a process

of consolidating the lessons learned from the work of 1916 and early 1917. Of this process perhaps

the most important change at the regimental level was a significant augmentation of the firepower

available to the Light Horse. Though each regiment, following pre-war practice, had gone to war with

two medium machine guns (Maxims or later Vickers machine guns), the Light Horse, as part of a

general British policy that affected both the infantry and cavalry, had concentrated them into new

Machine Gun Squadrons in mid-1916, one to each brigade.100 As a degree of compensation each

regiment was given instead three of the lighter more portable Lewis Guns, one being distributed to

each squadron.101 Though very useful the Lewis Gun appears not to have been entirely successful as a

cavalry weapon and in any case by late 1916 it was clear that mounted regiments required more than

three light machine guns on modern battlefields.102 Accordingly in early 1917 the Lewis Guns were

traded in for the more suitable Hotchkiss Machine Guns, twelve to a regiment, one going to each

troop.103 This represented a substantial increase to regimental firepower that was first used by the

Light Horse at the Second Battle of Gaza.

During the stalemate that followed that battle the three divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps

began a process of rotation, training and rest. One division was kept busy patrolling forward while

another, in reserve a few miles back, would be training, the third resting on the coast.104 For the

formation training there was considerable work to be done and, despite the experience and skill of the

Light Horse formations, no resting on laurels. The value of continued training was well understood

and regularly reinforced for any who tended towards sloth. In late 1916 one Brigade Major had

admonished his regiments and demanded to see their training programmes, complaining that: 'It does

not appear that sufficient advantage is being taken by all Regiments whilst in reserve to further

training of young officers and n.c.o.’s. [sic]"105 For their part Chauvel and Chetwode also wanted

99The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 14.

100'Machine Gun Battalions', The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 372.

101Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 325.

102R.P. Pakenham-Walsh, Elementary Tactics or the Art of War British School (London, publisher unknown, 1926), p. 26. I am indebted to two members of the H-War Discussion List, Gervase Phillips and Gordon Angus Mackinlay, for valuable information regarding the selection of Hotchkiss Guns for British mounted troops.

103Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 325, & Returns of Rifles, MGs & Ammunition, 7th LHR, 27 Dec. 1916 & 9 May 1917. AWM25, 49/18.

104Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 114.

105BM 2nd LH Bde. to 5th, 6th & 7th LHRs, 19 Sep. 1916. AWM25, 941/1 Part 2.

196

improvements and in mid-1917 pointed out to their subordinates that, previous good performances

aside, some things needed to be better done. Firstly leaders needed to make their minds up more

quickly and travel well forward in their commands so that they could make rapid appreciations if the

enemy was contacted. A general inclination among the men to dismount too soon and engage in long

range rifle firefights had to be reformed as it both wasted ammunition and aided the Turks if they

were attempting to delay. Also, there was too much extension of units when in contact in an effort to

cover too much frontage and maintain "actual hand to hand touch". In a demonstration of the idea of

'mission oriented tactics' (or Auftragstactik) for which the German army was supposedly the master

but that was a skill of any of any good cavalry leader, Chetwode made it clear that:

The G.O.C. wishes it to be pointed out that gaps in the line during offensive operations by mounted riflemen are of no importance provided all know the general plan and work to it under one command.106

Aside from such tactical lessons there was also a huge amount of more applied work for

regiments to get through. All the skills learned so far had to be maintained and improved upon and

units spent much time working at their grenade throwing, signalling, conducting gas drills and

training with the Hotchkiss Guns.107 Shooting, as always, remained a vital skill and Chauvel was 'most

anxious that no pains should be spared to bring the musketry training of...the Desert Corps up to a

satisfactory standard.'108 His staff held up the already legendary musketry of the British Expeditionary

Force in 1914 as the standard to be aspired to.109 The training programme stretched all the way back

to the work done with new recruits in Australia though in this regard there had been substantial

unhappiness in Egypt that the efforts in Australia were misguided or mismanaged. The commander of

one training area complained that the efforts to provide elementary training to Light Horse

reinforcements in Australia was undermined by a lack of good instructors in touch with recent

developments, a remarkable prevalence of absence without leave and an over generous allowance of

official leave. It was his opinion that when they arrived the "men were very backward in musketry

instruction and drill and a comparatively large percentage of the men were bad horsemen... I am of the

opinion that a large number are drafted to Light Horse units without having gone through a riding

test." [sic]110 This complaint and others eventually secured assurance from home that all that could be

106HQ A&NZ Mtd. Div. to all Bdes, 30 Jul. 1917. AWM25. 941/1 Part 4.

1072nd LHR, Report on Training, Week Ending 8 Sep. 1917. AWM25, 941/1 Part 6.

108Gen. Staff, Des. Corps to A&NZ Mtd. Div. 25 Jul. 1917. AWM25, 941/1 Part 6.

109Ibid.

110OC No. 1 Training Area to CO Isolation Camp Moascar, 28 Jun. 1917 AWM22, 752/3/2.

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done would be done and that riding tests would be enforced for Light Horse recruits.111 The problems

with poor horsemen were not new, however, and it seems that not all Light Horsemen were the natural

riders of the martial legend. The previous year another training officer in Egypt had noted that the

riding syllabus in the training regiments, based on the assumption that the recruits had passed the

riding test and were competent on horseback, was "too advanced for most of the men" and that they

were doing troop and squadron drill "before they have been taught how to ride."112 Accordingly the

Light Horse Training Regiments had a busy time of it both training new men in the fourteen-week

reinforcements course as well as conducting more advanced specialist courses for officers, NCOs and

men coming to them from the desert. One such training unit, supporting just one brigade, trained 16

officers and 1290 men in the first six months of 1917 alone, with a an average of 400 men being in the

camp at any one time.113

Beersheba and its Consequences

By October Allenby, drawing on a plan first drafted by Chetwode some months before, was

ready to again attack the Turkish defences running from Gaza near the coast and stretching out south-

east to their leftmost position at Beersheba. The plans called for a feint to be launched against the

main defensive position at Gaza and then for a rapid strike by the mounted troops around the Turkish

left at Beersheba. With Beersheba in British hands the entire Turkish position could be threatened

from behind and the enemy’s withdrawal route from Gaza jeopardised by the Desert Mounted

Corps.114 The Desert Mounted Corps faced a difficult problem of crossing a large tract of near

waterless country in order to get at Beersheba but some good intelligence work, a series of thorough

reconnaissances and some industrious work by Australian and New Zealand field engineers meant

that sufficient water was found for the plan to become a reality.115 On 27 October the guns of XXI

Corps commenced a bombardment of Gaza and on the night of the 30th the Desert Mounted Corps,

less the Yeomanry Mounted Division which was detached to cover the gap between XX and XXI

111Secretary of Defence to CO AIF HQ, Cairo. 18 Jun. 1918. AWM22, 752/3/2.

112CO A&NZ Training Centre to HQ AIF, re. Light Horse Training Regiment, 4 May 1916. AWM25, 941/1 Part 2.

113Report of OC 3rd Light Horse Training Regiment to GOC AIF in Egypt, 4 Jul. 1917. AWM25, 455/42, & Australian Imperial Force, Syllabus of Training for Light Horse, Infantry and Machine Gun Reinforcements (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullet, Government Printer, 1917) pp. 2-5.

114Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 115.

115The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. pp. 15-6.

198

Corps, left the watered staging points and commenced the final approach on Beersheba.116 The attack

of the Desert Mounted Corps began at dawn the following morning and lasted all day. XX Corps,

under Chetwode, completed their tasks and captured a number of the enemy positions south-west of

the town through the day, but the efforts of the Anzac Mounted Division along the Beersheba-Hebron

road, north-east of town, were met by heavy fire from well placed machine guns and artillery, and

they took most of the day to secure their objectives. The key to securing Beersheba, however,

especially for a mounted corps, was gaining control of the town’s wells. Accordingly late in the day

Chauvel ordered Brigadier-General William Grant, commanding the 4th Light Horse Brigade, who

had proposed a mounted attack, to charge across the open ground to the south-east of the town to seize

it and its wells. Two regiments, the 4th and 12th Light Horse Regiments formed up in squadron

extended order with 4 yards between each man and 500 yards between each squadron. Supported by

two batteries of horse artillery the regiments galloped at the trenches ahead of them. The first

squadrons dismounted on the trenches and engaged in a fierce close quarter fight while successive

squadrons wheeled onto alternate objectives or charged on into town to capture the wells.117 In a later

report the Commanding Officer of the 4th Light Horse Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray

Bourchier, summed up the effect of the charge:

In commenting on the attack I consider that the success was due to the rapidity with which the movement was carried out. Owing to the volume of fire brought to bear from the enemy’s position by Machine Guns and rifles, a dismounted attack would have resulted in a much greater number of casualties. It was noticed also that the morale of the enemy was greatly shaken through our troops galloping over his positions thereby causing his riflemen and machine gunners to lose all control of fire discipline. When the troops came within short range of the trenches the enemy seemed to direct almost all his fire at the horses.118

He also noted, most importantly, that this "method of attack would not have been practicable were it

not for the absence of barbed wire and entanglements."119 For the remarkably light casualties of thirty-

one killed and thirty-six wounded, most of which fell in the close quarter fighting in the trenches

rather than during the charge itself, the brigade had secured the wells and captured over a 1000 Turks

and nine guns.120

The left of the Turkish defensive line thus secured, Allenby's plans to dash into the flanks and

116Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 125.

117Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, pp. 127-8.

118Lt-Col M. Bourchier for Commander 4th LH Bde. to HQ Aust. Mtd. Div, 20 Dec. 1917 AWM25, 455/2.

119Ibid.

120Ian Jones, ‘The Charge at Beersheba and the Making of Myths', Australian War Memorial History Conference, 8-12 February 1983. p. 15, & Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 125.

199

rear of the Turkish army seemed set for success but a combination of dispersion, fatigue, lack of water

and determined rear-guards, supported by German and Austrian artillery and German machine guns,

meant that the though the enemy were pressed, disaster did not overtake them. Nevertheless during

the ensuing advance the Desert Mounted Corps took over 9000 prisoners and captured 80 guns.121

Fighting continued well into the next month as the Egyptian Expeditionary Force pushed north. Jaffa

fell to the New Zealanders in mid November and Jerusalem, Lloyd George's "Christmas present for

the British nation", fell to XXI Corps, with the 10th Light Horse Regiment attached to represent the

Australians, nearly a month later.122 Winter having set in, the Desert Mounted Corps, except the

Anzac Mounted Division who were required for further operations, was withdrawn as far as Gaza to

re-fit and ease the supply situation.123 The corps' pause in operations allowed time for the events at

Beersheba and of late 1917 to be taken into consideration. In particular there was an enthusiastic

discussion about what the Beersheba charge meant for mounted troops in modern war.

British cavalry in particular, having undergone a thorough period of reform since the Boer

War that emphasised both effective mounted and dismounted action, had proved a very valuable and

flexible force in 1914 on the retreat from Mons.124 That experience was, however, soon forgotten as

the open warfare of the first months of the war was supplanted by trench fighting dominated by

artillery and infantry. In 1915 Godley, who had a background as a proponent of mounted infantry, had

written from Egypt that this was "an infantry and artillery war - exactly the opposite of South Africa,

and mounted troops are at a discount..."125 This was not an uncommon view and when in late 1914 the

4th Light Horse Regiment charged Australian infantry during training umpires declared that it had

suffered nearly 100 per cent casualties from machine gun fire.126 Even Chetwode, who had

commanded a cavalry brigade in 1914-15, and then ascended to command the 2nd Cavalry Division in

France before coming to Egypt, had despairingly written of the unlikelihood of cavalry ever again

taking part in significant charges. In what is best described as short essay he wrote in 1916 that:

Our dismounted training has proved its soundness and value on every occasion and the tactics we employed with it are, as far as we can see, absolutely right and require no modification. Both in principle and execution we were on the right lines

121Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 136.

122Ibid.

123The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 21.

124Badsey, 'Fire and the Sword', pp. 282-93.

125Maj-Gen. Alexander Godley, GOC NZEF, to Col. Alfred Robin, Commandant New Zealand Military Forces, 5 Apr. 1915, cited in Grey, The Australian Army, p.42.

126Ian Jones, The Australian Light Horse, pp. 24-5.

200

throughout...Right or wrong one is irresistibly compelled to conclude that modern firepower has gradually, for some years, and now almost finally put an effective check on the mounted employment of masses of cavalry.127

Chetwode considered that small, squadron sized, actions were still occasionally possible, but there

was little point in continuing to direct resources to training for mass action and that concentrating on

fire action was the best solution for British cavalry. As Henry Gullet, the official historian of the AIF

in Palestine, later put it, "with occasional exceptions, the cavalry leaders were inclined to accept the

view established by the struggle in France, that trench warfare and machine guns had...greatly

curtailed the possibility of cavalry shock tactics."128

Light Horsemen, inheritors of the pre-war militia at home and products of the mounted rifle

template that Hutton had introduced, appeared to have a variety of opinions on the issue. That

Hutton's regulations had suggested that during war at least part of the Light Horse should be equipped

with lances when at war had not, apparently, remained part of the collective memory. Light Horse

training and experience did not encourage mounted action but still some seem to have been

considering the options. After their return from Gallipoli the Anzac Mounted Division reportedly

carried out trials with a type of lance, but for some reason it proved unsuitable and was not adopted.129

Light Horse training records for 1915 include part of a South African mounted rifle manual, published

in 1906, that included a section on fixing bayonets and using them mounted in the pursuit.130 How

much this was practised by any of the Light Horse, if at all, is unclear but clearly it was of interest to

someone. Such thinking remained well in the background however, as dismounted skills and mounted

rifle mobility remained the doctrinal centrepiece of training. During 1915-17 it was practice in such

things as shooting, grenade throwing, bayonet work and Stokes Mortars that dominated individual

training. Just a few weeks before Beersheba the Anzac Mounted Division had gone out of its way to

rationalise and improve its dismounted work for what it thought the coming battle would require. The

circulated memo read:

Should it be necessary for the Division to carry out a contemplated dismounted attack

127Untitled paper by Maj-Gen. Phillip Chetwode, Commander 2nd Cavalry Division, [1916?]. AWM25, 941/1 Part 3.

128Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 403.

129Anon, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, The Cavalry Journal X (Oct. 1920), 387.

130Drill for Mounted Riflemen, Cape Colonial Forces, 1906, Appendix III, Mounted Bayonet Practice. AWM25, 941/1, Part 1. An article reprinted from the Army Review in The Australian Military Journal in early 1914 had referred to South African trials of using the bayonet when mounted. The article claimed that the trials had found it unsuitable for such use but does not mention if the bayonet was held in the hand or fixed to the rifle as per the 1906 instructions. See: 'G.G.A.', ‘The Bayonet for Mounted Riflemen', The Australian Military Journal 5 (Jan. 1914), 135.

201

it is very essential that the same plan should be, as far as possible, adopted throughout the Division. Once launched to such an attack we are for the time being Infantry, and without doubt their dispositions, modified to suit the Mounted Service, as regards numbers distances and weapons, should be applicable.131

Attached was series of diagrams and notes on exercises to be practised by all in the division.

Nevertheless, a number of events showed that the usefulness of mounted charges was under

serious consideration. At Qatia, in August 1915 during the pursuit of the Turks after Romani, three

brigades of the Anzac Mounted Division, perhaps inspired by the South African manual, had fixed

their bayonets while mounted and charged a Turkish position. Intended more for moral affect than a

desire to lance the enemy, the charge, the first by the Light Horse in action, was unsuccessful as it

petered out in boggy ground.132 A similar charge by the 5th Light Horse Regiment and Auckland

Mounted Rifles soon after was deflated by the belated realisation there were in fact no enemy at the

objective.133 A few days later at Bir el Abd another unsuccessful mounted movement was reportedly

made by a squadron of the 10th Light Horse Regiment.134 More notable was another effort by the same

regiment at Magdhaba in 1916. There that regiment’s acting commander, Major Horace Robertson,

encircling the enemy position, opted not to advance on foot at the redoubts, as all the other regiments

were doing, but instead "went forward in a succession of mounted rushes, galloping from cover to

cover...".135 By doing so they demoralized and confused the Turks, captured a number of redoubts and

eventually took over 700 prisoners.136 Many years after the war, and in light of subsequent events,

Robertson wrote:

The success here was...important since it opened up to us the great possibilities of mounted attacks. It needed only the next and larger attack...[at Beersheba] to prove finally to the Light Horse that they must become cavalry if they wished to reap the full harvest of mounted action.137

More generally it was being found by early 1917 that the rapidity and surprise inherent in well-

131Memo on Dismounted Attack, A&NZ Mtd. Div. to 1st LH Bde, 9 Oct. 1917. AWM25, 941/1 Part 4.

132Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, pp. 171-2.

133Ibid. It was believed that the hod these two regiments were ordered to gallop at contained a number of Turkish guns.

134Major H.C.H. Robertson, ‘The 10th Light Horse Attack at Magdhaba, 23rd December, 1916', The Cavalry Journal 25:96 (1935), 230. The event, though perhaps significant in the author’s mind, as he commanded the squadron, must have been a small episode of the battle as no mention is made of it in the official history.

135Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 223.

136Ibid., p. 223-4.

137Robertson, ‘The 10th Light Horse Attack at Magdhaba', p. 233.

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executed mounted manoeuvre or attack made it a valuable tactic. Notes on "cavalry fighting"

circulated in April 1917 pointed out:

(d) Advances were made successfully over exposed ground moving at the gallop, extended. NOTE - Both at QATIA and OGHRATINA by the 2nd L.H. Bde. and W.M.R. [Wellington Mounted Rifles] and at MAGDHABA by the 1st L.H. Bde. an advance at a gallop under fire was made. In both cases the losses were practically nil. At RAFA also Bdes. galloped up to 2000 yards before beginning the dismounted attack... (f) When attacking, a sudden opening of hostile machine gun or rifle fire from a flank may be dealt with by detaching a troop or Squadron to gallop at the gun or rifle men while the main body continues its advance.138

This last point, given the widespread belief that the it was the machine gun that spelt doom for

cavalry, is particularly significant.

The charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade was not, in light of these expressions and

experiences, an inspired one off, but the dramatic culminating point in a series of tactical experiments

and lessons. Lessons that appear to have had their greatest resonance with a number of key persons in

the Australian Mounted Division. The 12th Light Horse Regiment's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-

Colonel Donald Cameron, had apparently remembered mounted rifles charging Boer sangers in South

Africa and maintained a conviction of the ability of mounted men to gallop at Turkish defences if the

conditions were correct.139 One can only wonder if the fact that he had started his military life before

federation as a cavalryman in the 1st Australian Horse was also of some import.140 More significant,

however, was the view of the divisional commander, Hodgson. A British cavalryman with a firm

belief in the value of mounted action, he had unsuccessfully attempted before Beersheba to have the

two Light Horse brigades of his command equipped with the sword.141 Frustrated in this course he

instead issued a detailed order on mounted action to his formation just before the battle:

(i) It is to be noted that the country is built for mounted action, whereas any dismounted attack is handicapped for want of cover. The Divisional Commander hopes that all brigades will endeavour to profit by their knowledge of these facts. (ii) To manouevre an attack mounted an arme-blanche weapon is necessary. The Divisional Commander suggests that the bayonet is equally as good as the sword, if it is used for pointing only; it has the same moral effect as a sword as it glitters in the sun and the difference could not be detected by the enemy. (iii) If used in this manner, the point only should be sharpened, to ensure the men

138Notes on Recent Cavalry Fighting up to 7th April 1917. AWM25, 923/27.

139Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 403.

140Burness, ‘The Australian Horse', pp. 44-5.

141Lt-Col. Rex Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, The Cavalry Journal XII:42 (1921) 351.

203

point instead of striking. (iv) The Divisional Commander suggests that the bayonet, used thus, will be more effective as an arme-blanche weapon than the rifle with bayonet fixed, as he fears that the latter method would leave the control of the horse too difficult in manoeuvre, and would leave the right arm too tired to give the final thrust.142

As one history notes the utility of the bayonet as a substitute for the sword was probably overstated

but the armourers were ordered to suitably sharpen all bayonets.143 Assuming that the 4th Light Horse

Brigade did as it was ordered the men who charged at Beersheba had blades suitably prepared and

certainly knew their divisional commander’s views.

After the charge those within this same brigade could not help but compare their relatively

cheap success at Beersheba with their involvement in the Second Battle of Gaza. There "this Brigade

made a long advance on foot, with two Regiments (11th & 12th) and the Machine Gun Squadron, and

had 187 casualties without any satisfactory result being obtained."144 Lessons were being learnt and a

week after Beersheba a squadron of the 4th Light Horse Regiment, conducting a reconnaissance,

galloped in open order for more than two miles under heavy rifle and howitzer fire and incurred no

casualties.145 The open fighting north of the Gaza-Beersheba defences in November and December

provided more examples of what charges could do. On the 8th of November at Huj a mixed group of

Yeomanry from the 5th Mounted Brigade drew swords and charged a series of strong positions made

up of riflemen, machine guns and Austrian artillery. Hastily organised and conducted without any fire

support the charge was costly. Figures proffered vary, but it seems that of the 120 or so men who

actually took part in the charge somewhere between 70 and 90 men became casualties.146 For that cost

however, they took thirty prisoners, a remarkable eleven field guns and four machine guns. The

commander of the 60th Division, whose own formation had benefited from the charge, expressed

regret at the casualties but was pleased that they "completely broke the hostile resistance and enabled

my division to push on to Huj."147 Following this on 13 November a charge by the 6th Mounted

Brigade at El Mughar, which had good fire support and was well executed, was very successfully

carried out. As well as clearing a long ridge from which the Turks had held up the 52nd Division most

of the day, the brigade killed an unknown but large number of the enemy, took nearly 1100 prisoners

142Aust. Mtd. Div. order cited in ibid.

143Ibid.

144History of the 4th Light Horse Brigade, 1915-19, p. 10. AWM25, 455/67.

145Ibid., pp. 10-1. The charge was not at a defended locality but across the front of two separate ones in order to find the cover of a wadi.

146Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, p. 181.

147Maj-Gen. Shea, GOC 60th Division, to Chauvel, cited in ibid., p. 175.

204

and captured two field guns and fifteen machine guns.148 For that they had lost sixteen men killed and

107 wounded.149 Other successful charges by the Yeomanry that November were made at

Khuweilfeh, Yebnah and Abu Shusheh.150 During the same period two regiments of the 1st Light

Horse Brigade galloped more than four miles to capture the village of Ameidat and nearly 400

prisoners. The 1st Light Horse Regiment captured Ludd on horseback and galloped down an enemy

rearguard beyond the town to take more than 300 prisoners and two machine guns.151

The charge at Beersheba, though arguably the most impressive (El Mughar must surely rate as

at least as spectacular), was but one of a rapid series of events that pointed to the continued utility of

sensibly executed shock tactics carried out under the right circumstances. During the quiet period that

followed Beersheba and subsequent operations, there was flurry of communications around the Desert

Mounted Corps about tactical lessons learned, and key among them were queries about the judged

value of mounted attack. The experiences of mounted work by the 1st Light Horse Brigade not

withstanding, there was a degree of ambivalence about the whole idea from the Anzac Mounted

Division. There was a general expression that because they had done nothing like the charge by the 4th

Light Horse Brigade they could not pass any worthwhile comment, though it was noted that

advancing mounted under shellfire in suitable artillery formations did not present a good target to the

guns, and thus casualties were generally slight.152 The responses of the Australian Mounted Division

to these queries have not been found but writing a year later Grant, of the 4th Light Horse Brigade,

wrote of the pursuit after Beersheba that:

[I]n such an operation as this pursuit they [the Light Horse and NZMR] were severely handicapped for want of an arme blanche weapon. The tactics of mounted rifles in pursuit necessitate turning movements, which are comparatively slow. The sword permits a far more direct line of attack and brings quick decisions...If we had swords, I am sure we could have ridden on and captured thousands; as it was we stood off and shot hundreds only.153

In a memorandum to all its divisions in January 1918 Desert Mounted Corps set out its

thinking on the matter. Referring to some of the charges of October and November it stated:

148Ibid., p. 198, & Table of Mounted Actions of Des. Corps, Oct-Nov 1917. AWM25, 923/27.

149Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, p. 198.

150Table of Mounted Actions of Des. Corps, Oct-Nov 1917. AWM25, 923/27. 151Des. Corps to all subordinate formations, 24 Jan. 1918. AWM25, 923/27.

152Training notes regarding recent operations by Anzac Mtd. Div, 16 Dec. 1917. AWM25, 941/1 Part 4.

153Brig-Gen. W. Grant cited in Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, pp. 365-6.

205

(i). Mounted troops are capable today, as in the past, of crossing a fire swept zone, so long as they move quickly and extended. In most of the attacks the Squadrons of each Regiment followed on another in a succession of waves. They were carried through at the gallop. (ii). The moral effect of a mounted attack has lost none of its potency. On one occasion the horses were so exhausted, after the gallop, that the enemy, if he had stood his ground, could have shot down our men with ease as they topped the crest. (iii). It is in close cooperation with infantry and not when acting independently, that mounted troops may expect to find the most favourable conditions, and to gain the most far-reaching results.

Then in regard to dismounted action:

The delaying power of a few machine guns against a dismounted attack was found to be very great...It is therefore clearer than ever that mounted troops must only engage in a frontal attack dismounted as a last resort and that before doing so they must be quite certain that they cannot obtain their objective either by mounted attack or by threat round a flank.154

That the mounted rifle Light Horse should begin to seriously consider the advantages of

mounted attack was, in the end, not much of an extension of their existing role. The difference

between British cavalry, in the form of the Yeomanry in Palestine, and the Light Horse or New

Zealand Mounted Rifles had not been that great to start with. The Yeomanry had spent most of the

years since the Boer War training to much the same mounted rifle template that the Light Horse had.

Since 1912 both had used the same Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training manual and occupied

virtually the same doctrinal ground under the Field Service Regulations. Never very content as

mounted rifles, and benefiting from a pre-war decision to allow them the arme blanche upon

hostilities, the Yeomanry had enthusiastically taken up the sword in 1914 and in the process

abandoned Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training in favour of Cavalry Training.155 Yet the

dismounted tactics, which it should be emphasised was by far the most commonly used form of battle

tactics for all mounted troops, of the Yeomanry and Light Horse were virtually identical. The early

Mounted Troops Course held at the Imperial School of Instruction at Zeitoun in Egypt had, by the end

of 1916, been re-titled the Cavalry School of Instruction and all horse mounted officers in need of

qualification in Egypt or Palestine attended it.156 There Yeomanry, Indian Cavalry, Light Horse and

New Zealand Mounted Rifles officers attended the same lectures on the full gamut of cavalry duties

154Memorandum on Recent Operations, attached to, Des. Corps Gen. Staff to A & NZ Mtd. Div., Aust. Mtd. Div., Yeo. Div. & 7th Mtd. Bde., 24 Jan. 1918. AWM25, 923/27.

155Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, passim, & Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 333.

156Results of Examinations, Imperial School of Instruction - Cavalry Wing, 28th Course, 27 Jul. 1917. AWM27, 306/1.

206

and employment, with virtually no distinction made between those equipped with a sword and those

not.157 Within the theatre of operations the term cavalry was regularly used, without any apparent

concern, to describe all the horse mounted troops as Allenby's proposal to retitle Chauvel's formation

the Second Cavalry Corps vividly demonstrates. The distinctions between cavalry and mounted rifles

was, by 1917, becoming an increasingly small one. A 1917 memo on dismounted attack, aimed at all

mounted troops, contended for all that it should not be "made unless it is morally certain that the

object cannot be attained by the real cavalry methods. That is to say, by a direct attack mounted or by

gaining the enemy’s flank..."158 As a post-war American review of the Palestine campaign noted of

the Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, "however they may have been classed prior to

1917, they had by training and experience in war in fact become Cavalry, and there is no good

purpose gained in splitting hairs about the meaning of the word Cavalry."159

The increasing focus on mounted tactics did not mean, however, that the Light Horse were

beginning to subscribe to a doctrine of hell-for-leather close order charges. The intense cavalry

debates of the years before the war and the reforms carried out meant that British and dominion

cavalry tactics called for relatively dispersed formations (unless charging cavalry, when tighter

formations were called for), the use of concealed approaches, comprehensive use of fire and

manoeuvre, and the judicious use of shock tactics in a modern and tactically adept way. The notes for

a 1918 mounted attack exercise in Palestine bear this out:

1. (i) In [an] enemy’s position one locality may appear most valuable tactically. (ii) Take special precautions [to] get to this point by a - sweeping it with fire b - arrange that successive lines should sweep over it c - let your last line halt on it d - send up Hotchkiss battery at once to consolidate.

2. (i) Give an objective to each attacking squadron. (ii) Squadron[s] will probably have to dismount to complete job; keeping one troop mounted as reserve. (iii) Hotchkiss battery [to] follow squadron close, come into action close behind melee ready to -

a - shoot if things go badly in melee b - if melee successful at once consolidate position.

(iv) Having consolidated with Vickers, Hotchkiss etc., rally all horsemen with a view to attack.

157Imperial School of Instruction, Zeitoun - Cavalry Course, Syllabus, May 1918. AWM25, 877/11. The only distinction was a few extra lessons on use of the sword/lance for those who came from regiments that were equipped with it.

158Memo on dismounted attack in-depth, undated but 1917, AWM25, 942/1 Part 4. Emphasis added.

159The Palestine Campaign, monograph of the United States Cavalry School, p. 66, cited in Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, p. 325.

207

Not mentioned here but certainly to be considered was the liberal application of horse artillery

support.

If Hodgson had been keen to have the Light Horse of his Australian Mounted Division

equipped with the sword before Beersheba and the following fighting he was now, not surprisingly,

thoroughly animated on the issue. One participant and early historian of the campaign noted that "it

thoroughly confirmed to the G.O.C. Ausdiv [Australian Mounted Division] in his opinion that his two

A.L.H. Bdes. were seriously handicapped for want of sword, and he determined to continue to press

this question the moment operations come to a halt. He knew that his opinion was shared by the C-in-

C [Allenby] himself."160 This same historian also asserted that since Beersheba all ranks of the 4th

Light Horse Brigade "wished to be armed with the sword."161 This was not strictly the case. In his

post-Beersheba reports Bourchier, writing on behalf of his Brigade Commander, wrote that "it is the

general impression, and I strongly support it, that similar mounted attacks could frequently be carried

out with success if all ranks were armed with revolvers...”162 Edward Hutton would have approved but

this recommendation does not seem to have gone far. In March 1918 the regiments of the Australian

Mounted Division were informed that mounted training with the bayonet, using lightly modified

sword drill, was "to be at once taught to all ranks",163 and Hodgson continued to agitate for his Light

Horsemen to be given swords. Even in the Anzac Mounted Division, a formation generally much

more ambivalent about mounted action, the 1st Light Horse Brigade was telling its regiments to

"always look out for a chance for a mounted attack...”164

1918

Before Hodgson's plans could come to fruition however, operations against the Turks again

commenced in early 1918. The pursuit of the Turks after Beersheba eventually came to halt just north

of a line between Jaffa on the coast and Jerusalem further east. As part of a series of operations aimed

at better securing the British right flank in the second half of February the Anzac Mounted Division,

attached to XX Corps, stuck east from Jerusalem to take Jericho.165 The following month the Anzac

160Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 354.

161Ibid.

162Lt-Col. M. Bourchier, for Commander 4th LH Bde., to HQ Aus. Mtd. Div., 20 Dec. 1917. AWM25, 455/2.

163Assistant BM, 3rd LH Bde. to 8th, 9th and 10th LHRs, 4 Mar. 1918. AWM25, 941/1 Part 7. The instruction in the use of the bayonet mounted was supervised by an Australian-born imperial officer, Col. Rex Osbourne, who was the CSO of Aus. Mtd. Div. and the author of much of the account of the Palestine campaign that appeared in The Cavalry Journal, which is used as a source for this work. Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 676.

164Lt-Col. J. Browne, A & NZ Mtd. Div, to 1st, 2nd & 3rd LH Regts, 28 Feb. 1918. AWM25. 941/1 Part 7.

165The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194,

208

Mounted Division, along with the cameliers, was similarly attached to the 60th Division to take part in

a raid across the Jordan aimed at destroying the viaduct and tunnel on the Hejaz Railway near

Amman, and provide some assistance to the Arab Revolt under Emir Feisal.166 Though the Jordan was

in flood the force got across the river and took the town of Es Salt. They managed to cut the railway

both north and south of Amman, but the viaduct and tunnel were too heavily defended to be

threatened. Hampered also by torrential rain, precipitous terrain and bitter cold the raid withdrew

leaving a bridgehead across the Jordan.167

This raid, it turned out, had coincided with the launch of the major German spring offensive

of 1918 in France and Belgium. The severe strain this placed on the British in France led to Allenby's

army fulfilling its role as a strategic reserve for the empire and it was raided for badly needed troops

to reinforce the battered British Expeditionary Force. As a result Allenby was required to despatch

about 60 000 of his British troops to France, including the bulk of the Yeomanry Division.168 These

cavalrymen had been earmarked as the basis of new machine gun battalions but the demands of the

situation upon their arrival meant they largely found themselves remounted in France to help stem the

German attack. When the crisis passed they then found their units broken up to reinforce the badly

depleted regular cavalry regiments.169 In compensation the Desert Mounted Corps received from

France the Indian 5th Cavalry Division and a further five unallotted regiments, all of which had

embarked at Marseilles for the Middle East just days before the German spring offensive.170

All this change required a substantial reorganisation but that would have to wait until

Allenby's second strike across the Jordan at Es Salt and a new Turkish position established at Shunet

Nimrin.171 This new effort, under Chauvel's command, would, like the attack towards Amman a few

months previously, not come off as planned. What became known as the Es Salt Raid had been

brought forward in an effort to assist local Arabs who had joined the Arab uprising and who promised

assistance to Chauvel. Furthermore the overall conception of operations from Allenby himself does

not appear to have been as clear as it might have been. Chauvel had been able to have the original

plan scaled back but according to his biographer he seems to still have had doubts about the chances

33.68/15152. p. 22.

166Ibid., & Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 143,

167Ibid.

168Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 144.

169Badsey, ‘Fire and the Sword’, pp. 333-5.

170Ibid.

171The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 28.

209

of success.172 Nevertheless Chauvel's command, made up primarily of the balance of the Desert

Mounted Corps, the 60th Division and the Imperial Camel Brigade, struck out towards their objectives

on 30 April. The 60th Division moved to take the Turks at Shunet Nimrin while the Australian

Mounted Division, less the 5th Mounted Brigade but with the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades

attached, pushed north before swinging east to capture Es Salt.173 The Australian Mounted Division,

wearing the steel helmets that were compulsory on the Western Front but that are not normally

thought of as Light Horse head dress in Palestine,174 further demonstrated the value of mounted

tactical movement by galloping over the line of outposts east of the Jordan and moving rapidly in

open formations under artillery fire for few losses.175 When this division swung east towards Es Salt

and the northern side of Shunet Nimrin, the 4th Light Horse Brigade was left to protect their left flank.

This brigade, still under Brigadier-General Grant, soon bore the brunt of a strong Turkish

counter move. Unknown to Allenby and Chauvel the Turks had made a number of improvements to

key tracks and bridges not far from where the 4th Light Horse Brigade had taken up its position.

Unknown also was that the Turks had been planning their own foray down the Jordan and thus had at

their disposal several extra divisions to send against Chauvel. On the morning of 1 May the Turkish

24th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division fell upon Grant’s position, soon turning his left and seizing the

vital ground at a location known as Red Hill. Grant was forced to withdraw his brigade promptly,

"one regiment covering the other", and though all personnel were brought out nine guns had to be left

to the enemy.176 Major-General Edward Chaytor and all available mounted reinforcements were sent

to stabilise the situation on the left but by the time this was achieved the whole enterprise at Es Salt

relied on a single threatened track from the bridgehead for its survival. The 60th Division, stripped of

resources to meet the Turkish attacks to the north, was unable to reduce Shunet Nimrin and with air

reports of large reinforcements massing at Amman the whole operation was brought to an end on 4

May. The promised support of the Arab Revolt never materialised. The old bridgehead across the

Jordan being maintained, Chauvel's force withdrew back across the Jordan. There then followed a

long, hot, dusty and disease-plagued summer for the Desert Mounted Corps in the Jordan Valley as

172Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 146.

173The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 28.

174S. J. Barron, 'Es Salt and the Jordan Valley', Reveille (1 Jan. 1936), 21. How often the Light Horse wore steel helmets in 1918 is unclear. There are no photographs known by this author showing Light Horsemen in steel helmets but the above source is quite clear that they were worn at Es Salt. A training syllabus of the 12th LHR from April 1918 also calls for two squadrons to turn out for training wearing them, so it seems clear that did in fact do so at times. HQ 12th LHR to Squadrons, 14 Apr. 1918. AWM25, 941/1 Part 8.

175The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 28, & Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 604.

176Barron, 'Es Salt and the Jordan Valley', p. 21, & Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 149.

210

Allenby's army rebuilt itself with its new Indian formations and new campaign plans were developed.

The despatch of much of the Yeomanry to the Western Front and the arrival of the regiments

of Indian cavalry had, back in April, started a process of reorganisation that was still underway when

Allenby ordered the Es Salt raid. The new Indian regiments, when combined with all the mounted

troops within the theatre already, gave to Allenby enough mounted men to reorganise the Desert

Mounted Corps with four mounted divisions. The remaining Yeomanry, including the 5th Mounted

Brigade of the Australian Mounted Division, were redistributed so that one British regiment could be

brigaded with two Indian regiments to make one of the new Cavalry Brigades. The under-strength

Indian (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade that had long been in Palestine as army troops was brought

up to strength with a third Indian regiment and all these brigades were arranged into the 4th and 5th

Cavalry Divisions.177

To replace the Yeomanry in the Australian Mounted Division it was decided to reduce the

Imperial Camel Corps and use the Australians and New Zealanders so released to create a new Light

Horse brigade. The decision to convert the cameliers led, however, to a series of difficulties. Though

camel troops had proved of diminishing value since the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had left the

desert and crossed into Palestine, it was thought prudent to maintain a few companies and the

Yeomanry cameliers stayed with their irregular mounts. Allenby proposed, in June, to form the new

mounted brigade with one New Zealand and two Australian regiments. The War Office, probably

cognizant of the long-standing desire for a purely Australian division, differed and told Allenby to

form the brigade with three Australian regiments and use the New Zealanders to create its machine

gun squadron. Allenby, looking at the diminishing Australian reinforcement pool (just 25 officers and

867 other ranks in early July) objected that the plan was not feasible but when the New Zealand

government, apparently holding its own manpower concerns, fell in with the War Office view he had

to give way.178 An order setting out the War Office plan was issued to the Imperial Camel Brigade in

late July.179 All efforts to this end were, however, being undermined by the spread of disease among

the cameliers in the Jordan Valley. Despite the vigorous efforts of the troops in draining marshes and

the medical services in preventing disease the camel brigade was so depleted by malaria and other

illness that, when they were combined with the available reinforcements, there were only enough

Australians to form two regiments.180 The new 14th and 15th Light Horse Regiments soon joined the

Australian Mounted Division as the 5th Light Horse Brigade, but the 16th regiment was on hold until

177The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. pp. 24-5.

178HQ AIF to Secretary, Department of Defence, 5 Sep. 1918. NAA(M) MP367/1, 469/20/14.

179Imperial Camel Brigade Re-organisation Order No. 8, 25 Jul. 1918. AWM25, 157/1.

180The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. pp. 27.

211

more men could be found, and this new brigade was rounded out with a mixed French regiment of

Spahis and Chasseurs d'Afrique. The War Office asked Australia to increase the Light Horse draft to

400 men per month but even if this manpower could be found, a difficult proposition in 1918, it

would take time for it to filter through.181 The actual conversion proceeded smoothly enough under

the eyes of a renowned trainer of soldiers Chauvel borrowed for the purpose, but as many of the new

Light Horsemen had gone to the camels from the infantry in 1916 it was a busy ten weeks.182

Training the new formation was made all the more complex by the fact that Hodgson's

agitation to be allowed the arme blanche had finally borne fruit and the cameliers had to master this

weapon as well. Hodgson had continued to assert his views on the sword but it was not until an event

in mid-July that his arguments began to hold sway. On 14 July a Turkish attack by two divisions,

spearheaded by two and half German battalions, was launched at the Anzac Mounted Division at Abu

Tulul. Quickly defeated by a rapid counter attack by the 1st Light Horse Brigade this battle proved to

be the last Turkish attack of the campaign.183 Further south, as part of the same general action, the

three Indian regiments of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade took part in a series of mounted

actions around El Hinu where they employed their lances to deadly effect, spearing about 90 Turks,

capturing another 90 and taking four machine guns.184 This relatively small action produced from the

staff of the Desert Mounted Corps and another widely circulated memo setting out the value of the

arme blanche:

(i) The mounted action of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade, who brought off several charges, is further proof of the value of shock tactics and cold steel... (iv) With an enemy such as we have against us, Turks or Germans who are 'tailors' on horses and have no spirit for a mounted fight, the greatest risks can be taken. A troop can easily dispose of a hostile squadron, provided they are charged with decision, rapidity and cohesion. (v) During the training period shock action against cavalry, infantry, and guns should be practised. There is no enemy we are likely to meet who can use rifle or machine gun with effect on rapidly moving mounted men, unless they themselves are secure behind wire and works. Artillery does not hurt extended and moving horsemen.185

Hodgson used this memorandum as the basis for a new attempt to get the sword for his Light

Horsemen. Claiming support from his two Australian brigade commanders, and pointing to the pursuit

181HQ AIF to Secretary, Department of Defence, 5 Sep. 1918. NAA(M) MP367/1, 469/20/14.

182Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 154.

183Ibid., p. 160.

184Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, pp. 239-40.

185Notes on Enemy Attack on Desert Mounted Corps, 14 Jul. 1918, by Brig-Gen. Godwin, Gen. Staff, Des. Corps. AWM25, 941/1 Part 8.

212

after Beersheba, he again set out his view that "the conditions in this theatre of war are particularly

suited to the employment of a steel weapon." That he could "expect greater and more rapid results

from my Light Horse brigades if they are equipped with a sword."186 He contended that the dash

shown on the move to Es Salt was a reflection of the training with the bayonet he had ordered and

dismissed the arguments that had been used against the sword for Light Horse. These were that the 7

lbs of sword weight would be better used for ammunition, that the conversion from mounted rifles to

cavalry would only "result in badly trained cavalry", and that the Light Horse drill taken from

Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training was not suited to shock action. As the amount of ammunition

carried by each man in the Desert Mounted Corps had recently been cut from 230 to 180 rounds the

issue of weight, always a paramount one for horsemastership, could be dismissed. He promised to

overcome any training obstacles and, though he admitted a preference for Cavalry Training over the

Light Horse manual, stated he could produce cavalrymen in a month.187 Chauvel, apparently finally

swayed by the actions of the three Indian regiments on 14 July, now agreed to his request.188

The staff of the Australian Mounted Division had already been preparing for such an

eventuality, having written a memorandum outlining a training programme on the same day as the

Indian regiments were spearing the Turks, and once authorised they quickly swung into action. Rifle

buckets and swords (the British 1908 Cavalry Sword) were procured and issued, and training

commenced in mid-August, continuing until the middle of the following month.189 Whatever the

passions for the arme blanche among the senior officers of the division the move raised a few

eyebrows further down the ranks. One brigade recorded that at "first the new arm for Light Horse was

looked upon with a certain amount of doubt, but once the troops had become accustomed to it, and

commenced training in earnest all feeling within the Division against its use soon vanished...”190

Things were eased by the mounted bayonet training that Hodgson had instituted earlier in the year as

the regiments had then gone through a vigorous period improving their mounted manoeuvring,

including mounted attacks, melees and rallying. 191 The Hotchkiss gunners too had already been

trained to operate in machine guns groups at squadron level, as was necessary for mounted actions,

186Maj-Gen. Hodgson to Des. Corps, 27 Jul. 1918. AWM25, 941/1 Part 8. It is clear that once authorised to use the sword Aus. Div. effectively abandoned Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training, which did not include sections on sword use, in favour of Cavalry Training which included drill specifically designed for use with the arme blanche. Lt-Col. R. Osbourne, Gen. Staff, Aust. Mtd. Div. to 3rd, 4th & 5th LH Bdes. 14 Jul. 1918. AWM25, 941/1, Part 8.

187Ibid.

188Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 154, & Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, p. 223.

189Table of Marching Order, Aus. Div to Brigades, 10 Sep. 1918. AWM25, 941/1 Part 9.

190History of the 4th LH Bde. AWM25, 455/67.

191Brig-Gen. L. C. Wilson, Narrative of Operations of Third Light Horse Brigade, AIF, From 27th October to 4th March 1919 (Cairo: Oriental Advertising Company, 1919), p. 53.

213

rather than as part of each troop as had been done previously.192 What was being discussed at this time

in the upper echelons of the Anzac Mounted Division about the sword is, unfortunately, unknown.

The account of the campaign that appeared in The Cavalry Journal in the early 1920s, written by

Hodgson's divisional Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Rex Osbourne, provides the only real clue:

The Anzac Div. was content to remain a mounted rifle division, as it had proved itself of magnificent quality at mounted rifle work, and the Divisional Commander [Chaytor] was by no means certain it would gain anything by adopting the sword.193

With the two Light Horse divisions having thus taken divergent doctrinal approaches the final

preparations for the next offensive were being made.

Facing the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in mid 1918 were three Turkish armies. The Fourth

Army was astride the Jordan River with most of its strength on the eastern side. The rest of the

Turkish line out to the Mediterranean Sea north of Jaffa was held by the Seventh Army in the centre

and the Eighth Army near the coast. Following the two British excursions across the Jordan earlier in

the year there was general expectation by the Turks that it was here that Allenby would again attack, a

belief reinforced by the location of the Desert Mounted Corps, his well established striking arm, in the

Jordan Valley. Instead Allenby developed a plan that called for the Turkish Fourth Army to be held

on the Jordan while the infantry near the coast punched a hole in the Turkish defences. A hole through

which the Desert Mounted Corps would move and strike deep into the enemy’s rear cutting off their

withdrawal routes across the Plain of Esdraelon (or Armageddon). The Turkish Seventh and Eight

Armies would be trapped by Chauvel's corps, and the Fourth Army on the Jordan would have to

withdraw towards Damascus or risk being cut off.194 It was a similar concept of operations to the Gaza

- Beersheba attack the previous November, but steps were taken so that the developments that had

hampered that mounted thrust and pursuit did not reoccur.195

The most important of these steps was the concentration of the bulk of the Desert Mounted

Corps in position where they could exploit the infantry created gap. Covered by a thorough and well

executed deception plan the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, along with the Australian Mounted

192HQ 12th LHR to Squadrons, 14 Apr. 1918. AWM25, 941/1 Part 8. Machine guns were only useful during mounted actions if sent to place where they could be concentrated and give effective fire support, something that any effective attack, mounted or otherwise, required. To take them along on the charge was to squander the advantages they offered. In his post-Beersheba report Bourchier noted that at that action, where at least some of the guns had accompanied the charge, "The Hotchkiss guns were useless, the fast pace affording no time to get them into action." Lt-Col M. Bourchier, for Bde. Commander, 4th LH Bde. to HQ Aus. Div. 20 Dec. 1917. AWM25, 455/2.

193Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’, p. 350.

194The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 33

195Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 161

214

Division, moved at night from the Jordan Valley into an assembly area in the orange groves north of

Jaffa behind XXI Corps. The Anzac Mounted Division remained in the Jordan Valley as part of a

mixed force, known as Chaytor's Force as he commanded it, that would "demonstrate across the

Jordan...[and] attack the [Fourth] Army should the main operations be successful."196 Osbourne, in his

history of the campaign, has contended that there was some disappointment within the Anzac

Mounted Division that they were not to be part of the cavalry effort on the coast and some mutterings

that because they had opted not to equip with the sword they were being disadvantaged.197 Whether

this was so remains unknown but, as outlined above, there had been concerns about the use of

mounted rifles in the pursuit and it is possible that this may have been part of the reason why they

were used as they were. This division was, however, perhaps the most experienced and capable

formation Allenby had his disposal having proven itself in more that two years of warfare. The

proposed operations against the Fourth Army in mountainous terrain were by no means simple and the

bestowal on Chaytor of a force nearly equivalent to two divisions and this important mission was in

itself an expression of confidence.198

On the morning of 19 September the attack commenced and within three hours the infantry of

XXI Corps had broken open the Turkish defences near the coast and, with the 4th and 5th Cavalry

Divisions leading, the Australian Mounted Division in reserve, the Desert Mounted Corps was headed

to its objectives. The advance was so rapid that the 5th Cavalry Division had reached Nazareth, over

fifty miles from their start point, by 5 am the next day. The 4th Cavalry Division covered 85 miles in

34 hours to reach Beisan and Chauvel's headquarters had reached its initial destination at Megiddo, 42

miles from its start point, by midday on the 20th. By the end of the first day and it was only by

wireless and aircraft that Chauvel could keep touch with his leading troops.199 Chauvel was elated and

wrote to his wife that he had "a glorious time. We have done a regular Jeb Stuart ride...It is the first

time in the war that this war that the G in GAP Scheme has really come off and I am feeling very

pleased with myself."200 The victory was remarkable and through the combined efforts of the infantry

to the south and Chauvel's cavalry in their rear the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies had effectively

been destroyed by the end of 21 September.201 By 25 September the 3rd and 4th Light Horse Brigades

196The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 33

197Lt-Col. Rex Osbourne, ‘Operations of the Mounted Troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (continued)’, The Cavalry Journal XIII (1923) 150-1.

198Ibid., p. 151, & The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 34.

199Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 697.

200Chauvel to his wife, 20 Sep. 1918 cited in Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 171.

201The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194,

215

had been pushed as far as Tiberias and Semakh on the Sea of Galilee and the Desert Mounted Corps

had taken about 33 000 prisoners.202 To the east Chaytor's Force had met stiff Turkish opposition for

the first few days but by 21 September the Turks, realising the threat to their rear from Chauvel,

began a withdrawal that quickly turned into something of a collapse as the enemy sought refuge and

escape at Amman. This city and its rearguard fell to the 2nd Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted

Rifles Brigades on 25 September. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade at Ziza took the last Turkish force of

any consequence east of the Jordan a few days later.203 The remainder of the Fourth Army escaped

north in reasonable order only to be largely destroyed by the 5th Cavalry Division at the end of the

month just before it reached Damascus.204

With two Turkish Armies destroyed and what remained of the third dislodged and headed

north Allenby rapidly moved move to exploit the success. The Desert Mounted Corps, except the

detached Anzac Mounted Division that had now, unbeknownst to them, fought its last battle, was now

directed to Damascus which was entered first by the 10th Light Horse Regiment early in the morning

of 1 October. The Australian Mounted Division was held around Damascus and the 5th Cavalry

Division, supported by the 4th, was instructed to advance north to Aleppo, the rail junction upon which

the Turks relied to support their efforts in both in Palestine and Mesopotamia. The 4th Cavalry

Division was soon so reduced by malaria, however, that it had to stop. The Australian Mounted

Division was similarly afflicted, as was the whole Egyptian Expeditionary Force, but was despatched

to take its place. It had reached Homs, on the road to Aleppo, by 30 October where it stopped as

Turkey had been granted an armistice205 Disease was now the greatest threat and all the formations of

the Desert Mounted Corps were afflicted. Malaria, contracted largely in the territory occupied by the

Turks prior to 19 September, had, by the time the Desert Mounted Corps reached Damascus, gone

through its incubation period and its effects were beginning to be felt.206 Men who had contracted it in

the Jordan Valley and who were now tired and worn out after the long advance on Damascus were

also brought down. The Anzac Mounted Division had similarly been stuck soon after its capture of

Amman.207 In early October too the world-wide influenza epidemic began to make its way through the

ranks. In the week ending 5 October over 1200 men of the corps were admitted to hospital, the

33.68/15152. pp. 36-8.

202Ibid., p. 38.

203Ibid., p. 39 & Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, pp. 713-27.

204The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. p. 41.

205Ibid., p. 49.

206Lt-Col R. Fowler, ADMS Aus. Div. to Des. Corps, 12 Dec. 1918. AWM27, 376/150.

207Gullet, The AIF in Sinai and Palestine, p. 780.

216

following week another 3100 were similarly treated.208

Tactically, however, the last phase of the Palestine campaign had strongly justified Hodgson's

faith in, and determination to get, swords. Light Horsemen had drawn their new weapons and used

them numerous times to great effect. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade had done so at Jenin, the Light

Horsemen and French cavalry of the 5th Light Horse Brigade also used them near Nablus. The 11th

and 12th Light Horse Regiments had charged in the pre-dawn darkness at Semakh and the 3rd Light

Horse Brigade had made more charges during operations around Damascus.209 The 4th Light Horse

Brigade recorded one such typical instance on way to Damascus in its post-war operational narrative:

'A' Squadron took the right flank of the 4th [LHR] line & 'C' Squadron to the left, with 'B' Squadron in reserve behind the low ridge. Both Squadrons had ground scouts out in front, as they advanced at the trot, this proved very fortunate as just before the final assault 'C' Squadron ground scouts gave the signal to take ground to the left, and the whole squadron as one man swung to the left thus avoiding disaster in an impassable ravine. After passing this obstacle 'C' Squadron again swung to the right and both squadrons locked in one strong line charged the position; 12th Regiment charging their sector on the right at the same moment. Covering fire was given by the artillery [the Notts Battery RHA] until the charging line was very close to its objective, with the result that the enemy was unable to work his machine guns, and at the near approach of steel fled, leaving his guns and prisoners.210

British and Indian regiments made at least six notable charges during the same period, only one of

which, by the Indian 2nd Lancers at Ibrid on 26 September, that reinforced lessons about adequate

reconnaissance and fire support, was a failure.211 Two weeks after the armistice in an edition of the

Kia Ora Coo-ee, the local magazine recently established for the benefit of the Australians and New

Zealanders in the Middle East, the "Official Correspondent with the AIF", Henry Gullet, wrote:

This great cavalry triumph vindicated the continued use of the sword and lance, and will probably lead to the sword being added permanently to the arms of Australian Light Horsemen. Had the Australian Mounted Division been armed only with rifles as in previous fights, its performance would not nearly have been so remarkable. Again and again Australian Regiments were able, because they possessed a mounted weapon, to gallop down the Turks and cause them to surrender. Without the swords they would have been compelled to dismount and go in on foot with their rifles, and it is certain that in many instances when thousands of Turks put up their hands the galloping advance of the horse and the sight of the sword, there would have been stout and perhaps successful resistance to our men approaching on foot...Before

208Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse, p. 183.

209The Australian Light Horse in the Great War, prepared by Lt-Gen. Sir H. Chauvel. NAA(C) A1194, 33.68/15152. pp. 36-44.

210History of the 4th LH Bde. AWM25, 455/67.

211Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Vol. 5, passim, see p. 319 for the 2nd Lancers

217

this campaign many experienced Light Horse officers were strongly opposed to the sword, but since they have seen the remarkable saving it has made in hard fighting and in casualties they have entirely changed their opinion. The Light Horseman has become a cavalryman.212

With the cessation of hostilities the Light Horse began a process of securing the gains of the

Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Sickness remained an issue for some time but by early 1919 the Light

Horse units had generally been moved to the healthier climes along the Mediterranean coast. There

they maintained a gentle training regime and educational courses aimed at giving Light Horsemen

useful civilian skills were conducted. Courses were available in a wide variety matters from training

mechanical fitters and railwaymen through to teaching shorthand, bookkeeping and French.213 To the

obvious disappointment of many men the horses they had been riding were not being returned to

Australia, the expense and quarantine risks being considered too great.214 In response to this, and on

the assumption that the horses would be sold to the local population of Egypt and Palestine, a number

of Light Horsemen apparently shot their mounts rather than let this happen to them.215 Contrary to

popular memory, however, this was an uncommon event and relatively few horses met their end in

this way. Instead all horses were subjected to a classification process for sale or disposal. Those riding

horses over 12 years old, otherwise unsound or requiring more than two months hospitalisation were

marked for destruction, the remainder were to be sold but by far the majority went as remounts for the

Indian Army. The number destroyed was relatively small, the Anzac Mounted Division shooting just

481 riding horses, probably about 10 percent of its establishment strength.216 The killing was done by

members of the Light Horse and it is perhaps misunderstanding and misinterpretation of these official,

but nevertheless unpleasant, duties that have grown into the idea that so many horses were killed just

to avoid their sale to the local population. More common was the experience of a squadron of the 2nd

Light Horse Regiment, for example. Involved in escort duties around Jerusalem in December 1918

they were withdrawn when the winter weather threatened to increase sickness among both the men

and horses. Marching to Homs they handed their horses over to reinforcements for the 5th Cavalry

Division and entrained for warmer climes.217

212H.S. Gullett, cited in 'A Retrospect', The Kia Ora Coo-ee, 2:5 (15 Nov. 1918), 1.

213Agricultural and Mechanical Courses, A & NZ Mtd. Div. GHQ War Diary, January 1919. AWM4, 1/60/35, Appendix 6, & 4th LH Bde. Syllabus of Training, week ending 18 Jan. 1919. AWM25, 941/1 Part 10.

214Henry Gullet, ‘The Horses Stay Behind', The Kia Ora Coo-ee, 2:5 (15 Nov. 1918), 10.

215'Waler', http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/animals/horses.htm. For example one author of a recent popular history of the Light Horse, drawing on family sources, states that her grandfather, a trooper with the 10th LHR shot his horse. See Jill, Duchess of Hamilton, First to Damascus: The Story of the Australian Light Horse and Lawrence of Arabia (Roseville: Kangaroo Press, 2002), p. 197.

216A & NZ Mtd. Div., Return of Animals Destroyed, [Feb. 1919?]. AWM25, 245/112.

217Summary of Operations of Des. Corps December 1918, 15 Jan. 1919. AWM25, 455/72.

218

This general process was thrown into some confusion, however, in early 1919 when a civil

uprising in Egypt required the hurried reissuing of horses to the Light Horse so they could assist in

restoring order.218 The first disturbances began in March not long before the bulk of the Light Horse

were to depart for Australia (the 1st Light Horse Brigade had already left). Initially telegraph and

telephone lines were cut, railway lines were destroyed and riots were not uncommon. Being virtually

the only troops available the Light Horse was remounted and reissued their equipment to help put

down the uprising.219 There followed several months of active patrolling and a number of brief violent

incidents. The Light Horse, perhaps reflecting long war service and an undoubted racial antagonism

towards the Arab population, acted harshly at times and there were instances that resulted in Arab

deaths, though a few Light Horsemen were also killed.220 Brigadier-General Lachlan Wilson,

commanding the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, summed up the general Australian soldier view at the time

in his narrative of the uprising:

As the natives apparently did not understand anything except force, what was required was some of the German frightfulness which our Teutonic friends exhibited towards the foreign civil populations under their control. We certainly never descended to these methods but found it necessary to adopt stern measures to convince the natives that we intended to restore order.221

Such methods were authoritarian and have come in for understandable criticism over the years. That

mounted troops were used to suppress a rebellion in a British colonial territory was hardly new and

with no specific training or equipment (if indeed any such thing existed) it is not surprising that the

results were as bloody as in other parts of the empire at various times. Though there were a few,

apparently genuine, enquiries into a number of the more violent or destructive episodes there seemed

to be little concern about how the situations were handled from the British authorities and Allenby,

now the High Commissioner in Egypt, thanked the Light Horse for what they had done.222 Though

undoubtedly unfortunate, and despite the fact there was some international press grumbling about the

British response,223 the Light Horse role in the uprising was not an exceptional one by contemporary

standards. The uprising was effectively over by June and soon thereafter the remaining regiments

embarked for Australia and then, after perhaps enduring a brief period of influenza quarantine in their

218W. Birkbeck, appointment unknown, to Kemble, appointment unknown, 1 Aug 1919. AWM25, 29/1.

219Brig-Gen. L. Wilson, ‘The 3rd Light Horse Brigade, Australian Imperial Force in the Egyptian Rebellion 1919', unpublished narrative, 1919, pp. 6-8.

220Suzanne Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914-1919 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980), passim

221Wilson, ‘The 3rd Light Horse Brigade, Australian Imperial Force in the Egyptian Rebellion 1919, p. 24.

222Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914-1919, p. 132, & Wilson, ‘The 3rd Light Horse Brigade, Australian Imperial Force in the Egyptian Rebellion 1919, p. 24.

219

home port, they were disbanded.224

The First World War had provided the greatest test for the Light Horse. Despatched to war in

1914 the mounted formations of the AIF drew on the officers and men of the militia regiments but

soon had little in common with their forbears. Formed and trained as completely new entities and put

in battle they achieved a remarkable standard of efficiency. Basic training in Egypt was tested and

built upon at Gallipoli before a return to the desert and an eventual commitment against Turkey in

Palestine. Throughout the ensuing campaign, but most prominently in the early Sinai operations, the

Light Horse had been a crucial element of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. It has become habitual

in Australia to pay little heed to the infantry forces of the British Army in this campaign and it should

be borne in mind that they did much fighting, but throughout the entire period of operations the

mounted troops played a crucial role. The Light Horse was pivotal to that role and provided much of

the strength of first the Desert Column and then its successor, the Desert Mounted Corps. As the war

progressed Yeomanry and then Indian Cavalry became an increasingly significant part of this corps

but the experienced Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles remained important. The contrast

with the indifferent performance of Australia’s mounted troops in South Africa could not have been

greater.

Of great significance also were the many tactical lessons learned. Gullet's assertion that the

Light Horseman had "become a cavalryman" by the end of 1918 was only partly true, for two reasons.

Firstly, the Light Horse, as mounted rifles, had always been a type of abbreviated cavalry. The

difference between them and Britain’s other imperial cavalrymen, be they regulars, Yeomanry, or

Indian Army, had always been one of degree rather than kind. After a few years of war whatever

differences there may have been in efficiency or battlefield presence had all but disappeared and the

only remaining divergence remained the matter of the arme blanche. Light Horsemen, imbued with

pre-war theories about firepower, had initially viewed the sword with suspicion. But in a theatre

where the enemy’s defensive schemes were rarely as tough as those on the Western Front the

possibilities of mounted action seemed to open up. Indeed one of the striking lessons of the Palestine

campaign was that it was not so much rifle and machine gun firepower in themselves that made

mounted action impossible (the Turks were rarely short of machine guns, though their employment

was not generally up to German standards), but the impediment of barbed wire. As was commented

on after Beersheba, that charge would not have been possible if the defensive positions had been

wired. It was thick defensive systems made up of a combination of obstacles and fire that made

cavalry seemingly redundant on the Western Front, not necessarily firepower in itself. Once this was

understood in the Middle East key Light Horse officers, led by a British cavalryman aware of what

modern cavalry could do in such a situation, happily took up the sword and made that short final step

223Brugger, Australians and Egypt 1914-1919, p. 138-41.

224Bourne, ‘Nulli Secundus’: The History of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment, p. 86.

220

to becoming true cavalry. Their agitation bore fruit during the last two months of the campaign when

in one of the great cavalry operations in modern military history the sword was drawn and used

regularly to telling effect. As the British Cavalry reformers had believed in the years before the war,

cavalry could combine frequent and effective dismounted action with the judicious application of

shock action. The Light Horse officers who made use of the sword in this last phase of the war clearly

became converts because the arme blanche gave them a degree of tactical flexibility that the more

simple mounted rifle model lacked. The second reason that Gullet's assertion was only partly true was

the more obvious one that not all the Light Horse adopted it. Those in the Anzac Mounted Division

belonged to a formation ambivalent about the arme blanche and which stayed with the mounted rifle

model to the end. There was thus, at the end of 1918, something of a tactical schism in the Light

Horse (8 regiments with the sword, 6 without, not including those on the Western Front), but with the

war ended there seemed little reason to bother trying to heal it and there is no evidence that any such

effort was made in the Middle East. The arme blanche, however, had its new Australian adherents and

Harry Chauvel seemed to be one of them. His views and the broader cavalry lessons of 1918 were

have to a significant influence on the shape of the Light Horse post-war.

221

Chapter 8 The Light Horse at Home

1914-1944

The decision in 1914 to send a specially raised expeditionary force for service overseas meant

that the militia Light Horse, which had been the focus of so much effort during the years since

federation, stayed at home. Though many histories have, until recently, treated the militia at home

during the First World War as if it had never existed, this was not the case. While the Light Horse of

the Australian Imperial Force fought in the Middle East and in France the regiments at home

continued to exist and serve the nation, under ever more difficult circumstances, throughout the entire

period. When the end of the war and the necessary home force reorganisation finally came it was

these strained and beleaguered units that were to form the basis of the Australian Military Forces

during the austere and difficult inter-war years. Years that would see the role of the Light Horse

change to reflect the lessons of the war and also see a failure, due to constrained resources and an

apparent unwillingness to address mounted troop modernization, to adequately prepare the Light

Horse for the next war.

1914-1921

At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 the government called out 10 000

militia to man the forts and bolster local defences.1 Light Horse units were part of this and selected

squadrons found themselves mobilized to assist with the effort. In order to ensure that Light Horse

and other militiamen took their commitments seriously, orders were issued in November that men

obligated to military service by the Universal Training scheme were to be prosecuted for offences

under the regulations.2 Such steps proved largely unnecessary, however. Japan’s declaration of war on

Germany in August effectively removed any potential threat to Australia and by the end of December

1914 most citizen units had been stood down.3 This proved to be the high point of warlike activity for

the Light Horse at home during the war. By mid-1917, when there were 89 officers and some 3000

other ranks on duty for Home Defence, the sum of the contribution by the Light Horse appears to have

1Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 70-1.

2RO No. 18, 26th LHR, 12 Nov. 1914. AWM1, 19/4.

3Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 70-1.

222

been just three men on duty at Fremantle.4

That such an effort was all that was required of the militia Light Horse in 1914 is probably

just as well. As outlined in an earlier chapter, General Sir Ian Hamilton’s 1914 report on the forces

had highlighted serious organisational and training weaknesses in the Light Horse and other arms. In

that report he had warned of the potential for "disarray and confusion" should the Light Horse face an

enemy. An assessment of the militia’s competence for war in 1914, made by the Military Board in

1917, could only come to a similar view. It realistically concluded that at "the outbreak of war it

would not have been possible to take a Militia Regiment as it stood and put it in the field at once

against an efficient enemy, without disaster."5 The myriad problems that the Light Horse had faced

between federation and the First World War became all too apparent in 1914. It would have taken a

significant period of mobilisation and strenuous training, as evidenced by the training of the Light

Horse in Egypt in 1914-15, before it could have approached a useful level of efficiency.

The poor state of the militia regiments in 1914 did not mean, however, that efforts were not

continuing towards the goal of trying to improve things. During the first years of the war the

government and military authorities had planned to maintain the citizen forces at home alongside the

AIF overseas. The Military Board believed that "there must be no relaxation in the training of the

Militia, Senior Cadets and Rifle Clubs".6 The training commitment of the Light Horse regiments in

1914-15 highlighted this determination. Training in 1915 reflected Kirkpatrick’s pre-war view that

continuous activities should take up the majority of the allotted Light Horse training days. When the

2nd Light Horse Brigade went into camp at West Maitland in June of that year, for example, they did

so for the extended period of twelve days, as all Light Horse regiments had been doing since 1913.7

Also of significance during this period was an apparent increase in the number of men serving

in the Light Horse. Just as the war scares of the nineteenth century and the outbreak of the Boer War

had seen the colonial governments inundated with applications to form new mounted detachments, so,

apparently, was the Commonwealth in 1914-15. In the last months of 1914 and up to mid-1915 the

Department of Defence received at least twenty-three applications to form mounted detachments or

squadrons.8 How many similar approaches were made to local commanding officers or the

commandants of Military Districts is unknown. Perhaps it was this martial fervour that helped boost

the numbers of the men serving in the Light Horse. The number of men serving in the arm had

4Return of Troops Doing Duty on Home Defence, 26 May 1917. NAA(M) B543, W246T/1/2393.

5Report by the Military Board, 1917, cited in Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 76.

6Military Board meeting, 5 Sep. 1914, cited in Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 71.

72nd Light Horse Brigade, Standing Orders, Camp: West Maitland, June 15th to June 26th 1915 (Sydney: The Kingston Press, 1915).

8Correspondence register regarding Light Horse Formation. NAA(M) B536, A229/8

223

hovered around 6500 in 1912 and 1913 but by the end of 1914 there were 8604 men serving in the

Light Horse and by the end of 1916 the number had risen to 11 103, all ranks.9 The traditional reliance

on voluntary enlistment for the mounted branch means that most of these men were probably

volunteers, but it seems reasonable to assume that a significant proportion were men who had, as

before 1914, opted to serve their Universal Training commitment in the Light Horse.10

This increase in raw numbers seems also to have facilitated a degree of organisational

expansion. In late 1914 there were 70 Light Horse squadrons serving around the country.11 This figure

was equivalent to the 23 regiments that had been raised up to the middle of 1913. Yet by the end of

1916 the forces were maintaining 78 squadrons.12 This was equivalent to 26 regiments, but the

number of regimental headquarters had not increased so this expansion evidently took place within

existing units. An increase in the number of units did eventually occur, however, and by 1919 the

Light Horse order of battle included 30 separate regiments,13 a figure close to the target of 31

regiments that had been set with the introduction of Universal Training in 1912. By the end of the war

these regiments had undergone yet another renumbering process to territorially align them with their

AIF brethren overseas. Thus, just as the 1st Light Horse Regiment of the AIF came from New South

Wales, so now did the 1st Light Horse Regiment of the militia, and so on around the country. The

driving force behind this decision had been the government, who saw it as a way to foster the elan and

spirit of the AIF in the troubled units of the militia. The Military Board had some misgivings at the

plan as there were more militia than AIF units and because the territorial recruiting areas of the two

forces did not always neatly overlap. Nevertheless, the plan was approved in mid-1916. As at least

one historian has noted, though the plan did have some merit it also tended to bolster the notion that

the militia was the AIF's inferior.14 When it is remembered that this was the third renumbering process

that the mounted branch had undergone since federation and that it went against the rationalist

approach that had been adopted to unit numbering with the introduction of Universal Training such an

assessment carries some weight. The change also saw another abolition of the territorial sub-titles that

had been adopted after 1912 as a way to foster unit morale and strengthen the ties of regiment and

community. If nothing else, these changes certainly represented a somewhat cavalier attitude to the

9Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources, 31 Dec. 1914. NAA(M) B197, 1972/3/137 & Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources, 31 Dec. 1916. NAA(M) B197, 1972/3/166.

10The exact proportions of volunteers and UT obligated men in the Light Horse during the war is unknown. In 1912-13 about one sixth of Light Horsemen were serving as Universal Trainees (1064 of 6401 men in mid-1913). Whether this proportion can be projected forward to the war years is debatable.

11Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources, 31 Dec. 1914. NAA(M) B197, 1972/3/137. 12Annual Return of Military and Naval Resources, 31 Dec. 1916. NAA(M) B197, 1972/3/166.

13Hall, The Australian Light Horse, pp. 75-6.

14Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 75-6.

224

traditions and community associations of some long-serving citizen units.

Other organisational changes were also contemplated and in mid-1915 a new divisional

organisation was prepared and under it the Light Horse were to be re-organized into the 1st and 2nd

Light Horse Divisions, each four brigades strong. This plan was probably an outgrowth of pre-war

thinking about establishing militia divisions, which had clearly been on the minds of the military

authorities for some time. The organisational structures set out by Kitchener and adopted for the

Universal Training scheme did not mention divisions but the number of units and brigades to be

raised had a strong correlation to the numbers that would be required if such a step were to be taken.

When, in 1912, new war establishments were prepared the Light Horse structures explicitly allowed

for the organisation of squadrons to act as divisional mounted troops should it be warranted.15 In mid-

1914 the Military Board considered a proposal to begin organising two infantry divisions under the

command of permanent officers and divisional staff. The tables of the 1915 plan went further than this

and apart from the two Light Horse divisions would have allocated, as divisional cavalry, two Light

Horse squadrons to each of the proposed six infantry divisions that were to be similarly organized

from the militia battalions. Out of the thirty regiments to be maintained under this organisation, two

were also unallotted, possibly earmarked for the role of corps cavalry regiments.16 All of this was,

however, highly optimistic. Though it is possible this framework provided a basis for post-war

deliberations there is no evidence that this grand divisional scheme ever progressed beyond the

drawing board. Given the true state of the Light Horse and the rest of the forces at home during most

of the war, such a plan can only be described as somewhat fanciful.

Despite the increase in numbers of men serving and the number of units raised during the war

the reality was that the Light Horse (and the other arms) at home during the war quickly became a

hollow force. There were a number of reasons, but chief among them was a persistent and debilitating

drain on manpower from the militia to the AIF. By December 1914 alone 10 000 soldiers out of the

56 000 then serving the military forces had agreed to join the AIF.17 What proportion of these men

were Light Horsemen is unclear, but the impact on the units they left must have been considerable,

particularly as those who left were often the keen, fit and interested officers, NCOs and men who had

made soldiering a passionate pastime and who were the backbone of their units. In 1917 the Inspector-

General reported to the Minster of Defence that 75 per cent of the officers and 50 per cent of the other

ranks who had been serving in the home forces had so far enlisted in the AIF.18 The high percentage

15War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912. pp. 23 & 26. NAA(C) A1194, 22.14/6970.

16 Military Board Meeting, Recommendation No. 15, 1 Jul. 1914. NAA(C) A2653, 1914, & Australian Military Forces, Tables of Peace Organisation and Establishments, 1915-16. NAA(C) A1194, 21.20/6895.

17Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 71.

18Ibid., p. 75.

225

of officer transfers meant that most units were soon under the command of quite junior men. Before

the war unit command had been a Lieutenant-Colonel or Major’s appointment but by early 1915 many

were passing to the command of Captains.19 By 1917 there were six Light Horse regiments or infantry

battalions under the command of a Lieutenant.20 Command of brigades was similarly falling to

Majors,21 and men who would normally have been retired through age were granted extensions of

service so that appointments could be adequately filled.22 Given the criticisms of pre-war militia

officers one can only wonder at the command qualities of many of these junior men suddenly found in

important appointments.

Men who did not volunteer for the AIF did so for their own reasons and it seems likely that

many Light Horsemen who had family and farm/business commitments were not in a position to

volunteer without bringing hardship on their families.23 That more than 80 per cent of the men who

enlisted in the AIF were unmarried serves to reinforce the point.24 Others tried to volunteer but were

rejected on medical grounds, a factor given much less consideration when men undertook to serve in

the citizen forces. Some, as the Military Board discovered in 1916 when it tried to comb out more

officer volunteers from the citizen forces, were simply not inclined to join the AIF and go to war. In

many cases the reasons offered upon questioning seemed unconvincing or vague. The Inspector-

General, with evident distaste, wondered "of these officers what they conceive to be the moral

obligation of a holder of the King’s Commission".25 Such men soon found their commissions

withdrawn and their military services dispensed with. It seems reasonable to assume that similar

situations and attitudes could be found across the full spectrum of the ranks.

The loss of quality manpower was exacerbated by a general rundown of support given to the

citizen forces as the war progressed. The determination to maintain militia training and resources

19Details of command appointments. NAA(M) A2023, A95/2/27 & A2023, 95/6/68. For example the command of the 2nd, 5th, 9th and 28th LH Regiments had all passed to Captains by the end of March 1915.

20Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 71-2.

212nd Light Horse Brigade, Standing Orders, Camp: West Maitland, June 15th to June 26th 1915, p. 3. For example the command of 2nd LH Bde. had passed to Major F. Thrift by mid-1915.

22Military Board Agenda, 3-4 March 1915. A2653/1, 1915. The minutes of these days give but an example of the decisions the Military Board had make regarding unit command for the forces at home during the war. Lt-Col. The Hon. R. Carrington, a long serving NSW Lancer officer and Boer War veteran, had his retirement extended to the end of the war and two other junior Light Horse officers were appointed commanders of their regiments. Such deliberations were a large part of Military Board proceedings for the duration of the war.

23Grey, The Australian Army, p. 55.

24Joan Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics. The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. VI (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 116. The breakdown of conjugal status of the 1st AIF was: 81.62% single, 17.38% married, 0.84% widowed and 0.16% unknown.

25Grey, The Australian Army, p. 55.

226

while also meeting the requirements of the AIF was waning by mid-1915. That July units were

informed that many of their rifles and all of their pistols were to be returned to store. Three months

later they were told that the issue of new clothing and other equipment to the militia and Senior

Cadets was also to cease.26 In September the Military Board decided that training would be suspended

for six months and, though this decision does not seem to have affected units until the beginning of

1916, the suspension was extended until 1917.27 The support of permanent instructors was also

drastically reduced as these men found their way to war, and by late 1915 there were only sufficient

permanent staff to maintain basic administrative functions.28 When training did take place the

circumstances were sometimes unusual: in 1917, for example, the 26th Light Horse Regiment, at its

fifteen-day camp, found itself supervising and training a large number of infantry recruits.29 Home

training, though of little use to the Light Horse before the war, continued to be in abeyance through

1917. Twenty-four days were allocated to training in 1918-19, of which sixteen days were to be in

camp, but many camps were never held due to the influenza epidemic. Again in 1919-20 training was

suspended, by which time the Military Board concluded that 80 per cent of the men in the citizen

forces were non-efficient.30 Proving how empty was the expansion of the number of units at home

during the war, in 1918 the government gave consideration to the idea of temporarily amalgamating

units so that some useful training could be achieved.31

With the end of the war the Light Horse at home was in poor shape. The legal restrictions on

the men serving were only gradually relaxed and it was June 1920 before the men who were

voluntarily enlisted in the Light Horse were released from serving under the war provisions of the

Defence Act and allowed either to discharge or re-enlist.32 Those serving men who had been fortunate

enough to have enlisted before the introduction of Universal Training were informed that if they re-

engaged they would have to do so at the lower post-1912 pay rate of 4 s. per day instead of the 8 s.

they had been getting. This did away with one of the last key Hutton-period conditions of service.33

Men serving under the provisions of Universal Training who had their obligation expire during the

war had been allowed to cease their service or re-enlist voluntarily in September of the previous

26RO Nos. 6 & 7, 26th LHR, 14 & 26 Jul. 1915, & RO No. 12, 26th LHR, 15. Oct 1915. AWM1, 19/4.

27Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 74, & RO No. 1, 26 ALH, 27 Jan. 1916. AWM1, 19/4.

28RO No. 5, 26th LHR, 3 Feb. 1917. AWM1, 19/4, & Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 74.

29Camp Order No. 4, 26th LHR, [?] Mar. 1917. AWM1, 19/4.

30Grey, The Australian Army, pp. 74-5.

31Citizen Forces Amalgamation Proposal. NAA(M) MP367/1, 549/3/5.

32RO No. 3, 26th LHR, 15 Jun. 1920. AWM1, 19/4.

33Ibid.

227

year.34 Other adjustments to peace also had to be made. The government and military authorities were

hoping that the returned officers and men of the AIF would provide the militia units with much

needed experience and professionalism, but not all returned men wished to continue with soldiering.

One officer, offered command of a Light Horse regiment in 1919, wrote to his superiors:

It is my intention directly on the conclusion of Peace to tender my resignation. My absence abroad entailed heavy financial sacrifices, and in consequence my business affairs requires my unremitting and closest personal attention.35

The immediate post-war period remained as ad hoc as the years preceding. Training again took place

in 1920-21, of which eight days were in camp, but it proved impossible to do anything but the most

basic military work.36

War had offered those who served at home some opportunities, however, even if they were

not always what the government had in mind. One permanent officer, adjutant of the 9th Light Horse

Regiment, found himself the custodian of a large amount of cash left over after paying one of the

unit's squadrons following a period of mobilisation early in the war. Slow in returning it to the pay

office, temptation, and inferentially from the records a taste for horse racing, eventually got the better

of him. Finding himself in "necessitous circumstances" he helped himself to some of these funds.

Undiscovered by the public servant clerks who should have been overseeing things, he then proceeded

to exploit the government with further fraudulent pay sheets. By the time he left the army in mid-

1916, for medical reasons, he had managed to defraud the government of more than a staggering £67

000. Eventually discovered and charged he was sentenced to four years jail. The liquidation of his

estate recovered just £19 726.37

Illegalities aside, it was clear by early 1919 that the militia, part of what was now commonly

referred to as the Australian Military Forces, would require significant reform if were to make a useful

contribution to the nation’s post-war defence. In January of that year the Military Board proposed to

the government the creation of a 300 000-man citizen force that would have included 26 regiments of

Light Horse organised into two divisions, along with an additional 12 squadrons destined as divisional

34RO No. 9, 26th LHR, 17 Sep. 1919. AWM1, 19/4.

35Capt. Stacey, OC A Sqn, 6th LHR to Commander 3rd LH Bde., date unknown, 1919. NAA(M) MP367/1, 630/19/59

36Review of Citizen Force Training, 1920-1921. NAA(C) A1194, 12.30/4477.

37Defalcations of Light Horse Accounts, NAA(C) A1831, 1922/6569. The perpetrator of this stunning fraud was Capt. David Howell-Price who, in his official guise, had been responsible for the publication of the Light Horse Pocketbook (used as a source elsewhere in this thesis), a small practical guide to Light Horse administration and training, just before the war. The total fraud was £67 012.18.6, the amount recovered £19 726.5.7, leaving a balance of £47 286.12.11 to be written off. A number of public servants also lost their jobs or were demoted as a result of this crime.

228

cavalry in support of the infantry.38 Raising and maintaining such a force was well beyond what the

government wanted to spend on military matters and instead it appointed a committee under the

stewardship of the Hon. G. Swinburne, to advise the government. Swinburne's report recommended a

force of 180 000 men and again the Light Horse were to be organized into two divisions. Perhaps

more significant for the mounted branch was the recommendation that the scattered and largely

ineffectual home training be stopped, and that almost all training take place in much longer camps.39

Swinburne's report also failed to become the basis for military planning and it was another committee,

this one of senior officers, formed in 1920 under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry

Chauvel, that would set the tone for the inter-war years. This committee reiterated the Swinburne

condemnation of home training and also advocated the establishment of a 180 000-man force. It also

echoed the previous report’s rejection of home training in favour of extended camps.40 The financial

constraints remained tight, however, and whilst Chauvel's committee also recommended a 180 000-

man force as the bare minimum acceptable force they proposed that in peacetime only 130 000 men

be enlisted at any one time. These figures did not take into account the multitude of support and

service troops that would be required to keep the above force in the field, nor the replacements needed

to replenish losses during a war. For the Light Horse the recommendation was for the establishment of

two divisions (alongside four infantry divisions) plus three regiments as part of the mixed brigades to

be raised in the smaller states (Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania) and an additional two

regiments allocated as corps troops. During peace Light Horse strength would be 11 000 men, to

increase to 22 000 upon the outbreak of war.41

The 1920s

Chauvel's template, adopted as the basis of planning for the Australian Military Forces, was

brought into effect in mid-1921. Each regiment was again reorganized and its framework structure

expanded to reflect wartime experiences. Units were now composed of three squadrons plus a

headquarters squadron that included a command group, an administration troop, a signals troop,

transport troop and a machine gun troop. Squadrons also had increased command establishments and

for the first time at home this was specifically described as a squadron headquarters. Squadrons were

to consist of four troops, one of which was a Hotchkiss Gun troop. Provision was also made for

38Military Board Agenda, 21 Jan. 1919. NAA(C) A2653/1, 1919, p. 12.

39Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 86-88. Swinburne was assisted in his deliberations by Lt-Gen. C.B.B White, Maj-Gen. J.W. McCay & Maj-Gen. J.G. Legge. Swinburne delivered his report to the government in June 1919.

40Ibid., pp. 90-1.

41Ibid.

229

adequate first line regimental transport.42 As in the years just after federation the restricted peacetime

establishment meant a near full number of officers and senior NCOs would be kept on strength but the

number of men they would command would be restricted. Still, the plans set out in 1921 had a Light

Horse regiment at full peacetime strength numbering a considerable 400 men and 29 officers.43

Though nothing had been agreed upon, a proposed establishment discussed in 1920 had the full war

strength of a regiment set at a very large 700 men, all ranks.44

Perhaps the greatest single change for the Light Horse to come out of this period of reform

was a modification in its role and equipment. No doubt as a result of the lessons of Palestine in 1917-

18, and the days of mobile warfare that had taken place on the Western Front in late 1918, it was

decided that all the Light Horse would "be trained as Cavalry in future".45 It was an explicit

affirmation of the experience of the Australian Mounted Division in 1918 and a general recognition

that cavalry, trained in modern fire tactics but also trained and equipped for the judicious use of the

arme blanche, was a tactically flexible and still useful arm. The change brought to an end the mounted

rifle template that Hutton had introduced upon federation and that had seen the Light Horse through

most of the war. The sword, as used by the Light Horse in Palestine, was the chosen weapon. The

lance, the subject of so much pre-war controversy in Britain and which Hutton had foreseen as a

suitable wartime armament for part of the Light Horse in 1902-3, was finally withdrawn from British

regiments in the 1920s and there is no evidence it was considered for Australian use. Somewhat

strangely, rather than adopt the imperial Cavalry Training manual, which had been revised to take

into account the lessons of the war and republished in 1920, it was decided to continue with Yeomanry

and Mounted Rifle Training, 1912, last given a small update in 1915, and which contained no sections

on sword training, as the Light Horse’s training guide. The authorities intended that the change to

cavalry would be gradual and this proved to be the case.46 At least one Light Horse regiment did not

receive its first instruction on the sword until 1926,47 though whether this unit was among the first to

42Annual Training Establishments (Provisional), 1921-22. NAA(C) A1194, 22.34/6984, & RO, 1st Cavalry Division, 8 Nov. 1921. AWM1, 17/18.

43Ibid.

44Proposals for Reorganisation of the Australian Military Forces. Military Board Agenda 272/1920, 29 Sep. 1920. NAA(C) A2653/1, 1920, Vol. 2.

45Correspondence regarding Divisional Organisation. NAA(M) MP367/1, 549/1/6.

46Ibid. There is no explicit explanation from the sources as to why the adoption of the sword was so drawn out. It seems likely though that economy was a key reason. Buying and importing sufficient swords from Great Britain would have been a significant expense during the austere inter-war years.

47Inspection Report, Annual Camp 1926, 11th LHR, p. 7, Military Board Agenda 165/1926, 13 Oct. 1926. NAA(C) A2653/1, 1926, Vol. 1. It is not clear from the extant sources when the sword training began. There were some mentions of problems relating to sword training, as will be seen, that date from 1927-28 and it was not until that time that any need to change to the manual to Cavalry Training was realised. It is possible that supply of the weapons, and training with them, did not begin until the 1926-27 training year.

230

do so or was a laggard is not clear. In contrast to the conversions from the sword and lance under

Hutton, there appears to have been no objections to the change.

This reform, in combination with the organisational changes that had been introduced,

resulted in the Light Horse Brigades being renamed Cavalry Brigades, and the two new divisions

were similarly titled the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (headquartered in Sydney and Melbourne

respectively). To make up these divisions six brigades, each of three regiments, were to be raised.

Queensland and South Australia supported one apiece, New South Wales and Victoria two each.

Queensland maintained a fourth regiment above the brigade requirement as part of the mixed brigade

also raised in its Military District. Tasmania and Western Australia’s solitary regiments were similarly

allocated to mixed formations based on their Military Districts. South Australia and Victoria also

maintained one additional regiment each, allotted as corps cavalry in support of the infantry.48

The changes brought into effect in 1921 were, however, quickly undermined by massive cuts

to defence spending the following year. The conclusion of the Washington Conference of 1921

provided the government, already a reluctant defence spender, with a pretext for a making deep cuts

to a defence force already trying to construct itself to constitute what was regarded as the bare

minimum. The government’s faith in the security provided by the treaties of the Washington

Conference was reinforced following the Imperial Conference of 1923 where the government

subscribed itself wholeheartedly to the Singapore Strategy. The cuts saw the militia reduced from

3256 to 2332 officers, and from 86 586 to 35 228 other ranks.49 The net effect of which was that the

military forces were reduced to what the government described as a "cadre formation of practically

25% of war strength."50 This percentage figure was, in reality, something of a fudge as there were at

this time no set wartime establishments. As the Military Board noted the following year, since "the

recent war, no Commonwealth War Establishments have been issued and in case of necessity,

improvisation must be resorted to."51 Universal Training was to be maintained but was scaled back to

just two years in the ranks, and would now encompass only cities and large towns, thereby forcing the

Light Horse to rely still more heavily on voluntary enlistment.52 Perhaps more disturbing was a drastic

reduction of the time allocated to training to just six days in camp and another four days of home

training.53 Reductions of training time to such low levels was not only contrary to all the advice on the

48Annual Training Establishments (Provisional), 1921-22. NAA(C) A1194, 22.34/6984.

49Grey, The Australian Army, pp. 78-9.

50Military Board Agenda 111/1922, 7 Jun. 1922. NAA(C) A2653/1, 1922, Vol. 2.

51War Establishments for Units of a Cavalry Division. Military Board Agenda 160/1923, 10 Oct. 1923. NAA(C) A2653/1, 1923, Vol. 2.

52Ibid.

53Ibid.

231

matter over the previous years (as were many decisions during this period) but, for the Light Horse,

completely disregarded the lessons of the pre-war years. Even the eight-day camps instituted under

Hutton had proved inadequate for the Light Horse and in the years immediately before the war there

had been a concerted effort to increase the number of days the mounted branch spent in camp. As had

been repeatedly pointed out, it was only in camp that the scattered Light Horse regiments were likely

to achieve useful training. It was also widely acknowledged by this time that whatever the length of

camp, one day could effectively be taken off both ends of the training program due to the

administrative requirements of marching in and out of camp.54 The introduction of six day camps was

thus nearly a regression to the pre-federation habit of four-day Easter camps.

The divisional and brigade structure was maintained but regiments would now be much

smaller than planned the year before, reduced to a smaller headquarters squadron and just two 'sabre'

squadrons (three in war).55 Each squadron was similarly reduced from four to three smaller troops -

Hotchkiss Gun Troops being maintained. The permanent forces, recently reformed from the old

Administrative and Instructional Staff into the Australian Instructional Corps (AIC), made up mostly

of the NCO instructors, and the new Australian Staff Corps, consisting of permanent arms corps

officers, were also drastically reduced. In 1921 the Central Training Depot, which included a Cavalry

Wing, had been established to provide regularised and consistent training to the permanent

instructors.56 This school might have done much to improve the quality of the permanent instructors

whose performance had been patchy before the war, but it also became a victim of the 1922 cuts. The

demands of reorganisation meant that no camps were again held during 1922.57 After the ambivalence

of the war and immediate post-war years, followed by a period of organisational tumult, it is no

surprise to find that the condition of some regiments at this time was far from rosy. The adjutant of

one New South Wales Light Horse regiment noted in a regimental journal in 1923:

Camp of Continuous Training 6 days was held in Orange in February. The Home Training for the Year was unsatisfactory and the % of efficient below 60. Generally speaking the condition of the Regiment is not good owing to several causes[,] one of which may be changes in Staff and the absence of a permanent Adjutant.[sic]58

54Review of Citizen Force Training, 1920-1921. NAA(C) A1194, 12.30/4477.

55Tables of Composition, Organisation and Distribution of the Australian Military Forces, 1922-1923. NAA(C) A1194, 21.20/6900, & RO, 1st Cavalry Division, 2 Aug. 1922. AWM 1, 17/18.

56Grey, The Australian Army, p. 78, & The Central Training Depot, Instructions and Syllabus of Training (Provisional), July 1921, Military Order No. 338/1921. NAA(C) A1194, 12.30/4479.

57History of Cavalry in New South Wales, Notes on History of NSWMR, 2nd LHR, & 6th LHR, 1888-1940, p. 29. AWM 1, 17/1.

58Notes by Maj. Couchman, Adjutant & QM, 6th ALH Regiment, 30 Jun. 1923, ibid., p. 30.

232

The years of the mid-1920s thus became ones where regiments, and the new formations above

them, spent much of their time trying establish themselves and find a degree of stability. For many

units getting their manning up to some point near their establishment was a key priority. Tasmania’s

lone regiment, in a state that had long had trouble raising mounted troops, exhorted Troop Leaders

and NCOs to be active in their community recruiting as the unit was much below strength.59 This was

all the more important as the roll-back of Universal Training meant that the only compelled trainees

finding their way into some regiments were the occasional infantryman with a horse, no doubt sick of

walking, who transferred from a nearby battalion.60 For men like this the authorities ensured that

"C.O.s of other branches are required to afford every facility for those who wish to

transfer..."[emphasis in original]61 Attempts were made to make service more attractive and in 1923

the leather leggings that had been on issue to the Light Horse just before the war and in the AIF, and

which seem to have been both a practical and cherished item of uniform for mounted troops, were

authorized for general use. Similarly emu plumes, which had been allowed for the Light Horse of the

AIF and for regiments in some states before the Universal Training, were also approved for general

Light Horse adoption in 1923, provided, of course, no expense was incurred by the Commonwealth.62

Granville Ryrie, commanding a Cavalry Division, had urged these changes as "the uniform should be

made smarter and more distinctive...[and] the result will be an appreciable increase in esprit de

corps..."63 Reflecting the change in role from mounted rifles, and formalising the honorific tradition,

the rank of the most junior soldiers was altered from Private to the traditional cavalry title of Trooper

in late 1924.64 In 1926, in a partial reversal of the wartime decision, territorial titles were again

introduced.65

At a time when there were few material resources to make use of it was small trappings like

these, aimed at boosting morale and spirit, that were about all that the military authorities could hand

out to their soldiers. In the same vein much effort was directed at trying to ensure that the honour and

elan of the AIF was carried over into the citizen forces. Battle honours earned by units of the AIF had

been handed out to the regiments that now carried their unit number and from 1926 they could be

59RO, Part I, Para. 16, 22nd LHR, 30 Nov. 1923. AWM1, 19/5.

60RO No. 7, 22nd LHR, 27 Mar. 1923. AWM1, 19/4.