The EU hand in sustainable fisheries governance: A case study of the effectiveness of the EU's illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing Regulation on the Philippines

KU LEUVEN MASTER OF EUROPEAN STUDIES: TRANSNATIONAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES BLIJDE INKOMSTSTRAAT 5

3000 LEUVEN, BELGIË

The EU hand in sustainable fisheries governance: A case study of the effectiveness of the EU's illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing Regulation on the Philippines

Mary Madeleine Denopra

Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in European Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Katja Biedenkopf

Academic year 2014 - 2015

10, 488 words (excl. footnotes)

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Contents

Title Page…………………………………………………………………..i

Table of Contents………………………………………………...………..ii

Acknowledgment..………………………………………………………..iii

Executive Summary………….…………………………………………...iv

1.0 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................1

1.1 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing: a serious global threat.......2

1.2 The international consensus and the EU.................................................3

1.3 Trade aspects and the IUU-tagged countries..........................................4

1.4 The EU and the IUU Regulation............................................................5

1.5 The Philippine Fisheries Law.................................................................7

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW.............................................................................9

2.1 Policy diffusion and global environmental governance……………….9

2.2 Related Studies……………………………………………………….10

3.0 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK…………………….…………………...11

3.1 Logics of social action and corresponding mechanisms……..……….12

3.2 Measures of effectiveness…………………………………………….15

3.3 Conditions shaping policy diffusion.....................................................16

4.0 METHODS.................................................................................................18

5.0 MAIN FINDINGS......................................................................................18

6.0 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................27

LIST OF REFERENCES............................................................................30

ANNEXES..................................................................................................37

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Katja Biedenkopf, whose

constant encouragement, patient and focused guidance, expertise, availability and overall

approachability, has made the thesis writing process a bearable and enjoyable one. I could not

have asked for a better promoter.

Second, I acknowledge the academic and moral support of my treasured friends at the

University and in the MAES program, especially Coco Korse, Jihyeon Kim, and Leigh

Karras, whose cheerful presence maintain my mental and emotional health. My thanks also

goes out to the teaching assistants and library personnel who have extended assistance during

my stay at the University.

Third, I am forever grateful to my Charleroi families: Andres-Griarte family, Werion-

Tambanillo family, Forneste-Duquet family, Monte-Gohy family, Pimentel family, and many

other equally supportive Tito’s, Tita’s, and friends whose generosity and TLC have ensured

my survival and safety in Belgium. Thank you for treating me as your own. May I be able to,

one day, express my appreciation the best way that I can.

Fourth, I would like to thank my precious friends in Liege, who have also been my

pillar of strength during the past academic year. To the Haenen-Craig family, Wynants-

Lemaire family, Massart-Meyers family, Lemaitre-Tomei family, Michel Jaspar and

Emmanuel Roblou, Laurette Ghaye, Janny Creteur, Laura Champenois, Michele Roubin,

Marie Campigotto, Marie-Pierre Thissen, Janie Mardaga, Marie Jeanne and Joelle Lurquin,

Jenny Janssen, Patricia Charlier, Chenot family, Danielle Caldellary and Charles Theys,

thank you for the understanding, love, and support.

Fifth, I have and will always appreciate the unconditional love and spiritual guidance of

my family regardless of physical distance: Tatay, Ate Bing, Kuya John, Ate Janet, Ate Di,

Ate Mar, Ate Chie, Ate Lan, and Auntie Bibing. Indeed, there is no place like home.

Sixth, I would also like to express my gratitude to Kuya Ed, Kuya Paeng, and my UPSA

family, without whom: I would never have been the sociable, culturally adaptable, and

resilient person that I am today; and would never have had the privilege of experiencing

Filipino-Belgian solidarity all around me.

Last but most importantly, I attribute all the good and the beautiful in my life to my

Creator, who has blessed me with my family, friends, and many other gifts that I continually

receive every minute of my existence. May I work effectively to benefit more than myself.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The pursuit of sustainable fisheries management has been continually constrained by

illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices that plague the marine

environment, fishing communities, and consumers the world over. This serious global

threat has been recognized by the UN, the FAO, states, regional fisheries management

organizations, and other multilateral actors. The battle against which, however, is notably

strategic in the EU’s pioneering IUU Regulation (No. 1005/2008) under its Common

Fisheries Policy. This policy instrument obliges Member States as well as external trade

partners to systematically ensure the sustainable use of the world’s fish resources and

specifically confront IUU fishing activities.

This study investigated the impact of the IUU Regulation particularly on the

Philippines as one of the two fishing nations (the other being Papua New Guinea) issued

with a ‘yellow card’ or pre-identified by the European Union in June of 2014 as a possible

non-cooperating country. This made the Philippines a candidate for eventual fish trade

sanctions if necessary reforms to comply with the Regulation were not made within a

specified (albeit a context-sensitive and negotiable) time frame. In April of 2015, the

yellow tag was lifted in recognition of the country’s constant cooperation and achieved

legal and administrative reforms, showing readiness to fight IUU fishing. The study

attempted to explain the extent of success of the EU IUU Regulation on the Philippines as

well as the conditions that shaped this success.

A policy diffusion approach enabled the study to: (1) identify the logics of social

action and diffusion mechanisms at play; and (2) analyze the level and conditions of

effectiveness of the concerned policy. The study revealed that: combined logics of

consequences, appropriateness, and, to a lesser degree, arguing, characterized the EU’s

approach on the Philippines; under these logics, the EU demonstrated mainly direct

diffusion mechanisms such as manipulating utility calculations in the form of

conditionality (the threat of trade measures) and capacity-building (technical and financial

assistance), socialisation, and, to a mild extent, persuasion; the effectiveness of the IUU

Regulation fully reached the level of rule adoption but not yet rule implementation,

considering that implementation rules and guidelines to the newly amended law are still

being drafted. Furthermore, the mechanisms and effectiveness of the IUU Regulation were

shaped by the following conditions: the weight of the EU’s market power that works, at

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the same time, within the context of a partnership and cooperation framework; the

legitimacy of EU's institutional leadership; and the domestic structures that influenced

transition from legal and administrative weaknesses to a remarkable improvement in a

span of ten months after the yellow warning was issued.

Overall, these findings showed that the success of the EU IUU Regulation on the

Philippines necessarily required a complex and fastidious approach both from the EU and

the Philippines. The implementation of the IUU Regulation on the Philippines is a good

case of explaining the importance of understanding the intricacies of EU-third country

interaction. Combining logics of social action demonstrates a 'carrot and stick' strategy and

the application of only one of them would render the policy ineffective. Moreover, the

convergence of interests, like-mindedness, and a shared committment to observing

international norms, were important in shaping the effectiveness of this case of policy

diffusion. The study showed that the Philippines and the EU had the same idea about the

way forward.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION One of the many important issue areas confronted today in global environmental

governance is illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This global threat has

brought in a range of social, environmental, and economic problems, such as, the

unsustainable exploitation of the marine environment, affording illegal fishers a

competitive advantage over law-abiding ones, causing unfair competition, affecting

government revenues, and threatening global food security.1 As a key environmental

player, the European Union (EU) recognizes this problem and, in fact, entered into force in

January 2010, a pioneering policy instrument that is geared towards fighting IUU fishing

both within and beyond EU waters.2

This study investigated the process and effectiveness of implementing the EU’s IUU

Regulation (No. 1005/2008) on the Philippines – one of the world’s top biodiversity hotspots

and a major fish-producing country.3 The archipelagic state, composed of 7,107 islands, was

issued by the EU with a ‘yellow card’ or pre-identified as ‘a possible non-cooperating

country’ with regard to the IUU Regulation.4 The pre-identification issued last January 1,

2010 meant that the country was detected to have engaged in IUU fishing activities.

Consequently, it faced the threat of being banned from exporting fish products into the EU

market should it not reform its legislation as well as control, monitoring, and surveillance

systems, to comply with the IUU Regulation. This study addressed the following questions:

How effective is the EU IUU Regulation in influencing sustainable fisheries governance in

the Philippines? What explains the degree of its effectiveness? In order to answer these

questions, the analysis employed a framework drawing on theories from the policy diffusion

literature. The framework provided several lines of inquiry which enabled the study to: (1)

identify the logics of political action and diffusion mechanisms at play; and (2) analyze the

level and conditions of effectiveness of the policy observed.

1 "Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing," FAO, accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.fao.org/fishery/iuu-fishing/en. 2 “IUU Regulation (EC) 1005/2008,” EUR-Lex, accessed October 27, 2014. http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1414715771227&uri=CELEX:32008R1005. 3 "The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014: Opportunities and challenges," FAO, accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. 4 "Question and Answers on the EU's fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing" European Commission Memo, accessed October 24, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-408_en.htm.

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The study found that the effectiveness of the EU’s IUU Regulation rested on

combined logics of consequences, appropriateness, and, to a lesser degree, arguing. These

underlying logics were manifested by direct diffusion mechanisms employed, such as,

manipulating utility calculations in the form of conditionality (the threat of trade

measures) and capacity-building (technical and financial assistance), as well as

socialisation and persuasion. The effectiveness of the IUU Regulation fully reached the

level of rule adoption in the form of fisheries law reforms, while rule implementation is

still in progress. The bigger picture showed the weight of the EU’s market power and the

legitimacy of its institutional leadership (both encompassed in the larger framework of

EU-Philippine partnership and cooperation), a convergence in interests and commitments,

and the favorable Philippine domestic structures that progressed from what were initially

systemic shortcomings which transformed into speedy improvement, rendering the third

country equipped to fight IUU fishing.

1.1 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing: a serious global threat

IUU fisheries worldwide is estimated to have benefitted more than 10 billion euros

annually as the demand for fish in the globalized world also increased.5 It is internationally

identified as a major environmental as well as a socio-economic threat, as confirmed by an

International Plan of Action (IPOA-IUU) developed by the Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO) in 2001.6 This problem is a serious one as unsustainable fishing practices

in the last few decades have caused an accelerated decline in the world’s fish stocks7. IUU

fishing causes ecological imbalance, affects global food security as one-fifth of the world’s

population is dependent on protein-rich fish8, and jeopardizes the livelihood of coastal

communities, especially in developing countries. The FAO reports that the “proportion of

assessed marine fish stocks fished within biologically sustainable levels declined from 90

percent in 1974 to 71.2 percent in 2011, when 28.8 percent of fish stocks were estimated to

be fished at a biologically unsustainable level and, therefore, overfished.”9 At this rate, there

is fear that the world would see a total collapse in marine fisheries by 2048 if measures to

5 David J. Agnewet al., "Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing," PLoS ONE 4, no. 2, (2009): e4570, accessed May 3, 2015, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004570. 6 "International Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing," FAO 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/y1224e/y1224e00.pdf. 7 Jordi Díez, “Globalization and Environmental Challenges Confronting the South,” in Global Environmental Challenges: Perspectives from the South, ed. Jordi Díez and O.P. Dwivedi. (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 18. 8 Ibid. 9 "The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014: Opportunities and challenges."

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fight IUU fishing are not put in place and implemented effectively10. A range of underlying

activities that define IUU fishing are described in the FAO’s IPOA-IUU to prevent, deter and

eliminate IUU fishing. These will be featured in a separate section on the IUU Regulation.

1.2 The international consensus and the EU

While the FAO, the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development, regional fishing management organizations (RFMOs), and

states make up a global consensus on strengthening measures to defeat IUU fishing, the

European Commission initiated to level up the EU’s policy, assuming an international

responsibility as the world’s largest economy and market for fish.11 The way to do it was to

enhance the EU’s strategy from what used to be a less comprehensive 2002 Action Plan12 to

what is now the IUU Regulation under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This well-

defined market-related policy instrument under the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs

and Fisheries (DG MARE) is based on, inter alia, the larger frameworks including the FAO

Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in 1995, the United Nations Conventions on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 from the United Nations

Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) or the Rio Summit. The

innovation of this policy rests on a package of thorough and technical regulatory schemes

with which third countries must comply in order to access or maintain access to the EU

market.

It is clear that this Regulation fulfills an objective of the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea, particularly Article 118, encouraging states to “cooperate with each other

in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas.”13 In

addition, one of the many fruits of the Rio Summit in 1992 was the formulation and adoption

of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which recognized that “aquatic

resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need to be properly managed, if their

contribution to the nutritional, economic and social well-being of the growing world's

10 Jordi Díez, 18. 11 "Communication from the Commission: On a new strategy for the Community to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing," EUR-Lex, accessed April 16, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0601&from=EN. 12 "Community action plan to eradicate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing," EUR-Lex, accessed April 16, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l66008. 13 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Article 118, UN, accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

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population is to be sustained.”14 Also, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) recognized the problem of IUU fishing in 2010.15

However, as previous statistics show, these international agreements, including the FAO's

IPOA-IUU, have been inadequate and not effective enough to address the problem of IUU

fishing.

1.3 Trade aspects and the IUU-tagged countries

The EU is the Philippines’ 4th largest trading partner overall16 and also the world’s

biggest fish importer.17 The EU’s role in tackling IUU fishing is critical since two-thirds of its

fish is said to be imported.18 The recent publication of Eurostat entitled The EU in the world

2014 showed the EU’s dependence on fish imports as “the total fish catch by the EU-28

fishing fleet was 3.9 million tonnes in 2011, less than half the catch 10 years earlier.”19 A

report by the European Market Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture Products

(EUMOFA) revealed that the value of imports increased at 3% between 2011 and 2012,

amounting to 19.2 billion euros.20 The EU benefits from the Philippine fishing industry as it

has imported “$230 million of fish products from the country last year—or one-sixth of total

Philippine exports,” with the EU consuming 40% of the Philippines’ tuna catch.21 Former DG

MARE Commissioner Damanaki pointed out during her announcement on the IUU warning

on the Philippines last June 2014, that “sustainability of fish in the Philippines also means

sustainability of fish on European plates.”22

Since the IUU Regulation’s inception, twelve other countries have been prompted,

namely: Papua New Guinea in 2014; Fiji, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu in 2012;

Ghana, Curacao and South Korea in 2013; and Belize, Cambodia, and Guinea in 2014, with

14 Preface to the "Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries," FAO, 1995, accessed October 24, 2014. http://www.fao.org/3/a-v9878e.pdf. 15 "Statement by John Scanlon, Secretary-General of CITES to the 17th Special Meeting of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas," Paris, November 19, 2010, CITES, accessed May 7, 2015, https://cites.org/eng/news/sg/2010/20101119_sg_statement_ICCAT.php. 16 "European Union, Trade in goods with Philippines," DG Trade, accessed October 24, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113436.pdf. 17 "2014 Edition: The EU Fish Market," EUMOFA, accessed April 16, 2015. http://www.eumofa.eu/documents/10157/7a04438d-9c52-4191-99ca-cfad38985718. 18 “Fighting illegal fishing to preserve sustainability in the Western Pacific,” EC Press Release 1, accessed October 24, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-187_en.htm. 19 “The EU in the world 2014: A statistical portrait,” accessed October 24, 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EX-14-001/EN/KS-EX-14-001-EN.PDF. 20 EUMOFA. 21 Trefor Moss, “EU Threat Looms Over Philippine Fishing Industry,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2014, accessed October 24, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/eu-threat-looms-over-philippine-fishing-industry-1403261826. 22 EC Press Release 1.

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the latter three already subject to trade bans (red cards).”23 Belize was later on "removed from

the list of non-cooperating countries," according a DG MARE Policy officer working on IUU

cases.24 In this study, a focus on the Philippines as an explanatory case study was given in an

attempt to illustrate a facet of the wider phenomenon of EU policy diffusion in the context of

global environmental governance.

1.4 The EU and the IUU Regulation

The European Union’s (EU) scope of influence continues to widen as it projects itself

onto the world stage as an environmental leader. With a legal foundation whose beginnings

can be traced back to the early 1970s25, the EU’s environment-related policy has significantly

progressed to the extent of promoting “measures at international level to deal with regional or

worldwide environmental problems.”26 Through decades of persistent participation in the

global environmental arena, it has earned a strong bargaining power and today, blazes a trail

as an active and pioneering policy innovator whose impact extends far beyond the bounds of

its member states. This study illustrated this distinctive feature of the sui generis EU by

examining the effectiveness of the IUU Regulation (No. 1005/2008) towards the Philippines.

The IUU Regulation (1008/2005) forms part of the international dimension of the

Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union. Directly under DG Maritime Affairs

and Fisheries (DG MARE), the CFP 's origins can be traced back to the 1970s and has since

undergone a series of updates.27 The CFP is primarily designed for the effective management

of the EU’s common fish resources to ensure environmental and socio-economic

sustainability. The IUU dimension rests on the fact that the EU plays a lead role in the

different bodies under the UNCLOS and UN Fish Stocks Agreement: the FAO and Regional

Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). RFMOs "are international organisations

formed by countries with fishing interests in an area" whose role is "to guarantee the

management, conservation and sustainable exploitation of the living marine species covered

23 "Commission warns Philippines and Papua New Guinea over insufficient action to fight illegal fishing," EC Press Release 2, accessed October 24, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-653_en.htm. 24 Anonymous interview, Policy Officer at DG MARE, interview by author, March 19, 2015, transcript. 25 Andrew Jordan, “Introduction: European Union Environmental Policy – Actors, Institutions and Policy Processes,” in Environmental Policy in the European Union – Actors, Institutions and Processes 2002, ed. Andrew Jordan (London: Earthscan Publications, 2002), 3. 26 "International Issues," EC-Environment, accessed April 25, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/index_en.htm. 27 "The Common Fisheries Policy," EC-Fisheries, accessed October 24, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/index_en.htm.

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in their remit by setting catch limits, technical measures and control obligations."28 The

Western and Central Pacific Fishing Commission (WCPFC) is an RFMO of which the

Philippines is a member. The EU joins these organizations in a multilateral approach to

combat IUU fishing, publishing "a list of blacklisted vessels and non-cooperative countries,

and penalising offenders."29

The management of the EU’s external fishery trade relations is covered in Part VI of the

CFP where the policy is viewed partly in the context of fostering development and economic

cooperation. It emphasizes promoting action to deter, prevent, and eliminate illegal,

unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The IUU Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 prevents

products from exporting states to enter the EU market without legal validation by its home

country’s authority - in the Philippines’ case, it is the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic

Resources. In cooperation with RFMOs, the EU also seeks to help improve scientific and

regulatory frameworks on fishing and fleet management, and to ensure compliance with

internationally adopted measures. The EU considers what it describes as a pioneering

Regulation a success that has been "triggering positive change" as it has been receiving

positive responses from 90% of about 50 countries it came in contact with.30

IUU fishing is first defined in the Regulation as “fishing activities which are illegal,

unreported, and unregulated.”31 Underlying activities that characterize IUU fishing are

subsequently identified and based on the definition provided by the FAO IPOA-IUU. Illegal

fishing activities are those which are: “(a) conducted by national or foreign fishing vessels in

maritime waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in

contravention of its laws and regulations; (b) conducted by fishing vessels flying the flag of

States that are contracting parties to a relevant regional fisheries management organisation,

but which operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by

that organisation and by which those States are bound, or of relevant provisions of the

applicable international law; or (c) conducted by fishing vessels in violation of national laws

or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States.”32 Unreported

fishing means activities which: “have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the

relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or (b) have

28 "The International Dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy," Infographic, EC-Environment, accessed May 6, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/2015-cfp-international_en.pdf. 29 Ibid. 30 Anonymous interview: Policy Officer at DG MARE. 31 IUU Regulation, Article 2, pt. 1. 32 Ibid., pt. 2.

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been undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management

organisation and have not been reported, or have been misreported, in contravention of the

reporting procedures of that organisation.”33 Finally, unregulated fishing refers to activities

which are: “(a) conducted in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries

management organisation by fishing vessels without nationality, by fishing vessels flying the

flag of a State not party to that organisation or by any other fishing entity, in a manner that is

not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that

organisation; and (b) conducted in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no

applicable conservation or management measures by fishing vessels in a manner that is not

consistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under

international law.”34

The identification of a third country as a possible non-cooperating country is clearly

specified in Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation. Article 31 states that a “third country may be

identified as a non-cooperating third country if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent upon

it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, to take action to prevent, deter

and eliminate IUU fishing.”35 In the same Article, this identification is based on examinations

done by the EU on the third country concerned, taking into consideration factors that affect

its capacity as a developing country. Moreover, Article 32 explains that the Commission shall

notify a third country of being a possible non-cooperating country with accompanying proper

explanations, request the third country to take necessary action to rectify the situation, and

grant a reasonable timeframe to do so.36 Those included in the list of non-cooperating

countries are prohibited from accessing the EU market in terms of fish products and related

trade, bilateral, and fisheries agreements are also banned, as indicated in Article 38 of

Chapter VII.37

1.5 The Philippine Fisheries Law The Philippine Fisheries Law has come a long way since the country’s independence

from Spanish rule, which lasted for more than three centuries.38 The new government

recognized the importance of the agricultural sector as the country’s main economic driver, of

33 Ibid., pt. 3. 34 Ibid., pt. 4. 35 Ibid., Article 31, pt. 4. 36 Ibid., Article 32. 37 Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 38. 38 "History," BFAR, accessed October 16, 2014, http://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/about_us.jsp?id=27.

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which fisheries makes up a substantial part, and established the Department of Agriculture as

one of its first agencies. After relative economic maturation, not to mention Second World

War interruptions in between, the fisheries division was reorganized and improved as the

Bureau of Fisheries in 1947 and has since been established as such.39 This provided the

foundation for the improvement of legislation specifically covering Philippine fisheries

governance.

After successive updates beginning from 1866 under the Spanish government and

after Philippine independence in 1898, legislation on fisheries became more comprehensive.

In 1975, a Presidential Decree (No. 704) directed the revision and consolidation of all

policies concerning fisheries.40 Until this year, the Philippine Fisheries industry was protected

by the Fisheries Code Republic Act 8550 or The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. This act

was created with the objective to provide for “the development, management and

conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources, integrating all laws pertinent thereto, and

for other purposes."41 Moreover, there was another Act in 1997 which envisioned

“transforming and modernizing the country’s agriculture and fisheries sector,” the

Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1998 or AFMA (Republic Act No. 8435).42

After the issuance of the “yellow warning” by the EU, the Philippine Senate and

Congress passed into law the Republic Act No. 10654 in July 2014, which entered into force

in February 2015.43 The act toughened sanctions and incorporated measures against IUU

fishing into the existing legislation. A reflection of the terminology used by the FAO in its

international plan of action, it was described as "an act to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal,

unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as

The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, and for other purposes."44 A technical working group

representing the commercial fishing sector, government, NGOs, municipal fishers,

39 Ibid. 40 "Presidential Decree No. 704 May 16, 1974," The LawPhil Project, accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1974/pd_704_1974.html. 41 "Laws and Regulations," BFAR Official Site, accessed October 16, 2014, http://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/lawAndRegulation.jsp. 42 "History," Department of Agriculture Official Site, accessed October 16, 2014, http://www.da.gov.ph/index.php/2012-03-27-12-02-11/2012-03-27-13-25-13. 43 Czeriza Valencia, "Amended Fisheries Code takes effect this week," The Philippine Star, March 28, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015, http://www.philstar.com/business/2015/03/28/1438198/amended-fisheries-code-takes-effect-week. 44 "Laws and Regulations."

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academicians, and aquarium fish exporters were commissioned to draft the implementing

rules and regulations due September of 2015.45

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Policy diffusion and global environmental governance The literature of policy diffusion can be found growing across related disciplines -

international relations, global governance, public policy, European and environmental politics

studies - where focal interest is shown on the way policies and international norms spread. In

their article entitled “Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners,” Shipan

and Volden provide an introductory account of policy diffusion scholarship recognizing the

increasing interest on the topic by scholars and practitioners, as well as nearly a thousand

articles that have been published in the last fifty years.46 In the field of global environmental

governance, Biedenkopf defines policy diffusion as “the process through which policies

spread among a group of jurisdictions or even globally.”47 In policy diffusion, the main task

involves identifying mechanisms which explain the ways by which one policy or norm

influences another.48 Examples of which are coercion, competition, learning, and emulation.49

However, formulating these mechanisms vary across different studies. Scope conditions that

explain why certain mechanisms are employed are also probed in policy diffusion research.

From an international relations angle such as that of Gilardi, diffusion is very important as

interdependence among states, regardless of geographical proximity, is what characterizes the

globalized world and, hence, there is an increasing need to harmonize policies especially

those that address issues of global concern.50

Similarly, the subject of Europeanisation in the EU studies literature examines

harmonizing policies in the EU and those at the national level. As Börzel and Risse (2012)

point out, since it is clear that the reach of EU policy extends from the member states and

45 Candeze Mongaya, "Amended Fisheries Code Sets Higher Penalties, Tightens Rules on Commercial Fishing," Oceana Press Release, April 16, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015, http://ph.oceana.org/press-center/press-releases/amended-fisheries-code-sets-higher-penalties-tightens-rules-commercial. 46 Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden, "Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners, Public Administration Review 72, no. 6, (2012): 788–796, accessed June 5, 2015. DOI: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02610.x. 47 Katja Biedenkopf, "Policy Diffusion," in Essential Concepts of Global Environmental Governance, eds. Jean-Frédéric Morin and Amandine Orsini, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 152. 48 Ibid. 49 Biedenkopf, 152-154; Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden, "The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion," American Journal of Political Science 52 (2008): 840, accessed June 5, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00346.x. 50 Fabrizio Gilardi, "Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies," in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, (Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 2012): 453-477.

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accession candidates to, for instance, Asia and Latin America without Europeanising these

regions, it is but logical to embed these phenomena within diffusion studies.51 For instance,

“the EU Treaties influenced the ASEAN Charter in 2008” and “the Andean Court of Justice

was modelled on the European Court of Justice.52 In terms of EU external governance,

Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) remark that much of EU legislation is based on

international rules and standards, as well as recognize that “the question of how far third

countries outside the circle of candidates for membership actually adapt to EU norms has

remained little investigated.”53

2.2 Related Studies Studies have been conducted on the problem of IUU fishing, mostly within marine

policy scholarship. Many of them involve the impact of market or trade related strategies as

well as international regimes to combat IUU fishing at the levels either of states, regions, or

the global system. Others provide a lengthy account of the surrounding contexts and

overaching legal and international frameworks that attempt to explain: the problem of IUU

fishing, causes of its prevalence, the legal, economic, and political factors involved, and the

specific measures proposed and effected at international and regional levels.54 For instance, in

September 2010, a study was conducted on the impact of the FAO Code of Conduct for

Responsible Fisheries on nine selected fishing countries from Asia, Africa, and Caribbean,

wherein findings point out the relative failure of the Code to fight illlegal, unreported and

unregulated fishing.55

There was also a study related to the EU’s role in combating IUU fishing. Miller, Bush,

and Mol (2013) investigated the impact of the EU’s market as well as its normative power in

implementing its IUU Regulation on Western Pacific island countries.56 Their research found

51 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction," West European Politics 35, no. 6 (2012): 1-2, accessed January 16, 2015, DOI:10.1080/01402382.2012.631310. 52 Anja Jetschke and Philomena Murray, "Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast Asia," West European Politics 35, no. 1, (2012): 174-191, accessed January 16, 2015, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2012.631320. 53 Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics," Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6, (2009): 800, accessed January 16, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760903087696. 54 Rachel Baird, Aspects of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in the Southern Ocean (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). 55 Gilles Hosch, Gianluca Ferraro, and Pierre Failler, "The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: Adopting, implementing or scoring results?" Marine Policy 35, no. 2, (2010): 189-200, accessed April 25, 2015, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2010.09.005. 56 Alice M. Miller, Simon R. Bush, and Arthur P.J. Mol, "Power Europe: EU and the illegal, unreported and unregulated tuna fisheries regulation in the West and Central Pacific Ocean, Marine Policy 45 (2014): 138-145, accessed October 24, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.12.009.

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that the EU’s market power remains a strong force in influencing regulatory frameworks in

third countries while its normative power is becoming less effective, recommending that the

EU focus on a cooperation approach instead of merely presenting the benefits of the IUU

Regulation or the consequences of non-cooperation. There is not much research done yet on

the impact of the EU's IUU Regulation on third countries.

In the Asia-Pacific, IUU fishing in Indonesia and Malaysia have been given scholarly

attention. Sodik, for instance, found that Indonesia lacks the sufficient legal framework for

vessel registration and fishing vessel licensing to fight IUU fishing as agreed upon in

international fisheries agreements.57 Similarly, Poh and Fanning conducted research on the

status of live reef fish trade in Sabah, Malaysia, under the bigger context of IUU fishing

trade.58 Again, international agreements that contain recommendations have not been

transposed to the national and local levels, and that “deliberate management planning and

action at multiple levels” must be done to effectively confront the problem.59 This study

presents the very recent Philippine case of IUU from the approach of the EU’s IUU

Regulation.

The diffusion literature involving EU-third country interaction with regard to

environmental policy has not come across the issue of IUU fishing, much less on the

Philippine case. The more popular studies are those that touch on the EU’s Forest Law

Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT)60 whose objective is the sustainable

management of the world’s forests. Focus was given on countries such as Ghana, Indonesia,

Myanar, and Cameroon, among others, as well as the whole region of Southeast Asia.61

3.0 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In their theorizing work on EU External Governance, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig

(2009) recount the picture of the EU as a sui generis political system that continues to

develop both internally and internationally.62 They attempt to illustrate the many ways in

which to characterize EU external governance as the EU influence spreads to third countries,

57 Dikdik Mohamed Sodik, "IUU Fishing and Indonesia's Legal Framework for Vessel Registration and Fishing Vessel Licensing," Ocean Development & International Law 40, no. 3, (2009): 249-267, accessed July 24, 2015, DOI: 10.1080/00908320903076797. 58 Tun-Min Poh and Lucia M. Fanning, "Tackling illegal, unregulated, and unreported trade towards Humphead wrasse (Cheilinus undulatus) recovery in Sabah,Malaysia," Marine Policy 36 (2012): 696-702, accessed May 8, 2015, doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2011.10.011. 59 Ibid. 60 "What is FLEGT?" EUFLEGT, accessed June 5, 2015, http://www.euflegt.efi.int/flegt-action-plan. 61 See References for FLEGT studies on Indonesia, Myanmar, Cameroon, and Ghana. 62 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, "EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics."

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regions, and organizations, consequently advancing itself in international affairs. In a similar

vein, Borzel and Risse (2012) recognize the diffusion of EU norms, ideas, and policies as the

larger framework in which processes of Europeanisation may be embedded.63 As this study

points to a particular case of EU policy diffusion – the IUU Regulation of the Common

Fisheries Policy touching down on another jurisdiction – it serves as a unique instance that

helps illustrate the variety of ways in which EU external action, particularly one that is of

environmental significance, is carried out towards third countries on different policy areas.

Policy diffusion is the dependent variable and finding out how, to what extent, and to what

effect the EU ‘customizes’ its approach in implementing the IUU Regulation on the

Philippines requires the application of tools of policy diffusion such as pre-identified

mechanisms. A mechanism is “a natural or established process by which something takes

place or is brought about.”64 The work of the study consists in detecting which mechanisms

were employed, how these mechanisms successfully led to diffusion, and what factors or

conditions shaped the diffusion process.

The analysis is guided by a framework that draws on and combines elements gleaned

from several recent theorizing articles. These contributions present syntheses of approaches

comprising mechanisms and conditions at work in EU policy diffusion. In particular, the

study consults mainly the works of Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009), and Borzel and

Risse (2012). It is important to note that their works also relate to theoretical and conceptual

inputs by Manners (Normative Power Europe), Damro (Market Power Europe), Habermas

(Logic of Argument/Justification), March and Olsen (Logics of Consequences and

Appropriateness), Gilardi and Biedenkopf (Policy Diffusion), among others.65 The order of

inquiry is logically arranged as follows: the three logics of social action and their

corresponding diffusion mechanisms, measures of effectiveness, and conditions of

effectiveness. This chapter expounds on each of these lines of inquiry.

3.1 The three Logics of Social Action and their corresponding mechanisms

In the study of Europeanisation, three major logics have been identified to serve as

‘visions’ that provide different lenses in perceiving social or political action which occur in

EU integration and enlargement66: logic of consequences, logic of appropriateness, and logic

63 Börzel and Risse, 2012. 64 "Mechanism," Oxford, accessed August 6, 2015, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/mechanism. 65 See References for Manners, Damro, Habermas, and March and Olsen. 66 Sonia Piedrafita and Jose Torreblanca, “The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, Identities and Arguments,”

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of arguing. Börzel and Risse (2012) incorporate these to their discussion of embedding

Europeanisation within diffusion studies. These logics prove useful in explaining the process

of policy diffusion since they “rest on distinct assumptions about actors and their relations

with social structures and institutions.”67 What follows is a discussion of what each of these

three logics are as well as the corresponding mechanisms falling under each of these logics. It

is important to note that these three logics are never mutually exclusive and often overlap in

reality.68

3.1.1 The Logic of Consequences or Instrumental Rationality

The logic of consequences or instrumental rationality views actors as “(mostly self-

interested) utility maximisers who select their course of action according to cost–benefit

calculations.”69 For instance, a state or a supranational entity - such as the EU – might see it

beneficial for itself to pursue a free trade agreement with another state for reasons such as job

generation and increased investment, and will hence enhance economic growth. It would be

more or less the same motive that drives a third country to accept this agreement.

A mechanism reflecting this logic is what Börzel and Risse call manipulating utility

calculations, wherein an actor offers “positive and negative incentives”70 to a third country.

A positive incentive comes in the form of financial and technical assistance to empower

“domestic actors who push for the adoption of the institutional solution”; a negative incentive

can mean “imposing costs through sanctions.”71 Börzel and Risse further classify this

mechanism into external incentives (conditionality) and financial/technical assistance

(capacity-building).72 By creating external incentives, the EU can steer third countries to

calculate the costs and benefits of adopting an EU policy, and are thus influenced by the

conditions set by the EU.73 On the other hand, the EU can also tap the capacity-building

mechanism and provide financial and technical assistance to enable third countries to make

the necessary improvements or policy reforms.74 Börzel and Risse identify (physical or legal)

Elcano Royal Institute Working Papers 51 (2004): 1-21, accessed April 13, 2015, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt51-2004#.VVUE71Wqqko. 67 Börzel and Risse, 2012, 5. 68 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3, (1984): 734-749, accessed July 5, 2015, DOI: 10.2307/1961840. 69 Börzel and Risse, 2012, 5. 70 Ibid., 6-7. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., 7. 74 Ibid.

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coercion as a separate mechanism that mainly applies to EU member states who must comply

with EU law.75 However, Biedenkopf considers conditionality a coercive mechanism76 and

some examples of which come in the form of “trade sanctions, conditions attached to market

access” and incentives77 which lead to policy change in the country accessing another market.

This mechanism is a clear case of the EU IUU Regulation influencing systemic reforms in the

Philippines. Other mechanisms under the logic of consequences include less direct ones, such

as socialization (a ‘race to the top’ mechanism through which when actors compete by

harmonizing their policies with, for example, those of the EU)78 and lesson drawing (a

country searches for and learns from other policies implemented in other jurisdictions in

order to solve its own problems).79

3.1.2 The Logic of Appropriateness or Normative Rationality

Contrary to the motive of self-interest, actors may be conceived as ‘a force for good’

that promotes international norms or universal values and principles. They are thought of as

“rule followers who ‘do the right thing’ because they want to be part of a particular

community and have been socialised into following rules.” This is the logic of

appropriateness or normative rationality,80 which also relates to Ian Manners’ conception of

the EU as essentially a normative power81 that acts to spread “its norms into the international

system.”82 An example is the norm of sustainable development, which was inspired by the

Rio Summit of 199283 and then stated in Article 3 of the Treaty of the European Union.84

Resulting mechanisms from this logic include socialisation and mimicry.

Socialisation occurs when actors “seek to meet social expectations in a given

situation.”85 A direct interaction between the EU and a third country without resorting to

75 Ibid., 6. 76 Gilardi; also Biedenkopf. 77 Biedenkopf, 152. 78 Börzel and Risse, 2012, 9. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235-258, accessed April 3, 2015, http://rudar.ruc.dk:8080/bitstream/1800/8930/1/Ian_Manners_Normative_Power_Europe_A_Contradiction_in_Terms_COPRI_38_2000.pdf. 82 Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe: the international role of the EU," European Community Studies Biennial Conference,- The European Union between International and World Society, Wisconsin (2001): 9, accessed April 3, 2015, http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/1/002188_1.PDF. 83 Ibid., 11. 84 Article 3, "Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union," Official Journal of the European Union, May 9, 2007, C115/17, accessed March 23, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:en:PDF.

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coercive measures provides both parties the opportunity to learn from each other, although in

the case of the EU, it might see itself as a promoter of norms. In this study, the issue area

concerned is one that is recognized by the international community, including the EU and the

Philippines, which interact in their commitment to practice sustainable fisheries governance.

Another mechanism under this logic which is less direct is mimicry or normative emulation,86

wherein states strive to upgrade their status in order to ‘belong’ to the international

community by voluntarily mimicking what the rest of the community are doing, for instance,

exercising international norms or standards promoted by the EU – sustainable development,

democracy, human rights, rule of law, among others.

3.1.3 The Logic of Arguing or Communicative Rationality

Actors are not only seen to be concerned with self-interests and/or norm-conformity,

but are also open to argumentation on the validity of their claims when interacting with each

other. This is the logic of arguing or communicative rationality, which “involves reason-

giving and challenging these reasons as well as the legitimacy of norms”87 as explained by

Börzel and Risse. Following this logic, a scrutiny of domestic factors as they impact

international political or policy action is crucial in assessing the effectiveness of a policy

towards a third country. When the EU and a third country engage in a political dialogue, they

are employing the persuasion mechanism as they “try to persuade each other about the

validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement”88 they bring forward. This

places them on a level playing field rather than in a hierarchical relationship such as that of

manipulating utility calculations.

3.2 Measures of effectiveness of Policy Diffusion

The main question of the extent to which (if at all) mechanisms are successfully

diffused89 can be addressed by referring to levels or measures of effectiveness posited by

Lavenex and Schimmelfennig. How can diffusion or the effectiveness of EU external

governance be measured? They lay down three levels or steps to measure the effectiveness of

EU rules on third countries: “rule selection in international negotiations and agreements, rule

adoption in domestic legislation, and rule application in domestic political and administrative

86 Börzel and Risse, 7. 87 Börzel and Risse, 5; also Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 5. 88 Ibid., 8. 89 For the definition of effectiveness, see Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 800.

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practice.”90 As association, partnership, or cooperation agreements serve as the overarching

frameworks defining EU-third country relations, the first step is to check whether and how

EU norms are established as the reference point of EU-third-country agreements. It is

important to recognize that the EU also promotes or shares international norms set, for

instance, by the UN and the OSCE. Third countries may negotiate with or come to an

agreement with the EU by selecting and accepting EU rules or ‘joint rules’ (international

norms entrenched within EU norms and vice versa).91

Second, when actors have selected and accepted rules in international negotiations and

agreements, it is important to assess whether third countries have actually transferred these

rules into domestic legislation. This also reflects EU actorness in global governance. Proofs

of rule adoption are “the ratification of agreements with the EU or the adoption of laws and

other legal documents that incorporate EU and joint rules.”92

The third and final step in measuring the effectiveness of mechanisms towards third

countries is rule application. Beyond incorporating an EU or joint rule into domestic policy,

how and whether this policy translates into (consistent) implementation in political and

administrative practice indicates the deepest impact of policy diffusion.93 Policy reform in a

third country may be successfully done but may not extend to effective application on the

ground. The next and final section describes the conditions that may permit or impede policy

diffusion.

3.3 Conditions shaping Policy Diffusion

An examination of how processes and impact levels of a diffused policy are correlated

provides the basis for another line of inquiry. What are the larger structures at work that

control and shape the mechanisms and effectiveness of policy diffusion? Lavenex and

Schimmelfennig (2009) differentiate between institutionalist, power-based, and domestic

explanations.

Institutions are reflected in the mechanisms and effectiveness of EU policy diffusion

since external policies are, first and foremost, based on internal institutional structures.

Institutions can serve as a “template in a highly uncertain policy context or they may be

90 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 800. 91 Ibid., 800-801. 92 Ibid., 801. 93 Ibid.

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imbued with high legitimacy.”94 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier postulate that “the more an

EU policy is supported and complied with within the EU and the more it is in line with

international rules beyond the EU, the more likely third countries will accept it as a basis of

negotiation, adopt it and apply it.”95 On the other hand, a power-based explanation is

dependent on external structures in contact with the EU. In this perspective, the EU’s

bargaining and market power on third countries and vis-à-vis other competing ‘governance

providers’96 is gauged. The higher the EU’s bargaining power (which, in this case, includes

market attractiveness and development assistance capacity), the more likely a third country

adopts and applies its diffused policy. Finally, policy diffusion depends on the existing

domestic structures in third countries. The more similar, fit or compatible the domestic

institutional make-up of a third country is to that of the EU, the more that third country

perceives and accepts an EU norm as legitimate.97 In terms of effectiveness, selection,

adoption, and application will manifest if the EU rules “resonate well with domestic rules,

traditions, and practices.”98 Additionally, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig suggest modes of

governance that are similar to diffusion mechanisms but reflect the macro-level dynamics of

policy diffusion: hierarchies, networks, and markets.

Overall, several elements drawn from the works of Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, and

Börzel and Risse, are synthesized in this analytical framework. The effectiveness of diffusion

mechanisms, which are reflections of underlying logics of social action, may reach the level

of rule selection, rule adoption, and at its best, rule application. The impact depends on and

can be explained by institutional, power-related, and domestic factors surrounding EU-third

country interaction. Figure 1 provides a visualization of policy diffusion dynamics as

identified in this framework.

94 Ibid., 802. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid., 804. 98 Ibid.

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FIGURE 1 VISUAL REPRESENTATION: EU POLICY DIFFUSION

4.0 METHODS Following a case study approach, the analysis was conducted by a triangulation and

consultation of sources from the EU, Philippines, and other international actors. Various

materials were used: official online information, reports, statements and publications;

pertinent legislation and accompanying documents; agreements; and official documents from

the UN, FAO, and Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. There was also

reference to studies related to IUU fishing, Philippines fisheries, as well as official statistics

on the Philippine environment and fisheries. This study also involved conducting personal

interviews with key officials and referencing a variety of available news articles and audio-

visual media sources such as documentaries and interviews.

5.0 MAIN FINDINGS The pre-identification of the Philippines as a possible non-cooperating country was

lifted last April 21, 2015, with DG MARE Commissioner Karmenu Vella remarking that

"both Korea and the Philippines have taken responsible action, amended their legal systems

and switched to a proactive approach against illegal fishing".99 On June 30, 2015, ten months

after the warning was issued, the Philippine Secretary for Agriculture remarked that the

Philippines is the fastest country to have worked on achieving compliance status with the EU

99 "EU acts on illegal fishing: Yellow card issued to Thailand while South Korea & Philippines are cleared," EC Press Release 3, April 21, 2015, accessed July 24, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4806_en.htm.

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IUU Regulation.100 By and large, this study revealed that the accompanying mechanisms and

scope conditions characterizing the IUU Regulation itself and its impact on the Philippines

constituted an effective and potent formula for the success of this case of policy diffusion.

Within this general finding, several explanatory observations were carved out in the analysis.

5.1 Manipulating utility calculations, 'coercion,' and the logic of consequences A number of diffusion mechanisms, one more pronounced than the others, were

detected in the implementation of the IUU Regulation vis-à-vis the Philippines as a fish

exporter to the EU market. One of them, manipulating utility calculations, involves

conditionality (the threat of trade measures) and capacity-building (financial and technical

assistance), and is a main characteristic of the IUU Regulation. Number 31 of the 'whereas'

clauses of the Regulation sums up its conditionality feature:

"...the Community should be entitled to identify those non- cooperating States, on the

basis of transparent, clear and objective criteria relying on international standards, and,

after giving them adequate time and to respond to a prior notification, adopt non-

discriminatory, legitimate and proportionate measures with respect to those States,

including trade measures."101

Indeed, former DG MARE Commissioner Maria Damanaki issued the Philippines as

well as Papua New Guinea a "stern warning" last June 10, 2014 at a press conference in

Brussels. In her statement, she disclosed that "these two countries exercise no real control on

what goes on in their waters and on their ships so that they cannot guarantee that their fish is

caught respecting local and international rules."102 This warning, which carried the possibility

of trade measures, proved to have influenced the Philippines' response since it manipulated

their cost-benefit calculations in terms of market access. Overall, the EU member states,

namely, Germany, UK, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark, represent the 2nd

biggest fish export value (next to the US) for the Philippines, according to data reported by

BFAR on its 2012 Philippine Fishery Exports in terms of value.103 These facts demonstrate

the indispensable value of the EU market for Philippine fish exports. Perez stated that "40%

of our total fishery export products goes to the EU, 39% goes to the US, and the rest goes to

100 Department of Agriculture Secretary Alcala's speech at the Philippine Embassy in Brussels, June 30, 2015. 101 IUU Regulation, 6. 102 European Commission Press Release 1, "“Fighting illegal fishing to preserve sustainability in the Western Pacific.” 103 "VI. External Trade," BFAR-Statistics, accessed July 24, 2015, http://www.bfar.da.gov.ph/profile?id=5#post.

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Japan and the rest of the world."104 The Philippine fisheries sector simply cannot afford to

lose the EU market.

As the Regulation employs negative incentives in the form of pre-identification and

the possibility of being blacklisted from the EU market, it also carries with it a coercive

element by way of its market size. From the Philippine side, the Undersecretary and Director

of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), Mr. Asis Perez, admitted that "the

publicity and the fear of pre-identification created some level of urgency" and that it "helped

enhance and speed up the process."105 The press statement by Commissioner Damanaki as

well as the comprehensive Commission Decision (2014/C 185/03, which narrated in

chronological order every key activity of the EU-PH interaction, hence, elicited a coercive

effect on the Philippines through its publicity.106

The EU appeared to have balanced out the negative incentives inherent in the

Regulation by tapping its own capacity-building ability through financial and technical

assistance to the Philippines. Article 20 (point 4) of the IUU Regulation states that "the

Commission shall, where appropriate, cooperate administratively with third countries..." in

order to facilitate their compliance with the given provisions.107 The Commission Decision

that put the Philippines in the pre-identified list explicitly confirmed that the "Commission,

with the assistance of the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), and at the request of

the Philippines authorities, has organised a capacity building workshop in Manila from 22 to

26 July 2013, focusing on port state measures and risk analysis."108 Both the Philippine

fisheries director and the DG MARE officer confirmed that this, indeed, took place.109 In the

same document, the EU also took into account the fact that in 2011, the EU had already

"funded a specific technical assistance action in the Philippines with respect to the fight

against IUU fishing."110 Director Perez adds that the Trade-related Technical Assistance (EU-

TRTA) extended to the Philippines amounting to 3.5 million euros,111 includes support in

104 BFAR Director Asis Perez, skype interview by author, July 29, 2015, transcript in Annex 1. 105 Perez interview, Annex 1. 106 "Commission Decision of 10 June 2014 on notifying a Third Country that the Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating Third Countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing," EUR-Lex, accessed October 24, 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0617(01)&qid=1439166445885&from=EN. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid., C185/18, No. 23. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., C185/27, No. 87. 111 "Trade-related technical assistance," EEAS Official Site, accessed July 24, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/eu_philippines/trade_relation/trade_related_tech_assistance/index_en.htm.

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developing traceability systems and is still ongoing.112 On the whole, the direct mechanism of

manipulating utility calculations reflected the logic of consequences, which worked towards

the interests both of the EU and the Philippines. From the receiving end, the Philippines

realized that the benefits of complying with the Regulation outweighed the costs entailed and

it was ultimately in the country's interest to improve the management of its own fisheries.

5.2 Persuasion (logic of arguing) and Socialisation (logic of appropriateness)

Behind the upfront application of the IUU Regulation, the EU employed mechanisms

such as socialisation, and, to a lesser extent, persuasion. If one looked at the Regulation, a

detailed timeline of exchanges could be seen between the EU and the Philippines from the

time the Regulation was entered into force in 2010 up to the pre-identification stage.113 These

exchanges involved consultative meetings both in Brussels and the Philippines, reports and

commentary submissions by both sides, a capacity-building activity, and a series of

observation missions conducted by the EU in the Philippines. This dynamic illustrates a

socialization process whereby the EU team shared best practices, since they are, according to

Director Perez, "the experienced ones, and in those aspects...helped and gave us good

advice."114 Persuasion occurred from both sides on a moderate level and touched on minor

issues such as the divergence in the idea of deterrent penalties in the amended law, which

was a matter of difference in, for example, vessel size. Perez confirmed that they had to

haggle with the EU about this and that the EU, on the other hand, sent very good diplomats to

engage in administrative cooperation activities with the Philippines.115 More obviously,

argumentation on validity claims was not necessary as the IUU Regulation is, after all, a

regime-based policy instrument motivated by an international commitment to combat IUU

fishing. Both the EU and the Philippines, signatories to the UNCLOS, expressly commit to

the International Plan of Action on IUU fishing - a voluntary instrument developed by the

FAO in 2001.116 They are also present in the conferences of RFMOs including the Western

Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.117 Contrary to the threat of possible trade measures,

these mechanisms neutralized the EU's stance on the Philippines in making them comply

with the IUU Regulation. 112 Perez interview, Annex 1. 113 Commission Decision. 114 Perez Interview, Annex 1. 115 Ibid. 116 FAO, "International Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing." 117 "Little progress by Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)," EC Fisheries, accessed July 24, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/mare/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=19564.

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5.3 Rule Adoption: The new Philippine Fisheries Law (RA 10654) The effectiveness of the EU IUU Regulation on the Philippines reached the level of

rule adoption as evidenced by the newly amended Philippine Fisheries Law or Republic Act

10654. As previously mentioned, this amendment underwent consultations with the EU in

terms of the gravity of deterrent penalties to be imposed. The Commission Decision issuing a

yellow card on the Philippines indicated that in February 2014, "the Commission received a

submission containing in particular the National Plan of Action for IUU, the new draft for the

revision of the Fisheries Law and the draft regulation on traceability."118 In February 27,

2015, the amended 16-year old Philippine Fisheries Code lapsed into law and on April 13 of

the same year, a 41-member committee which represented the commercial fishing sector, the

government, the NGOs, the municipal fishers, the academe, and aquarium fish exporters,

commenced the drafting of the implementing rules and guidelines.119 The EU deems the new

Philippine Fisheries Law a more effective one that now includes measures to fight IUU

fishing by toughening sanctions on violators, and strengthening monitoring, control, and

surveillance systems.120 As the implementing rules are still being drafted and are set to be

completed by September 2015, the deepest impact of policy diffusion is yet to be reached.

Perez acknowledged that the "Philippines’ capability against IUU fishing will be judged by

our administrative capacity and political will to implement policies.”121

The first level of effectiveness, which is rule selection, could be seen in the broader

context of EU-Philippine relations - the Partnership Cooperation Agreement of 2012, which

strengthened the relationship by enabled development and economic cooperation as

characterized by trade agreements and an influx of humanitarian and technical assistance

from the EU.122

5.4 Institutional, Power-based, and Domestic explanations 5.4.1 An institutionalist explanation: The EU's legitimacy and environmental influence The effectiveness of the mechanisms employed by the IUU Regulation on the

118 Commission Decision, C185/19. 119 Mongaya, "Amended Fisheries Code Sets Higher Penalties, Tightens Rules on Commercial Fishing." 120 BFAR, "Laws and Regulations." 121 Mongaya, "Amended Fisheries Code Sets Higher Penalties, Tightens Rules on Commercial Fishing." 122 Political and Economic relations," The Philippines and the EU, EEAS Official Site-Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines, accessed May 8, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/eu_philippines/political _relations/political_economic/index_en.htm.

23




Philippines can be explained by the EU's institutional legitimacy. First, the overarching

Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a legitimate policy proposed by the Commission and

legally approved by the Parliament and the Council. Its external dimension rests on the IUU

Regulation but the provisions primarily apply to Member States in accordance with the

acquis communautaire as EU membership conditions.123 As Member States are required to

abide by the provisions set by the Regulation, it is but natural that the EU demands the same

from its trade partners. The establishment of a comprehensive system to fight IUU fishing

within the jurisdiction of the EU is a legal one and, as BFAR Director Perez affirms, "this is

the right of every country and that is the action they took to help ensure that this international

commitment is taken seriously."124 The EU can legally regulate trade access to its market if

the nature of production of a good entering the market is not compliant with internal EU

rules.

Moreover, the fact that this policy is in line with the existing international regime

combatting IUU fishing worldwide increases its legitimacy. By exercising this right, the EU

can apply incentives to its trade partners. It is worth noting that the EU considers this policy

the first of its kind in terms of a comprehensive and highly systematic strategy in fighting

IUU fishing within and beyond EU jurisdiction.125 In fact, it was only in early 2015 that the

US, another important fish market, began to follow suit and draft legislation to fight IUU

fishing.126

Additionally, the Philippines regards the EU as an expert and experienced policy-

maker in the realm of environmental governance. Director Perez affirms that the EU made

good suggestions to the third country since it is the "experienced one."127 It was more or less

easier for the EU to persuade the Philippines to apply specific measures to combat IUU

fishing since they hold such reputation. A Philippine diplomat also acknowledged this by

remarking that the EU is a meticulous and comprehensive policy-maker.128

5.4.2 A power-based explanation: the tandem of market power and a cooperative approach This study showed the ironic complexity of the role power (and the lack thereof) plays

123 Börzel and Risse, 3. 124 Perez interview, Annex 1. 125 Miller, 140. 126 "Presidential Initiative on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and Seafood Fraud," NOAA Fisheries, accessed April 21, 2015, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/taskforce.html. 127 Perez interview, Annex 1. 128 Anonymous remark.

24




in this case of policy diffusion. On the one hand, processes of manipulating utility

calculations, such as the threat of trade measures and capacity-building activities, proved the

weight of the EU's market power when the Philippines acted swiftly and improved on its

legal and administrative fisheries framework. Although other factors also hastened the

process as will be explained, the recognition of the importance of the EU market to the

Philippines attests to Damro's theory of a market power Europe wherein he sees the EU as

"fully capable of using both persuasive and coercive means and tools to influence

international affairs.”129 Commissioner Karmenu Vella also emphasized the EU's market

leverage in his statement removing the yellow card from the Philippines, saying that "by

using our market weight, the EU is getting important players on board" in terms of readiness

to combat IUU fishing.130

While the compelling force of the EU market holds true for the Philippines, this was,

at the same time, equalized by the EU's cooperative stance in its dialogues with the third

country. This reflects a networking mode of governance. The policy officer at DG MARE

affirmed in March 2015 that the third country's response to the IUU warning "was very

positive when we engaged in a cooperative dialogue with them" and that the response was of

the highest level, as shown when the Philippine President "verbalized to the EU his

commitment on cooperating in the fight against IUU" during his September 2014 state visit to

Belgium.131 The Philippines also consistently made sure that it projected itself to the EU as a

sovereign country who willingly and voluntarily worked towards its commitment (with or

without the yellow warning) to fight IUU fishing. This helped delineate EU-Philippine

relations in the context of a cooperative framework. Director Perez carefully explained that

the Philippines did not perceive the EU's action as a coercive one, saying "I am a very

nationalist person and any form of coercion committed against our country, I will look at it

with a very negative attitude. Of course they are doing persuasion but that was really to help

us implement what we have promised."132 Similarly, Philippine Ambassador to Belgium and

Head of the Philippine Mission to the EU, seemed to echo Perez's comment as she remarked

that "among other matters which the President will reassure the EU...is this whole resolve to

make sure there is no IUU fishing in the country, which is, or course, a common concern, and

129 Damro, 682. 130 European Commission Press Release 3. "EU acts on illegal fishing: Yellow card issued to Thailand while South Korea & Philippines are cleared." 131 Anonymous interview: DG MARE Policy officer, Annex 2. 132 Perez interview, Annex 1.

25




we do want them (the EU) to comply as well as they require us to."133

Furthermore, the IUU Regulation itself considers the capacity constraints of the

Philippines as developing country. The EU showed flexibility towards the third country in

terms of proposing a "tailored action plan," funding of and conducting capacity building

activities, granting it a reasonable time frame to respond to the EU’s proposals.134 In the

Regulation, the EU "should take into account the capacity constraints of developing

countries"135 and that "a system for mutual assistance should be established to enhance [such]

cooperation."136 As the Regulation is a rigid policy replete with detail-oriented schemes,

meticulous control and traceability systems, it simultaneously deals with third countries in a

context-sensitive manner. A cooperative framework situates the interaction in a non-coercive

setting, causing the Philippines to respond well to the IUU Regulation.

5.4.2 A domestic explanation: a convergence of interests This study unravelled the domestic structures that enabled the Philippines to cooperate

with the EU towards IUU Regulation compliance. In sum, three factors created a domestic

context conducive to IUU Regulation compliance: the overarching good governance/reform

agenda of the current Philippine government, the shared international commitment with the

EU to fight IUU fishing, and the high importance of the fisheries sector in the archipelagic

state. They make up the bigger picture that presents a clear compatibility on policy,

principles, and interests between the EU and the Philippines.

In terms of the good governance/reform agenda, effectiveness can be attributed to the

present political climate in the Philippines that explains its ease of cooperation with the EU.

BFAR Director Perez commented that it was, in the first place, part of the President's agenda

"to stop all forms of unsustainable resources utilization because this results in the

impoverishment of our people and is a clear case of bad governance."137 The present

administration's political will to pursue its overarching reform policy, "tuwid na daan" (a

straight path), gave sufficient support and confidence in the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries as

well as the Department of Agriculture to address the initial "lack of a good system - the

133 RTV Presidential Broadcast Staff, "Interview with Ambassador Victoria S. Bataclan 9/14/2014," YouTube video, 20:22,

posted by "RTVMalacanang," September 14, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0DWG_8IkmA&index=3&list=PLe0PrP28rV5RFcU6azuGIeiXUU85USpa9.

134 European Commission Press Release 2. "Commission warns Philippines and Papua New Guinea over insufficient action to fight illegal fishing." 135 IUU Regulation, pt. 14. 136 IUU Regulation, pt. 38. 137 Perez interview, Annex 1.

26




system of law enforcement" found at the start of the current administration.138 The

Agricultural Secretary, Mr. Prospero Alcala, attributed the reforms to a strong "political will"

that is intolerant of bad governance. He unhesitatingly divulged the Philippines' previous

discrepancy in fish catch reports, in particular, how the increasing seaweed production was

included in the fish catch statistics, which produced incorrect data that gave the impression

that fish production in the country was increasing when in reality, it was steadily declining.

He also added that "so as long as at the back of our minds, the President strongly denounces

this, we have all the confidence and guts to fight the problem."139 For BFAR, Perez lays

down the agency's strategy to exercise political will, which consists of "education,

persuasion, and implementation," in the order.140 These testaments appear congruent with a

report by Transparency International which provides corruption rankings, revealing that the

Philippines ranked 129th out of 178 countries in 2011, 105th out of 176 in 2012, and 94th out

of 177 in 2013.141

Another fact worth noting is that systemic change could already be seen even prior to

the EU's yellow card warning on the Philippines. For instance, as early as his third day in

office, the present BFAR Director, a former NGO worker, professor, and environmental

lawyer, prioritized pursuing and penalizing illegal fishers committing fish kill142 and theft of

corals banned for exportation.143 In a skype interview with him, he explained that enforcing

environmental laws, specifically those within his job scope, was "the reason why I was

recruited by the President in the first place." An employee at the BFAR confirmed that

combatting IUU fishing was and is Perez's priority project in the Bureau and that his strict

adherence to the law stirred up criticisms here and there.144 From the EU side, the lifting of

the pre-identification after constant monitoring of Philippine action towards IUU compliance

just ten months after the warning was issued, is the most obvious indicator of the country's

perseverance to reform its fisheries policies.

138 Ibid. 139 Department of Agriculture Secretary, Prospero Alcala, Q&A at Philippine Embassy Forum in Brussels, June 30, 3015, transcript in Annex 3. Director Asis Perez, skype interview by author, July 29, 2015, transcript in Annex 1. 140 Perez interview, Annex 1. 141 “Corruption Perceptions Index Overview,” Transparency International, accessed October 28, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 142 "New BFAR head confronts fish kills and environmental woes," Official Gazette, accessed July 24, 2015,http://www.gov.ph/2011/06/07/new-bfar-head-confronts-fish-kills-and-environmental-woes/. 143 "Huge stash of corals, shells found in Zambo warehouses," Inquirer.net, June 4, 2011, accessed July 27, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/12049/huge-stash-of-corals-shells-found-in-zambo-warehouses. 144 Buena Bernal, "Anti-Fisheries Code protest undermines fight vs illegal fishing," Rappler, July 24, 2015, accessed July 27, 2015, http://www.rappler.com/nation/100378-fisheries-code-protest-undermines-fight-illegal-fishing.

27




Moreover, a clear point of convergence is the EU and Philippines' shared international

commitment to the UNCLOS, the FAO Plan of Action to fight IUU fishing, and the

conservation measures put forth by RFMOs. This facilitated close cooperation and did away

with argumentation on the validity claims of the IUU Regulation. The implementation of the

Regulation works under a larger framework - an established regime and international

agreement to address the issue of global IUU fisheries.

Finally, EU Maritime and Fisheries Affairs director-general Lowri Evans attested to

the importance of the fisheries sector in the Philippines, noting that the country "is a sea

nation and fish is not just a source of food, it is part of the essence of your country."145 The

improvement of the fisheries sector in the Philippines improves the lives of the fisherfolk

communities, which the FAO recognizes as the "poorest among the poor."146 Hence, it is,

fundamentally, in the country's national interest to fight IUU fishing. Perez provides a

summative comment on the country's domestic principles with regard to the fight on IUU

fishing: "our three parameters include our national interest, our international commitment,

and of course, a consideration of our market partners, which in this case is the EU."147

6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main findings led the study to conclude that the EU-Philippine interaction in the

implementation of the IUU Regulation involved the application of a combination of and at

times, overlapping mechanisms. These reflected an interaction of logics: consequences,

appropriateness, and, to a lesser degree, arguing. Following these logics, the EU-

Philippine dynamic was illustrated by the presence of direct diffusion mechanisms such as

manipulating utility calculations in the form of conditionality (the threat of trade

measures) and capacity-building (technical and financial assistance), socialisation and, to

a mild extent, persuasion. The effectiveness of the IUU Regulation on the Philippines fully

reached the level of rule adoption but not yet rule implementation, considering that

implementation rules and guidelines to the newly amended law are still being drafted.

Furthermore, the mechanisms and effectiveness of the IUU Regulation were shaped by the

following conditions: the weight of the EU’s market power alongside a cooperative

145 Mongaya, "Amended Fisheries Code Sets Higher Penalties, Tightens Rules on Commercial Fishing." 146 “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: Philippines,” FAO, accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/PHL/en. 147 Perez interview, Annex 1.

28




approach, the legitimacy of EU's institutional leadership, and favorable domestic

structures.

Overall, these findings showed that the success of the EU IUU Regulation on the

Philippines necessarily required a complex and fastidious approach. The implementation

of the IUU Regulation on the Philippines is a good case of explaining the importance of

understanding the intricacies of EU-third country interaction. Combining logics of social

action demonstrates a 'carrot and stick' strategy and the application of only one of them

would render the policy ineffective. Moreover, the convergence of interests, like-

mindedness, and a shared committment to observing international norms, were important

in shaping the effectiveness of this case of policy diffusion. The study showed that the

Philippines and the EU had the same idea about the way forward.

Drawing from the combined logics of social action detected in this case study, the

EU's market power proved to be an effective tool in enabling or empowering third

countries, consequently bringing about positive change beyond its jurisdiction, despite a

unavoidable perception that it entails a kind of hierarchy or power assymetry to the

advantage of the EU. In the end, an instrument of a logic of consequences can serve to

achieve objectives borne by a logic of appropriateness. To be more specific, the Philippine

case showed that informal dialogues and technical assistance prior to the yellow tag had to

be accompanied later on both by a market-related and a cooperative strategy.

The success of the IUU Regulation on the Philippines can also potentially bear fruit

on other third countries presently pre-identified and identified as non-cooperating

countries. On July 27, 2015, The President mentioned the country's success in overcoming

the yellow tag from the EU in his sixth and last State of the Nation address, where he said

that Agricultural Secretary Alcala received advice from the EU to "not resent the attention

if other nations with yellow card status" approached the Philippines since, it is, after all,

"the ones in a position to teach them the initiatives and steps to resolve the problem.148

This study recommends that future related research touch on the effectiveness of the

IUU Regulation on other third countries and, eventually, enable a comparative analysis to

shed light on EU external affairs and bring helpful additions to the study of policy

diffusion in Europe and beyond. From a regional standpoint, this research can also serve as

a springboard giving impetus to study the impact of the IUU Regulation on other Asia- 148 "Benigno S. Aquino III, Sixth State of the Nation Address, July 27, 2015," Official Gazette, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/2015/07/27/english-president-aquino-sixth-sona/.

29




Pacific countries and detect trends or patterns (or the lack thereof) of interaction. Finally,

this also contributes to the investigation of how joint rules or international norms are

transposed into domestic policies, which, in turn, interact with each other. A study of other

international rules can draw lessons from this case, and, furthermore, update it.

30




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ANNEX 1 Skype interview: Undersecretary Asis Perez of (Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) July 29, 2015 @ 12:00nn

MPD: I had an interview with a Policy officer at the DG MARE here at the European Commission. He said that what happened to the Philippines was a success story because the Philippines was very cooperative. Actually, when PNoy (President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino) was here last September during a visit, he even broached the subject to the EU leaders. So up to the level of the Presidency, this subject was touched. USEC: Yeah, because the President really values the importance of the sustainable utilization of resources. Actually, that’s part of the 10-point agenda of PNoy when he ran for President. It's part of his agenda to stop all forms of unsustainable resources utilization because the result of this is the impoverishment of our people and this is really a clear case of bad governance that’s why this is part of his 10-point agenda. As far as the need to protect the resources concerned, it’s on top of the President’s 10-point agenda. MPD: Before this IUU warning, were you already working on tackling IUU fishing in the Philippines? USEC: Yeah, because that was the reason why I was recruited by the President in the first place. I think it’s part of the reasons why I was chosen by the alter ego of the President, Secretary Procy (DA), because we really do recognize the problem of IUU fishing not only in the Philippines but throughout the world, and the Philippines being one of the important fishing nations, has a substantial share of this problem. And so, when the President took over in 2010, and when I was appointed in 2011, the first thing that I did on my 3rd day was to fight IUU fishing. So since that’s part of the President’s agenda, we are really focused on that. On my third day in office, first thing that I did was to address the issue of fish kill, the second issue that I tackled on my 3rd day was to arrest those violating our law on coral resources. And then we moved forward developing our capability to address IUU fishing on our first month by appointing people to law enforcement functions. Because when I came to office, there were only 4 enforcers. MPD: (4 enforcers) in the whole Philippines? USEC: Yes, in the whole Philippines, who are assigned in the Bureau of Fisheries at the central office. How will you enforce the law when you have 4 personnel? MPD: So what have been your shortcomings? USEC: Our shortcomings were structural and strategic. Structural because of lack of personnel, lack of resources, lack of patrol vessels, we also have policy shortcomings because the law at that time didn’t have the deterrent effect since the penalties were too low. Then there are strategic shortcomings, lack of budget necessary to implement the task. MPD: Right now, has the budget been increased? USEC: Yes. So all of that we resolved in a period of 5 years. Of course the process was long. The first thing that we resolved was the absence of a good system – the system of law enforcement – we try to take out the problem by institutionalizing systems. For example, systems on monitoring, control and surveillance, our traceability system we worked on that, policy on addressing vessel operation in the high seas and outside Philippine jurisdiction, policy ensuring that all regulations in the RFMOs are actually transposed in the national legislation or national regulation. Those are the policy lack at that time that we were able to address. And then in terms of the personnel, even if you have a policy but you lack manpower, so the President allocated an adequate number of personal, we were given more than 700 frontline personnel dedicated to address regulatory as well as enforcement work. There really is a big difference now. We have been given funds to acquire floating assets because even if you have enough personnel but not enough boats then it’s useless, so we have that budget now. As of now, we have acquired 70 small crafts and we are waiting for 27 more. Aside from that we have just bid on 2 multi-mission vessels that can operate outside Philippine jurisdiction so that our Philippine boats’

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movements outside can be monitored. On top of that, the President also added a training program. We developed our own training academy. MPD: Who are training them? Is it in collaboration with other actors? USEC: This is a multi-agency approach. Most of our 700 personnel have graduated from our academy, it’s in Pagbilao, it’s a 3-month training program for our law enforcers, where we developed our law enforcers from technical…Most of them are fisheries graduates, so they technical, scientific, and we turn them into law enforcers, so they have to learn both the tactical and strategic elements in law enforcement. You see you have the personnel, you have the boats, and then you take out a system for training them. Number 4 element is of course the money for operation. Around 20% of our funds now is actually dedicated for regulatory enforcement work and that’s big. We’re looking at around 1 billion pesos. So you can see how dedicated our government is to do what is necessary to stop law violations to the best of our ability. MPD: I’m sure it has not been easy and not everybody from the fishing communities have a positive perception of this. How do you approach them? When you are enforcing stricter measures? What solutions do you propose? For example, you enforce the open/closed season. How do you handle that? USEC: As of this time, we have the capacity. We are talking about now. But we really don’t reach that all the time. There are times when we do not have the capacity but we persevere. You know, sometimes it’s just a matter of stubbornness. They are hard-headed, we are also hard-headed. And the question is, who head will burst first? In other words, that’s the final element: you really have to have the political will. But before you exercise political will, you exercise persuasion. So we started with education, persuasion. MPD: Did many of them get convinced that we have to do this, how strict we have to handle our fish resources? Are they cooperative? USEC: Well, if you look at it basically from a more scientific approach to law enforcement, 70% of all people will follow the law, if they know the reason for the law and if they know the law. 20%, even if they know the law, will violate/non-following if there is no enforcer, we call them opportunistic violators. And then you have 10% who will really defy the law. So at the onset that they are made aware of the law, you already have a 70% success rate. For you to be able to enforce it further by 90%, visibility, that’s where presence comes. And for the remaining 10% who are real violators, you really have to give them a taste of the law, they have to be caught. So it’s education, persuasion, and then implementation. MPD: So I have just read an article that you are already drafting the implementation rules and regulations that you are finishing by September? USEC: Yeah, part of the law is to make sure that implementing rules have to be done in 6 months. MPD: So, is the newly amended Fisheries Code enforced now? USEC: Not all, because there are provisions that will require implementing guidelines. We are in the process now of finalizing the guidelines and this is what’s good about it: we are doing a very participatory process of the development of the guidelines. All of those involved in the fishing sector are part of it. We have around 40 members. MPD: All actors are properly represented in the committee, right? USEC: Actually, 18 come from the commercial fishing sector, ah no, now they are 20. Aside from that there are those that come from aquaculture, those from municipal fisheries, those from the government. From the government, there are only 9 representatives. So majority of the committee are those who are likely to be affected by the legislation. So this is very participatory and the work is very extensive. We are very grateful that the committee members have been working really hard. I think we’re on the right track to be able to deliver the goods on the expected dates. MPD: Tapos Sir, my question is, to what extent do you think the EU has influenced or helped to hasten the legislative/systemic reforms, the inclusion of tackling IUUF in the law?

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USEC: EU’s has been giving good advice. MPD: Was it a coercive or a cooperative approach? USEC: I think it’s more of the cooperative approach. If it were coercive, I would not cooperate with them. MPD: That’s a good point. USEC: If it were coercive, I would not allow that. I’m a very nationalist person. Any form of coercion committed against our country, I will look at it with a very very negative attitude so I can assure you that there was no coercion. What they really did was provide us with an avenue to make us realize the points that we need to improve on and I appreciate the advice especially the guys they sent were really good diplomats, not only trained in diplomacy that they make it…although of course they are doing persuasion..but that was really to help us implement conform with what we promised. Let me put the framework so we have a proper framework. In 2001, so many countries of the world agreed to fight IUUF. There was a commitment. It was not a treaty, but it was an agreement. MPD: Was it the FAO International Plan of Action? USEC: It’s the International Plan of Action to fight IUUF, you’re right. The __ by the countries voluntarily to fight IUUF. So what they did was only to help us remember our commitment so to speak. This is what we agreed on and what we committed on. So for their part, we will only accommodate product exporters who are compliant to the agreement. I think this is the right of every country and that is the action they took to help out in ensuring that that agreement or that commitment is taken seriously. That’s what they did. They looked at areas for improvement and they made a suggestion. And their suggestions are also in accordance with what we want. We will not be forced by anybody if we don’t think that is it to our interest. So, conformably, most of the recommendations are in line with what we are doing already or what we intend to do. There is a convergence of idea in the way forward. What the EU did was really to assist us on how we should do it because they are the experienced ones, and in those aspects they helped us and gave us good advice. MPD: To what extent, in terms of capacity-building, technical assistance, trainings, has the EU helped you in terms of that? USEC: In fact, the EU TRTA is still ongoing. Trade-related support in terms of traceability. They have even sent consultants and shouldered the expenses, to help teach us do the right thing, which we requested from them – it’s a technical support that we asked from them. We also asked them to provide us with good names of consultants. There were others which we shouldered just so we can receive the services. You see, that is the level of cooperation we have with the EU. Although some people look at it as a form of coercion, I don’t think that’s the case. Again, if we were coerced, we would not have cooperated. MPD: I salute you on that. USEC: It’s really more of a convergence of interest that’s why this happened. MPD: So there was no real mismatch in the policy , because in the first place, they were convergent. USEC: As a matter of principle, yes. Of course there were differences in terms of, for instance, penalties. We were haggling more or less. In principle, we agreed that there has to be a deterrent but as to what are the deterrents, that’s where differences in view come in. Because of the situation difference, say, for instance, their size of vessel and the size of Philippine vessels. In that aspect there was a divergence in what was identified as deterrent and what was not. MPD: Can you tell me more about the legislation in passing the new fisheries code, the process underwent? USEC: Since we are a bicameral system, there were two proposals: one proposal coming from Congress, one proposal coming from the Senate. We initiated both, but the Senate version is a finer one. But when we had the bicameral conference, the one that was passed was the House version. For me, I would have opted for the Senate

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version, because the one from the House had higher penalties. That one prevailed in the bicameral conference although my preference would have been the Senate version and that reason for that is that it was reviewed more and the language was, I would say, more attuned to the law. But the overall effect is that you have the new law that has the deterrence penalty. MPD: I’m just curious on the US influence on this. Who is more influence in this issue area? Who is more involved? USEC: Well, at the time, US was not that active in mandatory trade requirements. The EU definitely has greater active participation than the US. MPD: In terms of legislative reforms, if the EU had not given us the yellow card, do you think you would have pursued amending the new fisheries code in the same pace? Was the process catalyzed or sped up because of the yellow card? USEC: I would be lying to my team if I say that didn’t have an effect. Of course the publicity created some level of urgency. The fear created some form of urgency, pre-identification. I think it would have happened without the yellow warning but not as swiftly as that. But the urgency created by the yellow card helped enhance the process, sped it up, to be honest. MPD: How important is the EU market? What are the top markets for our export fish products? US, Japan? USEC: The EU market is number one for us in terms of the value. 40% of our total fishery export products goes to the EU, 39% goes to US, and rest goes to Japan and the rest of the world. You can just imagine the value. MPD: When the yellow card was issued, you were given 6 months to work on it. Did you negotiate to have it extended to another 6 months? USEC: I think the 6 months is an SOP for them. Everybody is given 6 months. We were given another 6 months because they saw the progress. MPD: Who said that it would be extended? USEC: The EU. MPD: You did not request for it at some point? USEC: Well, it’s a continuing negotiation really, a regular consultation. So when they saw on the 9 month that the progress was really tremendous, they came here, and 2 months later, they issued the lifting. So they really saw that as early as the 9 month, they could see already that the Philippines was really doing its best and had done a lot to make sure that EU IUU warning is addressed. MPD: At the onset of consultations that started in 2012, when the EU had missions in the Philippines and you then had regular meetings. USEC: Yes that happened in 2012. MPD: When you had these meetings, didn’t you try to argue first or bargain or negotiate some aspects of the IUU Regulation. Or did you say you will work on it right away? USEC: Because just like what I said, there was convergence in policy. They said, you have a commitment under the International Plan of Action, we think that you need to work on these areas. We said, you are correct, and we are actually working on those areas. In truth, with or without the EU IUU warning, that was a priority of the President. You know, it’s very hard to sign here and there but there is no intention to abide by what we signed up for. An international commitment is always important. But more than international commitment, we have to remember that IUU is seen by our administration as the reason for poverty in the countryside. So fighting IUU is actually on top of the President’s agenda because it is important for the country itself, with or without international commitment. This is our to national interest that we fight IUU. That should be clear in your paper.

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We are fighting IUU because this is a national interest as identified by our own people and by our President, that’s why it’s part of his reform agenda. Number two, he knows and we know that continuing IUUF undermines the capacity of our resource to regenerate, and if that happens, our people will go hungry so it’s important to articulate that. Also, we joined the community of nations in 2010/2011 in identifying IUU as a primary cause of resource decline and that we’ve signed up to this commitment in 2001. The Philippines intends to honor its signature if the former administration failed to do it, this administration does not want that. What we want to do is to abide by our commitment. MPD: So it is important that this present administration’s agenda on good governance should prevail. USEC: Yes, that’s the overaching reason. Good governance is that President’s number one, main agenda. Illegal fishing and the continuation of that is bad governance. You see, if there’s no corrupt, there is no poor. If there are no corrupt officials who allow illegal fishing, there is no poor fisherman. And then number 3, we understand also that our market partners require us to be at par with them terms of ensuring that only legally caught fish come into their market. So that market forces count too. So those are the 3 parameters in that order strictly. Our national interest, our international commitment, and then of course, in consideration of our market partners, which is EU in this case. MPD: So Sir, you mentioned the 10% violators of the law. At this point, I am also looking at the cultural context. This reminds me of an interview a watched about a fisherman who said, “I don’t believe that that the seas will run out of fish.” In your interaction with fishermen, how easy or hard was it to make them understand the reality? USEC: It is easy to make the fishermen understand, especially the real ones, because they already feel the the scarcity of their fish catch. I am sure that whoever said what you told me now is not a real fisherman. He is just probably pretending, because the real fishermen are aware about the decline in catch. MPD: Ok, but what he said seems to be consistent with what was said by an interview who was President of the SOCSARGEN fisheries federation, Ms Rosanna Contreras. She also emphasized that. She said that fishing is a way of life so it’s not easy to constraint people to follow these new sustainable methods. USEC: But you cannot say that the sea will not run out of fish. They know it will run out. But yes it is also true that the people were already fishing long before there was government. There is also that cultural aspect. But even in that aspect, I cannot imagine that a fisherman would want to waste our fish resources because of the culture. I cannot attribute bad practices or relate them to culture. The use of dynamite fishing, for example, was not existent before the 2nd world war. It’s not part of our culture to destroy our fish resources, and the livelihood resource. This is not so hard to explain to them. MPD: Earlier you said that you really focused work on penalizing violators as early as your 3rd day in office. How exactly did you do that? Can you describe the process? USEC: Number one, prior to working for the government, I worked for an NGO. I am an environmental lawyer who is familiar with the court. I am confident and familiar with the courts as far as the supreme court, and also I am comfortable in the fox holes. The breadth of my experience, so to speak, spans from enforcement to the court. I am comfortable with this and I take a very operative approach. I train people to become enforcers and I am with them in the operations that’s why I know all these things, even before I stumbled into government office. I could already identify where the problem lies. I have that reputation of being an enforcer before I even joined the government. I will helping government enforcers. And so on my third day, I knew very well what to do and I knew who to catch. So that’s why we acted on it immediately. MPD: What was the dynamics behind it? USEC: Before I joined the government, there was a huge black eye in the Philippines. Three big container vans were caught in NAIA, they were full of coral that were banned for export. That was a shameful thing to discover, those were black corals that protected species. And we had to stop this. Then there was a Senate investigation, etc etc. It was big news in the Philippines. So what I did on my 3rd day was I hit the source. I went to the warehouse, I hit the nail on the head. So we went around the town where the warehouse was. Eventually, we were doing IEC, information education campaign to inform the people that they were not supposed to do this

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and do that. That was our biggest confiscation of endangered coral in the whole Philippines, in history. The intention really is to stomp out all unsustainable practices. After that we enforce the open/closed season for 3 months. After I was elected in 2011, the first closed season was implemented. 2012, same thing. 2013, the people themselves requested that, so we implemented it. We managed our responsibility to the WCFPC and now we are following the regulations. All our vessels are compliant with their requirements. We were able to do that in a short period of time and we’re very thankful to all my colleagues in the government and to the private sector who cooperate with us. ANNEX 2 Personal interview: anonymity requested - to refer to respondent as policy officer from DG MARE DG MARE, March 19, 2015, @ 10am What is the current status of the yellow tag imposed on the Philippines under the EU's Common Fisheries Policy's, specifically the IUU Regulation? How have they responded so far to this warning from the EU? So an evaluation/assessment was made by DG Mare last 2012 regarding the catch certification compliance, surveillance, legislation in the Philippines. This revealed the deficiencies of the Philippines. The report itself is confidential but you can refer to the press statement made by former Commissioner Damanaki last year – that can be found in the official journal published 17th of June 2014. This decision was made at the level of the College of Commissioners. The response of PH was very positive when we engaged in a cooperative dialogue with them. I took over this file (PH) a year ago and our team has been in the PH 5 times. We have received a very high level, maybe the highest level of response - up to President Aquino. During his visit here in Belgium September of last year, he verbalized to the EU his commitment on cooperating in the fight against IUU. Specifically, Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the Regulation state 3 stages of dialogues with third countries. The 1st stage, the yellow card means “pre-identification.” The 2nd stage is “identification,” which is the red card. The 3rd stage would be the trade measures. This depends on the Council’s decisions upon the proposal of the Commission, which decides on the trade measures. The warnings are more technical and not legal. They are based on the international obligations of third countries as flag, coastal, port and market State. We can resort to trade bans in worst case scenarios. The idea really is to help the third countries to be at par with the global standards. We have had dialogues with around 50 countries. Only 4 of them have been blacklisted. Bans have been imposed on non-cooperating countries such as Belize, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Guinea. Belize was removed from the list of non-cooperating countries in fighting IUU fishing once it addressed the deficiencies highlighted by the Commission). To be clear, the objective of this regulation is not really to impose a trade ban but to trigger a series of reforms not only within the EU but also on third countries. I can say that this has been a success as the IUU regulation has been triggering positive change. I think 90% of the countries have responded well. We are continuously monitoring them and of those countries given a yellow card, 4 have been lifted. I hear that you have just gotten back from the Philippines. What were the challenges you observed that appear to have hindered the Philippines' compliance to the IUU Regulation and led to the yellow warning? I think the main challenge for them was to cover the activities of the long distance industrial fleets. There, we saw more risks in terms of their resources to follow properly the activities of the fleet, their legal framework, their lack of cooperation with other countries like Papua New Guinea. It was basically on monitoring, control and surveillance. For example, they didn’t have the Vessel Monitoring system/device to track where the vessels are. Is the EU offering assistance to the Philippines to facilitate compliance? Capacity-building projects? Anything specific? Is it really just a strongly enforced IUU regulation imposed on the Philippines or are there other mechanisms, perhaps complementary ones from other relevant/connected DGs?

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There was a capacity-building mission from DG Mare in July 2013, focused on inspections. During our dialogue, we also gave our technical assistance in the Philippines. EU’s Trade-Related Technical Assistance on the PH also helped on progress in catch certification, improving the national plan of inspection, developing policy instruments. This was coordinated with the EU delegation in Manila. Do you think that this market-based regulation has had a strong influence or a significant impact on the Philippines? Has it been willing to completely submit to the conditions/requirements stated in the regulation? Did it attempt to bargain or negotiate some aspects of the regulation with the EU? You have to remember that IUU is not really an original idea of the EU. This regime has been existent for a long time within international law: The UN, RFMOs, and FAO have been implementing this. As you are aware, the Senate has passed legislation on fisheries in response to the yellow warning (February 2015). What’s also important is that we have helped in confidence building in the PH. We have extended the 6-month working period to continue dialogue with Philippine authorities. 6 months was reasonably not enough for them. *refer to answer to question 1 as well How important are Philippine fish and fish products exports for the EU? There are other competing exporters, too. You can refer to Eurostat, for instance, on statistics related to EU imports from the PH. (*2/3 of EU fish consumed are imports). ANNEX 3 Forum at the Philippine Embassy in Brussels: DA Secretary Prospero Alcala June 30, 2015 @ 9:00pm MPD: I would just like to bring up the subject about our fisheries because I know that that sector is considered the ‘poorest of the poor’ in our society. It’s a bit problematic because we have a long-standing deep-rooted culture on fishing and in some sense, this clashes with the current international norms and standards that are being promoted throughout the world. And I really congratulate the Department for the EU’s lifting of the yellow warning. Congrats also Ambassador. I am a Master’s student of European Studies at the University of Leuven and pardon me if I am using a European perspective. I just chose the Philippines as a case in point for the love of country. Just curious, how did you overcome the domestic hurdles that you had to go through in order to harmonize or strengthen our policy in accordance with international law which the EU is promoting? It would be helpful to the rest of our community if you identified the challenges. I also read in the Council Decision that it was mainly about the traceability issue, which is kind of understandable since we are an archipelagic state and how do you actually manage 7,100 islands right? How do you explain the new fisheries law to our fisherfolk communities now that sanctions have been toughened? Considering a lot of our fisherfolk still believe that our seas will not run out of fish, it’s part of our culture. SEC: First of all, I want to give proper credit to whom it is due. In fact, Ambassador Vicky, Pit Laquian, they are our partners, the key players who worked hard and showed their brilliance to the EU. We are the fastest country to have overcome the pre-identification. How have we done this? There are a lot of challenges at sea. First of all, a lot of Filipino fishermen have gotten away with illegal fishing practices. I think the biggest solution is on the political will. We in the Department know that our President will never tolerate bad governance. Our enemies include both the small and big fishers who still engage in illegal practices. So as long as we know that at the back of our minds, our President strongly denounces this, we have all the confidence and guts to fight the problem. It just happened that USec Asis Perez, our BFAR Director, used to be my professor who taught me about environmental protection. Before I joined politics, he encouraged me to join ….kalikasan. I was influenced through that. I am a businessman but I finance our environmental protection projects until I was really influenced. Now, when I joined this Department, I encouraged that he be the BFAR Director. Would you believe that we have 7,100 islands and yet we only have less than 10 patrollers? How can we even do this, considering we still lack equipment to accompany them? In fairness to the President, we have been training a lot of people, we are taking in a lot of professionals, fish partners. At the end of the day, our fisherfolk have a “to see is to believe” mentality. What is the quickest reform that we have introduced? We know that our fish catch in the wild declines every year. The problem was, before this administration, reports were doctored/tampered.

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Why? Records on seaweeds were included in the fish stocks report. You don’t notice that decline in fish stocks because the seaweed industry is growing. This time, I said, no. If it is really declining, let’s work on solving the problem and take the facts as they are. We have to make sure the solution is the right one. Let’s change and separate the program on seaweeds. Now we can explain. We tried first to close the Zamboanga peninsula (dec, jan, feb) for 3 months of spawning tamban or sardines. Why close it? There is a scientific finding that in every 10 kilos of egg-producing tamban, on the next cropping it will produce 27 kilos. I said, let’s not touch them. Let’s feed the 7 kilos to the tunas. In the first time that we closed the Zamboanga peninsula, there is a lot of commotion, there is a lot of activities we had to do. But after 6 months, the fisherfolk have noticed a significant increase in their fish catch in the wild. Now we are been losing 4 areas already. The volume of fish catch in the wild has really increased a lot. The closed season regulation really helps. We hope that next time, we can close the Palawan seas wherein there is a huge fish population of galunggong. Before, we used to import galunggong. Now we are getting back our own production. MPD: How do you explain this open/closed season regulation to our affected fishermen? SEC: By talking directly to them. Now we know their names, we know their residence, what type of equipment they are using, if they are just mere seller of fish or not. Every item in the fishing industry in the Philippines has been registered. We have registered 1,600,000 fisherfolks in the Philippines right now. We have it in the computer. Everything is recorded. We are registering all fishing boats whether small or big all throughout the country. It’s a big deal that we have been registering them, so that when we give intervention..for example, during the Yolanda/Haiyan catastrophe, a lot of fishing boats were destroyed. We had them repaired and financed them, and I think we even now have surpluses. Now I think we have distributed almost 30,000 fishing boats. Now we are teaching our fishermen to make fiberglass fishing boats, instead of resorting to plywood. This is how we do it. We are also simultaneously we trying to encourage our fisherfolk to put up natural infrastructures. What are they? The mangroves. Why do they need to take care of the mangroves? For protection from storm surges, and they also serve as cleaners. Aside from that, now we are giving away help to the fisherfolk, we call that aquacivic. If you plant mangroves in that area right now, we will give you a net and close that area. We’ll let you dig a canal, we’ll give you crablets, fingerlings. They don’t need feeds. In 18 days, there will be crab eggs. So you can sell the mud crab at a higher price. We are also now encouraging our fisherfolk to plant shells because they don’t need feeds. But we know there are a lot of things to be done right now in terms of sustainable governance. BFAR is also working on putting up fish aggregating devices, like payaw. We have the shallow payaw for municipal waters and there is the payaw for the deep sea. We have vast sea resources. Those big fishers should stay in deep waters because they have the capital, they have the boats. Municipal waters are for municipal fishermen, big fishers are not supposed to fish there, we will reprimand them. And the small fishers don’t have to spend for gasoline anymore. They just need to use sibid and you have the payaw. For sure you can get 4 to 4 kilos a day. The family is safe. So the government is providing them assistance but they have to take care of this. If they don’t, then they will be the ones who will suffer. Again, it is also a question of governance. We have to be tough, especially in the case of IUU fishing. At the end of the day, now we are focusing on our local fish, we are earning more on the premium. If we have a lot of sardines in our fishing grounds, tuna will stay there for a longer time. The chance of the Filipino fisherfolk to catch new tuna is high. Right now we are exporting tuna to US, Japan and of course the EU.

The EU hand in sustainable fisheries governance: A case study of the effectiveness of the EU's illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing Regulation on the Philippines

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