The Ethnocentrism Problem in Feminism

Oda Karoline Storbråten Davanger
MASTER IN PHILOSOPHY
Associate Professor Kari Jegerstedt
Faculty of Humanities
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Oda K.S. Davanger
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Abstract I am concerned with the ethnocentrism problem in feminism, what it is and what philosophy
might to do help solve it. I rely mostly on the works of bell hooks and Uma Narayan to argue
that the question of ethnocentrism is important for the feminist political project, and support
my assertion by relying on methodologies from Jaques Derrida and Audre Lorde. In order to
investigate ethnocentrism in feminism, I develop the idea of latent ethnocentrism. I
distinguish between an epistemological prong and a political prong in the ethnocentrism
charge against feminism. I use hooks’ interlocking-axes model of oppression and Narayan’s
destabilization of the West/rest dualism to investigate the epistemological causes of
ethnocentrism. I defend the thesis of epistemic privilege, upon which they base their claims. I
find that our language and the political agendas of the norm of whiteness and the Western is
reciprocally reinforcing, which is a mechanism I call the episteme-politic. In the political
prong, I consider solutions to the ethnocentrism problem that have been attempted in feminist
politics: identity politics, intersectionality, and transnational feminism, and find that it is
difficult for feminism to overcome the ethnocentrism problem while also being reliant on
Othered identities in emancipatory resistance. I consider that one faction of transnational
feminism may find good ways of doing non-ethnocentric feminism because of its focus on
intercultural dialogue and a negotiating praxis that presumes non-ideal situations. I conclude
by comparing the strategies of revolution and reform for the ethnocentrism problem in
feminism, and find that feminism has to work continually on this problem.
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Acknowledgements I am greatly indebted to the time and effort that my supervisor Tove Pettersen has put into
this project. I am grateful for her support, enthusiasm, and her honest feedback. I am also
very thankful to my secondary supervisor Kari Jegerstedt for valuable insights and guidance.
I would like to thank Caroline Hansen in the philosophy administration at the University of
Oslo, for all of her help during my two years as a master student.
I think of the many wonderful teachers I have had in schools throughout all the stages of my
education, who have taught me to write intelligently and think independently. I cannot
mention them all here by name.
Thank you to my fellow student sparring-partners and friends at the philosophy institute, and
the excellent group of students at the gender studies center for the many breaks and
interesting discussions during the times we spent writing.
Thank you to the Science Studies Colloquium Series and the philosophy institute (IFIKK) for
the grants that I have received for this thesis.
Lastly, I appreciate the support from my family and friends outside the University.
Particularly Arne Martin Vik, who has been an invaluable support for the duration of this
project.
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Contents
1 Introductory Chapter ............................................................................................................ 1 1.1 What is Feminism? ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1.1 Definitions of Feminism by Feminist Theoreticians and Philosophers ............................ 2 1.1.2 Challenges to Feminism from Black and Post-Colonial Feminist Philosophy ............... 5
1.2 What is Ethnocentrism? ............................................................................................................... 9 1.2.1 Necessary Ethnocentrism .................................................................................................................. 10 1.2.2 Latent Ethnocentrism .......................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 14 1.3.1 Feminist Philosophy and The Western Philosophical Canon ............................................ 14 1.3.2 What Is Poststructuralism? ............................................................................................................... 15 1.3.3 The Master’s Tools Paradigm .......................................................................................................... 19 1.3.4 bell hooks and Uma Narayan ........................................................................................................... 21
1.4 The Ethnocentrism Charge Against Feminism ..................................................................... 22 1.4.1 The Two Prongs of the Charge ........................................................................................................ 23 1.4.2 What is at stake? .................................................................................................................................... 24
2 The Epistemological Prong of the Ethnocentrism Charge ..................................... 25 2.1 Feminism’s Metaphysical Heritage ......................................................................................... 26 2.1.1 Ethnocentrism in mainstream feminism .................................................................................... 26 2.1.2 Feminism Is Not Inherently Ethnocentric .................................................................................. 29 2.1.3 Difference And Devaluation .............................................................................................................. 30
2.2 The Political Effects on Feminist Epistemology ................................................................... 35 2.2.1 Destabilizing the West-and-the-Rest Dichotomy .................................................................... 36 2.2.2 Dualisms Represent Political Agendas ........................................................................................ 38
2.3 The ‘Something Rotten’ ............................................................................................................. 40 2.3.1 The Problem of Knowing the Other .............................................................................................. 41 2.3.2 The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Theory .................................................................. 45 2.3.3 The Essentialist Silencing Problem ............................................................................................... 49
2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 52 3 The Political Prong of the Ethnocentrism Charge .................................................... 54 3.1 Identity Politics ........................................................................................................................... 54 3.1.1 Identity Politics Is the Use of Masters’ Tools ............................................................................ 55 3.1.2 Defense of Identity Politics as a Successful Method of Resistance .................................. 60
3.2 Intersectionality ......................................................................................................................... 64 3.2.1 Crenshaw’s Intersectionality ............................................................................................................... 64 3.2.2 The Popularity of Intersectionality ............................................................................................... 66 3.2.3 Puar’s Objection to Intersectionality ............................................................................................ 67 3.2.4 Letting Identity Go or Not .................................................................................................................. 70
3.3 Transnational Feminism ........................................................................................................... 72 3.3.1 Othering in Transnational Feminism ........................................................................................... 72 3.3.2 Cultural Abstractionists ..................................................................................................................... 74 3.3.3 Cultural Contextualists ....................................................................................................................... 76 3.3.4 Against Purity Politics ......................................................................................................................... 79
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 81 4 Reform and Revolution ..................................................................................................... 82 4.1 hooks’ Radical Revolution ........................................................................................................ 82
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4.2 Revolution Disillusion ............................................................................................................... 85 4.3 Narayan’s Reform ....................................................................................................................... 92 4.4 Adequate Reform ....................................................................................................................... 94 4.5 Reform and Revolution Are Two Sides of the Same Coin .................................................. 97
5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 98
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................. 101
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1 Introductory Chapter One does not simply begin with the problem. First, one has to give that which the problem is
about. I am concerned about ethnocentrism in feminism, if there is such a thing in feminism,
what it means, why it is there, how it is important, and what philosophy might be able to do
about it. In this thesis, I will examine the charge of ethnocentrism against feminism. I rely on
two feminist schools of thought to do so, black feminism and post-colonial feminism, and the
feminist philosophers bell hooks and Uma Narayan. I will consider the charge from an
epistemological standpoint and a political standpoint. Near the end of this thesis I consider
possible ways forward toward non-ethnocentric feminism, whether revolutionary or by
reform. I end by concluding that ethnocentrism is an ongoing problem – not only for
feminism, but because this thesis is meant as a feminist examination of feminism, I hold that
this problem is something on which feminists need to continue to work. First, before the
discussion, I explain some central concepts, and more thoroughly lay out the issues at hand.
In this introductory chapter I will explain the two most central concepts in this thesis,
namely, feminism and ethnocentrism. I give a brief overview of some general narratives of
feminism and introduce Black and post-colonial feminist concerns about ethnocentrism in
feminism. I explain what I mean with ethnocentrism in this thesis, which I refer to a latent
ethnocentrism. I draw on feminist poststructuralism for my methodology, and am inspired by
poststructuralist critique of ethnocentrism in Western philosophy. In the final parts of this
chapter, I give a precision of the ethnocentrism charge against feminism, which I find can be
separated into two prongs – one epistemological and one political. In this thesis, I question
what the ethnocentrism problem in feminism is, and what philosophy might do about it.
1.1 What is Feminism?
Feminism, in its many forms and varieties, has grappled with ways in which to overcome or
surpass unjustified differential treatment largely based on ideas about sex and gender.
Feminism is an emancipation project, and opposes whatever it is that generates inequality
based on sex and gender in society. The many versions of feminism have prescribed a variety
of measures in order to do this, and have different outcomes in mind as for what the ideal
society might look like. I will cover some of the main frameworks for understanding
feminism, before introducing some of the main tenants of Black and post-colonial feminism.
Etymologically, the word feminism stems from the Latin femina, which means
woman (Holst 2009, 9). The coinage of the term féminisme has long been attributed to French
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political philosopher Charles Fourier (1772–1837), although this is much disputed. It is rather
safe to assume, however, that the term first appears during the “political agitation of the
1830s” along with terms such socialisme and individualisme (Offen 1988, 45). My stance is
that feminism is first and foremost a political project and an ideology much like classic
liberalism or socialism, but also a philosophical discipline that spans and challenges other
areas in philosophy including – but not limited to – epistemology and political philosophy.
1.1.1 Definitions of Feminism by Feminist Theoreticians and Philosophers
Although the ethnocentrism charge is leveled against a mainstream feminism, there many
different kinds of feminism, which may complicate any idea of a general feminism. In her
book Feminism (2002), gender scholar Lena Gemzöe gives a definition of feminism based on
an overall premise on which all feminisms might agree: Firstly, woman is subservient to man
and secondly, this relation should change (2002, 13). The generality of this premise
unfortunately does not say anything about the nature of the feminist movement or its agenda,
which is to create equality, and of which there are many different versions with different
ideas about strategy and analysis (2002, 23–27). To account for some of its variations,
feminism is often divided politically, chronologically in ‘waves,’ or into ‘difference’ or
‘equality’ feminists.1 I will briefly account for these variations.
Feminism is often analytically divided in the ideological terms of liberal, Marxist or
socialist, and radical feminism, according to feminist philosopher and poststructuralist Chris
Weedon in Feminist Practice & Poststructuralist Theory (1987, 16–18). Cathrine Holst,
sociologist and political theorist problematizes the clean distinction between feminisms in her
book What is Feminism,2 arguing that many feminists are liberal in one sense, and radical in
another (2009, 73–74). According to Gemzöe, liberal feminism, with its roots in
Enlightenment philosophy ideals of fundamental freedom and rights of all individuals, holds
that women should have the same democratic liberties and rights as men because they share
the same capacity for reason (2002, 38). Liberal feminism is effective at gaining basic rights,
such as the right to vote, but cannot account for women’s continued subjugation (2002, 42).
Marxist/socialist feminism draws from the philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, who connect women’s liberation with socialist revolution against capitalism (Gemzöe
2002, 58). In capitalism, a system of private ownership, most people belong to the working
1 In addition to these, there are several other strands of feminism with specific foci such as black feminism, post-colonial feminism, anarchist feminism, ecofeminism, French feminism, and lesbian feminism to name some. Many other ideologies also have other versions of feminism as parts of the main ideology. 2 Original title: Hva er feminisme (2009).
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class and sell their labor to the much smaller upper class without the opportunity to share in
the economic surplus that their work creates (Gemzöe 2002, 65–67). Socialist feminism
builds on the Marxist assumption that human nature is “socially produced and changeable”
and can be transformed (Weedon 1987, 17–18). Marxist philosophy has been influential for
feminist epistemology, most notably feminist standpoint theory.
Radical feminism originates in the 1960s and is an umbrella-term that includes
several different views, but focuses on women’s lived experiences, which means that its
theoretical reach includes oppression that is related to sexuality, domestic violence, and
domestic work. Radical feminists oppose patriarchy, which Gemzöe explains as an
oppressive ideology and invisible mechanism of power that organizes society in favor of men
(2002, 45–46). The patriarchal structure of power relations subordinates women’s interests
(Weedon 1987, 2). I find Marilyn Frye’s explanation of the term “oppression” helpful.
Etymologically, oppression literally refers to a “press,” Frye finds that people often fail to see
oppression in terms of macroscopy and usually look in microscopic ways that obscure its
complexity. Using the metaphor of a cage, Frye argues that if one only looks at one of the
wires of the cage, one might be inclined to think that circumventing one little barrier might
not be too difficult. If one takes a step back to view the construction of the cage put together
by many wires, its entirety exposes the restrictions for one inside the cage. This construction
is not “accidental or occasional,” but systematically restricts and penalizes (2005, 84–86).
Although Weedon connects radical feminism with an essentialist view of gender – namely
that there is an intrinsic female property (1987, 17) – Gemzöe finds that there are strands in
radical feminism that believe gender is socially and historically created, which came to be
referred to as gender having been socially constructed (2002, 49). The danger with asserting
intrinsic female properties is that this position may lead to biological determinism, which
means that gender relations cannot or should not be altered.
In addition to the three ideological strands mentioned above, Gemzöe names a fourth
strand that originates as a dialogue between Marxist and radical feminism. The principle of
socialist radical feminism is that the individual in liberalism cannot be disconnected from its
social context and historical conditions. Marx held that people in similar social conditions
develop similar capacities, such as better conditions for health and educational development
in the upper classes (Gemzöe 2002, 71). Socialist radical feminists hold that bodies and our
psychology are formed by social structures. They contest, therefore, that there is anything
natural binding women as a group together, but find instead that ‘woman’ is an abstraction
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(Gemzöe 2002, 74).3 Questioning and destabilizing the category ‘woman’ is also often
attributed to feminist poststructuralism as a branch of postmodernism. Feminist
poststructuralism has informed much of my analysis in this thesis, and will be discussed in
the section on methodology. Other variations, such as difference versus equality feminism is,
in short, a discussion on whether femininity should be more valued or whether society should
be more gender neutral. Chronologic feminist ‘waves’ refer to different feminist foci from the
late 19th century, beginning with issues such as suffrage in the first wave, reproductive and
domestic rights in the second, and focus on difference and anti-normativity such as sexual
and cultural difference in the third.4
With these presentations of feminism, I have hoped to show what the standard
narratives are and that it is difficult to speak about any sort of mainstream or general
feminism. Holst is critical of these general narratives of feminism, because they do not
properly account for feminism globally, and risks falsely painting the West as a leader of
feminist development (2009, 58). It is important, nevertheless, for any feminist project to be
able to speak about generalizations in order to analyze societal structures and mechanisms of
oppression. Therefore, in order to ask the questions – is there ethnocentrism in feminism,
what is it, and if so what can philosophy do about it? – I have to insist on some generalization
of feminism, or at least invite the reader to consider a form of ‘mainstream’ feminism against
which the charges of ethnocentrism are brought. In none of the standard stories of feminism
does multiculturalism or critique of Eurocentrism come entirely to the fore. Perhaps this is an
indication that there is still a form of tension in feminism between analyzing sexism alone,
and analyzing sexism as part of a larger framework of oppression. In her introductory book,
Holst is quick to point out that feminism is not simply about sexual equality, but is concerned
with creating a just society for everyone. Feminism is not just about sex, she writes, but about
working against all forms of injustice related to sex or gender (2009, 10). Even though she is
critical of the standard narrative, Holst does not spend much time in her book discussing
cultural or racial difference, besides the occasional issues related to Western supremacy,
multiculturalism or global feminism. Neither does Margaret Walters, the author of Feminism:
A Very Short Introduction (2005), except for a final chapter on feminism around the world.
3 Some feminist philosophers are skeptical to the notion of the category or group “woman” at all. See for instance Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990). This question is of no irrelevance to this project, but is also a complete separate question in its own right and will not be thoroughly tackled in this thesis. 4 These frameworks will not be discussed in detail here, but see Joan W. Scott (1988) for a critical analysis of difference versus equality feminism. See Jane Spencer (2007) for an overview of the three feminist waves outlined by Julia Kristeva, and a critical analysis of how the wave analogy obscures long-standing feminist disagreements. See Munro Ealasaid (2013) for an overview of the potential fourth feminist wave.
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Gemzöe, similarly, tackles ethnicity and culture in one of her final chapters. Granted, there
are probably good reasons for these authors to structure their books as they did, and there
might exist counter examples to this trend, but the prevalence of this structure indicates that
issues related to race and culture are seen as niche, not unlike how feminism is relegated to
the margins in political philosophy.5
1.1.2 Challenges to Feminism from Black and Post-Colonial Feminist Philosophy
Many feminists and feminist philosophers have long since acknowledged that there is or has
been an ethnocentric issue in feminism and have been trying to remedy that issue. Many
‘intersectional’6 feminists promote a more inclusive feminism that is more sensitive to sexism
as one of many axes of oppression that women face. For instance, Maggie Humm, author of
The Dictionary of Feminist Theory (2005) notes in her definition of feminism that a
“fundamental goal of feminist theory is to understand women’s oppression in terms of race,
gender, class and sexual preference and how to change it” (Humm 1995, xii). Nevertheless,
feminist projects, still today, when attempting to be attentive to differences between women,
are charged with ethnocentrism on the basis of failing to acknowledge or properly
acknowledge the forms of oppression that other women experience. In 2013, feminists from
Harvard Law School and Women’s Center were mocked and criticized by Indian activist,
feminist and blogger Nivedita Menon for announcing their intent to help Indian feminists
with rape violence in India (2013). One might be inclined to ask why Menon was so quick to
reject help from such well-connected, privileged women with – I presume – excellent
knowledge of feminist theory. Perhaps the Harvard feminists had not properly recognized the
work put in place by Indian women, or Menon perceived a certain self-congratulatory attitude
from the elite Western women that was in bad taste, or that they had somehow miscalculated
the value of the help they were offering in an Indian context. Uma Narayan discusses these
sorts of reactions from nonwestern feminists in “The Project of Feminist Epistemology:
Perspectives from a Nonwestern Feminist” (2004). Nonwestern feminists are weary of help
from Western women and respond negatively to feminism as savior, even though they oppose
Western women’s dismissal or minimization of their specific struggles (2004, 219.) It does
not seem that the issue of ethnocentrism has been successfully resolved. If there is a root
5 This trend of relegating to the back of the book is noticable for books about general narratives in political philosophy as well. Two examples where feminism and multiculturalism is added toward the end of the book in introductory works to political philosophy are David Miller’s Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (2003), and Johnathan Wollf’s An Introduction to Political Philosophy (1996 & 2015). 6 I will discuss intersectionality in chapter three of this thesis.
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philosophical ethnocentrism in feminism, then that problem may be more difficult to
eliminate from feminism and feminist philosophy than many may have thought.
The criticism of such representations of feminism by women of color is not something
new, and in the United States can be traced back to the early 1800s.7 The Combahee River
Collective, an organization created by Black feminists, many who were also lesbians,
released a statement in 1977 where…