THE ETHICS OF THE OBJECT IN MODERN BRAZILIAN LITERATURE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF IBERIAN & LATIN AMERICAN CULTURES AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ami Schiess August 2020
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THE ETHICS OF THE OBJECT IN MODERN BRAZILIAN LITERATURE
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF IBERIAN &
LATIN AMERICAN CULTURES
AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Ami Schiess August 2020
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/
This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/rg851tg2486
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequatein scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Vincent Barletta, Primary Adviser
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequatein scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Hector Hoyos
I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequatein scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Marilia Librandi
Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies.
Stacey F. Bent, Vice Provost for Graduate Education
This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file inUniversity Archives.
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Abstract
The Ethics of the Object in Modern Brazilian Literature examines the status and function
of objects in Brazilian literary works spanning the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Each work registers and contends with an uncanny encounter with the object—be it a
thing proper, an artistic construction or a disciplinary formulation—through a turn to the
aesthetic. “The ethics of the object” describes the process by which these objects-as-
agents interrupt and impact the creative process by forcing their observers to negotiate
with them as something other than passive recipients of the descriptive gaze. By reading
works across various genres—poetry, fiction, nonfiction prose and essays—I show that
the attempt to pack a disconcerting experience with agential objects back into language
results in the emergence, and even mobilization, of literary techniques that confuse and
muddle subject and objects, and place the ontological status of the writing subject in
doubt. In focusing primarily on the trouble that many different kinds of encounters with
alterity wreak upon narration, and by extension on the reader, this dissertation offers a
new mode for analyzing the ways in which Brazilian authors contend with difference.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation was a feat that took many hands to produce. I would like to
thank, first and foremost, my advisors and professors in the Department of Iberian
Languages and Cultures for their unwavering support and encouragement of my work as
I navigated the many challenges of undertaking a Ph.D. over a decade after completing
my Master of Arts Degree. Thanks to Vincent Barletta for caring deeply about every
aspect of my writing, from conceptual questions of alternative ontologies to the minutia
of sentence structure, and for gently nudging me back “in my lane” when the breadth of
my intellectual interests threatened to lead me off-track; to Héctor Hoyos for his astute
and surgical eye that helped me to hone in on the larger implications of my research
while “cutting the fat” from my writing; and to Marília Librandi for introducing me to
contemporary research on Amerindian thinking and for her dedication to my project
throughout. Thanks also to Lisa Surwillo and Ximena Briceño, who were both wonderful
mentors over the course of my studies in ILAC, and to Cintia Santana for the depth of her
knowledge in Translation Studies and for her encouragement of my own translating
endeavors.
I would not have walked through the doors of Pigott Hall as a doctoral student
had it not been for the many mentors I encountered in earlier times. My indebtedness to
Joan Brown at the University of Delaware goes back many, many years. Without her
particular guidance, I would never have imagined that a person could make a career out
of reading, and would not have had the courage to turn away from the field of
international politics to that of literature. Thank you to my co-advisors in the Graduate
Program at the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, Daphne Patai and Nina Scott, for
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taking a chance on an International Relations major; and to Márgara Russotto for
encouraging me to submit my first article for publication at age twenty-one. Finally, I
extend my gratitude to the professors at the University of California-Berkeley who
welcomed me into their doctoral classes as an extension student—Francine Masiello and
Candace Slater. Without those experiences I would never have imagined that the path of
academic literary study was still a possible avenue. The same is true for the friends and
colleagues that I met there: Alex Brostoff, Ashley Brock and Yael Segalovitz. Without
Yael’s warm encouragement at the After Clarice conference in Oxford, UK in 2016, my
writing on Clarice Lispector would not have been a part of this study.
The writing of a dissertation is an arduous and lonely task. I will always
appreciate my Stanford writing partners, Monica VanBladel and Callie Ward, who mixed
blinding intellect with warm support, and for whom no draft was ever too messy to share.
The same is true for my writing support partners through the Unstuck Program, Meredith
VonNatta and Margaret Bostrom (without whose editing suggestions I would not have
made it through the forest of Chapter 1). The Unstuck Program itself was also invaluable,
surpassed in payoff only by the Writing in the Pandemic Series. Both of these, coached
by the wonderfully irreverent Kel Weinhold, were a lifeline in practical and personal
strategies for managing academic writing.
Last, I can only have completed this degree with the loving support of the people
in my personal network. I am grateful for the serendipity that brought Liliam Perez Ávila
to our household for the first year of my studies and for her intermittent support of our
family, always there when we most needed it, in the years since. Thank you to all of the
friends and fellow mothers who watched my children while I met deadlines and sat for
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exams. Thank you to those beautiful children, Jack and Tucker, who grew from
preschoolers to middle-schoolers over the course of this endeavor. And thank you to my
ever-supportive spouse and partner, Andy Peay, who never once questioned my decision
to undertake this degree and who was at my side every step of the way.
What is the status of the object in modern Brazilian literature? What are its limits
and possibilities? How does the object manifest itself in works written between the 1922
Semana de Arte Moderna and the present day? How does it differ from the writing
subject and what power does it exert over this subject? These seemingly naïve questions
cut to the core of a literary tradition filled with a wide range of objectified “others”—
from material objects and tools to nature to the millions of marginalized and overtly
racialized people that make up the overwhelming majority of Brazil’s population. As
Roland Greene (Unrequited Conquests) has argued in his account of the first decades of
Portuguese colonization, Brazil is a place where objects commonly overshadow their
subjects.
To get a more concrete sense of what Brazil’s complex relation to objects might
look like in a literary text, it is worth turning to Sidney Rocha’s “matriuska,” a micro-
narrative published in 2009 as part of a collection by the same name. Focused on female
characters from Brazil’s Northeast and published just at the threshold of widespread
smartphone technology and increased internet access, the stories in matriuska explore
themes of interpersonal and interregional connectivity—or the lack of these—against a
backdrop of social inequality.
The short story “matriuska” consists of only 516 words, and it reads as an
extended prose poem in a single paragraph. The story begins abruptly, “foi naquela vez
que nos vimos que me mostrou todas suas importâncias” ‘it was that time we saw each
other, that she showed me all of her personal importances,’ and this small bit of context is
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all we learn over the course of the narrative about the unnamed characters (23). Instead of
context or circumstance, the narrative gives the reader an ebb and flow of pocketed
clauses, detailing a list of objects taken by the woman from a purse and displayed to the
narrator. Like its title, the narrative of “matriuska” contains no capital letters and few
periods; instead, its short phrases are connected by a series of commas. These commas
both link and separate, creating a daisy chain of items and phrases as the character
extracts and names each one. The story’s unconventional punctuation thus serves to
mimic a continuous flow of both objects and spoken words:
Uma ametistazinha adormecendo como um olho num pedaço de veludo
cor de abacate, sem serventia que se saiba, uma cartela de lexotan que
confessou nunca usar, que coisa sem uso dá mesmo charme, uma fivela
com forma de peixe, mas ela não gosta de peixe [...] Duas carteiras de
estudante sem validade, daquele bolso de tempo em que viveu com um
cara (23)
[a tiny amethyst sleeping like an eye in a piece of avocado velvet, role
unknown, a pack of lexotan, never used, but unused things still give off
charm, a fish-shaped buckle, but she doesn’t like fish […] two student i.d.
cards, invalid, from that pocket of time when she had lived with a guy]
What is the status and function of the objects in this stuttering string of language? The
question is initially unclear. The piece builds tension toward a final reveal: “o tesouro, o
seu tesouro, […] algo que realmente valesse a pena a existência da bolsa” ‘the treasure,
her treasure, […] something that would truly validate the existence of that bag’ (24). As
this moment approaches, it becomes clear that the process of self-revelation is both
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arduous and risky. As the paragraph proceeds, the sentences begin to trail off, changing
direction rapidly or simply fading away:
,,, e foi somente depois disso que ela me apresentou ao que sem dúvida
nenhuma e sem qualquer risco de erro sairia mais caro mostrar, o que
somente algumas pessoas conhecem, mas antes havia um recorte de jornal,
tinha que conseguir aquele emprego, três sementes de pau-brasil, não sabia
onde fora parar o relógio com bracelete quase de ouro, Deveria estar aqui
perto da. Uma piranha com dois dentes a menos, sim, sim, estava
procurando algo que realmente pudesse valer a pena a existência da bolsa,
e lá estava, finalmente, como numa matrioska ou nas tantas camada du’a
cebola o que podia lhe valer mais que uma vida, que é o que vale uma
lembrança para sempre (24)
[,,, and it was only then that she introduced the thing that without a doubt,
with a zero-percent risk of error would cost the most to show, what only a
few people know, but first there was the newspaper clipping, she had to
get that job, three brazilwood seeds, she didn’t know where that
wristwatch with an almost-gold band had gone, It should be here next to
the. a piranha missing two teeth, yes, yes, she was looking for something
that would truly validate the existence of that bag, and there it was finally,
as if in a Russian doll or the layers of an onion there could be something
worth more to her than her life, which is what a souvenir is always worth]
As the passage progresses, cristiane’s rising anxiety passes to the reader by way of
stutters and starts. She is looking for something specific, a specific thing that she cannot
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quite grasp; as dialogue fails her, the objects in her purse step in to translate her
experience.
In Rocha’s story, the litany of objects stands in for an expressive breakdown: the
character’s inability to articulate an ambivalent anxiety about the “value of a life,” her
own life. As the bag becomes progressively empty, these items encircle a central void:
her desire to be seen by the story’s narrator and to be validated by his reception of her
narrative. The narrator’s telling of the story—or better, his (literary) retelling of her
(material) telling of her life—reflects his dawning realization of her need, and of his
inability to fill it. The narrative itself becomes his attempt to compensate her for a
relation they will never have. Objects meet the (writing, narrating) subject and the latter
finds only its limitations, its never-ending responsibility to the former.
Beyond the matter of subjective and symbolic limits, Rocha’s “matriuska”
underscores key elements of what I consider to be an “ethics of the object” in modern
Brazilian literature. The textual muddling of subjects and objects I describe over the
course of the present dissertation is by no means a simple matter, but it can be boiled
down to three central claims. In the first place, these texts all contain objects that take on
some form of agency. Second, these counterintuitive object-agents provoke discomfort in
the writing subject, a discomfort that inevitably points (as smoke points to fire) to
something outside the text itself. Finally, the discomfort that the object-agent causes the
narrating subject gives form (intentionally or unintentionally) to the text and passes this
sense of ontological estrangement on to the reader. As I see it, the ambivalent literary and
ontological terrain of modern Brazilian literature has tended to mix personified objects
and objectified people. Like the objects in cristiane’s purse and cristiane herself, it is
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nearly impossible to determine the point of separation between self-disclosure and a bare
list of items: “a tiny amethyst sleeping like an eye in a piece of avocado velvet, role
unknown, a pack of lexotan, never used, [etc.]” This charged locus of encounter and
doubt likewise serves as the ground for an intra-textual ethics that does not rely on
similarity, assimilation, or even understanding; here what is different does not have to be
discarded for the relation to proceed.
The phrase “ethics of the object” also encompasses the project’s meta-aesthetic
function, which records the influence of shifted subject-object relations on the formal
features of the text. That is, I argue that these works produce their effect (at once
performative and referential) primarily through a culturally situated, experimental poetics
rooted in ontological confusion and radical alterity. Finally, this meta-aesthetic function
shades into what I perceive as the pedagogical functions of the poetics I describe: these
formal attributes, which I associate with aesthetic experiences of the sublime and the
uncanny, create a mirror-experience that recreates in the reader precisely the sensations
of disquiet, disorientation and curiosity experienced by the narrating subject. By way of
this particular approach, any claims I make for the “ethical import” of literary objects for
the reader have to do with affects, like attraction, frustration, and wondering, that arise
from encountering and decoding the unusual objects and unconventional formal features
of these texts. The following sections of my introduction dig deeper into Rocha’s
micronarrative in order explore each component of “the ethics of the object” in greater
detail.
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The Orders of Things
Throughout the texts I analyze in the present dissertation, different categories of
“object” emerge as textual agents. Sometimes the “object” in question denotes physical
objects, sometimes artistic ones; sometimes the object is a text to be translated, and
sometimes it is a disciplinary “object” (such as the “native informants” that form the
object of early ethnographic work) that asserts its subjectivity. This “agency” takes many
forms across the texts I examine, and some of these emerge in Rocha’s “matriuska.”
Within that story, material objects translate for a character having a hard time naming her
experiences and desires. She wishes to defend her life and her self-worth after having
been discarded by the narrator. In this way, her objects actively mediate a fraught
interpersonal exchange.
We might also say that the objects in Rocha’s story communicate more about
relations than either cristiane or the narrator has in mind. Some of them readily call up
pre-established categories of agentive things—it is easy to recognize, for instance, the
likeness with a fetish (the “tribal” variety, not the commodity kind) of a “sachê de
sândalo que inclusive afasta coisas do ciúme” ‘a sandalwood sachet that also protects
things from envy,’ or even “uma amestitazinha adormecendo como um olho” ‘a tiny
amethyst sleeping like an eye’ (23). One also finds a collection of the detritus of capitalist
relations such as tourism (“a [dried] piranha missing two teeth”), or imported values
(“she doesn’t like fish, but she would like to see what sushi tastes like, but where do they
sell that?”) that highlight the character’s “thrownness” into global structures of exotic
tourism and taste brokering. These objects throw the commodity fetish into disarray by
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way of an imperfection (missing two teeth) or an unattainability (where do they sell that?)
that pokes a hole in the aura of exchange value.
The unused anxiety medication, (a pack of lexotan, never used, but unused things
still give off charm) for its part melds both variants of the fetish, in that it embodies the
webs of pharmaceutical production and affect regulation that characterize late capitalism,
while at the same time it would seem that cristiane carries it (if we understand the phrase
“dá charme” in light of the etymological meaning of “charming,” and also if we believe
her assertion that she does not take the pills,) more as a talisman than as a chemical
intervention. Still other textual “objects” that cristiane takes from her purse have no
concrete form (“dois sonhos já desistindo, ir a cuba e comprar com o suor do rosto um
fiat uno que fosse” ‘two dreams giving up the fight: going to cuba and buying, with the
sweat of her brow, a fiat uno that runs’) precisely because they are material aspirations
that will never take form.
The Object-Agent as Pivot
The potpourri of lively objects on display in “matriuska” is an apt metaphor for
the eclectic collection of objects that emerge in the works studied in the present
dissertation. In each case, the agency of the object acts as a pivot point that provokes
questions of curiosity and responsibility toward entities that tend to be viewed (whether
in philosophical inquiry or through force of habit) as outside the field of ethical concerns:
an ethics of the object. That is, the corpus of work I examine in the present dissertation,
which ostensibly deals with different orders of objects, ultimately makes de-objectifying
moves. By questioning the status of their textual objects, these works challenge the
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extratextual objectification of different forms of life. In “matriuska,” as cristiane narrates
by means of objects and then struggles in vain to find an object that would “be worth
more than a life,” the narrator comes finally to see her as an individual to whom he has
some responsibility. He stops her as she moves to show him an unnamed object (“the
treasure, her treasure”), and he seems to understand that this revelation would render her
too bare: “Não o faça, guarde para si, eu disse, e ela olhou-me como para quem a
salvasse” ‘Don’t do that, save it for yourself, I said, and she looked at me as if at
someone who had just saved her’ (25). Rocha’s use of the imperfect subjunctive (“como
para quem a salvasse”) reveals that the narrator holds no illusions over the insufficiency
of his gesture to “save” cristiane, but his own footing has nonetheless been altered: “e o
seu silêncio redesenhou algo em mim, que não sei direito, e todas aquelas coisas foram
lentamente para o sus bolsa e em mim outras coisas se ordenaram e se mediram” ‘and her
silence redrew something inside me, I don’t know exactly what, and all those things went
slowly back into her bag and within me other things were ordered and measured’ (25).
The narrator in Rocha’s story is moved by the objects cristiane puts on display.
Likewise, the different orders of objects described in this dissertation “move” subjects
out of position, knock them off-kilter, or ask them to switch places. In Chapter 1, I
describe how a visitor to the Amazon region wrestled for decades with a poetic creation
that could never convey, to his complete satisfaction, his experience of immersion in the
lively animacy of the rainforest. Raul Bopp was so impacted that even as his diplomatic
career removed him from Brazil, overran his literary pursuits and required him to take a
utilitarian view of the forest as a commodifiable resource, he continued to revisit and
revise his poetic work Cobra Norato. Not incidentally, I argue, Bopp’s modifications of
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the poem’s verb phrases quite often make the grammatical subjects more agentive. These
observations beg the question in regards to subject and object, poet and forest: which
acted, and upon whom?
In Chapter 2, I describe Clarice Lispector’s artistic preparation for the ethical and
representational dilemmas that inhere in writing an Other subjectivity. As if in a
Barthesian process of preparation du roman, Lispector undertakes an extended
examination of artistic representation in her novel Água viva (1973). The questions that
invade Água viva’s narrator as she paints/writes and that shape her visual representations
of caves, doors, mirrors and finally, a wardrobe, are precursors to those that reappear in
her later novel, A hora da estrela (1977). This, the final novel that Lispector publishes
before her death, is the one in which the author finally brings to fruition her previously
latent desire to write a social novel. By way of an artistic wrestling with questions of
objecthood, Água viva serves as the author’s training ground for addressing the ethics of
representing social alterity.
Chapter 3 offers an altered view of processes of cultural and disciplinary
representations of radical (human) alterity. I do this first by summarizing some of the
major stopping-points in the evolution of cannibal tropes. Since the times of First
Encounters, the word-concept cannibal has functioned as a marker of the nearly-
inhuman; the colonial Other whose abhorrent anthropophagic practices make him unlike
enough to warrant his colonial subjugation.
These cannibal tropes tell us a lot about what the West thinks about relationships
with extreme alterity. They also reveal much about how much we desire or fear
communication with such an alien subjectivity, or whether we even believe such a thing
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to be possible. Perhaps this is why cannibalism serves as such an apt metaphor for
processes of translation of all kinds. But, as I explore in this chapter, “cannibals” may
well have their own ideas about that proposition. As ethnography among lowland
Amerindian tribes over the last forty years has shown, the “meaning” of the cannibal rite
within cultural groups presumed to have practiced anthropophagy in the past is founded
upon very different configurations of same and different, self and other, human and
nonhuman, than those that for centuries have shaped European interpretations of the
cannibal act. From this, it follows that such differences between Amerindian and
European conceptual thought will drive very different concepts of translation. This
chapter finally asks what kind of result we might obtain if “the cannibal”—the object of
colonial description, including ethnography—were to become an agent of literary
translation theory.
Readers on the Storm
My third claim has two parts. In the first place, I maintain that an anxiety over the
status of objects emerges as literary form in the texts studied here. Second, I argue that
these textual features produce an analogous effect in the reader. I read all of these works
from the “bottom up;” that is, carefully analyzing at the level of language the sometimes-
subtle, sometimes-blatant shifts in subject-object relations I just summarized. Often, this
language portrays more than “mere” representations of objects as agential: it also
registers textual ripples and quirks that betray a discomfited negotiation on the part of the
narrating subject.
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It is true that my analysis in the present dissertation focuses intently on the intra-
textual dynamic occasioned by the object’s agency; however, I also write from the
assumption that texts are written and read by people. Given this fact, it is reasonable to
conclude that texts both register and provoke feelings and attitudes. Since Ludwig
Wittgenstein and John Austin, literary criticism has largely accepted the view that
literature “does things” to the reader and that these things have extratextual
consequences, positive or negative. If writing can create and reinforce largescale societal
structures and biases (as both Michel Foucault and Angel Rama claim), it follows that
these attitudes gain critical mass in a society because they have become lodged in the
hearts and minds of individuals. My analysis thus aligns with the corpus of literary
criticism that holds out hope, even as the disciplinary “ethical turn” of the early twenty-
first century fades from view, that individual encounters with literary texts can also
produce ameliorative effects and attitudes. Within this camp, my own position inclines
less toward a procedure based on humanistic principals such as those defended by Martha
Nussbaum and Wayne Booth, and more toward the deconstructively inflected process
described by Gayatri Spivak. Nussbaum and Booth speak of literature as a process of
identification, one that helps us to make ethical judgments by imagining ways that
different characters Spivak, on the other hand, defines reading in the following way: “to
learn to read is to dis-figure the undecidable figure into a responsible literality, again and
again” (Death 72).
The view I take from these debates is that literature is not ennobling so much as
enabling. Following Spivak, I understand an “ethics of reading” to be a theorization of
the attempt, always incomplete, of trying to reckon with something ultimately
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indecipherable (be it a literary figure or some textual form) through the process of
reading. That is, the literary figure must be approached and calls out for interpretation,
yet there is never any definitive comprehension possible. One might think here of that
that mercifully withheld “treasure” in cristiane’s bag: it has no name and is never
revealed, and yet it is undoubtedly “there” and stands as the very axis of the narrative
itself. Approaching the figure in literature in this way, over and over, is the exercise that
trains the imagination.
My concern with materiality and object-agents in Brazilian literature is part of a
broader current in literary studies that focuses on questions of materiality, the concrete,
and the status of the nonhuman in literary works. Often, but not always, such analyses
also contain an interrogation of social relations (Lezra; Giorgi; Daly; Hoyos) of
environmental concerns (French; Murari; McNee). Of this corpus of studies, three recent
studies elaborate perspectives that particularly inform the present dissertation. The first
two, Rachel Price’s 2014 study of “concreteness” in The Object of the Atlantic and
Héctor Hoyos’s formulation of “transcultural materialism” in Things With a History
(2019), share the premise that Latin America, as a region both steeped in the business of
things and occupying a place on the “dependent edges” of world capitalism, is a
privileged site for intellectuals to think through issues related to “thingness.”
Price and Hoyos maintain that the pronounced literary preoccupation with
“concretud/concretude” ‘concreteness,’ or “materia” ‘material’ in Latin American letters
derives from the region’s specific and historical place in the development of a world
economy. Price attributes the region’s pronounced artistic preoccupation with “the
concrete” over the course of the twentieth century to the increasing virtualization of
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material life. Price describes a transition whereby a physical Atlantic traversed by Iberian
ships loaded with gold and slaves converts to an “incipiently virtualizing Atlantic,” with
neo-colonial power wielded increasingly from the United States through complex
networks of economic domination and consumer dependency. As exploitation and
subjugation become more virtual, Price argues, a world of invisible forces began steadily
to replace the world of things. Objects and concreteness step into art and writing as a
counterweight: the material enclosure around an inner void representing the attempt to fix
in a tangible, visible form that which threatens, to paraphrase Marshall Berman, to
dissolve into thin air.
The paradigms of global capitalism and economic dependency that are so
important to Price’s argument also undergird Hoyos’s more recent study, which turns
explicitly to an examination of the region’s “default mode” of economic development:
extractrivism. Seeing the region’s approach to “stuff” as fundamentally shaped by its
history as the source of raw material for the European capitalist machine, Hoyos analyzes
the eclectic and yet, for him, particularly Latin American expressions of materialist
preoccupations in literary works from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Hoyos argues that dominant contemporary modes for theorizing materialism do
not adequately encapsulate the “material thinking” of Latin American writers. Looking at
historical approaches founded on the writings of Karl Marx, for example, Hoyos argues
that these ultimately deal with stuff through the anthropocentric prism of human social
relations. For Hoyos, “the language deployed in the region’s fiction [is] one of the realms
where different material paradigms clash” and, as a result of this clash, new forms
emerge both for “language” and for “material paradigms” (loc 207). With respect to the
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latter, Hoyos formulates a “third materialism” that for him more adequately accounts for
the array of human-nonhuman relations to be found in the region’s literary corpus:
transcultural materialism, to describe a set of relations that precisely “cuts across” (like
the prefix trans-) both nature and culture.
The historical conditions underlying the corpus I study here are undeniably the
same as those detailed by Price and Hoyos, which is to say that a differential relation to
“stuff” occasioned by a history of extractivism and an awareness of economic
“dependence” also informs the works I examine, most notably Cobra Norato. I also share
their view that a troubled and troubling encounter with objects drives a turn to language
and that language emerges transformed. Reading his sources as a ground where differing
configurations of human-nonhuman relations meet and compete, Hoyos detects the
imprint of this conflict on the form of the text: “Here language is material in the first
order: a thing. And in the second order, it is a thing that summons other things. The
instability and plasticity that new materialist thinkers celebrate in stuff is also present in
language” (loc 245).
Price argues in a similar vein when she finds that the thread connecting works as
diverse as José Martí’s chronicles and his Versos sencillos (1891), Augusto de Campos’s
“Caracol” (1960) and “Código” (1973), Severo Sarduy’s “Espiral negra” (1970), and
Alejo Carpentier’s Concierto barroco (1974) is a drive to use language to create a
tenuously concrete exterior, one that imperfectly encases within the emptiness of a
virtualizing world: “words become objects whose hollowness seems to allude to the
dreams that commodities both feed on and promise to satisfy” (172).
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My analysis focuses far less on economic relations as the source for the strange
encounter with things and more on estrangements of an ontological nature. Hoyos, for his
part, also sometimes describes the transversal nature-culture dealings explored by Latin
American writers in terms of a kinship with Bruno Latour’s formulations of human-
nonhuman actor networks, or again with Latour’s notion of individual entities as human-
non-human hybrids. The core assumption of such a framework, however, is not that
humans and non-humans might be ontologically indistinct, but rather that humans and
nonhumans are deeply interactive in ways that are not always acknowledged or
understood. In contrast, the language in the works studied in the present dissertation
persistently questions whether subjects and objects are really distinct, a claim that neither
Price nor Hoyos makes.
In this way, my approach is closer to that taken by Tara Daly in Vital
Materialisms and the Andean Avant-Garde (2019), particularly in regard to her reading
of the work of Peruvian poet César Vallejo. Writing on Vallejo’s poetry collection, Trilce
(1922), a highly experimental work that is notoriously impervious to interpretation, Daly
writes:
Vallejo’s stumbling poetics points to the relative newness of language as a
human tool (and even newer as a theoretical cornerstone of humanity).
Because language has been naturalized as what differentiates the human
from other species, Vallejo undermines this difference by partially
negating that which makes humans different from other animals: the
ability to reason and conceptualize the world through language (27).
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By frustrating interpretation, Daly argues, Vallejo turns language into one more kind of
material rather than a tool of human exceptionality. In doing so, he launches his reader
into “a poetic ecosystem that forces us to reorient before the materials in which we are
embedded,” both inside the poem and out of it (28).
When Daly contends that in Trilce, “each poem brings new materials into an
ethical fold—that is, into something readers sense and approximate—as witnesses to, and
agents alongside, the human,” she thus argues for a poetic reconsideration of human-
object relations that comes to envelop the reader (27-28). Daly’s stress on the textual
cohabitation of human and nonhuman elements, as well its implications for readerly
involvement and affect, are also fundamental to the claims I make in this dissertation.
The artistic mixing of human and nonhuman traits in order to stage a politico-
aesthetic confrontation of dominant, dehumanizing discourses is not necessarily unique
the authors I study, nor to Brazil more generally. Cary Wolfe has argued in various
contexts against what he calls the “institution of speciesism,” a phrase he uses to denote
the systematic discrimination against others through the association with generic
nonhuman traits; in Animal Rites he calls on literary criticism to unearth an “alternative
discourse of species” that protects humans and nonhumans alike (9).
Mel Y. Chen’s study of animal tropes and queer affectivity in contemporary art
aligns with Wolfe’s premise that the association of marginalized human groups with
animal traits serves as a rhetorical device for dehumanization and discrimination. Just as
language qua rhetoric has the power to naturalize discriminatory representations, so
language qua art holds the power to startle; to call attention to buried biases and shake
them loose. Chen’s focus on language—what it conjures, what it reveals—circulates
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around poetic language that startles the reader with its unexpected animacy. Thus, the
unsettlingly “hybrid” human-nonhuman forms that populate this study, animated as they
are through the force of poetic language, are necessarily artistic interventions in the
political:
Language tells us of shared priorities (cognitive or not) and material-
linguistic economies, in which some “stuff” emerges and other “stuff”
remains ineffable, unmaterialized. The sentience of a noun phrase has
linguistic and grammatical consequences, and these consequences are
never merely linguistic and grammatical, but also deeply political. (53-54)
Chen’s concern for the political consequences of animated language, so crucial to the
framework of my first two chapters, is also shared by a number of critics writing in the
field of the ecological humanities, or ecocriticism. From this vast body of literary
criticism, the present study finds most affinity with the more speculative branch best
exemplified by the work of Timothy Morton. In the first two chapters, which focus
explicitly on literary representations of the nonhuman environment, for example, I find
the uncanniness of Cobra Norato’s Amazonian forest or Água viva’s vibrant wardrobe to
resemble what Morton has called “the object-oriented sublime” (“Why Ambient Poetics”
52). For Morton, this refers to “a poetic enactment” that surfaces in works that question
the relation between humans and nonhuman environmental objects, relations “of nondual
awareness that collapse[…] the subject-object division” (52). Importantly, this mode
begins with poetics and gestures toward ethics (or what Morton calls “solidarity”): it
wraps the reader and writer (qua sublime) into a common affective experience and
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provokes a feeling, “however temporary in experience, [and] howsoever weak,” of
“warmth toward one’s world, in which one is included” (52).
In speaking of an “ethics of the object,” my goal is to describe a linguistic
procedure that can be located, I argue, in a diverse array of textual forms—thus, the
corpus of works that I study here crosses genres. Chapter 1 places a canonical poetic
work of Brazilian modernismo against the new relief of an understudied corpus of the
poet’s nonfictional writing. Chapter 2 examines a series of prose works by one of Brazil’s
most eminent mid-century writers, Clarice Lispector. In Chapter 3, I trace the evolution
of a trope—the cannibal—in texts on literary translation written over the course of the
last forty years.
Across this varied textual terrain, I describe how textual objects are invested with
agency in these writings and how that investiture impacts the humans who contemplate
them. That is, while my analysis includes texts from various genres and time periods,
each chapter explores the ways in which works both create and debate new categories of
subjectivity by way of a constant reverberation between the categories of subject and
object. In Chapter 1, for example, the Amazonian forest depicted in a 1920s modernista
poem becomes an agent that interrupts the poem’s subject as the poet attempts to enact
rather than represent a living natural environment. In Chapter 2, a series of material
objects that Lispector’s narrating subject depicts in painting serve as a training-ground for
questions of ethics and representation as Lispector herself prepared to turn her attention
to social relations in her work. In Chapter 3, translators write about translating through
the prism of the most ambivalent of subject-object (or is it subject-subject?) relations: the
one embodied by the act of cannibalism. That is, the interaction between the
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translator/reader and the textual object is figured as a relationship between two subjects,
where one subjectivity will be acted upon decisively (and fatally) by the other.
Because I read such varied sources for their differentiated manifestations of
subject-object oriented phenomena, each chapter falls within somewhat different,
although often overlapping, theoretical coordinates. However, insofar as the
subject/object ambivalence on view in these works of literature and criticism explicitly
foreground the breakdown of Humanist Enlightenment conceptual distinctions, they all
also partake implicitly in critiques of the category of the human as self-identical with
subjecthood, and of the figure of the white European male as the subject par excellence.
This critical basis, shared among the texts that I analyze, also aligns my dissertation with
a vast corpus of scholarly work over the last several decades, developed in the social
sciences, ecology, speculative philosophy, and of course literature, that increasingly
views the assumptions of traditional Humanism with skepticism. Each chapter brings a
slightly different disciplinary expression of this skepticism into the fold of the analysis.
In Chapter 1, “Nature in the Active Voice,” I analyze Brazilian writer Raul
Bopp’s Cobra Norato (1931) in light of this work’s uneven approach to the Amazon in
the early twentieth century. This work is best-known as a canonical example of the
stylistically experimental work associated with the antropofagia movement, a collection
of literary and visual art produced by a small group of artists in 1920s São Paulo.
In this chapter I present Cobra Norato as an early twentieth-century intervention
in debates over the status and function of Brazil’s natural environments; debates that
continue with increased urgency today. The recently intensified deforestation of the
Amazon has thrown competing views of the region into stark relief: Is the Amazon region
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a planetary resource or national territory? Or do both of these approaches to the rainforest
miss the mark? Today there is also a growing tendency among scholars and activists to
view the forest as a collective entity, comprised of human and nonhuman life, that
possesses an inherent and inalienable right to persist.
I argue that while many competing strains of modern thinking are evident in
Bopp’s depiction of Amazonia, the poem mainly encounters the forest as a disconcerting
natural environment: one that is animated (that is, “alive” and “aware”) in ways related
to, but also not fully consistent with, Amerindian cosmologies. Thus, this chapter also
addresses questions of whether, and to what extent, “outsiders” to the Amazon can
become allies to its human and nonhuman communities on their own terms. My central
claim here is that Raul Bopp’s struggle to contain the unexpected agency of the
Amazonian rainforest within the poetic form, to resolve his primary experience of the
landscape and pack it back into language, produces an early example of Morton’s
“ambient poetics” that is, a legitimate poetic reckoning with radically different modes of
human and nonhuman being implications of this approach for how we might understand
both poetry and the natural world.
In Chapter 2, a series of material objects that culminates in a mirrored wardrobe
becomes a field site for developing an ethical position for describing characters from
socially marginalized sectors of society. Central to the chapter are questions of social
visibility, artistic representation and ethics. What are our responsibilities to the social
groups inside our own society that remain inscrutable to us? What is the role of artists
and writers in times of social repression and hardline political control? “Reflections in the
porta-espelho,” I read works from the late phase of the most-read Brazilian author of the
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twentieth century, Clarice Lispector. Although Lispector is most often characterized as a
subjective and introspective writer, recent scholarship suggests that the emphasis on self-
writing that dominates her early work increasingly makes way for social critique as
Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964-1985) hardened its stance at the expense of civil and
human rights. Such studies document Lispector’s response to the political and social
conservatism that both enabled and benefitted from the invisibility of the poor (Sanchís
and Pola; Dalcastagnè) and the social repression of female and LGBT sexuality
(Moriconi).
My analysis brings contemporary object theory (Brown, A Sense of Things,
“Thing Theory”; Lezra) to this discussion of Lispector’s engagement with social alterity
and representation. I argue that in “The Hen and the Egg” (1964), Água Viva (1973) and
Hour of the Star (1977), Lispector’s descriptions of physical objects become tropes for
the difficulties inherent in seeing, knowing and confronting the realities of people who
are strangers to us. Seen in this light, Lispector deploys the philosophical impenetrability
of the thing as the basis for a literary ethics that is attuned to the strangeness of the
stranger, while nevertheless reaching toward her.
Both Raul Bopp’s rainforest and Lispector’s painted objects are uncanny, hard to
decipher, and viscerally unsettling. There is a strangeness in their suggested subjectivity
that at once attracts and repels interpretation. Chapter 3, “Cannibals in Translation
(Studies),” represents a pivot. This chapter situates the work of one of Brazil’s most
prominent critics and literary translators, the poet Haroldo de Campos, within a broader
corpus of writings on translation published over the last forty years as I trace a series of
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changes that take place, as the role taken by this figure of extreme human alterity in
works that probe the dynamics of power and meaning inherent to acts of translation.
Yet the essays on the theory and practice of translation that I read in this chapter
also engage, I argue, in the same textual dance with the uncanny figure that I describe in
the earlier chapters. The difference is that a different order of objects that shift into view
as potential subjects. Rather than belonging, like trees and wardrobes, to the umbrella
category of material “stuff,” these objects—both the “cannibal” himself, a figure for non-
European people and cultural practices to be translated as objects of colonial
representation, and the texts that are understood to be translated in a “cannibalistic”
way—are both unavoidably wrapped up in the human.
I examine the first of these, the cannibal, as a rhetorical object that represents,
within the sphere of the Western imaginary, an ambivalent category of the human. He is,
on the one hand, the radical other of the European colonial enterprise: a “savage” or
“primitive” human, perhaps, but undeniably a human. On the other hand, the very
savagery or primitiveness conveyed by the word-concept cannibal relies precisely on the
“inhumanity” of his presumed anthropophagy. What could be less social, less civilized,
less human (and more beastly), than the act of eating like kind? What could be more
confusing of group solidary and identity than the uncanny reversal of insides and outsides
on view as we envision the cannibal making his feast? What, for that matter, makes a
subject into an object more summarily than eating him, or makes the object of colonial
domination into the subject of resistance more clearly than the cannibal’s revenge upon
the colonizer? As recent scholarship on early modern, colonial and contemporary sources
strongly suggests, however, it is precisely the fact that “the cannibal” stands in the murky
Schiess 23
territory between self and other; between the human, the inhuman and the nonhuman that
makes him so useful a bulwark for establishing such divides according to the shifting
priorities of ideology and rhetoric (Hulme; Chambourleyon and Bombardi; Boucher;
Sanborn; Freire; Bratlinger). In this way the cannibal, a word-concept thrown into motion
by the meeting of European and American cultures over five hundred years ago, comes to
stand as a caricature of the not-quite-human colonial Other that shades into contemporary
structures of political and cultural power (Bergman; Root; Rice; Bergland).
In the context of twentieth-century Brazil, one can hardly speak of the cultural
function of “the cannibal” without accounting for antropofagia and its cultural afterlives.
This aesthetic and philosophical paradigm was first developed in the 1920s by Oswald de
Andrade as a nationalistically-inflected reaction against European cultural imposition. As
one of the major aesthetic formulations to emerge from the Brazilian avant-garde
movements, it is also arguably the most widely-circulated Brazilian theory that explicitly
addresses the questions of just who—and what—finds expression in formulations of
Brazilian culture.
As the group’s name suggests, the antropófagos (anthropophagi) sought to claim
and instrumentalize the figure of the indigenous cannibal in order to redefine Brazilian
cultural and artistic identity. This was, as many critics have noted, a problematic
endeavor given both the cultural rooting of the movement’s engineers in the very
European traditions and viewpoints that they wished to decenter with the “cruel integrity
of the savage,” and their limited knowledge of the native cultures that they sought to
represent (Castro-Klarén, “A Genealogy”; Madureira, “A Cannibal Recipe”; Sá,
Rainforest Fictions). Roberto Schwarz has characterized the movement as only
Schiess 24
superficially progressive, its revalorization of the native a thin cover for a bourgeois
formulation that sought to revivify the elitist values of “true” art and high intellectualism.
Nevertheless, even for Schwarz (and for many of antropofagia’s defenders, both inside
and outside of Brazil, the specifically Brazilian reclamation of the cannibal represented
by the formulations of antropofagia represents a turning point in Brazilian cultural
theory:
Oswald de Andrade advocated cultural irreverence in place of subaltern
obfuscation, using the metaphor of ‘swallowing up’ the alien: a copy, to be
sure, but with regenerative effect. […] Modernism therefore brought about
a profound change in values: for the first time the processes under way in
Brazil were weighed in the context of the present-day world, as having
something to offer that larger context. Local primitivism would give back
a modern sense to tired European culture, liberating it from Christian
mortification and capitalist utilitarianism. Brazil’s experience would be a
differentiated cornerstone, with utopian powers, on the map of
contemporary history. (Schwarz 9)
It is precisely this play of self and other against a backdrop of colonial power that makes
the cannibal such an apt figure for acts of cultural and literary translation.
In Chapter 3, I review several such formulations of “cannibal translations” that
highlight broader disciplinary transformations taking place around the turn of the century:
George Steiner’s “Hermeneutic Motion,” (1975), Haroldo de Campos’s “Da razão
antropofágica” (1983), and Spivak’s “The Politics of Translation” (1993). Each of these
texts is exemplary of a different version of what is understood through references to
Schiess 25
cannibals, and the trajectory established between them reflects the scholarly trends put in
motion by what is called the postcolonial turn.1 Steiner employs a traditional trope that
reveals the desires and anxieties of a colonial self, who is attracted by the force of the
exotic but fears “being eaten”—succumbing to its force. Campos reverses and transvalues
this colonial threat, arguing for the creative force of a metaphorical antropofagia cultural
(cultural anthropophagy), whereby works of literature that travel from Europe to Latin
America will be consumed and transformed, rather than piously revered, by the New
World intellectuals that encounter and translate them (whether in a strictly linguistic
sense or an artistic one). Spivak’s essay, in turn, gives us a cannibal as a figure of almost-
unreachable alterity: a cultural and temporal other from whom we can learn only if we
adopt the alternative version of knowing that the figure comes to embody in the essay.
To these texts that ask, implicitly or explicitly, how a certain configuration of the
cannibal figure can illuminate procedures of linguistic translation, I add examples from a
more recent work that asks similar questions but from an opposite vantage point: Eduardo
Viveiros de Castro’s “Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled
Equivocation” (2004). Unlike the literary and cultural theorists who precede him in the
chapter, Castro is an anthropologist. Since the 1990s, the theories he derived from his
field work in Lowland Amazon has helped to foment (along with that of Marilyn
Strathern) a major shift in disciplinary paradigms that can be most neatly summed up as
the reconsideration of anthropology’s traditional “object”—the “native”—as no longer an
object of ethnographic description but rather as a co-producing participant in a new wave
of anthropological theory. [ontological turn, if it hasn’t been done in the intro]
Schiess 26
The juxtaposition of Castro’s work with that of these translation theorists,
particularly Spivak’s, is especially productive due to the similarity of their intellectual
objectives across divergent fields. Both Spivak and Castro are concerned with
establishing conceptual bridges between the patterns of thought inherent in a Eurocentric
academy, and the alternative ways of thinking and being that characterize the vast
segments of the world’s population that often constitute the object of academic
disciplines such as political theory, economics, sociology and anthropology. The fact that
Viveiros de Castro openly frames the anthropological endeavor as a multi-layered act of
translation is also a key element of the work that I consider here:
[T]he comparison of which I am thinking is a constitutive rule of the
discipline. It concerns the process involved in the translation of the
“native’s” practical and discursive concepts into the terms of
anthropology’s conceptual apparatus. I am talking about the kind of
comparison, more often than not implicit or automatic (and hence
uncontrolled), which necessarily includes the anthropologist’s discourse as
one of its terms, and which starts to be processed from the very first
moment of fieldwork, if not well before. Controlling this translative
comparison between anthropologies is precisely what comprises the art of
anthropology (“Perspectival Anthropology” 4-5)
In an endeavor that is aligned with Spivak’s defense of non-Western subjectivities, then,
Viveiros de Castro uses examples of linguistic (mis)translation to highlight the
differential meanings of concepts—in this case, the concept of translation itself—across
cultures.
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Thus, my reading of “cannibal translations” over the course of this chapter moves
across the time and space of the colonial and post-colonial arena, documenting an
evolution of the cannibal figure from “object” to “subject”—from a mask of colonial
making that fully obscures the human behind it, to a subjecthood-seizing figure for the
resistance of the postcolonial intellectual, to the concept-forming and differential
subjectivity Viveiros de Castro describes as a relational co-producer of a new
anthropology. The diachronic and intertextual approach that I take in this last chapter thus
complements the intra-textual readings I perform in the first two chapters: each
vantagepoint illuminating another angle on the shifting status of the object as performed
by language.
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CHAPTER 1
Nature in the Active Voice: Raul Bopp’s Cobra Norato
In the summer of 2019, a series of events related to Brazil’s Amazon region
sparked an exchange of barbs and accusations between the leaders of Brazil and France, a
contentious back-and-forth that usefully underscores the themes of this chapter. In the
months prior to this exchange (between June and August), fires in the tropical rain forest
devastated an area equal in size to the U.S. state of Texas. While large-scale fires in the
region are a cyclical phenomenon and often result from smaller fires set for the purpose
of clearing land for agriculture, the rate of uncontrolled burning spiked significantly in
2019. By June, the acreage burned that year represented an 80% increase over the same
period the year before. These fires burned for several months without the intervention of
local or national government, and this prompted many to speculate that Brazilian
President Jair Bolsonaro tacitly supported the large-scale destruction of forest in order to
clear the way for national mining and agribusiness interests (Londoño, et al.).
By August, the Amazon fires had set off a storm of international press coverage
that attracted the attention of world leaders. Just prior to the Group of 7 conference on
climate change in Biarritz, France, French President Emmanuel Macron used Twitter to
refer to the fires as an “international crisis” in terms that drew the ire of many Brazilians
(including the country’s president): “Our house is burning. Literally”
(@EmmanuelMacron). While Bolsonaro’s supporters tweeted angrily that Macron should
“[ir] cuidar da sua casa” ‘[go] take care of [his] own house,’ the Brazilian president
asserted that Macron’s comments constituted “ataques descabidos e gratuitos à
Schiess 29
Amazônia” ‘false and gratuitous attacks on the Amazon,’ and that the French president
had chosen to “disfar[çar] suas intenções atrás de uma ‘aliança’ dos países do G-7 para
‘salvar’ à Amazônia, como se fôssemos uma colônia ou uma terra de ninguém” ‘disguise
his intentions behind an “alliance” of the G-7 countries to “save” the Amazon, as if we
were a colony or a no-man’s land’ (@jairbolsonaro). The precise language of Bolsonaro’s
objections, “as if we were a colony or a no-man’s land,” strongly suggests that what
bothers Bolsonaro is what he perceives to be Macron’s explicitly internationalist, and
perhaps even neo-colonial, framing of the Amazonian fires as much as the latter’s
designation of them as a “crisis.”
The Macron-Bolsonaro Twitter exchange raises many questions at the center of
Brazilian history and culture. Is the Amazon region a planetary resource or national
territory? Is it a bulwark against the rising temperatures that endanger human life across
the globe, or a much-needed source of economic development for a sovereign (and
inarguably post-colonial) nation? The exchange also illustrates two opposing views of the
Amazon region that are quite familiar to citizens and scholars of Brazil. Bolsonaro’s
statements are typical of the view that frames the Amazon as fuel for Brazil’s economic
machine; consequently, it takes an appropriative and openly objectifying attitude vis-à-
vis the region. On the other hand, while Macron’s position is clearly predicated on a
concern for the conservation of the rain forest, it is indicative of a view that is no less
appropriative and objectifying, only more subtly so. Here, Amazonia appears as an
exceptional landscape that is somehow supranational: its crucial role in regulating
planetary balance means that it ostensibly “belongs to all of us,” with the implied hope
that its preservation will save us from ourselves.
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This very recent debate between Macron and Bolsonaro is just one instance in a
long war of words over the Amazon. In the over five hundred years since Europeans first
recorded their impressions of the region, the superlative exuberance of its vegetal and
animal life has provoked many overlapping and competing characterizations, from the
persistent Green Hell/Earthly Paradise binary to more temporally-specific visions such as
El Dorado, the land of the mythical Amazonian warrior women, and the Terra do Sem-
fim/Last Frontier (Slater; French; Pizarro; Murari and Monteleone; Silva).While each of
these tropes values the Amazon differently, they all emerge from and thus represent a
visitor or outsider’s point of view of the rainforest. Because of this inherent separation
between the viewing/interpreting subject and the physical environment, these tropes are
implicitly vulnerable to, if not explicitly based upon, the objectifying impulses that also
undergird the Macron-Bolsonaro exchange.
In the present chapter, I examine Raul Bopp’s Cobra Norato (1931), a book-
length narrative poem that constitutes an early twentieth-century literary intervention in
these debates. As I demonstrate over the course of the present chapter, Bopp offers an
alternative to the poles of rarefication and utilitarianism that most commonly shape views
of the Amazon. At the time he first composed the poem, Bopp, a Southern-born Brazilian
writer and diplomat, was himself a visitor to the Amazon, having decided to travel
through Brazil by completing each year of his law degree at a different federal university.
The kernels of poetry that he wrote over the course of the year spent in Belém do Pará,
where the Amazon River meets the Atlantic Ocean, would eventually become Cobra
Norato—an important work of Brazilian modernism that was also Bopp’s primary
literary achievement. Based loosely on plots and characters from local oral tradition and
Schiess 31
Amerindian myths, Cobra Norato relays the journey of an outsider through an
Amazonian forest populated by a variety of human and nonhuman entities.
In Cobra Norato, Bopp crafts a complex matrix of contrasting views of the
Amazon. This matrix, together with the field of criticism surrounding the poem and its
author, offers a particularly rich case study of competing characterizations of the Amazon
region over the course of the last century. As a text formally impacted by the encounter
with an alien and assertive physical environment, Cobra Norato subtly interrupts
accounts of the Amazon that alternately rarify the region as a pristine, primitive
environment, or codify it as so many resources to be marshaled for economic
development. What makes this intervention particularly useful in surmounting the
present-day dispute over who “owns” the Amazon is that, while the poem was written by
a visitor to the region, its representation of the forest is not wholly circumscribed by the
objectifying impulses characteristic of outsider perspectives. Like Macron’s and
Bolsonaro’s back-and-forth, the poem is riddled with contradictory views over who or
what the Amazon is “for,” and yet Cobra Norato also works to reveal another mode of
relationality that troubles both types of objectification and offers an alternate way
forward.
Despite the experiential “interruption” at the heart of Cobra Norato, researchers
have mostly operated within the same romantic/developmentalist binary one finds in the
Macron/Bolsonaro Twitter debate. For the most part, critics have read Bopp’s poem as an
integral part of the antropofagia movement, Brazil’s most celebrated avant-garde
movement. Given the thematic, stylistic and historical affinities between Bopp, his poem,
and the small cadre of artists that comprised the antropofagia group in 1920s São Paulo,
Schiess 32
it is logical to contextualize Cobra Norato in this way. As the group’s name suggests, the
antropófagos (anthropophagi) sought to claim and instrumentalize the figure of the
cannibal, an aim that also encompassed a modernist reevaluation of mythology,
indigenous languages, popular culture, and rural landscapes. Cobra Norato, a literary
work that prominently features these very elements, often assumes in the critical tradition
an isomorphic relationship with the antropófago movement as its “porta-voz”
‘mouthpiece’ (Averbuck 88) or its “poema-símbolo” ‘symbol-poem’ (Esteves 75).
This tight affiliation leads, on the one hand, to scholarly readings that co-celebrate
the work and the cultural-artistic program for a “poetic nationalism” that valorizes the
previously devalued category of indigenous culture (Mendes; Inojosa; Garcia; Averbuck;
Olivos Santos). On the other hand, because Cobra Norato is so closely associated with
antropofagia, the poem is subject to the same critical reassessments that recognize
Brazilian primitivist nationalisms, even the progressive antropofagia, as overtly
universalizing and romantic—not unlike Macron’s view of the Amazonian environment
in the exchange above.
As a movement that explicitly sought to convert the particular and the local (the
cannibal relation) into a new universal (a model for a non-subalternizing mode of
intellectual and artistic production), antropofagia sought to subvert the inside-outside
dynamic described above by theorizing Brazil from within. The problem with these aims,
as critical assessments of antropofagia have noted, is that they fall prey to neo-colonial
re-enactments of “inside” vs. “outside.” As Sara Castro-Klarén and Luís Madureira
(“Cannibal Recipe”) have pointed out, antropofagia as an artistic-philosophical
construction remains mired in the historical limitations of its urban, coastal, and
Schiess 33
cosmopolitan founders. As outsiders to indigenous cultures themselves, they could only
envision a “cannibal relation” or “contacto com o Brasil Caraïba” from a viewpoint based
within European models of thinking and never as the “anthropophagi” see themselves
(Andrade 3). This basic observation has spurred Madureira to assert that Cobra Norato’s
“ethico-political foundation” is “brittle” (Cannibal Modernities 82), undermined by the
same ideological blind spot that Jacques Derrida locates in Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Writing
Lesson: “an ethnocentrism thinking itself as an anti-ethnocentrism, an ethnocentrism in
the consciousness of a liberating progressivism” (130).
Building on such insights, two more recent studies unmask the ethical limitations
inherent in Cobra Norato despite its progressive intentions. One of these, Lúcia Sá’s
Rainforest Fiction (2004), demystifies the long-held view that the poem represents a
straightforward adaptation of Amerindian myth by identifying the overwhelming
mediation of a nonindigenous point of view. The other, Madureira’s Cannibal
Modernities (2005), reads Cobra Norato as a complex allegory of Brazil’s peripheral
modernity, a paean to the country’s indigenous roots that is nevertheless driven by a
latent desire for development. Ultimately, both studies argue that Bopp’s poem articulates
the developmentalist, nationalist, and rationalist discourse of Brazilian coastal elites that
it purports to critique. In other words, they claim that Cobra Norato expresses an earlier
iteration of the same desire that motivates Bolsonaro’s discourse about the Amazon in the
twenty-first century: the desire to pull the Amazon into the grid of national development.
Where do these contradictions leave the relationship in Cobra Norato between
human and nonhuman, outsider and local, the poetic voice and the forest in which it
moves? In this chapter I move beyond the developmentalist/universalist binary that
Schiess 34
currently structures critical readings of Cobra Norato. My reading outlines a third poetic
presentation of the forest, one that offers important insights into the relationship between
poetry, experience, and the natural world. My objective in doing so is broadly ecocritical,
in that it responds to environmental philosopher Val Plumwood’s early twenty-first
century call to poets and humanists to read and depict “nature in the active voice, the
domain of agency” (451). In this reading, then, I follow Plumwood’s urging to be “open
to hearing sound as voice, seeing movement as action, adaptation as intelligence and
dialogue, coincidence and chaos as the creativity of matter” (451). My analysis
acknowledges that this endeavor depends equally upon recognizing the “intentionality”
conveyed by Bopp’s poetic language, and on my own willingness and “ability to use an
intentional vocabulary” in this analysis (Plumwood 451).
To this end, in analyzing the formal and thematic features of Cobra Norato, I
detail the myriad ways in which the experience of a face-to-face with the nonhuman
physical world interferes with Bopp’s writing, leaving us with a poem that is an uneasy
co-production between poet and environment. I begin by linking two facets of the poem
that in my view have been inadequately interpreted: the first of these is the presence of a
very curious narrative stagnation that contradicts the conventions of the poem’s supposed
frame, the epic, as well as the conventions of an epic hero; the second is the widely-held
view that the poem’s images of talking frogs, birds and trees are instances of
anthropomorphism. Complicating these earlier interpretations of the poem’s flora and
fauna, I argue that these sometimes endearing, sometimes uncanny images participate in
the larger pattern of artistic challenges to the modern(ist) objectification of the
Amazonian environment and its indigenous peoples that Bopp enacts in Cobra Norato. In
Schiess 35
this view, Cobra Norato is the record of a visceral and immediate experience, one that
defies the cognitive and linguistic capacities of the poet—a specifically Amazonian
instance of the sublime. This specificity owes to that fact that the poem’s most powerful
challenge to the subject takes the form of a lively and disconcerting natural environment:
an Amazonian forest that is animated in ways related to, but also not fully consistent
with, Amerindian cosmologies.
My principal contention in this chapter proceeds from two basic premises. In the
first place, Cobra Norato is the record of a visceral experience: more a prolonged artistic
and ontological reckoning and less a product of a specific cultural movement. I support
this premise by analyzing selections from Bopp’s extra-poetic writings, including
autobiographical reflections and diplomatic dispatches, as well as the long publication
history of Cobra Norato, which Bopp revised repeatedly, ultimately issuing twelve
editions between 1931 and 1984. The consequence of this reading of Cobra Norato
realigns the poem within Brazilian literary history by easing its tight association with the
antropofagia movement.
In the second place, I understand the visceral experience that Bopp struggles to
represent in his poem as that of an encounter with a forest that breaches the Western
category of “matter.” By this I mean that Cobra Norato’s forest is not inert and passive
but invested with a form of mind that makes itself felt and that consequently violates
acceptable terminology for the nonhuman in European languages. As such, the poem
presents a powerful alternative to the utilitarian framings of the region that pervade the
Amazon’s representations both in national artistic and intellectual circuits of the 1920s
Schiess 36
and 30s, and in the more globalized arena reflected in the 2019 Twitter dispute between
Bolsonaro and Macron.
It is precisely the poet’s genuine struggle to resolve his disconcerting experience
with nature into poetry and to square this project with existing figurations of the Amazon
that produces the beautiful forms and images of Cobra Norato while also generating the
work’s many fault lines and flaws. These fault lines and flaws include the poem’s
deviations from the formal and thematic characteristics of the epic, and the subtle ways in
which Cobra Norato diverges from and disrupts the artistic and political vision of the
movement it is most associated with, antropofagia. In the poem, Bopp works to articulate
his own interruption by the forest. In so doing, Bopp renders the forest as a relational
ecology, one that emerges in Cobra Norato as radically Other. Once we acknowledge the
presence and force in Cobra Norato of a forest invested with some form of mind, we can
also acknowledge the ways in which the encounter between the poetic voice and the
environment stages a prolonged interruption that undermines both the romantic myths of
national identity and the latent rhetoric of modern development that critics have shown to
direct the poem’s narrative thrust. The most explicitly political outcome of analyzing
Cobra Norato’s subversive elements in this way, then, lies in its potential as a model for
interrupting the rhetorical stalemates that reinforce the continued objectification of the
Amazon region, with disastrous environmental-political consequences.
Stories of Thwarted Progress
My reading of Cobra Norato as a poem that records the prolonged interruption of
its poetic speaker by his environment—an assertive, dynamic Amazon forest—
Schiess 37
recontextualizes Bopp’s long narrative poem in relation to several of his extra-poetic
writings, including texts that are often overlooked by scholars and critics. Until now, the
many reviews and introductions to Bopp’s poetic work that reference his nonliterary
writing, as well as the one scholarly study that does so (Averbuck), all focus on
autobiographical passages describing the poet’s 1921 sojourn to the Amazon. These
writings are relevant for an analysis of Cobra Norato; however, their formal and thematic
features, combined with their prominence in critical and scholarly literature, reinforce
narrow interpretations of Bopp’s poem as the “porta-voz” ‘mouthpiece’ of the
antropófago movement (Esteves 75). Furthermore, these memoirs, which are closely
linked to Bopp’s self-fashioning as an antropófago poet, also reinforce romanticized
visions of Amazonian landscapes and cultures.
In this section, I challenge the narrowed outcomes of these interpretations by
placing Bopp’s memoirs from his time in the Amazon within a broader panorama of his
extra-poetic texts. This panorama includes a short comparative reading of multiple
editions of Cobra Norato itself, as well as the introduction of lesser-known diplomatic
texts, specifically Bopp’s economic dispatches from the mid-1930s, a collection titled,
Sol e banana. What emerges from this examination is a more complete picture of Bopp’s
varied and ideologically complex representations of the region across genres, as well as a
more nuanced understanding of Bopp as a multifaceted figure within Brazilian literary
history. Reading Bopp’s poem within this larger constellation of extra-poetic texts
illuminates the diverse and competing constructions of human-nonhuman relations in
Cobra Norato, a strategy that serves ultimately to reveal complexities obscured by
interpretations that overstress the poem’s relation to antropofagia. In more specific terms,
Schiess 38
I focus on a pattern of editorial changes visible across later editions of Cobra Norato:
instances in which Bopp revises his original language and syntax in ways that invest the
poem’s rendering of the environment with more agency and dynamism. My reading also
underscores the unique capacities of poetry to capture experiences that tend to escape
other forms of expression.
In his autobiographical writing, Bopp’s primary objective in recalling his travels
in Amazonia seems to be to stress the conditions of immanence under which he
composed the original segments of Cobra Norato. During the year he studied in Belém,
Bopp took at least three extended trips by canoe and other small craft, piloted by local
fisherman, in and around the lower Amazon River and its delta. His plans to travel up the
Rio Negro to Manaus were thwarted by a case of malaria, but not before he had spent
many days navigating the famously shifting shores and fluvial whims of the great river
and its many tributaries, and many evenings listening to the stories of the canoe pilots,
who would draw their boats together for the night. The poet’s recounting of this period is
captivating, often written in an impressionistic style that stresses immanence, immersion
and even bodily porosity: “Canoa de vela. Pé no chão ouvindo aquelas mil e uma noites
tapuias. Febre e cachaça. O mato e as estrelas conversando em voz baixa. [...] Instinto
puro. Bruto.” ‘Sail-driven canoes. Feet on the ground listening to those Thousand and
One Tapuia Nights. Fever and cachaça. […] Pure, brute instinct’ (Bopp, Poesia completa
218). Bopp’s reminiscences convey the sense of being rocked by the river’s waves,
invaded by its microbes, and infiltrated by the soundwaves of ambient noise and
storytelling. In these writings, Bopp’s immersion in the environment bleeds into
identification with the presumably nonhuman: “brute instinct.”
Schiess 39
Vicky Unruh has pointed out that passages such as these, in which rural
landscapes figure as “a telluric body-content rooted to ancestral origins, a body for which
the new American artist will provide a voice,” are quite typical of Latin American
vanguard programs (27). This observation points out a secondary objective in Bopp’s
memoir-writing: its function as an explication or a defense of his role in antropofagia.
According to the author’s prefaces, Movimentos modernistas no Brasil is compiled from
an invited talk (in two parts) that he gave at the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos
Internacionais in the early 1960s, and from notes in reply to an interview questionnaire
from a journalist at the Correio da Manhã. These repurposed writings were then
published more or less as-is (17). Bopp passado-a-limpo por ele mesmo (1977) is, as the
title suggests, a defense against the accusations by the journalist Paulo Haeker Filho that
Bopp had used such speaking and publishing opportunities to inflate the importance of
his participation in the Brazilian avant-garde (12). A critical approach that focuses
exclusively on these texts, then, runs the risk of operating in a closed circuit of mutually-
reinforcing representations.
By contrast, my consideration of Bopp’s published archive begins with the least-
discussed of his writings: a collection of diplomatic dispatches that, unlike his memoirs,
appears to be completely detached from recollections of his poetic process. Sol e banana
is the title of a series of communiqués on international trade that Bopp penned between
1934 and 1938 from his posting in Yokohama, Japan, where he served as a young
member of then-president Getúlio Vargas’s diplomatic corps in the years preceding the
Second World War. Originally published in a monthly publication called Correio da Ásia
and sent to 5,000 Brazilian subscribers and news outlets, these short dispatches were
Schiess 40
intended to awaken Brazilian readers to concerning disparities between Brazilian
production and that of other nations, particularly those with similarly emerging
economies.
Insofar as these short texts focus explicitly on the very capitalist themes that
Madureira (and to a lesser extent Sá) find to be implicit in Cobra Norato, they offer a
stark counterpoint to the romanticized vision of nature emphasized in Bopp’s memoirs
and poetic texts. The following passage from Samburá: notas de viagens e saldos
literários is indicative of the style and content of the latter:
Ao chegar à Amazônia, senti que estava ante um cenário diferente, de uma
violência desconcertante. A linha constante da água e mato era a moldura
de um mundo ainda incógnito e confuso. A impressão que me causava o
ambiente, na sua estranha brutalidade, escapava das concordâncias. Era
uma geografia do mal-acabado. As florestas não tinham fim. A terra se
repetia, carregada de alaridos anônimos. Eram vozes indecifradas. (21)
[Upon arriving in the Amazon, I felt I was confronted with a different kind
of scenery, one of a disconcerting violence. The unbroken line of water
and forest was the measure of a world still in disorder and confusion. The
impression that the environment caused in me, in its strange brutality,
escaped all commensurability. It was a barely-finished geography. The
forests were endless. The land repeated itself, full of anonymous
screeches. They were undeciphered voices.]
Schiess 41
When one compares this passage from Bopp’s memoirs with the Amazon he constructs in
the following excerpt from his economic dispatches in Sol e banana, a significant
contrast emerges:
Temos ainda um sem número de plantas taniferas, como o angico, o
barbatimão e o mangue vermelho, que se estende por alguns milhares de
milhas na faixa litoral norte do Brasil. Em determinadas regiões da África
Ocidental; em Borneo; em Madagascar; nas Celebes ou na Venezuela,
extrae-se a casca do mangue para a exportação. O Brasil exportou em
1936 apenas 9 contos da casca dessa planta. Por outro lado importou de
extrato de quebracho paraguayo e argentino 3,566 contos. (50)
[Furthermore, we have [growing naturally in Amazonia] innumerable
species of tanniferous plants, such as angico, barbatimão and red
mangrove,2 which grows over an area of many thousands of miles of
northern coastline. In certain locations of East Africa; in Borneo; in
Madagascar; in the Celebes and in Venezuela, mangrove bark is extracted
for export. Brazil exported a mere 9 contos of this plant bark. On the other
hand, we imported 3,566 contos of Argentine and Paraguayan quebracho
tannins.]
In the first excerpt, Bopp renders the Amazon as an “endless,” “undecipherable,”
“disconcerting” and “confused” landscape that defies containment. In the second, the
Amazon appears to be, at least rhetorically, entirely reducible to quantification. The vast
exuberance one finds in Bopp’s memoirs—which conjures up a place animated by
Schiess 42
mysterious “voices” and seemingly without end—finds itself reduced in Sol e banana to
a series of interchangeable and commodifiable resources.
Despite their differences in tone, style, and audience, a strange analogue occurs
between the two preceding descriptions. This subtle correspondence emerges from
Bopp’s confrontation, in both texts, with an environment whose scale, variety, and
dynamism escape and exceed human description and control. When Bopp writes in his
memoirs of an “impressão que […] escapava das concordâncias” ‘impression that […]
escaped all agreement,’ this fugitive lack of “agreement” gestures toward an
incommensurability, in this case between the lived experience of a place and the measure
of the cognitive categories provided by language to describe or capture that experience.
Bopp’s language, in effect, acknowledges the breakdown of description and an overflow
of experience that escapes through the gaps between this “impression” and any
previously encountered phenomenon.
Sol e banana is also driven by the desire to corral an escaping excess, and it is
also populated by “voices” clamouring to be deciphered, but these voices are of a very
different order than those Bopp evokes in his memoir’s phenomenologically-intoned
descriptions. In his passage on Brazil’s “plantas taniferas” ‘tannin-rich plants’ from Sol e
banana, this excess slides into focus through verb choice: Bopp’s use of “temos” ‘we
have’ indicates a wealth that occurs spontaneously, without cultivation or management.
As Bopp notes, only a small portion of this naturally occurring abundance—a mere nine
contos of mangrove—is successfully exported from Brazil as a tanning material. What
remains is uncountable: the rest of the “sem número” ‘innumerable’ lies untouched and
unmarshalled, escaping quantification. In Bopp’s view, this uncountable abundance is
Schiess 43
troubling, because it is representative of Brazil’s failure to generate wealth from the latent
value of its natural resources. Making matters worse, the small fraction of this material
successfully captured for international sale is grossly off-balance with the nearly-four-
hundred-times greater amount (nine contos to 3,566 contos) of a substitutable product
imported to Brazil from Paraguay and Argentina. In this estimate, Brazil falls behind by
sitting still; its potentially mobilizable environment lies fallow while the country slips
quietly behind its Latin American and African competitors.
In the entries of Sol e banana, the Amazon “speaks” in a very different way from
what one finds in Cobra Norato. In the former, Bopp mobilizes a litany of trade statistics
and commodity descriptions to tell the story of Brazil’s historical moment as a series of
mathematical figures. Correspondingly, the flora and fauna of Brazil, and often
specifically of the Amazon, become resources to be charted and catalogued, converted
into units of measure with a quantifiable exchange value. He then presents these figures
in a terse, staccato prose, without commentary, as in this excerpt detailing Amazonian
exports:
A Amazônia repousa sua economia em dois únicos produtos: a borracha e
a castanha do Pará. São dois artigos, como se sabe, de largo consumo
internacional. A borracha silvestre, porém, não pode competir com a
cultivada, e caiu recentemente de preço, […] A castanha, em sua vez, valia
em fevereiro de 1938 apenas 60$000 o hetrolitro, quando, pouco tempo
antes, era cotada a 180$000. (Bopp, Sol e banana 80)
[The economy of the Amazon rests on two sole products: rubber, and
Brazil nuts. It is well known that these two items have a large
Schiess 44
consumption overseas. The harvest of naturally-occurring rubber has not
been able to compete, however, with the cultivated variety. The price of
Brazil nuts […] was valued in February 1938 at $60,000 per hetroliter,
while just a short time earlier, it had been at $180,000.]
Pedro Leão Veloso Neto, who served as Brazil’s ambassador to Japan during Bopp’s
tenure as consul in Yokohama, wrote the preface to Sol e Banana. In this preface, Veloso
suggests that Bopp’s ostensibly objective prose allows the facts to speak for themselves:
“One must not dramatize facts. The truth is that the careful examination of the figures
contained within this volume tells the most eloquent story” (ix). Indeed, beyond gesturing
toward the collapse of the Amazonian rubber trade, Bopp mostly leaves out the broader
economic context for the contracting trade figures that surface above, and that repeat
incessantly from entry to entry.3 The figures that reflect slipping prices and decreasing
tonnage instead tell the story of implicit social and economic anxieties: a regression by
stagnation; a standing still while other nations move ahead into modernity.
Working backward through this rhetorical chain, one might say that Bopp
transforms nature into figures in Sol e banana, and that these figures morph into “facts.”
For the reader, these facts are meant to be instructive, given that they seemingly have the
power to speak (“eloquently” and for themselves) to the consequences of Brazil’s lagging
production. According to this language of eloquent facts, Brazil’s trade deficit is driven
by the underdevelopment of domestic resources and an insatiable taste for luxury
imports. For Bopp, these factors present a threat to Brazil’s well-being early in the
twentieth century.
Schiess 45
The awareness of a temporal gap between Brazil and Europe is nothing new in
Brazilian cultural studies. In fact, the consideration of “belatedness” and related concepts
underscores the vast majority of not only Brazilian but also Latin American (and Iberian)
cultural critique from the twentieth century onward. But the sense of a shrinking world, in
which Brazil not only has to chase the European metropole but also vie with other former
colonies for a slice of the global market is particularly acute in Bopp’s treatment of
Brazilian nature in Sol e banana. Consider the symbolic importance of the banana in the
following excerpt: “A Formosa, que é 92 times menor do que a Amazônia, exportou para
o estrangeiro, em 1935, mais que 36 milhões de yen; isto é, mais do que o Pará e a
Amazônia no mesmo ano. […] De bananas, a Formosa exportou duas vezes mais do que
o Brasil” ‘Formosa, which is 92 times smaller than Amazonia, exported more that 36
million yen in products in 1935; that is, more than the states of Pará and Amazonia
combined. […] In bananas alone, Formosa’s exports totaled more than twice the amount
exported by all of Brazil’ (Bopp, Sol e banana 81). If the small Japanese island of
Formosa could surpass Brazil in banana production (and bananas were then Brazil’s most
iconic crop, if not its greatest source of export revenue), what could that mean for the
latter’s place in the world, or even among other developing nations?
The communiques in Sol e banana make clear that Bopp was thinking through a
range of economic and geopolitical questions. For this reason, adding Sol e banana to the
constellation of extra-poetic texts that inform Bopp’s literary oeuvre provides a more
nuanced image of the poet, one that recognizes him as a historical figure steeped in
ideologically conflicted characterizations of the Amazon region. The dispatches included
in Sol e banana speak openly to anxieties that Madureira teases out of Cobra Norato’s
Schiess 46
narrative structure. They reveal that if Bopp presents the Amazon as an eternally
“undeciphered enigma” in his memoirs (Bopp passado 12), he was also quite capable of
viewing the forest as a commodifiable (national) resource: not as a source of vitality in its
own right, but rather a source of prime materials for the development of a thriving
national economy.
Opening Cobra Norato scholarship to Bopp’s more utilitarian work underscores
the shifting transhistorical web of values and associations toward Amazonian nature in
the early twentieth century. It also highlights the extent to which the poet was caught up
in these contradictions over the course of his lifetime. The fact that these are later texts
likewise brings Cobra Norato’s prolonged editorial history to the fore, and analyzing
later editions deepens the already more nuanced and complete view of the poet we gain
from reading the poem alongside Sol e banana. This history lends additional credence to
Madureira’s against-the-grain reading of Cobra Norato. Bopp authorized the publication
of twelve editions of Cobra Norato in his lifetime, the first of which was re-issued in
1937, while Bopp was still posted in Japan—the same period during which he was
composing the dispatches that comprise Sol e banana. This edition, as well as the next six
(published between 1947 and 1969), show varying degrees of authorial editing that are
meticulously documented in Averbuck’s 1985 study. This means that Bopp’s disparate
Amazons, emerging across genres and over decades, cannot be relegated to specific
periods. Instead, we might look at the romanticizing and commodifying tendencies in
Bopp’s various texts as an alternating current of discourses; one that is ultimately short-
circuited by the lingering effects of an encounter with the physical environment as radical
alterity.
Schiess 47
Examining the alterations Bopp makes across Cobra Norato’s many editions
helps to explain what kept him tinkering with his text for over thirty years. In general
terms, the editorial changes that Bopp makes over time tend to invest the environment
with more agency. As the poet selects new adjectives and crafts new verbal constructions,
his nonhuman entities show more visual movement, and that movement occurs with
greater intentionality. Plants become more animal-like or, along with the forest’s animals,
more human-like, as in the example where “Sapos escondidos espiam no escuro” ‘Hidden
frogs spy in the dark’ in Canto II later become “sapos beiçudos” ‘thick-lipped frogs’
(Averbuck 225). In another example from Canto IV, the line “raízes inflamadas estão
mastigando lodo” ‘inflamed roots are chewing mud’ from the poem’s first edition
becomes “raízes desdentadas mastigam lodo” ‘toothless roots chew mud’ in the fourth
edition (Averbuck 226).
In another example from the fifth canto, the description of a riverbank undergoes
many successive mutations across later editions. As Bopp works and reworks his imagery
and syntax in this section, the original image becomes increasingly invested with
liveliness. What in the third edition is rendered as “Terra esverdeada, lisa de lama com
maceguinhas ao redor” ‘Greenish earth, mud-smoothed, surrounded by tiny weeds,’
passes through slight variations in each of the following four editions (Averbuck 227).
One intermediary verse from the fifth edition shows a move toward intentionality through
the insertion of a reflexive verb: “um plasma visguento se descostura como uma seda
murcha” ‘a slimy plasma unravels itself like a withered piece of silk’ (Averbuck 227).
Despite this, the mud remains associated with inert material via a simile that likens its
self-unraveling to that of a limp cloth. By the poem’s seventh edition, however, Bopp
Schiess 48
eventually opts to reinforce the agency of the first verb with an active second verb,
turning the mud into an actant that modifies the shape of the riverbank: “um plasma
visguento se descostura e alaga margens rasas debruadas de lama” ‘a slimy plasma
unravels itself and dissolves the riverbank’ (Averbuck 228). These changes suggest that
what the poet is after in these revisions is the same thing that the poetic voice struggles so
mightily to describe in the poem: a forest in some way invested with mind.
Animacy and Stagnancy: Ingredients of an Interpretative Suspension
I what remains of this chapter, I focus intently on the language of animacy that
Bopp so continuously revisited in what, I argue, is a poetic return to questions of mind
and agency of the physical environment. This process of linguistic return, initially visible
by way of the alterations between editions examined above, is a powerful driver of both
the curious narrative circling and the eerie tone conveyed in the poem as a whole.
My revised reading of Cobra Norato revolves a re-reading of two complementary
aspects of its poetics: 1) the active character (read as agency) of its environment; and 2)
the corresponding stalling (read as incapacity) of its poetic subject. In doing so, my
analysis modifies standing readings of two important textual elements: its imagery of the
natural environment, often described as “anthropomorphic,” and its narrative structure,
commonly characterized as “epic.” In the case of the former, Bopp’s renditions of
scheming trees, whispering stars, and embracing vegetation should not be read as
examples of anthropomorphism or personification but rather as part of a sincere account
to express the lived experience of a forest in some way invested with mind. In the case of
Schiess 49
the latter, I argue that the poetic subject’s experience in the forest serves to undermine the
poem’s ostensibly epic form.
It is common for readers of Cobra Norato to see the work as an epic; however,
this often occurs without a thorough investigation of the premises for classifying it as
such (Holanda 61; Garcia 43; Cavalcanti 64).The poem indeed shares certain narrative
features with the trajectory of the classic epic form: a hero on a journey, the facing of
trials, the achievement of an objective and a final resolution in which the hero rests at
last. At least initially, the poem’s quest-structure seems to conform to certain conventions
of the epic narrative form, the most important of which is a setting-in-motion of the hero:
in the poem’s opening lines, the lyric subject sets out through a “cyphered forest” to look
for a kidnapped princess, whom he hopes to marry. To do this, he first murders a local
enchanted entity, the eponymous “Snake Norato,” and assumes both his name and his
identity by slipping into the mythical snake’s “silken elastic skin” (I.16). He then
proceeds to strike a deal with the spirits of the forest, who outline the trials he must
undergo, before setting off in search of the object of his desire.
Despite a seemingly epic setup, little happens throughout much of the poem (Sá
209). The ostensible hero eventually succeeds in liberating the princess from her captor,
the evil Boiuna or Big Snake; however, for most of the poem he is remarkably un-heroic.
In twenty-two of the poem’s thirty-three sections, he is given to wandering, losing his
way, and indulging in fits of lyric pining. He finds himself mostly adrift in a
disconcerting environment where trees reach upward, roots bite down into the earth, birds
and animals chatter, voices reverberate, and the river surges, displaces, destroys and
rebuilds. In contrast to this background of action, the narrator merely meanders, often
Schiess 50
lamenting having lost his way, a fact that conveys a lack of agency and competence.
Given the reliance of developmentalist rhetoric in Brazil on narratives of progress,
Bopp’s contortion of linear progress throws notions of advancing modernity into doubt.
Madureira and Sá have underscored the tension between motion and stasis in
Cobra Norato, and they have pointed out how this tension undercuts any claim to epic
heroism in the poem. I am certainly indebted to their readings; however, I am more
interested in linking the tension to which they point to deeper ontological and descriptive
crises. Madureira, for example, offers a reading that is distinct from my own in two
specific ways. In the first place, he focuses on a stasis that sets in at the end of the poem,
after the hero has rescued the princess and his journey has ended. Madureira identifies the
hero’s journey through the forest as a quest for modernity, according to which the hero’s
progress through a chaotic landscape (associated with peoples of the past) sends him
toward a bright new future of order and management. He considers the hero to be moving
capably until he is seduced by the princess and by preguiça, the latter an eroticized torpor
associated with the tropics. an undercurrent of skepticism toward the atavistic and a
related, eugenically-inflected distrust of the native. The hero’s journey, then, results not
in a triumphant homecoming but in failure: in the Homeric terms used by the poem’s
early critics, we might say that he reaches the land of the lotus-eaters and never leaves.
There is a good deal to be said about the hero’s journey in Cobra Norato;
however, I am most interested in the many verses of aimless wandering. I see these as the
poem’s gravitational center, even if readers tend to be put off by the sense of narrative
stalling that occurs in them. By lingering over these long delays in the journey, where the
Schiess 51
forest blocks any conventional sense of forward movement, we may in fact come to
understand what it is that the poetic voice labors to render into language.
Sá is perhaps the only critic to have addressed the poem’s narrative stagnation,
and she quite rightly links this to Bopp’s near-obsession with referentiality and
description: “[the] parts of the poem that narrate the travels of the poetic ‘I’ are for the
most part taken up by descriptions of the Amazon at various times of day and night, and
under various atmospheric conditions; […] one could be justified in thinking that
Norato’s epic journey is just an excuse to present the reader with forest landscapes” (212-
15). Bopp’s own reflections on the poem’s composition confirm Sá’s hunch: “A
impressão da vida vegetal amazônica formou uma das primeiras sementes do poema […].
Numa desordem de ideias, fui dando forma às impressões colhidas em frequentes
viagens, de canoa, rio-abaixo, rio-acima, procurando representar a floresta no seu sentido
telúrico” ‘My impressions of Amazonian vegetal life sowed the first seeds of the poem
[...] In a disordered environment of ideas, I began giving form to the impressions I had
collected over my frequent canoe trips up and down the river, trying to represent the
forest in its telluric sense’ (Vida e morte 60). In another setting, Bopp points out that
“depois de preparar cenários mágicos, que tomam parte nos próprios episódios do poema,
tratei de compor a sua trama” ‘After first creating the magical scenes that take part in the
various episodes of the poem, I undertook to create its plotline’ (Movimentos 133-34).
Together with Bopp’s recollections, Sá’s assessment brings an important detail to the
fore: the poem’s narrative stagnation and the poetic voice’s fraught attempt to pack the
forest into language are, in essence, two sides of the same coin—unable to be able to
describe what he sees, the narrative voice remains suspended in a state of thwarted
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interpretation. Put another way, the environment shifts from object to subject and
effectively interrupts and even confounds Bopp’s poetic voice.
In speaking of the forest as poetic subject, it is important to move past
conventional notions of anthropomorphism, although this concept holds an outsized place
in the critical tradition on Cobra Norato. It is perhaps understandable that critics might
see Bopp’s poetic animation of the forest as an example of anthropomorphism.
Throughout the poem, after all, the forest and actors within it routinely engage in activity
normally reserved for humans: trees dream, frogs spy on passers-by, and stars whisper to
each other. A close reading of such passages, however, reveals anthropomorphism to be a
highly reductive and even deceptive concept.
Briefly stated, anthropomorphism designates a narrative technique by which the
human author imposes their own form, or breathes their own essence into the nonhuman
environment, while simultaneously conveying that this is done inappropriately. The
talking, reasoning animals of the Amazonian stories recorded by Amorim operate
unproblematically in this way, just as they do in the Pañcatantra or Kalila wa Dimna. So
what is meant by “inappropriate”? The terms by which this is determined are often
contradictory and overly dependent on the subjective (and often ideological) whims of
the reader. In posthumanist critique, to take a contemporary example, there is a consistent
critique of representations of the nonhuman world that are imagined too closely through
the lens of the human. By casting nonhumans as humans in animal clothing, these
representations assumedly maintain (arrogant) humanity as the universal form for
animacy.4 As a corollary of this, the use of anthropomorphism often functions as a
policing term that sidelines agentive depictions of non-humans into nonrational
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categories like the fantastical, childish, “primitive,” or folk, and their associated
subgenres: fable, myth, cartoons, satire, science fiction and magical realism (Huggan and
Tiffin 152).
Even bracketing off the troubles that seem always to accompany
anthropomorphism, it is worth questioning whether such a technique even finds
expression in Cobra Norato. Let us take as an example, a brief description of daybreak:
“A madrugada vem se mexendo detrás do mato / Clareia / Os céus se espreguiçam”
‘Dawn comes stirring itself beyond the forest / It brightens / The skies stretch and yawn’
(XXI.1-4). Here Bopp sketches out the shapes and events of the physical environment in
terms that give motion and voice to the forest’s nonhuman entities, but without
constraining them to uniquely human forms. One finds another example of this in Bopp’s
earlier account of the tidal phenomenon of pororoca: “O mar está se aprontando / para
receber as águas vivas / de contrato com a lua […]/ o mangue pediu terra emprestada /
pra construir aterros gosmentos / brigam raízes famintas” ‘The sea prepares itself / to
receive the live waters / in a deal with the moon [...] the mangroves asked to borrow land
/ to build slimy dumping grounds / hungry roots bicker’ (XX.2-9). Here again, what is at
stake are not the human attributes of the forest, or even some fully-formed or a priori
mode of action and interaction. What one finds in these passages, and throughout Cobra
Norato, is Bopp’s deep engagement with the very question of subjectivity, and of who or
what can speak for itself within the bounds of a modern(ist) poem. In literal terms, Bopp
calls the very notion of “subject”—its parameters, its ontological and pragmatic scope—
into question.
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There is, perhaps logically, a very tight and well-established link between
“anthropomorphism,” understood as a figurative device that gives nonhumans attributes
judged to be proper only to humans, and non-Western world views. Given Bopp’s
extensive use of Tupi vocabulary and the important role played in the poem by characters
borrowed from Amazonian myth, it makes sense to explore further the question of
subjectivity and representation in terms of Cobra Norato’s relation to indigenous
ontologies. This is Sá’s main task as she details the many important differences between
representations in the poem and the human-like characters that populate Upper Rio Negro
mythology that are the presumed source of the title character.5 In particular, Sá questions
long-held assumptions in the critical tradition that Bopp’s non-humans “function as
primary characters” (Garcia 22), and that they somehow represent “the native expression
of Nheengatu mythology, translated in its pure form” (Averbuck 87).
There are two main ethnocentric tendencies running through readings that see
Bopp’s representation of the non-human as a more or less “pure” expression of
indigenous thought. The first of these, as Sá notes, is that these readings accept Bopp’s
moving, speaking forest as an unproblematic representation of what anthropologists now
refer to as relational ontologies. The second emerges through a subtle or even explicit
dismissal of these ontologies by non-indigenous observers. In the case of Lígia Averbuck,
her analysis is generally positive with respect to emergent and non-rational points of
view. That said, her classification of Cobra Norato’s “anthropomorphism” as a hinge
linking an “inoffensive tale for children” to the expression of the “simplicity” of an
indigenous culture “in the infancy of humanity” also invokes, like early theories of
cognition, a conflation of animist thought and infantile psychology (Averbuck 110).6
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Abílio Guerra’s defense of what he sees as the critical and rational character of Bopp’s
poetic processes is even clearer in emphasizing what he sees as a necessary separation
between artist and the “Other” point of view he consciously seeks to recreate through
poetry. Guerra avers that Bopp “consciously employs the language” [of animism,]
“because it effectively expresses the primitive mentality. At its root, it is a very realist
and conventional choice” (183). By stressing the rational creative processes of realist
representation, Guerra displaces multispecies relationality as a belief held by
“primitives;” and argues forcibly against any notion that Bopp himself was taken in by
this or any other irrational mental process.
Sá’s careful analysis of the Upper Rio Negro myth cycles involving Cobra Norato
ultimately discredits any close relation between “[t]he dialogic and human-like behavior
of nature in Cobra Norato” and indigenous sources; she finds, for example, that the
poem’s primary animal character, Compadre Tatú, behaves more like a page in a
medieval knight’s tale, à la Sancho Panza to Don Quijote, than like an armadillo. For that
reason she finds the relationship between the animal character and Cobra Norato to be a
stock trope from European literature, rather than reflecting the “complex and varied”
relations between humans and nonhumans to be found in the mythology of the Upper Rio
Negro (Sá 213). This then leads Sá to follow Guerra and consider Bopp’s imagery as
essentially mimetic; and these representations are, in her opinion, fundamentally visual.
As she puts it, the purpose of rendering trees as “pregnant” and “napping,” for example
(“onde as velhas árvores prenhas cochilam” ‘where the pregnant old trees doze’), has
more to do with conjuring the still shape of their bulging silhouettes (such as that of the
thick-trunked ficus) than with investing them with “higher” animacy traits. Such a
Schiess 56
reading subsumes the possibility of an authentic poetic engagement with alternative
understandings of mind and matter into questions of metaphorical representation.
Sá sees the object of Bopp’s fascination to be the exotic forest of travel literature
and landscape photography. My argument moves in quite the opposite direction. Bopp’s
imagery is more fascinating than exoticized, and more eerie than luxurious. Indeed, the
distanced stance of the photographer helps us to imagine everything that this voice lacks:
his safe remove behind the lens of his camera; the mechanical ease with which his
representative machine can point, focus, and record; the confidence with which he snaps
a shot, and moves on. All of these features are precisely what Cobra Norato loses, or
cedes, as he immerses himself in the forest.
Sá’s and Guerra’s approach to Cobra Norato and indigenous Amazonian culture
rests on the notion of a writing/poetic subject who maintains a critical and disconnected
stance with respect to their environment. I disagree with this framing, in large measure
because I see in Cobra Norato a deep immersion in the environment that is not merely
figurative or even disinterested. In the end, Bopp sets out not to conjure with images of
Amazonian otherness but rather to explore in a serious way the subjectivity of objects.
Put another way, Cobra Norato is perhaps closest to alternative ontologies when it is not
attempting to translate Amerindian myth but rather when it records the experience of a
Western subject as that subject comes to realize that they are surrounded by other forms
of subjectivity. He is slowed up by a forest that will not “let [him] through:”
Erva-picão me arranhou
Caules gordos brincam de afundar na lama
Galhinhos fazem psiu
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Deixa eu passar que vou pra longe
Moitas de tiririca entopem o caminho [...]
O resto da noite me enrola
A terra perde o fundo
Um charco de umbigo mole me engole. (III.2-6, 12-14)
[Prickle-grass scratches at me.
Thick stalks play at sinking in mud.
Thin little branches say psssst.
Let me through, I have far to go.
Thickets of tirirca enclose the path. […]
The rest of the night envelops me.
The earth loses its floor.
A soft-naveled swamp swallows me whole.]
This short section from the poem’s third canto illustrates several of the ways in which the
forest detains the subject. The forest physically impedes him at times: “Thickets of tirirca
enclose the path” and, more threateningly, “a soft-naveled swamp swallows me up.”
Even so, the more pervasive mode of delay is enchantment—a more metaphysical, yet
nonetheless active, process of involvement.
Signs of the imposter’s diminished puissance appear immediately as the voice
proceeds into the forest in the guise of his victim. In the closing lines of the poem’s first
canto, the fading power of the poetic subject is figured as a loss of the “strength” of
contact between his body and the material world: “O sono escorregou nas pálpebras
pesadas / Um chão de lama rouba a força dos meus passos” ‘Sleep slips over my heavy
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lids / A floor of mud steals the strength of my steps’ (I.21-22). A corresponding loss of
sight and consciousness mirrors this (sleep slips over my heavy lids), while the opening
line of the second canto further amplifies the subject’s difficulty in discerning and
decoding his environment: “Começa agora a floresta cifrada” ‘This is where the ciphered
forest begins’ (II.1). The correspondence between problems of vision and a difficulty in
progressing persists throughout the poem. Beyond these problems of vision, however,
Bopp also frequently invokes the more visceral senses of smell, sound, touch and, more
to the point, a sixth sense: a sense of eerie disquiet, of being watched or of being in a
place where things are not what they seem.
Turning back to line twelve of canto three (“O resto da noite me enrola” ‘The rest
of the night envelops me’), it is worth focusing on the verb enrolar, which encodes a
diffused intentionality that matters for the sense of disquiet that Bopp produces. Literally
meaning “to roll up” or to wrap into a ball or coil, when used as a transitive verb it also
colloquially designates a complex action of deception and evasion toward its grammatical
object, similar to the English “to dupe X” or “to give X the run-around.” The indirect but
effective impediment conveyed by enrolar brings to light a particular use of the concept
of agency currently in circulation in literary studies and the ecological humanities. In this
view, agency is not merely the capability of producing a physical effect (the way a
barking dog, a hunting jaguar, or a light-seeking plant might all be said to be agents in an
environment). Instead, much as the use of the word “agent” in economic theory muddles
the concept of action by designating someone who acts on behalf of another, the human
and nonhuman agents in Cobra Norato:
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[…] are no longer the agents/authors of action. [Rather,] they are also
caught up in a system of relations that shifts the place and authority of
action and modifies (or even completely muddles, [as] in its use in
economic theory), the definition of action. In its contemporary uses,
‘agency’ is thus the point where the dualisms action/passion and
agent/patient are erased, and also where the subject/agent is defined in a
new way. (Balibar and Laugier 17)
The diffused construction of agency throughout the poem, clearly in view in the segment
from canto three that I have discussed here, goes a long way toward re-routing the most
common rubric for assessing Bopp’s poetics: the device of anthropomorphism. Like the
term “anthropomorphic” itself, the few existing studies addressing the presence of Bopp’s
active images deflect the notion that the poet earnestly experienced the forest as
unsettlingly, eerily, actually animate in ways that breach the Western category of matter.
This leads one to speculate that the avoidance or re-domestication of poetic devices that
“level up” the agency of nonhuman entities is similar to the “critical embarrassment”
noted by Jonathan Culler regarding the study of lyric apostrophe. Culler notes that the
reluctance on the part of critics to discuss apostrophe, where the poet “addresses the
objects of the universe [as] potentially responsive forces,” reflects a desire to give wide
berth to a “categorical mistake” regarding the former’s ability to respond (139). As Culler
puts it, apostrophe is a “mistake” that, if taken seriously, risks stripping the poet of their
rational faculties (139). The concern here is with a device that regards the nonhuman
world as potentially responsive, and so it is even more a matter of apprehension for a
poetic device like Bopp’s that has the “objects of the universe” quite clearly talking back.
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Plumwood similarly notes the delegitimizing power of anthropomorphism, noting
that authors’ “attempts to apply intentional terms for the non-human” are often
characterized by critics as “presenting [non-humans in unduly humanlike terms” (452).
This particular formulation of anthropomorphism underscores the extent to which our
perceptions of human vs. non-human capabilities are encoded in language; that the types
of predicate that we deem appropriate for any given grammatical subject are weighed
according to (culturally specific) continuums dictating the degree of intentionality that
may be attributed to different categories of matter. In a recent study of contemporary art
and pop culture, Mel Y. Chen re-emphasizes the importance of language to assessments
of animacy, noting that the first studies to propose and map the “animacy hierarchies” as
continuums were ethno-linguistic ones (2). Chen then goes on to speak of “animacy
transgressions,” or strategic moves, in art and rhetoric, that present the viewer/reader with
a critical confrontation between presumably human and nonhuman traits (2). Chen
stresses the discomfort experienced by a viewer or reader when faced with the
incongruous pairing of animal/human or animate/inanimate traits, and it makes sense to
view Cobra Norato not as (yet another) experiment in anthropomorphism but as an
artistic transgression that questions the objectification of marginalized regions and
populations.
Nature’s Interruption: Voice, Noise and the Fading Subject
One of the most radical ways in which Cobra Norato stages the confrontation
between animate/inanimate and human/nonhuman is through a strategic confusion of
voice and noise. Bopp’s forest is a noisy place, where the onomatopoeia of animal sounds
Schiess 61
and vegetal rustlings mixes with dialogic voices emitted by trees, rivers, frogs, and the
narrator’s traveling companion, the tatu-da-bunda-seca or dry-bottomed armadillo. In
addition, there are many questions and commands that seem to be disembodied, ambient
to the forest itself. Enmeshed in this atmosphere of sonic confusion, the poetic voice is
subject to enchantment in the most literal, etymological sense: in-cantare. The forest
sings out a (noisy) spell that worries and interrupts the poetic subject, rendering him an
enrolado.
A detailed description of the web of communication present in the poem reveals
that it is one of the most politically radical aspects of Cobra Norato. One reason for this
claim is that there is no clear division between the types of entities that can communicate
with one another, and even more importantly, no clear distinction between symbolic and
other types of expression. There is likewise no distinction between the “voice” that
speaks in language and the “noise” produced by other vocalizations. One begins to see
this confusion in the following lines, typical of the poem’s many constructions of non-
dialogic voice:
Sapo sozinho chama chuva
No fundo
uma lâmina rápida risca o mato
Trovãozinho ronca: já vou
Vem de longe
um trovão de voz grossa resmungando (VII.15-20)
[A forsaken frog requests rain.
Deep within,
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A quick blade cuts the forest.
A thunder-rumble rasps: Here I come.
It comes from far away,
A thick-voiced thunderclap grumbling.]
In the thirteenth canto, a similar feature emerges: “Rios escondidos sem filiação certa /
vão de muda nadando nadando / Entram resmungando mato adentro” ‘Hidden rivers of
uncertain lineage / Carry on changing, swimming, swimming, / Move muttering into the
jungle’ (XIII.8-10). In these lines, muttering, rasping and complaining are all forms of
communication in which affect can be conveyed without words. Nevertheless, these
terms denote purposeful, if not necessarily linguistic (and therefore presumptively
“human”) communication, a fact that orients these sonic images away from mere mimesis
and toward a broader poetic construction of voice. As I show below, the radical aspect of
the forest’s sonic vortex comes more clearly into view as it entangles not only human and
nonhuman communication but also European and Amerindian languages.
A second feature of the poem supporting the notion of the importance of voice is
that the forest constantly addresses the narrator, slowing him down and forcing him to
attend to its strange call. From the very first sections of Cobra Norato, the voices of the
forest call out to the poetic subject, catching him up in a web of call and response that
leaves his subject position uncertain. At times these voices tempt, interrogate, or
command the narrator: “—Onde vais, Cobra Norato? / Tenho aqui três arvorezinhas à tua
espera” ‘Where are you headed, Cobra Norato? / I have three young trees, and they’re
waiting for you’ (II.30-32). At various stages along his journey, the poetic subject
overhears language in the forest; in others, he comes to suspect that he is being
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addressed: “Correm vozes em desordem / Berram: não pode!/ --Será comigo?”
‘Disordered voices come running / Shouting: No, you can’t! / “Are they talking to me?”
(VI.15-17). At other moments, forest creatures hail the narrator in suspicion: “Espia-me
um sapo sapo / ‘Aqui tem cheiro de gente / --Quem é você?’” ‘A froggy-frog spots me. /
“Smells like people here: / Who are you?”’ (IV.17-20). The forest, that is, sees him as an
intruder (or, one might say, smells him out), and it demands an explanation.
Such a reading reverses Schüller’s argument that in Cobra Norato “trees and
rivers […] speak because the poet interrogates them” (Bopp, Mironga 3). To the contrary,
the masculine-gendered poetic subject finds himself addressed in the second person, his
privileged subject position upended by a forest that interpellates him. This observation
leads one to ask whether Bopp’s representation of nature as animate and vocative is a
mere poetic device linked to the European tradition (prosopopeia), or is it expressive of
something deeper and more immediate, an experience had or affect felt by the poetic
voice that is related to, though not wholly consistent with, Amerindian forms of thought.
When taken as a whole, the semiotic continuum within Cobra Norato subtly
undermines the distinctions that separate human from nonhuman communication and
recalls current anthropological work conducted among indigenous Amazonian peoples.
Bopp’s provocation of the human-nonhuman divide is particularly resonant with Eduardo
Kohn’s formulation, based on his study of the Runa in Ecuador’s Upper Amazon, of an
“ethnography of the nonhuman.” Rather than reconfiguring this distinction based on the
biological embeddedness of the human within a greater ecology (a stance that is familiar
within the environmental conservation movement), Kohn takes the opposite approach,
arguing in a Peircian vein that representing the world in thought and in communication is
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not a humans-only activity: “the recognition of representational processes as something
unique to, and in a sense synonymous with, life allows us to situate distinctively human
ways of being in the world as both emergent from and in continuity with a broader living
semiotic realm. […] [L]ife and thought are one and the same. Life thinks, and thought is
alive” (15-16). As Kohn puts it, it is within the non-linguistic modes of communication
where humans and nonhumans inhabit the same semiotic space and relating becomes
possible: “Semiosis (the creation and interpretation of signs) permeates and constitutes
the living world, and it is through our partially shared semiotic properties that multi-
species relations are possible, and also analytically comprehensible” (9).
The artistic and philosophical provocation caused by the communicative web in
Cobra Norato is thus doubly political. On one hand, the poem’s semiotic continuum
allows that alternative constructions of the human-nonhuman relation, like the one
described by Kohn in relation to the Runa, are not merely the “infantile” representation of
a world that is misapprehended by the “primitive” mind. On the other, the fact that the
poem’s web of address also entwines European and Amerindian languages means that the
poem’s critical confusion of voice and noise maps onto a long history of colonial power
relations in which indigenous languages were demoted to the level of “mere sound.” In
Brazil, the figuration of indigenous language as noise dates at least back to the
seventeenth-century sermons of Padre António Vieira: “Por vezes me aconteceu estar
com o ouvido aplicado à boca do bárbaro, e ainda do interprete, sem poder distinguir as
sílabas, nem perceber os vogais ou consoantes de que se formavam” ‘At times it
happened that I placed my ear near the mouth of a barbarian, and also near that of the
interpreter, without being able to distinguish the syllables nor pick up the vowels and
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consonants from which they were formed’ (A. Vieira 7). For Vieira, the utterances of
“the barbarian” are so devoid of semiotic content that they not only lack the constituent
parts of spoken language (syllables, vowels and consonants); they cannot even be forced
sufficiently into the structure of another language by an interpreter to make them
comprehensible to the listener.
The incorporation of indigenous and popular speech patterns and linguistic tokens
is admittedly a common feature of many works of the Latin American vanguard.
Although this practice sought to create a new and unified national voice by bringing
together the divergent expressions of social strata and marginalized ethnic groups at the
dawn of a new century, Vicky Unruh underscores that its revolutionary aspect was not
limited to the spirit of class and ethnic inclusion that it was meant to conjure. Instead, the
incorporation of these words that were “designated on one level as familiarly and
collectively ‘ours,’ into profoundly unfamiliar literary contexts and to readers for whom
they would be strange” creates sonic and cognitive dissonance that “call[s] to attention
language’s foreign substance” (247-48). The result is a defamiliarization of all language.
In the case of Cobra Norato, Bopp’s specific procedure of navigating the boundaries
between European and native languages, between local variances and national norms,
effects a productive confrontation between the sound and the sense of language.
The poem’s many examples of un-glossed and untranslated Tupi words for local flora,
fauna, cultural practices and divine beings take part in a signifying hide-and-seek, where
the phantasm of fugitive meaning plays ambivalently on colonial power relations of
language. Such an interplay of sound and sense is evident in these lines, where the
grammatical scaffolding of Portuguese allows the non-local reader to skate along while
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the full mimetic impact of the lines remains muted: “Alarmam-se tiriricas / As
saracurinhas piam piam piam/ Guariba lá adiante puxa reza” ‘The tiriricas send up an
alarm / Little saracurinhas cry piu piu piu. / Up ahead a guariba prays. (VIII. 10,12). For
the coastal reader, Bopp’s images remain partially veiled by the obscurity of his Tupi
vocabulary: knowing that tiriricas are a type of flexible reed would allow for a visual and
audio appreciation of the plants swaying and hitting one another; while understanding
that a guariba is a type of monkey would produce an image of the animal seemingly bent
in prayer.
Throughout Cobra Norato, the forest’s voices interrogate the visitor (both directly
and indirectly), demanding that he slow himself down and attend to its strange call. The
poet’s procedure for incorporating Tupi vocabulary enacts a similar experience upon the
reader. Meaning slips away from the poet’s lettered audience as Tupi terms become mere
noise to the Portuguese-speaking reader: they are sensible and call for interpretation but
cannot quite be apprehended. Such a procedure deliberately sidesteps the “necessarily
Baroque” solution to the problem of cultural-linguistic interpretation described by Alejo
Carpentier:
The word pino is enough to show us a pine; the word palmera is enough to
define, to show a palm. But the word ceiba—the name for an American
tree that Cuban blacks call, ‘the mother of trees’—does not allow people
from other latitudes to see the rostral column of that gigantic tree. […]
This can only be accomplished through the precise polarization of various
adjectives, or to elude the adjective, by the adjectival use of certain nouns
so that these take on a metaphorical character. If one has luck—now
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speaking in literary terms—the purpose will be achieved. The object lives,
it is contemplated, it allows itself to be weighed. But the prose that gives it
life and consistency, weight and measure, is baroque, necessarily baroque.
(35-37)
In contrast to Carpentier’s formulation, Bopp’s poetics eschews the weight and measure
of excessive linguistic scaffolding. Instead, his election to leave these signifiers
deliberately opaque points emphatically to the desire to use these words as they are, at the
risk and with the intention of being unclear; and it leaves readers, not unlike Bopp’s
poetic persona, to fend for themselves among unknown terms.
The Deixis of the Real
I have argued so far that Bopp’s particular use of the vocative and sonic
confusion, the circling—both spatial and descriptive—of its poetic voice, and its uncanny
imagery are indices of a source of disquiet. The forest’s persistent interruption of the
poetic subject, its immanence, and the poetic subject’s awareness that he is the object of
its scrutinizing gaze all interfere with that subject’s ability to move through the poetic
environment. In this concluding section, I show that these relations also interfere with the
poet’s ability to represent that environment in language. For if the forest has its many
eyes on the poetic subject as he shuffles through its space, the latter also gazes intently
back at it. And despite his inability to “see” clearly, the subject labors repeatedly to
present what he sees in poetic language.
The poetic subject’s frustrated labor manifests itself in a series of poetic quirks
that are likely the best indication that Cobra Norato is indeed the record of an ontological
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crisis. These textual flaws and repetitions, jarring disruptions of the “smooth continuity of
representation” constitute what Aaron Dunckel refers to as a “deixis of the real,” a phrase
Dunckel uses to describe strips of text that point to an expressive anxiety. As he presents
it: “We know we are in the presence of the real when mimesis breaks down—that is to
say, the real is precisely that which is not represented but rather indicated by
representation’s failure” (217). Cobra Norato manifests so many such representative
breakdowns that one is hard-pressed not to see these as a “pointing-to” a phenomenon
that outstrips semantico-referential meaning. Read in this way, Cobra Norato’s glitches
and flaws point to something outside the poem; to an affect or experience that refuses to
be packed back into language: specifically, the experience of the nonhuman environment
as radical alterity (Dunckel 211).
These flaws manifest primarily as a series of repeating and shuffled terms
throughout the poem’s descriptive scenes. Significantly for my argument, the shuffling
takes place exclusively between grammatical subjects that are nonhuman, such as plants,
animals and waterways, and predicates that are usually reserved in Western cultures for
human actors. Over and over, these nonhuman subjects and (assumedly) human
predicates are repeated and recombined in a fugue of iterative images. In just one group
of examples, we see “um fio de água atrasada lambe a lama” ‘A stream of water running
late licks the loam’ (II.6), while further on “raízes desdentadas mastigam lodo”
‘Toothless roots chew on mud’ (IV.6), “raízes com fome mordem o chão” ‘hungry roots
bite at the ground’ (VII.8) and “o charco desdentado rumina lama” ‘the toothless bog
ruminates on mud’ (XVII.6). At one point, it is the narrator who chews on the forest:
“me misturo no ventre do mato mordendo raízes” ‘blending into the belly of the brush;
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biting roots’ (I.4), while shortly the tables turn and he is consumed: “um charco de
umbigo mole me engole” ‘a soft-naveled swamp swallows me whole’ (III.14).
These slightly altered repetitions of particular words and images suggest that
Bopp’s so-called anthropomorphism is in fact a literary manifestation of wonder, doubt,
and ultimately of the interplay between descriptive failure and compulsion. On a
structural plane, these repetitions with variation come to suggest both an overlapping of
space (as in travelling in a circle) and an elasticity of time (as in déjà vu.) The circular
path constructed by these repetitions recalls the man wandering through the forest who is
unsure of his bearings, questioning whether he has already seen this tree, this bog, this
stretch of river, who may well be traveling in circles, and who has lost track of time.
Formally, they recreate ontological and descriptive uncertainty: Bopp’s repetitive,
reshuffled, and animated figurings of nature reveal a node of expression at work, a stone
in the shoe of the poet that produces an expressive blister.
In Cobra Norato, there is a ghost in the machine of representation that can’t be
fixed by human techné. Just as the poetic persona is unable to move properly across the
terrain he encounters, so too does the poetic voice falter and repeat itself, effectively
stuttering as it circles an unnamed center of gravity. “Nothing but this circulating around
an unnamed middle could convey such ambivalence,” wrote the poet Rosmarie Waldrop
(58). Cobra Norato’s ambivalent circling traces the return of the poetic subject to a site of
unease, a disquiet whose source is the linguistic ineffability of the object but also of the
subject’s relation to that object. The uncanny effect of Bopp’s pairing of nonhuman
subjects with predicates of human behavior, then, is not only produced by the cognitive
dissonance that comes from these juxtapositions, but by the fact that the reader is swept
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up with the poetic voice into a spiraling temporal, linguistic and visual disorientation that
circles around the status of the nonhuman.
A final return to Bopp’s published archive reinforces such a notion. In 1932, he
had again taken to the road; this time on an international trip to Asia, Africa, and Europe.
In a letter posted in Mombasa, he wrote to friends in Brazil including the author Jorge
Amado, consigning to them a new group of poems for publication. But like a spurned
lover, even as he details the qualities of his new literary relationship, he cannot resist
returning to the subject of Cobra Norato:
Não reneguei a Norato, apesar do seu fracasso, porque para mim ela vale
como a tragédia da maleita, cocaína amazônica. Com toda a indiferença
que teve (salvo um grupo num perímetro pessoal), ela é meu Don Quixote
de la Mancha. Eu quero é a filha da rainha Luzia. Obsessão sexual.
Druídica. Esotérica. Ela tem um ar de livro de criança. Quente e colorido.
Mas no fundo representa a minha tragédia das febres. A maior volta ao
mundo que eu dei foi no Amazonas. Canoa de vela. Pé no chão ouvindo
aquelas mil e uma noites tapuias. Febre e cachaça. O mato e as estrelas
conversando em voz baixa. Esse outro [Urucungo] é um livro fácil.
Fracionado. Consciente. O outro [Cobra Norato] não fui eu que fiz.
Instinto puro. Bruto. (Poesia completa 218)
[I never renounced Norato, despite its [critical] failure, because for me it
weighs with the tragedy of an affliction; Amazonian cocaine. With all the
indifference it inspired (except within a small group of acquaintances, it is
my Don Quijote de la Mancha. What I want is Queen Luzia’s daughter. A
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sexual obsession. Druidic. Esoteric... It has the feel of a children’s book...
Hot and flushed. But at its root it represents my fevered tragedy. The
greatest trip around the world I ever took was in the Amazon. Sail-driven
canoes. Feet on the ground listening to those Thousand and One Tapuia
Nights. Fever and cachaça.1 The stars and the sky whispering together.
This book [Urucungo] is facile. Fractured. Conscious. The other one
[Cobra Norato]—it wasn’t me who wrote it. Pure, brute instinct.]
Though not quite the sinister vortex of José Eustacio Rivera’s Amazonia, the textual
forest that emerges in Cobra Norato still exerts a centripetal force that acts upon the
poetic subject. He can neither tame the forest by traveling safely through it, nor can he do
so by fixing it definitively in writing. Nature’s active voice exerts itself, inserts itself into
poeisis: “it wasn’t me who wrote it.”
Seen in this light, Bopp’s Cobra Norato emerges as a record of the speaking
subject’s active involvement in and by an Amazonian environment not in the service of
human material needs or rhetorical deployments. Nor is it an “alterity” that remains
framed, distant, and distinctly unknowable, like the image of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s
Mont Blanc that Dunckel examines. This is the nonhuman environment as the immanent
Other: one that moves, touches, queries, commands and enmeshes the human; that draws
even Western man out of his privileged subject position and allows him the flickering
perspective of what it is like to be an “object.” At the very same time, the face-to-face
with an agentive environment reminds us of the need to respond to its vulnerability:
“nothing but this circulating around an unnamed middle could convey such
ambivalence.”
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The Amazon emerges as a force of creative and metaphysical transformation in
Cobra Norato. In place of familiar renderings of the region as an inferno verde or paraíso
terrestrial, here we see an alien “Nature” acting upon modern man and his culture;
shifting his very experience of reality and imprinting itself upon his expression of that
reality. This is not a case of precious reason slipping away (as in Rivera’s Voragine or
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.) Instead, it is a case of a local environment pressing
itself upon the visitor, putting pressure on his ability to express his experience. This
pressure on expression forces a turn to the aesthetic, and it gives aesthetic expression a
form that is, ultimately, an uneasy co-production between self and other, human and
nonhuman, Nature and Culture, between the modernista poet grounded in just such
divisions, and the nonmodern place he encounters.
Coda
Cobra Norato is primarily the story of a shifted (and shifting) relation between
the poetic subject and the various kinds of objects that populate the poem: the object of
his quest, the objects of his description, and the Amazonian forest of the early twentieth
century, an increasingly objectified region that is viewed by a
nationalist/developmentalist apparatus as a collection of exploitable resources. Seen in
this light, the poem gives the attentive reader a model for interrupting familiar, utilitarian
views of the natural world.
The backlash in Brazil against Macron’s 2019 tweet focused, among other points,
on the French president’s use of the word “house”: “Our house is burning.” Reading
Cobra Norato in the “active voice,” that is, “being open to experiences of nature as
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powerful, agentic and creative, making space in our culture for an animating sensibility
and vocabulary” (Plumwood 451), forces us to take stock of notions that the Amazon
region is primarily “for” us. It also urges us to ask ourselves what kind of “house” it is
that we have set on fire. Is it the kind of house that Sigmund Freud evokes in his
etymology of the term Heimlich (homey); a set of “not strange, familiar, tame” physical
surroundings (126), vast and powerful but yet ultimately in our service? The Amazon-as-
house image evoked in the Twitter wars, whether its function is to provide “our” oxygen
or fuel “our” economic machine, would seem to assume so.
But if this public debate construes the Amazon as a house, Cobra Norato cautions
against making ourselves at home. Freud’s figure for the uncanny hinges upon the
interplay between what is effortlessly seen and named and the notion that the familiar
walls of the house obscure something more sinister, “removed from the eyes […] hidden,
secret”—something we might wish had remained unseen (133-34). Pivoting on this sense
of unease, Cobra Norato flips the homely environment to reveal its unnerving counter-
face: the poem’s “unnamed middle,” the one that causes all the circling, is the sense that
the physical environment may have something to say on its own terms regarding the
long-term interactions between our species and the planet. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has
suggested in his discussion of the distinction between historical and geological time, it is
in many ways unthinkable to us that the planet may be indifferent to the scale of human
life and human history (6-9). The forest that Cobra Norato encounters as alterity, that
imprints itself in the text as an unevenness of form, hints at this planetary indifference:
the unthinkable thing, this unnamed entity inside of the house that we thought was
familiar.
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CHAPTER 2
Reflections in the Porta-espelho: Clarice Lispector’s Literary Theory of the Object
“I must study the wardrobe before painting it. What do I see?
I see that the wardrobe appears penetrable because it has a door.
But when I open it, I see that penetration has been put off:
since inside is also a wooden surface, like a closed door”
(Água Viva 74)
One of twentieth-century Brazil’s foremost literary figures, Clarice Lispector
(1920-1977) is also perhaps the best known Brazilian writer outside of the Portuguese-
speaking world (Moser). A prolific writer whose work spans over three decades (from the
1942 publication of her first novel at age twenty-two to her untimely death in 1977),
Lispector would express by the 1960s a keen frustration with a perceived shortcoming in
her work: for failing, in her own view, to use her fiction to address Brazil’s deeply
entrenched social inequalities. In an autobiographical addendum to the 1964 short-story
collection A legião estrangeira (The Foreign Legion) Lispector confesses her personal
consternation over, as she puts it, “não saber como me aproximar de um modo ‘literário’
(isto é, transformado na veemência da arte,) da ‘coisa social’” (149) ‘not knowing how to
approach in a “literary” fashion (that is, transforming into the vehemence of art), “the
social thing.”’ She further laments:
Desde que me conheço o fato social teve em mim importância maior do
que qualquer outro: em Recife os mocambos foram a primeira verdade
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para mim. Muito antes de sentir "arte,” senti a beleza profunda da luta.
Mas é que tenho um modo simplório de me aproximar do fato social: eu
queria era fazer alguma coisa; como se escrever não fosse fazer. O que não
consigo é usar escrever para isso, por mais que a incapacidade me doa e
me humilhe. O problema de justiça é em mim um sentimento tão óbvio e
tão básico que não consigo me surpreender com ele — e, sem me
surpreender, não consigo escrever. E também para mim escrever é
procurar. O sentimento de justiça nunca foi procura em mim, nunca
chegou a ser descoberto, e o que me espanta é que ele não seja igualmente
obvio em todos. Tenho consciência de estar simplificando primariamente
o problema. [...] É que não se trata de querer, é questão de não poder. Do
que me envergonho, sim, é de não “fazer,” de não contribuir com ações.
(149-50)
[As long as I have known myself the social fact has been more important
to me than any other: in Recife the slums were the first truth for me. Long
before I felt “art,” I felt the profound beauty of the struggle. But I have a
foolish way of approaching the social fact: what I wanted was to “do”
something, as if writing was not doing. What I can’t manage is to use
writing for that, as much as my incapacity hurts and humiliates me. The
problem of justice is in me a feeling so obvious and so basic that I can’t
surprise myself with it—and, without surprising myself, I can’t write. And
also because for me writing is searching. The feeling of justice was never
a search for me, it never had to be discovered, and what astounds me is
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that it is not just as obvious for everyone. I’m aware of oversimplifying
the problem. [..] It’s not a question of not wanting [to contribute to social
justice through writing] but of not being capable of it. What I am ashamed
of, however, is not “doing something,” not contributing with my actions.]
Despite her apparent resignation, Lispector expresses in this passage her previously latent
desire to “do something” with writing that will bear upon matters of social justice. In the
present chapter, I take an approach to the question of alterity and social consciousness in
Lispector’s writing that diverges from those developed over the last few years. Rather
than focusing on Lispector’s works explicitly foregrounding social relations, I analyze
some of her less representational texts for the ways in which they illuminate the
dilemmas of art and social engagement that Lispector describes in the statements above.
My principal concern here are deeper questions of artistic representation and writerly
ethics that might inform our sense of whether, and how well, Lispector was able to
overcome her ambivalence regarding fiction and the “social thing.”
In light of Lispector’s recognition of a gap between her art and her social
conscience, several recent studies have investigated the representations of social
otherness that begin to erupt with increasing intensity in Lispector’s work throughout the
1970s (Moriconi; Kahn; Cabanilles and Lozano de la Pola; Dalcastagnè). Lispector’s
oeuvre, broadly categorized, focuses on the internal experiences and impressions of
female narrators; Ítalo Moriconi has called it a body of work that “stages the limits, the
exhaustion [of the] progressive radicalization of self-reflective writing” (215). In the
1970s, however, her work takes a clear turn. Still as thoroughly self-referential and
subjectivist as ever, the last fictional works that Lispector publishes before her death—A
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via-crucis do corpo (The Via crucis of the Body, 1974) and A hora da estrela (The Hour
of the Star, 1977)—vacillate openly between metanarrative and a new concern with
marginalized figures. Understandably, these are the works that tend to garner the most
critical attention when it comes to Lispector’s social or ethical disposition in her fiction.
A via-crucis, for example, is a collection of short stories that offers a parodic
exposé of sexual desire that is sympathetic to forms of diversity and variation categorized
as deviant (transvestitism, polyamorism, same-sex attraction) or merely aberrant (strong
sexual desire felt by older women, nuns, and unmarried women) in 1970s Brazil. For
Moriconi, the collection signals Lispector’s new willingness to address “the darker
aspects of existence—evil, sin, crime—as the privileged, though not exclusive topics for
literature and art in general” (214). If one draws an analogy between marginalized forms
and marginalized sexual desire, Lispector’s decision in this collection to parody “low”
genres, such as detective fiction and science fiction, might also be read as a further
defiance of the exclusion of difference from the normative spheres of both life and
literature.
Neiva Pitta Kadota suggests, however, that “the social thing” is woven into the
structural fabric of Lispector’s work, less a question of its content than its narrative form:
“A concern for social questions manifests itself in the author’s body of work, as glimpses
of submerged coagula of social perturbances that traverse her fiction” (21). Significantly,
Kadota’s analysis leaves out A hora da estrela, focusing on the “introspective” phase that
Moriconi deems prior to Lispector’s pivot toward social questions. Kadota considers
Lispector’s stylistic “transgressions” to be indicative of a rebellion against gendered—
i.e., social—codes of expression: “[Lispector’s] constant employment of rupture from the
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language of power, perhaps responsible for some critics’ classifications of her prose as
intimist, subjectivist, or alienated, is precisely what causes one to question whether this
constitutes an aesthetic positioning that points toward questions of a social nature” (20).
Ana Aparecida Arguelho de Souza agrees, extending Kadota’s analysis of the social
implications of Lispector’s formal choices to Lispector’s most recognizably “social”
novel, A hora da estrela.
Moving back within Lispector’s oeuvre, Gabriel Giorgi detects an ethical impulse
in Lispector’s depictions of female bodies as “less-than-humans,” as “not-yet-humans,” a
designation that crosses class distinctions and unites women with other categories of the
nonhuman. In A paixão segundo G.H. (1964) both the absent maid Janair and the
protagonist herself—whose recollection of a past abortion evokes two “broken bodies,”
her own and that of the fetus—are likened to the crushed cockroach that occupies a
central place in the novel’s narration. As Giorgi has it:
Between the feminine body (evidently defined by the coordinates of class and
race) and the animal body, in this alliance that is also a war or an agonic link, this
individual body-form, this individuality present to itself, isolated and closed, in its
essence, all exterior—is undone. If “human life” is measured in relation to this norm of
individuality, the bios interrogated by Lispector desires to make every return to this
biopolitical measure and norm impossible” (116-17).
Lispector’s unconventional narration, Giorgi suggests, in which the narrating
voice constantly circles and questions itself, is a formal enactment that wraps the writer
into her own interrogation of biopolitical norms:
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Autobiography vs. bio-graphy, the writing of the bios: the question is at
once philosophical and formal, one of the writing of a life without a form,
a life that never ceases to form itself, to conclude itself or to form itself
(determinarse) into a subjectivity, into an I as a privileged form of life.
[…] The bios that Lispector’s writing constantly interrogates is at once the
void and the relation, absence and enmeshing, the passage to a virtual
plane in which the fragility and the power of bodies in relation come into
play. We do not see the living as an interior crease, or as the basis of an
individual body, but rather as the contours of a relation, as an adherence,
as a zone of enmeshing between bodies and between materialities. (117)
Building on these concerns, I trace the extension of this “enmeshing between bodies and
between materialities” beyond the sphere of biological life in Água viva. Moriconi
considers Água viva to be the text that initiates the final phase of Lispector’s work:
having “exhausted” the project of self-writing, “the social thing” moves increasingly into
view. Água viva, then, pushes Lispector’s self-writing to new levels of abstraction, and it
is also ground zero for new concerns.
If one were to attempt to historicize the shift in Lispector’s authorial perspective,
the increased militarization of Brazil’s civil sphere following the 1964 coup would be an
obvious point of departure. In early 1968, the new military president, Arthur Costa e
Silva, began to implement increasingly oppressive tactics against university students, and
while Lispector’s literary and journalistic writing had to this point been notably
apolitical, she now wrote openly in support of students’ rights in her weekly newspaper
column in the Jornal do Brasil. On June 26, 1968, Lispector went even further in her
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efforts to “contribute with actions” by participating in the March of a Hundred Thousand,
a peaceful protest against the killing of a 19-year-old student during a clash with police
over cuts to the subsidized meal program for poor university students. Despite
Lispector’s increasingly visible political stance, the political cartoonist Henfil made her
the object of derision in 1972 by portraying her as “a simple writer about flowers, birds,
people, the beauty of life,” an accusation that Moser has suggested stung Lispector (325).
Whether or not this is true, this moment coincides with the shift in Lispector’s work
toward a more notably social thematic.
It is also tempting to link Lispector’s concern with the social to her own
biography. Born in a rural portion of Ukraine to Jewish parents forced to flee Eastern
Europe to escape widespread pogroms, Lispector spent most of her childhood in Recife, a
former colonial city on the Northeastern coast with an established Jewish community. In
Recife, Lispector’s father worked in the informal economy, mainly as a clothing peddler,
and the author and her two sisters grew up on the precarious edge of poverty. When
Lispector was ten years old, her mother died of syphilis—a disease that had debilitated
her for years and that Lispector’s biographers speculate may have been contracted as a
result of rape at the hands of Russian soldiers (Moser 25-95). Lispector’s childhood
experiences as other—Jewish, immigrant, motherless, poor—offer a suggestive point of
departure for considerations of the writer’s later literary explorations of social exclusion.
The social protection afforded by the Jewish community in Recife, along with
formal instruction at a rigorous Hebrew primary school, offered Lispector and her sisters
the potential for upward social mobility. All three attended prestigious secondary schools
and earned university degrees. Lispector later married a young diplomat, Maury Gurgel
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Valente, and she spent over a decade residing in Europe and the United States. One might
readily speculate that far from assuaging any sense of non-belonging, these experiences
would only serve to amplify it.
My aim in the present chapter is neither to question nor to explain Lispector’s
social conscience but rather to describe how she prepares herself, as a writer, to manage
the intertwining aesthetic and ethical conundrums of representing social alterity. In what
follows, I examine the material objects of Lispector’s “hinge” novel, Água Viva (1973),
as precursors to the objects and representational strategies of A hora da estrela (1977),
her most explicitly “social” work of fiction.
The narrator of Água Viva presents her reader with a paradox: in a novel that
explicitly begins by striving to do away with representational art in the traditional sense,
the narrator nevertheless returns repeatedly to a series of objects that she represents in
painting.7 Caves, a collection of flowers, a church portico, a mirror and eventually, a
wardrobe, all serve as indices for a constellation of artistic and ontological questions
concerning seeing and knowing the nature of the world that lies outside of the self.
Working through Lispector’s earlier exposition of the object-as-such in her short story “O
ovo e a galinha” (The Egg and the Hen), which forms part of her 1964 collection, A
legião estrangeira (The Foreign Legion), I present the last of Água Viva’s objects, the
wardrobe with its mirrored door (the porta-espelho), as particularly emblematic of the
Clarician “theory” of what it is to look at the object and what the nature of that object
itself might be.
In “O ovo e a galinhaLispector traces a theory of art that insists on the integrity of
the object as essentially opaque. My central claim in this chapter, once again, is that
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Lispector’s approach to the artistic object in the mid-1960s can help readers to
understand how she works to prefigure the more explicit ethics of representation that
emerges in her later work, such as A hora da estrela. More or less from Água Viva
forward, Lispector’s object-as-such remains inaccessible beneath (or beyond) its visible
surface; it withdraws or flees under the scrutinizing gaze of the observer. By repeatedly
figuring a general failure to solve the enigma of the object, Lispector prepares her writing
for an ethics of trial-and-error that emerges fully through her complex (in part because it
is deferred) portrayal of Macabéa in A hora da estrela.
The wardrobe in Água Viva that anchors my analysis has a telling antecedent. It
appears in the very first paragraph of Lispector’s debut novel, Perto do coração selvagem
(Near to the Wild Heart, 1944):
A máquina do papai batia tac-tac…tac-tac-tac…O relógio acordou em tin-dlin
sem poeira. O silêncio arrastou-se zzzzzz. O guarda-roupa dizia o que? Roupa-
roupa-roupa. Não não. Entre o relógio, a máquina e o silêncio havia uma orelha à
escuta, grande, cor-de-rosa e morta. Os três sons estavam ligados pela luz do dia e
pelo ranger das folhinhas da árvore que se esfregavam umas nas outras radiantes.
(9)
[Her father’s typewriter went clack-clack... clack-clack-clack ... The clock awoke
in dustless tin-dlen. The silence dragged out zzzzzz. What did the wardrobe say?
clothes-clothes-clothes. No, no. Amidst the clock, the typewriter and the silence
there was an ear listening, large, pink and dead. The three sounds were connected
by the daylight and the squeaking of the tree’s little leaves rubbing against one
another radiant. (3)]
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The play of sounds that opens this novel is portentous: the “three sounds” collected here
(the clock, the typewriter, and the silence) announce themes that will provide perceptible
structure to much of Lispector’s work in the years to follow: the fleetingness of time, the
act of writing, and the impossibility of capturing the ineffable in language.8 But amidst
the onomatopoeia of typewriter clacking, clock ticking and silence droning, a fourth
object briefly appears to have a voice: the wardrobe.
Does the wardrobe also speak, the narrator implicitly asks herself, and if it does,
what does it say? The answer is mundane: “Roupa-roupa-roupa” ‘clothes-clothes-
clothes.’ This conjecture is immediately followed by a “No, no” that closes off any
further questioning: whether negating the wardrobe’s capacity to speak or simply
sidelining its contribution as banal, Joana’s response eliminates this object from the
afternoon’s chorus. This wardrobe dutifully fulfills its function (“roupa-roupa-roupa”);
but because it is nothing but what it does, it fails to warrant “listening to.” Thus, while the
questions of literary creation that accrue to the typewriter, the clock, and the silence
become perhaps the central themes of the author’s body of work, the question of what a
wardrobe might have to say resurfaces in Lispector’s work only decades later, when the
wardrobe appears as an uncanny figure for the obscurity of the non-self.
In an important sense, one might see Lispector’s theory of the artistic object as an
extension of her career-long quest to pursue the aspects of existence that cannot be
captured in language: as the child Joana concludes in the opening scene described above,
(14) ‘She would never allow herself to say, even to her father, that she never managed to
catch ‘the Thing.’ Precisely the things that really mattered she couldn’t say’ (6).
According to this view, the category of the object is akin to Lispector’s many enigmatic
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phrases (“as entrelinhas” / the ‘between-the-lines’; “o indizível” / the ‘inexpressive,’ “o
intervalo” / the ‘interval,’ “o It” / the ‘It,’ and “o X” / the ‘X’) through which the author
attempts to represent the non-representable aspects of existence. Plínio Prado sees such
phrases as a mark of Lispector’s commitment to the sublime, and her return to them
across various texts as a gravitation toward “the impalpable, the incomprehensible, the
un-nameable, [in a] tormented attempt to encircle that which simultaneously repulses”
(28). Prado goes on to characterize these repeated attempts to “encircle the un-nameable”
as an “aesthetic of failure” (28).
If “precisely the things that can’t be said” about direct experience preoccupied
Lispector for the bulk of her career, in her late phase the author came to grapple with
aspects of the world outside the self that cannot be shown directly in representation. Água
Viva’s narrator formulates this problem clearly: “Quando se vê o ato de ver não tem
forma—o que se vê às vezes tem forma e às vezes não. O ato de ver é inefável. E às vezes
o que é visto também é inefável” (89) ‘When you see, the act of seeing has no form—
what you see sometimes has form and sometimes doesn’t. The act of seeing is ineffable.
And sometimes what is seen is also ineffable’ (81). In my analysis, what Lispector’s
rendition of objects in “O ovo e a galinha” and Água viva does for representation (and
eventually for ethics) is what the rest of her “failed” writing does for language: it
performs the limits of knowing and expression as a practice of renewed attempts and
always-partial failures.
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The Hidden in Things and the Hidden in Humans
What do we call Although the wardrobe seemingly lacks the rich trove of
philosophical associations of the object-as-such that accrue to other objects like the jug or
the mirror, Gaston Bachelard’s 1958 Poetique de l’espace (Poetics of Space) stands out
for its brief yet pointed exposition of the psychological functions of boxes, drawers, and
wardrobes in poetry. These, Bachelard tells us, often represent canny, just-so spaces of
order and intimacy, such as in these lines by Colette Wurtz: “Ordonance. Harmonie. /
Piles de draps dans l’armoire, / Lavande dans le linge” ‘Orderliness. Harmony. / Piles of
sheets in the wardrobe / Lavender in the linen’ (Paroles pour l’autre, 26). This is the
function of Lispector’s first wardrobe, the one from Perto do Coração Selvagem that
opens this chapter: a presence so familiar, in fact, that its mundane existence fails to
excite Joana’s interest at all.
Let us return to Bachelard, however. As another example of the just-so pleasure
of boxes, he cites these lines from Arthur Rimbaud: “A box-top that is in good
condition…should have no other desire than to be on its box” (original SOURCE,
French). Bachelard quickly notes, however, that when Rimbaud’s box-top closes over its
contents, the familiar aspects of these spaces shade quickly into the uncanny.9 As he puts
it, “The poet has given concrete form to a very general psychological theme; namely, that
there will always be more things in a closed, than in an open box” (88). Just a few lines
later, Bachelard goes even further with this idea, directly linking the closed interiors of
the human psyche to those of the objects that surround it. It is for the poet, he suggests, to
open up these interiors: “the hidden in humans and the hidden in things fall under the
same topo-analysis as soon as one enters this strange region of the superlative, a region
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barely studied by psychology” (116). From this, one might ask: on what ground does
Lispector’s concern for “the hidden in humans” intersect with her equally vital concern
for “the hidden in things”?
For Bachelard, a philosopher of science, it would seem that the only shared terrain
between people and things is poetic, tropological: to enter this terrain, we must “écouter
les poètes” ‘listen to the poets’ (89). Is the same also true for Lispector? How might the
analysis of objects in her work from the 1960s prefigure the question of ethics so central
to her work in the 1970s? Can object theory help? Can one consider ethical the expansion
of this theory to the depiction of a human personae? How might one avoid the trap of
dehumanizing or even objectifying a character like A hora da estrela’s Macabéa, a young
woman from an oppressed sector of Brazilian society, when comparing her to the
nonhuman objects that run through Lispector’s work? In the end, as Lúcia Sá has argued,
such comparison merely re-inscribes the objectification of the poor, and particularly the
Northeastern migrant, by Brazil’s elites: “For many generations of Brazilians, especially
those in urban centers, the Northeastern migrant par excellence” is characterized by “the
extreme incapacity for communication […] a lack of vocabulary, limited experiences,
lack of imagination, and the inability to understand or to make oneself understood:” in
short, as a semi-person who is mostly devoid of language and consciousness (58). In Sá’s
view, literary representations of characters like Macabéa and the migrant family in
Graciliano Ramos’s novel Vidas secas (Barren Lives, 1934) are largely responsible for
the perpetration of such stereotypes; it is therefore important that literary criticism avoid
doing the same.
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Before turning directly to Lispector’s texts, it is worthwhile to question the nature
of the relation I propose between Lispector’s literary sketches of objects and her forays
into representing social alterity. Over and above any similarities that one might rightly
draw between Macabéa’s characteristics and those of an object (her relative “muteness,”
for instance, or what the narrator describes as her lack of self-awareness), my reading
focuses instead on the similarities between the procedures Lispector undertakes to see
and represent these two orders of literary “objects.” Second, while it is possible to object
(pace Sá) that such parallels serve to dehumanize Macabéa, I would argue that this is
only partially true, or perhaps only part of the story.
The question of how Lispector’s approach to non-human alterity converges with
her concern for the human other is a timely one. Since the 1990s, there has been a
growing concern, in both the humanities and the social sciences, with establishing a non-
metaphorical ground of correspondence between people and things, often with the
implicit or explicit aim of reformulating our concept of ethics. This has led to a
systematic rethinking of hierarchical human/nonhuman relations from areas as varied as
new materialisms, object-oriented ontology, ecological philosophy, animal studies, and
Amerindian perspectivism. The preoccupation with the relation between the human and
“everything else” is such that Jacques Lezra argues it constitutes the general mood of our
intellectual moment and ‘the current disposition in Anglophone as well as European
academic culture” (14).
Why so much thinking about things? Timothy Morton has described this trend as
a deep- seated “churning” that is indicative of an ontological malaise; a repetitive return
to a site of trauma. But to what trauma exactly? For Lezra, our interest in things
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represents an expression or even a fortification of our interest in ourselves, whereby
categories “such as ‘things,’ ‘objects,’ ‘matter,’ and companion terms rise up like
positive, real conditions to designate the finitude of the human animal” (13-14). For
Morton, quite to the contrary, the return represents “a kind of Stockholm syndrome” vis-
à-vis the tyranny of human-style thought and consciousness; by returning to it time and
again, we betray an underlying rejection of the line that separates humans from the
nonhuman world” (Humankind 54). In quite a different vein from Morton’s speculative
realism, Bill Brown asserts that the allure of things for literature lies in a “vertiginous
capacity” of a thing to be both itself— a useful, uncomplicated material object whose
appeal is a respite from theorizing—and to serve as a “sign (symbol, metonym or
metaphor) of something else” (“Thing Theory” 11).
These brief quotations illustrate some of the fundamental conundrums that arise
when we theorize the thing. Does our current intellectual preoccupation with things
represent a self-serving concern for the human, or are we truly engaged in a
reconsideration of what separates us (or not) from the material world around us? Do
things serve as figures or as exempla that help us to concretize abstract phenomena, or do
they allow us a respite from thinking? The debates surrounding our concerns for “things,
objects, matter, and companion terms” suggest that these questions are, in the last
instance, unresolvable.
Lispector’s objects in Água Viva, and their uncanny similarities to the protagonist
of A hora da estrela, embody many of the same dilemmas. If the literary in general is
more amenable to contradiction than philosophical expositions, which must make clean
distinctions and adhere to principles of non-contradiction, the slippery nature of
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Lispector’s prose works makes them even more capacious for housing the different
orders of concerns and contradictory responses that characterize current debates in thing
theory. Água Viva’s indeterminable genre, one that slides continually between the lyric,
the epistolary and the mystical while only flirting with the narrative, makes room for
many types of relations between the writing subject and the object of her address.
Similarly, Lispector’s deployment of material things as images of the object-problem
likewise leaves room for a variety of ontological relations between subjects and objects.
In Água Viva and elsewhere, Lispector opts not to draw hard distinctions between
different philosophical categories of alterity and existence. In this way, Lispector’s
literary style is a model for her literary theory: the object that is a subject and the subject
that is an object continually spin a web around one another that, as Héléne Cixous has
observed of the novel’s narration generally, defies unraveling (Reading 16).
Beyond its capacity for housing competing concerns, the question of genre in
Lispector’s fiction also allows her to employ literary form to re-enact concerns about
things. Not unlike the philosophical “churning” described by Morton, Lispector’s literary
approach to things is structured by returns and contradictions. Her narrators continually
revisit the question of the object, figuring and re-figuring it in a fugue of varying themes:
while the text’s specific object shifts and morphs, Lispector’s literary sketches of objects
enact a spiraling concern that is more significant than any single figure.
The identification of such a formal mimesis recalls Prado’s “aesthetic of the
sublime,” and it also echoes Carlos Mendes de Sousa’s analysis of Lispector’s
posthumously published Um sopro de vida [A Breath of Life]. This text, assembled after
the author’s death from fragments of writing, maintains an “unfinished” quality that
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Sousa reads as “not a puzzle, but the very figure of destabilization, of chaos [...]. What is
offered in [Lispector’s] presentation of the unfinished is the non-figure, or the
impossibility of figuring)” (359). In an analogous way, Lispector’s narration in Água
Viva mimics the approach of the unknowable: a study in obscurity that also underscores
the limits of the self’s own capacities.
Disentangling the Object
The words objeto and its variants appear in Água viva twenty-nine times, and
designate different orders of objects that become entangled over the course of the novel.
Given Lispector’s multiple uses of the term, it would seem that “object” names a
problem, or a series of problems, rather than a single concept: it is the node where
apparently heterogeneous concerns converge. In this sense, Água viva’s object aligns
with Brown’s characterization of the thing’s vertiginous capacity to be both itself and a
sign of other things.
The word “object” first appears in the Água viva’s epigraph, which Lispector
takes from Belgian painter and art critic Michel Seuphor (1901-1999): ‘tinha que existir
uma pintura totalmente livre da dependência da figura—o objeto—que, como a musica,
não ilustra coisa alguma, nado conta uma história e não lança um mito. Tal pintura
contenta-se em evocar os reinos incomunicáveis do espírito, onde o sonho se torna
pensamento, onde o traço se torna existência” ‘There must be a kind of painting totally
free of the dependence on the figure—or object—which, like music, illustrates nothing,
tells no story, launches no myth. Such painting would simply evoke the incommunicable
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kingdoms of the spirit, where dream becomes thought, where line becomes existence.’ In
Seuphor’s words, the desire to do away with the object seems definitive.
Água Viva comes very close to Seuphor’s ideal in that the narration does away
almost entirely with traditional objects of literary representation such as people, places
and events. In fact, the epigraph’s last phrase (“where dream becomes thought, where line
becomes existence”) comes very close to a line from Lispector’s A cidade sitiada (The
Besieged City, 1949) that is often employed to sum up her own artistic aims: “Nela e
num cavalo a impressão era a expressão” ‘In her and in a horse, impression equals
expression’ (19). If Clarice Lispector has an ars poetica, it is this: to produce a
temporally and affectively immediate work of art, where expression cleaves as closely as
possible to experience (Librandi; Moser; Prado). The author’s intention of creating a
nonrepresentative work of literary art in Água Viva may well constitute the apex of a
progressive move toward avant-garde abstraction, in the service of her aims for
immediacy.
Lispector’s nonrepresentative aesthetic concerns intersect with Brazilian
concretismo, a late avant-garde movement in both the plastic and literary arts of which
Lispector was a contemporary. Librandi notes the striking similarities between Água
viva’s narration and this statement by Brazilian artist Hélio Oiticica in 1968, just a few
years before the novel’s publication:
The Object is seen as an action in the environment within which objects
exist as ‘signs” and not merely as “works.” It is the new phase of the pure
vital exercise, where the role of the artist is to propose creative activities.
The Object is the discovery of the world, and each instant. It does not have
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any a priori established existence but rather is the creation of what we
would like it to be: a sound, a scream can be an object (qtd. in Librandi,
114)
Oiticica’s declaration of the ephemerality of the artistic object conjures several parallels
in Lispector’s novel and also elicits a second understanding of the word “object” in this
text. The first of these parallels is the theme of disposability, a motif that Lispector
applies at various moments in her prose to the act of looking, the use of language, and to
her writing. In “O ovo e a galinha,” for example, the narrator declares that “olhar é o
instrumento necessário que, depois de usado, jogarei fora” ‘Looking is the necessary
instrument that, once used, I shall discard’ (56). In Água Viva, the narrator similarly uses
“a palavra como isca: a palavra pescando o que não e palavra. […] Uma vez que se
pescou a entrelinha, pode-se com alívio jogar a palavra fora” (22) ‘So writing is the
method of using the word as bait: the word fishing for whatever is not word. When this
non-word— between the lines—takes the bait, something has been written’ (15). Água
Viva’s narrator poses her text not only as an object, but also as one that will be thrown
away: “Nunca leerás o que escrevo. E quando eu tiver anotado o meu segredo de ser—
jogarei fora como se fosse ao mar” (73) ‘You will never read what I’m writing. And
when I’ve noted down my secret of being— I’ll throw it away as if into the sea’ (66). The
gesture of disposal, of the concrete text as an ephemeral thing whose use is exhausted in
its production, speaks to the notion of an artistic object-as-event, over one that is a closed
and durable entity.
The disposable character of writing raises a fundamental question for Água Viva,
namely, why a text so averse to referentiality and mimesis nonetheless contains such
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detailed representations of external objects. Brown argues that the emergent questioning
of the role of literature in the modern era is precisely one of the dilemmas that is
“hypostasized” by the literary treatment of things: “the question of things [in literature]
becomes a question about whether the literary object should be understood as the object
that literature represents, or the object that literature has as its aim, the object that
literature is” (Sense of Things 3). In short, the confrontation in Água Viva between the
text as object as the text as object-free stages the modernist and avant-garde debates
about the nature of art; an observation that resonates with Prado’s assertion that in
Lispector’s work “A escritura, como a música (mas também como ‘a coisa’), deve ser
index sui” ‘Writing, like music (and also like “the thing”) should be index sui’ (21).
Finally, the narrator uses the term “object” to refer to herself: “se tenho que ser
um objeto, que seja um objeto que grita” (87) ‘if I must be an object let it be an object
that screams’ (79). In the context of Água viva’s many objects, however, it is worth
noting the link between this phrase and the disposability motif just outlined. Objeto
gritante, (translated in some critical studies as “Loud Object” but meaning literally
“screaming object”) names an earlier and much more extensive manuscript of the novel.
Marta Peixoto and others have noted that in addition to this title, what was cut from that
manuscript in the editing process were its autobiographical details (Peixoto 66-68; Sousa
348-49). In excising a title that appears to refer to herself, it is as if the author wished, in
some way, to get out of her own text—even if that proved possible in name only.
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From objects to ethics?
A hora da estrela is Lispector’s most radical examination of the self-as-writer and
the novel, and it is also her clearest attempt to confront the problem of social inequality in
Brazil. In this novel, Lispector creates a writerly alter ego, Rodrigo S.M., who in turn
creates the fictional character Macabéa. The girl, a poor and uneducated migrant living
precariously as a typist in Rio de Janeiro, remains as stubbornly opaque to her creator as
her own existence, he presumes, remains to her. A hora da estrela thus revolves around
the problematic representation of an “object” that is neither fully a what nor a who.
Rodrigo S.M. battles a profound anxiety over putting into words a character that
requires “a criação de uma pessoa inteira” ‘the creation of a whole person’ (11) and a
story “ que nunca […] viveu” ‘that he has never lived’ (40). This anxiety makes it nearly
impossible for him to begin his narration, and it results in a tug-of-war between the
“facts” of his story and his recurrent self-doubt. How does a writer “create” a wholly
other person? How does a member of the privileged classes represent the impoverished
sectors of his or her own society? How to build a character that is realistic, give her a
modicum of dignity, and yet be unflinchingly honest about the disdain of the dominant
classes? How to presume to know experiences that are utterly alien and yet refrain from
projecting one’s own subjectivity onto the blank screen of the other’s interiority?
The narrative poses these questions both explicitly and implicitly, while leaving
undecided Rodrigo’s capabilities for sincerely engaging with his class guilt. Sá doubts the
narrator’s desire to transcend class divisions: “Pre-disposed to speak for the poor, he does
not want to hear them, nor get to know them up close” (“Mal-estar” 61). Dalcastangné
agrees that Rodrigo’s shortcomings “prevent him from making [Macabéa] speak but say a
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lot about the difficult relationship between the intellectual and a great majority of
Brazilians” (58). She nevertheless detects an ethics of sorts, one that manifests precisely
in the narrative’s “deficiencies” (58). In the formal clumsiness of Rodrigo’s narration, in
his inability to begin, in the constant frustration he feels trying to decipher his character,
in the prejudices toward her that he inadvertently lets slip, Dalcastagné sees the formal
replication of a “deep discomfort in [the] face of his object of writing” (58). Fueled by
the contradictory impulses of empathy and self-distancing, this discomfort is at least
baldly, unflatteringly revealed.
In a similar vein, Daniela Mercedes Kahn argues that Rodrigo’s stuttering
narration “mirrors the conflict between the culture of the elites and that of the
marginalized within a country that is itself peripheral” (120). However, Dalcastagné’s
idea of a discomfort that arises from the face-to-face affirms that what she describes is
not only the replication of a political problem but also an ethics: a discomfiting encounter
that imprints itself on the form of the novel by hijacking narration, and that discloses the
subject’s attitudes as flawed. It is, in other words, an ethics comprised of narrative
failures. Working back from Lispector’s social concerns in A hora da estrela to her
earlier work, it becomes increasingly clear that the objects in her earlier texts, and more
specifically how they are (or are not) seen, pave the way for Rodrigo’s ambivalent
presentation of his character. Macabéa should enjoy full subject status; however, insofar
as she remains stubbornly inscrutable to the narrator, she is but a heightened form of the
same gaze-defying objects one encounters in “O ovo e a galinha” and Água Viva.
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The porta-espelho
In a work that is so explicitly concerned with the writing of the self, the narrator
of Água Viva nevertheless presents the reader with three related external objects of
representation: the church portico, the mirror, and the wardrobe. The narrator focuses on
their physical properties: the solidity and opacity of the wooden surfaces of the portico
and the wardrobe, the unfulfilled promise of interior space suggested by the presence of
doors, and the equivocal capabilities of the reflective face of the mirror as emblematic of
the problems of looking that characterize any approach of the object. The wardrobe with
its half-ajar door, also hung with a mirror, functions as a fusion of these qualities:
Mas eu também quero pintar um tema. E este tema será—um guarda-
roupa, pois que há de mais concreto? Tenho que estudar o guarda-roupa
antes de pintá-lo. Que vejo? Vejo que o guarda-roupa parece penetrável
porque tem uma porta. Mas ao abri-la, vê-se que se adiou o penetrar: pois
por dentro é também uma superfície de madeira, como uma porta fechada.
Função do guarda-roupa: conservar no escuro os travestis. Natureza: da
inviolabilidade das coisas. Relação com pessoas: a gente se olha ao
espelho da parte de dentro de sua porta, a gente se olha sempre em luz
inconveniente porque o guarda-roupa nunca esta em lugar adequado:
desajeitado, fica de pé onde couber, sempre descomunal, corcunda, tímido
e desastrado, sem saber como ser mais discreto, pois tem presença demais.
Guarda-roupa é enorme, intruso, triste, bondoso.
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Mais eis que se abre o porta-espelho—e eis que, ao movimento que
a porta faz, e na nova composição do quarto em sombra, nessa composição
entram frascos e frascos de vidro de claridade fugitiva. (82)
[But I also want to create a theme, I want to paint an object. And that
object will be—a wardrobe, for what is more concrete? I must study the
wardrobe before painting it. What do I see? I see that the wardrobe looks
penetrable because it has a door. But when I open it, I see that penetration
has been put off: since inside is also a wooden surface, like a closed door.
Function of the wardrobe: to keep drag and disguises hidden. Nature: that
of the inviolability of things. Relation to people: we look at ourselves in
the mirror on the inside of the door, we always look at ourselves in an
inconvenient light because the wardrobe is never in the right place:
awkward, it stands wherever it fits, always huge, hunchbacked, shy and
clumsy, unaware of how to be more discreet, for it has too much presence.
A wardrobe is enormous, intrusive, sad and kind.
But suddenly the door-mirror opens—and suddenly, in the
movement that the door makes, and in the new composition of the room in
shadow, into that composition enter flask after flask of glass of fleeting
brightness. (74)]
“I also want to paint a theme, I want to create an object,” Lispector begins, “and that
object will be—a wardrobe, for what is more concrete?” As I established in this chapter’s
second section, the narrator in Água Viva openly intends for her text to relay, above all
else, an unmediated expression of her own experience. The episode’s introductory
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conjunction (“But I also”) alerts the reader to an alternative, namely that the wardrobe’s
superlative concreteness serves as a late-arriving counterweight to the text’s famously
subjectivist perspective. The theme of the concrete, then, allows that which is external to
the narrator to begin to contend for narrative space.
“Quero pintar um tema, quero criar um objeto,” Lispector’s narrator has just
declared, and she continues, “tenho que estudar o guarda-roupa antes de pintá-lo. Que
vejo?” (82) ‘I want to paint a theme, I want to create an object. I must study the wardrobe
before painting it. What do I see?’ (74). The second sentence of the guarda-roupa section
reinforces the notion that the wardrobe is the nexus of themes of seeing, knowing, and
representing: the verbs pintar and criar in the first sentence leave no doubt that the
problematic addressed here plays out on the ground of the artistic act; while ver and
estudar figure the difficulties to come in terms of a gaze seeking knowledge of the sort
that ostensibly precedes representation. But the third sentence quickly runs up against the
problem of appearances, of insides and outsides: “Vejo que o guarda-roupa parece
penetrável porque tem uma porta” (82) ‘I see that the wardrobe looks penetrable because
it has a door’ (74). Finally, although the presence of a door suggests the possibility of
accessing an interior essence, the wardrobe’s apparent penetrability is (at least
temporarily) thwarted: “Mas ao abri-la, vê-se que que se adiou o penetrar: pois por dentro
é também uma superfície de madeira, como uma porta fechada” (82) ‘But when I open it,
I see that penetration has been put off: since inside is also a wooden surface, like a closed
door’ (74).
What will define Lispector’s object in Água Viva, then, is its intransigence. This
wardrobe is no longer the mundane, utilitarian cabinet that Joana disdains in Perto do
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coração selvagem; it thwarts the seamless relation between user and used, seer and seen.
Brown makes the point that such an intransigent object, one that will not make itself
available for our practical or conceptual aims, initiates a shifted power dynamic between
subject and object:
We look through objects because there are codes by which our
interpretative attention makes them meaningful as facts. A thing, by
contrast, can hardly function as a window. We begin to confront the
thingness of objects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks,
when the car stalls, when the windows get filthy [...]. The story of objects
asserting themselves as things, then, is the story of a changed relation to
the human subject. (“Thing Theory” 4)
Whether it is the car engine that refuses to start or the philosophical thing that blocks the
view of the concept, what defines the thing in Brown’s analysis is precisely the moment
at which it reveals that it was never “for” us. The object that will not let itself be used, be
known, be properly seen, is an object that both demands and defies our attention.
Lispector had already begun to explore this play of sight, surfaces, and depths in
an earlier exposition of the object. In “O ovo e a galinha,” the formal dynamic between
object and sight is so prevalent that Regina Pontieri reads the story as essentially
structured by the polarity “Egg vs. Eye” (210-12). In it, problems of looking and knowing
are framed in terms that specifically problematize the gaze, especially a penetrating one:
“O que não eu sei do ovo é o que realmente importa, o que eu não sei do ovo me dá o ovo
propriamente dito, [...] Quem se aprofunda num ovo, quem vê mais do que o superfície
do ovo, está querendo outra coisa: está com fome” (56) ‘What I don’t know about the egg
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is what matters. What I don’t know about the egg gives me the egg properly speaking...
Whoever plunges deeper into an egg, whoever sees more than the surface of an egg, is
after something else: that person is hungry’ (277). But in the face of the penetrating gaze,
the object stages a retreat: “ovo visto, ovo perdido” (55) ‘an egg seen is an egg lost’
(276). One is reminded at this point of Brown’s formulation of surfaces and depths, that
the allure of the thing is precisely the challenge it presents to our interpretative habits:
that the heuristic mind “imagines, deep within the surface/depth dichotomy, overcoming
it. However intriguing the inside might be, a sophisticated intelligence will make it
disappear” (Sense of Things 11). In the end, we cannot resist reading things, even if—or
precisely because—they resist being read. We are attracted to the enigma, even if it
refuses to offer itself up.
The egg that disappears upon capture, the reticent opacity of the wardrobe’s
receding wooden surfaces—all designate a robustly independent object that exceeds the
sum of the human observer’s knowledge. Morton describes the object’s capacity to
exceed apprehension as “withdrawal,” a term that he uses to designate the limits of
knowledge: “a single mode of access can never exhaust the thing; [...] the more we know
about a strange stranger, the more he (he, it) withdraws” (“Here Comes Everything” 166).
The idea of an object that withdraws from the totalizing gaze of the subject takes on an
ethical cast when the object of observation is no longer a what, but a who. In A hora da
estrela, Rodrigo complains: “tenho um personagem buliçoso nas mãos e que me escapa a
cada instante querendo que eu o recupere” (22) ‘I have a fidgety character on my hands
and who escapes me at every turn expecting me to retrieve her’ (13). But at the same time
as she withdraws from Rodrigo’s attempts to describe her, Macabéa will not leave him
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alone. She has invaded even his physical space in her passive demand for attention: “ela
se me grudou na pele qual melado pegajoso ou lama negra […] pois a datilógrafa não
quer sair dos meus ombros” (21-22) ‘she’s stuck to my skin like some sticky treacle or
black mud […] the typist doesn’t want to get off my shoulders’ (13). The elusive object
nevertheless gets under the skin.
What Lispector’s object theory in Água Viva offers to the discussion of
withdrawal is two-fold. First, even before the introduction of a clearly human “object” in
A hora da estrela, the description of material objects in Água Viva strongly implies that
behind its surface of apparently inert material, the object might feel. In the pages
preceding the wardrobe passage, Lispector describes the act of painting a church portal,
whose wooden doors offer a precursor to the porta-espelho. This earlier description of
wooden surfaces also begins with metaphors of impassibility: “sinto uma longa estrada e
poeira até chegar ao pouso do quadro. Mesmo que os portais não se abram. [...] Crio o
material antes de pintá-lo [...] Compacto, fechado como uma porta fechada” (77) ‘I feel a
long road and dust until I reach the resting-place of the painting. Even though the portals
don’t open […] I create the material before I paint it […] Compact, closed like a closed
door’ (70). Despite the resistance offered to the gaze by the opaque impenetrability of
this material, Lispector tells us that beyond the apparent finality wooden surfaces, there is
something much more vital than a void. The portal’s matter itself bears the mark of what
might be hidden beyond the closed doors: “Mas no portal foram esfoladas aberturas,
rasgadas por unhas. E através dessas brechas que se vê o que está dentro de uma síntese,
dentro da simetria utópica. Cor coagulada, violência, martírio, são as vigas que sustentam
o silêncio de uma simetria religiosa” (77) ‘But onto the portal openings were flayed,
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scratched out by fingernails. And it’s through those openings that you see what is inside a
synthesis, inside the utopian symmetry. Coagulated color, violence, martyrdom, are the
beams that sustain the silence of a religious symmetry’ (70). There is surely something
behind the church door, behind the inner wall of the armoire: beyond the visible surface
of the object, beyond its representation, lies affect; fury, desperation, nails scratching;
“violence, martyrdom.” But we can only glimpse this “beyond,” if we can see it at all:
“Função da guarda-roupa: conservar no escuro os travestis. Natureza: da inviolabilidade
das coisas” (82) ‘Function of the wardrobe: to keep drag and disguises hidden. Nature:
that of the inviolability of things’ (74).
Second, the wardrobe passage offers, at least provisionally, the possibility of a
deferral for interpretation: “vê-se que adiou o penetrar” (82) ‘I see that penetration has
been put off’ (74). Rather than ending in aporia (“an egg seen is an egg lost”), the use of
the verb adiar (“to put off”) suspends the interpretative dance in mid-act. The question of
seeing inside the wardrobe, of making the interior “disappear” through exposition or
through understanding, is left indefinitely unresolved. This deferral also guarantees that
the interpretative cycle of attraction-repulsion will always renew itself. Just because the
object-Other is uninterpretable, does not mean that we ignore it utterly; and yet we
approach it knowing that the heuristic act will never be consummated or completed:
“Nature: that of the inviolability of things.”
If, as Brown’s formulation suggests, the story of the object’s resistance to
penetration by the hungry gaze is “the story of a changed relation to the human subject,”
what is the alternative relation that will arise between subject and object now that the
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wardrobe has asserted its capacity to withdraw? Lispector comes explicitly to the
question of relation at this point in the guarda-roupa passage:
Relação com pessoas: a gente se olha ao espelho da parte de dentro da sua
porta, a gente se olha sempre em luz inconveniente porque o guarda-roupa
nunca esta em lugar adequado: desajeitado, fica de pé onde couber,
sempre descomunal, corcunda, tímido e distraído, sem saber como ser
mais discreto, pois tem presença demais. Guarda-roupa é enorme, intruso,
triste, bondoso. (82)
Relation to people: we look at ourselves in the mirror on the inside of the
door, we always look at ourselves in an inconvenient light because the
wardrobe is never in the right place: awkward, it stands wherever it fits,
always huge, hunchbacked, shy and clumsy, unaware how to be more
discreet, for it has too much presence. A wardrobe is enormous, intrusive,
sad, kind. (74)
Here, the narrator endows the material object with sensibility: “a wardrobe is enormous,
intrusive, sad, kind.” And precisely because the armoire has subject-like characteristics
(awkward; standing wherever it fits; shy and clumsy; unaware of how to be more
discreet), it makes itself inconvenient to its observer. The object’s quiet self-assertion is
perhaps what leads Hélène Cixous to observe of Água Viva’s objects: “the thing is
standing upright, despite the torment inflicted upon it. [...] Matter is riddled with the hope
of something” (Reading 48). The subjective object, inconveniently present to the
observer who wishes to see herself, passively disrupts her self-contemplation. Perhaps we
have seen the armoire, and it is Macabéa.
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The alternative subject-object relationship that arises at this point in the guarda-
roupa passage hinges upon an apparent change in the value of the mirror. Up until this
point in Água Viva, and also in other instances in Lispector’s work, the mirror is
presented as a foil to seeing the non-self. Tenuously capable of revealing infinite depths,
the mirror also frequently represents the dangers of self-projection: “Ao pintá-lo precisei
de minha própria delicadeza para não atravessá-lo com minha imagem, pois espelho em
que me vejo já sou eu” (78) ‘When painting it I need my own delicateness in order not to
cross it with my own image, since a mirror in which I see myself is already I’ (71). This
problem is re-enacted in A hora da estrela, when Rodrigo is famously unable to wrest his
narration away from a description of his own personal and artistic struggles in order to
conjure his character. Over the many pages of “warm-up” that begin A hora da estrela,
Rodrigo’s attempts to portray Macabéa and her story in any detail slide repeatedly back
into first-person narration: “Desculpai-me que vou continuar a falar de mim que sou meu
desconhecido” (15) ‘Forgive me but I’m going to keep talking about me who am
unknown to myself’ (7). When Rodrigo finally manages to imagine Macabéa’s physical
appearance as she gazes at herself in a mirror, however, the image of her face is
supplanted by his own: “Vejo a nordestina se olhando ao espelho e—um rufar de
tambor—no espelho aparece o meu rosto cansado e barbudo” (22) ‘I see the Northeastern
girl looking in the mirror and—the ruffle of a drum—in the mirror appears my weary and
unshaven face’ (14).
An object that performs the role of self-affirmation resonates in Kahn’s analysis
of the role of alterity in Lispector’s short fiction. Kahn pinpoints the persistence of “a
particular kind of Other, whether person, animal or thing, that takes the passive role of
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serving merely as an index of the protagonist’s self-recognition” (69). Kahn’s description
of alterity in Lispector’s work thus recalls Lezra’s critique of post-humanist disciplines
that sees categories like “things,” “objects,” and “matter” as proxies for ‘the finitude of
the human animal” (13-14). In Kahn’s analysis, Lispector’s objects take the role of
mirrors that merely display the contours of the self.
How has the mirror come to have a different value, and how has the relation that
it incites with the viewer shifted from one of self-affirmation to one of awkward
inconvenience? The key to this shifted relation is a question of angles. As an alternative
to the direct or penetrating gaze, the narrator of Água Viva repeatedly claims her point of
enunciation from the sides and in the shadows: “Por que não abordo um tema que
facilmente poderia descobrir? Mas não: caminho encostada a parede, escamoteio a
melodia descoberta, ando na sombra, nesse lugar onde tantas coisas acontecem. Às vezes
escorro pelo muro, em lugar onde nunca bate o sol” (81) ‘Why don’t I tackle a theme that
I could easily flush out? but no: I slink along the wall, I pilfer the flushed-out melody, I
walk in the shadow, in that place where so many things go on’ (73). The peripheral gaze,
arriving at an angle from the margins, becomes a mark of respectful distance:
A vida oblíqua? Bem sei que há um desencontro leve entre as coisas, elas
quase se chocam, há desencontro entre os seres que se perdem uns aos
outros entre palavras que quase não dizem nada. Mas quase nos
entendemos nesse leve desencontro, nesse quase que é a única forma de
suportar a vida em cheio, pois um encontro face a face com ela nos
assustaria, espaventaria os seus delicados fios de teia de aranha. Nos
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somos de soslaio para não comprometer o que pressentimos de
infinitamente outro nessa vida que te falo. (70)
[Oblique life? I am well aware that there is a slight detachment between
things, they almost collide, there is a detachment among the beings that
lose one another amongst words that almost don’t say anything anymore.
But we almost understand one another in this light discord, in this almost
that is the only way to stand full life, since a sudden face-to-face encounter
with it would frighten us, scare us off its delicate spider’s web threads. We
are askance in order not to jeopardize what we foresee is infinitely other in
this life of which I speak to you. (63)]
Standing askance to the Other, we are to understand, is another form of Lispector’s ethics
of failure. As we see in these two quotes, for Lispector it is the almost-but-not-quite
quality of the encounter, the sideways glance from the margins, that allows for any
encounter at all. Morton argues that this kind of partial encounter, the “light discord” of
Lispector’s “slight detachments between the beings that lose one another” is the only type
of encounter that is possible (Here Comes Everything” 165). “Objects,” he argues
(including the objects that we, as humans, also are), “encounter each other as
operationally closed systems that can only (mis)translate one another” (“Here Comes
Everything” 165).
At the same time, Água Viva’s narrator seems to suggest that by standing to the
side, we may finally manage a glimpse of an Other that is not a reflection of ourselves:
‘só uma pessoa muito delicada pode entrar no quarto vazio, e com tal leveza, com tal
ausência de si mesma, que a imagem não marca. Como prémio, essa pessoa delicada terá
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então penetrado num dos segredos invioláveis das coisas: viu o espelho propriamente
dito” (78-79) ‘Only a very delicate person can enter the empty room where there is an
empty mirror, and with such lightness, with such absence of self, that his image leaves no
mark. As a prize, that delicate person will then have penetrated one of the inviolable
secrets of things: he saw the mirror itself’ (71). This leaves the reader with a pressing
question: is the object accessible or not?
The conclusion of the guarda-roupa episode comes as close as possible to
achieving an answer to this question. In it, one finds a half-open door with a mirror
attached: “Mais eis que se abre a porta-espelho — e eis que, ao movimento que a porta
faz, e na nova composição do quarto em sombra, nessa composição entram frascos e
frascos de vidro de claridade fugitiva” (82) ‘But suddenly the door-mirror opens—and
suddenly, in the movement that the door makes, and in the new composition of the room
in shadow, into that composition enter flask after flask of glass of fleeting brightness’
(75). Up to this moment, the narrator has presented the reflective capacities of the mirror
mostly as a potential foil to seeing. In the porta-espelho episode, however, the angle of
the door permits the object to interrupt, and no longer with the lumbering presence of a
wooden wardrobe but with a luminous emission of its essence; of it-self. The verb in the
last sentence in this passage is not “reflect” or “project,” but “enter”; the construction is
active, not passive; and what enters are fragments of the material-made-ethereal: “flasks
of glass of fleeting brightness.” The object enters the creative space of the subject and
transforms it. The angled mirror permits the subject and object to be co-present and to
level, if only fleetingly, the exchange between them.
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After the conclusion of the porta-espelho episode, Água Viva ends with an
extensive rumination on subject-object elision. This shift in position, where the narrator
will bind herself to her typewriter, echoes an earlier formulation of subject-object (or
rather, object-object) solidarity when the narrator says of the mirror, “Não descrevi o
espelho. Fui ele” (79) ‘No, I did not describe the mirror—I was the mirror’ (72). In the
exhaustion of the project of looking, the narrator moves from the position of observer (“I
did not describe the mirror”) to one of a companion-object (“I was the mirror”). The
typewriter passage is even more unnerving, however, because it mixes a tone of solidarity
with strains of complicity and responsibility: “O que sou neste instante? Sou uma
máquina de escrever fazendo ecoar as teclas secas na húmida e escura madrugada. Há
muito já não sou gente. Quiseram que eu fosse um objeto. Sou um objeto. Objeto sujo de
sangue. Sou um objeto que cria outros objetos e a máquina cria a nós todos. Ela exige”
(78) ‘What am I in this instant? I am a typewriter making the dry keys echo in the dark
and humid early hours. For a long time I haven’t been people. They wanted me to be an
object. I’m an object. An object dirty with blood. That creates other objects and the
typewriter creates all of us. It demands’ (78). The subject becomes an object among
objects, and in the phrase’s penultimate pronoun, involves us—her readers, all of “us”—
in a great web of relations beyond our control.
In the face of the mechanism that “demands,” Lispector leaves her reader with
two resources. The first is the scream (“if I must be an object let it be an object that
screams”). This scream is at once a protest against the objectification of self and of others
by the “mechanism,” the anguished acknowledgement of the complicity of the writer in
that objectification, and, as Oiticica proposed, an object-event in itself. The second
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recourse is the oblique encounter of subject to subject, object to object, mirror to mirror:
“Não são precisos muitos [espelhos] para se ter a mina faiscante e sonambúlica: bastam
dois, e um reflete o reflexo que o outro refletiu, num tremor que transmite em mensagem
telegráfica intensa e muda” (77) ‘You don’t need many [mirrors] to have the sparkling
and sleepwalking mine: two are enough, and one reflects the reflection of what the other
reflected, in a trembling that is transmitted in an intense and mute telegraphic message’
(70). By placing herself to the side and looking into the mirror at an indirect angle, the
narrator becomes the second mirror that reflects infinity. This is what she asks of her
readers, as well.
In taking care not to overpower or obscure the object itself, the object is free to be
itself, to maintain its “it-ness.” This peripheral approach is described by Cixous in terms
of non-intrusion: “Clarice Lispector’s endeavor consists in leaving the non-self alone”
(Coming to Writing 20). Água Viva discreetly allows the object its space; however, it
does not quite leave the non-self alone. In the repeated attempt to see past the object’s
opaque surface, and in their explicit failures; in the empathetic positioning of the self as
object, and the acknowledgment of the object’s disruptive potential; in the enduring,
uncomfortable curiosity for what lies within, Lispector traces the complexities and
ambivalences inherent in making an Other the object of representation. In the process, the
author has drawn together the poles of the human and the non-human Other (the material
and the sentient) to the point of co-contaminating their properties, without resolving
whether the space that separates them is any different from the one that separates humans
from each other: “We are askance in order not to jeopardize what we foresee is infinitely
other in this life of which I speak to you.” The result is a continuous field of alterity, of
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objects strange to one another (in which the narrator of Água Viva includes herself, “a
typewriter making the dry keys echo”) where the repeated enactment of an always-partial
encounter is seems to be the meeting point for aesthetics, ontology and ethics.
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CHAPTER 3
Cannibals in Translation (Studies)
In a lecture delivered in 1990 at the University of Cambridge, Guyanese novelist
Wilson Harris offers his audience an explicit account of translation and cannibalism in
the Caribbean. He speaks in particular of the role of the bone flute in Carib culture, an
early musical instrument crafted from the bones of one’s enemies:
The ancient Caribs possessed a bone flute that was made from the body of the
enemy. They consumed a morsel of the flesh of their enemy and they thought
thereby they would understand the secrets of the enemy, what the enemy was
planning to do, how he would attack them, how he would ravage their villages.
The peculiar thing is that the bone flute also became the seed of music. We have
here a very remarkable strategy which makes one wonder where music may
possess its seed, its birth. (22)
The flute and its music, Harris explains, are the Carib’s technology for making contact
with his other: for anticipating the enemy’s moves and intuiting his motivations. It is not
surprising, then, that he should link the flute—and by explicit extension, the
anthropophagic act that created it—to more modern technologies, such as fiction and
translation, that achieve the same end.
I begin this chapter with Harris’s ideas on cannibalism and translation because
they are emblematic of more recent theorizations of the cannibal and translational
practices both inside and outside of Brazil. Scholars of Brazilian letters will immediately
notice the resonance between Harris’s bone flute and Oswald de Andrade’s early
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twentieth-century Manifesto antropófago (1928). In Harris’s account of Carib
cannibalism and the origins of musical technology, one finds a reworking of one of the
Andrade’s main assertions: that Brazil’s “anthropophagous past” contains a “recipe for
the future,” a seed of alternative thought that has stowed away within European
interpretations of the Americas. And nowhere is there greater possibility for this than in
European “readings” of the practice of anthropophagy among indigenous peoples and the
translations—from the early sixteenth century to the present day—that emerged from
these.
In the present chapter, I focus on a somewhat different intersection of cannibalism
and translation—as both theory and practice—in works published over the past forty
years. During this period, authors and theorists working on Brazil, the Caribbean, and
Latin America as a whole have highlighted the “transubstantiation in reverse” that
characterizes both textual translation and the ceremonial ingestion of one’s enemy. This
raises the question: how are readers of Latin American literature to understand this
practice? What does “cannibal translation” entail? As we shall see, much of it consists of
taking translation itself toward what Alexandre Nodari describes as a reversal of Freud’s
classic formulation of cannibalism, or “the permanent transformation of Taboo into
Totem” (9-40). There is also the question of an irresolvable tension between meaning and
experience.
Writing on translation just three years after Harris’s Cambridge lectures, Gayatri
Spivak uses Harris’s literary flute as the figure for an aperture between two subjectivities:
what she calls a “surrender” on the part of a literary translation to a perspective other than
that of her home audience. Citing Harris directly, she begins to tease out how the flute’s
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“primitive” technology can help us now by teaching us to consume some of the harmful
biases inherent in modernity itself:
The Caribbean bone flute, made of human bone, is a seed in the soul of the
Caribbean. It is a primitive technology that we can turn around (trans-version?).
Consuming our biases and prejudices in ourselves we can let the bone flute help
us open ourselves rather than read it the other way—as a metonymic devouring of
a bit of flesh. The link of music with cannibalism is a sublime paradox. When the
music of the bone flute opens the door, absences flow in, and the native
imagination puts together the ingredients for the quantum immediacy of
unpredictable resources. (220)
What Spivak highlights in Harris’s telling is the “sublime paradox” of music and
cannibalism, ephemeral sound and durable bone, as the catalyst for a complex procedure
of ontological relationality. The materiality of the bone, and the physical traces of the
anthropophagic act that produced it as raw material to be converted into cultural artifact,
are subsumed into notes with the potential to pierce an immaterial membrane: the divide
that separates “us” from “them,” from the cannibals who produced the flute after they
presumably ate the flesh, and from “the native imagination” that conceived and theorized
those acts. Elsewhere, Harris refers to precisely this process as “transubstantiation in
reverse:” a “shar[ing] in the biases of the enemy” by way of inciting a “mutual psyche
[between] protagonist and antagonist” (23). A bias is, of course, a slanted view: a matter
of perspective. Harris’s literary formulation suggests (and more recent ethnography
confirms) that sharing in the perspective of the other is precisely what counts as
knowledge in certain Amerindian systems of thought, particularly in lowland Amerindian
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groups who are themselves the descendants of “cannibals.” In this chapter I tease out
some of the implications of Harris’s idea of “sharing a bias” for the topic of his talk:
cultural and linguistic translation.
Cannibal Translation
The 1980s witnessed an explosion of “cannibal studies” that corresponded with
the rise of post-colonial studies. This research suggests that from its first appearance in
European accounts cannibal, as a word-concept thrown into motion by the meeting of
European and Amerindian peoples, has always revolved around cultural translation as
mistranslation. The word recorded by Christopher Columbus was an exonym, used by the
Arawak people he first encountered to designate an enemy tribe. As the story goes, “the
noun ‘cannibal’ derives from the Arawak caniba, apparently a corruption of cariba,
which the Caribbean Indians of the Lesser Antilles gave to themselves. To their enemies,
however, the peace-loving Arawaks of Cuba, the name had a distinctly pejorative
connotation of extreme ferocity and barbarity” (Lestringant 15). Given the openly
inimical relationship between the Arawak and the Carib, a skeptical
By way of Columbus’s diary, the Spanish caníbal finds its way into European
languages with remarkably little change, a fact that causes Peter Hulme to comment:
[The word cannibal] was adopted into the bosom of the European family of
languages with a speed and readiness which suggests that there had always been
an empty place kept warm for it. Poor “anthropophagy,” if not exactly orphaned,
was sent out into the cold until finding belated lodging in the nineteenth century
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within new disciplines seeking authority from the deployment of classical
terminologies. (Hulme 19)10
As a linguistic artifact of the first encounter, cannibal accomplishes both the
etymological and the metaphorical applications of the word “to translate:” like the
remains of saints that were “transferred” (translatio) to new shrines from their original
resting place, it is “carried across” distances; while like the linguistic term, it transports a
cultural meaning that is inevitably reconfigured at its destination. The remarkable
persistence of this word, and the complex histories of its application, compels one to ask
along with Hulme, what, exactly, was the “place kept warm” in Europe for the cannibal?
From the perspective of post-colonial studies, the cannibal comes to stand for the
ambivalently human limit case created by colonial discourse: the nonwhite, “uncivilized,”
human-but-not-quite-“us” of European centers of power whose “savage” nature justifies
notions of an imperial “civilizing mission.” Textual descriptions and visual images of
anthropophagy circulating in Europe in the hundred years after Columbus’s encounter
shaped European ideas of the Americas for centuries; while accusations of
anthropophagy, real or constructed, were instrumental in Spanish and Portuguese
justifications for taking possession of land and people (Hulme, Bombardi, Freire). Images
of the cannibal also broke free of that original context. Even as the seat of imperial power
moved from the Iberian nations to Britain and then the U.S., and as anthropophagy itself
faded as an anthropological practice, the specter of the cannibal—his ferocity, barbarism,
resistance to civilization—conditioned perceptions of nonwhite, non-European peoples
across the world and created a political fiction that remained imbedded for centuries in
the logic of Empire. (Boucher, Bratlinger). “Taming cannibals or civilizing savages was
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oxymoronic,” argues Patrick Brantlinger, because “civilization was a goal that the
nonwhite peoples of the world could not attain, or at best, could only approximate as
‘mimic men’” (2). The figure of the cannibal as a category of life that straddles the line
between humanity and animality created a justification for a mission that need never end
because it could never be completed; a receding horizon of domination that shades into
contemporary structures of political and cultural power (Bergman, Root, Rice, Bergland).
Moving back in time, it is worth noting that it was precisely in response to
historical structures of cultural and racial domination that a reversal of the cannibal figure
emerged in twentieth-century Latin American letters. The earliest of these interventions
were the 1928 Manifesto antropófago by the Brazilian writer Oswald de Andrade, as well
as Cuban critic Roberto Fernández Retamar’s Calibán: apuntes sobre la cultura en
nuestra América (1971). In these works and in the vast corpus of works that they inspired
(some of which will be discussed in detail over the course of this chapter), the cannibal’s
ferocity is turned against the colonizer in a gesture of defiance against the cultural and
intellectual dominance of the former European metropoles. By the latter half of the
century, these two strands of the transvalued cannibal had taken hold in Brazilian theory
(B. Nunes; H. Campos; Castro-Klarén “Corpor-ización,” “A Genealogy”) and Hispanic
and Caribbean literatures (Joseph; Lopez Springfield; Jáuregui; Reyes; Loichot; Colas;
Githire; Basile).
The resurgence of interest in the figure of the cannibal in cultural and literary
studies since the 1970s has a parallel in the field of Translation Studies. In 1975, the
cannibal emerges as a shadowy threat to the authority of the translator in George
Steiner’s “The Hermeneutic Method,” chapter five of the author’s landmark work, After
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Babel. The Brazilian poet, translator and critic Haroldo de Campos resurrects the
anthropophagous figure of São Paulo’s 1920s avant-garde in his 1981 essay, “Da razão
antropofágica: Europa sob o signo da devoração.” 11 The essay by Spivak that opened this
chapter would appear in 1993. Spivak’s reading of Harris is especially important for
Brazilian Studies in that it appears to confirm some of Andrade’s assertions about the
viability of “native thought” as a transformative force within the Western intellectual
tradition. This vector only intensifies beginning six years later, when Campos’s writing
again appears in the field of Translation Studies, this time as the subject of essays
addressing his own work as a literary translator (E. Vieira, “A Postmodern Translational
Aesthetics,” “Liberating Calibans”; C. Andrade; Guerini, Mello and Costa). For Susan
Bassnett and Harish Trivedi, the editors of Postcolonial Theory and Practice, Campos’s
work as a translator belongs to a tradition of “anthropophagous” cultural practices in
Brazilian art and literature. They even single out Campos, and with him the metaphor of
the “cannibal translation,” as exemplary of procedures of what they define as post-
colonial translation.
The historical coincidence of interest in the ideological role of the cannibal in
cultural studies and the appearance of this figure in the still-coalescing field of post-
colonial translation is far from gratuitous. The importance of cannibal tropes for
narratives of colonial dominance is partially responsible for this; however, the cannibal
and translation are also imbricated in ways that remain to be fully articulated in the field
of cultural studies. In the present chapter, I draw out these connections by reading essays
on translation theory alongside work emerging from a third disciplinary pivot point—the
ontological turn in contemporary anthropology. Briefly put, this ethnographic current
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began at roughly at the same time (the 1990s) as the postcolonial turn, and has sought to
decolonialize the practice and applications of ethnography by considering indigenous
thought to be of equal weight and validity as those of the anthropologist. In other words,
the goal of the ontological turn is to attempt to place “Western” and “non-Western”
thinking on equal theoretical footing.
While the connections between anthropology and ideas of cannibalism may be
somewhat obvious; it is worthwhile to lay the groundwork for how these recent
developments in the discipline (which I will discuss in greater depth below) relate to
translation. As Tejaswani Niranjana notes, anthropology and translation are enmeshed by
a shared history in the colonial past. Translation, she points out, had long served in the
colonial context as a “significant technology of colonial domination” (21). As
ethnography began to coalesce into a new discipline in the early twentieth century, it also
relied on translation—of mostly oral culture—in a complex operation that was not only
linguistic but necessarily conceptual. Anthropologists, that is, not only translated
indigenous culture and history into Western languages (often via “native interpreters”)
but also translated “the savage mind” (Levy-Bruhl) into disciplinary language structured
by Western epistemic regimes. “The idea of translation in such a context,” Niranjana
continues, “is a metonymy of the desire to achieve transparent knowledge and provide for
a Western audience immediacy of access to ‘primitive thought’” (70).
As a large body of post-colonial work in the 1990s and 2000s came to show,
“cannibals,” as a liminal figure for humanity in the Western imaginary, already sit at the
site of translation between self and other and inhabit something akin to the outer
boundary between same and other. Due in large measure to the uncanny interplay
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between “insides” and “outsides” (both metaphorical and biological) that the
anthropophagic act seems to entail (Kilgour; Cottom) cannibals are particularly apt
figures for the work of establishing group identity: the dismemberment of the human
body for consumption makes external (human viscera) that which should remain internal,
and the act of eating further internalizes (human flesh) that which, by common
membership in a species, is already “inside.” Understood as a violation of group identity,
the cannibal exists just on the other side of what is acceptable to humanity, and yet, this
figure is still undeniably human. This conceptual crossing of “insides” and “outsides” is
why the cannibal can stand at the same time, as “a limit of the exotic” (Célestin 37) and
as a “metaphor of political inclusion” (Z. Nunes 23). It is also why Montaigne could use
the cannibal as the “outside ground” from which to launch a critique of French society,
while still expelling the American other from the “inner circle” of his essay’s closing
rejoinder: “ils ne portent point de haut-de-chausses” ‘they wear no pants.’ The power of
cannibal tropes is their ability to move, pointing to the line where self and other divide
and differentiate, but never clearly designating who is “in” and who is “out.”
Cannibalism’s mobility—and mutability—has given rise to various models for
conceptualizing its function in the European imaginary, many of which take recourse to
terms from linguistic semiotics. Zita Nunes calls cannibalism a “mobile metaphor” (23)
while Carlos Jáuregui denotes it a “palimpsestic sign” that often functions as “the
specular trap of difference” (28). Lestringant calls it a “universal symbol” (68) or a
“moveable sign, a signifier which can cover the most varied signifieds” (71). Sanborn
distinguishes between the two psycho-linguistic functions for the cannibal: “the warmth
of the savage symbol”—familiar notions of a cultural other that is safe because he is
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constructed as a caricature of otherness—and the “coolness of the savage sign,” which
promises a Lacanian “missed encounter” with an alterity that is genuinely alien to us and
hence always slipping from our grasp, unknowable and unreachable (Sign 175). Within
this field of signs, symbols and metaphors, why do I turn to translation?
One of the main reasons is bi-directionality. A sign, by definition, signifies within
a speech community.12 By contrast, translation as a procedure acknowledges by default
the possibility of meaning across both sides of a linguistic or cultural divide (and here I
use the term “translation” both in the specific sense of the interlingual literary translation
that is the object of study in the field of Translation Theory, and also in a broader
application for the cultural and conceptual (mis)encounters that occur in the meeting of
heterogenous actors and systems.) To translate, one must translate something; there is a
fundamental acknowledgement that a portion of text produced within a (linguistic,
cultural, conceptual) system that is different from one’s own is worthy of attention; that
is, it is valid.
The effort to rethink anthropological comparisons represented by the ontological
turn has yielded a variety of new conceptual tools for the process of doing anthropology.
As Castro (and the current generation of anthropologists who were influenced by him
along with Marilyn Strathern) moves from a traditional anthropological model based on
ethnographic description to the development of a procedure for comparing concepts, a
drastic shift of what constitutes anthropology’s object takes place. No longer the people,
but their thought, no longer description, but comparison; a process that undermines the
universality of concepts and thus creates a new concept of the concept. How might these
tools, developed in the discipline of anthropology for the process of cultural translation,
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come to bear on the analogous field of literary translation, particularly as regards
translations that require an encounter with an obscure cultural other?
In the decades that have followed the ontological turn, the research of
anthropologists working with Lowland Amerindian tribes in northwestern Brazil has been
responsible for some of the turn’s most ambitious and controversial theories. Among
these is Amerindian Perspectivism, a term coined by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and
Tania Stolze Lima to refer to an ontology founded not on a principle of Being (as is the
case with Western philosophy) but rather on position (i.e., perspective) within a diverse
community of selves belonging to different species. Perspectivism as a theoretical model
for an alternative, relational ontology has gone on to influence a new generation of
anthropologists, and not only those working among with Amerindian groups in the
lowland Amazonian context (Vilaça, Lima, Fausto, Saez) but also in the upper Amazon
in Ecuador (Kohn) and the Andes (Cadena). Not coincidentally, the theory of
Perspectivism arose from ethnographic elaborations of a complex cosmology behind the
social structures and practices, including endo- and exo-cannibalism, of surviving Tupi
groups.13
The growing body of ethnographic and theoretical work focused on Perspectivism
has provided a significantly revised understanding of what cannibalism “means” to those
who practice[d] it.14 A thorough examination of the methods and modes of fieldwork that
have produced this work lies beyond the scope of my dissertation; that said, there is good
reason to bring this current of ethnographic research to bear on my own ideas about
translation.15 In the first place, it is worth asking how recent theoretical tools developed
in the discipline of anthropology—a field whose foundational method comprises an act of
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cultural translation, often carried out by way of linguistic translation—might help Luso-
Brazilianists to articulate methods of literary translation.16 These “tools” consist largely
of reframing the cultural “Other” as a co-participant in the collaborative process of
theorizing what happens when people from different communities meet and interact. This
amounts to working not only in a reflexive way but also in a co-constructive one—to
move beyond merely wondering how the anthropological “object” sees the
anthropological “subject” to embedding the process of actively “working things out” into
the ethnographic text. This includes accounting for how native collaborators (whether
they live in San Francisco or the Amazon) view and interpret the process and making
sure the result of that process squares with the conceptual tools they bring to the table. To
take an example, one might say that E. E. Evans Pritchard’s mid-century studies of the
Azande and the Nuer are unquestionable landmarks of anthropological analysis (The
Nuer; Witchcraft), but they are also works from a now-distant disciplinary past
(Hutchison). What happens for Translation Studies when we listen to an alternative
idea—put together with the alternative concepts of “meaning” and “relation” that
underscore Viveiros de Castro’s descriptions of Araweté thinking—of what comprises a
translation? This is what the last section of this chapter asks. What would that sort of
“cannibal translation” look like?
Non-European cultures, it seems obvious to say, do not necessarily share Western
metaphysical descriptions about how the world works. What is most at issue for
anthropology’s ontological turn—and hence, as I will argue, for translation—is that non-
Western cultures who do not share Eurocentric points of view, even about the most
“basic” of concepts, like what a “world” and a “view” are, are not for that “bereft” of
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understanding. In fact, the alternative concepts of “world” and “view” that they possess
can help those steeped in European thought to understand better their own views of the
world and even modify those views along with corresponding disciplinary practices. It
follows from this that if one is to understand what “cannibalism” means (assuming that it
refers to a human self eating a human other), it is necessary to understand what a
“cannibal” understands by concepts such as “self,” “human,” and “other.” The same logic
applies also to “cannibal translation,” insofar as this involves the making of meaning in
relation to the verbal expression of an Other. Given this, Viveiros de Castro’s essay on
anthropology and translation is of particular value.
It is also worth pointing out from the outset that both theoretical and common-
sense notions of translation share an understanding of the process as “imperfect.” That is,
both notions openly acknowledge that there are gains and losses, and they assume that
translation necessarily involves the shifts and displacements of meaning: the truism that
“something is lost in translation” is precariously counter-balanced by the many residues
(both ameliorative and harmful) that are “gained” in that act. Translation acknowledges
its limits; it has theories for its own slippages and partial failures. Making the lack of
correspondence between cultural and linguistic systems the object of inquiry is the
advance of the postcolonial branch of Translation Studies in which Spivak’s essay
participates, as well as the “new anthropology” of the ontological turn in which Viveiros
de Castro’s anthropological theory of comparison intervenes. This means that there is
room within translation for the “partial fails” entailed by every communicative act, every
encounter. A true recognition of incommensurability requires a revised theory of
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translation; one that will rely, as we will see, on the facilitation of an experience rather
than on the calcification of a hermeneutics.
This aspect of “imperfection” is amplified to an extreme degree in the
epistemological schema that Viveiros de Castro attributes to Perspectivist thinking, where
he asserts that for the Araweté the basic building block of thinking is an awareness of all
semiosis (both what we would call symbolic and non-symbolic representation) as
essentially, inescapably based in “mis-translation.” Given all this, the question of why we
find the cannibal lurking around translation studies may have to do not only with its
mobility and mutability in the context of European thought. Instead, Viveiros de Castro’s
formulations would seem to suggest that cannibals and translations have always been
imbricated in ways that remain to be fully articulated in the field of cultural studies.
This reformulation is both ethical and theoretically effective. It is ethical, because
it re-theorizes a fundamental feature of the colonial encounter from the perspective of
those that had the most to lose from the “failures” of translation that ensued from it. It is
more effective because, as a concept explicitly derived from the site of the encounter
between anthropologist and indigenous groups and between Western and non-Western
thought, controlled equivocation explicitly theorizes those mistranslations rather than
viewing them as an unfortunate residue of an “imperfect” operation.
By using Viveiros de Castro’s work to illuminate a broader trajectory of
translations for the cannibal, I join contemporary anthropologists in treating “the
suppositions of Amerindian cosmology not only as demanding a critique of ostensibly
universal Western concepts but also as a possible and actual basis for our own thinking,
and thus too as the products of people(s) who ought to be acknowledged as having a
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status equal to that of practitioners of modern science” (Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics
12). This approach also makes some inroads with respect to the dilemma expressed by
Myra Jehlen in an exchange with Peter Hulme in 1993. It was at this time that the “first
wave” of reinterpretations of cannibal tropes threatened, in Jehlen’s view, to focus solely
on deconstructing the Western discourse of “the savage” rather than on the historical
reality of indigenous peoples. As she puts it, “if we do not join the undoing of the term
cannibalism with doing the history of anthropophagy, [then] the people whom the myth
of cannibalism misrepresents, instead of emerging more truly when the myth has been
dispersed, disappear altogether” (Jehlen 189). It is worth acknowledging here that there is
no monolithic or homogenous body of “indigenous thought,” and that the fifteenth-
century Caribs whose “rights” to self-definition Jehlen defends are not the same as the
twentieth-century Araweté whose self-narration gives rise to Viveiros de Castro’s
formulations. With this in mind, however, I wish to tease out a bit the implications of
Jehlen’s point.
At the end of his analysis of the evolving and intertwining application of cannibal
tropes in Latin America over the course of five hundred years, Carlos Jáuregui ends with
a concern similar to that of Jehlen. The “palimpsestic superimposition” (540) of several
species of tropological “cannibals” (colonial cannibals, Calibán, and antropofagia
cultural) and their many iterations in Latin American cultural production creates a “tejido
intricado” that requires, in the case of Jáuregui’s monograph, 600 pages to begin to
unravel. For Jáuregui, the true alterity of the cannibal (which he refers to as caníbal-
Calibán, in acknowledgment of the interconnected and transvalued representations that
create the Latin American “cannibal complex”), remains exterior to and inapprehensible
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by academic studies focused on what Jehlen terms “the European imaginary.” As
Jáuregui puts it: “That is why, after having exhauseted the cartographies of Canibalia, he
inevitably, fatally escapes us” (604). Jáuregui nevertheless ends on a utopian note, by
signaling “the usefulness of the Calibán-caníbal complex as a tool for instigating political
imagination, as a form for imagining the unsayable Others who are waiting, in some dark
corner, for their moment as the center of institutionalized academic study” (604). As the
figure of Otherness par excellence, Jáuregui suggests that the caníbal-Calibán skirts the
confines of “institutions of knowledge […] like a teasing, threatening figure [un
amenazador ñam ñam] from the exteriority that postmodernity negates” (604).
Jáuregui’s escaping cannibal—the figure for an alternative (to) modernity that the
author associates with “the elusive utopia” (604), has much in common with the cannibal
that Harris tries to conjure via “transubstantiation in reverse.” The remainder of this
chapter traces the appearance of the cannibal in the field of Translation Studies, from its
first iteration as colonial threat, to its appropriation as a figure for post-colonial defiance,
and finally as the suggestion of a Perspectivist Other—an alien subjectivity always just
out of reach, reminding us that all translation is at its core “mis-translation.
Cannibal Relations in Translation (Studies)
The first appearance of the cannibal in Translation Studies tracks closely to the
colonial tropes outlined above, where it circles around both the dangers and the allure of
the exotic. Despite the imperial overtones and explicit Eurocentrism that runs through
George Steiner’s After Babel (1975), contemporary scholars tend to view this
groundbreaking work of translation theory as a precursor to the development of the
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specifically post-colonial branch of Translation Studies. This is so because the study was
one of the first in the field of literary translation to problematize power relations between
texts and cultural traditions as a central feature of literary translation. Nevertheless, even
the names of the four steps of Steiner’s “Hermeneutic Motion,” the fifth chapter of his
book, figure the translational process in terms that mimic colonial desires, aggression and
fears. The first and final steps (“Trust” and “Restitution,” respectively) register both an
inclination toward alterity, a value that attracts and that will be “borrowed” from a text,
and a debt that this “borrowing” incurs. These two benign-sounding steps, however,
bookend the more violent processes at the Motion’s core: “Aggression,” where “the
translator invades, extracts and brings home,” and “Incorporation.” These two procedures
implicitly invoke the colonial threat of cannibalism.
As Steiner’s description of the “incorporative” step continues, he addresses the
asymmetrical relations of power by way of cultural examples that evoke the figure of the
savage while also expressing the colonial anxiety that anthropologist Gananath
Obeyesekere’s uses to distinguish between “anthropophagy” (“an actual practice which
may take place in all societies under conditions of stress or as a feature of rituals”) and
“cannibalism” (the “European fantasy the other is going to eat us”) (14). Expressions of
the allure of the exotic (acts of translation are said to “add to our means; we come to
incarnate alternative energies and resources of feeling” (Steiner 314) give way to the
risks of drawing too near to alterity: “The dialectic of embodiment entails that we may be
consumed […] we may be mastered and made lame by what we have imported. There are
translators in whom the vein of personal, original creation goes dry…because the voice of
the inhaled text had come to choke their own” (315-16).
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Steiner’s cautions his reader regarding the risk of foreign influence, and this is not
far from the complex that drove Andrade’s 1928 rebellion against a Brazilian literary
tradition that he read as subpar and subservient to European models. Andrade dates his
Manifesto in relation to the date on which the Tupinamba consumed the Bishop of
Sardinha. In doing so, he reminds us that the threat of cannibalism to the West is that the
colonial “prey” (the native that is to become the vassal of the Empire) will turn the tables
and become the hunter. The foreign vitality—text, land or people—that was to be
appropriated to fuel the home machine has the potential to overpower the Western self.
As scholars of the Global South began to assert a different position for the cultural
production of “subaltern” cultures, colonial models of understanding the cannibal in
relation to translation such as Steiner’s quietly evaporated, making way for the
transvalued cannibal proposed by Brazilian antropofagia. With “Da razão
antropofágica,” Haroldo de Campos gleefully revives Andrade’s vengeful cannibal: the
colonial subject who, sometimes playfully and sometimes pointedly, rejects not the “gift”
itself of European civilization, but the terms of the exchange.17 As Campos envisions the
legacy of antropofagia for his theory:
Oswald’s “Anthropophagy” is a theory proposing the critical devouring of
universal cultural heritage, formulated not from the insipid, resigned
perspective of the ‘noble savage’ […] but from the point of view of the
“bad savage,” devourer of whites – the cannibal. The latter view does not
involve a submission (an indoctrination), but a transculturation, or, better,
a “transvalorization:” a critical view of History as a negative function (in
Nietzsche’s sense of the term), capable of appropriation and of
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expropriation, de-hierachization, deconstruction. Any past which is an
“other” for us deserves to be negated. We could say that it deserves to be
eaten, devoured. (160)
Whereas Steiner ultimately neutralizes the threat to the translator of extreme alterity,
Campos seizes that threat, actualizes it and transvalues the outcome. Campos’s cannibal
stakes a place for himself in an alimentary system where relations between the consumer
and the consumed are not only leveled, but recursively circular. In doing so, he furthers
an important aspect of Andrade’s formulation, namely that original thought had long
been filtering to Europe from the Americas: “Sem nós a Europa não teria sequer a sua
pobre declaração dos direitos do homem” (Andrade 3).
Campos extends the fulfillment of the project of antropofagia cultural from fact
to awareness. As he argues, not only would “New World thought” continue to inform and
infiltrate the supposedly monolithic tradition, as it had done for centuries, but Europe
must inevitably become conscious of its role as cultural recipient: “Europeans must learn
to live together with the new barbarians who, for some time, in an alternative and
different context, have been devouring them and making them flesh of their flesh and
bone of their bone. They have long been resynthesizing them chemically, through an
impulsive and uncontrollable metabolism of difference” (173). Throughout the essay,
Campos uses extended metaphors of digestion to designate processes of artistic influence
that are non-hierarchical and non-ethnocentric. Rather than a model of intellectual
production that holds European art and philosophy as the gold standard of originality and
viability, with “new world barbarian” thinkers capable only of stale regurgitations,
Campos proposes that “old world” productions serve as the fuel for new and innovative
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artistic gestures. Finally, Campos declares, this New World differential otherness will be
force-fed to the center: “The logocentric writers, who imagined themselves to be the
privileged master of a proud one-way koine, must prepare themselves for the increasingly
urgent task of re-devouring the differential marrow of the new barbarians” (177). By
twisting the food chain into a knot, the ex-centric savage seizes subjecthood from the
European conqueror precisely by a sly remaking of that conqueror in his own
cannibalistic image.
Antropofagia, Translation, and Post-Coloniality
The resurgence in the 1990s of Antropofagia in the context of postcolonial
Translation Studies was notable, not only insofar as it represented a much-deserved
international recognition of Andrade’s work and the Brazilian artistic corpus it inspired,
but because one might propose that an international interest in a Brazilian theory of
cultural differentiation essentially fulfills one of the movement’s core predictions. In her
introduction to a 1999 essay describing Haroldo de Campos’s theory, Else Pires Vieira
presents the following lament about the critical re-interpretation of Antropofagia:
As with any rich offering, satisfaction can be accompanied by surfeit or
excess. Such may be the case for the world's digestion of the Brazilian-
derived metaphor of anthropophagy [...] Antropofagia has become a too
quickly swallowed body of thought, a word devoured literally and not
digested as a complex metaphor undergoing metamorphoses in different
contexts and critical perspectives. (95)
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In Vieira’s view, Andrade’s formulation of cultural anthropophagy has been mis-
translated when taken out of its home context. We are to understand that “the world’s
digestion of the Brazilian-derived metaphor” has resulted in interpretations that are over-
simplified, reduced to the “literal” referent of anthropophagy (presumably, in an idea to
which I will return later, that referent is “furious eating”) when in fact “Antropofagia,
[…] in Haroldo de Campos’ view, is a sign of the polyphonic identity of Brazil, [and it]
rings not a note of furious aggression but rather one of irreverently amorous devouring.
Deriving from a non-Eurocentric way of conceiving spiritual force as inseparable from
matter, related to the local natives’ animism, it ultimately entails a tribute to the other’s
strength that one wishes to have combined with one’s own for greater vitality” (96).
Somewhat paradoxically, Vieira’s essay takes part in (although presumably as a
corrective) the very “world digestion” of antropofagia that she questions. The essay
appears in English, in a volume specifically devoted to the politics of translating within a
context of hierarchical relations between cultures. In their introduction to this volume,
Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi choose Campos’s theory as a model for post-colonial
translation in general. The cannibal thus moves through this chain of interpretations and
re-interpretations to emerge as the post-colonial translator par excellence: the procedures
of a supposedly cannibalistic relation between texts and traditions plays out on the level
of the volume and on that of the essay. The conceptual impoverishment that (in many
ways rightly) alarms Vieira in the case of Antropofagia is but another instance of the
trajectory described in the first part of this chapter. As it turns out, the mis-en-abyme on
view in Vieira’s statement is part of a chain of infinite regress that, to paraphrase the old
commonplace, is nothing but mistranslations all the way down.
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Following Vieira, many studies have qualified the view that Campos’s
translational practices are demonstrably “anthropophagic.” Célia Andrade Prado points
out that it was Campos’s brother, fellow critic and concrete poet Augusto, who claimed
the term for his own relation to foreign texts: “My way of loving them is to swallow
them, according to Oswald de Andrade’s Anthropophagic Law” while Haroldo de
Campos never used the term to refer directly to his own translations (A. Campos 7; C.
Prado 95-6). Haroldo de Campos echoed his brother’s language in his essay on cultural
(mis)appropriation, calling literary production in Latin America a process of “deglutição”
‘swallowing,’ a term Vieira ties tightly to Campos’s descriptions of his literary
translational praxis as “transcriação” ‘transcreation,’ “transtextualização,”
‘transtextualization,” and “uma transfusão de sangue” ‘a blood transfusion,’ neologisms
that all invoke anthropophagic metaphors of creative consumption and vitality (Vieira 96-
97). Campos also borrows from his brother Augusto the idea that seventeenth-century
Bahian poet Gregório de Matos is Brazil’s first anthropophagic poet: “the first
experimental cannibal in our poetry” (H. Campos 165).
What makes Matos’s poetry (which is itself a translation or appropriation of a
long lineage of Iberian poetic forms) “anthropophagic,” Campos says, is its character as
“a double speech of the other as difference” (165). Campos also points out the poet’s
endeavor “to speak a code of alterities and to speak it in an altered state,” and his efforts
to speak “the difference in the gaps of the universal code” (165-6). For Campos, then, the
anthropophagic work carries the trace of difference in the body of its text. Is this process
analogous to Harris’s “transubstantiation in reverse?”
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Robert de Brose’s study of the Portuguese translation of Homer’s Iliad upon
which Campos worked between 1990 and 2007 offers a clue to this question. Brose seeks
to explore to what extent Campos’s Iliada, as the result of the translational practice
denominated “transcriação,” can help us “to understand aspects of the Homeric poem that
would otherwise remain obscure to the reader unversed in Greek” (loc. 2897, italics
mine). Campos’s version of the Iliad was initially criticized by Brazilian scholars of
Greek who remained “faithful to the principles of classical philology […] but [had] little
knowledge of the theoretical premise for Campos’s translational project” (Brose loc.
2880). These specialists found his “alternative reading” to be linguistically “inexact”
(Brose loc 2880). Departing from philological exactness, Campos focused instead on
creating what he termed an “isomorphic” version of the Iliad; one that recognizes the
cultural specificity of what Jakobson would call its formal plane: “For the Greeks,
‘poetry’ differed from ‘speech’ on account of the presence of rhythm and melody;
specifically, by the interplay of long and short syllables arranged according to sequential
patterns of contrast between the two” (loc 2914). Brose continues:
When Haroldo de Campos says that the source text and the translation will
“co-crystallize into a self-same system” he is alluding to the fact that the
translator must understand the rules governing said system, the ones that
are operative within the original text, in order to applky them to the
transposition of sense (which, to make a point, is never simply semantic in
poetry) into the receiving language. In order to do this, however, the
translator must know not only how to trace the delicate clockwork
mechanisms of the original (that is, to make use of its
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metapoetic/linguistic function), but more importantly, that he be capable
of listening to the rhythm of its gears, the velocity of its internal workings,
the machine work that gives it life. Elements such as these lie so far
beyond the sum of a text’s dictionary meanings, rooted instead in the deep
and silent waters of what, within the arrangement of its signs, is non-
verbal. (loc 2926)
What Campos translated, if not the “dead letter” of Homer’s text, was its music. He
privileges the structure and rhythm of the Portuguese lines, rather than the semantic
content of individual words or even full passages. And this produces a different kind of
“fidelity” to the original: an attempt to capture its escaping music. That is, the process of
transcriação captures something inherent to the text that over time became ephemeral, as
the context that produced it vanished into the past, the fading of the sung word into the
dead letter of the text. This is precisely what de Brose refers to as the elements that would
“remain obscure” to the reader “unversed in Greek;” they arguably also remain obscure
to the philological reader of the “dead text.” The new, “transcreated” text is, like Harris’s
bone flute, the result of a process of “transubstantiation in reverse,” where the ephemeral
becomes material and the material carries with it the seed of escaping alterity (the Greek
song, the cannibal’s music) with the power to transform the receiver.
If, as Brose proposes, Haroldo de Campos captures the essential alterity of the
Ancient Greeks—their reliance on oral, rhythmic language—by reproducing the interplay
of syllables and silence of Homer’s epic, Spivak focuses on a different music, namely,
what “in more workaday language I have called the obligation of the translator to juggle
the rhetorical silences in the two languages” (220). What Spivak calls a text’s
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“rhetoricity” refers to that which language performs outside of itself, in its interstitial
silences: “Poststructuralism has shown some of us a staging of the agent within a three-
tiered notion of language (as rhetoric, logic, silence). [As translators] we must attempt to
enter or direct that staging, as one directs a play, as an actor interprets a script. That takes
a different kind of effort from taking translation to be a matter of synonym, syntax and
local color” (203).
In many ways, Spivak’s concerns for the cultural specificity of the text parallels
the driving force of Campos’s transcreation of Homer. It is noteworthy, however, to
distinguish Spivak’s translational perspective from Campos’s, in that the former stands
on the “other end” of the relation between Europe and the Global South; from translating
non-European texts into European languages. Spivak’s main concern for what is “lost in
translation” is this: “without a sense of the rhetoricity of language, a species of neo-
colonialist construction of the colonial scene is afoot […] this happens when all the
literature of the Third World gets translated into a sort of with-it translatese that erases all
the differences between authors and identities” (203-04). When Spivak uses Harris’s
cannibal flute to conjure that which would otherwise remain obscure for the audience of a
translation, her concern is, like Jehlen’s, for the people misrepresented by the “colonial
fantasies” of the West.
Spivak’s invocation of the cannibal stands for the “traditions and situations that
remain obscure because we cannot share their linguistic construction […]. If we say
things should be accessible to us, who is this ‘us’? What does that sign mean?” (379-80).
Spivak’s use of Harris’s flute suggests that we can view the cannibal as another example
of the effort to communicate with alterity in extremis (Spivak elsewhere uses the example
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of the extraterrestrial), whereby “absolute alterity or otherness is differed-deferred into an
other self who resembles us, however minimally, and with whom we can communicate”
(370-71).
The historical specificity of Spivak’s Other points us back toward Roberto
Schwarz’s critique of Antropofagia: “How can one fail to notice that the Antropófagos—
like the nationalists—take as their subject the abstract Brazilian, with no class
specifications?” (9). Campos’s cannibal is similarly metaphorical. When he writes, for
example, that “for some time, the devouring jaws of these new barbarians,” among whom
he counts Gregório de Matos, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Jorge Luis Borges, Alfonso
Reyes, and Mário de Andrade, “have been chewing up and ‘ruining’ a cultural heritage
that is ever more planetary” (174), the ironic edge of his prose is that these historical
figures are clearly not “primitives,” only that they are “savage” in their refusal to bow
down to a Western tradition that would like to exclude their contributions or to insist that
the New World thinker is only capable of stale regurgitations of innovative European
thought. Campos uses “barbarian” ironically to point out European ethnocentrism;
however, he does so not out of any commitment to actual indigenous people or to the
objective of using native thinking to dismantle European power. His goal is to carry out a
European interpretation of indigenous practices; however, he inverts the perceived value
of both as a way to gain a foothold for elite Latin American intellectuals on the stage of
“universal” cultural production.
If Campos’s project of anthropophagic translation ultimately comes up short,
what of value is there in Spivak’s theories on the cultural translation that inheres in
linguistic transfer? Perhaps more to the point, how do these theories (developed in
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Manhattan) relate to the notion of translation derived by Viveiros de Castro from his
fieldwork in the Amazon? When we try, like Jáuregui, to imagine the perspective of the
historical cannibal and realize that he escapes us, or when Spivak urges us to imagine the
perspective of the effaced colonial Other through the figure of the cannibal while
realizing that one cannot quite do so, it is in fact tempting to say that we are practicing a
version of Viveiros de Castro’s controlled equivocation. Is this, however, the case?
Spivak’s explicit invocation of the cannibal in “The Politics of Translation” is
quite brief, consisting of the passage I cited in the introduction and a short, counter-
Hegelian interpretation of the relationship between the “spirit” (the flute music) and the
“bone” (the flute itself), to which I have already alluded. But the idea made clear in the
action of “turning the flute around” to “consume our biases” participates in a longer
series of formulations. These attempt in various ways to figure Spivak’s view of the
relationship a translator should have with her text (and with the subjectivity behind the
production of that text) as she enters into to the endeavor of creating with them a new
meaning. This is particularly true, as I stated in the introduction, when the source text
communicates a subjectivity that does not coincide with that of the translator’s audience,
and where the translation runs the risk of erasing or leaving behind the aspects that mark
that difference. Spivak’s attitude of concern, played out upon a background of the
remnants of the colonial regime—unequal material conditions and a disdain for
nonwestern modes of thinking—constitute the “politics” of her translation.
How should a translator relate to the text in this context? The “mutual psyche”
between self and other that Harris proposes as arising from cannibal music, and that
Schiess 138
Campos pursued in a more self-actualizing way, loses its aggressive edge in Spivak’s
essay:
Language is not everything. It is only a vital clue to where the self loses its
boundaries. The ways in which rhetoric or figuration disrupt logic
themselves point at the possibility of random contingency, beside
language, around language. Such a dissemination cannot be under our
control. Yet in translation, where meaning hops into the empty spaciness
between two named historical languages, we get perilously close to it […]
Although every act of reading or communication is a bit of this risky
fraying which scrambles together somehow, our stake in agency keeps the
fraying down to a minimum except in the communication of and in love.
(What is the place of “love” in the ethical?) The task of the translator is to
facilitate [a] love between the original and its shadow, a love that permits
fraying [of meaning], holds the agency of the translator and the demands
of her imagined audience at bay (202).
Not expecting that a translated text should speak the “with-it translatese” of World
Literature, while also not expecting that author, text, translator and audience should
belong to the same grand cultural tradition, the same world with the same concepts, is
how Spivak’s formulation takes us from Campos’s guiltless “deglutição” ‘swallowing,’
to what Viveiros de Castro calls controlled equivocation, then—to know (and show that
one knows) that the perspective of the Other is other. Spivak herself seems to point the
way: “Tracking commonality through responsible translation can lead us into areas of
difference and different differentiations” (216).
Schiess 139
A final example of how Viveiros de Castro defines controlled equivocation can
help to determine whether there is in fact some sort of practical application or footing
available to translators looking to incorporate perspectivism into their work. In
“Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled Equivocation,” Viveiros de
Castro explains the fundamental difference between Western and Perspectivist relational
systems—systems of translation—with an example of an equivocal homonym. As he
points out, the Cashinahua, indigenous people living in Western Brazil near the border
with Peru, use the word txai as a term of affinity. One might readily translate this term of
intimacy as “brother,” but Viveiros de Castro warns that this would be a mistake:
The powerful Western metaphors of brotherhood privilege certain (not all)
logical properties of this relation. What are siblings, in our culture? They
are individuals identically related to a third term, their genitors or their
functional analogs. The relation between two siblings derives from their
equivalent relation to an origin which encompasses them and whose
identity identifies them. This common identity means that siblings occupy
the same point of view onto an exterior world; deriving their similitude
from a similar relation to a same origin, they will have ‘parallel’ relations
(to use an anthropological image) to everything else. […] Two partners in
any relation are defined as connected in so far as they can be conceived to
have something in common, that is, as being in the same relation to a third
term. To relate is to assimilate, to unify, to identify. (18)
In a model built on the “brotherly” relation, “to translate is to isolate what the discourses
share in common, something which is only ‘in them’ because it is (and was already
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before them) ‘out there;’ the differences between the discourses amount to no more than
the residue which precludes a ‘perfect translation,’ that is, an absolute identificatory
overlap between them. To translate is to presume redundancy” (19-20). By contrast, “the
common word for the relation, in Amazonian worlds, is the term translated by ‘brother-
in-law’ and/or ‘cross-cousin.’ This is the term we call people we don’t know what to call,
those with whom we wish to establish a generic relation. In sum, ‘cousin/brother-in-law’
is the term which creates a relation where none existed; it is the form through which the
‘unknown’ is made known” (18). There are significant implications to this difference, as
Viveiros de Castro points out:
My relation with my brother-in-law is based on my being in another kind
of relation to his relation with my sister or my wife. The Amerindian
relation is a difference of perspective. While we tend to conceive the
action of relating as a discarding of differences in favor of similarities,
indigenous thought sees the process from another angle: the opposite of
difference is not identity but indifference (19).
What Spivak seems to be after, then, fits the model of an “affinal” translation where, in
the words of Viveiros de Castro, difference serves as a “condition of signification and not
a hindrance” (20). In an “affinal” translation based on the differential relation of the
brother-in-law, connections are based not on identity and equivalence, but on
approximation and difference:
The image of the social connection is not that of sharing something in
common (a something-in-common acting as foundation), but, on the
contrary, that of the difference between the terms of the relation, or better,
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of the difference between the differences which constitute the terms of the
relation—then a relation can only exist between what differs and in so far
as it differs. In this case, translation becomes an operation of
differentiation—a production of difference which connects the two
discourses to the precise extent to which they are not saying the same
thing, in so far as they point to discordant exteriorities beyond the
equivocal homonyms between them. (italics mine, 20)
In other words, my relation to a “brother-in-law” is predicated on a differential relation
both to him and to some third term. He may be the spouse of my sister, or he may be the
brother of my spouse. Here there is only relationality and ambiguity rather than the
implied base of sameness contained within a relation of brotherhood, fictive or not. It is
worth pointing out here that a feminist theorist such as Spivak will likely note the
absence of a female perspective in Viveiros de Castro’s formulation, where the wife
serves merely as the point of the differential relation between two “brothers-in-law.”
Nevertheless, the parallels with Spivak’s politics of translation—aimed specifically at
texts by “Third World” women—are clear insofar as difference and ambiguity becomes
the very “condition of signification” rather than an obstacle.
What are the practical implications of Viveiros de Castro’s differential cannibal
for the practice of translation? What are the contours of translational poetics of the
“brother-in-law”? Campos and Spivak each hold up an ideal for translation as the
creation of a text that defies the expectations of the home audience for a familiar
sameness and performs the task of crystallizing an escaping alterity. Campos’s
formulations seem to offer more certainty that the task can be achieved, while Spivak
Schiess 142
presents it as a goal to be pursued even if never completed. For both, however, the
cannibal stands as its (untranslatable yet visible) trace. Viveiros de Castro’s early
ethnography of Araweté culture provides another formulation that attends to the
importance of pursuing the perspective of the Other even as he argues that this project
relies upon an infinite array of deflections and differentiation to function. Like Gilles
Deleuze’s baroque folds, there are only constantly evolving acts of creation,
decomposition, and re-creation along other meridians.
A differential theory of “cannibal translation” inevitably leads one to an
unsolvable riddle. If this sort of translation requires one to privilege process over product,
how can that be squared with the translator’s responsibility to produce a translated text?
The cultural differences inhering in languages cannot be crystallized, and yet without the
concrete form of a new text in a new language, there is no translation. What is one to do?
Returning once again to Cobra Norato, we may examine what it means to try to
translate Raul Bopp’s experiential poetics, a poetics that attempts to take seriously
Amazonian modes of otherness, into English. It follows from this that any translation
must also take seriously these ideas and not work to resolve them into some
“comfortable” form based on the illusion of identity.
The challenge of capturing Cobra Norato’s “other voices” arises from its very
first lines. In these, “Um dia / eu hei de morar nas terras do Sem-fim” ‘One day / I’ll go
and live in those Lands of No-End,’ the last word may well underscore Bopp’s awareness
of participating in a tradition of Amazonian writing. In particular, one might note that the
phrase “terras do Sem-fim” ‘Lands of No-End’ parallels the observation made by
Euclides da Cunha in his posthumously published “Impressões gerais” ‘General
Schiess 143
impressions’ (part of his larger collection, À margem da história (At the Margin of
History, 1909). In that essay, he writes on his experience in the Amazon: “em poucas
horas o observador […] sente que o seu olhar se abrevia nos sem-fins daqueles horizontes
vazios e indefinidos como o dos mares” ‘within a few hours the observer […] feels that
their view is cut off in the endlessness (no-ends) of those empty and indefinite horizons
like those of the seas’ (3)18. In this case, sem-fim refers to the sensory overload (or
perhaps, underload) imposed by the sheer unchanging depths of the Amazonian
landscape. This is a singular experience, and it is one that Bopp shares in a nod to his
literary predecessor.19
The sem-fim reference also has another local referent beyond topographical
description. Sem-fim is one of a number of a popular names for the Tapera naevia
(striped cuckoo), a bird native to Amazonia whose calls resemble, for local inhabitants,
the voices of human spirits.20 The choice of this description for the world that the poem’s
narrator is about to enter may, in this case, prefigure Bopp’s creation of an interspecies
polyphony where the voices of humans, plants, animals and enchanted beings mix and
proliferate. Bopp’s original phrase performs something akin to Campos’s anthropophagic
transcreation: it wraps together a lettered tradition and local specificity, both of which
may easily be lost in the translation of his text into yet another language and cultural
context.
In the case of sem-fim, are the term’s ephemeral resonances in fact “mere”
information (intertextual references, local lore) or are they an index of something more
radically other, like the ñam-ñam figure that appears at the end of Jáuregui’s analysis and
points to “the elusive utopia”? In the end, they are both. In deciding how to signal these
Schiess 144
differences, the translator must decide how many steps to take for her reader in the
direction of alterity. One might take the approach of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “thick
translation”: a text that represents the translator's effortful attempt to capture the nuances
of contextual meaning with scores of notes and appendices and at the same time passes
the burden of lengthy interpretation on to the reader who must contend with their weight.
Conversely, one might follow the “abusive translation” of Lawrence Venuti that shares
with Campos’s transcreation a foundation in the premises of Walter Benjamin’s
translation theory: alterity is brought into the fabric of the receiving language, opening
the door to the Other by way of the reader’s sense of estrangement within her own
language. These are choices that all grapple with the differential aspects of cannibal
translation to varying degrees. The sem-fim opens up a threshold for us (not unlike for the
narrating poetic “I” of Bopp’s first line, who will someday live in its openness), and it is
up to the translator to devise a way to keep it open for the reader.
There is also the question of music and rhythm. As de Brose’s analysis of
Campos’s Iliada underscores, the internal music created by a poetic text is a common
casualty of interlinguistic translation. In Bopp’s Portuguese and Nhenhegatú (the local
term for the modern version of língua geral amazônica, Brazil’s pidgin Tupi), Cobra
Norato achieves this music through repetition, alliteration, and the irregular alternation of
long and short lines. The repetition of individual words and meanings (“andando
caminhando caminhando” ‘going along walking, walking;’ “afundando afundando”
‘sinking sinking’), for example, is typical of both Tupi speech patterns and the local
variants of the Portuguese language spoken in Amazonian regions (Buss). Lines such as
“me misturo no ventre do mato mordendo raízes” ‘I blend into the belly of the brush,
Schiess 145
biting roots;’ “faço puçanga de flor de tajá de lagoa” ‘I make a puçanga from the flower
of the tajá de lagoa;’ “sapos beiçudos espiam no escuro” ‘full-lipped frogs peer into the
darkness;’ and “um fio de água atrasada lambe a lama” ‘a string of slow-running water
licks the loam’ (among others) rely heavily on alliteration and assonance. Such poetic
features are challenging for the translator to maintain while also attempting to
communicate the semantic meaning of the words in these lines. My own English
translations attempt to recuperate some of the sonorous quality of the original, and I
deliberately leave the Tupi terms puçanga and tajá de lagoa as they appear in the original
Portuguese text, without qualification or glossing (a puçanga is a magical charm; the tajá
de lagoa is a flowering aquatic plant). The point of this is that for most readers of the
Portuguese original, these terms are likewise unknown and estranging. This, as I discuss
in the first chapter of the present dissertation, has much to do with the Bopp’s own poetic
project, but it also has to do with my own concern for the sort of cannibal translation that
works as transubstantiation in reverse:
“Transubstantiation in reverse” means that the bone flute can turn right around
and in our day and age one may suddenly be confronted with the necessity to look
deeply into oneself and to ask oneself, how can one begin to revise the images in
which one’s furies are planted, in which one’s biases are planted? How can one
begin to revise the technologies in which we lodge our furies, technologies that
we have planted around the earth and which seem immoveable? How can one
begin to revise them unless one looks very deeply into the capacity of fiction by
way of its imageries and textual perspectives to ‘consume our own biases’?
(Harris 23)
Schiess 146
Here, the Nhenhegatú deflects and bends the English as it does the Portuguese of the
original. Whether the reader trips over her own biases or consumes them, they are at least
on view.
Perhaps, then, the literary “cannibal translation” does not depend on the
production of a determined text, but on the creation of an experience: a “flickering pocket
of transcendence,” or “a transient identification of beings” (Cannibal Metaphysics 20,
187). Viveiros de Castro has used these phrases describe the meaning of the cannibal rite
for the Araweté: an incursion toward knowledge, via an ephemeral visitation of the
perspective of the Other. A perspectivist translation lies less in the textual object “out
there” (which will be in any case a different object for every reader), and more on the
disposition of the translator attuned to the impossibility of her task’s completion. To
perform something like Harris’s transubstantiation in reverse, the translator effects such a
visitation by leaving traces in the printed work that signal to the reader, like a flicker of
movement in her peripheral vision, the presence of an alterity that she cannot entirely
apprehend.
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CONCLUSION
Can the Object Speak?
The poetry, fiction, nonfiction prose, and essays that I bring together in this
dissertation all convey, in different ways, an uncanny object. Like the word “objeto” in in
Lispector’s Água viva, the objects in this dissertation point to similar problems but are
never restricted to a single type or category. Each chapter shows how different Brazilian
writers have used language to present an object that slips outside of the position of the
passive recipient and shows itself to exert an agency that, quite possibly, it has always
possessed.
The slipperiness of the objects examined so far in this dissertation might lead one
to ask what would happen if the object were to slip completely from view, leaving its
agency—in this case, the agency to withdraw—as its only remnant. A good case study of
such a fictional narrative is Sidney Rocha’s micro-narrative “googlemap,” a companion
story to the text with which I open the introduction of this dissertation and a fitting
bookend for its conclusion. In this story, which invites allegorical readings, it is quite
possible that its phantasmal objects are, to appropriate a formulation from Sharon Marcus
and Stephen Best, ghosts that are “presences, not absences” that we might just “let be
ghosts, instead of saying what they are ghosts of” (13).
Insofar as “googlemap” is a sister-story to “matriuska,” Rocha composes it in a
style very similar to that of “matriuska;” however, it also contains a modicum of
connective narrative tissue supplied, for instance, by verb phrases and indicated dialogue.
The text is broken into three brief, numbered sections, and the prose is abrupt and
choppy, written in short sentences that often, like “matriuska,” eschew capitalization.
Schiess 148
It is only by a brief narrative spur, however, that one learns that these two
characters are the same people engaged in the purse scene that makes up the narrative
“matriuska”. In contrast to “matriuska,” the main preoccupations of this second text seem
to be the broader social issues of regional and class difference. This dynamic is
exemplified by the interactions between the story’s narrator, who is revealed to be a
writer from São Paulo, and cristiane, a maid in the hotel where the story takes place. In
“googlemap,” the reader learns the context for the purse scene that comprises
“matriuska:” cristiane has a job as a maid in a hotel, she desires to be a singer or to visit
São Paulo, she makes frequent trips to the roof of the hotel to glimpse the horizon, and
she sexually propositions the narrator (one presumes unsuccessfully), who is a writer and
guest in the hotel. The nature of this background material makes it tempting to read the
story as an allegory for the neglect and light disdain with which elite Brazilian urbanites
treat the Northeastern region: it is fine for a beach vacation, but one would not want to
live there.
One reason for the interregional disdain suggested in “googlemap” is a long
history in which the Northeast has been cast as a region characterized by lack: it lacks
rain, it lacks industry, it lacks infrastructure, it lacks opportunity. In “googlemap,” a story
named for digital technology, this motif of lack points to a void. In contrast to the super-
present parade of objects in “matriuska,” the objects in “googlemap” are absent. They are
the computers and digital devices that don’t appear in a story that is named after their
capabilities. Paradoxically enough, of course, the power of these devices is that, by way
of their physical presence, one can navigate absence. The title “googlemap” itself
suggests the all-seeing eye whereby with a computer, one can digitally access seas of
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virtual data without moving from a fixed site. Despite these new capabilities, cristiane’s
power to “travel the world without leaving the room” is undeniably analog: she collects
stories about other places from her lovers and from other guests in the hotel. At times she
sleeps with guests at the hotel (hence her willingness to proposition the narrator), and it is
after these trysts and conversations (categories that sometimes overlap) that she imagines,
from a vantage point on the building’s roof, that she can “connect” to the coastal cities of
the south by following the curve of the coast with her line of vision. “Sua cidade tem
mar” ‘Does your city have an ocean?’ she asks the narrator one day while cleaning his
room:
“Se tiver, posso qualquer dia ver, lá de cima.” assim foram os dias. “Aqui
no hotel ouço as viagens que me contam. com o tempo dá pra adivinhar
quem tem pra contar. homens feito o senhor tem, eu sei.” contei algumas.
na terça, entrou no quarto e pediu para sentar na cama, “Se não for
ousadia.” sentou. “Você transaria comigo?” (78)
[“If it does, maybe one of these days I can see it from up there on the
roof.” so passed the days. “Here at the hotel, I hear about the trips that
people take. after a while you can just tell who has stories to tell. men like
you. i know you do.” so i told her a few. on tuesday, she came into the
room and asked to sit down on the bed, “If it’s not rude to ask.” she sat
down. “Would you have sex with me?”]
In the absence of her own digital device, cristiane remains bound to an imaginary rooted
in the material presence of other bodies and of physical places. That she trades sex to
engage in this version of virtual travel and also risks her employment by neglecting her
Schiess 150
duties underscores the psychic importance for this character of the transcendence of
place. The sex and the horizon-gazing are “real” in concrete terms; however, they do not
quite go the distance. Just as in “matriuska,” cristiane’s treasure remains inside the bag,
and she remains fixed within the region “donde nunca saiu, nem nunca sairá” ‘that she
had never left, and never would leave’ (77).
Given the historically (and ongoing) asymmetrical relation between Brazil’s
Southern coastal cities and its Northeast, there is good cause to read “googlemap” as an
allegory for neglect on a national order. Rocha’s published works span a transitional
period for Brazil’s poorer classes that radically changed configurations of power.
Beginning with the presidency of Labor Party leader Luís Inácio da Silva in 2002, new
federal policies such as guaranteed basic income (the Bolsa Familia) and greater access
to higher education stoked real hope for greater social mobility and political relevance for
Brazil’s poor and working classes. At the same time, the federal expansion of electrical
service into the country’s vast rural areas, followed by the dawn of the Internet age,
smartphone technology, and increased cellular service suggested the integration of
overlooked places and populations into the grid of modern connectivity. In light of the
country’s subsequent economic retraction and far-right political swing, not to mention the
disproportionate fatality rate to COVID-19 in the country’s rural areas, the long-term
promises of greater social inclusion suggested in the first fifteen years of the twenty-first
century are increasingly uncertain.
Rocha logically knew nothing of the Brazilian elections of 2018 or the global
pandemic of 2020 when he published matriuska in 2009. Nevertheless, his prose registers
a prescient skepticism toward both social mobility and the notion that the Northeastern
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region would be truly “connected” to the urban south. He goes to great pains, for
example, to show that cristiane is aware that it is social class that most separates her from
the narrator. When the narrator is struck speechless by her sexual proposition, she puts
him on the spot: “Não transa comigo porque arrumo quartos nessa merda dum hotel, né
isso?...Sou cantora também, viu?...Transe comigo. Me carregue” ‘You don’t want to
sleep with me because I clean rooms in this shit hotel, is that it? I’m a singer too, you
know. Have sex with me. Carry me away’ (78). She astutely frames her geographical
isolation in terms of a literally embodied social habitus (Bourdieu): lacking the money
and the opportunity to leave her locale, she laments in corporeal terms “não sei na pele o
que quer dizer 100 quilómetros” ‘i can’t even feel in my skin what 100 kilometers would
mean’ (77).
The readings I perform over the course of this study would suggest, however, that
an allegorical reading of “googlemap” and “matriuska” (as stories in dialogue or that
reflect one another even if at an oblique angle) falls short of the mark. After all, which of
these presents the narrator’s shift in disposition? Which of the two short stories is more
moving to the reader? In “googlemap,” absent digital devices flicker into view like
holograms of a promised connection that is never realized. A hotel maid in Brazil’s
marginal Northeast looks out at a horizon that fades into emptiness, like the holes of a
net, and all the supposed promise of digital “connectivity” (a term that Silicon Valley’s
prophets conveniently never define) dissolves into smoke that points to no fire. In
“matriuska,” on the other hand, the physical objects of the purse speak, persuade, and act
upon the narrating subject. These object-agents work upon the narrator, altering his
stance, transforming the encounter into an ethics of the object.
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The works I examine over the course of this dissertation employ a variety of
tactics to convey this shifting object position, which is often just as much a matter of a
shifting subject position. These techniques include subtle shifts in grammatical
predicates, altered vantage points, different spatial or causal relations between subject
and object that drastically change the relation between them. This ethics of the object
shapes all the works I examine, regardless of genre, because it is precisely when texts
foreground the poetic function of language that this ethics comes into view (Jakobson).
One could similarly reverse the perspective of this causal relation and say that a writer’s
uncanny encounter with an object has a distorting effect on language; it forces a turn to
the aesthetic—the unusual, reflexive use of language—in order to pack a disconcerting
experience into words. The question of who acts as the agent in this process is a relevant
one for this study.
Many times, this change plays out through a question of angles, as an observing
subject moves from one spot to another in order to gain a different perspective. This is
the case for Cobra Norato, who perambulates in circles, and for the narrator of Água viva,
who chooses her vantage point carefully in order to paint “the mirror itself.” It is also true
for the anthropologist or the literary translator who tries to “turn the flute around,” using
“native” technology to engage the other and consuming her own conceptual biases in the
process.
In tracing the move from object to agent that is woven into the language of the
texts I examine, another throughline of this dissertation comes into view. This is a
dimension that I have referred to as “ethical” in reference to the intimate scale of the
intratextual relations presented in each text. As each object exerts an unaccustomed
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agency, their observers—be they literary narrators or academics performing their
disciplinary work—have to contend with the unexpected contributions of an object that
inserts itself into the creative process as a co-participant. In light of the many kinds of
objects encompassed within the works included here, my approach takes a non-
anthropocentric view of the ethical stance as something that encompasses both human
and non-human others.
Looking at texts’ language as something that can convey a new view of—a new
disposition toward—their various objects also allows us to read these works productively
as a sub-corpus of the Brazilian canon, united by common conundrums that cut across
Brazilian history and manifest in various literary periods and genres. Rather than being
circumscribed as examples of primitivist modernism, or avant-garde subjectivism, or
disciplinary description, for example, the corpus of works collected together here are seen
for the complex ontological negotiations with alterity that they are. This trans-textual
move also allows us to think of literary ethics in the contemporary Brazilian context in a
new way. A number of studies in the field approach questions of ethics in Brazilian
literature by focusing on narratives that thematize social concerns (Lehnen, Sá,
Dalcastagné, Williams); still others emphasize the importance of considering texts by
socially marginalized groups as part of a reconsidered canon (Brandallero; Librandi, “A
carta Guarani Kaiowá;” Dias, “Creativity as Transformation”). In focusing primarily on
the trouble that many different kinds of encounters with alterity wreak upon narration,
this dissertation offers a new mode for analyzing the ways in which Brazilian authors
contend with difference.
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In the end, textual ethics necessarily fades into politics. I cite Mel Chen in my
introduction, and it bears repeating that “the sentience of a noun phrase has […]
consequences, and these consequences are never merely linguistic or grammatical, but
also deeply political” (54). A forest that can speak must be encountered and not simply
burned to make way for mining equipment. A wardrobe mirror that reflects back onto the
narrator at an inconvenient angle reminds the reader that actions only have meaning when
one asks in an honest (and necessarily fumbling) way how the Other sees the self. An
Araweté person offers a radically different concept of this relation between self and
Other, and in the process they ask, doubly, to relate differently to them. These are shifts
that have consequences that reverberate in the reader, and through her, in the world.
NOTES
1 The beginning of this shift is most often traced to Edward Said’s publication of
Orientalism (1978). This work, which is framed as a critique against academic
Eurocentrism, is a detailed examination of the rhetorical othering of non-Europeans in
works of art and scholarship that is, in the words of Leela Gandhi, “party to—indeed at
the helm of—a new philosophical skepticism in some European and American scholarly
systems, with offshoots in counterpart postcolonial settings” (ix).
2 “Angico” is the common name in Brazilian Portuguese for tress of the family
Mimosecae, while “Barbatimão” refers to the legume Stryphnodendron adstringens.
3 This context includes the end of Brazil’s rubber boom after 1912; the bottoming-out of
coffee prices two decades later in the wake of the economic crash of 1929; the resulting
depressed international economy; and the rising military aggression in Europe and Asia
Schiess 155
that Bopp could not failed to have missed as he wrote to Brazil from his post in Japan.
For more on this, see Baer; Slater (25-28); and Pizarro (110-11).
4 See, for example, the debate between anthropologists Phillipe Descola and Marshall
Sahlins in HUA; or Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin’s distinction between
anthropomorphism and “animal genres” (150-54).
5 Bopp credits Antonio Brandão de Amorim’s Lendas em nheêngatú e em portuguez, a
transcription and translation of myth fragments originally collected as his source for the
mythical figure Cobra Norato, along with representations of dialogic nature and a series
of local expressions and speech patterns. Luiz da Câmara Cascudo describes the story of
Cobra Norato as “one of the best known legends in the further North of Brazil, Amazonas
and Pará. An Indian woman was bathing in the Paraná waterfalls, […] when she became
pregnant by the Big Snake. The mother gave birth to a boy and a girl, and, following the
shaman’s advice, threw them in the river, where they grew up as water snakes. The boy,
Honorato, and the girl, Maria Caninana were always together. Norato was good and
Maria was bad (271).
6 The first use of the term “animism” in anthropology can be found in the work of
Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), who described the attribution of thought or intention
to nonhumans as “irrational, primitive and childish,” a characteristic of “the first stage of
[human] religion” according to an evolutionary model of cultural development (Praet 3).
Lucién Levy-Bruhl (1857-1939) developed an anthropological cognitive schema based
on a primitive/modern dichotomy that contradicts Tylor’s continuum. He also developed
the concept “participation” to describe the erroneous attribution of intention to animals
and objects by way of the subject’s projection of his own experience onto nonhumans, a
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concept subsequently taken up by psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Piaget’s model
for developmental cognition effectively weds Tylor’s teleological model with Levy-
Bruhl’s participation in order to pose “animism” as a stage to be overcome on the way to
individual developmental maturity (Kohler 79-80).
7 I have taken English-language citations of Lispector’s novel from Stefan Tobler’s 2012
translation, which maintained the novel’s title in the original Portuguese, while
capitalizing the second word in accordance with English-language conventions for book
titles. Earl Fitz, the novel’s first translator to English, rendered its title as Stream of Life.
8 Marília Librandi’s study adds the act of listening, figured by the giant ear, to the list of
structuring concerns that is announced by the opening paragraph of Perto do coração
selvagem (5-6).
9 Sigmund Freud’s description of the uncanny famously hinges on this interplay between
the familiar and the alien, the seen and the unseen: “the ‘uncanny’ is that class of the
terrifying which leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar […]
Heimlich thus becomes increasingly ambivalent, until it finally merged with its antonym
unheimlich. The uncanny (das Unheimliche, the unhomely) is in some way a species of
the familiar (das Heimlich, the homely)” (134). Freud’s analysis, in its ambivalent
circulating around the walls of the home (homely/unhomely, open/hidden,
familiar/unfamiliar) is thus related to the return of the repressed: “the term “uncanny”
applies to everything that was intended to remain secret, hidden away, and has come into
the open” (132).
10 For more on the uptake of this Amerindian loanword, see Erlendsdóttir 2017.
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11 Translated into English by Wolff (“The Rule of Anthropophagy”) and Cisneros
(“Anthropophagous Reason”).
12 For more on the idea of speech communities, see Gumperz; Cohen; Duranti (The
Anthropology of Intentions; Linguistic Anthropology); and Morgan.
13 Of the terms endo- and exo-cannibalism, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro notes in his
introduction to Aparecida Vilaça’s 1992 study, “Estes são rótulos, como [a autora]
reconhece, de conveniência; pois sua análise mostra justamente como o canibalismo
problematiza a separação entre o ‘dentro’ e a ‘fora,’ o ‘endo’ e o ‘exo’; e isto a meu ver
não é um dos resultados menos importantes deste trabalho” (xvii).
14 Vilaça, for instance, reports that when she began ethnographic research with the Wari’
in 1993, many elders still had clear memories of ritual anthropophagy, both funerary
(endocannibalism) and bellicose (exocannibalism). The Wari’ had been “pacified” by
local officials in 1961-62, after a decade of conflict that had begun when rubber tappers
in the area began massacring indigenous groups (Strange Enemies, 86-92).
15 In reduced form the cannibal rite, along with the practice of ritual warfare and the art of
shamanism, participate together in a system for gaining knowledge of others of various
kinds. For more on the specificities of different Amerindian groups’ understanding of
these processes, see (Viveiros de Castro, Araweté: os deuses canibais; Vilaça, O
canibalismo funerario, Comendo como gente; Fausto, War and Shamanism; Lima, Saez).
16 My focus in this chapter is on the evolving concept of “the cannibal” for Western
thinking, and the impact of these changes on theories of translations that use cannibal
tropes in their formulations. For a view from the opposite standpoint, that is, on how the
theories derived from Translation Studies and ethnopoetics can be modified in order to
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effectively and ethically translate Amerindian performative arts into the written form of
European languages, see Jamille Pinheiros Dias, “Peles de papel”.
17 Campos had, in fact, written on Antropofagia since the 1960s and 1970s: Oswald de
Andrade – Trechos escolhidos (Oswald de Andrade – Selected Passages) (1967) and
Morfologia do Macunaíma (Morphology of Macunaíma) (1973). This writing occurred in
the context of revitalizations of notions of national artistic movements such as Tropicalia
and Cinema Novo that also re-worked non-Brazilian artistic influences into distinctively
local forms, in a process that might be called anthropophagic (E. Vieira 1999).
18 Cunha’s collection was translated into English by Sousa (The Amazon: Land Without
History). The above translation is mine.
19 Bopp would not be the only Brazilian writer to use this reference: by the time of Cobra
Norato’s writing, Américo Facó had published Poesia da terra do sem fim, and in 1943
the novel Terra do sem fim was published by Jorge Amado.
20 The bird’s scientific name, incidentally, also follows a hybrid cultural construction:
“tapera” comes from the Tupi word for the class of songbirds that includes the cuckoo,
and “naevia” from the Latin for “marked, patterned.”
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REFERENCES
Appendix 1: Original Translation of “matriuska”
matriuska (Sidney Rocha, 2009)
That time we saw each other she showed me all of her personal importances: they were
photos in her wallet, the aloneness of an earring that had let its partner loose into the
world, a card with a few numbers from Manaus, in case of emergency, a pinginte di noir,
two dreams giving up the fight: going to cuba and buying a fiat (any one) by the sweat of
her brow, an airline ticket from a trip that her friend made (denmark-brazil) so as to never
go back to that gringo again, That son of a bitch, a sanitary napkin and two memories of
an abortion, a sandalwood sachet able to protect even objects from envy, a tiny amethyst
sleeping like an eye in a piece of avocado-colored velvet, use unknown, a pack of
lexotan, unused, but unused things can still give off charm, a fish-shaped buckle, but she
doesn’t like fish, though she’d like to know what sushi tastes like, But where do they sell
it? two student i.d. cards, invalid, from that pocket of time when she lived with someone.
In the outer slices of leather the little mirror that only holds the mouth’s reflex, the
lipstick a body in a hand-guilded coffin,,, and it was only then that she introduced the
thing that without a doubt, with a zero-percent risk of error would cost the most to show,
what only a few people know, but first there was the newspaper clipping, she had to get
that job, three brazilwood seeds, she didn’t know where that wristwatch with an almost-
gold band had gone, It should be here next to the. a piranha missing two teeth, yes, yes,
she was looking for something that would truly validate the existence of that bag, and
there it was, finally, as if in a matriuska or in so many layers of an onion there could be
something worth more than a life, which is what a souvenir is always worth, and that’s
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why she hunched over in pain and silence, that’s why even her breathing sounded of
abandonment, that’s why the voice falling down her throat landed dryly in the soul’s
abyss, but there it was at last, or almost, while the treasure, her treasure, sparkled, but still
she unraveled the fabric within the fabric within the and what could come into the world
as a trace or a cry, (and she is about to shatter into shards of glass over it,) and her
decision was a life-or-death decision, of giving in, of descent, that’s it exactly, of descent,
and that was when the tear fell invading the café we were in and part of the world was
liquidated in that motion, it was then that I caught her hand mid-movement, Definitively,
don’t, i said, don’t do it, save it for yourself, i said, and she looked at me like someone
who might save her and her silence redrew something around me, i don’t know what
exactly, and all of those things slowly returned themselves to her bag and within me other
things were ordered and measured, but there wasn’t a waiter in the world who would
smile at me.
Appendix 2: Original Translation of “googlemap”
Googlemap (Sidney Rocha, 2009)
1. after cristiane told me “I want to go away”, i started thinking. i was leaving that hotel
in two days. cristiane worked nights as a singer and her plan was to just disappear from
there, from that place she had never left, and never will leave. it had the sea, you could
stroll on the beach whenever you wanted, see the couples making love in the sunset over
the distant tide, but no: she needed to get out of there. “I don’t even know in my skin
what 100 kilometers means.” “A highway: I don’t know what that is.” she was with pedro
because he would tell her about a trip to são paulo, but she knew that one by heart.
“Could you tell me one?” “Any one,” she asked. “I need to go somewhere.” during the
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day, she cleaned rooms at the hotel. she’s been warned several times because they’re
always catching her on the roof, looking at the horizon-sea. “I keep looking for cities,
places, way out there. pedro said there’s no beach in são paulo, so i look for the river and
i just start going, going…” “Does your city have an ocean? if it does, maybe one of these
days i can see it form up there.” so went the days. “Here at the hotel, I hear about the trips
that people take. after a while you can just tell who has stories to tell. men like you. i
know you do.” so i told her a few. on tuesday, she came into the room and asked to sit on
the bed, “if it’s not rude to ask.” she sat. “would you have sex with me?”
2. i don’t know who would be prepared to answer her. i paused. “You don’t want to
sleep with me because I clean rooms in this shit hotel, is that it?” “No.” i explained with
all the words I had. “That’s not it.” “You’re embarrassed.” “I’m a singer too, you know.”
she smiled. “Have sex with me. Carry me away.”
3. “When are you leaving?” “In a week,” i lied. the next day a friend would take me to
the airport. I went down to the café, as early as i could. that’s when cristiane came in
through the lobby. she slid like a mermaid in an aquarium at the ocean park. she sat and
she told me her life, which became the story matriuska. never again will a woman keen
so much tenderness. i think she also wanted me to see her like this, at her best. and to be
sorry.
4. i remembered cristiane today, in this hotel in são paulo. looking out the window, i
linked my thought today to that other one, hers, saying she wanted to go away. i know
right now she’ll be at the top of the hotel, looking at the sea of possibilities in people.
from there, can she see me here? certainly. there’s no beach in são paulo, but the power
of cristiane has overcome these limits, that foolish thing the sea.
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Appendix 3: Original Translation of Cobra Norato Cobra Norato1 (Raul Bopp, 1931) I One day I’ll go and live in those Lands of No-End… I amble along, walking, walking Blending into the belly of the brush, biting roots. Later on I make a puçanga from the tajá de lagoa and send someone to get the Cobra Norato. “Let me tell you a story. Come walk with me in those low-slung river islands Pretend there’s moonlight. The night arrives gentle-like Stars chat in whispers I play that I’m tying a string round the snake’s neck, then I choke him. Now’s the time: I thread myself into his silken elastic skin and I’m off to see this world. I’ll pay a visit to Queen Luzia. I want to marry her daughter. “Then first you must close your eyes.” Sleep slips over my heavy lids. A floor of mud steals the strength of my steps. II This is where the ciphered forest begins. Shade has hidden the trees, Full-lipped frogs peer into the darkness. A slice of forest is being punished here. Saplings squat in a bog,
1 This translation uses the text from Poesia completa de Raul Bopp. 2nd edition, edited by Augusto Massi, Olympio, 2013. pp.166-211.
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A stream of water running late licks the loam. All I want is to see Queen Luzia’s daughter! Now I come to drowned rivers drinking up the path. Water slides through the quagmire; sinking, sinking. Far up ahead the sand still holds traces of Queen Luzia’s daughter. Now, at last I’ll soon see Queen Luzia’s daughter. But first you must pass through seven doors, See seven white women with unpeopled wombs, guarded by an alligator “All I want is Queen Luzia’s daughter.” You must give your shadow to the Creature of the Depths. You must perform mirongas under the new moon. You must drink three drops of blood. “Ah, but only if it belongs to Queen Luzia’s daughter!” The great forest is stricken with sleeplessness. Drowsy trees yawn. The night feels drier, the river’s water has broken. It’s time to move on. I vanish adrift in the depths of the forest where pregnant old trees doze. They call me from every side: “Where are you headed, Cobra Norato? I have three young trees, and they’re waiting for you.” “I can’t. Tonight I’ll sleep with Queen Luzia’s daughter.” III I quickly continue, wounding the sand. Prickle-grass scratches at me.
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Thick stalks play at sinking in mud. Thin little branches say psssst. Let me through, I have far to go. Thickets of tirirca enclose the path. “Ai,2 Father of the Forest; Who breaks me with their evil eye, twisting my path upon the ground? I search and wander, shrivel-eyed, from the search for Queen Luzia’s daughter.” The rest of the night envelops me.3 The earth loses its floor. A soft-naveled swamp swallows me whole. Where will I go? Poor me, already aching in the blood from the mirongas cast by Queen Luzia’s daughter. IV This is the forest of stinking breath giving birth to snakes. Thin rivers forced to work. The currents ruffle, peeling away at slimy berms. Toothless roots chew on mud. On a flooded stretch The swamp swallows the igarapê. A strong stench… The wind has switched spots. A whistle startles the trees, the silence bruised. Up ahead a piece of dry wood falls-- Boom.
2 An outburst of pain, lamentation or frustration. 3 The Portuguese verb enrolar means “to roll up or coil.” Colloquially, it means to cheat or to give someone the slip.
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A shout cuts through the forest, Other voices arrive. The river has choked itself in a ravine. A froggy-frog spots me. “Smells like people here: Who are you?” “I am the snake called Norato, And I’m going to find Queen Luzia’s daughter.” V Here is the school for trees. Today they are studying geometry. “All of you are blind by birth. You must obey the river.” “Ai! We are slaves of the river.” “You are condemned to your task, forever and ever making leaves to cover the forest.” “Ai! We are slaves of the river.” “You must drown man in shade: The forest is the enemy of man.” “Ai! We are slaves of the river.” I push through thick walls, Hear tiny cries of “ai-help-me” The birds are being punished. “If you don’t know today’s lesson you’ll be turned into trees.” “Ai, ai, ai, ai…” “Now what must you do way up there? “I must announce the moon’s arrival as she rises over the jungle.” “And you?” “I wake the stars on the Night of São João.”
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“And you?” “I keep time in the depths of the woods.” Ti-oo… Ti-oo… Ti-oo Twee. Twee-wee. VI I move along the edge of a boggy mess. Viscous plasma unravels itself And floods the mud-hemmed margins. I poke holes through soft walls and fall into the depths of a forest that is swollen, spooked, surprised. You can hear the whistles of a bate-que-bate They’re welding, sawing, sawing; It looks just like they’re making dirt. Why! They really are making dirt. Long banks of pacoema-mud creak. The rotten old scaffolding melts away. Quagmires amend themselves and the built-up jungle spills to the ground. Disordered voices come running, Shouting: No, you can’t! “Are they talking to me?” I pass under leafy arcades. Strange bushes ask, “Is it daytime?” Stains of light open holes in high canopies. Sisterly trees, secretly Spent the night embroidering leaves. A breezy-breeze blew, tickling boughs, Undoing coded writing. VII Ai, I’m in a hurry. I walk on pushing through taboca groves “Where am I?”
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Trees with idiot branches spy on me; Dead waters are awaiting their moment to rot. I slip into a labyrinth with imprisoned trees sitting in the dark. Hungry roots bite at the ground. Dirty carobas lift dresses like dripping sheets of mud. Thigh-high acaís Move slow leaves in heavy air Like spider legs stabbed on a stem. Miritis open up great sluggish stems. A forsaken frog requests rain. Deep within, A quick blade cuts the forest. A thunder-rumble rasps: Here I come. It comes from far away, A thick-voiced thunderclap grumbling. A portion of sky opens up. Mud walls tumble, crashing in the dark. Saplings dream of tempests… Shadows eat slowly at swollen horizons. VIII Rain tumbles, washing vegetation. Wind plunders the leafy trees, hands-up in the air. The great forest rattles. Black clouds gather. Squatting monsters cover thick horizons. Palm fronds snip at the sky. The tiriricas send up an alarm,
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Little saracurinhas cry piu piu piu. Up ahead a guariba prays. Lagoons rend themselves. Low water becomes tangled in trunks. Dry boughs roll over the ground. The bog belly-swells with tiny plants coming, coming, on the torrent. Stagnant trees cry for help Mata-paus embrace, “yes-I’m-fine.” The sky hides its face. It rains… and rains… and rains IX Ai, but I’m lost in the depths of the forest, frightened, forsaken. I am stalled in a muddy womb, The air has lost its breath. A cocoa scent spreads Mussels make merry in the mire. Behind stagnant trunks I hear the cries of a guachinim. I think someone coming through this exit-less dark. “Olelé. Who goes there?” “I am the tatú-da-bunda-seca.”4 “Ai, compadre Tatú, How good that you have come. Show me how to get out of this rotten gullet.” “Then hold on to my tail and I’ll pull you out.”
4 Literally, the dry-bottomed-armadillo.
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X Now, I want to bathe in a borrowed river. I want to sleep three days and nights The sleep of the acutipuru. “Wait for me here, and later I’ll tell you a story.” XI I wake. The moon has risen with sleepy eyes. Within the forest, silence aches. The stars open up and the great waters shrink down with sleep. The tired night stops. “Ai, compadre! I yearn for a soft song that stretches out through the blood as I listen; a song that tastes of the moon and the body of Queen Luzia’s daughter. One that makes me hear again the river’s chatter, grumblings from the road, and far-off voices whispering ai, ai, ai. I’ve crossed the Shiver-shiver Lands, Passed the house of the Minhocão, Left my shadow for the Beast of the Depths. All for Queen Luzia’s daughter. I wore a scented pussanga and a tinharão hull A fanfan of trevo leaves And mucura-caa root But none of it worked… I have a jurumenha,
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The kind that makes you ache a bit, And mixes slowly with the blood.” Ai, compadre Don’t make any noise. The daughter Of Queen Luzia May still be asleep. Oh where could she be, When I want only To see her wet green eyes Her long canarana-like body? Perhaps she wanders far from here And I’ve become a vagabond Just to earn a little love From the daughter Of Queen Luzia Ai. Don’t make noise. XII Dawn stirs from beyond the forest. It brightens; The skies stretch and yawn. Horizons roll themselves up. At the top of a cumandá a Maria-é-dia sings. Sleepy roots awaken. A little stream goes to school, studying geography. Crouching trees wash their uncombed branches in the current. Seagulls measure the sky. Green-crossed horizons call to me.
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“Compadre, Let’s move quickly to the Jaguar-poiema We have some distance to cover Before the low tide. The river is our road. “Ay, the pirixi reeds— “Row, row to this side-- I want to stretch out and lie among the pirixi. I’ll invite the evening To come over and stay.” XIII Childlike little sun grows fat and happy. Impatient saplings nurse on the light running down leaves “Move your hand. Don’t push!” The forest’s wombs call out: “Fill me!” Hidden rivers of uncertain lineage carry on changing, swimming, swimming, Move muttering into the jungle. Pieces of fallen earth make new homes up ahead in a geography under construction. Mamoranas on the riverbanks dream of travels; Melt themselves into the current: Elastic cities in transit. The sun tinges the path. There up ahead Swim swollen-lipped trees Moving long, contrarian boughs. XIV Slow-moving sky
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of mid-day The cry of an arapapá rips through the forest Slimy estuaries coagulate laid out in the sun to dry The bog wrinkles like a dried-out ovary A lone socó-boi stalks imbibing silence Far-off behind a trampled strip of forest horizons stretch out The sun nips the lake’s blue skin On the bank lined with canaranas armored lizards doze “I’m going to take a dip and cool off, Call me if I take too long. This water is sweet and smooth as a maiden’s leg, compadre!” XV Bluest sky A white egret flies and flies… He thinks it’s the lake up there The muggy air weighs down. The light hurts the eyes. The sun like a little mirror. Voices dissolve and fade A lone large bird scratches the surface of the bulging landscaper XVI “Is the sea far away, compadre?” “Sure is. It’s ten leagues through the forest plus ten leagues more” “Then let’s go”
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The light starts to dim The evening stretches its reddish wing Long trenches of capim-grass wave writing their shadows on the worn sands An inhambu startles The tired call of a pixi-pixi echoes in the dark to no response The light of the day slowly folds itself up “The dark is clogging up my eyes” “Good-bye, fat armadillo” “Good-bye, dark lake heron” The colors turn off their lights. Horizons sink down in a slow shipwreck As night runs aground on a shipment of stars XVII The forest comes walking toward me “Open up. I want to come in!” Roots move, their legs bogged down Full-bellied waters laze and stretch in the channels A toothless bog gums mud Well! Here comes a little streamlet of orphaned waters running away “Ah, glug-glug-glug Don’t tell anyone If the sun sees me he’ll swallow me up “Then ask someone to send the rain, compadre”
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Screams and echoes hide themselves struggling for breaths of air Hungry humpbacked trees chewing exploding amidst the snoring of unfurled wombs Oof, Compadre I’m getting hungry too “Then let me blow on your belly” This lake is feverish, swelling. The waters stalled. “Ay, I was a bachelor river Going along drinking up my path But the brush stopped me up Now I’ve got an aching uterus, ow” Alone in the mangroves cries a lost seriquara quara quara XVIII I’m going to stretch out here and listen to the sounds at the edge of the forest and feel the night, all inhabited by stars Who knows if maybe one of them has seen with its silver threads the luminous face of Queen Luzia’s daughter Distant rumbles dissolve in the depths of an anonymous forest I feel the beating cadence of the earth’s own pulse Immense silences reply… XIX A disheveled sea with elastic horizons spent the night with insomnia monologuing and grumbling Weary waves arrive
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Tired from the trip laying down their load of mountains Slices of sea dissolve in the sand It seems as if space has no end “Where does so much water come from, compadre?” XX Today the big tide begins The sea gets itself ready to receive the live waters it ordered from the moon “Let’s wander over to the banks of the Bailique To watch the pororoca arrive” The mangroves asked to borrow some earth to build up their slimy berms Famished roots fight for it The water gummy with mud slides slowly in the soft sediments Swamps full of philodendrons open into flooded clearings Barefoot roots sink into bogs Scrawled thickets tie up the path “Quick, compadre We have to beat the moon there” This low coast feels like summer The river shrugs, the waters retreat, The wind chews at the shore’s chapped lips Frowning mangroves walk a long while with us XXI Punctual night Full moon takes aim, the pororoca growls
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It comes on, coming like a swollen wave rolling and curling waters tumbling Vagabonding along the startled shores A piece of the sea switched places The littlest islands disappear beneath the fat-bellied wave tearing up vegetation Little forests vanish The lovestruck waters embrace the forest Trees explode guts-out from the force The pororoca brings back fugitive earth that emigrated downstream carried on the currents XXII Boggy landscape Thick moonlight calms the waters The trees are puffed up like birds Convoys of floating earth return slowly upriver matupás that will build up new islands in a silent feat of engineering The tail of water disappears Going away to rest under the moon at the tip of the Seriaca “Let’s take advantage of the flow of the flood” “Then hold on to this balsawood” High tide Low tide Wave that comes Wave that goes A heart that sits at the water’s side Has a low tide of its own “That smashed-up bit of forest is catching my eye” “Then point your raft over there, compadre”
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XXIII A big night… The bank at the water’s edge is so nice Today there’s a sky that goes on and on stretched out to that point in the distance I wish I could push out horizons see lands with low-slung forests on a night dressed up by the moon with tresses made of stars “I have a mussangulá” Inside the forest of nickeled trees the silence says tincuã Crickets send warning Up ahead they respond Sore-throated frogs say their lessons aloud The sky like geometry laid out in large font “There are so many things we don’t understand, compadre” “What d’you think is out there behind all those stars?” XXIV “Compadre, I’m hungry. Let’s go down to the putirum and steal some manioc” “Will we have to go far?” “Just a little bit more and we’ll be there Brother Tortoise knows the way.” “Then let’s go.” Let’s go down to the putirum Putirum Putirum. Let’s steal some tapioca Putirum Putirum.
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The Big House with great stores of grain Women working on manioc graters Gnawing the tips of their pipes. The caroeira squeaks in the thresher Manioc shavings in the tipiti. “Joaninha Vintém, tell us a story.” “Which story?” “Any one.” “Then I’ll tell the one about the Boto.”5 Putirum Putirum. “Love was raining, drizzling down. I was out washing clothes, When the Boto got me.” “Oh, Joaninha Vintém-- Was the Boto ugly or wasn’t he?” “Ah, sister. He was young, and blonde, And played the guitar. He grabbed me by the waist…” “What happened next?” “People, look! The tapioca is caught in the threshers!” “That Boto. Always after the girls.” Putirum Putirum. XXV The party looks lively, compadre. “Shall we turn human-shaped and go in?”6 “Let’s go.” “Good evening.”
5 In local tradition, the Boto is an enchanted river dolphin who takes human form (see Slater). 6 Amazonian oral tradition commonly includes enchanted shape-shifting beings who can change their outward appearance. Enchanted beings with other “natural” outward forms will often display an aggressive sexual appetite and exude a powerful attraction toward the opposite sex while in human shape. In the human species, this shape-shifting ability resides in shamanic individuals.
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“G’d evenin’.” “They don’t know me in there. They’ll ask, ‘Who could that be?’” “Come on in, if you mean no harm.” “Then I ask your permission to spin a verse for the head of the house.” Angelim little leaf What made you so sad? Tarumã The wind failed to bring News of one gone away Tarumã The titi-flower wilted away On the shores of the river Tarumã No name remained on the sand And the wind took the rest Tarumã “Strike up another sad one, compadre.” “Brother, take a shot of cachaça-- for strength.” “Now, watch this: Long-leafed tajá Don’t chirp next to me Tajá Mount Farewell-Maria Don’t take my love to your rise Tajá Night falls on the mountain I fear that she’ll leave Tajá She already has night In her forget-me-not eyes Tajá
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Bad-omen tajá Don’t chirp next to me Tajá “Move that old body, compadre. Twine your legs with the girl’s.” -Swing. Cross. -With your partner. -Back to the right. -Change position. I’m going to have some hot tacacá The tico-tico came back to his nest He went to the jungle to cut firewood Urmutum Boom-doo-doom The woodpecker knock-knocks Like my heartbeat Knocked his beak all night long Urmutum Boom-doo-doom These eats are delicious, Pass the farina gourd. Pepper fires up my mouth. Clear your throat with tequila. “Look, compadre: that girl is all in knots over you.” “It’s about time to go. Have a chiribita to warm yourself up. We still have a long way to travel.” “Let’s go!” “Compadre, Let me whisper to you: Joaninha Vintém wants to come along.” “No way. It’s getting late. Bring herbs for our hangovers, And let’s get back in the bodies we left outside.” XXVI The lovely night Feels enclosed in glass.
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Sororoquinhas sleep on the riverbank. Naked trees go for a dip. Alligators on holiday Chew on stars melting in the water. Between stands of macegas A susuarana passes a jaguar in silk slippers. A soft breeze combs the leaves of the embaúba. The pathway unravels like a cloth. Brother Tortoise took a different turn: “Send our regards to Mrs. Tortoise. As long as it’s night with this spacious sky and so many stars, Let’s keep walking. Hurting roads, always onward. XXVII Up ahead a shaman’s hut In the dark at a corner of a farm A shaman whistles long and low fiu…fiu. Calling the forest. “Forest! Maracá calls you. I want my jaguar.” The leopard arrived Jumped Entered the shaman’s body. “I want tafiá. I want to smoke and mimic-dance.” I don’t like fire. Master Paricá calls out to those Who are feverish and gut-swollen from espinhela. “The only one who can cure that is the Mother of the Lake.” “The vulture is the one who knows about body swellings.” The shaman makes a blessing like untwisting the evil eye. And then he smokes and unsmokes mucurana smoke,
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gervão tea with titica-vine leaves and cumaru beans. Then he picks up an Angola fig, Scratches a cross in the dirt And sweeps his body’s sorcery with the feathers of a great bird. The last caruana asks again for a mimic-dance, “And I want more diamba too.” “Compadre, should we have a smoke too?” Shaman grew dizzy… Squatted… Slowly disappeared… Then, He makes a deal with the forest to do magic. XXVIII The forest swells. Scarecrow monsters move their limbs, Scratching strange shadows on the ground. Hooded trees release ghosts with Birdlike faces. The moonlight softens the sleepy jungle. There up ahead Silence marches on like a music band. A ventriloquist forest makes believe it’s a city. Cubic bushes move about Beneath arcades of samaúma. Curly palm trees wave. Monocled jaburus sweet-talk myopic stars. A João Cutuca nibbles the trees. Down below the King of the Treetop’s entourage passes by Canaranas bow down. Anonymous sounds arrive from far away.
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“Who goes there?” “Here comes a train.” The black steam engine chuggachuggachuggas. The forest awakens. Vines play at intrigue in the treetops, Undoing themselves in giggles. One tree telegraphs another: Psst psst psst. Contraband voices disembark. Frogs spell out the laws of the forest. Up on high, A curió plays flute. The river stretches out. The forest accompanies it. Distances unravel Between stains of fog. “There goes a ship, compadre!” A cicada whistles A tree waves goodbye with the tip of its bough. XXX “Open up, wind. And I’ll give you a burned penny. I need to pass through quickly, Before the moon sinks into the forest.” “Pass, then, my grandson.” pereré pereré pereré bata-boom bata-boom bata-boom I want to reach the Far-Off Range “Duck-Shaman, my grandfather:
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Move to the side, away from the forest I need to get by. I’m taking a ring and a golden comb To the bride of the Big Snake.” “What else do you have?” “I have cachaça.” “Then leave me a little. You may pass.” A pitiro-pitiro sings in the depth of the forest The silence doesn’t answer. Matim-tá-pereira sidles up “Better leave a chunk of tobacco for the Curupira, compadre.” We’re getting close to the Slippery Point. An aracuã stands guard. Where the maidens bathe in a hidden spot “It’s a shame you’re in a hurry, compadre. If not we could peek at those delicious things.” “Keep going, it’s getting late.” “Slow down, The hard ground hurts me—owoooow.” “There’s only a sliver of moon up there.” “Slow down, The hard ground hurts me—oof oof.” “If the long-eyed witch agrees.” She scatters evil. “Go slow. The hard ground hurts, ugh.” “Hurry, compadre. I’ve caught sight of the Windy Range On the other side of the moonlight. The Lands of the Big Snake Begin after the swamps.”
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XXXI Here is the entryway to the Boiuna’s lair. Down below there’s a swamp. A cururu stands sentry. I descend through the immense depths of the grotto Through obscuring darkness. The hollow ground resounds; Silence cannot leave here. There are swollen-mouthed sewers. “Where do you think this leads?” “It leads right into a slippery gullet.” Here the belly itches with fear. There up ahead, In a haunted stretch of water A canoe floats along, filled with skeletons. Through this peek-hole You can see the Great Snake’s bride. “Compadre,” I shook with shock. My breath stopped. Do you know who that woman is down below? …naked as a little flower? “It’s the daughter of Queen Luzia!” “Then run with her, quickly. Lose no time, compadre, The Great Snake has awakened.” The bullfrog sounds. “Oh, Four Winds, help me. I wish for the strength to flee. The Great Snake comes, comes, is coming to get me. I’m gonna-get-you I’m-gonna-get-you “The Snoring Mountains unroll there down below. Cover my tracks for me.
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Put up three walls of thorns, and ouricuri-palm smoke.” “Throw these ashes behind you to cover more distance.” I’m gonna-get-you I’m gonna-get-you. “Tamaquaré, my brother-in-law. The Great Snake is coming, coming Run away and imitate my footsteps. Pretend to be me. Take my scent back to the Duck-Shaman’s house. Go, quickly, and throw him off track; The Bouina is coming behind us. Like a thunderstorm of stones, He comes gathering forest. Why! He passed by scratching the path Saplings strewn, necks wrung Others squeezed, and flung roots-up. The horizon’s gone flat. The wind ran and ran, Biting the tip of its tail. The Duck-Shaman points in the wrong direction: “The Cobra Norato, with a girl? He went to Belém. He went to get married.” The Big Snake bellowed all the way to Belém. He entered the Cathedral by way of the pipes, And got his head stuck under Our Lady’s feet. XXXII “And now, compadre I’m going back to the Lands-of-No-End I’m going there to the highlands
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Where the ranges raise themselves up Where the clear-watered rivers run Between thickets of molungu I want to take my bride I want to just be with her Live in a house With a lovely little blue door Painted by colored pencil I want to feel the heat of her come-hither body I want to be together Like lovers when they love well.. To rest in the shade of the forest and listen to the jurucutú, to the song of the waters flowing, lulling us as we lay. And as long as we are waiting for night to come again, I’ll have to tell her stories, and write names in the sand for the wind to play at erasing. XXXIII And so, well, compadre Go and follow your path Look for my godmother Maleita and tell her I’m getting married That I’m going to dress my bride in a dress made of sun. That I want an embroidered hammock, With herbs spreading their scent And a little carpet Made of irapuru feathers. On the way, Invite everyone for caxiri. We’ll celebrate For seven moons and seven suns.
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Bring Joaninha Vintém, the Duck-Shaman and the Complaining Bull. Don’t forget Both Xicos, Maria Pitanga and João Ternura. Augusto Meyer, Tarsila, Tatízinha I want the whole crowd from Belém, Porto Alegre and São Paulo. “Then I’ll see you soon, compadre. I’ll be waiting for you Beyond the range of the No-End.”7
7 The 1954 edition of Cobra Norato contains an additional two lines, absent from the original publication: “They knock at the door: boom boom boom. “It’s noon!” / The dream is shattered like the shell of an egg.”
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pañcatantra. Translated by Patrick Olivelle, Oxford UP, 1999.
@EmmanuelMacron. “Our house is burning. Literally. The Amazon rain forest – the
lungs which produces 20% of our planet’s oxygen – is on fire. It is an
international crisis. Members of the G7 Summit, let’s discuss this emergency first