THE END OF LIFE : EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY

7/23/2019 THE END OF LIFE : EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY

1/3

P H I L O S O P H I C A L I N Q U I R Y 1993 V O L . X V No 1-2

B O O K - R E V I E W

T H E

END OF

L I F E : E U T H A N A S I A

AND

M O R A L I T Y

J A M E S R A C H E L S O X F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S O X F O R D

1986

Reviewer:

Stanley Sfekas

Southeastern College

Athens Greece

James Rachels argues against the traditional view that the killing of

the innocent is always wrong and presents an alternative view based on a

fecund distinctionbetweenhaving a life and merely being alive between

abiographical life and a biological life. In an essay which makes a signal

contribution to the euthanasia

debate

he examines the ideas and as

sumptions that lie behind one of the

most

important moral rules the

rule

against killing. Where killing is concerned the dominant moral

tradition

of our culture is Rachels holds profoundly mistaken at almost

every point. His essay presents a systematic argument against the

traditional

view and a

defense

of an alternative account.

Rachels

acknowledges that the

traditional

theory from a philosophical

point of view is the only fully worked-out systematically elaborated

theory of the subject we have. Its

development

has

been

one of the great

intellectual achievements ofWesternculture accompliced by thinkers of

great ingenuity and high moral purpose and a complex account of the

morality of

killing

has thus resulted.Thisaccount appeals to a series of

distinctions that taken

together define

a class of actions said to be

absolutely forbidden. In deciding whether a

particular

killing

is permissible

the method is to aprly the distinctions to determine whether the act falls

into

the forbidden class.

Some of

these

distinctions have to do with the status of the victim;

for example is the victim human or non-human for at the heart of the

traditional

dotrine is the idea that the protection of human life - all

human life - is immensely important.

Likewise

it matters enormously

whether the human in question is innocent or not.

Capital

punishment


2/3

7

B O O K - R E V I E W

and killing in war are traditionally sanctioned on the ground that the

people

who are killed are not innocent. It is the killing of the innocent

that is prohibited.

Other traditional distinctions focus on the qualities of the act; for

example, it matters whether the killing would be intentional. It is the

intentional killing of innocent hum ans fha is absolutely forbidden. Perhaps

the most problematic of the traditional distinctions is

between killing

people

and merely

letting people die

On the traditional view, even

thoughkillinginnocent

people

is forbidden, letting them die is

sometimes

permitted.Thismaze of distinctions,

Rachels

maintains, cannot withstand

analysis.

To

replace the traditional view, Rachels

begins

by distinguishing

between having a life and

merely

being alive.

Merely being alive, in the

biological sense, is relatively unimportant. One s

life

by contrast, is of

immense significance. It is the sum of

one s

aspirations, decisions, activities,

projects, and human relationships. The point of the moral rule against

killing

is the protection of

lives

in this biographical sense.

Only

by

paying careful attention to the concept of a life can we understand the

value of life and the evil of death.

The details of Rachel s account are strikingly different from the

traditionalapproach. The distinctionbetweenhuman and non-human,

so important to the traditional view, is subordinated to the concern with

the protection of lives. Because most humans have lives, killing them is

objectionable. However,

some

unfortunate humans, such as

Kar en

Ann

Quinlan,

do not have lives, even though they are alive; and so killing

them is a morally different matter. Likewise,the other traditional dis

tinctions -

between

innocence and non-innocence, intentional and non -

intentional

killing,

and

ordinary

and

extraordinary

means - also

turn

out

to be of secondary importance. And Rachels argues that the distinction

betweenkillingand letting die is morally insignificant as well and provides

no basis for thinking that an act of letting

someone

die is morally better

than

an act of killing.

I n

deciding questions oflifeand death thecrucialquestion in Rachels

account is always: Is a

life

in the biographical sense, being destroyed or

otherwise adversely affected? If not, the rule against killing offers no

objection. Rachels

sees

being moral, not as a matter of faithfulness to

abstract

rules or divine laws, but as a matter of doing what is

best

for

those

affected by ouz, conduct. Warning against blind rule -worship,

Rachelsnotes

that the point of the rule against killing is the protection

of its victims. I fwe should not k i l l it is because inkillingwe are harming


3/3

O O K - R E V I E W

someone.In euthanasia cases, the

kilUng

ofapatient can be viewed as in

no way harming the patient, indeed perhaps even helping. But on the

traditionalview, this has little importance: an innocent human should

not be intentionally

killed.

Rachels

account stands in

stark

antithesis: the importance of being

alive is derivative from the more fundamental importance of having a

life. Death is an evil for the person whodiesbecause itforeclosespossibiUties

for his or her life; because it eliminates the chance for developing abilities

and

talents; because it frustrates desires,

hopes

and aspirations.

This

view leads to a new understanding of the sanctity of life. Againsts the

background of the traditional view,

Rachels

alternative approach thus

emergesas aradical idea.

THE END OF LIFE : EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY

Documents