The End of Kyoto A Perfect Storm for Scotland of Kyoto - A Perfect St… · Scottish Climate & Energy Forum Summary 1.Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol cease as of 31st December.

Scottish Climate & Energy Forum

The End of KyotoA Perfect Storm for

ScotlandKyoto, Sunspots & Gales - The end of a dream for independent Scottish power?

Produced by Mike Haseler BSc. MBA of the Scottish Climate & Energy Forum

(not to be used for legal advice)

Scotland is in for a storm: historical accident; impending solar minimum; a government heavily committed to wind subsidies, needing to prove its economic credibility as oil

runs out; these will make energy & climate a critical issue in the independence debate.


Summary1. Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol cease as of 31st December.

2. The 3rd October 2012 is the latest date at which any amendment to the Kyoto protocol could have been passed for it to be operational by 1st January 2013.

3. With no meeting planned, and huge delays for members states to ratify, there is no practical way for an amendment to be presented and ratified by the 143 members (3/4 of members).

4. When the commitment ceases on the 31st December, all operational Articles stop being effective. The only active clauses appear to be 5 & 19 (estimate of greenhouse gases), 8 (review of national inventories) & 11 (financial obligations to undeveloped countries). Administrative functions such as meetings and procedures for amendments remain active.

5. There is talk of bypassing domestic procedures for ratification by amending articles 20 & 21 to allow the amendment to enter into force before it is ratified by the parties. This will allow it to enter into force earlier than otherwise but will not stop the commitment ceasing on 31st December.

6. In an almost unprecedented move1, there is talk of a last minute extra-Kyoto-protocol agreement where some countries (particularly the EU) intend to agree to Kyoto-like commitments after the Kyoto protocol commitment ceases.

Political Impacts

1. The practical effect of Kyoto has been marginal even possibly counter-productive.

2. Kyoto was a symbol of a global political consensus. That political consensus has come to an end.

3. It is most likely the Nov/Dec Climate talks will not agree any substantive extension to Kyoto or that it will be changed in any other way. If the goodwill was not there to change the commitments in the last 3 years it is not there to hurry through other changes which would reduce state influence.

4. Europe, the main proponent for Kyoto, is likely to try to induce enough other states to assent to a form of political deal to give cover for the lack of Kyoto Commitments.

5. Sometime over the next year, green groups will realise Kyoto has ended and start campaigning vociferously for a replacement to Kyoto. But their main impact will be to raise public awareness that Kyoto has ended and undermine emissions reduction policy.

6. Anti wind & anti EU Parties like the UK Independence Party, will start campaigning in opposition to the European policy on climate. As wind opposition is growing, this will have knock on effects. In the UK it will push the Conservatives to become anti-wind potentially destabilising the UK coalition where the Lib Dems are strong advocates for climate policy.

7. Scotland is in for a storm: historical accident; impending solar minimum; a government heavily committed to wind subsidies, needing to prove its economic credibility as oil runs out; these will make energy & climate a critical issue in the independence debate.

1 The only previous instance is the GATT treaty

18/9/2012 scef.org.uk Page 2


Table of ContentsSummary..........................................................................................................................................2

Political Impacts...........................................................................................................................2Part 1: End of Kyoto Protocol...........................................................................................................4

Introduction..................................................................................................................................4Purpose....................................................................................................................................... 4Why this document is necessary..................................................................................................4Background.................................................................................................................................4Commitment Period.....................................................................................................................5Second Commitment Period........................................................................................................5Procedure for Amendment to Kyoto Protocol...............................................................................6Status of Amendment ..................................................................................................................6Deadline for Amendments is past................................................................................................7Extra-Kyoto Agreements..............................................................................................................7Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform..........................................................................7

Part 2: Political implications..............................................................................................................8Background.................................................................................................................................8Post-2012 Replacement Climate Change Regime ......................................................................9Plugging The Gap......................................................................................................................10The Effect of Kyoto Collapsing...................................................................................................11Political Impacts.........................................................................................................................12Case Analysis: The effect of the End of Kyoto on Scotland........................................................14

Public Opinion.......................................................................................................................14Scottish Politics.....................................................................................................................15Policy Arena..........................................................................................................................15The Economics of Wind in Scotland......................................................................................15A Colder Climate...................................................................................................................15

Appendixes....................................................................................................................................17Appendix 1 - Key Dates & Timing..............................................................................................17

Timing...................................................................................................................................17Appendix 2 – Kyoto Clauses Affected........................................................................................18Appendix 3 - Stakeholder Analysis.............................................................................................19

Wind Opposition Groups & Sceptics.....................................................................................20Wind/ Renewable Sector.......................................................................................................20Civil Servants and Academics...............................................................................................20Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ...........................................................21

Appendix 4 – References & Links..............................................................................................22References............................................................................................................................22Useful Links...........................................................................................................................22Useful Articles.......................................................................................................................22

Appendix 5 - Known Unknowns................................................................................................23Appendix 6 - Acronyms..............................................................................................................23



Part 1: End of Kyoto Protocol

IntroductionKyoto is an iconic treaty. It is a symbol of an international consensus regarding the climate. The end of the commitment under Kyoto is also a symbol: it is the end of that international political consensus. Indeed, with the lack of warming since the turn of the century, the growing evidence against climate catastrophe, and the growing political opposition, it is almost certain that future historians, when writing of the 21st century, will select 31st December 2012 as the date the global warming scare ended.

PurposeThis is a briefing document intended only for the recipient. It aims to explain the current position regarding the “end of Kyoto” or to be more exact “the end of the commitment to climate regulation under Kyoto” on 31st December 2012.

It has been prepared by the Scottish Climate & Energy Forum as a result of our own investigation. However, a note of caution: we are not international lawyers. The views expressed are our best assessment but we can give no warranty.

Why this document is necessarySearching the web, one will find assertions that Kyoto will continue because there is a “second commitment period”. These statements are false. The current position is that there is talk, about having discussions, about agreeing an amendment, which they may then present to a future meeting, at which they may agree, to go back to their respective legislatures, and ask for it to be ratified.

The second commitment period does not exist. It is purely talk.

There is currently not even an agreement on how to amend the protocol. Even if they agree the text of an amendment to Kyoto at Dohu (COP18/CPM8 aka Quatar 6th December) these changes cannot take place immediately and certainly not before the commitment period expires. The simple fact is that the commitment under Kyoto ends on the 31st December.

There is also talk of extra-Kyoto protocol agreements. These are agreements outwith the procedures of Kyoto,and as such it is false to suggest that they are part of the Kyoto protocol.

BackgroundThe Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These amount to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012.



The major distinction between the Protocol and the Convention is that while the Convention encouraged industrialised countries to stabilize GHG emissions, the Protocol commits them to do so.

Commitment PeriodThe Kyoto protocol under article 3 sets a commitment period:

Article 3The Parties included in Annex I shall, ...[reduce] their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.

Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 then refer to various actions as part of this commitment. As such it would appear that all these articles largleuy cease effect (see Appendix 2 for details) when the commitment period of Article 3 terminates. As the protocol was signed in Kyoto, (with no indication to the contrary) we believe the commitment officially terminates as of midnight local Kyoto time, which 15:00 London time. (see Appendix 1 for a range of local times)

Second Commitment PeriodAfter the failure of Copenhagen in 2009 to come up with a new, internationally-binding deal, there was talk of a second commitment period at Cancún (COP16/CPM6 2010) which agreed to “avoid the emergence of a gap between the first and second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol”. Such a gap was felt to be highly damaging to industry confidence:

One of the main current concerns of the private sector is that there will be a vacuum following the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol post-2012. Having the COP agree that such a gap needs to be avoided has been very good news for the private sector and the carbon markets.http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2010/cancun/COP16summary.pdf

At Durban (COP17 & CPM/7 2011), the following text was produced as a basis for the amendment of Article three (Decision 1/CMP.7):

The following paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Protocol:The Parties included in Annex I shall, [... reduce2] their overall emissions of such gases by at least [X] per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2013 to [2017][2020]. (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf)

This text did not specify either the level of reduction or the period.

2 Text removed for clarity. For full text please see original.


http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2010/cancun/COP16summary.pdf

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf


Procedure for Amendment to Kyoto ProtocolThe Kyoto Protocol sets out the requirements for amendments (Article 20):

• Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties [The next is Doha (COP 18 6th December)].

• The text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption.[For COP18 this date is 6th June 2012]

• An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt.

This means that for any amendment to be valid on the 1st January 2013, it must have been ratified by the required number of parties to the protocol by 3rd October 2012.

Status of Amendment Article 20 requires that “The text of any proposed amendment” should be available 6 months before the next COP (Doha COP18). But the text after the last meeting at Durban does not yet appear to be a valid amendment as the “text” of the amendment has still to be decided in detail.

The deadline for passing an amendment at Doha was 6th June 2012. It is therefore technically impossible for COP18 to pass an amendment. This is supported by the following from the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development:

If the negotiations in 2012 conclude in the successful adoption of amendments to Kyoto Protocol Annex B a gap will arise as amendments to the Kyoto Protocol itself or its Annexes require time to enter into force (see Kyoto Protocol Articles 20 and 21) following acceptance by Parties, which may require lengthy domestic procedures.

It appears Doha can only agree a text of an amendment for the next COP (COP19) in November 2013. Assuming this is passed, this text would then go back to member states for ratification.

Ratification is a long process. Kyoto was adopted on 11 December 1997 but it was not until 25th February 2005 that the 143rd country (the current limit to pass an amendment) signed. Around half the countries (83) are recorded on Wikipedia as having a gap between signing and ratifying Kyoto. Even if all other countries that could signed without delay, if just those remaining 83 took the same time to ratify the new amendment as they did to ratify Kyoto it would still take about 3.8 years until the required 3/4 of parties ratified (based on the 35th shortest time for country to ratify being 3.8 years). Even then it would take another 90 days for it to come into effect. This suggests, that even if it is passed in Doha a best estimate for it to come into effect is:

replacement for Kyoto commitment: End of 2017.



Deadline for Amendments is pastAs the protocol states that even if an amendments had been passed, it take 90 days to come into force, the latest date at which an amendment could have been passed to allow the protocol to continue after 31st December was October 3rd 2012. However as such amendment requires a COP meeting and approval by all governments and their parliaments, it is now certain that all commitments under Kyoto will become invalid as of 31st December.

Extra-Kyoto AgreementsBecause of the delays inherent in Kyoto protocol, various suggestions have been made to continue the commitment after 31st December. However, there is now no mechanism within the Kyoto protocol to allow this. So these changes will not be part of Kyoto. Instead they will be a a separate inter-governmental agreement outwith Kyoto.

It there is to be legal continuity, commitments from industrialized countries presented in a second commitment period have to be legally-binding as of 1 January 2013, when the new commitment agreement would need to begin. To avoid a gap, Parties would have to exercise a great deal of creative and legal ingenuity to circumvent the inevitable ratification gap.

Developing countries, particularly AOSIS, favour provisional application, whereby the amendments to the Kyoto Protocol would be applied provisionally from 1 January 2013, pending entry into force or ratification by individual parties. However, this would be problematic because because Kyoto explicitly rules out such a procedure. But, precedent for this does exist. For example, the GATT, which preceded the WTO, was famously provisionally applied from 1948 to 1995. However, due to domestic legislative constraints in some countries, this would not be an option open to all parties. For example, provisional application appears to be an obstacle for countries like Australia, whose constitution does not allow for their executive to provisionally apply treaties unless it is “urgent and in the public good.”

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban PlatformDurban, agreed to “develop a new protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force that will be applicable to all Parties to the UN climate convention,”. and a working group established. The exact nature of: “legal instrument” or “agreed outcome” has not yet been decided.

In 2011, the CMP (Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol), at its seventh session, adopted decision 1/CMP.7, which requested the “Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol” (AWG-KP) to aim to deliver the results of its work in time to complete its work by the eighth session of the CMP (26 Nov - 7 Dec 2012, Doha, Quatar).

The AWG-KP session in Bangkok (30 August - 5th September) was devoted to resolving outstanding issues to ensure the successful completion of the group’s work in Doha, Qatar, in December 2012, by recommending an amendment to the Conference of the Parties (COP) serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) for adoption.

However in reality there was no real progress. [link]


http://www.europolitics.info/sectorial-policies/mixed-reactions-to-outcome-of-bangkok-meeting-art342597-15.html



Part 2: Political implications.There are two big questions coming into this years climate talks. These are not whether the commitment will end on the 31st December, because that is now a certainty, nor even whether there will be anything to replace it on the 31st January, because again that is damned near impossible (there is only a month between the talks and the climate crunch on the 31st). The big questions will be:

• Will there be enough political agreement & concrete evidence of progress (including a timetable) to assure the “carbon” markets that it is only a temporary gap, rather than an end.

• How long will the gap continue.

So, it seems the most likely outcome of the climate talks of 2012, will be some form of political agreement, whose main intention will be to create the illusion that Kyoto has not broken down. One is tempted to ask: “what rabbit can they pull out the hat?”

BackgroundThe Kyoto protocol is part of a larger political context. The overarching agreement is the Framework Convention on Climate Change resulting from the Rio de Janeiro summit in 1992. The objective of this treaty was:

to achieve [...] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. (UN General Assembly)

But the treaty sets no binding limits and has no enforcement mechanisms and in that sense is considered legally non-binding. Instead it provides a framework for specific binding treaties called “protocols” of which Kyoto appears to be first and only one.

A similar pattern of framework with protocols has been adapted in other areas such as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, and the adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987.

Kyoto Protocol

Kyoto divides the world and their commitments under the protocol into two: the developed (annex I countries) and undeveloped (non Annex I countries). It talks about “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Because the protocol negotiations focussed exclusively on emissions from developed (Annex I) countries the talks became one between the opposing power blocks of the EU on one side and the US with allies of Japan, Australia and other members of the so-called “Umbrella Group” on the other.



Kyoto was modelled on the Montreal Protocol for reducing chemicals like CFCs which were thought to be affecting the Ozone hole3. Like the Montreal protocol, Kyoto established legally-binding commitments. However unlike the Montreal protocol which set limits for production and use, Kyoto set national performance standards for emissions for a five year period from 2008 to 2012. In addition there were detailed requirements for monitoring, reporting and review of national emissions and a market mechanism that parties could use, including emissions trading and clean development mechanism.

Post-2012 Replacement Climate Change Regime Negotiations have been ongoing for a replacement to come into force after 2012. The intention has been to include developing countries, which changed the focus from EU versus US to one of developed versus undeveloped.

Some of the big questions before agreement became impossible were: whether the replacement for the Kyoto commitments would come as an amendment to the protocol or as an entirely new agreement; whether, if there is a new agreement, it would be only a political or a legally-binding agreement; whether the agreement would specify defined commitments or whether it would be left to each country to unilaterally define their own, and the last was whether the division between developed and undeveloped would continue to be enshrined in the agreement and e.g. separate targets and mechanism applied for each group or common standards used. There were widely different views. According to a report by Daniel Bodansky (2012):

“Positions vary widely on these issues. The European Union is open to considering a new round of legally-binding Kyoto targets, but only as part of a global and comprehensive framework that includes the United States and China. The United States would be willing to negotiate a legally-binding agreement, but only if the mandate provided that the agreement would apply with equal legal force to all of the major emitters (including China and India). ... China and India would like developed countries to continue Kyoto’s top-down, legally-binding approach, but are unwilling to accept this approach themselves. They insist on maintaining the Kyoto “firewall” between developed countries (which have emissions limitation commitments), and developing countries (which don’t).”

Copenhagen was supposed to wrap up a deal on the post-2012 climate change regime. Unknown to most commentators, the biggest impact of the release of the Climategate emails prior to Copenhagen may have been to stall and delay this deal long enough for general growing concerns to torpedo the agreement altogether. This is because having been postponed to this year, it is now too late to have post-2012 agreement to hang seamlessly onto the Kyoto Commitment when it ceases on 31st December. This was despite discussions on the post-Kyoto agreement taking place at both at Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011). With the final amendment text still undecided as of September 2012, whilst there is a lot of talk, the fact is that there has been very little tangible progress since 2009. This lack of progress speaks louder than assertions of a “second commitment period” and does not bode well for the 2012 talks.

3 There is a reasonable suspicion that the case for banning CFCs was not well founded. Banning CFCs has had little effect on the so called “ozone hole”. Its “cause” may be natural (chlorine from sea water).



There are four possible scenarios, as of 1st January:

• That nothing will be agreed for post-2012 and effectively the agreement will collapse with no prospect of a replacement. As such there will be no legally-binding quantitative limits on states’ greenhouse gas emissions.

• That there is outline political agreement to continue without agreeing specific details.

• That agreement is reached regarding a specific period extending Kyoto. However as this cannot be passed until the end of 2013 and then it will take several years to ratify, there will be a gap without a Kyoto Commitment. There are several options for this gap period:

• No agreement.

• Political agreement for some states to independently continue with Kyoto-like commitments.

• Political agreement to act to create some legal basis for binding commitments in the gap period. Which in turn would need to be signed and ratified by member governments.

• Political agreement to act to hasten the process to adopt a new amendment by changing Kyoto rules to e.g. lower the threshold of countries needed before the amendment comes into force.

Of all the scenarios, the most likely, according to Daniel Bodansky (2012), is that the meeting will not agree to any form of extension to Kyoto. This view seems to be confirmed by the failure to agree even the text of an amendment coming into the climate talks Nov/Dec 2012. This will mean the U.N. climate regime will not be able to impose any legally-binding quantitative limits on states’ greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, the only limits that would continue to apply would be domestic law and the political commitments that states made in their Copenhagen/Cancun pledges.

Bodansky gives as his reasons for thinking this is the most likely outcome that:

the European Union is willing to consider a second commitment period only as part of a comprehensive framework including the United States and China. The United States is unwilling to accept a new legal agreement unless it includes new commitments of the same legal character by all of the world’s major economies (although these could be very different in terms of stringency and content). And China seems unwilling to accept any legal commitment to limit its emissions, no matter how differentiated. The gridlock can be relieved only if one or more parties back out of their current positions.

Plugging The GapThere has been talk of amendments to the Kyoto protocol to speed up the process so that the amendment that is needed to continue the commitments can be implemented quicker. However, there is no reason to believe this hastening amendment could be passed any quicker than the new commitment amendment it is intended to hasten. Indeed, there is every reason to think that states may be even more reluctant to bypass the procedures because those holding up the amendment (for whatever reason) may be reluctant to pass an amendment which by bypassing the established protocol removes their influence.



The same basic argument can be used to rule out a binding extra-Kyoto agreement. If the will was there to create what would amount to an entirely new treaty, it would be there to pass the amendment for an extension to the commitment period. However, this does not rule out an agreement between a much more limited group of participants. However the lack of inclusivity would be seriously damaging and would not easily dovetail into the Kyoto protocol mechanisms and organisation.

So, whilst there has been talk of “provisional application” pending entry into force and various other ways, these ignore the fact that if there were the necessary good will to go above and beyond the normal protocol within a very short time, there would surely have been the necessary good will to have obtained an agreement in the three years since Copenhagen. However the concept of “provisional application” has been seen before. It was applied to the the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This may be all that is on offer and even though it is unlikely to materialise as a practical replacement to Kyoto it may be pursued as the “the way forward”. But this will be more of a political cover to hide what would otherwise be seen as a failure and a breakdown of Kyoto.

It seems the most likely outcome of the climate talks of 2012, will be some form of political agreement, whose main intention will be to create the illusion that Kyoto has not broken down.

The Effect of Kyoto CollapsingThe aim of Kyoto was always nebulous. Grub (2004) put it thus:

The main aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to contain emissions of the main greenhouse gases in ways that can reflect underlying national differences in emissions, wealth, and capacity, following the main principles agreed in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These include the need for evolutionary approaches and the principle of “common but differentiated” responsibilities, including leadership by the richer and higher-emitting industrialised countries.

And even in 2005 it was known the practical effect would be negligible and it was largely political in nature:

“Although the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on CO2 concentrations and temperature increase in 2012 is insignificant, its implementation has considerable impact on the pathways that are available in the future to reach certain climate stabilization levels.” Höhne (2005)

However three were specific targets and e.g. Horner (2006) described the EU's promise thus:

Europe’s Kyoto promise, as originally ratified by the EU-15 individually, was to lower each of the nations’ GHG emissions to 8% below 1990 levels by 2010

However such aspirations have not been achieved. Instead the reduction has been closer to 5%, but this may not be all it appears.



As the graph to the right shows, the net effect has been to hold emissions on Annex I countries use down, but worldwide outputs have shot up in non-annex I countries.

So, the practical effect of Kyoto on CO2

emissions is marginal at most and it is very likely that the emissions in Annex I countries have been held down by effectively moving heavy use industries from Annex I countries to non Annex I where the lower efficiencies and increased transportation costs may have increased CO2 output rather than reducing it.

In addition to internationally legally-binding emissions levels, many of the monitoring arrangements would also come to an end. This would affect, for example, the system of national registries to track each state’s assigned emissions and the rules for crediting of land use change and forestry activities. So, to use an analogy of a car, not only would the car engine cut out, but because the monitoring mechanisms end, the view of the road could also black out unless countries choose to voluntarily report their emissions.

However Bodansky suggests several clauses will remain active. The operational ones he lists are:

• Article 5 & 19 - developed countries to have “national systems” to estimate their greenhouse gas emissions.

• Article 8 - expert reviews of national inventories (although there to ensure compliance with commitments it also verifies the national emissions inventory).

• Article 11 - financial obligations for undeveloped countries.

The rest are administrative (See Appendix 2) and keep the institution going as a body.

Political ImpactsThe end of Kyoto has crept up on us almost without being noticed by the press and politicians. A very likely scenario is that a similar attitude continues amongst most commentators & politicians after the Climate talks in Nov/Dec. This will be helped by some face-saving political deal which will likely (behind the scenes) involve the EU offering financial inducements to recipient countries to join up to an extra-Kyoto type deal which can be sold to the public as a continuation of Kyoto.

So, one shouldn't expect a quick change in EU, UK or Scottish policy. However, that will not stop the wind, renewable sectors and policy makers from anticipating a change. The biggest impact is likely to be to morale. The initial reaction (if informal discussions so far are anything to go by) is likely to be denial that anything has changed. Eventually the realisation will dawn that the end of Kyoto marks the end of any global political consensus. This change could take several years, perhaps incrementally changing as each climate talk comes and goes with only rhetoric and no tangible progress.



Over the normal course of events this would act to change the priority given by government and e.g. make it less willing to antagonise communities of voters where wind is an issue. With little manufacturing there will be few active proponents.

But, because renewable developers have such a long time horizon, they may be particularly susceptible & sensitive to this slow ongoing change. However, if (as we suspect) the failure of Kyoto catches them unaware, there may be a precipitous fall in share price following the Nov/Dec climate talks, followed by years of “wind-like-intermittency” of share-holder value as the issue drifts on with little leadership. This uncertainty will dramatically reduce investment, and the mentality will drift toward a “cash-cow” type scenario, with a reluctance for high risk, long payback period projects.

However, in terms of the political impacts there are two groups who will be significantly affected:

Pro-environment parties (e.g. in UK Lib Dems & Scottish Nationalist Party SNP)As these groups appear like everyone else to have just accepted that some agreement will take place, sometime, the initial reaction is likely to be denial that anything significant has occurred. However, as the more “distrusting” amongst them come to realise that there is no longer a global climate deal, they will quickly begin campaigning. This is likely to start in anti-capitalist, anti-establishment groups. Their action will likely create tension between those who benefit from the policy (who do not wish to give ammunition to opponents & who do not wish the public to know that the climate deal has fallen through) and those who want direct action to push global politicians to take action.

Sometime between the end of the talks in December and the next climate talks at the end of 2013, those wanting action to campaign to bring back a climate deal will begin to coming to public notice. This may be triggered by the actual end of Kyoto, or as a result of a working party climate meeting in the summer. When this happens it will give those who want to keep quiet little choice but to join in the chorus.

Anti Europe, Anti-Wind PartiesThe anti European politicians also tend to be anti-wind. In particular the UK Independence Party has the worlds highest profile sceptic: Lord Monckton. The EU is likely to try to “buy” a treaty as cover for the internal pro-wind policies. This will be like a red rag to a bull to anti-EUs and it is almost inconceivable that UKIP and anti-EU politicians in the Tories will not try to capitalise on this. This will play to the growing opposition to wind, particularly amongst Conservative voters in the countryside which have been most affected by wind. So, there is a real threat that UKIP could take a lot support away from Tories in these areas both in England and even in Scotland where UKIP is at present a very small party.

This in turn will force the UK conservative coalition government to react and they will try to rein in wind development. This will create tensions between themselves and their strongly pro-green, pro-Europe coalition partner (Lib Dems). Because this issue attunes with strong sentiment in both parties (pro-green, anti-EU) it will be very divisive between the coalition partners. Indeed, it could so antagonise the partners and poison the relationship that it could play a significant role if the coalition were to end ahead of the next election.

With parties on the right worldwide tending to be less supportive of Kyoto, similar scenarios may occur in many other countries.



Case Analysis: The effect of the End of Kyoto on Scotland

Scotland is in a very interesting position because the circumstances of Scotland will force an early public debate and make her a barometer for informed opinion worldwide.

The reason for this is that the ruling party in Scotland is not only a self-proclaimed “world leader” in pushing to decarbonise the Scottish economy, but it is also committed to holding an independence referendum which will force close scrutiny of its energy and climate policy. The Government party in Scotland is the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). There are several reasons for it being strongly pro-wind:

• Before Devolution the SNP was only a small party in Westminster (UK Parliament) and they attracted many anti-nuclear campaigners. There still remains a strong anti-nuclear, pro-green, pro-renewable lobby within the party.

• One of the few substantial economic powers given to the Scottish government in 1999 (One year after the peak of warming in 1998) was power over renewable energy policy. This was one of the few ways Scottish politicians could be seen to be “active”.

• Scotland has a massive resource of wind (which may be why so much encouragement was given by Westminster by devolving this power)

• Scotland has benefited from the massive reserves of oil in the North Sea and the SNP have used these to underpin its economic plans for a future independent Scotland. But this oil is running out and so wind has been grasped as the “new oil” underpinning both its economic and political argument for independence.

Public Opinion

There id a very high level of support amongst Scottish politicians, media, public, civil servants and academics. The result is that there has been very little public debate and the little there has been focussed on which renewables and where. So, it would be inconceivable to most people in Scotland that anything could change. There is no talk about the end of Kyoto or indeed any serious discussion within the establishment about the lack of scientific basis for the concept of catastrophic climate change. So, in the normal course of events, the end of Kyoto on 31st December is unlikely to be noticed in Scotland.

However, by the date of the referendum in 2014, not only will the Kyoto commitment have ended, but with another round of talks in 2013, so will substantive hope of a successor to Kyoto in the foreseeable future. This will not be welcome news to the SNP because they have made much play of selling wind from Scotland to the rest of Europe. If Kyoto falls, then given the lacklustre performance of the EU economy, so too will EU targets and without EU targets obliging consumers to buy expensive Scottish electricity from wind, so too will the economic credibility of the SNP.

Ironically, the predominance of the pro camp view in Scotland makes it all the more likely that a large & unpredictable swing in public perception could occur. This is because the arguments pro & against Kyoto (I.e. climate catastrophe) have not been aired in Scotland and this lack of previous debate may make the Scottish public all the more interested and ready to listen to and then embrace alternative views.



Scottish Politics

In the independence debate the SNP (and Greens) stand for independence, and the iconic party for the union, is the Conservative and Unionist party. Whilst not officially against wind, the conservative politicians in Scotland have been the most vocal opponents and they have strong support in areas being affected by the rapidly spreading wind sites. So, it is very likely that the two extremes of the independence debate will also represent the two extremes of the Wind/Kyoto/climate debate.

Policy Arena

The act setting up the Scottish Parliament gave few significant powers outside Health and Education to the Scottish Government except renewables. As such the performance of the SNP can only be assessed in a narrow range of areas and economically renewables is one of the few areas where their economic competence can be assessed. As Scotland receives large subsidies from the UK, economics and economic credibility has been very important in the debate so far and so the Scottish government renewable energy policy is likely to be dissected and examined in great detail by all sides.

The Economics of Wind in Scotland

Scotland is one of the windiest countries in Europe with a vast coastline and strong tides which in principle make available huge renewable resources. However it has been singularly unsuccessful at attracting wind manufacturing companies and those that have set up have soon closed. The proponents of wind are keen to point out that there are supposedly 11,000 jobs in wind. However without manufacturing these will almost all be temporary and estimates suggest that for each job in the wind sector, the money sucked out of the rest of the economy removes around 3 other jobs.

Perversely, whilst the wind sector has been able to trumpet the “success” of jobs in installation as the number of wind sites escalates, the down side to this is that any hiccup in installation numbers will have a very quick impact leading to widespread jobs losses.

It is therefore no surprise that the SNP administration have recently announced a massive increase in wind development. This will have been welcomed by the developers. But as wind opposition is growing and as wind developers begin to realise that the global climate consensus has fallen apart, confidence in future political support may evaporate. This will lead to a a significant reduction in future investments, leading to a drop in installation & consequent job losses. In turn this will lower public support undermining confidence in investors, creating a potential vicious downward cycle to replace the previous virtuous “ever growing” mindset of the developers.

A Colder Climate

Despite the strong support, Scotland is not an obvious place one would expect such strong support for action to stop warming. Scotland suffers from cold weather. Indeed, the famines during the colder period of the 1690s were so catastrophic to the Scottish economy that they are largely responsible (alongside the failed Darien scheme) for precipitating the loss of Scottish independence. This is an issue that is likely to come to prominence in the lead up to the referendum debate raising the question of whether warming is bad for Scotland.



However, worse is to come. In addition to the 1690s being colder, it was also a period of low-solar activity known as the Maunder Minimum. It now appears very likely that in the next year, clear evidence will appear that solar activity has dramatically reduced lately. This could not come at a worse time for the SNP coming on the heals of the Kyoto breakdown.

Given all these factors, climate and renewable energy policy are so politically sensitive that it will blow up into a major issue in the run up to the independence referendum. It is almost impossible to conceive of a greater dissonance between public perception of “warming must be harmful” and the historical facts in Scotland of a quarter of the population dying from cold in the 1690s.

One indication of the future importance of climate may be seen in the persona of the new Climate Minister (Paul Wheelhouse). As an economist with an MBA, he appears almost never to have spoken about the environment. He is far from an obvious candidate for the role. So is there more to this appointment that meets the eye? It may just be coincidence: Alex Salmond (SNP leader) wants to strengthen his front-line team for the independence debate and climate was just a handy position in which to place this economist. Or it may be a sign that Salmond has already recognised the weakness of his energy policy, that he understands this policy area will be critical in the debate,

Scotland appears to be in a perfect storm. Historical accident of the 1690s and the impending solar minimum; a Scottish government reliant on wind power to show its own economic credibility; a political and economic reliance on oil which is running out and wind is not giving the economic or political benefits it was sold with; the impending realisation that the global political consensus of Kyoto is evaporating, all appears to make this a toxic cocktail for the SNP government in the referendum debate.

However, there is a lifeline for the SNP: to blame others. In this case it will be to blame the climate science and energy policy advice of the UK government. The argument will be “if we were independent we wouldn't have had to rely on English scientists and English policy advice.” and “We need a Scottish centre of excellence on the climate”. However, by implication, the SNP, if they adopted this line would be aligning themselves with climate sceptics. The arguments the SNP would be using would be those of the sceptics: that the (English) Climategate inquires were inadequate, that the the certainty of the science was exaggerated, even that the science itself was politicised. They may even point to the failure of the BBC to properly inform the public of the credible evidence supporting the sceptic view.

This is perhaps a very bizarre scenario for anyone that knows the SNP viewpoint on climate. However, this referendum is a once in a lifetime opportunity,which Alex Salmond is unlikely to see again as leader. If he misses this opportunity for his long cherished dream, he may not see another opportunity like this in his lifetime. As a result the SNP will be prepared to bend over backwards and consider all kinds of hitherto unimaginable lines of argument. And attacking the science does have its merits. The SNP is clearly not responsible the climate science advice. The pro-unionists parties were responsible for that advice and the University of East Anglia was clearly implicated in malpractice and the issue has not gone away.

Energy and climate will be hugely important to the independence debate. But it is very difficult to know how this will play out. It is possible to conceive that energy policy will cripple the SNP as a result of Kyoto. It is also possible that it could be turned around upon the Unionist. What can be said, is that the critical nature of this policy to the independence debate, will mean that Scotland will be where the Global debate will be held in all its gory details over the next two years.



Appendixes

Appendix 1 - Key Dates & Timing

2010

29 November – 10 December CMP6/COP16 Cancún (Mexico)

2011

28 November - 9 December CMP7/COP17 Durban (S.Africa)

2012

14-25 May Bonn Climate Change Conference 2012

6 June Deadline for amendments to be received for COP18

3 October Deadline to amend Kyoto to not expire 31st Dec.

30 August – 5 September Ad Hoc Working Group, Bangkok Climate Talks

6 December COP18 (Doha Quatar)

26 November - 7 December CMP/8COP18 Doha

31 December Date Kyoto Commitment ends

2013

2013: 11 November COP19 (Eastern Europe)

Timing

As the protocol was signed in Kyoto, (with no indication to the contrary) we believe the commitment officially terminates as of midnight local Kyoto time, which is locally:

Location Kyoto Commitments End(Local Time )

Canberra (Australia) 1:00am 1st Jan.

Kyoto Midnight

Beijing (China) 11:00pm 31st Dec.

Delhi (India) 8:30pm 31st Dec.

Doha (Quatar) 6:00pm 31st Dec.

Copenhagen (Europe) 4:00pm 31st Dec.

Glasgow (UK) 3:00pm 31st Dec.

Durban (S. Africa) 3:00pm 31st Dec.

New York (US) 10:00am 31st Dec.

Cancún (Mexico) 9:00am 31st Dec.

Washington (US) 7:00am 31st Dec.



Appendix 2 – Kyoto Clauses AffectedThe operational ones he lists are:

• Article 5 & 19 - developed countries to have “national systems” to estimate their greenhouse gas emissions.

• Article 8 - expert reviews of national inventories (although there to ensure compliance with commitments it also verifies the national emissions inventory).

• Article 11 - financial obligations for undeveloped countries.

The rest are administrative:• Article 7 - requiring developed countries to publish information showing compliance with

the Protocol (which appears a mere formality).• Article 9 - periodic reviews of the Protocol.• Article 10 - general obligations• Article 12 – the Clean Development Fund (CDM) would still exist and be able to register

projects for a “share of the proceeds”, but without any commitments to be offset by CDM projects, it is hard to see the purpose of register as there is unlikely to be funding unless parties volunteer to donate money outwith Kyoto.

• Article 13 - the Protocol’s institutions such as the Meeting of the Parties• Article 14 - the secretariat



Appendix 3 - Stakeholder AnalysisWhat follows is a potential synopsis based on the experience of the Author in the wind industry, from research into energy, in the Green movement and as a sceptic interested in the science and energy policy arenas.

Whether or not a political deal is brokered to camouflage it, Kyoto will be dead in the water on 1st January. This will because China and other growing economies who have done well out of being outside the Kyoto commitment, will not join. Likewise, Russia,the US, Canada and Japan will not join. The only significant block appearing willing to sign, apparently for domestic reasons due to its high-profile domestic policy pro-wind, will be the EU. The other group who will wish to join are smaller recipient countries who stand to benefit from emissions trading.

Given the ability of the UNFCCC to portray the lack of any real progress since Copenhagen as a series of “successes” (at least in the UK press), it is not unreasonable to think the public & politicians may yet again be given the impression that “there's nothing unusual”. Indeed, with press interest in global warming decreasing, it is possible there is next to no press coverage of what amounts to the end of the global political consensus on what was said have been the greatest problem facing mankind.

If such a scenario were to occur, one would not expect to see major changes. Policy would continue, sceptics would continue being sceptical of the science and wind opposition would continue opposing wind. Only perhaps at the very highest level of industry, where they are able to obtain independent legal advice and do not rely on the “shop talk” might there be serious concern about the future political ramifications which might question the viability of long term investment projects.

Green NGOs

However by far the most likely scenario is that the more zealous green NGOs will themselves create the rumpus that will make it impossible for politicians and the public to fail to notice Kyoto has ended. This will come when these green groups realise that for all the assurances from politicians, their cherished binding international commitments to reduce CO2 have come to an end. Paradoxically, their ability to create publicity will be strongest in the EU where politicians can do least. It may also be very divisive amongst green groups. Many environmental groups such as the John Muir Trust and Mountaineering Council of Scotland are already starting to oppose wind. Others may feel that far too much effort has gone into “anti-capitalist” type opposition to fossil fuel when there are much bigger problems like the cutting of the Amazon jungle.

So, the “need for action” created by the end of Kyoto, may split the greens between those who see CO2/fossil fuel economies as the biggest problem and those who may be generally against excessive consumption but see it as a relatively minor problem compared to others.



Wind Opposition Groups & Sceptics

One might think that wind opposition groups and sceptics would seize an opportunity like this. However, neither group is well organised. Worse, wind oppositions groups tend to be pro-environment so are lukewarm supporters of Kyoto. Sceptics tend to focus on the science itself, and matters of policy and particularly climate talks and climate politics is usually only a passing concern. It is therefore unlikely that either group will spontaneously try to capitalise on the end of Kyoto.

Wind/ Renewable Sector

For many wind and renewable developers, the end of Kyoto may come as quite a shock. Particularly if they only hear this from green NGOs. It is likely that this will be seen as significant, indicating an end to global political consensus. Whilst present administrations may continue to utter reassuring words, renewable developments tend to be long term and therefore developers will try to see beyond the words of the here-today-gone tomorrow politicians who are currently in office.

When taken in a context of growing opposition to wind, the lack of concrete evidence of warming, adverse weather extremes or direct affects, developers may begin to think they see the writing on the wall for renewables supported as part of a CO2 reduction strategy.

However, it is apparent that other avenues of “argument” are being opened up. One of these is that resources will “soon be at an end”. However, this is somewhat countered by the relative success of shale gas in the US.

Civil Servants and Academics

In the author's view it is the public service ethos in these groups that has made them most receptive to the message of “saving the planet” and least interested in the commercial impacts of rising energy costs caused by the policy. Academics in particular are part of a global network and most, regularly fly abroad to conferences and so are more likely than most to see themselves as being part of one global community.

So, perversely this group may be more affected than many when it finds that the EU is almost alone in supporting the policy. This will create a dissonance between what they have been led to believe ought to be happening (I.e. reducing global CO2) and the obvious implications that this group will be most aware of. The result is likely to be a feeling within civil servants and academics particularly in the EU that they have been “let down” by their colleagues in the rest of the world.

Whilst it is possible this may make some look again at the science, it is more likely that the feeling of being let down by the rest of the world will make EU based civil servants and pro-global warming academics more insular and more antagonistic.

In particular, the most zealous pro-global warming academics & civil servants are likely to react badly. They will not readily accept the idea that the world rejected Kyoto. Instead (if past behaviour is repeated) we may see further unethical attacks on sceptics of their climate catastrophe theory. (Academics have broken FOI law, forged documents and data, and impersonated individuals to steal documents from the Heartland Institute). More worrying is that far from being condemned, this criminal behaviour appears to be condoned by other academics. This suggests there is a pervasive culture in at least some parts of academia which feels threatened by the end of Kyoto.



Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 ostensibly to provide the world with a scientific view on the current state of knowledge of climate change however being inter-governmental, its reports are as much political rhetoric and aspiration as scientific observation. Whilst not directly affected by the end of the commitment under Kyoto, the lack of global political consensus will affect the workings of the IPCC if for no other reason than academics who contribute are not paid, and they give their time only because they believe it would help support the action they thought was necessary. If the global political consensus does not exist irrespective of vociferous nature of the advocates of action in the IPCC, the IPCC will lose power, influence and goodwill.

Indeed, the perception of the IPCC by climate academics may change from the IPCC being a helpful conduit to express their fears about the future through the language of science, and instead they may see the IPCC as the opposition: the representation of the global politicians who they see standing in their way of saving humanity from global warming hell.



Appendix 4 – References & Links

References

Bodansky, Daniel (2012) “W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond”, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21314/whither_the_kyoto_protocol_durban_and_beyond.html]Grubb, M. (2004) "Kyoto and the Future of International Climate Change Responses: From Here to Where?" (PDF). International Review for Environmental Strategies 5 (1): 2 (PDF version).[http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/rstaff/grubb/publications/J37.pdf]Höhne, Niklas (2005) “Impact of the Kyoto Protocol on Stabilization of Carbon DioxideConcentration”, ECOFYS energy & environment, Cologne, Germany[Online: http://stabilisation.metoffice.com/posters/Hohne_Niklas.pdf]Horner, Christopher C. (2006) “An Assessment of Kyoto and Emerging Issues for the 12th Conference of the Parties: Europe’s Performance, California Dreaming, Trade Wars and Waiting for Godot”, EEI Policy Note[http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Christopher%20Horner%20-%20An%20Assessment%20of%20Kyoto%20and%20Emerging%20Issues%20for%20the%2012th%20Conference%20of%20the%20Parties.pdf]UN General Assembly (1994) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2, Objective[http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php]

Useful Links

• Text of Kyoto Protocolhttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf

• United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Changehttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf

• Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its seventh session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf

• Legal considerations relating to a possible gap between the first and subsequent commitment periodshttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awg13/eng/10.pdf

Useful Articles

• Kyoto Protocol May End With the Year (Sept 17th 2012)http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/kyoto-protocol-may-end-with-the-year/

• EU Agrees to Extend Kyoto Emission-Reduction Goals Beyond 2012http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-11/eu-agrees-to-extend-kyoto-emission-reduction-goals-beyond-2012.html

• UN May Seek Kyoto Extension Without Canada, Japan, Russia


http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21314/whither_the_kyoto_protocol_durban_and_beyond.html

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21314/whither_the_kyoto_protocol_durban_and_beyond.html

http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/rstaff/grubb/publications/J37.pdf

http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1353.php

http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Christopher%20Horner%20-%20An%20Assessment%20of%20Kyoto%20and%20Emerging%20Issues%20for%20the%2012th%20Conference%20of%20the%20Parties.pdf



http://stabilisation.metoffice.com/posters/Hohne_Niklas.pdf

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-11/eu-agrees-to-extend-kyoto-emission-reduction-goals-beyond-2012.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-11/eu-agrees-to-extend-kyoto-emission-reduction-goals-beyond-2012.html

http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/kyoto-protocol-may-end-with-the-year/

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awg13/eng/10.pdf


http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf


http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-10/un-may-seek-kyoto-extension-without-canada-japan-russia.html

• Durban Parties Agree Kyoto Extensionhttp://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/12/12/durban-parties-agree-kyoto-extension/

• Third World Network, Bonn News Updatehttp://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/news/Bonn09/TWN_bonn09_up05.pdf

• A second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol: a victory or a deception?http://www.nelemarien.info/kp_victory_or_deception/

• Temporary extension of the Kyoto Protocol and relationship with the flexible mechanismshttp://www.legalresponseinitiative.org/download/Briefing%20note%20-%20Temporary%20extension%20of%20the%20KP%20and%20the%20Flexible%20Mechanisms%20%2822%20May%202010%29.pdf

Appendix 5 - Known UnknownsA few events are unpredictable and are listed here for completeness:

• EU Crisis:Given the current EU monetary crisis and huge debt by some countries, any sign that the EU is reckless with money may significantly dent its credibility. However, the EU is likely to end up after the climate talks at the end of the year trying to “go it alone” with little support from other Annex I countries and only getting support from others by offering huge incentives to recipient countries to sign a new deal. The simple fact is that neither the EU nor its member states can afford this policy nor worse afford the huge bribes others will ask to create anything meaningful post Kyoto. There is clearly a potential linkage between the EU monetary crisis and the end of Kyoto.

• Weather & Climate. A very cold winter with high fuel prices would clearly increase pressure and may bring in left of centre parties against the policy, whilst a mild winter is unlikely to have much impact. An exceptionally hot summer in 2013 has a much smaller impact than cold and in any case may be far too late to have any meaningful impact. Indeed, perversely, the main effect of any catastrophe linked to weather may be to raise awareness of the problems with Kyoto and speed the public realisation that it has effectively ended.

Appendix 6 - AcronymsCOP Conference of the Parties

CPM Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

AWG-KP Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol


http://www.legalresponseinitiative.org/download/Briefing%20note%20-%20Temporary%20extension%20of%20the%20KP%20and%20the%20Flexible%20Mechanisms%20(22%20May%202010).pdf



http://www.nelemarien.info/kp_victory_or_deception/

http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/news/Bonn09/TWN_bonn09_up05.pdf

http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/12/12/durban-parties-agree-kyoto-extension/



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