The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETYVOLUME 29, NUMBER 1, MARCH 2002ISSN: 0263-323X, pp. 197–225

The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation

Bettina Lange*

This article argues that the study of legal regulation can be furtherdeveloped through an analysis of emotions because it can bring intosharper focus the social nature of regulation. The article illustrates thispoint by discussing the notion of regulatory law as an emotionalprocess. It then suggests various ways in which an analysis of emotionscan promote understanding of a key issue in legal regulation, the roleof structure and agency. The article concludes with a brief discussionof how existing social science research methods can be adapted to thestudy of emotions.

INTRODUCTION

This article suggests that emotional processes are one aspect of legalregulation. Sociological analysis has made important contributions to theunderstanding of regulatory processes. It has shown the significance of arange of contextual factors, beyond formal law, in shaping the design andimplementation of legal regulation. It has, however, been limited by focusingon cognitive aspects and by neglecting emotional dynamics of social action.Hence, this article aims to open up a sociological analysis by suggesting thatregulating also involves the generation, expression, and management ofemotions. In order to make a contribution to regulatory theory, however, ananalysis of emotions has to be more than simply the addition of anotherdependent variable or the introduction of new terminology, such asrelabelling attitudes or values of regulators and regulated as emotionaldispositions.1 An analysis of emotions should open up new analytical terrain.Hence the ‘opening up’ of the sociological analysis of legal regulation has tobe accompanied by a ‘narrowing down’ which brings into sharper focus a

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* Law Department, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, England

1 A. Hochschild, ‘Ideology and Emotion Management: A Perspective and Path forFuture Research’ inResearch Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions, ed. T. Kemper(1990) 117.

key issuein legal regulation.Theseare law and society interrelationshipsand,in particular,thepossibilityof constructingcloselinks betweena socialanda legal realmon thebasisof ananalysisof emotions.Sectiononeof thearticle further strengthensthe casefor analysingemotionsas part of legalregulatoryprocessesby presentinga rangeof reasonsfor the relevanceofemotions.Sectiontwo arguesthatananalysisof emotionsand,in particular,thenotionof regulatorylaw asanemotionalprocess,enablesus to perceivestronglinks betweena socialanda legal realm.Sectionthreeillustrateshowananalysisof emotionsmight furtherdevelopa key areaof debate,the roleof structureandagencyin legalregulation.Sectionfour concludesthearticlewith a discussionof methodologicalissuesraisedby integratingan analysisof emotionsinto researchdesignson legal regulation.First of all, however,the questionwhat areemotionshasto be addressed.

WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?2

1. Emotion as linked to bodyand cognition

How to define emotionshas beena matter of debate.A rangeof socialscientists, however, agree that emotions involve both cognitive andphysiologicalprocesses.Hencefeeling is inextricably linked with thinkingand physicalarousal.The definitions of emotionsof two sociologistswhowork within different theoretical traditions illustrate this point. Arli eHochschild,a socialconstructionistdefinesemotionsas:

anawarenessof four elementsthatwe usuallyexperienceat thesametime: a)appraisalsof a situation, b) changesin bodily sensations,c) the free orinhibited display of expressivegesturesand d) a cultural label applied tospecificconstellationsof the first threeelements.3

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2 Some sociologists use the terms emotion, feeling, sentiment, and affectinterchangeably(see,for example,M.L. Lyon andJ.M. Barbalet,‘Society’s Body:Emotionandthe‘‘Somatization’’ of SocialTheory’ in EmbodimentandExperience:The Existential Ground of Culture and Self, ed. T. Csordas(1994) 48. Othersdistinguish, for instance,betweenfeeling and sentiment.According to Homan(referredto in T. Kemper,A Social Interactional Theoryof Emotions(1978) 23),feelingsareactualfeelings,while sentimentsarethe‘activities thatthemembersof aparticular verbal or symbolic community say are the signs of the attitudesandfeelings’ thatsocialactorsdevelopin interaction.Kemper(id., p. 48) usesthetermsaffectsor sentimentsfor themoreenduringemotions,suchashostility or love.Levydistinguishesemotion and feeling becausethey involve different relationshipsbetweentheself andthebody(R. Levy, ‘The Emotionsin ComparativePerspective’in Approachesto Emotion, eds.K.R. SchererandP. Ekman(1984)401–3).

3 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 118–19.

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Similiarly TheodoreKemperwho hasa morepositivistorientationdescribesemotionsas:

a relatively short–termevaluativeresponseessentiallypositive or negativeinnatureinvolving distinctsomatic(andoftencognitive)components. . . Cognitivecomponents consistof verbal judgementsor labelsthat identify the emotion.4

Sociologistsandanthropologistsdisagree,however,onhowexactlythebodyand the mind become involved in the production of emotions. Moreimportant for the discussionof legal regulation,however,is the fact thatlawyershaveoftenworkedwith adifferentconceptof emotion.In fact,somefacetsof lawyers’ definitions of emotionshaveimplied a limited view onhow they canbe takeninto accountin an analysisof legal regulation.

2. Emotionas ‘other’

Three ideasare central to lawyers’ definition of emotions.First, lawyershaveoftenperceivedemotionandcognitionasin tensionwith eachotherandhavedistancedemotionin particularfrom reasonandrationality.Moreover,rationalityandreasonarefrequentlyunderstoodasbeinginherentin the lawitself, for instancein the dueprocessmodelof criminal law.5 Consequentlyemotionis constructedas‘other’ to law.

Second,emotionsareconsideredaspotentiallyanarchic,unbounded,andassociatedwith a lack of control.Thereforewhenlawyershavediscussedtherole of emotionsin legal processestheyhaveemphasizedthe importanceofcontainingthem.6 The ‘messyindividuality’ of emotionsis contrastedwithhardandfast ‘categoricalrules’.7 Thus,lawyers’ constructionof emotionas‘other’ distancesemotionnot just from cognition but also from normativeprocesses.This again is different from sociologists’ understandingofemotions.In particular, social constructionistshave emphasizedthat thegeneration,expression,andmanagementof emotionsis subjectto normativepractices.For example,accordingto Hochschild‘feeling rules’ shapewhatemotionsare felt.8

Third, lawyers have not consideredemotionsas a social fact but havediscussedthem from a normative angle. Hence, they have been lessconcernedwith analytical links betweenemotional and legal processes.Insteadtheyhavedebatedthequestionwhetheremotionsshouldplay a rolein legal proceedings.9 The normative angle has been extendedeven to

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4 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 47.5 See,for example,T.M. Massaro,‘Show (Some)Emotions’in ThePassionsof Law,

ed. S. Bandes(1999)98–9.6 See,for example,Massaro,id., p. 99; C. Solomon,‘Justicev. Vengeance:On Law

andthe Satisfactionof Emotion’ in Bandes,id., pp. 138,144.7 S. Bandes,‘Introduction’, id. p. 7.8 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 122.9 For contrastingviewson this see,for example,Massaro,op.cit., n. 5 andD.M. Kahan,

‘The ProgressiveAppropriationof Disgust’ in Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, pp. 63–79.

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emotionsthemselveswhenlawyershavediscussedwhatare‘bad’ and‘good’emotions.10

To conclude,the term emotiondescribesthoseaspectsof social life thatinvolve feeling. For social scientists, however, emotions cannot beunderstoodin isolation but are closely linked to cognition and the body.Different definitionscanfulfill variousanalyticaltasks.While lawyershavetended to construct emotion as ‘other’, sociologists’ definitions providefirmer analyticalgroundfor exploringemotionalprocessesasanintegralpartof legal regulation. The next section will suggestvarious reasonswhyemotionsshouldbe takeninto accountin an analysisof legal regulation.

WHY DOESAN ANALYSIS OF EMOTIONS MATTER FORUNDERSTANDINGLEGAL REGULATION?

1. Emotionalizedsocieties– emotionalized legal regulation

Academicanalysisof legal regulationoften reflectsthe broadersocialandintellectual contextsin which it is produced.As societiesand intellectualfashionschange,so do accountsof legal regulation.Systemstheory hasinfluencedacademicanalysisof legalregulationconsiderablyalsobecauseitreflectsandexplainsa widespreadperceptionthat – despiteglobalization–societies are increasingly differentiated, complex, and diverse.11 Morerecently, however, societies are described as becoming increasingly‘emotionalized’.12 This ‘emotionalization’ takes various forms. It caninvolve the expressionof emotionsas an accepted,routine part of publicdiscourse.For example,criminal justicedebatesaboutthereleaseof thetwoyoungBritish menwho killed the toddlerJamesBulger wereconductedinemotionalizedterms.They referredto compassionand forgivenesson theone hand and vengeance, hatred, and disgust on the other hand.13

‘Emotionalizing’ societies,however, can also mean to problematizethegeneration,expression,and managementof emotionsand subject socialactorsto increasingsocialcontrol throughformal andinformal practicesofinterventionin their emotionallives. For example,deviantemotionscanbeperceivedasa causefor crime andhencethe appropriateresponsebecomes

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10 Bandes,id., pp. 5, 13, 14.11 N. Luhmann,TheDifferentiationof Society(1982);K. Dammann,D. Grunow,and

P. Japp(eds.),Die VerwaltungdesPolitischenSystems(1994); J. Kooiman (ed.),ModernGovernance,NewGovernment– SocietyInteractions(1993)3, andchapterby T.B. Jørgensen,‘Modesof GovernanceandAdministrativeChange’in Kooiman,id., p. 219.

12 S. Karstedt,‘Emotions,Law andCrime’ in Crime and Emotions, eds.W. de HaanandJ. Loader(2003),specialissueof TheoreticalCriminology, forthcoming.

13 L. Barton, ‘The Problem With Children Who Kill’ Guardian, 10 July 2001; S.Rushdie,‘Who Will RehabilitatetheBritish TabloidPress?’Guardian, 7 July 2001.

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the treatmentandcorrectionof theemotionalmake-upof theoffender.14 Toconclude,if societiesare becomingincreasinglyemotionalized,then it isdifficult to argue that legal regulation is untaintedby this and that theacademicanalysisof legal regulationdoesnot requireany referenceto therole of emotionsin regulatoryprocesses.The next sectionwill arguethatemotionsdo not just becomea topic in regulatoryanalysisbecauseof thesocial changesthat societiesundergobut also becauseof innovationsinintellectualtrends.

2. Emotionsas a topic in postmodernistperspectivesof legal regulation

An analysisof emotionscanhelp to takethepostmodernturn fully on boardin the analysisof legal regulation.A significant part of the literature hasexaminedlegal regulationwithin a modernistframework.This hasinvolvedaparticularview of law andsocietyrelationships.It hasbeenassumedthatinprinciple regulatedand regulators,can act in a goal-oriented,rational waypursuingtheir interests.15 Regulatorylaw hasbeenseenasa tool which canbe employedin an instrumentalmannerto achievethrough linear cause-effect relationshipsthe endsthat have beenspecified in legal regulation.Analysisof legal regulationfrom systems-theoretical or otherpostmodernistperspectiveshasdepartedfrom theseideasby questioning,for instance,thepossibility of agency. In systems-theoretical accounts agency is notpresupposedbut is the outcomeof communicativeprocesses.Henceactionsare simply elementsof systemsand agencyis understoodas a form ofreductionof the complexityof systems.16

Some aspects of postmodernist, and in particular post-structurali stanalysis,however,are not fully taken on board in thesecontributions.17

Post-structuralist accountshavefocusedupononeparticularaspectof socialactors;their body.18 Thebodyreplacessubjectsandcanbea key site for theexerciseof social control.19 Significant concepts,such as power20 andgovernance,aswell asstructureandagency,arereconceptualizedthroughananalysis of the body. For example, speechacts are a manifestationofpower.21 Emotionsare one important aspectof the functioning of bodies.

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14 K. Williams, Textbookon Criminology (1994)181,228.15 E. Bardach and A. Kagan, Going by the Book, the Problem of Regulatory

Unreasonableness(1982);A. Kagan,N. Gunningham,andD. Thornton,RegulatoryRegimesand Variations in CorporateEnvironmentalPerformance:Evidencefromthe Pulp and Paper Industry (2001).

16 N. Luhmann,SozialeSysteme(1992)192–3.17 For a differentperspectiveseeG. Burchell,C. Gordon,andP. Miller, TheFoucault

Effect,Studiesin Governmentality(1991).18 See,for example,M. Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality(1981,tr. by R. Hurley).19 T. Turner, ‘Bodies and Anti-Bodies: Flesh and Fetish in ContemporarySocial

Theory’ in Csordas,op. cit., n. 2, p. 30.20 For example,Foucault’sconceptof biopower.21 Turner,op. cit., n. 19, p. 35.

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Analysing them as an aspectof regulatory processesmeansto developfurtherpostmodernistperspectivesof legalregulation.Moreover,ananalysisof emotions can help to overcome some of the limitations of post-structuralistaccounts.Foucault’snotion of the body hasbeencriticized astoo abstractand too removedfrom the ‘flesh’ of real bodies.22 Hence,ananalysisof emotions,as part of the physicalbody, allows us to draw on afuller andmorematerialaccountof the body.

3. Correctingthe `cognitivebias' throughtaking emotionsinto account

Exploringemotionsasanaspectof legalregulationdoesnot meanto declarecognitionasunimportant.Insteadit meansto correctthecurrentbiasin mostaccountsof legal regulationwhich focusexclusivelyon cognitiveprocessesin legal regulation.Emotionalprocessesmight evenconstitutea largerpartof social life thancognitive processes.According to Kemperwe feel morethan we know and one of the reasonsfor this is that we do not have thelanguageto label all our feelings.23

Correctingthe cognitive bias can take two forms. First, cognition andemotion might be perceivedas two separatevariables.24 Being able tocontrol for the influenceof either cognition or emotionin legal regulatoryprocessesallows us to draw firmer conclusions.Henceresearchon legalregulation that considers emotions as a possible factor in regulatoryprocessesmay show that in some regulatory processesemotionsdo notplay a role andthat theseregulatoryprocessesaredriven by cognition.Thevalueof suchan analysiswould be to confirm explicitly the importanceofcognitiveprocesseswhich currentlyare just assumed.

Second,correcting the cognitive bias could mean acknowledgingthatdiscussionsabout cognition in legal regulation inevitably need also toaddressemotions because cognition and emotion are closely related.According to Durkheim emotionsare inextricably linked with thoughtandbelief.25 Emotions can come into play in various ways in cognitiveprocesses.26 Somecommentatorshaveevenperceivedemotionsascognitive

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22 id., pp. 28, 36, 38.23 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 86.24 Accountsof relationshipsbetweenemotion and cognition are subject to cultural

variation. In Chinese culture, for example, thought and emotion are strictlydifferentiated:T. Ots; ‘The SilencedBody – The ExpressiveLeib: On the Dialecticof Mind andLife in ChineseCatharticHealing’ in Csordas,op. cit., n. 2, p. 119.

25 E. Durkheim,TheElementaryFormsof the ReligiousLife (2001,1st edn.1912,tr.C. Cosman)312. The possibility of a closelink betweenemotionandcognition isalsoreflectedin theterminologythatsomecommentatorsadopt.For example,Levyand Frijda distinguish between‘feelings’ which are just a bodily sensationand‘emotions’ which involve a cognizedinterpretation.R. Levy, ‘Emotion, KnowingandCulture’ in CultureTheory:Essayson Mind, SelfandEmotion, eds.A. ShwederandA. LeVine (1984)218–33.N. Frijda, TheEmotions(1987).

26 Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 14.

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constructions. Fromthis perspectivesituationscanrequiretheproductionofa certainemotion.27 It is only throughthe thoughtprocessesthat arisefromthis productionof emotionsthat emotionsbecomereal. Thoughtprocessescan also be involved in the productionof emotionsbecause,accordingtoKemper,a largeclassof emotionsresultfrom ‘real, imagined,or anticipatedoutcomesin social relationships’.28

For social constructionists,cultural cognitive constructsplay an importantrole in shapingwhat emotionsare felt andexpressed,29 for example,whetherandwhentheemotionshameis triggeredis informedby socialactors’previousexperiences.Cognition,in turn, is involved in themakingof experiences.‘Ouraffect systemis heavily modulatedby our analyticalcapacities’.30 Similiarly,the emotion of disgust has been defined as: ‘. . . not an instinctive andunthinking aversion but rather a thoughtpervadedevaluative sentiment’.31

Also, by referring to languagein definitions of emotion,cognitive processeshavebeenclosely linked to emotions.Emotionsare often expressedthroughlanguageandhencethey havebeenperceivedas‘complex narrativestrugglesthat give shapeand meaningto somaticand affective experiences’.32 Thus,emotionsare ‘types of self-involving storieswhich makeit possiblefor us totell aboutour feelings’.Theyare‘linguistic ploys’ which canalsofulfill socialfunctions,suchasattributingblameor reinforcingconductthroughpraise.33

For Collins a closelink betweencognition and emotionarisesfrom thefact that both aregeneratedthroughgroupprocessesand, in particular,theengagementof individuals in grouprituals. For example,feelingsof moralsolidarity in a groupcangenerateactsof altruismandlove aswell asanger,for example,in the persecutionof individuals perceivedas outcastsof thegroup.But cognitiveconstructscanalsoarisefrom high-solidarityrituals.34

Thesethen becomeinvoked in thinking and communicatingand in thisprocessindividualsfeelagaintheemotionsof groupsolidaritytheyfelt whenthey first participatedin the group.35 Also Collins’s conceptof emotionalenergy points to close links betweenemotion and cognition. Emotionalenergyhasa cognitivecomponentbecauseit is basedon the expectationtobe a memberof a groupor to be dominantin interaction.36

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27 T. Kemper,‘Introduction’ in Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, p. 11.28 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 43.29 Hochschild,op.cit., n. 1, p. 117;C. Lutz, UnnaturalEmotions:EverydaySentiments

on a MicronesianAtoll and their Challengeto WesternTheory(1988).30 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, p. 85.31 Kahan,op. cit., n. 9, p. 64, referringto Miller.32 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, p. 86, referringto A. Shweder‘ ‘‘You’re not sick, you’re just

in love’’ : Emotion as an Interpretive System’ in The Nature of Emotion:FundamentalQuestions, eds.P. EkmanandR. Davidson(1994).

33 Massaro,id., p. 86.34 R. Collins, ‘Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions’ in

Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, p. 34.35 Collins, id.36 id., p. 40.

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In whateverway emotionsare taken into accountin the analysisoflegal regulation, as a separatevariableor as closely linked to cognition,an analysisof emotionsin legal regulationis importantin order to avoidan uncritical reproduction of legal ideology in research on legalregulation. Legal ideology, and in particular the notion of the autonomyof law, is premisedon the ideathat legalprocessesarebasedon reasontotheexclusionof emotion.It is clear,however,thatemotionsplay a role ina rangeof legal processes.For example,victim impact statementsarepart of the United States capital sentencingprocessand these caninfluence the jury’s emotionaldispositiontowardsthe offender. Wherethe existence of emotion in legal processeshas been recognized,emotionshave been assignedto specific, narrowly defined placesandonly a limited list of law-related emotionshasbeenacknowledged,suchas anger,compassion,mercy, vengeance,and hatred.37 Emotions havebeenrecognizedto exist in particular in thecriminal courts.For example,defendantssometimespresentparticular emotional statesto a jury inorderto influencefavourably the trial outcome.38 Thus,the expressionofemotionsis in particularattributedto thosewithout legal training,suchasdefendants,juries, and witnesses.Legal personnelare expectedto beimpartial, distant, and detached and empathy should not influencedecision-making. The rule of law assumesthat laws can be appliedin apredictable and logical way.

Socio-legalresearchaspiresto discoverthe social realitiesof law andtodocumenthow law lives. Correctingthe cognitive bias in studiesof legalregulationcancontributetowardsthisaim.Moreoveremotionsshouldnotbeexcludedfrom an analysisof legal regulationbecauseaccordingto somedefinitions of legal regulation they might be inextricably linked with theprocessof regulating.

4. Regulatingas involving emotionalprocesses

Emotionscannot be excludedfrom an analysisof legal regulationbecauseregulatingdrawson emotionalprocesses.A growingbodyof literaturein thecontextof both theUnitedStatesandUnitedKingdomlegal systemsarguesthat emotions are important for understanding the operation of lawgenerally.39 Moreover,definitions of regulationsuggestthat emotionsarean integralpart of regulating.Thereis no agreementon how to definelegal

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37 S. Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 2.38 A. Posner,‘Emotion versusEmotionalismin Law’ in id., p. 319.39 See,for example,Bandes,id., in the United Statescontext;in the United Kingdom

context,seeT. Murphy and N. Whitty, ‘Crowning Glory: Public Law, PowerandMonarchy’(2000)9 SocialandLegalStudies7–27;L. Gies,‘ContestingtheRuleofEmotions?The PressandEnforcedCaesareans’(2000)9 Socialand Legal Studies515–38.

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regulation.40 A number of commentators, however, have perceivedbehaviouralcontrol as a key aspect.41 This occursin two ways. First andmoreobviously,successfullegalregulationeitherby theregulatoror throughself-regulationimpliescontroloverthebehaviourof theregulated.Secondly,andincreasinglydiscussedin the literature,legal regulationinvolvescontrolof the behaviour of the regulators themselves.This implies not justtraditionalaccountabilitymechanismsbut alsomorediffuse processessuchas culture within regulatoryagencies.42 Explanationsfor suchbehaviouralcontrol,however,aretoo narrowif theyrefer just to eitherthoughtprocessesor emotions.Both what social actors think and feel producesbehaviour.Also, other definitions suggestthat emotionscannotbe excludedfrom ananalysisof legal regulation.Selznick’s definition of regulation,which isadoptedby a numberof contributorsto debatesabout legal regulation,43

suggeststhat regulationis: ‘sustainedand focusedcontrol exercisedby apublic agencyover activities that are valued by a community’.44 Hence,regulation is here defined as an activity in the public interest.For somesociologists,values,which can underpinnotionsof the public interest,are‘cognitions infusedwith emotion’.45 For instance,environmentalistvalueswhich include emotionaldispositionscan underwriteenvironmentallegalregulation.According to holistic, integratedenvironmentalregulation,thenaturalenvironmentis not to be exploitedanddominatedby humansocialactors.Insteadhumanactorsrecognizetheir interdependencewith ecologicalsystemsand therefore care for and sustain the natural environment.46

Furthermore,some commentatorsuse terms such as compassionor a‘passion’ for equity, justice,and fairnesswhen talking aboutvalueswhichcan inform legal regulation.47 The idea that emotionsare involved in theprocessof regulating through law can be further developedthrough thenotion of regulatorylaw asan emotionalprocess.

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40 J. Black, ‘DecentringRegulation:Understandingthe Role of Regulationand SelfRegulationin a ‘‘Post-Regulatory’’ World’ CurrentLegalProblems(forthcoming).

41 L. Hancher and M. Moran,’Organizing Regulatory Space’ in A Reader onRegulation, eds.R. Baldwin, C. Scott,andC. Hood (1998)148; Black, id.

42 C. Hall, C. Scott,andC. Hood,TelecommunicationsRegulation,Culture,ChaosandInterdependenceinside the RegulatoryProcess(2000).

43 See,for example,A. Ogus,Regulation:LegalForm andEconomicTheory(1994)1;G. Majone, ‘The Rise of the RegulatoryStatein Europe’ in Baldwin, Scott, andHood,op. cit., n. 41, p. 196.

44 P.Selznick,‘FocusingOrganizationalResearchon Regulation’in RegulatoryPolicyand the SocialSciences, ed. R. Noll (1985)363.

45 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 27.46 For a polemicaccountof environmentalistvalueswhich perceivesemotionsaspart

of thesevalues,seeJ. Porritt, ‘SeeingGreen’in Holistic Revolution, ed.W. Bloom(2000).

47 Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 2.

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REGULATORY LAW AS AN EMOTIONAL PROCESS

Law andsocietyinterrelationshipshavebeena key issuein the analysisoflegal regulation.Variousdifferent ideason how legal andsocialrealmscanbecomelinked havebeendiscussed.Somehaveperceivedregulatedsystemsas‘normativelyclosedbut cognitivelyopen’.48 A legalandsocialrealmcanbecomelinked through‘structuralcoupling’.49 Othershavearguedthat legalregulationneedsto draw on social dynamicsthroughthe conceptsof ‘co-regulation’ ,50 ‘ co-steering’ ,51 and ‘socio-political’ 52 regulation. Thisconstructscloserrelationshipsbetweenstateand societyin regulationthantraditional, instrumental,top-down,‘command-and-control’ approaches.

This sectionarguesthat an analysisof emotionsallows to identify closeinterrelationshipsbetweena legalanda socialrealmbecauseemotionsareacrucial ‘link concept’.53 On theonehand,emotionsareclearlyanchoredin aprivatesphereof civil society,but, on theotherhand,theyarealsoinvolvedin thecreationof socialstructures,suchasformsof governanceandlaw. AsLock suggests:‘emotion is the mediatrix amongthe individual body, thesocialbody andthe body politic’.54 This sectionillustratessuchcloselinksby describingregulatorylaw asan emotionalprocess.Threepointssupportthis. First, legal regulationcan be the sourceof emotions.Secondly,legalregulationcanbe the outcomeof emotionalprocesses.Thirdly, ‘regulatorylaw in action’ canbe understoodasthe interactionbetweenregulatorystatelaw andthe ‘laws of emotions’.

1. Legal regulationas the outcomeof emotionalprocesses

In Westernlegalsystemslegal regulationis oftenconsideredastheoutcomeof cognitive processes.Rational discussionis usually focused upon inaccountsof the production of legal regulation. For example, politicallobbying, an important aspectof the creationof legal regulation,is often

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48 G. Teubner,Law as an AutopoieticSystem(1993)32–4.49 N. Luhmann,Das Rechtder Gesellschaft(1993)ch. 10.50 Co-regulationis also advocatedas an important techniqueof regulation in the

EuropeanUnion’s Sixth EnvironmentalAction Programme.Communicationfromthe Commissionto the Council, the EuropeanParliament,the EconomicandSocialCommitteeand the Committeeof the Regions,‘Environment 2010: Our Future,Our Choice’, 24 January2001,COM (2001)31 final 61.

51 D. OsborneandE. Gaebler,ReinventingGovernment(1992).52 J. Kooiman,‘Social-PoliticalGovernance:Introduction’ in Kooiman,op. cit., n. 11,

p. 453 M. Lyon, ‘C. Wright Mills meetsProzac:theRelevanceof ‘‘Social Emotion’’ to the

Sociologyof HealthandIllness’ in Health and the Sociologyof Emotions, eds.V.JamesandJ. Gabe(1996)57.

54 M. Lock and P. Dunk, ‘My Nervesare Broken’ in Health in CanadianSociety:SociologicalPerspectives(1987),referredto in Csordas,op. cit., n. 2, p. 14.

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describedasa processin which variousactorstry to asserttheir self-interestsandin that senseact rationally. Evenwherepoliticiansact asadvocatesonbehalf of other groups,this behaviourcan still be describedas rational.According to public-choice theories of regulation, politicians acting onbehalfof interestgroupsact rationally becausethey canexpectto maintainor be voted into positionsof political power in return.55

Furthermore,institutionsfor the productionof legal regulation,suchasparliamentsand their specific proceduralrules for debate,are meant toensurethat legal regulationis producedon thebasisof rationalcriteria.Theideathat reasonandrationality aredriving forcesin modernsocietyanditslegal regulationhas,of course,beencriticized and questioned,56 but newforms of rationality have been considered as possible. According toHabermas, communicative rationality involves the conduct of socialrelations ‘according to the principle that the validity of every norm ofpolitical consequencebe made dependenton a consensusarrived at incommunicationfree from domination’.57 Stenvallevensuggeststhat:

Whenit comesto governabilityin the senseof creatingorder,a world whichremainsinaccessibleto humanintervention,can also not be affectedby itsargumentor logic.58

Not just cognitive but also emotional processesare important in theformation of legal regulation. Both from a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’perspective,emotionsare significant for explaining how legal regulation isproduced. Interactionist studies of the day-to-day enforcement of legalregulationhaveshownthat its meaningis constructedfrom ‘the bottom up’throughsmall-scaletransactionsbetweenregulators,regulated,andsometimesthird parties,suchas non-governmentalorganizations.59 Legal regulation‘inaction’ is composedof small-scale,socialorderswhich areestablishedduringthepracticalimplementationof statelegalregulation.60 Sofar, theliteratureon

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55 Ogus,op. cit., n. 43, p. 59.56 See,for example,M. HorkheimerandT. Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment(1972,

tr. J. Cumming).57 J. Habermas,Knowledgeand HumanInterests(1971,tr. J. Shapiro)284.58 K. Stenvall,‘Public Policy Planningandthe Problemof Governance:the Question

of Educationin Finland’ in Kooiman,op.cit., n. 11,p. Similiarly, Gunninghamet al.argue:‘Therearethosewhomaybe irrational, intransigent,or incompetentandwhomay lie beyond the reach not only of voluntary, but also of incentive-basedmechanisms’(emphasisadded):N. Gunningham,P. Grabosky,and D. Sinclair,SmartRegulation,DesigningEnvironmentalPolicy (1998)316.

59 Hall, Scott, and Hood, op. cit., n. 42, pp. 193–4; K. Hawkins, EnvironmentandEnforcement,Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution (1984); W.G.Carson,‘The Institutionalizationof Ambiguity in the Early British FactoryActs’ inWhiteCollar Crime: Theoryand Research, eds.G. GeisandE. Stotland(1980).

60 Forexample,Hawkins,id. documentsthatwaterpollutioncontrolofficersdevelopeda set of social norms which defined the ‘just’ and ‘efficient’ treatmentof waterpollution cases.Thesealso influencedwhen prosecutionswould be initiated andhencethe form andcontentof the legal regulationin practice.

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legal regulationhasfocusedon the cognitive dimensionof thesesmall-scalesocialorders.Forexample,actors’interpretationsof formallegalregulationfeedinto theestablishmentof thesesocialorders.Mundanesocialorders,however,canalsobeanelementof thesesmall-scalesocialorders.Somesociologistshavearguedthat emotionalprocessesarekey to understandinghow suchmundanesocial ordersbecomeestablished.Collins, in analysingGarfinkel’s work,61

suggeststhat the limits of human cognitive abilities are essentialfor anexplanationof how the micro elementsof mundanesocialorder,suchasrulesgoverning conversations or encounters between family members, areestablished.Socialactorsemploya rangeof practicesin ordernot to recognizethat mundanesocialorderis establishedin a ratherarbitrary fashion.62 Hencesocialactorskeepup conventionsbecauseemotionsbuttressthem,not becausetheyhaveevaluatedtheseconventionsasvalid andconsciouslysupportthem.63

Thisinsightwasgeneratedthroughexperimentsconductedby Garfinkel.Duringthese,participantsshowed strong negative emotions when the experimentrevealedto therespondentsthattheywereconstructingtheirownsocialworld inan arbitrary and conventionalway, rather than respondingto an exterior,objectivereality. Hence,not to questionthe conventionsthat makeup socialorder is accompaniedby positive emotions.Collins concludesfrom this that‘socialordercannotbebasedonrational,consciousagreement’andthat‘realityconstructionis anemotionalprocess’.64

Also, from a ‘top down’ perspectivelegalregulationcanbeperceivedastheoutcomeof emotionalprocesses.In this approachlegal regulationis equatedwith formal, regulatorystatelaw. On the most simple level the feelingsthatsocialactorshaveabouttheissueswhicharelegally regulatedcaninfluencetheform andcontentof legal regulation.For example,theexpressionof emotions,suchasfear abouthealthor aversionto interferencewith the ‘laws of nature’,arepartof debatesabouttheregulationof GMOsandcanfeedinto its design.65

Moreover,emotioncanfeedinto the establishmentof cognitiveconstructsonthebasisof which a law-makingdebateis conducted.For example,notionsofromanticlovecanhelpto explainthedifferentlegalregulationof same-sexandheterosexualrelationships.66 The point that emotionsfeed into law-makingprocessescanbemadeevenmorestrongly.Emotionsalsoinherein large-scalesocialstructures,suchasthestateandsystemsof governance.Legalregulation,in turn, reflectsthenatureof theselarge-scalesocialstructures.67 For example,

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61 H. Garfinkel, Studiesin Ethnomethodology(1967).62 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 29.63 id., pp. 29, 30.64 id., p. 30.65 J. Black, ‘RegulationasFacilitation:NegotiatingtheGeneticRevolution’ (1998)61

ModernLaw Rev.622.66 C. Calhoun,‘Making up EmotionalPeople:TheCaseof RomanticLove’ in Bandes,

op. cit., n. 5, pp. 217–40.67 M. Barbalet, ‘A Macro Sociology of Emotion: Class Resentment’(1992) 10

SociologicalTheory150–63.

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Barbalet suggeststhat resentmentis a key ingredient of class structures.Economic structures,such as a differential distribution of resources,orcognitiveconstructs,suchasclassconsciousness,arenot sufficient to explainthesocialphenomenonof class.68 Emotions,suchasresentment,alsoconstructclass.Furthermorethe control andmanagementof emotionscanbe importantfor the maintenanceof systemsof governance.Barbalet,referringto Fantasia,arguesthat somecapitalistsystemsrequire‘massivestructuresandresources’,suchasunions,for the control of collective impulses.69 Similiarly Scheffhasexploredhow shameandangersequencescaninform collectivebehaviourandinfluence internationalrelationsbetweenstates.70 Also, anthropologistshaveargued that statescan becomeinvolved in the constructionand strategicmanagementof emotions and legal regulation bears the imprint of the‘emotional economy’of a state.71 To conclude,this sectionhasarguedthatlegal regulationcanbe the outcomeof emotionalprocesses.The next sectionwill suggestthat legal regulationcanalsogive rise to emotionalprocesses.

2. Legal regulationas giving rise to emotionalprocesses

The ideathat legal regulationcangive rise to emotionalprocesseshasbeendiscussedin particularin thecontextof enforcement.Particulartypesof lawmay leadto specificemotions.Regulatoryor coercivelaw mayelicit fear.72

For example, Hood suggeststhat the power of school inspectors torecommendschool closuresgeneratedlevels of fear amongthe regulatedunknownin businessregulation.Moreover, it hasbeenarguedthat a gapbetweenthebehaviourof theregulatedandtherequirementsof formal legalregulation,canbethebasisfor attemptsto generatetheemotionof shameinoffenders.73

This sectionsuggests,however,that any legal regulationcangive rise tothe full rangeof emotions,not just negativeemotions,suchas shameandfear. According to Kemper’s social interactional theory, emotionsare aresponseto environmentalstimuli. Thesestimuli are producedin socialrelationships between individuals. Kemper considerspower and statusdistributions as key aspects of these relationships. Changes in theirdistribution lead to the production of emotions.74 The feelings producedvary dependingif theself or theotherpersonareseenasthesourceof one’sexcessive,sufficientor insufficientstatusor power.Forexample,if oneactorperceivesthestatusothersgrantto him or herasadequatethenthisactorwill

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68 id., p. 152.69 id., p. 159, referring to R. Fantasia’swork.70 T. Scheff,Microsociology:Discourse,Emotion,and SocialStructure(1990)76–8.71 H. JenkinsandM. Valiente, ‘Bodily Transactionsof the Passions:El Calor among

SalvadoreanWomenRefugees’in Csordas,op. cit., n. 11, p. 164.72 Miller, referredto in Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 6.73 J. Braithwaite,Crime, Shameand Reintegration(1989).74 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 26.

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feel secure.75 When a person,however, thinks that too much status isallocatedto them by anotherpersonthen the emotionproducedis shame.This, however,canbe ‘extrojected’in theform of hostility or angertowardsthe other.76

Legal regulationcan impact directly on the distribution of power andstatusamongsocial actors.For instance,command-and-controlregulation,can enhance the power of regulators, or where devices of ‘creativecompliance’ are successfully used it can enhance the power of theregulated.77 Evenwherelegal regulationis not enforcedin practice,simplyits existencecanaffect the distribution of powerandstatusbetweensocialactors.For example,bargainingbetweenregulatorsandregulatedcanoccurin theshadowof the ‘big stick’ of sanctions.78 Accordingto Kemper,statusexists when social actorspossesspositive attributesin responseto whichother social actorsgrant voluntary compliancewith the demandsof suchactors.79 For example,regulatorsare sometimesperceivedas providersofexpertconsultancyadviceby theregulated.80 Theregulatedat timescomplyvoluntarily with regulators’demandsbecauseregulatorsareattributedstatuson thebasisof their knowledgeandexpertise.Legalregulationcanaffectthedistributionof statusbetweentheregulatedandregulators.For example,theinvocation of criminal sanctionscan lead to status loss.81 According toKemper,theperceptionof thedistributionof statusbetweensocialactorsasadequate,insufficient or excessive,in turn, leads to the production ofemotions.82 Understandinghow legal regulation generatesemotions isimportantbecauseemotionscanhelpto explainsocialdynamicsbetweentheregulatedand the regulators.For example,angermight lead to behaviourwhich is directedat change,while securitymight underpinbehaviourwhichis aimed at the preservationof the status quo between regulated andregulators. The next section will argue that legal regulation involvesemotionalprocessesalsobecauseregulatorylaw in actionis theoutcomeofinteractionbetweenformal statelaw andthe ‘laws of emotions’.

Theliteratureon legalpluralismandtheenforcementof legalregulationhas documentedthat the meaning of the law in action results frominteractionsbetweenformal state law and various types of small-scalesocial orders created in the field. According to some sociologists,

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75 id., p. 50.76 id., p. 62.77 D. McBarnetand C. Whelan, ‘The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalismand the

Strugglefor Legal Control’ (1991)54 ModernLaw Rev.848–7378 Gunninghamet al., op. cit., n. 56, p. 261; I. Ayres andJ. Braithwaite,Responsive

Regulation:Transcendingthe DeregulationDebate(1992)161.79 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 30.80 Hawkins,op. cit. n. 59, p. 45.81 See,for example,thepublicationof a list of namedcompanieswhich areconsidered

as ‘ bad envi ronmental performers’ by the UK Envi ronment Agency:<www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business>.

82 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, ch. 3, p. 5.

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emotionalprocessescangive riseto suchsmall-scalesocialordersbecausesocial norms govern the generation,expressionand managementofemotions.83 Hencethereare specific ‘laws of emotions’,and regulatorylaw in action can be describedas the outcomeof interactionsbetweenformal statelaw andthese‘laws of emotions’.

3. Whatare the `laws of emotion'?

Some sociologists have argued that emotions do not just happenspontaneously but ‘unarticulatedgroundrulesof social interaction’,suchas expression and feeling rules, govern whether emotionsare activelyinvokedor suppressed.84 Feelingrulesregulatehow socialactorsoughttofeel in a particularsituation.85 Their fluid naturemakestheir normativitydifferent from statelaw. Feelingrules simply establish‘zonesthat markoff degreesof appropriateness’.86 Expressionrules,in turn, regulatewhatfeelingsareappropriateto display.87 Organizationsareonearenain whichthe‘laws of emotions’andformalstatelaw caninteractin orderto produce‘regulatory law in action’. Feeling rules are central to the operationoforganizationsbecausethey can be considered as the ‘ ‘‘underside’’ of anorganization’s occupational ideology’.88 Law-making and enforcementorganizations,as well as the organizations of the regulated,in turn, arecrucial for constructing the meaningof regulatorylaw. Someaspectsofregulating throughlaw may morestronglythanothersinvolve interactionwith the ‘laws of emotions’. Rulesfor the guidanceof behaviour, suchasemotion rules, become particularly relevant when various, mutuallyexclusiveopportunitiesfor action exist, suchas in the caseof conflict.Conflicts of interestscanarisebetweenregulatedandregulators. Theycanalso arise betweendifferent parts of a regulatedorganization, such ashealthandsafety,environmental managementor compliancedepartmentson the one hand,and commercial and operationalsectionson the otherhand.89

Not just organizations,but alsosystemsof social stratification can beanotherkey site for interactionsbetweenformal legal regulationand the‘laws of emotions’.Emotionshelp social actorsto define and constructrelationshipsbetweenthemselvesandtheworld aroundthem.90 Theyhelp

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83 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 120, 122.84 id.85 id., p. 122.86 id., p. 123.87 id., p. 122.88 id., p. 118.89 B. Lange, ‘National Environmental Regulation? A Case-Study of Waste

Managementin EnglandandGermany’(1999)11 J. of EnvironmentalLaw 76.90 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 119.

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people to find their ‘place’ in social relationships.91 ‘Place’, in turn,defines an individual’s relationship to others with referenceto power,status,andsocial distance.Theserelationships can vary amongdifferentsocial actors, and hence emotions contribute to the establishmentofsystems of social stratification.92 Social stratification can also beexpressedand reinforcedthroughemotions.Emotionscan be directedatconfirming what constitutesthe ‘low’ or ‘high end’ of a systemof socialstratification.93 For example, disgust reflects particular social normsaccordingto which somepeopleor objectsarejudgedas‘low’ andshamecanhelp to avoid statusreducingbehaviour.94

Furthermore, according to some commentators, feeling rules andemotionalstrategieshelp to explain how emotionsbecomeinvolved in theconstruction of systemsof social stratification. Social actors have an‘intuitive grasp’of their locationin systemsof socialstratificationandin thelight of this awarenessparticularfeelingrulesappeal.95 Thoughtandfeelingfeed into ‘strategies of action’.96 Such emotional strategiescan eitherconfirm or changeexistingpatternsof socialstratification.97

Not just emotions,however, but also legal regulation feeds into theestablishmentof systemsof socialstratification.Forexample,socialsecurityand taxation law can influence social status through the allocation ofresources.Furthermorecriminal law or anti-discriminationlegislation canaffect status allocation by simply defining what is acceptable andunacceptablebehaviour.98 Different forms of legal regulation, such ascommandandcontrolaswell asself-regulation,influencethedistributionofpowerandthussystemsof socialstratification.

Various forms of interactionbetweenlegal regulationand the ‘laws ofemotions’ in systemsof social stratification can be imagined.On the onehand,both the ‘laws of emotion’andformal legal regulationcanupholdthesame,existingsystemof socialstratification.For example,emotionssuchasdisapprovaland shamecan supporta systemof social stratificationwhereactorswho damagethe naturalenvironmentareconsideredas ‘low’. Legalregulationmight also confirm and supportthis social stratificationsystem.On theotherhand,the‘laws of emotions’andlegalregulationmight supportdifferent socialstratificationsystemswhich are in conflict with eachother.For example,the ‘laws of emotion’ might support a social stratification

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91 C. Clark, ‘Emotions and Micropolitics in Everyday Life: Some PatternsandParadoxesof ‘‘Place’’ ’ in Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, p. 305.

92 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 28.93 Kahan,op. cit., n. 9, p. 64.94 id., p. 85.95 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 137.96 A. Swidler,‘Culture in Action: SymbolsandStrategies’(1986)51 Am.Sociological

Rev.273–86.97 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 139.98 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, p. 82.

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systemwherethe maximizationof economicgainsis consideredas ‘high’.Formallegal regulation,however,maysupporta socialstratificationsystemwheremaximizationof economicgainsranksconsiderablylower than theprotectionof health and safety at work. The specific outcomeof variouspossible interactions between the laws of emotions and formal legalregulation is regulatory law in action. So far this article has arguedthatpointing to the emotionalaspectsof legal regulationwhich originatebothfrom privateandpublic socialorders,allowsto seelaw ascloselylinked to asocialsphere.Thenextsectionwill illustratein moredetail how ananalysisof emotionscan further developa key areaof debate,the role of structureandagencyin legal regulation.

EMOTIONS AND STRUCTUREAND AGENCY

1. Structure and agencyas a key issue in debatesabout legal regulation

Issuesrelatingto structureandagencyhaveshapedkey questionsin regulatoryanalysis.Agency describesthe undeterminedand voluntary aspectsof socialaction.99 Structurerefersto recurringpatternsof social behaviour.Economicand political institutions, as well as norms, values,and social roles can beconsideredasstructuralaspectsof asociety.100Key questionsare,for example:do regulatorsregulateand,if so,to whatextent?Do regulators‘row’ or do theyjust ‘steer’?101 If regulatorsonly steeris this becauseof structuralrestraintswithin which they operate?How doesthe internal regulationof governmentactivity through accountabi l i ty systems associated with New PublicManagementrestrain the delivery of legal regulation?102 How doesagencyof the regulated, expressedfor instance through co-regulation, ‘creativecompliance’ ,103 and ‘capture’ 104 curtail regulators? Limited notions ofstructure and agency, however, have informed these questions becausestructureandagencyhavebeenassumedto mainly involvecognitiveprocesses.

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99 G. Marshall,Oxford Dictionary of Sociology(1998)10.100 id., p. 648.101 D. OsborneandT. Gaebler,ReinventingGovernment(1992)25–48.102 C. Hood, C. Scott, O. James,G. Jones, and T. Travers, Regulation Inside

Government:WasteWatchers,Quality Police, and SleazeBusters(1999);C. HoodandC. Scott, ‘BureaucraticRegulationandNew Public Managementin the UnitedKingdom: Mirror-ImageDevelopments?’(1996)23 J. of Law and Society321.

103 D. McBarnet and C. Whelan, Creative Accountingand the Cross-EyedJavelinThrower (1999); D. McBarnet, ‘Whiter than White Collar Crime: Tax, Fraud,Insuranceandthe Managementof Stigma’ (1991)42 Brit. J. of Sociology324–44.

104 M. Bernstein,RegulatingBusinessby IndependentCommission(1955); F. Pearceand S. Tombs,‘Ideology, Hegemonyand Empiricism,The ComplianceTheory ofRegulation’(1990)30 Brit. J. of Criminology423–43;T. Makkai andJ.Braithwaite,‘In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Senseof Regulatory Capture’ inBaldwin, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 41.

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Where the literaturehasdepartedfrom this narrow view it hasusually onlyimplied that emotionsalsoplay a role, without further developingan analysisof theseemotionalprocesses.Theactivitiesof the regulatedandregulators,aswell asrestraintson themhavebeencharacterizedmainly in termsof cognitiveprocesses.This hasoccurredthrougha focus on the cognitive tasksthat areinvolved in legal regulationwhich have beendistancedfrom emotions,byportrayingthemaspart of a ‘rational’ process.Cognitivetaskshavealsobeenperceivedasa justification for regulation.

2. Regulationas involving cognitivetasks

Taskssuchasgenerating,managing,andmaximizinginformationhavebeenconsideredascrucial to legalregulationbothat thestageof designaswell asat the stageof its practical implementation.105 For example,a range ofstudies refer to information asymmetries between regulators and theregulatedasa restrainton regulators’ability to regulate.106 Hence,acquiringinformation has been perceived as a prerequisite for regulating andsuccessful regulation also requires the appropriate management ofinformation flows among different parts of regulator’s and regulated’sorganizations.107 Moreover, the involvement of NGOs in regulatoryprocessesis often discussedin terms of their accessto information, forexample,through‘community right to know legislation’.108

Informationhasalsobeena criterion for classifyingdifferent enforcementstyles.For example,thepossibilityof a matchbetweenregulators’informationdemandand the regulateds’information supply is one characteristicof the‘ cartesian-bureaucratic’ style of regulation of the United KingdomtelecommunicationsregulatorOFTEL.109 By consideringcognitive tasksascentralto legal regulation,the limits of socialactors’ cognitiveabilities haveoftenbeenequatedwith thelimits of regulation.Thecollectionandmanagementof information,however,hasnotjustbeenkeyto descriptionsof whatregulatinginvolves.It hasalsobeenanimportantjustification for regulatorytasks.Publicinteresttheoriesof socialregulationhaveseenlegal regulationasa significanttool for reducinginformation deficits which impair the properfunctioningofmarkets.110Furthermoretheemergenceof differentformsof legalregulation111

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105 Gunningham,Grabosky,andSinclair, op. cit., n. 58, p. 44. ; P. Kleindorfer andE.Orts, InformationalRegulationof EnvironmentalRisks, Working Paper,Universityof Pennsylvania(1996); S. Breyer, ‘Typical Justifications for Regulation’ inBaldwin, Scott,andHood, id., p. 72.

106 Hawkins,op. cit., n. 59; OsborneandGaebler,op. cit., n. 101,p. 285.107 Hall, Scott,andHood op. cit., n. 42, p. 13.108 Gunninghamet al., op. cit., n. 105,pp. 63–5,202–5.109 Hall, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 42, p. 9.110 Ogus,op. cit., n. 43, p. 4, ch. 7.111 R. Baldwin and M. Cave,UnderstandingRegulation:Theory,Strategyand Practice

(1999)182.

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has beenexplainedas a result of competition betweendifferent regulatoryregimesandinformationis alsokeyto theefficientoperationof thesemarketsinlegalregulation.Anotherway in which theliteraturehasemphasizedcognitionis by distancinglegal regulationfrom emotionalprocesses.

3. Characterizinglegal regulationas a rational process

A numberof commentatorshavecharacterizedlegal regulationasa rationalprocess.112 For example, a study of OFTEL, the United Kingdomtelecommunications regulator, suggeststhat rationality was an empiricalfact, documentedin one of the three regulatory decision styles, and anormativeexpectationfor the regulator’sbehaviourin general.113 Therearea numberof sourcesfrom which rationality in legal regulationcanbesaidtooriginate.First, legal regulationmight be consideredas a rational processbecause it is implemented by bureaucracies. According to Weber,bureaucraciesprovide legitimacy to the exerciseof power becausepoweris wielded in a rational and legal manner.Bureaucraticorganizationsarecharacterizedby a separationof official activities from private affairs, aswell as calculability of routinizeddecisionsbecausethey are takenon thebasisof legalruleswhich reduceuncertaintyfor thosesubjectto bureaucraticoversight,suchasprivateeconomicactors.114

Secondly,legal ideologyhasbeenanothersourcefor characterizinglegalregulationasrational.ModernWesternstatelaw is basedon the ideaof therule of law, not the rule of man. Governing accordingto clear, formal,predictable rules is differentiated from decision-makingthat also takesemotionsinto account.115 Even in critical accountsof the role of law inmodern Westernsocieties,rationality, which is open to and dependsoncommunicativereason,hasbeenconsideredasalso inherentin law. Henceformal legal rules which are the outcomeof processesof communicativerationality can legitimatethemselves.116

Moreover, by recognizing that often there are various differentrationalities at play in legal regulation, the literature has qualified andfurther strengthenedthe idea that regulating is a rational process.Forexample,Gunninghamet al. discusspossibleconflictsbetweenthe‘logic’ ofprivate enforcementof environmentalregulationthroughgrantingpressure

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112 See,for example,Gunningham,GraboskyandSinclair, op. cit., n. 58, p. 36.113 Hall, Scott, and Hood, op. cit., n. 42, p. 205. The strength of this normative

expectationis alsoillustratedby the fact that thesubjectsof thestudydid not agreewith the finding that other decision-makingstyles, which conformedless to therationality paradigm,suchasan ‘adhocratic-chaotic’style, alsocharacterizedtheirwork.

114 M. Albrow, Bureaucracy(1970).115 Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 6.116 K. Baynes,‘DemocracyandtheRechtsstaat:Habermas’sFaktizitat undGeltung’ in

TheCambridgeCompanionto Habermas, ed. K. White (1995)206–7.

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groups accessto the courts, and the ‘logic’ of informal enforcementrelationships just between regulated and public regulatory agencies.117

Moreover, regulated organizationshave been perceived as subject todifferent rationalities,such as the pursuit of short-termprofits, ‘boundedrationality’ ,118 and long-term sustainable business goals.119 While asignificant part of the literature on legal regulationhas discussedagencyandstructurein cognitiveterms,someaccountshavegonefurther andhaveimplicitly acknowledgedthat regulating involves more than cognitiveprocesses.

4. Recognizingthe limits of cognition in regulatoryprocesses

Somecontributionsto the literature on legal regulationhave implied thatlegal regulation involves more than thinking and doing based on thisthinking. This hasoccurredin particular whereconcepts,suchas culture,ideology,attitudes,beliefs,andpersonalitytraitsof regulatorsandregulated,motivation, values, and behaviour are employed. For example, thepersonality traits of the directors of United Kingdom utility regulatoryagencies,120 thechief inspectorof prisons,121 andprojectleadersin thecivilservice122 have been discussed.123 Personality traits have even beenconsideredas key to explanationsof regulationwithin government.124 Forexample,HecloandWildavsky foundthatpowerwasallocatedin the1970sinside the British civil service on the basis of reputationswhich wereconstructedin the processof peer review. Reputationswere defined byreferenceto personality traits such as brightness,dullness,strength,andweaknessas well as trustworthiness.125 What can an explicit analysisofemotionsaddto suchaccounts?

5. Fuller accountsof agencyand structure

On the most simple level, an analysisof emotionscanprovide for a fullerand more roundedaccountof agency.Human actorsclearly do more insociallife, includingregulatingthroughlaw, thanto think andto acton thosethoughts.Regulatingis often describedasinvolving the activeconstruction

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117 Gunningham,GraboskyandSinclair, op. cit., n. 58, p. 105.118 H. Simon,Economics,BoundedRationality and the CognitiveRevolution(1992).119 Gunningham,GraboskyandSinclair, op. cit., n. 58, p. 415.120 Hall, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 42, pp. 74, 75, 78.121 Hood,Scott,James,Jones,andTravers,op. cit., n. 102, p. 135.122 Hall, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 42, p. 46.123 For a generaldiscussionof individual traits of expert regulatorsseeBaldwin and

Cave,op. cit., n. 111,p. 199.124 See,for example,Hall, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 42, p. 5.125 H. HecloandA. Wildavsky,ThePrivateGovernmentof Public Money:Community

and Policy InsideBritish Politics (1974)14–15.

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of animageof regulator.126 This task,however,cannotbejust understoodincognitive terms but has to be analysedwith referenceto the emotionalstrategiesthat regulatorsemploys.127 For example,the building up of trustbetweenregulatedand regulatorsin order to promotethe enforcementoflegalregulation;theinvocationof shamein theregulatedin orderto promotecompliance;andtheuseof emotionalstrategies,suchasdisplayof angerorcalm in bargainingbetweenregulatedandregulatorsareimportant.128 Whatsomesociologistshavecalleddramaticor ‘hot’ emotions,which interrupttheflow of activity, are especially relevant for an analysis of agency.129

Emotionshave beenperceivedas enablingagencyto various degrees.Inparticularthosecommentatorswho haveemphasizedthephysiologicalbasisof emotionshave perceivedthem as an important sourceof agency.Thebody is perceived as enabling social agency becauseit preparesforbehaviour:

Oneof the major functionsof emotionconsistsof the constantevaluationofexternalandinternalstimuli in termsof their relevancefor the organismandthe preparationof behaviouralreactionswhich may be requiredasa responseto thosestimuli. 130

Specific emotionsenableparticular types of behaviour.For example,theessenceof anger can be seenas the mobilization of energy in order toovercomean obstacle.131

Emotions,however,havenot beenconsideredjust asa sourceof agency.Emotionscanalsohelpto establishsocialstructureandtheycaninherein it.In particularlong-termor ‘cool’ emotionshavebeenlinked to the buildingup of socialstructure.132 For instance,underlyingmoodscanstabilizesocialaction.They havebeencalled by somesociologists‘emotional energy’.133

An exampleof a long-lasting emotion which has been discussedin thesociological literature is solidarity, which involves feelings about identityand membership.134 Simi l iarly, Kemper distinguishes structural ,anticipatory,and consequentemotions.Structuralemotionsarise from thestructural aspectsof a social relationshipsuch as the perceptionof thedistributionof statusandpowerin thatrelationshipasadequate,excessiveor

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126 Hood,Scott,James,Jones,andTravers,op. cit., n. 102, p. 131.127 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1.128 See,for example,Posnerwho discussesthe impact of emotionson bargainingin

contractualrelationshipsand how the expressionof emotionscan influence thesearchfor appropriateremediesfor breachof contract.A. Posner,‘Law and theEmotions’ (1977)89 GeorgetownLaw J. 2006–10.

129 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 41.130 K. Scherer,‘On the Natureand Functionof Emotion’ in Approachesto Emotion,

eds.K. SchererandP. Ekman(1984)296.131 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 34.132 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, p. 98.133 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 32.134 id., p. 31.

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insufficient.135 Anticipatory emotionsare linked to how actors view thefuture stateof the social relationship.What is beinganticipated,in turn, isbased on interactional outcomesof past relationshipsand the specificdistributionof powerandstatusthat they involved.136 Consequentemotionsaretheemotionswhich resultfrom thenextinteractionepisode.Hence,thesethreetypesof emotionsillustratehowemotionscanbepartof ongoingsocialrelationshipsandhowemotionsbecomeinvolvedin thebuilding up of socialstructure.While somecommentatorshaveanalysedhow emotionsbecomeinvolved in the establishmentof social structure,othershave emphasizedthat emotions can also becomesubject to social structural forces. Forexample, the social constructionistshave emphasizedthat emotions areculturally constructed, such as through vocabularies of emotions.137

According to Gordon, anger exists as a raw emotional arousalbut it isthrough social processesthat sentiments,such as rage, bitternessandjealousyare created.138 For othersthe body and emotionsare just anothersite of socialcontrol. In Foucault’swork the body is a ‘text uponwhich thepowerof societyis inscribed’.139 For Elias emotions,especiallyshameandembarassment,play a central role in making bodies, and their naturalfunctions, conform to the particular behavioural norms of specificsocieties.140

HOW CAN FULLER ACCOUNTSOF STRUCTUREAND AGENCYADVANCE DEBATES ON LEGAL REGULATION?

1. Questioningstructure and agencyas differentiatedconcepts

An analysisof emotionschallengesthe idea that structureand agencyaretwo separateconcepts.In the literature on legal regulation,structureandagencyare often consideredas differentiatedin two ways. First, structureand agencyare perceivedas the oppositeendsof a horizontal continuumbecausethey are in tensionwith eachother. Structuralrestraints,suchaseconomicor political dynamicsareoftenreferredto in orderto explainwhyregulatorsor regulatedhave limited agency.141 Secondly, structure and

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135 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 50.136 id., p. 74.137 Lyon and Barbalet,op. cit., n. 2, p. 58; A. Hochschild,‘Emotion Work, Feeling

Rules,andSocialStructure’(1979)85 Am.J. of Sociology551–75;A. Thoits, ‘TheSociologyof Emotions’(1989)15 AnnualRev.of Sociology320;L. Gordon,‘SocialStructuralEffectson Emotions’ in Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 145–79

138 Gordon,id., p. 150.139 Lyon andBarbalet,op. cit., n. 2, p. 49.140 N. Elias, TheCivilizing Process,TheHistory of Manners(1978)ch. 2.141 G. Winter, DasVollzugsdefizitim Wasserrecht(1975);W. Carson,TheOtherPrice

of Britain’s Oil: Safetyand Control in the North Sea(1981).

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agencyare often perceivedas locatedon the oppositeendsof a verticalcontinuum.Agencyis placedonamicro level while structuresaresituatedatthe macrolevel of socialdynamics.142

Thesedifferentiationsare justified if behaviouralconsequenceswhichflow from structureandagencyarethereferencepoint.Structuresimply thatthereare limits to what actorscan do and agencysuggeststhat actorscanengagecreatively in voluntary social action. However, if structure andagencyaredescribedwith referenceto their sourceit becomesmoredifficultto differentiatethem.Emotionsarea commonsourcefor both structureandagency.Emotionscanpreparefor social action.They arealsoa sourceforstructurebecausethe ‘bottom-up’ emotionsthatactorsfeel on a micro levelin everydayinteractionsfeedinto thedevelopmentof socialstructures,suchasinstitutionsandnorms.‘Top-down’ emotionswhich arecrystallizedintosocial structures,such as the feeling rules of occupationalideologiesinprivatecompaniesor enforcementbureaucracies,shapeemotionsandactionsin everydayregulatorysituations.

Perceivingagencyandstructureaslessdifferentiatedconceptscanenableus to askdifferent questionsaboutlegal regulation.For example,insteadofaskinghowandwhatstructurescanrestraintheagencyof bothregulatedandregulators,socialactors’role in creatingsocialstructurescanbeexplored.143

In particular the role that the generation,expression,and managementofemotionsplays in constitutingboth agencyandstructurecanbe addressed.For instance,emotionscaninherein political structures.Collectivistpoliticalstructuresmay be associatedwith emotional cultures which involve co-operationandempathyamongsocialactors.Individualistpolitical structureswhich rely on a free play of market forcesmay be more closely allied toemotionalculturesbasedon self-relianceand competition.Such differentpolitical structureshavebeenperceivedas giving rise to variousforms oflegal regulation.144 Hence,thescopeof agencythat regulatorsandregulatedhave under thesevarious forms of legal regulation is not the result ofseparate,independentsocial structuresbut can be linked to collectiveemotionmanagementwork thatboth regulatedandregulatorsparticipatein.An analysisof emotions,however,canalsohelpto deepenanunderstandingof conceptswhich alreadyimplicitly acknowledgeemotions.

2. Developingthe conceptsof culture, values,and ideology

Some sociologists have argued that culture does not just compriseknowledge,symbols, and meaningsbut also emotions and their bodily

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142 For a critical perspectiveon this, seeR. Collins, ‘The Romanticismof Agency/Structurevs the Analysisof Micro/Macro (1992)40 Current Sociology77, 82.

143 A. Giddens,The Constitutionof Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration(1986).

144 Ogus,op. cit., n. 43, pp. 1–2.

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dimension.145 Emotions are not ‘anarchic’ or ‘unbounded’ but theirproductionand managementis subject to feeling rules.146 This allows usto explore how culture does not just set ‘ social’ and ‘ cognitiveboundaries’147 but also behavioural boundaries according to what isappropriateto feel. Sucha broaderconceptof culturemay, in turn, changehow somekey conceptsin the analysisof legal regulationare used.Forexample, different styles of legal regulation are often distinguishedaccordingto their degreeof formality.148 Wheretheform or implementationof legal regulationis describedasinformal, cultureis oftenconsideredasanimportantresourcein regulating.For example,professionalcultures149 andconventional‘waysof doingbusiness’150 andregulationcanbesuchculturalresources.Hence,informality is sometimesusedasa criterion for describingregulatoryprocesses,asdistinct from the normativeprocessesof the formallaw. An analysis of emotions, however, highlights that culture is notnecessarilya resourcefor regulatinginformally. The normsrelating to theproduction and managementof emotions,can introduce a highly formaldimensionto the conceptof culture.Hence,addingan analysisof emotionscanrequireusto rethinkhowconcepts,suchasformality andinformality, areusedin the descriptionandexplanationof regulatoryprocesses.

Furthermorean analysisof the variation in the normswhich governtheproduction and management of emotions might further promoteunderstandingof legal regulation in a comparativedimension.Nationalcultures have been perceived as giving rise to specific emotionalresponses.151 Hence,an important issuefor the literature on comparativeregulationmight be how nationalculturesgive rise to different emotionalculturesandhow this in turn affectslegal regulation.

An analysisof emotionscanalsofurtherdevelopanunderstandingof theconceptof values.Different relationshipsbetweenlegalvaluesandemotionscan be traced.First, in particular,lawyershavediscussedlegal valuesandemotionsas two separateconcepts.From this perspectiveit is possibletoexplorehow emotionsmayaffect theoperationof legal valuesin regulatoryprocesses.Forexample,Massaropointsto thedangersof usingdisgustin theenforcementof legalregulationbecausethis canjeopardizetherealizationoflegalvalues,suchasfairness,expressed,for instance,in thelegalprincipleofproportionality.152Secondly,somesociologistshaveperceivedemotionsand

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145 C. Geertz,The Interpretation of Cultures (1973); J. Csordas,‘Introduction: TheBody asRepresentationandBeing-in-the-World’in Csordas,op.cit., n. 2, pp.1–14.

146 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 122.147 Hall, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 42, p. 5.148 id., p. 201.149 Hawkins,op. cit., n. 59, chs.3, 4.150 Gunninghamet al., op. cit., n. 105,pp. 157,163.151 M. Barbalet, ‘A Macro Sociology of Emotion: Class Resentment’(1992) 10

SociologicalTheory158–9.152 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, pp. 98–9.

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legal valuesascloselyintertwinedby suggestingthatemotionsarethebasisof moral commitments.153 For example, legitimate expectation,a valueprotected through Engli sh administrative law, which is to guide theenforcementactivities of regulators, contains the emotional aspectsofsafetyandtrust.Similiarly, the legalvalueof unbiasedadministrativeactioninvolves emotional distancefrom those who are affected by regulators’decisions.An analysisof emotions,however,canalsohelpto developfurtherthe conceptof ideology in legal regulation.

Ideologiesare belief systemsabouthow particularaspectsof social lifeshouldaffect socialaction.Somesociologistshavearguedthat feeling rulesarean importantaspectof ideologies.154 In particularthe role thatemotionsplay in the establishmentof small-scaleideologies has been analysed.Hochschild, for example,has explored gender ideologies,that is, beliefsystemsabouthow gendershouldimpacton social life. Sincesocialactors’ideological frameworksare sometimesat odds with real life situations,emotionsand active attemptsto changethem play an important role inmanagingtensionsbetweenbelief systemsandreality.155 It is thesuccessfulmanagementof thesetensionswhich producessocial action: ‘we try tochange‘‘how we feel’’ to fit ‘‘how we mustfeel’’ in orderto pursuea givencourseof action’.156

Thesegeneralinsightsaboutthe role of emotionsin ideologiesmay betransferredto the context of legal regulation. Here, for instance,beliefsystemsabout what power is and how it should operatein relationshipsbetweenthe regulatedand the regulatorsare important.157 Similiarly, legaland economic ideologies,such as notions of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘theefficient operationof markets’, matter in the context of legal regulation.Hence,an analysisof emotionsmay developfurther an understandingofideologicalprocessesin legalregulationwhich havesofar focusedon macroaspects, such as grand-scale political ideologies about state-marketrelationships.Finally, however, the questionhow we can actually studyemotionsneedsto be addressed.

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153 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 27.154 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 125.155 id., p. 129.156 id.157 See, for example,Reichman’sconcept of ‘cultural authority’ in N. Reichman,

‘Moving Backstage:Uncovering the Role of CompliancePracticesin ShapingRegulatoryPolicy’ in Baldwin, Scott,andHood,op. cit., n. 41, p. 326.

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INTEGRATING AN ANALYSIS OF EMOTIONS INTO RESEARCHDESIGNS

1. Introduction

Is it more difficult to know what other peoplefeel than what they think?Emotions might be considereda less visible part of social life.158 Theirparticularnature,for example,that they can be spontaneouslyand quicklyexpressed,might make them more difficult to study through the tools ofsocial scienceanalysis.159 This sectionarguesthat the study of emotionsposessomespecificchallengesbut thesecanbe overcomethroughcreativeadaptationof existingsocialscienceresearchmethods.

Argumentsthat either emotionalor cognitive aspectsof social life areintrinsically visible or invisible arequestionablebecauseperceptionsof thevisibility of aspectsof social order to its participantsor researchersareinfluencedby prior theoreticalassumptionsaboutsocial actors’ role in theconstructionof socialorders.Ontheonehand,socialactorscanbeperceivedas knowledgeableagentswho actively shapesocial order and henceknowand can report about its cognitive and emotionalaspects.160 On the otherhand, social actors might be perceivedas objects of social forces aboutwhich they know little. Hencethere might be no intrinsic aspectswhichmakeemotionsmoredifficult to studythancognitiveelementsof sociallife.Moreover,a rangeof sociologicalstudiesusingquantitativeandqualitativeapproachesprovideevidencethatemotionscanbestudiedthroughempiricalresearchmethods.The rangeof usualtechniquesof datacollection,suchasobservationof emotionsin naturalor laboratorysettings,surveys,interviews,andself-reporteddata,suchas journalskept by researchparticipants,havebeenemployed.161 In applyingthesefamiliar tools to the studyof emotionsresearchershave identified specific methodologicalproblemswhich havevariedaccordingto the definition of emotionsthat researchershaveworkedwith. Somehavestudiedemotionsfrom a positivist perspectiveand haveperceived them as a separate,self-containedphenomenonwhich existsobjectively in social reality andwhich is in turn shapedby socialstructuralandinteractionalconditions.162For theseresearchersakeyproblemhasbeento accesspure, primary emotions, for example, in a laboratory setting,becauseprimary emotionsoften interactdirectly with secondaryemotionsandcognitions.Forexample,thefirst emotionin ananxietysituationmaybe

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158 Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, p. 2.159 JenkinsandValiente,op. cit., n. 71, p. 167.160 A. Giddens,Central Problemsin SocialTheory(1979)71.161 Jenkins and Valiente, op. cit., n. 71, p. 165. See, also, S. Farrall on how to

conceptualize‘fear of crime’ in large crime surveys:S. Farrall, J. Bannister,J.Ditton, andE. Gilchrist, ‘SocialPsychologyandtheFearof Crime’ (2000)40Brit. J.of Criminology399–413.

162 Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, p. 11.

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fear,but fear may leadquickly to distress,shameor anger.163 Furthermore,only a specificrangeof emotionsmaybeexpressedandhenceaccessibleforstudy.Particularlyembarassingor shamefulemotions,suchasshameitself,might be lessfreely andopenlyexpressedthanotheremotions.164 Emotionscan also be contrived,suchas the expressionof remorseby defendantsincriminal trials in order to impress juries favourably.165 Moreover, theremight be little agreementamongsocialactorson whatcountsasa particularemotion.Experimentshaverevealedthatpeoplewhowereshownpicturesofvarious emotional statesuseda range of different labels to describetheemotions.166 Hence within and betweendifferent languagecommunitiestheremight be considerablevariation in labelling emotions.167

For socialconstructionists,however,thesepointsarenot methodologicalproblemsbut simply reflect oneof their prior assumptionsaboutsocial life.Emotions are socially constructedand hence understandingthe processthroughwhich only someemotionsbecomeexpressed,or how they interactwith other emotions and cognition, constitutesvalid knowledge aboutemotions.Also the ideathatemotionscanbepretendedandcontrivedis notnecessarilya problemfor socialconstructionistsbut anopportunityto studythe particular feeling and expressionrules which influencewhat emotionsarefelt andexpressed.Furthermore,researchinto cognitiveaspectsof sociallife hasto dealwith thepossibility thatsocialactorsprovide‘false’ accountsof eventsor engagein impressionmanagement.This canbe addressed,forinstance,by accessingothersourcesof information aboutthe eventsunderstudy. Moreover, understandingthe reasonsfor the provision of ‘false’accountscanprovide interestinginsights.

Methodologicalproblemsidentified havealsovariedaccordingto whichemotionsarestudied.For example,it hasbeenconsideredmoredifficult tostudylong-termemotions,or ‘emotionalenergy’becauseinformationaboutchangesin people’slong termemotionsrequiresdataabouta wholechainofinteractions.168 This canbe achieved,for example,throughlong periodsofcontinuousobservationsor through periodic sampling and it has beensuggestedthatthelong emotionaleffectsof interactionsmaylastonly ‘a fewdays’.169 Furthermore, methodological problems have been addressedthrough the application of quantitativeand qualitative approachesto thestudyof emotions.

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163 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 185.164 Massaro,op. cit., n. 5, p. 114, fn. 87.165 For a discussionof remorsein the context of capital sentencingsee A. Sarat,

‘Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment:An Analysis of PopularCulture’ in Bandes,op. cit., n. 5, pp. 168–90.

166 Kemper,op. cit., n. 2, p. 85.167 id., p. 86.168 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 50.169 id.

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2. Applyingquantitativeandqualitativeapproachesto thestudyof emotions

Oneof theadvantagesof quantitativemethodsis thattheycanhelpto predictwhat emotionswill arise in a particular situation.170 Quantitativeresearchdesigns require to specify dependentand independentvariables. Somecommentatorshave perceivedstatusand power as independentvariableswhich cancorrelatewith thedependentvariableemotion.Thekey issuethenhasbeenhowto operationalizethesevariables.It hasbeensuggestedthattheoperationof power in small-scalesettingscan be measured,for example,through providing numerical values for order-giving and order-taking.171

How to operationalizeemotionshasbeena moredifficult question.Variousdifferent indicatorshavebeensuggested.A rangeof themarebasedon theideathat emotionshavea physicalbasis.Hence,voice, eyes,body posture,and movementscan expressemotions,such as confidence,initiative orapathy.172 Furthermore,aspectsof the voice, suchas its loudnessandfalsestarts, can provide further information about emotional states.173 Otherbodily experiencescanalsobe indicatorsof emotions.For example,Jenkinsand Valiente’s analysisof links betweenpolitical structures,culture, andemotionis basedon narrativesabout‘el calor’, anxiety-relatedexperiencesof women refugees from El Salvador.174 Furthermore, mental repre-sentationsof emotions,suchaslanguageandethnopsychological knowledge,may be usedassourcesof informationaboutemotions.

Problemsof finding valid operationalizationsof theconceptof emotioninquantitativeresearchdesignscanalsobeovercomethroughcombiningbothquantitativeandqualitativeapproaches.For example,out of qualitativedataon emotionsmoreabstractandrigorouslydefinedconcepts,suchasemotionmanagement have been developed which then can be measured.175

Qualitative approaches,however, can raise ethical concernsabout theprotectionof privacy of researchparticipants.176 For example,Hochschildcarried out observation of domestic life which sometimes involvedargumentsin order to study the particular distribution of householdandchildcarework betweenwomenandmenin marriedcouples.177 Suchissues,however,canbeaddressedthroughcarefulaccessandconsentproceduresas

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170 See,for example,the work of L. Smith-Lovin, ‘Emotion as the ConfirmationandDisconfirmation of Identity: An Affect Control Model’ and R. Heise, ‘AffectControl Model TechnicalAppendix’ in Kemper,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 238–70andpp.271–80respectively.

171 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 49.172 id., p. 50; P. EkmanandV. Friesen,Unmaskingthe Face.A Guideto Recognizing

Emotionsfrom Facial Clues(1975–1984).173 K. Scherer,‘Methods of Researchon Vocal Communication’ in Handbook of

Methodsin NonverbalBehaviorResearch, eds.K. SchererandP. Ekman(1982).174 JenkinsandValiente,op. cit., n. 71, p. 165.175 A. Thoits, ‘Emotional Deviance:ResearchAgendas’in Kemper,op. cit., n. 1.176 Collins, op. cit., n. 34, p. 50.177 Hochschild,op. cit., n. 1, p. 125.

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well as confidentiality agreements.To conclude, sociological and legalliterature on emotionsbearstestimony to the possibilitiesof overcomingmethodologicalproblems.Whatspecificproblemsareraiseddependson thedefinition of emotionadopted.Whereresearchersproceedon the basisthatemotionandcognitionarecloselylinked currentpracticesof datacollectionin empirical researchabout legal regulation might not even have to beradically changed.Instead,collectionof dataaboutcognitiveprocesses,forexample,throughinterviews,would just needto provide fuller accountsofinterviewdataandinclude,for instance,informationaboutemotionsthroughindicators,suchas facial expressions,useof voice, bodily postures,andsoon. Often this additional information in interviews is edited out and onlycognitive elementsof the interview processare recordedand defined asresearchdata on which the analysisis based.Noting and analysingthisadditionalinformationasdatain their own right andnot just asinterpretiveaids to the ideas expressedin interviews could be the first simple steptowardsintegratingan analysisof emotionsinto researchdesignson legalregulation.

CONCLUSION

This article hasarguedthat an analysisof the generation,expression,andmanagementof emotions can open up an important new aspectin thesociologicalanalysisof legal regulation.This shouldenablenew analyticalinsights to be gained about law and society relationshipsin regulatoryprocesses.In particular,theanalysisof emotionspresentedhereallowsustotrace close links betweena legal and a social realm. Further and moredetailedanalysisis neededin order to addressa numberof issuesthat thisarticle has raised. These concern relationships between emotion andcognition178 and betweenlaw and emotions.Under what conditionsdoeslegal regulationwork asan emotionalprocessandwhendo regulatorylawandemotionshaveto be understoodastwo separateconcepts?

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178 On this see,also, M. Nussbaum,Upheavalsof Thought: The Intelligenceof theEmotions(2001).

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