The Effectiveness of the Office of Director of National Intelligence

The Effectiveness of the Office of Director of National

Intelligence 1


Intelligence

Linda Royer

Henley Putnam University


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Abstract

After the tragic events of 9/11, Congress and the 9/11 Commissionconcluded that a lack of information sharing between Security Agencies played a significant role in reducing the US’ ability todetect and thwart the attacks. The resulting recommendation was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence position and office to lead the integration of the Intelligence Community and remove the barriers of communication and agency turf wars that plagued it. To date the position has had mixed results in achieving its mission, vision and goals. There have been notable successes, but many failures as well, resulting in the loss of life and causing major intelligence breaches. Various factors influence the effectiveness of the position, such as Statutory Authority, Congressional budgeting and a fast evolving threat environment.


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Until 9/11, the CIA led the intelligence cycle of

collection, compiling, analysis, and dissemination, but it did

not have controlling authority, nor was its job to assimilate

intelligence from various agencies (Bakos, 2012). However, in

2004, this changed. The 9/11 Commission recognized the

shortfalls in the United States (US) Intelligence Community(IC)

and recommended the United States unify the intelligence

community resulting in The Director of National Intelligence

Office (ODNI/DNI). Today, according to its website, the DNI

"serves as the head of the Intelligence Community, overseeing and

directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program

and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the

National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for

intelligence matters related to national security” (History,

n.d.). Yet, however noble and sensible the intent, the DNI’s

effectiveness is debatable.


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The 9/11 attacks were the most devastating and provocative

in US history. Though US Intelligence was among the best in the

world, we were clearly unprepared and caught off guard for this

attack. Brigadier General Russell Howard, USA (Ret) told us that

this type of terrorism was unprecedented, and that “terrorism’s

previous incarnations, were not nearly as organized, deadly, or

personal as the attacks inflicted on New York City and

Washington, D.C., or on that remote Pennsylvania field” (Howard,

Sawyer, & Bajema, 2009, p. XIII).

What made these attacks even more chilling is that the

hijackers lived and trained in America. There were signals that

these terrorists were plotting this horrendous attack yet

intelligence did not see the big picture and act. Intelligence

dropped the ball because of a “failure to connect the dots” (The

9/11 Commission Report, p. 408). Organizational policies,

procedures, and culture prevented information sharing.

Previously, the IC organized itself to deal with potentially


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hostile nation states that posed the threat of nuclear or

conventional attacks. “Sharp lines had been drawn between foreign

intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Little attention had

been given to coordination by intelligence agencies with

national, state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies”

(Best, 2010). The Intelligence Community’s “need –to-know”

culture, a necessity during the Cold War, became a handicap that

threatened our nation’s ability to uncover, respond and protect

against terrorism and other asymmetric threats (ODNI,

Intelligence community information sharing strategy, n.d.).

Immediately there was the removal of the legal barriers to

create sharing information amongst intelligence organizations and

law enforcement, via the USA Patriot Act in October 2001 (The

9/11 Commission Report, p. 328); followed by an intensive

combined investigation by the two intelligence committees. Based

on the work of the Joint Inquiry, the two committees made a

number of recommendations. They urged that the National Security


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Act be amended ”to create and sufficiently staff a statutory

Director of National Intelligence who shall be the President’s

principal advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range

of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to

make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a

coherent whole” (Best, 2010, p. 2).

The recommendations set the foundation for the subsequent

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States which produced

the 9/11 Commission Report. This investigation received far more

attention than the Joint Inquiry and the Report was published in

the midst of the 2004 Presidential election, bringing it more

gravitas since both candidates, endorsed it. The 9/11 Commission

Report identified the problems, inconsistencies, and failures,

prompting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

(IRTPA) of 2004, enacted 17 December by the 108th Congress. This

Act used the recommendations put forth in the 9/11 Commission to

make sweeping changes to the IC structure and processes. Chiefly,


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IRTPA created the Office of Director on National Intelligence

(ODNI). The Office is responsible to:

(1) Serve as head of the intelligence community;

(2) Act as the principal adviser to the President, to the

National Security Council, and the Homeland Security

Council for intelligence matters related to the national

security; and

(3) Consistent with section 1018 of the National Security

Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the

implementation of the National Intelligence Program.

(Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004,

n.d.)

According the ODNI Website, its Mission, Vision and Goals

are as follows:

Mission

Lead Intelligence Integration.


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Forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most

insightful intelligence possible.

Vision

A Nation made more secure because of a fully integrated

Intelligence Community.

Goals

Integrate intelligence analysis and collection to inform

decisions made from the White House to the foxhole.

Drive responsible and secure information-sharing.

Set strategic direction and priorities for national

intelligence resources and capabilities.

Develop and implement Unifying Intelligence Strategies

across regional and functional portfolios.

Strengthen partnerships to enrich intelligence.

Advance cutting-edge capabilities to provide global

intelligence advantage.

Promote a diverse, highly-skilled intelligence workforce

that reflects the strength of America.


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Align management practices to best serve the Intelligence

Community.

(ODNI, Mission, vision and goals, n.d.)

The Director of National Intelligence oversees the 17 federal

organizations that make up the IC. In doing so, he organizes and

coordinates the efforts of the IC agencies. The DNI also manages

the implementation of the National Intelligence Programs (but

does not include intelligence efforts by the military departments

in support of tactical military operations (Code, 2006). He also

serves as the principal adviser to the president and the National

Security Council on intelligence issues (A Complex organization

united under a single goal: national security, n.d.). The act

gives the DNI some additional managerial and budgetary powers

including certain authorities to transfer personnel and to move

funds from one agency to another. It established an Office of the

DNI, separate from any other agency, to support the DNI in his

coordinative responsibilities. In conjunction, it established the


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National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with responsibilities for

analyzing information on terrorist threats and preparing

government-wide counterterrorism planning (Best, 2010, p. 3).

The organization chart below outlines the staffing for the DNI:

(A Complex organization united under a single goal: national

security, n.d.)


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The DNI's duty is to organize and coordinate the efforts of

the other 16 IC agencies, to meet previously determined

intelligence needs. As illustrated below, the other members of

the IC are divided into three groups:

Program Managers, who advise and assist the ODNI in

identifying requirements, developing budgets, managing

finances, and evaluating the IC’s performance;

Departmentals, who are IC components within government

departments outside the Department of Defense that

focus on serving their parent department’s intelligence

needs;

Services, which encompass intelligence personnel in the

armed forces, and which primarily support their own

Service’s needs.


security, n.d.).


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The DNI is in charge of the National Intelligence Program

(NIP). The NIP is supposed to run the budget for America’s

Intelligence Community by aligning the strategic outcomes and

budget priorities and ensure adequate resources are matched with

major challenges and emerging threats (ODNI Factsheet, 2011). It

acts as the head for the National Security Council and Homeland

Security Council for Intelligence Matters related to national

security (History, n.d.). It is also in charge of the National

Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America.


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security, n.d.)

The organizational structure can be a problem since fifteen

of the community’s sixteen elements reside in six different

executive branch departments: Defense (DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and

the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps), Justice (elements of FBI and DEA), Homeland

Security (I&A, Coast Guard intelligence), State (INR), Energy


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(IN), and Treasury (OIA). “Defense and Justice proved to be the

most resistant to DNI inroads into what they saw as their

secretary’s statutory authorities (Neary, 2010, p. 3). The

provision in IRPTA, that the heads of departments shall not

abrogate statutory authority, there is potential for agencies to

“stall ODNI initiatives—save those related to the National

Intelligence Program (NIP)—by asserting the activity impinged on

their secretary’s prerogatives and thus they would not

participate in the process in question” (Best, 2010).

The language in the IRTPA grants the DNI several explicit

authorities, giving it only partial budgetary control of the IC

and mandating considerable deference to those supposedly under

the DNI’s leadership as described above.

The indeterminate powers of the DNI position have been

exacerbated by the short tenure of the four DNIs (and one

“acting DNI”) who have served over the past eight years, and

the continued “turf battles” among agencies and department


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heads over what specific functions and responsibilities the

DNI should assume (Retting, 2013).

According to historian and former intelligence analyst

Matthew Aid, the DNI was created, yet given almost no authority

over the 100,000+ spies who work for the Pentagon. Essentially

two separate spy networks within the intelligence community now

exist: the civilians who work for the 16 agencies reporting to

the ODNI, and the 100,000 spies at the Pentagon who report to the

undersecretary of defense for intelligence. "They have separate

budgets, they report to separate committees, and it is a

structural nightmare” (Aid, 2012).

The DNI website posts its latest record of accomplishments,

dated 2011. It lists several notable measures and events that

suggest the DNI is reaching its stated goals and mission. It

leads off with it “Led the IC’s integrated effort in taking down

Osama bin Laden, an event that showed the rest of the world the

unyielding determination and resilience of the United States.” It

claims that this was the “most successful intelligence operation


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ever”, which is open to debate (ODNI Factsheet, 2011). It

continues by citing the fusion of foreign and domestic

intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks, strengthening the

watchlist criteria, and establishment of an analytic “Pursuit

Group” to focus exclusively on information that could lead to the

discovery of threats aimed against the United States or interests

abroad. To address the insider threat, such as WikiLeaks, the

ODNI published a blueprint and guidelines to prevent further

incidents. The ODNI Rapid Technology Transition Initiative funded

80 new technologies to include Biometric platforms resulting in

“identification and capture of hundreds of valuable intelligence

targets in high-priority countries” (ODNI Factsheet, 2011).

In addition, according to the fact sheet, ODNI implemented

initiatives to increase information sharing and integration.

These include a newly developed infrastructure by NCTC to enhance

search capabilities across databases, and the development of a

“CT Data Layer” to discover non-obvious terrorist relationships.

It created a joint duty program that requires service in a


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position that qualifies as joint duty, improvements to the

President’s Daily Brief, collaborative tools such as Intellipedia

and A-Space and improved information sharing via state and local

fusion centers.

Is the DNI accomplishing its stated mission? Is the IC

fully integrated, or at least close to it? Is the IC providing

the most insightful intelligence possible? There is certainly

evidence to indicate that it is making progress in achieving its

stated mission. The collaboration efforts that were not existent

are routine today, due to the DNI-led efforts that changed

policies that had prevented analysts from intelligence sharing or

seeing large volumes of information. The “intelligence community

is transforming from a confederation of feudal baronies into

networks of analysts, collectors and other skilled professional

who increasingly think of themselves as members of an integrated

enterprise with a common purpose” (Fingar & Mary Margaret, 2010).

However, since the creation of the DNI, there have been

numerous intelligence failures, mishaps and/or pitfalls. Patrick


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C. Neary, an ODNI official wrote a negative assessment of the

work of the ODNI in the journal Studies in Intelligence. According to

Neary, though the technological advances of A-Space and

Intellipedia increased collaboration, they will not revolutionize

analysis since they “target symptoms rather than root causes…they

do not address the decentralized management of analysis or the

product-centric analytical process” (Neary, 2010, p. 10)

Additionally, Neary says that internal billets within an

agent’s home assignment can meet the Joint Duty requirement and

over 1,400 personnel were “grand-fathered in”, thus Joint Duty

looks good on the Fact Sheet, but in reality a truly Joint

culture does not exist.

Neary also asserts that though DNI establishes the broad

priorities for collection, it has “little capability to monitor

fast-changing shifts in collection efforts and even less

capability to direct modifications to take into account of fast-

breaking situations” (Best, 2010, p. 8). A brief look at the


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intelligence failures from 9/11 onwards illustrates this

predicament clearly.

The 2009 Christmas Day “underwear” bombing attempt by a

Nigerian on board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to

Detroit was thwarted because of the passengers (Ariosto &

Feyerick,, 2012). The “system did not work”, despite the claims

of then Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano. A

Senate Select Committee noted 14 intelligence failures over this

incident. Among those failures were competing intelligence

priorities. The suspect was on the US database of suspected

terrorists, but his name was not on a “no-fly” list or other

lists that would have subjected him to more security scrutiny

(Alic, 2013).

Also in 2009 there is the Fort Hood shooting, when US Army

Major Nidal Malik Hasan went on a shooting rampage, killing 13

people. Information that Hasan was actually being monitored by US

intelligence prior to this shooting was never shared with Army


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counterintelligence, which could have prevented the incident

(Alic, 2013).

Then there is the Arab Spring, which snuck up on the IC. It

went viral on the internet before US intelligence caught on. Not

only did the intelligence community fail to predict the advent of

the series of popular uprisings starting in 2011, but it also

believed that the movement would "damage al-Qaeda by undermining

the group's narrative” (Robbins, 2015).

In 2013, the Tsnaraev brothers bombed the Boston Marathon

despite FBI monitoring since their first investigation in 2011.

A sharply critical congressional report said “federal officials

suffered multiple communication failures in the year before the

Boston Marathon bombing and called on authorities to

significantly tighten up scrutiny of ‘hot lists’ of potential

terrorism suspects when they embark on foreign travel” (Viser,

2014) .

Though the Benghazi attack in 2012 was not attributed to an

intelligence failure (Miller, 2014), the flawed testimony given


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by United Nations (UN) Ambassador Susan Rice, on Meet the Press,

about the attack might be attributed to the large bureaucracy of

the DNI. The interagency process, for which the DNI was created

for creating National Intelligence Estimates takes months, “and

cannot be replicated at the tactical level in a fast moving

situation like Benghazi. It is likely the DNI passed the document

to other agencies which all added views from their analysts and

created another set of talking points” (Bakos, 2012).

James Clapper Jr., the current DNI is has made some major

gaffs. In December 2010, he admitted in an interview to Diane

Sawyer that he did not know about a major bomb plot busted in the

U.K. that week. Additionally he has “told Congress that the

regime of Moammar Gadhafi would likely prevail in Libya, that

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood party was ‘largely secular’ and that

the National Security Agency doesn't collect data on millions of

Americans” (Dozier, 2013). His assessments and assurances were

proven wrong or false.


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The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

(ISIS/ISIL) fuels the debate of the success of the DNI. In an

interview broadcast, President Barak Obama said that intelligence

agencies had underestimated the peril posed by the Islamic State.

He quoted Clapper, “acknowledging that he and his analysts did

not foresee the stunning success of Islamic State forces or the

catastrophic collapse of the Iraqi Army” (Baker & Schmitt, 2014).

This list of failures, and others not mentioned indicate

that the ODNI/DNI is nowhere close to meeting its mission and

vision. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton in a commentary

published in the Wall Street Journal, assesses the failures are

symptomatic of far larger problems. Bolton states that “In

analyzing the ongoing Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons

programs, both the IC and policy makers are guilty of

politicizing intelligence, exactly the behavior harshly

criticized during the Bush administration” (Bolton, 2010). He

assesses that the DNI’s fear of over stating the threat, which


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led to the Iraq war, to now under playing the threat the Iranian

and North Korean Weapons programs.

In addition, according to Bolton, achieving better

communication and analysis “does not require more centralization

of authority, more hierarchy, and more uniformity of opinion

(2010). The IC's problem stems from a culture of anonymous

conformity. Greater centralization will only reinforce existing

bureaucratic obstacles to providing decision makers with a full

range of intelligence analysis”.

The DNI is a very large bureaucracy, creating another layer

for intelligence analysis and dissemination. It is often not the

intelligence we collect, but assessing its implications. “Solving

that problem requires not the mind-deadening exercise of

achieving bureaucratic consensus, but creating a culture that

rewards insight and decisiveness” (Bolton, 2010).

This revolving door of leadership does help the DNI’s image.

The public and media’s confidence in an organization is “affected


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by the perceived impact of the organization’s leadership on the

worth of the enterprise” (Kakabadse, 2003).

Integrative efforts have thus far been “based on a number of

gradual changes that are not necessarily dramatic. Yet, changing

an “entrenched culture is the toughest task leaders face (Murray,

n.d.). The organization cultures of intelligence agencies are

especially strong, and legislating a change in culture via the

Intelligence Reform Act does not necessarily result in a quick

fix, rather it is a work in progress.

Cultural barriers were not the only factor leading to 9/11;

Intelligence mistakes happened and will happen again.

Intelligence is not a science; it is an art, which adjusts as the

environment evolves. “It should be remembered that intelligence

analysis is an intellectual exercise; it is not possible merely

to increase budgets by 50% and receive 50% better analysis in the

same fiscal year” (Best, 2010, p. 9).

There are arguments in favor of stream lining or even

eliminating the position of DNI. There are others who feel it is


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working, but it constrained by the authorities and budget which

are not under its control. Ronald Reagan once quipped, “No

government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. Government

programs, once launched, never disappear. Actually, a government

bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on

this earth” (Reagan, 1964). The DNI is here to stay, its mistakes

and setbacks have slowed it, but it still hopes to achieve its

vision of truly integrating the Intelligence Community.


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incomplete-intelligence-reform-why-the-u-s-intelligence-

community-needs-an-empowered-odni


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Robbins, J. (2015, May 15). A cauthionary tale. Retrieved June 2, 2015,

from usnews.com: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-

report/2015/05/26/arab-spring-intelligence-failure-holds-warning-

for-us-policymakers

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Viser, M. (2014, March 26). Marathon bombing report critical of intelligence

agencies. Retrieved June 2, 2015, from The Boston globe.com:

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marathon-bombings-critical-government-failures-focus-more-

scrutiny-tamerlan-tsarnaev/hCstgRy3myIu4jKJZ3SbEO/story.html

Very good. Passive voice value is 2%. F-K value is 15.9.

LOGIC: 100% X .4 = 40.0%CONSTRUCTION: 100% X .3 = 30.0%CONTENT: 100% X .3 = 30.0 % WEIGHTED SCORE: 100.0% GRADE: 100.0%


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.

The Effectiveness of the Office of Director of National Intelligence

Documents