-
The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and
SeparatismAuthor(s): Pal Kolsto, Andrei Edemsky, Natalya
KalashnikovaSource: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6 (1993), pp.
973-1000Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL:
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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, 973-1000
The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism
PAL KOLST0 & ANDREI EDEMSKY with NATALYA KALASHNIKOVA
FROM A FORMAL POINT OF VIEW, the Soviet Union was a
confederation of independent states rather than a federal state: in
the constitution, all the Union republics were granted a right to
secede. As a result of this structure, no new borders were drawn on
the map when the state collapsed in 1991. Instead, what used to be
the internal borders, delineating its constituent parts, were
elevated to the status of international boundaries. This invested
them with an incomparably greater importance, much more than they
had been intended to carry. Many of them had been drawn in a rather
casual manner, reflecting compromise solutions between various
concerns-the ethnic distri- bution of the population, historical
and cultural differences, economic efficiency and political
expediency.
Not surprisingly, in the post-Soviet debate calls have been made
to change these borders. The arguments marshalled for such designs
have been of different kinds. At times, the main desire has been to
make the borders reflect the ethnic distribution of the former
Soviet nationalities in a more accurate manner. This was, for
instance, the rationale behind Solzhenitsyn's proposals to conduct
oblast' referenda in Kazakhstan and Ukraine on the question of the
political independence of these states.1 This idea was supported
by, among others, El'tsin's former adviser on nationality
questions, Galina Starovoitova, but with a somewhat different
argumentation: her motivation was not a desire to create ethnically
homogeneous states, but to respect the will of the population.2 At
other times still, demands for border revision have been based on
historical claims, such as the Estonian and Latvian campaigns for
the return of some areas in the Russian Federation which were parts
of these Baltic states in the interwar period.3 In these two cases
the territorial pretensions are not bolstered by ethnic arguments,
since the population in the disputed areas is preponderantly
Russian (95-98%). Finally, some pretensions, such as the designs
for the transfer of the Crimean peninsula to Russian jurisdiction,
are backed by both historical and demo- graphic arguments: the
Crimea is former Russian territory, and the Russians make up the
largest ethnic group in the area.
The political leaderships in the Soviet successor states have
vehemently rejected all border changes which might render their
territories smaller. They often point to the principle of the
inviolability of borders, a principle which, it is claimed, is
enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This assertion is
somewhat misleading. In fact, the CSCE documents do countenance the
possibility of border changes, but only if they are implemented by
peaceful means and based on an agreement between the
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
interested states.4 Moreover, while the dissolution of the
Soviet Union could certainly be justified on moral and political
grounds, the way it was brought about represented clear breaches of
the CSCE rules for border changes. The USSR was broken up in the
face of strong opposition from the Soviet leadership.
The international legitimacy of the post-Soviet border
arrangement ultimately derives from two sources: the fact that
according to the Soviet constitution the republics were granted a
right to secede (a right which Gorbachev tried to deny them), and
the recognition of their independent statehoods by the
international community. There is a strong tendency in
international politics to defend the territorial status quo,
however recent it may happen to be.
Still, the territorial-political arrangement of the former
Soviet Union is far from settled. A number of military encounters,
up to and including protracted wars, have erupted around
post-Soviet territorial disputes. This article5 focuses on one of
them: the conflict between the new Moldovan authorities in Chisinau
and the 'Dniester Moldavian Republic' (with the Russian acronym
PMR) on the Dniester left bank. In late spring and summer 1992 a
full-fledged, albeit limited war broke out in this area which
resulted in several hundred casualties. The conflict was soon
eclipsed by other world events and disappeared from the news
headlines. It remains, however, one of the most complicated
conflicts on the post-Soviet scene, both in terms of its
pre-history, its political constellations and its possible future
developments. While an effective ceasefire was concluded on 7 July
1992, no solution has as yet been found to the underlying
contentious issue-the legal-territorial status of the Dniester left
bank of the Moldovan state.
The PMR was proclaimed in September 1990, but at the time of
writing (April 1993) had not been recognised by any other state. On
the other hand, Moldovan independence has been recognised by more
than 120 states, and the territorial integrity of the state has not
been questioned in any of these recognitions. The fact that the
Dniester area had already proclaimed its independence in 1990, at a
time when Moldovan independence was not recognised by the
international community (and at a time when the relationship
between Moldova and the Soviet Union was, mutatis mutandis, the
same as the relationship between the Dniester Republic and Moldova
today), was partly overlooked, partly not considered relevant. In
1990 and 1991 the fact that the Croatian leadership was not in
control of the entire territory which it claimed was invoked in
many Western capitals as an argument against extending recognition
to this state. The same argument was for some reason not considered
to apply to the Moldovan case. However, the discrepancy between the
Western responses in the two cases may, of course, be due to wrong
handling of the Yugoslav crisis rather than an erroneous reaction
to the break-up of the Soviet Union.
The aim of this article is twofold: to present a chronicle of
the Dniester war and the conflict leading up to it-concentrating on
political rather than military aspects- and, second, to try to
uncover the roots of the conflict-historically, culturally and
politically-to gain an understanding of how it might possibly be
resolved.
974
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
The hostilities
The major battles in the Dniester June war took place in the
city of Bendery, which is located on the right hand (Bessarabian)
side of the river, and which has a predominantly Slavic population.
The losses in military personnel and civilian casualties of both
warring sides were considerable. According to the Chisinau branch
of the human rights centre Memorial, 203 persons from the Dniester
side lost their lives between 19 June and 3 July as a result of
military actions. These figures include 34 civilians plus
unidentified bodies.6 In addition, according to the Bendery city
council, around 200 local inhabitants are missing. The same source
reports that more than 300 civilians have been treated for serious
injuries. Moldovan government sources report that 77 persons from
the Moldovan side lost their lives during the June hostilities,
including 37 civilians. Some 532 persons were injured, of whom 348
had taken part in the military confrontations.7 In addition to
this, skirmishes prior to 19 June had taken a considerable,
although lower, toll on both sides.
As in most modem wars, both parties accused their adversary of
having perpetrated terror and massacre of civilians. The word
'genocide' was tossed around lightly.8 There is, however, reason to
believe that most of the atrocity stories were greatly inflated.
The annual report on human rights observation around the world,
issued by the US State Department in February 1993, remarked that
in the Dniester conflict, 'while some abuses occurred, press
reports on both sides exaggerated their actual extent.'9 The
independent human rights centre in Chisinau, Memorial, reached a
similar conclusion.10
The war had the character of an internecine conflict: Orthodox
Christians were killing Orthodox Christians, and members of the
same ethnic groups-Moldovans, Ukrainians and Russians-participated
on both sides. To give a few examples, the police commissar in
Bendery, loyal to the Moldovan authorities, V. Guslyakov, is a
Russian Old believer, while the PMR defence minister, Stefan
Kitsak, as well as the chairman of the PMR Supreme Soviet, Grigore
Maracuta, are Moldovans. It is therefore a gross oversimplification
to present the conflict as a showdown between the ethnic Moldovan
and the 'Russian-speaking' part of the Moldovan population.
Although the mass media have regularly referred to the war as an
ethnic conflict, neither side agrees to this description. Both
insist that it is essentially political in character, (although
they strongly disagree as to which political values are at stake).
At the same time, the ethnic dimension cannot be denied altogether.
Russians, and to some extent Ukrainians, are overrepresented in the
PMR leadership. " Conversely, until after the war the
post-communist Moldovan government in Chisinau was composed almost
exclusively of ethnic Moldovans.
The eastern Slavs in Moldova cannot be regarded as a single
group although they have several interests in common. While a large
part of the Ukrainians are linguisti- cally russified, they
nonetheless feel a stronger attachment to Ukraine than to Russia.
Pro-Rukh sentiment among them has been fairly strong. The other
major nationalities in Moldova-the Gagauz, the Jews and the
Bulgarians, being the fourth, fifth and sixth largest groups
respectively-are all actively reanimating their national cultures
and, if anything, look to Ankara, Tel Aviv and Sofia rather than to
Moscow. The Gagauz are Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians who in
1990 proclaimed their own
975
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
autonomous state in southern Moldova, a counterpart to the
Dniester state. A community of interests exists among the
leaderships of the two would-be states.
Besides the two warring parties, three states-Russia, Ukraine
and Romania-are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict.
Ethnic Russians make up some 25% of the population of PMR, and the
Russian Federation has been engaged both through the presence of
its 14th Army in the area and as a party to the political
negotiations concerning the conflict. Ukraine is not only an
adjacent state, but also feels a special responsibility for the 170
000 Ukrainians living in the Dniester republic (28% of the total
population). Finally, Moldovans are ethnic Romanians (according to
some; according to others, their very close relatives), and active
groups in both Romania and Moldova are lobbying for the unification
of the entire present-day Moldovan state, including the Dniester
area, with Romania. This makes the Dniester conflict the only
post-Soviet ethno-territorial controversy which is not only a
matter of territorial (re)distribution among the former Soviet
nationalities, but also a question of an irredenta of another
European state.
Although all conflicts in the former Soviet Union might be said
to have an ethnic component, this is probably less true of the
Dniester conflict than of most others. What, then, are the driving
forces behind it?
Historical background
In earliest recorded history, from the 10th to 12th centuries,
the eastern parts of the Carpatho-Dniestrian lands belonged to the
Kievan state. When this state disintegrated in the 13th century, an
independent Galician-Volhynian principality was established, into
which the Moldovan area was incorporated. At the same time the
first signs of political unification among the romanised Wallachian
tribes in the Carpatho-Danubian lands were visible. The Wallachians
received the Christian faith from the south Slavs, and along with
the religious influence went other cultural impulses such as the
Slavonic script and the Old Slavonic language. This language was
for a long time the official language of the Wallachian and
Moldovan principalities when they were established in the 14th
century.
The existence of a Moldovan principality in the eastern
Carpathian lands is recorded in the chronicles from the middle of
the 14th century. The consolidation of this state took place under
voievoda Roman (1392-94) who expanded its territory by
incorporating into it the lower Danubian lands which had been
controlled by the Golden Horde.
In 1420 the Ottomans for the first time invaded Moldovan lands.
Stephen the Great (1457-1504) put up a brilliant defence, and for a
while managed to control an enlarged Moldovan principality. He
later became one of the main heros of Romanian and Moldovan
national consciousness. However, in order to stave off the Ottoman
threat the Moldovan princes had to seek succour from various
neighbours, and as a result lost much of their independence. Their
state passed from one patronage to another; Hungarian suzerainty
was replaced by Polish overlordship, but to no avail. In the 16th
century Moldova passed into vassalage dependence on the Porte.
In 1538 Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent captured vast tracts of
land between the Prut and Dniester rivers. The town of Tighin on
the western bank of the Dniester was
976
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
renamed Bender(y), and was turned into a Turkish stronghold
together with its surrounding territories. At that time the area
beyond the Dniester was more or less depopulated.'2 The first
significant migration of Moldovans across the river took place in
the second half of the 17th century.'3 At about the same time the
Dniester left bank was also being populated by Ukrainians coming
from the east. By the first part of the 18th century a number of
smaller settlements already existed in the area-Rashkov, Rybnitsa,
Dubossary and Tiraspol. The area was controlled by the Crimean
Tatars who had accepted Ottoman suzerainty in 1475.
In 1711 the Turkish sultan deprived the Moldovan boyars of the
right to elect their own sovereign as had hitherto been the custom.
Henceforth, he was appointed by the Porte and chosen among the
Greek Phanariots. According to the terms of the Peace of Kuchuk
Kainarji, which terminated the Russo-Turkish war of 1772-74, the
Wallachian and Moldovan principalities remained under Ottoman rule,
but with extended political liberties. Under the terms of the same
treaty Russia received the 'right of patronage' over all Christians
in the Danubian principalities.14
In 1787 the Porte declared another war on Russia and suffered
another defeat. The terms of the Peace of Iasi in 1791 basically
established the Dniester river as the new border between the
Russian and the Ottoman empires.15 This meant that the entire
northern coast of the Black sea from Azov to the east and the
Dniester to the west passed into Russian hands. Already in 1793 the
khanate of the Crimean Tatars had ceased to exist. In 1793, the
northern part of the Dniester left bank, which had hitherto
belonged to Poland, also passed to Russia. From then on and until
the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Dniester area which is
fought over today belonged to the Russian/Soviet empire(s). The
largest group on the left bank of the Dniester in the 18th century
was the Ukrainian peasants.16 The dichotomisation of the population
on the Dniester left bank between an 'indigenous' Moldovan and a
'non-indigenous' Slavic group, encountered in the Moldovan and
occasionally also in the Western press,17 is therefore without any
historical basis.
The next Russo-Turkish confrontation, ending with the peace of
Bucharest in 1812, significantly changed the political map of the
region. Turkey had to cede to Russia the mesopotamia between the
Prut and Dniester rivers, that is, the northern part of Moldova
which at that time became known as Bessarabia.18 The vassalage of
Wallachia and of rump Moldova to the Porte was reconfirmed.19 As a
result of the peace terms the left bank of the Dniester ceased to
be a theatre of military operations.
When the united and independent Romanian state was proclaimed in
1878, 'Moldova' disappeared from the political map of Europe as a
separate entity while the name was retained as a designation of a
historical and cultural region. Although both Bessarabia and left
bank Dniestria now belonged to the Russian empire, the cultural and
economic development of the two areas was rather different.
Bessarabia was almost exclusively an agricultural region with a
very low degree of urbanisation. The population in the few towns
that existed was Jewish, German and Slavic, hardly any Romanian.
The Romanian speakers were held in bondage as serfs on large
estates owned by landlords with a motley ethnic background.
On the left bank, Slavic cultural and demographic influence was
much more pronounced. In this area more people were engaged in
trade and the density of urban settlements was higher. The Slavs on
the banks of the Dniester belonged to different
977
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
social and cultural sub-groups. Some were religious refugees
from Russia, such as Old Believers and Dukhobors, a few belonged to
the Black Sea Cossacks, while some were military men manning the
garrisons of Tiraspol and Dubossary.
After World War I the political history of Bessarabia and
Dniestria parted ways again. In March 1918 the newly installed
bolshevik power in Moscow was not yet consolidated, and an assembly
of popular representatives of Bessarabia, the Sfatul Tarii,
approached the Romanian government petitioning that the former
Bessarabian guberniya of the Russian empire should be annexed to
the Romanian kingdom. The Ukrainian, German and Bulgarian
representatives of the assembly did not endorse this petition. The
following month Romania declared that the petition had been
granted, and for the next 22 years Bessarabia belonged to the
Romanian crown. In addition, Romania occupied Bukovina, which had
an ethnically very mixed population. Southern Bukovina had a
Romanian majority while northern Bukovina was domi- nated by
Ukrainians, who preferred to belong to Ukraine. Bukovina had been a
Romanian province until it was annexed by Austria in 1775.
Left bank Dniestria remained Russian. When the Soviet Union was
established as a federal state in 1922, the area was joined to the
Ukrainian SSR. Two years later, however, it was given a status as a
Moldavian Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (MASSR) under the
Ukraine SSR. The appellation 'Moldavian' (= Moldovan) thus regained
a political significance, although with a new meaning. The
rationale behind this move was probably not so much to protect the
interests of the ethnic Moldovans in the area, although they were
given certain cultural rights. More important to Moscow was the
desire to create a springboard for a reconquest of Bessarabia.20
This scheme was made rather transparent when Kishinev (Chisinau) on
the right bank, on Romanian territory, was proclaimed the symbolic
capital of the Moldavian ASSR. As the functioning capital the small
town of Balta was chosen. Five years later the capital was
transferred to Tiraspol.
The number of ethnic Moldovans in the MASSR is a matter of
uncertainty as official Soviet statistics were obviously juggled.
In July 1924 this group was said to constitute 14.2% of the total
population, while in October the same year the number had risen to
58%!21 In the census taken in 1926 the percentage was said to be
30.1%, which may be closer to the truth but possibly still too
high. The corresponding figures for the other major ethnic groups
at the time were (said to be) 48.5% Ukrainians, 8.5% Russians and
8.5% Jews.22
In 1940 the Soviet acquisition of Bessarabia was made possible
by the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Stalin
immediately set out to redraw the administrative borders in the
area. In June that year the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic was
created as a component part of the USSR. This republic included
most of former Romanian Bessarabia, with some significant
exceptions: the southern parts, with the counties of Izmail and
Khotyn and the town of Ackerman, were joined to Soviet Ukraine,
(together with northern Bukovina, including the city of Chernovtsy
to the north). To the remaining parts of Bessarabia was added most
of the Moldavian ASSR on the left bank, but not all. Seven raiony
and the towns of Balta, Anan'ev, Kodyma and Kotovsk remained parts
of the Ukrainian SSR. In short, almost all of the administrative
borders were brand new.
One can only speculate as to the reasons behind this
rearrangement. One possible
978
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
explanation could be the need to create viable economic units:
the more developed left bank could complement the predominantly
agrarian Bessarabian economy. How- ever, in a strongly centralised
economic system like the Soviet one such considerations were hardly
decisive. Second, ethnic considerations clearly played a role. The
fact that MASSR was divided into two halves roughly along ethnic
lines corroborates this thesis.23 The transfer of southern
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, with a strong Slavic population,
to the Ukraine also contributed to the creation of ethnically more
homogeneous republics.24 Probably equally important, however, was a
desire to eradicate the traces of the murky Soviet-German deal.
With the new borders the disputed territory between the Dniester
and the Prut, Bessarabia, ceased to be a single unit. It was
expected that this would complicate any future attempt to have the
area returned to Romania. Indeed, this has also turned out to be
the case.
When Romania joined the German military campaign against the
Soviet Union in summer 1941, not only Bessarabia but also left bank
Dniestria and parts of Ukraine east to the river Bug temporarily
came under Romanian administration. The territories beyond the
Dniester were administered by a Romanian-appointed governor and
given the name Transnistria. This is the only time when this has
been the official name of an administrative unit.25 According to
most experts, Romania had no real interest in annexing
Transnistria, but it was given to her by Hitler as a kind of
compensation for northern Transylvania, which had been awarded to
Hungary in August 1940.26 After the collapse of the Axis powers the
administrative division of the area reverted to the 1940
arrangement.
Under Soviet power some of the historically established
differences between Bessarabia and the Dniester left bank in
Moldova were retained while others were reduced. The entire area
was infused by the same Soviet political culture and ruled by the
same administrative practices from the same centres, Kishinev and
Moscow. The Moldavian SSR was actively incorporated into the Soviet
economy. On Stalin's order entire industrial plants were moved to
the republic. As a concomitant effect, the Slavic population
increased considerably in both Bessarabia and Dniestria. Today,
close to 70% of the Russians in Moldova live to the West of the
Dniester. In all large Moldovan cities the Russian-speakers either
predominate or constitute a substantial minority. In both parts of
the country the bulk of the Slavic population element consists of
recent immigrants. However, while the newly-arrived Russians in
Dnies- tria were grafted into an older local Slavic culture, in
Bessarabia they to a larger extent represent a new cultural
element.
Left bank vs. right bank
During perestroika two parallel ideas captured the attention of
the Moldovan public: the idea of creating an independent state and
the idea of uniting with Romania. Although these ideas were clearly
at odds with each other, the disparity between them was regularly
obfuscated. The Moldovan Popular Front led the struggle for
political independence from Moscow. In an appeal to the citizens of
Moldova in June 1989 the Front stated that it took as a starting
point for its activities 'the necessity of consolidating the
statehood and sovereignty of the Moldavian Socialist Soviet
Republic'.27 Gradually, however, the idea of Moldovan sovereignty
was jettisoned,
979
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
and the Front stood as the most consistent champion of
unification with Romania.2 In Romania too a movement for
unification was gaining speed. In this campaign intellectuals from
Bessarabia who had fled to Romania during World War II played an
important role.
In December 1989 the Second Soviet Congress of People's Deputies
in Moscow declared the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact illegal. This
pronouncement was understood among certain groups in Romania and
(the then still Soviet) Moldavia as an annulment of the annexation
of Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940. Importantly, the unification
movement put forward the demand to unite not only Romania and
Bessarabia (including southern Bessarabia, now a part of Ukraine),
but also the Dniester part of the Moldovan republic. The
irredentist claims finally covered also northern Bukovina. All
these different claims could not be justified on the same grounds.
While the return of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were demanded
with historical and legal arguments, the same reasoning could not
be applied to Dniestria. In the latter case Moldovan Front leaders
switched to demographic arguments, pointing to the fact that
Moldovans constitute a plurality (although not a majority) of
today's population on the left bank.29 In Romania most champions of
unification included the Dniester area in their schemes for a
Greater Romania, either as a genuine wish or, possibly, in order to
keep it as a bargaining chip for a future land swap with
Ukraine.
The prospect of Romanian unification was one of the main reasons
why the Dniester authorities declared their independence from
Chisinau in September 1990. It is widely recognised that the
Romanian record on human rights and minority protection leaves
something to be desired. There is no reason to believe that a
Slavic minority in Romanian Moldova would be treated any better
than the Hungarian minority in Transylvania is being dealt with
today.
The prospect of becoming a minority in a separate Moldovan state
was also a disconcerting thought to many Slavs. As the struggle for
national independence of the non-Russians in the Soviet Union
picked up speed in 1989-90, Moldova soon became one of the
frontrunners. To be sure, it would be wrong to explain the drive
towards independence simply as a reflection of an ethnic impulse.
There were also solid economic reasons why the republics wanted to
throw off Soviet power. For instance, as late as 1990 no less than
95% of all Moldovan enterprises were controlled directly from
Moscow.30 Enormous factories, many of which belonged to the
military-indus- trial complex, functioned as extra-territorial
zones where the republic's writ was not really effective.
Importantly, a major part of the Union-controlled factories were
located on the left bank. This region accounted for 33% of all
industrial goods and 56% of all consumer goods produced in the
republic as a whole.31 The largest power station in the republic,
which provides 90% of the energy needed on the right bank, is
located in Dubossary on the left bank.
Thus, when in 1989-90 Moldova started to gain real sovereignty
and the power of the central authorities in Moscow was seriously
shaken, it is not surprising that the technocrats and factory
directors in the republic became uneasy. Their positions depended
upon retaining the links to Moscow. The tension was increased by a
wave of nationalist outbursts instigated by the Popular Front in
Chisinau.
In August and September 1989 the Moldovan parliament passed a
number of
980
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
language laws.32 The enshrinement of the Moldovan/Romanian
language as the state language was identified as a 'basic
precondition for the existence of the Moldovan nation in her
sovereign nation-state formation'. A separate law assumed a gradual
transition from Cyrillic to Latin script for this language. The
actual text of the laws was not really illiberal and contained a
number of clauses concerning the rights of other language groups:
the republic undertook to safeguard the development of the Gagauz
language, and recognised Russian as 'a language of interethnic
communica- tion'. It was explicitly stated that citizens were
entitled to use the language of their choice at all public and
private gatherings and in local administration. In the central
administration Moldovan would be the working language, but
documents were to be translated into Russian whenever necessary.33
Nonetheless, the law contained a number of loopholes which cleared
the way for extensive arbitrariness. Russians soon started to
complain that applicants with a command of the state language were
given priority in admission to higher education and in employment.
Even pro-Moldovan sources admit to this, although they scale down
the proportions of the problem. 'A lot of fools and scoundrels can
be found in any nation'.34
The language laws incited stormy emotions, agitating both sides.
In practically all major cities strikes were organised in August
1989, in which the strikers demanded that the draft laws should be
put to a popular referendum. The strikes started before the
language laws had been adopted. What the strikers opposed, then,
was the actual text of the new laws, not the application of them.
The referendum demands were not met, and the laws were passed by
the parliament in late August.
Actually, for the left bank Moldovans it was rather far-fetched
to talk about a 'return' to the Latin script as, with the exception
of some 15 years in the interwar period, they had used the Cyrillic
alphabet since the 14th century. The left bank Moldovans had been a
kind of Romanian diaspora for more than two hundred years, and were
very much influenced by Slavic culture. If many Moldovans on the
right bank felt that they were pure and plain Romanians, with no
separate Moldovan identity, this was not necessarily true of the
Dniester Moldovans. Thus, there were not only disagreements and
friction among the different language groups in the republic, but
also within the Moldovan population (as well as within the other
ethnic groups).
The language question was increasingly understood in the context
of a possible reunification with Romania. Such unification was ever
more vociferously demanded among the Moldovan public, and also from
the highest rostrums, such as the parliament. This was especially
true after the fall of the hideous regime of Ceausescu in December
1989. At that time not only in Romania and Moldova but all over
Eastern Europe and indeed all over the world people were in the
grips of national- democratic enthusiasm.
In 1990-91 the Moldovan government conducted a campaign for the
'nationalisa- tion' of the schools. This campaign was to some
extent understandable as Russian was used as the language of
education not only for Russians but also for many Moldovans and
members of other ethnic groups. It was reasonable to expect that in
a period of intense national awakening many pupils from these
groups would switch to schools offering education in their mother
tongue if they got the chance. A number of Ukrainian schools were
reopened, and Ukrainian students flocked to them. As many parents
in earlier times had chosen Russian schools for their offspring for
career
981
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PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
reasons, the career argument now worked in favour of Moldovan,
the new state language. At the same time the desertion from the
Russians schools was obviously not always voluntary. In a number of
cases pressure was being exerted to speed up the process. Russian
sources tell us that in 1990-91 15 Romanian-Russian mixed schools
in Chisinau dropped education in Russian, and the Russian language
pupils were required to attend other schools. As a result,
practically all Russian language schools in Chisinau had to run two
shifts-day and night classes.35 If this information is correct, the
Russian schools were obviously being closed down faster than the
students were deserting them. In addition, the curriculum of all
schools, irrespective of the language of education, was
nationalised. In history classes from 5th grade and upwards study
of the history of the USSR was replaced by study of the history of
the Romanians.
At the Moldovan state university the course in Russian language
and literature was dropped altogether for the year 1991.36 This
drastic move reflected the redundancy of Russian teachers after the
school closures. But members of ethnic minorities were studying
less and less at other faculties as well. In 1990 the number of
students in the Russian sections of several faculties was reduced
to 40-50% of the previous level. The next year the Russians,
Ukrainians, Jews, Gagauz and Bulgarians taken together made up no
more than 11% of the students in the first year of study at the
Moldovan state university, while at other higher education
institutions they comprised 19.5% of the entire student body.37
That was a far cry from their share of the total population.
On 5 June 1990 a new name for the Moldovan republic was adopted.
Instead of 'Moldavia' the name was henceforth to be spelled and
pronounced 'Moldova'. This minor and seemingly inconsequential
change bore witness to a desire to underline the continuity and
unity of the contemporary Moldovan state and the Romanian district
with the same name. Another important milestone in Moldovan
legislation was the passing on 23 June 1990 of a declaration of
state sovereignty of the Moldovan republic and of an evaluation of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The pact was denounced as an act of
aggression leading up to the Soviet occupation of a part of
Romania. This description was no doubt accurate, but of more
immediate contempo- rary relevance were the possible consequences
this document could have for the question of unification with
Romania. The document declared illegal the decision of the USSR
Supreme Soviet to create a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and
its incorporation into the USSR.
In January 1990 a referendum was conducted in Tiraspol on the
question of giving the city and its surrounding county a status as
an autonomous territory based on self-financing and self-rule. A
little later referenda were held in Bendery and some other towns as
well. Some 90% of the voters were in favour of the proposed
arrangement, and there is little reason to doubt the announced
result. Russian speakers make up a clear majority in the polling
districts, and in any case the economically strong Tiraspol area
would no doubt benefit from a system of financial independence. The
idea of a left bank free economic zone could be attractive to all
residents of the Dniester area, not only to the Slavs. Generally
speaking, economic autarchy was at the time in vogue all over the
Soviet Union. Everywhere people wanted to keep for themselves
whatever they produced.
On 2 September 1990 the Second Extraordinary Session of the
Peoples' Deputies
982
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
of the Dniester Area took place in the city theatre in Tiraspol.
At that meeting the Dniester Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
(later renamed The Dniester Moldavian Republic) was proclaimed as a
constituent part of the USSR. The PMR has approximately 740 000
inhabitants, 17% of the total population of Moldova. Its territory
comprises roughly one-sixth of the area of the Moldovan republic.38
The PMR considers itself the legitimate heir to the Moldavian
Autonomous Republic of the interwar period, but without any
territorial claims to those parts of the MASSR which are now
included in the Ukrainian state.39 PMR officials point out that, no
less than the incorporation of Bessarabia into the Soviet Union,
the abolition of the Moldavian ASSR in 1940 was a result of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The resurrection of MASSR can therefore be
seen as a natural corollary of the denuncia- tion of this pact.40
The weak point in this line of argument is the fact that the MASSR
was created precisely in order to facilitate a Soviet conquest of
Bessarabia, and thus was an element in the same expansionist scheme
as was the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.
In any case, on one crucial point the PMR broke with the MASSR
tradition. Independence from Moldova was declared also for the
right bank, Bessarabian, city of Bendery. Since the majority of the
population in this city is Russian-speaking, their desire to be
included into the new state is probably not to be doubted. By this
action the Dniester leaders indicate that they base the legitimacy
of their republic not on legal and historical argumentation only,
but on popular will criteria as well. However democratic this
principle is, its standing under international law is tenuous.
Moldovan authorities consider Moldova a national state for the
Moldovan nation in which some other national groups also happen to
be living.41 Hence, ethnicity is a constituting principle of this
state. In contrast, the new Dniester republic was proclaimed as a
supranational state. The adjective 'Moldavian' was nonetheless
included in the official designation of the state in order to
underline the continuity with the MASSR, as homage to the largest
population group, and in order to keep the door open for
negotiations with Chisinau. In conscious contrast to the language
situation on the right bank, the new would-be republic was given no
less than three state languages-Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan.
(It was emphasised that the third language was Moldovan, not
Romanian, and it is written in the Cyrillic alphabet.) The
relationship between these three languages, however, is far from
equal. Russian clearly dominates in official communications. The
implementation of the language regulations is very liberal: no one,
whether an official or a private citizen, is required to learn any
new languages. The number of PMR officials fluent in Moldovan is
limited, and in practice the language policy tends to perpetuate
Russian linguistic hegemony.
In one respect, political tolerance seems to be greater in the
PMR than in the Moldovan-controlled part of the country:
Dnestrovskaya pravda, Trudovoi Tiraspol and other PMR publications
are not on sale on the right bank, while official Moldovan papers
may be purchased in Tiraspol. On the other hand, certain local
Moldovan-lan- guage newspapers on the left bank have been
suppressed, and as the PMR has taken over the Tiraspol radio
transmitter for its own broadcasting, Chisinau radio is in practice
being jammed in many areas. While this is done for political and/or
practical rather than ethnic reasons, it also contributes to a
russification of PMR society.
983
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
In September 1990 and again in September 1991 a parliamentary
commission from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR arrived from Moscow
to study the socio-political situation in Moldova. The commission
was headed by the radical deputy Sergei Krasavchenko and dominated
by anti-communist democrats. Its report acquitted the Moldovan
authorities of the charges levelled against them by local Russians.
In Moscow the main political battle at that time concerned the
future of the communist regime, and analyses of regional skirmishes
were regularly subsumed under this perspective. It was clear to all
that the political leaders of the Russians in Moldova clung to the
unified Soviet state while the Moldovans had turned into fiery
anti-com- munists. Taking this into account, Moscow democrats were
loath to antagonise potential allies in other republics, and prone
to overlook what were deemed to be minor breaches of minority
rights.
In the liberal Russian press at the time the situation in
Moldova was presented in the same perspective: on one side was
Chisinau fighting to throw off the empire, on the other side
conservative partocrats in Tiraspol were impeding democratic
transfor- mation of society. This media picture was abruptly
altered only in summer 1992, under the impression of the killings
in Bendery and Dubossary. The tendency then switched to sympathy
with the left bank.
From 2 September 1990 Tiraspol stopped taking orders from
Chisinau and became de facto independent, as the Moldovan
authorities were not in a position to enforce their decrees on the
left bank. On the right bank activity in support of the Dniester
regime was declared a criminal offence, and a number of persons
were arrested on charges of separatism. On the left bank police
stations loyal to the Moldovan authorities were besieged until they
surrendered. Some Moldovan front activists were incarcerated on
charges of terrorism.
On 2 November 1990 the first military encounter between the
parties took place in Dubossary, leading to the death of three
people. In Moscow (under whose jurisdiction Moldova still was) a
conciliation commission was set up. From that moment on Tiraspol
for all practical purposes broke off all relations with central
Soviet authori- ties, and also with the new democratic leadership
in the increasingly independent Russian state. The disappointment
and distrust between the Dniester Russians and the Russian
democrats in Moscow was deep and mutual. The Dniestrians relied on
their own strength and resources and also on support from whomever
was willing to help them. The commander of the Soviet Army unit in
the area, the 14th Army, General Gennadii Yakovlev, agreed to serve
as Minister of Defence of the Dniester Republic. His replacement as
Army commander, General Netkachev, however, jealously watched over
the neutrality of his units in the brewing conflict.
The all-Union referendum on 17 March 1991 on the future of the
Soviet Union was boycotted by the Moldovan authorities. Prominent
Moldovan politicians claimed that acceptance of this referendum
would amount to a 'death sentence' and a 'crime against
ourselves',42 statements which indicated great uncertainty about
the possible outcome. However, on the left bank the referendum was
carried out. Here, the number of voters in favour of a unitary
Soviet state was reported to be above 93%.43 Attempts to set up
polling stations on the right bank were physically prevented by
Moldovan activists. In this situation the reaction in Chisinau and
Tiraspol towards the coup d'etat in Moscow in August was
predictably different. While the actual extent and
984
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
character of the Dniester support for the State Emergency
Committee remains disputed, most political leaders in Tiraspol were
clearly favourably disposed towards the new would-be masters in
Moscow. This was especially true of the leadership of the United
Council of Workers' Collectives (Russian acronym: OSTK), which in a
sense amounted to a Dniester Popular Front. It should be borne in
mind, however, that in those turbulent days most leaders in the
non-Russian republics, with the exception of Moldova and the Baltic
states, either equivocated or gave explicit support to the
putschists.
In the aftermath of the abortive coup the OSTK leader, Igor
Smirnov, was arrested and incarcerated in Chisinau. This action
triggered a railway blockade on the left bank organised by a
women's committee affiliated with the OSTK. As practically all
Moldovan transport communication with the rest of the Soviet Union
passes through Tiraspol-controlled territory, this effectively
choked the Moldovan economy. The Moldovan authorities were forced
to release Smirnov, who was soon afterwards elected president of
the PMR. The apprehension of Smirnov had taken place in the
Ukrainian capital of Kiev, and in another attempt to bring Dniester
coup supporters to justice Moldovan secret agents later abducted
the PMR defence minister, Gennadii Yakovlev, in Odessa. This action
almost created a diplomatic incident with Ukraine.
On 27 August 1991, less than a week after the collapse of the
coup, the Moldovan parliament declared the complete independence of
Moldova under international law. While the establishment of a
separate Moldovan statehood reduced the chances of an imminent
reunification with Romania, the text of the declaration was
ambiguous on this particular issue: it declared that the parliament
acted 'in cognisance of the thousand-year existence of our people
and its uninterrupted statehood within the historical and ethnic
boundaries of its national formation'. It further considered the
'divisions of the national territory in 1775 and 1812 as acts in
contravention of the historical and national right and legal status
of the Moldovan principality'.44
On the other bank, on 1 December 1991, the Dniester declaration
of independence was followed up and confirmed by an area-wide
referendum. According to the official report 97.7% supported the
creation of the PMR. Voter turnout was 78%.45 There is somewhat
more reason to be sceptical about the accuracy of this information
than of the results of the referendum in Tiraspol the year before.
No international observers were present (as no state wanted to lend
the new state any legitimacy), and charges of fraud and
intimidation have been levelled from the Moldovan side. Little
concrete documentation of this has been offered, but there can be
no question that the referendum was conducted in a very primitive
fashion. During a visit to Tiraspol in September 1992 the present
authors were shown voting lists were the 'ayes' and 'nays' of the
residents had been recorded. Hence, the anonymity of the voters had
been compromised. There were hardly any 'nays' on the lists, but
all blanks had been counted as 'nays', we were told. The actual aye
vote, then, amounted to 76% of the electorate. While that, too, may
be considered suspiciously high, reminiscent of rigged Soviet
elections, it should be contrasted with the Ukrainian referendum on
independence arranged on the very same day. The results here were
strikingly similar: with a voter turnout of 84%, the 90.3% yes vote
amounted to 75.8% of the entire electorate.
Circumstantial evidence indicates that the PMR referendum had
been boycotted in
985
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
a number of Moldovan villages in central PMR, since a second
round of voting had to be conducted there.46 The annual press
release from the US State Department on human rights in 1993
claimed that 'while there is some question concerning the extent of
local Slavic support for the current Transnistrian leadership, it
is clear that most ethnic Romanians in the region do not support
the Transnistrian authorities'.47 The Swedish-Danish Slavist
Martha-Lisa Magnusson, however, believes that as many as 70% of PMR
Moldovans support the regime.48 This figure is somewhat higher than
even the referendum result would indicate. In any case, the obvious
deficiencies of the Dniester referendum ought to be considered
against the background of the reluctance of the Moldovan
authorities to hold any referenda whatsoever.
In 1991-92 the idea of unification with Romania was clearly
becoming less fashionable among ethnic Moldovans, contrary to what
most experts on nationalism had expected. The new catch-phrase,
'cultural Romanian-ness and political Mold- ovan-ness', carried the
day. There were obviously several reasons for this.49 For one
thing, the democratisation process in Romanian society was
proceeding slowly, and many Moldovans began to fear that the
political and cultural freedoms they had achieved since
independence could be jeopardised again by unification. It was also
recalled that life in interwar Romania had been far from idyllic.
Romanian political life had been dominated by politicians from
further south, and many Moldovans had felt that the capital had
treated their region contemptuously as a backward province.
In addition, Romania had not much to offer in economic terms.
The living standard in Romania was lower than in Moldova, and the
economic structures of the two countries were too similar to
complement each other. Continued trade with the former Soviet Union
was more important to Moldova than expanded exports to the Balkans.
The anxieties of the minorities were also taken into consideration.
Should unification come about, ethnic tensions in Moldova were
certain to be badly aggravated. Finally, as Moldovan state-building
was mounting, a large number of intellectuals had got prestigious
jobs in the new Moldovan state apparatus, and thus had a strong
vested interest in the continued existence of this state.
The pro-Romanian Popular Front was losing members and influence,
but could still count on the support of around 100 deputies in the
parliament. The Front reacted to the changing political climate by
pressing the cause of unification even further. A large-scale
explanatory campaign among the population was launched. On 24
January 1992 the first national conference of unification was held
in the Romanian city of Iasi (once the capital of the Moldovan
principality). The Moldovan Popular Front leader Mircea Druc was
elected chairman of the conference.50 At the same time, the
Moldovan Front continued ferociously to demand that the left bank
be regarded as an integral part of Moldova. In a resolution adopted
at its 3rd congress in February 1992, the Front not only denounced
the 'terror and criminal vandalism of the armed bands of
separatists', but also attacked the failure of President Snegur to
defend the territorial integrity of the country. 'A policy of
conciliation toward these forces . .. is a sign of cowardice, and
even of tacit understanding with them'. The Front claimed that all
citizens of the Moldovan state residing on the left bank had a
right to obtain Romanian citizenship on a par with the residents of
the right bank. 'The fact that they were not citizens of Romania
prior to 1940 cannot be a valid ground for denying them this right,
as they more than anybody else have been subject to
denationalisation
986
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
under tsarist and communist repression'.51 The question of
whether the residents of the left bank actually wanted Romanian
citizenship was not addressed.
A liberal Moldovan law on citizenship, in effect enforcing the
'zero option', had been passed on 5 June 1991. The possibility that
Moldova would follow the Estonian and Latvian example and deny
post-war Slavic immigrants status as original citizens was
therefore excluded. However, the question of the status and
protection of minorities was left hanging. A draft law on ethnic
minorities, under discussion in the parliamentary commission on
human rights, gave cause for concern.52 In the preamble it stated
that 'the only possible guarantee of the national rights and
liberties of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova is the right
of the indigenous population to its own ethnic territory and its
right to self-determination'. The tenor of this document was very
similar to the official view on minorities in Romania, as the
obligations of the non-titular groups were emphasised just as much,
or more, than their rights. The document, however, has not yet been
approved by the parliament, and the chances are that it will never
be. Still, the tensions it stirred up were running high.
In this atmosphere military confrontations between Chisinau and
Tiraspol became almost everyday occurrences. During spring 1992
Cossacks from other parts of the former Soviet Union started to
arrive in Tiraspol to support the regime. While the Dniester
authorities denied that they had invited them, and indeed
discouraged them from coming, their services were nonetheless
accepted. The Cossacks and other volunteers were put on the state
pay-roll, receiving around 3000 rubles a month.53 The long-term
objectives of most Cossacks were, however, at odds with the policy
of the Dniester leadership. While the latter tried to uphold the
independence of their new state, the former wanted to restore the
Russian tsarist empire.54
On 29 March 1992 the Moldovan president, Mircea Snegur, issued
an ultimatum to the left bank leaders, demanding full compliance
with Moldovan laws. When the PMR leaders remained unrepentant,
martial law was declared on the entire territory of the republic.
In an emotional address to the nation President Snegur claimed that
'the knife has been put to our throat ... The equanimity which I
have always advocated ... can no longer help us. Our national
dignity is under threat! ... Let us give the foreign [sic]
separatists and the traitors a decisive repulse'.55 The skirmishes
gradually escalated to a war. Bendery was recaptured by Moldovan
forces on 19 June but only for a very short time. In a lightning
attack on the night of 20-21 June they were driven out in a matter
of hours.
Who actually conducted the fighting on the Dniester side remains
a hotly disputed topic. While the Cossacks claim that they did the
job almost single-handedly,56 the support of the notoriously unruly
volunteers at times obviously proved a mixed blessing to the PMR
state. Some volunteers were arrested by Dniester authorities for
disobeying military orders. The most famous case involved
Lieutenant Colonel Kostenko, who was accused of fighting his own
war against the PMR and Moldova alike. He later died under
mysterious circumstances.57 On the Moldovan side volun-
teers/mercenaries also participated in the fighting.
In September 1991 the PMR had established its own Republican
guard, who also claim that they did most of the fighting. While
this Guard is not yet at full strength, it is planned to be
maintained at a level of 12 000 men. Some observers find it more
than odd that this is almost exactly the same size as the Russian
14th Army stationed
987
-
PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
in the area. A Western source sympathetic to the Moldovan cause
has indicated that a peculiar 'revolving-doors' system is in
operation in PMR, in which the officers of the 14th Army put on the
Guard uniform when the occasion calls for it.58 Russian military
spokesmen have pointed out, however, that, apart from the top
officers, the bulk of the 14th Army consists of local conscripts
and non-local NCOs who over time have struck roots in the area.
Their involvement in the conflict, while not condoned by Moscow,
should according to this view be seen as an aspect of Dniester
self-defence. General Lebed', who replaced Yurii Netkachev as
commander of the 14th Army in June 1992, on a number of occasions
voiced strong support of the PMR regime. He has declared the right
bank city of Bendery an inalienable part of PMR and PMR itself 'a
small part of Russia'.s9 When Bendery was captured by Moldovan
forces on 19 June, tanks from the 14th Army crossed the bridge over
the Dniester. This event appears to have been the turning point of
the battle.
International ramifications
The view from Romania
Without making another deep dive into history we will point out
that the Bessarabian question was officially removed from the
political agenda of communist Romania when Ceausescu declared in
1977 that 'Romania has no territorial claims against the USSR'.
Nonetheless, the thorny issue was frequently raised again after
that time, in the speeches of Ceausescu himself as well as in the
works of Romanian historians. A rather transparent allusion to it
was made by the dictator at the last congress of the Romanian
Communist Party in November 1989, a few weeks before his downfall.
In order to stave off the impending catastrophe Ceausescu tried to
play his last trump card: to pose as a champion of Romanian
national consciousness by demanding a new inquiry into the
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.
In the first decrees issued by the National Salvation Front,
which took over after Ceausescu's fall, the new Romanian leaders
assured the world that they would unswervingly honour all
international agreements signed by the Romanian state and support
the development of friendly relations between Romania and the
Soviet Union. However, outside the corridors of power, in the
rapidly organising opposition, the demand for the return of
Bessarabia became one of the main mobilising themes. This
development was greatly boosted by the events taking place in
Soviet Moldova at the same time.
Only a few weeks after the Christmas revolution, in January
1990, a delegation from the Moldovan Popular Front arrived in
Bucharest. The members of this delegation declared that 'when
Moldova has achieved complete independence from the USSR,
reunification of Soviet Moldova-that is, Bessarabia-and Romania
will sooner or later take place'.60 Soon afterwards a National
Action Committee 'Bucharest-Chisinau' was formed.
Leaders of the burgeoning Romanian parties were frequently asked
by journalists to state their position on the Moldovan question.
Some of the more authoritative politicians, such as the leader of
the liberals, Radu Campeanu, expressed rather moderate views: 'In
today's situation the people of Bessarabia and Bukovina demand
988
-
THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
as yet only cultural distinctiveness and political autonomy.
However, should the political situation in Europe change and should
the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina come to demand
unification with Romania, there is no reason to deny them that'.61
As tensions continued to build up in Moldova, however, the
influential Romanian opposition parties moved to ever more radical
positions. The Romanian Orthodox Church also joined in the fray. In
a synodal encyclical on Christmas Eve 1990 it spoke of the need to
support the renaissance of the Romanian people. 'We meet you, (our
brothers beyond the Prut), with an open heart and an outstretched
embrace. We rejoice at any and every kind of activity on your side
in the name of rapprochement between us'.62
By the end of April 1990 the question of simplified border
crossing between Romania and Moldova was being discussed. By a
mutual agreement 6 May was designated as a day of 'open
borders'-'the flower bridge over the Prut'. This provided the
impetus for further actions. On 21 June 1990 the independent
Bucharest paper Romania libera published a joint appeal from a
number of organisations-the Moldovan Popular Front, 'Stefan cel
Mare', 'Sans frontieres', 'Bucharest-Chisinau' and 'For Bessarabia
and Bukovina'. They proposed 24 June as a day of 'peaceful
demonstration of solidarity and friendship' and also the temporary
opening of the USSR-Romanian border. Popular figures in Moldovan
public life were regularly given column space and air time in
Romanian mass media.
When the Dniester and Gagauz republics were formed in autumn
1990 the Romanian media coverage of Moldovan affairs was greatly
expanded. On 17 September the Moldovan Front leader, Iurie Rosca,
during a visit to Bucharest, declared that 'the fragmentation of
the Moldovan territories, Bukovina and southern Bessarabia, is a
great impediment to our unification with the mother country'. He
further maintained that 'the situation is exacerbated by the
creation of the self-styled Gagauz and Dniester republics'.63 Thus
the elimination of these republics was presented by the Front as a
necessary step towards the achievement of their ultimate and
paramount objective, unification with Romania.
Official Bucharest still had no opinion on this touchy and
crucial issue. While demonstrators were picketing the Soviet
embassy in the city with slogans such as 'Bessarabia is Romanian',
the Romanian parliament at all costs tried to avoid a discussion of
the Bessarabian question. A radical and a moderate tendency crys-
tallised in the attitudes of Romanian politicians. The latter was
represented by Ion Iliescu, who considered a parliamentary
statement on this issue inopportune. 'Thus the Moldovan (or the
Bessarabian) problem', noted the Bucharest weekly Cuvlntul, 'was
farmed out to the opposition, to the street mob and, partly, to the
independent press'.64
When the independent Moldovan state was proclaimed in August
1991, Romania was one of the first states to recognise it, a move
that dismayed and angered Moldovan and Romanian unificationists.
Romania, moveover, did not accept dual Moldovan-Romanian
citizenship. Neither did Moldova. The official Moldovan posi- tion
of 'one people, two states' was not gainsaid in the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On 28 March 1992, the very same day as Mircea Snegur issued his
ultimatum to the PMR leaders, the Moldovan crisis was discussed by
Iliescu and several Romanian
989
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PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
ministers. They expressed their readiness to support Moldovan
territorial integrity, but at the same time spoke in favour of a
peaceful solution. In a somewhat contradictory move, the National
Salvation Front leader Petre Roman hinted that the key to the
problem might be a land swap between Moldova and Ukraine.
When quadripartite discussions on the resolution of the Dniester
conflict under CIS auspices were initiated at the same time,
involving Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, Romania was included despite
the fact that the country was not a CIS member. On 21 June 1992 the
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration which
dotted most of the 'i's: 'We are confronted by a deliberate policy
aimed towards the undermining of the legal Moldovan government.
Foreign military forces are attempt- ing to obstruct the law
enforcement organs and military units of the Republic of Moldova
assigned to restore and keep order'. The Romanian state secretary,
Con- stantin Ene, was dispatched to Chisinau to attend a hastily
convened meeting of representatives of the foreign offices of
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Romania. He complained that 'every
time progress is being made in the political negotiations, the
situation in the region is aggravated by someone'.65 Nonetheless,
in a number of subsequent statements and interviews Romanian
statesmen took a very balanced position and distanced themselves
from the high-pitched campaign in the Romanian press. This was
recognised also by the chairman of the Committee on mass media and
information in the Moldovan parliament, Valeriu Matei, himself a
prominent Popular Front leader.66
In sum, the acuteness of the Bessarabian question in Romanian
politics may to a large extent be explained by domestic factors.
The opposition parties chose to focus so sharply on this issue not
least because it was one of the few weak spots in the otherwise
seemingly impenetrable armour of the Salvation Front.
Significantly, the aggravation of the Dniester conflict in summer
1992 coincided with the election campaign to the Romanian
presidency. Moldovan popular front leaders were also doing their
best to keep the unification issue high on the Romanian political
agenda.
Official Romanian circles oppose the dismemberment of Moldova
while they at the same time refrain from strongly worded statements
on the topic. Romanian-Moldovan reunification is considered not as
a priority objective, but in a long-term historical perspective.
However, after the impressive showing of the nationalists in the
Roma- nian general elections in September 1992, official Romania
was hard pressed to change its accents and approaches. On 5
December the new foreign minister, Teodor Melescanu, criticised
Moldova's lack of enthusiasm for unification, and a few days later
an under-secretary of state, Adrian Dohotaru, expressed the belief
that unification could take place before the turn of the century.
That statement created a commotion in Chisinau and raised some
eyebrows in Russia and the Ukraine as well.
The view from Ukraine
Ukraine for a long time kept a low key in the inflammable
Dniester conflict as the republic already has a number of
political-cum-ethnic tension zones within its own borders-the
Crimea, Trans-Carpathia and possibly also the Donbass. Moreover,
any Ukrainian involvement in the Dniester conflict would almost
inevitably lead the state into an imbroglio with Bucharest, since
influencial circles in Romania clearly coveted
990
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
the Ukrainian region of northern Bukovina plus the raiony of
Hertsa, Khotyn and southern Bessarabia. The combination of domestic
and international concerns, then, kept Ukraine from adopting the
role of arbiter.
At the same time a number of factors made it ever more difficult
for the country to retain a passive attitude: first, the sizable
presence of Ukrainians in Moldova in general and in the Dniester
republic in particular; second, the possibility that an area in its
immediate vicinity could be turned into not only a source of
tension but of actual military fighting and possibly become a
military stronghold of Russia; third, the prospect of hundreds of
thousands of refugees ending up on Ukrainian soil as a result of
such fighting; and finally, the intense propaganda campaign in the
Bucharest press concerning the disputed territories.
After the declaration of Moldovan independence in August 1991
the focus of irredentist claims in many Romanian media shifted from
Bessarabia to northern Bukovina. Some even suggested that this
piece of land could be swapped for left bank Moldova, which could
be given to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Supreme Rada expressed concern
that the strongly worded Romanian declaration on the
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on 24 June 1991 could be interpreted as
containing territorial pretensions against Ukraine. The Bucharest
press pretended to challenge this view by declaring that 'this is
not a matter of territorial claims, but only of demanding back what
has been stolen from us'.
The Romanian parliament protested against the Ukrainian
referendum on indepen- dence on 1 December 1991 on the grounds that
it was also held in allegedly disputed territories. The parliament
called upon the states of the world to take cognisance of this
circumstance and explicitly exclude southern Bessarabia, northern
Bukovina and the raiony of Hertsa and Khotyn when extending
recognition to the new Ukrainian state.67 To our knowledge, no
government has followed this advice. The paramount concern of
Ukrainian foreign policy, however, was not the relationship with
Romania or Moldova, but the relationship with Russia. The Dniester
conflict was seen through the prism of the tug of war over the
Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea fleet. Moldovan politicians did
their utmost to exploit the tensions between the Russian and
Ukrainian leaderships,68 and when the two great East Slavic states
were at logger- heads, the rapport with Chisinau was fairly good.
However, when Kravchuk started to mend fences with Russia,
relations with the Moldovans soured somewhat. The Ukrainian stance
on the Dniester issue may be said to describe a pendulum movement,
from an initially greater scepticism towards the Romanian position,
to an even greater scepticism towards the leadership in Moscow, and
back to the first position.
When the rhetoric around the Black Sea fleet was running high in
spring 1992 Kiev on a number of occasions made common cause with
Chisinau on the Dniester question. In April Ukraine established a
50 kilometre deep security zone along its border with the PMR,
primarily in order to intercept Cossack volunteers crossing
Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Foreign Department also thwarted
Russian at- tempts to assign the 14th army the role of
peace-keeping force in the region. The country also insisted, along
with Moldova, that Romania should be included in the negotiation
process around the conflict. Russia, on her side, wanted to keep
these negotiations an intra-CIS affair. In any case, the spring
round of negotiations did not
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PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
lead to any practical results. Its failure was probably also
caused by the fact that the PMR was not allowed to participate. As
a result, the information received by the negotiating parties about
the conflict was incomplete. On the issue of PMR represen- tation,
however, the Ukrainian side supported the Russian position.69
When by early summer the conflict threatened to grow into a
full-blown war, Kiev to some extent changed its approach. On 22
June, at a time when the official Ukrainian press was still blaming
mostly Russia for the escalation,70 the Ukrainian deputy minister
of foreign affairs, B. Tarasiuk, declared in Chisinau that Ukraine
was in favour of Dniester autonomy within the framework of a united
Moldovan state. He further suggested that representatives of
Tiraspol ought to participate directly in the negotiations as
members of the Moldovan delegation. The next day the Moldovan
crisis was discussed at the Dagomys summit between the Russian and
Ukrainian presidents. At this juncture Ukraine moved significantly
closer to the Russian position.71
The view from Russia
In Moscow support of the PMR has for long been a major rallying
point of anti-liberal politicians and journalists. A stream of
Russian right-wingers-Albert Makashev, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Viktor
Alksnis, Aleksandr Nevzorov and others-have made pilgrimages to the
Dniester republic. They portray it as a last bastion of healthy
communist order (the PMR has retained the hammer and sickle in its
state emblem and no Lenin statues have been torn down), as a heroic
community of besieged ethnic brethren, or both. In April 1992 the
entire editorial staff of the leading anti-El'tsin newspaper
Den'-including controversial figures such as Aleksandr Prokhanov
and Igor' Shafarevich-descended on the banks of the Dniester to
express their solidarity with the PMR. 'Here, on the Dniester,
Russia has for the first time taken up the sub-machine gun. She is
fighting, beating off attacks, and saying "no!" to the traitors and
scoundrels'. 'Today, the fate of little Dniester is the litmus
test, the focus of all the problems of [Russia]'.72 Den' was also
one of the first Russian media to advocate not only moral but also
armed support of the PMR. In an article in spring 1991 with the
indicative title 'Once more on Great Russia' it claimed that 'our
army has an obligation to defend its people against foreign
intervention and should immediately throw the Kishinev bandits back
across the Dniester. If this is not done, the army is not worthy of
its name'.73 To the Moscow rightists the consolidation of the PMR
was not an end itself but a means to restore the multinational
Russian/Soviet empire.
Significantly, however, in Russia not only anti-democrats
embraced the Dniester cause. A number of public figures who had
been in the forefront of the battle for democratic reform under
perestroika have also voiced explicit support for the PMR. Upon his
return from a visit to the Dniester republic in September 1991
Nikolai Travkin, the leader of the 'Democratic Party of Russia',
declared: 'In my view, Dniestria has all moral, civil and political
rights to decide for itself both the issue of status as a state and
whom they want to join in the future'.74 Another staunch supporter
of the PMR in the Russian liberal camp is the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Russian parliament, Evgenii
Ambartsumov. Like Travkin, he defends the right of Russia to have a
say in the conflict as a matter of protecting
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
Russian fellow citizens (sootechestvenniki).75 The influential
anti-communist politi- cian Sergei Stankevich also adheres to this
view.
The outbreak of major military confrontations in the Dniester
area put Boris El'tsin in an unenviable position. It was extremely
difficult to find the point of balance between support for the
Moldovan alliance partner in the Commonwealth of Indepen- dent
States and the need to stop the wave of allegations that he was
betraying the interests of fellow Russians in the PMR. In addition
to this, the position of Russia was complicated by a number of
other concerns: (a) the territorial integrity of not only Moldova,
but also of Russia was at stake. If Russia should decide to
recognise PMR and the Gagauz republic, Moldova and Romania would
most certainly retaliate by recognising the breakaway Russian
territories, Tatarstan and Chechenia. Other states could then be
expected to follow suit. (b) El'tsin had not forgotten that Mircea
Snegur was one of the few Soviet republican leaders who explicitly
supported him in the struggle against the putschists in August
1991-while the PMR leaders did not. (c) If strong anti-Russian
sentiments should prevail in Moldovan politics, this state could
possibly, together with Ukraine and the Baltic states, end up as a
kind of anti-Russian 'cordon sanitare'. That would greatly
complicate the attempts of the El'tsin regime to integrate Russia
into the Western world. (d) The El'tsin regime is very sensitive to
allegations of Russian neo-imperialism. Despite the fact that it
contributed to the dismantling of the Soviet Union, it is regularly
being accused of harbouring imperi- alist schemes, and it tries to
avoid any action that could substantiate such accusations. Thus the
political constellation in Russia in many ways resembled the
situation in Romania and Moldova: a very vocal activist opposition,
within and outside the parliament, was goading on a low-key,
non-interventionist executive power, demand- ing that it take a
more militant stance on the Dniester issue.
The efforts of the patriotic opposition to bring about a more
active Russian policy in the Dniester conflict met with sympathy
and support among certain members of the El'tsin entourage.
Significantly, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi is a leading
champion of the Dniester cause in Russian politics. Rutskoi has on
a number of occasions directly and indirectly attacked the position
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, who is
generally considered a soft-liner on this and on most other issues.
In a situation almost unprecedented in democratic states the vice
president of the Russian Federation expressed the attitudes of the
parliamentary opposition just as much as the attitudes of his
government. The contrast between the two voices of the Russian
executive was made abundantly clear in early April 1992 when both
Rutskoi and Kozyrev visited Chisinau and Tiraspol within two days.
Rutskoi proclaimed that the Dniester republic 'has existed, exists
and will continue to exist',76 while Kozyrev seemed to be running
after him with a fire extinguisher.77 In a heated debate at the 6th
Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation shortly
afterwards Rutskoi advocated official recognition of the PMR.78 The
o dtious faction in the parliament prevailed, however. At the very
same time, on 6 April 1992, diplomatic relations were established
between Russia and Moldova.
The escalation of the conflict after the Snegur ultimatum in
March 1992 threatened to compromise the neutrality of the 14th Army
in Moldova, which Russia took under its control by a presidential
decree of 1 April. Suzanne Crow of Radio Liberty believes that this
move was intended to rein in the army and prevent its units
from
993
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PAL KOLST0 ET AL.
becoming 'accidentally' involved should open hostilities break
out.79 This effect was not achieved, however. General Lebed' used
ever stronger language in his denuncia- tions of the Chisinau
regime, including accusations of fascist tendencies. His utterances
were interpreted in some quarters as a sign that the Russian
military was pursuing a foreign policy of its own, but in reality
the general staff in Moscow distanced itself from Lebed's verbiage.
More than anything else, the commander's attitude probably
reflected the increasing nervousness of the locals in the Dniester
region, military and civilians alike. Confronted with the
ambiguities of official Russian policy on the issue and the lack of
a clear policy concept in the Kremlin concerning the 'near abroad'
in general, they were afraid of being left in the lurch.
The June 1992 war created a new situation for Russian policy
makers. The 14th Army was involved in the recapture of Bendery, and
a statement by Aleksandr Rutskoi on 20 June, during El'tsin's visit
to the USA, indicated a change in Russian policy towards a more
active line. Upon his return home, El'tsin backed up the vice
president.80
Among the Moldovan and Dniestrian populations the war was very
unpopular. According to a report in Russian media not a single
recruit reacted to the 50 call-up papers issued by Moldovan
military authorities on one particular day, despite the fact that
failure to do so was fined with the equivalent of 25 months' pay at
the minimum wage rate.81 Under mounting pressure from the agrarian
bloc in the Moldovian parliament, President Snegur had to make a
number of changes in domestic as well as foreign policy. Two of the
most vociferous anti-Dniester ministers-for defence and national
security-were removed from the cabinet.
Furthermore, Chisinau agreed to bilateral negotiations with
Russia. The negotiation process started on 3 July 1992 in Moscow.
The PMR was allowed to participate as an observer, but not as a
negotiating partner. The Moldovan side proved very accommodative.
In return, a new and 'softer' Rutskoi arrived in Chisinau and
Tiraspol for consultations. He attempted to persuade the Dniester
leadership to adopt a more conciliatory stance.
A bilateral agreement was signed on 21 July. As one of its most
important points, the composition of a multilateral peace-keeping
force was agreed. It was to consist of units from Russia, Moldova
and the PMR. Bulgaria, Belarus and Romania had been asked to
contribute peace-keeping units as well but declined the invitation,
despite Moldovan pledges to cover all expenses. It was further
agreed that the 14th army should be gradually withdrawn from the
area, and a number of economic issues of mutual concern were
addressed. In the lengthy communique the sovereignty, indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova were
underlined. Significantly, should the status of the Moldovan
Republic as a state be changed at any time in the future, the
population of the left bank was guaranteed a right to secede.82 The
details of a 'special status' (osobyi status) for the left bank
were to be worked out later. In a subsequent round of negotiations,
in September 1992, the Moldovan side offered the city of Bendery a
status as a free economic zone.
994
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
Prognosis
The Snegur-El'tsin agreement of 21 July 1992 has not yet been
ratified by any party, and the Moldovan parliament has refused even
to discuss it. Activists from the 'volunteer units' affiliated with
the Popular Front have conducted hunger strikes in central Chisinau
to protest against Snegur's alleged appeasement policy. Moldovan
refugees in Bessarabia from the left bank incite their compatriots
with stories of Dniester atrocities. Fortunately, most of the
refugees have already returned home: of the 50 000 registered with
Moldovan authorities in July 1992, only 2800 still remained on the
right bank in November.83 Those who stay behind seem to be the most
intransigent anti-Dniestrovians. Most of them will probably return
only when the regime on the left bank has been toppled.
The nervousness of right bank Russians is growing. In a summer
1992 survey reported in an official Moldovan newspaper 60% of them
complained about adverse interethnic relations in the republic, and
only 12% saw no reason to contemplate emigration. One year earlier
the latter figure had been three times as high.84 Any injustice
done to the Russians in Moldova may inflame passions in Russia,
where the treatment of the Russians in the near abroad is closely
monitored. Should the El'tsin team be replaced by more
nationalistic leaders, they might feel compelled to honour pledges,
made while in opposition, to come to the rescue of the PMR.
In autumn 1992 the beleaguered community on the left bank was
showing signs of fatigue and rents in the social fabric. In the
official PMR press it was admitted that as a result of the war and
of the arming of large groups in the population the crime rate had
soared. While 13 homicides had been registered in the first eight
months of 1991, the figure for the corresponding period in 1992 was
ten times higher.85 Moreover, the political leadership was torn by
internal squabbles. General Lebed' and one of his deputies, Mikhail
Bergman, were publicly accusing certain members of the PMR
government, including state secretary Valerii Litskai, of
corruption and links to the Russian KGB.
The fate of the 14th army is still in the air. A pullout will
require complicated negotiations with Ukraine on the conditions of
transfer. More importantly, the Kremlin apparently does not have
sufficiently effective levers to influence the political leadership
of the PMR. Nor does it control completely the officers' corps of
the army, which in itself is a most disconcerting fact. The 14th
army is to a large degree recruited from the locals and non-locals
who have become established in the area (according to General
Lebed's own, partisan, estimate, 40% of the officers and 90% of the
NCOs86). These circumstances make the transformation of the army
into the armed forces of the PMR a likely outcome. This will
inevitably provoke strong protests from Chisinau, possibly also
from Kiev.
While the military defeat in the June war did little to enhance
the prestige of president Snegur among the Moldovan public, the
Moldovan hardliners have as yet not been able to capitalise on his
problems. In the Moldovan parliament the adherents of revenge are
in a decisive minority. The formation of the new government of
national consensus in August-September 1992, led by Andrei
Sangheli, testifies to this. The composition of his cabinet
consciously reflects the ethnic distribution of the population. In
this government some posts are reserved for the left bankers,
should they care to fill them.
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PAL KOLST0 ETAL.
The position of the Popular Front of Moldova, renamed Christian
Democratic Popular Front, dropping 'Moldova' from its name, in
February 1992, is seriously weakened. The Front is ever more
exclusively fighting for one cause only, unification with Romania,
but is for that very reason being marginalised. The participation
of the Front leader, Mircea Druc, in the Romanian presidential
elections in September 1992 turned into a most quixotic affair.
Druc, having taken Romanian citizenship, garnered only 3% of the
votes, and turned out to be the least popular of all the
candidates.
According to most estimates, one year after independence close
to 90% of the Moldovan population was opposed to unification with
Romania. However, the Moldovan leadership has not been willing to
forswear this policy option entirely. On the contrary, the policy
line is kept deliberately vague. Occasionally the impression is
being conveyed that its disagreement with the Popular Front is only
a matter of tactics and timing. A statement from the Political
Analysis Department of the Moldovan State Office in September 1992
said that 'matters ought not to be rushed. Every child is born only
when the foetus is mature, after its measured time in the womb. So
also with the "child" of the Front' (i.e. unification).87 Such
analyses will not placate the Front leaders, nor allay the
apprehensions of the left bankers.
While the nationalists in many respects strengthened their
position in Romanian politics during 1992, the cause of
Romanian-Moldovan reunification has not benefited from this.
Romanian nationalism is primarily concerned with the Hungarian and
Gypsy questions, not the issue of unification with Moldova. Vatra
Romaneasca and the Greater Romania Party at times even claim that
reunification with Bessarabia could be detrimental to Romania as it
might encourage separatist moves among Transylvania's Hungarians.88
This makes it reasonable to suppose that President Iliescu might be
able to continue his restrained policy.
The Ukrainians are most likely to continue to support the
precarious equilibrium in Moldova and try to stay out of the
conflict as a 'concerned bystander'. The Russian position will
depend on the ability of President El'tsin to gain ratification of
his agreement with president Snegur by the Russian parliament. This
agreement seems to be one of the most realistic starting points for
a resolution of the conflict. If the hostilities should be renewed,
the question of extending official recognition to the PMR will no
doubt be raised once more in the Supreme Soviet and/or in the
Congress of Peoples' Deputies.
The main unresolved bone of contention in the Dniester conflict
is the status of the PMR. A draft law proposed by Chisinau, in
which the independence of the Dniester area was reduced to a matter
of administrative autonomy, was clearly insufficient for Tiraspol.
Against the background of the recent bloody war the Dniestrians
found it difficult to accept the new outstretched Moldovan hand,
especially as they see the Moldovans as the aggressors and
themselves as the victors.89
The drafts prepared in Tiraspol are likewise unacceptable to
Chisinau. The Dniestrians would prefer a confederate scheme, with
the Gagauz republic in the south as a third party to the
arrangment. In this state they would have their own army (to defend
themselves against the other part of the confederation!) and be in
control of almost the entire budget of their area. Under
post-Soviet realities a confederation might for all practical
purposes be the next thing to complete independence.
The alternatives to a confederation with Moldova, as Tiraspol
sees them, are:
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THE DNIESTER CONFLICT
* Establishment of an independent Dniester state on good terms
with the eastern Slav states. The 14th Army could be kept in the
area as a Russian army. The PMR is at present busily building up
the entire infrastructure of an independent state, including
ministries and state committees, customs control and border
guards.90 A separate Dniester citizenship is being discussed.
* Annexation to the Russian Federation. While the PMR does not
have a contiguous border with Russia, neither has Kaliningrad
oblast'. Still, history has shown that territorially divided states
tend to be very unstable structures.
* Conclusion of a federal arrangement with Ukraine. While the
Ukrainian SSR, in contrast to several other Union republics, never
had any autonomous formations on its territory, Crimea was
nonetheless granted autonomous status within the Ukrainian state in
February 1991. A precedent for similar arrangements in other areas,
then, has been created. Ukrainian nationalists would no doubt
welcome the return of former Ukrainian territory along the
Dniester, but on the other hand these same groups are strongly
opposed to a general federalisation of the Ukrainian state.
* Inclusion in a united eastern Slav
(Russian-Ukrainian-Belorussian) state, or another wider Union or
invigorated Commonwealth. Although the entire political arrangement
of the former Soviet Union certainly is still in flux, this option
at the moment does not seem very realistic. Ukraine is in the
process of urgent state building, and will most probably try to
keep big brother Russia at arm's length for years to come.
All these alternatives must be regarded as less stabilising than
the El'tsin-Sne