THE DIALOGUE THAT NEVER BLOSSOMED? THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ITALIAN LEFT AND THE EASTERN DISSENT

Europe in the InternationalArena during the 1970s

Antonio Varsori & Guia Migani (eds./dir.)

P.I.E. Peter Lang

For some time now studies on European post-war history have regarded the 1970s as a period of crisis and uncertainty. Recently historians of both the Cold War and European integration have started to reassess the 1970s, but we still lack a comprehensive analysis of the period. Such an analysis was the main goal of a research project launched by a groupof Italian scholars with the collaboration of foreign colleagues. The present volume is the outcome of the most significant results of the project, all based on extensive archival investigations. It offers significant new contributions on a fundamental period of our most recent history. Jusqu’à une époque récente, les études sur l’histoire de l’après-guerre en Europe ont considéré les années 1970 comme une période de crise et d’incertitudes. Ce n’est que récemment que les historiens de la guerre froide et de l’intégration européenne ont com-mencé à réévaluer les années 1970. Une mise en perspective globale faisait cependant encore défaut. Un groupe de chercheurs italiens a décidé de s’y atteler, en développant un projet de recherche avec la collaboration de collègues étrangers. Cet ouvrage présente les résultats de leurs discussions ainsi que des recherches menées dans les archives de plusieurs pays et organisations. Il offre de passionnantes contributions et interprétations sur une période fondamentale de notre histoire récente.

Antonio Varsori is a full professor of history of international relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Padua and deputy chairman of the Liaison Committee of Historians of Contemporary Europe at the European Commission. Among his recent publications are: European Union History. Themes and debates (ed. with W. Kaiser, 2010); La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi (2010); Les trajectoires de l’innovation technologique et la construction européenne. Des voies de structuration durable ? (ed. with C. Bouneau and D. Burigana, 2010).

Guia Migani, Ph.D. in history of international relations, is a research fellow at the Uni-versity of Padua. In 2010-2011 she has been post-doctoral fellow at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. Her work focuses on relations between Europe and Africa, decolonisation, the Cold War and European integration. She is the author of La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne (2008) and co-editor with M. Affinito and C. Wenkel of Les deux Europes (2009).

ISBN 978-90-5201-689-4

P.I.E. Peter LangBrussels / Bruxelles www.peterlang.com

Entering a Different World

L’Europe sur la scène internationale dans les années 1970À la découverte d’un nouveau monde

Anto

nio

Vars

ori &

Gui

a M

igan

i (ed

s./d

ir.) •

Euro

pe in

the

Inte

rnat

iona

l Are

na d

urin

g th

e 19

70s

L’Eu

rope

sur

la s

cène

inte

rnat

iona

le da

ns le

s an

nées

197

0

Europe in the InternationalArena during the 1970s

Antonio Varsori & Guia Migani (eds./dir.)

P.I.E. Peter Lang

For some time now studies on European post-war history have regarded the 1970s as a period of crisis and uncertainty. Recently historians of both the Cold War and European integration have started to reassess the 1970s, but we still lack a comprehensive analysis of the period. Such an analysis was the main goal of a research project launched by a groupof Italian scholars with the collaboration of foreign colleagues. The present volume is the outcome of the most significant results of the project, all based on extensive archival investigations. It offers significant new contributions on a fundamental period of our most recent history. Jusqu’à une époque récente, les études sur l’histoire de l’après-guerre en Europe ont considéré les années 1970 comme une période de crise et d’incertitudes. Ce n’est que récemment que les historiens de la guerre froide et de l’intégration européenne ont com-mencé à réévaluer les années 1970. Une mise en perspective globale faisait cependant encore défaut. Un groupe de chercheurs italiens a décidé de s’y atteler, en développant un projet de recherche avec la collaboration de collègues étrangers. Cet ouvrage présente les résultats de leurs discussions ainsi que des recherches menées dans les archives de plusieurs pays et organisations. Il offre de passionnantes contributions et interprétations sur une période fondamentale de notre histoire récente.

Antonio Varsori is a full professor of history of international relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Padua and deputy chairman of the Liaison Committee of Historians of Contemporary Europe at the European Commission. Among his recent publications are: European Union History. Themes and debates (ed. with W. Kaiser, 2010); La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi (2010); Les trajectoires de l’innovation technologique et la construction européenne. Des voies de structuration durable ? (ed. with C. Bouneau and D. Burigana, 2010).

Guia Migani, Ph.D. in history of international relations, is a research fellow at the Uni-versity of Padua. In 2010-2011 she has been post-doctoral fellow at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. Her work focuses on relations between Europe and Africa, decolonisation, the Cold War and European integration. She is the author of La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne (2008) and co-editor with M. Affinito and C. Wenkel of Les deux Europes (2009).

ISBN 978-90-5201-689-4

P.I.E. Peter LangBrussels / Bruxelles www.peterlang.com

Entering a Different World

L’Europe sur la scène internationale dans les années 1970À la découverte d’un nouveau monde

Anto

nio

Vars

ori &

Gui

a M

igan

i (ed

s./d

ir.) •

Euro

pe in

the

Inte

rnat

iona

l Are

na d

urin

g th

e 19

70s

L’Eu

rope

sur

la s

cène

inte

rnat

iona

le da

ns le

s an

nées

197

0

P.I.E. Peter LangBruxelles

Bern

Berlin

Frankfurt am Main

New York

Oxford

Wien

EUROPE IN THE INTERNATIONALARENA DURING THE 1970s

ENTERING A DIFFERENT WORLD

L’EUROPE SUR LA SCÈNEINTERNATIONALE

DANS LES ANNÉES 1970À LA DÉCOUVERTE D’UN NOUVEAU MONDE

EUROCLIO is a scientific and editorial project, a network of research institutionsand researchers, and an ideas forum. EUROCLIO as an editorial projectconsists of two aspects: the first concerns studies and documents, the secondconcerns tools. Both are aimed at making the results of research moreaccessible, and also at opening up paths through the history of Europeanconstruction/integration/unification.

The EUROCLIO series meets a dual objective:- to provide reference tools for research,- to provide a platform for this research in terms of the publication of results.

The series thus consists of two sub-series that satisfy these requirements:the STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS series and the REFERENCES series. These twoseries are aimed at general libraries and/or university history departments,teachers and researchers, and in certain cases, specific professional circles.

The STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS series consists of monographs, collectionsof articles, conference proceedings, and collections of texts with notes forteaching purposes.

The REFERENCES series consists of bibliographies, guides and other tools. Itthus contributes to the creation of a database making up a “Permanentcatalogue of sources and bibliographies on European construction”.

EUROCLIO est un projet scientifique et éditorial, un réseau d’institutions derecherche et de chercheurs, un forum d’idées. EUROCLIO, en tant que projetéditorial, comprend deux versants : le premier versant concerne les études etdocuments, le second versant les instruments de travail. L’un et l’autre visent àrendre accessibles les résultats de la recherche, mais également à ouvrir despistes en matière d’histoire de la construction/intégration/unificationeuropéenne.

La collection EUROCLIO répond à un double objectif : offrir des instrumentsde travail, de référence, à la recherche ; offrir une tribune à celle-ci en termesde publication des résultats. La collection comprend donc deux sériesrépondant à ces exigences : la série ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS et la sérieRÉFÉRENCES. Ces deux séries s’adressent aux bibliothèques générales et/oudes départements d’histoire des universités, aux enseignants et chercheurs, etdans certains cas, à des milieux professionnels bien spécifiques.

La série ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS comprend des monographies, des recueilsd’articles, des actes de colloque et des recueils de textes commentés àdestination de l’enseignement.

La série RÉFÉRENCES comprend des bibliographies, guides et autresinstruments de travail, participant ainsi à la création d’une base de donnéesconstituant un «Répertoire permanent des sources et de la bibliographierelatives à la construction européenne ».

Edited by / Sous la direction de

Éric BUSSIÈRE, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (France),Michel DUMOULIN, Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgique),& Antonio VARSORI, Universitá degli Studi di Padova (Italia)

Antonio VARSORI & Guia MIGANI (eds./dir.)

Euroclio n° 58

EUROPE IN THE INTERNATIONALARENA DURING THE 1970s

ENTERING A DIFFERENT WORLD

L’EUROPE SUR LA SCÈNEINTERNATIONALE

DANS LES ANNÉES 1970À LA DÉCOUVERTE D’UN NOUVEAU MONDE

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, microfilm orany other means, without prior written permission from the publisher. All rights reserved.

Toute représentation ou reproduction intégrale ou partielle faite par quelque procédéque ce soit, sans le consentement de l’éditeur ou de ses ayants droit, est illicite. Tousdroits réservés.

© P.I.E. PETER LANG S.A.Éditions scientifiques internationalesBrussels / Bruxelles, 20111 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels / Bruxelles, Belgium / [email protected] ; www.peterlang.com

ISSN 0944-2294ISBN 978-90-5201-689-4D/2011/5678/52

Printed in Germany / Imprimé en Allemagne

CIP available from the British Library, GB.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

With the financial support of the Research Project of National Interest(PRIN 2006)

Avec le soutien financier du Projet national d’intérêt national(PRIN 2006)

Europe in the international arena during the 1970s : entering a different world =L'Europe sur la scène internationale dans les années 1970 : à la découverte d'un

nouveau monde / Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani (eds.). p. cm. --(Euroclio, ISSN 0944-2294 ; no. 58) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-5201-689-4 1. European Economic Community--Foreign relations. 2. European EconomicCommunity--Foreign economic relations. 3. Europe--Economic integration--

Political aspects. 4. Europe--Economic integration--Social aspects. 5. Cold War--Diplomatic history. I. Varsori, Antonio, 1951- II. Migani, Guia. III. Title: Europe

sur la scène internationale dans les années 1970.D1060.E7957 2011 327.4009'047--dc22 2011013498

“Die Deutsche National Bibliothek” lists this publication in the “DeutscheNationalbibliografie”; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at <http://dnb.de>.« Die Deutsche National bibliothek » répertorie cette publication dans la « DeutscheNationalbi-bliografie » ; les données bibliographiques détaillées sont disponibles sur lesite http://dnb.de.

7

Table of Contents

Acronyms/Acronymes ...........................................................................11

Introduction ...........................................................................................15Antonio Varsori & Guia Migani

EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION: THE GREAT DIVIDE

LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE : LE CHANGEMENT

The European Construction in the 1970s. The Great Divide.................27Antonio Varsori

D’une Europe inachevée à l’affirmationdu régionalisme européen dans la mondialisation .................................41

Éric Bussière

Germany between Ostpolitik and European Integration........................55Wilfried Loth

The Significance of British Entryinto the European Community in 1973..................................................71

Mark Gilbert

EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS

L’EUROPE ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES

Europe between the Superpowers, 1968-1981 ......................................85Silvio Pons & Federico Romero

The US, Western Europe and a Changing Monetary System,1969-1979..............................................................................................99

Duccio Basosi

Europe and Le Défi Américain: a Nonsense Question?The European Strategy for an Intergovernmental andEuro-American Techno-Industrial Cooperation ..................................117

David Burigana

8

The Soviet Union and Europe in the 1970s .........................................143Vladislav Martin Zubok

EUROPE AND THE NORTH-SOUTH CHALLENGE

L’EUROPE ET LE DÉFI NORD-SUD

Europe, the United Nations and Dialogue with the Third World ........161Luciano Tosi

La politique globale méditerranéenne de la CEE, 1970-1972 .............193Guia Migani

Continuity or Change? The 1973 Oil Crisis Reconsidered..................211Giuliano Garavini & Francesco Petrini

La politique internationale face aux jeunes États.Le cas de la Belgique...........................................................................231

Valerio Perna

EUROPE, MASS MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC OPINION

AND NEW FORMS OF FOREIGN POLICY

L’EUROPE, MOUVEMENTS DE MASSE, OPINION PUBLIQUE

ET NOUVELLES FORMES DE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE

Identité et conscience européenne. L’émergenced’un débat inachevé. Le Sommet de Copenhague,14-15 décembre 1973 ..........................................................................243

Philippe Chassaigne

The Influence of Protest Movements on the European IntegrationProcess. An Interpretation of the 1972 Paris Summit..........................253

Simone Paoli

The Dialogue that Never Blossomed? The Complex Relationsbetween the Italian Left and Eastern Dissent.......................................279

Valentine Lomellini

TRANSITION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

LA TRANSITION EN EUROPE DU SUD

The United States and the Crises in Southern Europe .........................301Mario Del Pero

9

The Federal Republic of Germany and the ResistibleRise of the “Historic Compromise” in Italy (1974-1978)....................317

Giovanni Bernardini

Bonn et la réponse européenne à la révolution portugaise ..................339Antonio Muñoz Sánchez

Telling the Whole Story. America, the EEC and Greece,1974-1976............................................................................................355

Eirini Karamouzi

Notes on Contributors..........................................................................375

Index....................................................................................................377

279

The Dialogue that Never Blossomed?

The Complex Relations betweenthe Italian Left and Eastern Dissent

Valentine LOMELLINI

Introduction: from the Soviet Union to Italy –the Question of Dissent

Contemporary historiography has shown how international relationsin the 1970s were characterised by a process of “overcoming the ColdWar”.1 Détente, the dialogue between superpowers about arms control,and the Ostpolitik, among other factors, had a positive effect on interna-tional relations.2

The results of détente were not though restricted to the internationalarena. Domestic developments became possible because of a substantialchange in the world situation. In the Italian context, one particularlycharacterised by the interdependence of international and domesticconcerns, détente gave clear outcomes: the biggest and best-organisedcommunist party of the Western bloc drew closer to taking up a role ingovernment.3

Meanwhile, the spread of détente meant the rise of dissent in theSoviet Union and the slow beginnings of internal opposition in someEastern European countries such as Poland.4 These movements stronglyaffected the Western left: “existing socialism” constituted an undeniable

1Loth, W., Overcoming the Cold War: a history of détente, 1950-1991, London,Palgrave, 2002.

2Hitchcock, W., Il continente diviso. Storia dell’Europa dal 1945 ad oggi, Roma,Carocci, 2003, p. 361-388; Flores, M., Il secolo mondo. Storia del Novecento, 1945-2000, Vol. 2, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002, p. 393-404.

3Crainz, G., Il paese mancato. Dal miracolo economico agli anni ottanta, Roma,Donzelli, 2005, p. 444-452.

4Zubok, V., Zhivago’s Children: the last Russian Intellighentsia, Cambridge, BelknapPress, 2009; Vaissié, C., Pour votre liberté et pour la notre. Le combat des dissidentsde Russie, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1999; Paczkowski, A., The Spring will be ours.Poland and Poles from Occupation to Freedom, Pennsylvania, University Park,2003.

Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s

280

point of reference for all those that proposed socialism in the capitalistworld. Even communists and socialists who refused the “Soviet model”,could not avoid the USSR’s existence, and naturally picked over itspositive and negative aspects. Above and beyond international anddomestic outcomes, the development of détente brought the growth oftransnational connections; among which were the contacts between theWestern left and opposition within the Soviet bloc.

The dialogue between these potential interlocutors could represent a“bridge” through the Iron Curtain. And, in fact, the history of relationsbetween the Italian left and the Eastern opposition needs to beconsidered as one of the most interesting case-studies in this respect.During the 1970s, Italy was a frontline State both geographically andpolitically. In fact, the issue of opposition in the Soviet bloc became arelevant factor in Italy’s political system, which was characterised first,by the “blocked” political situation and, second, by an unusual balancewithin the Italian workers’ movement.5 The PCI was the largest andbest-organised communist party in the Western bloc. Still very much apart of the international communist movement, Italian communists alonecould challenge the Kremlin’s shaping of a new kind of socialism. Itwas also the “first party” on the Italian left, able to collect about 35% ofvotes, while the PSI had been reduced to a middle-sized group.6 Duringthe 1970s, these parties competed for the leading role on the Italian left:this is one of the reasons why opposition in the Eastern countries – aninternational or even a domestic aspect of the Soviet bloc – became apoint of controversy in Italy. On the one hand, the PCI was committedto keeping the upperhand and to gaining enough domestic and inter-national credibility to get into government. The PSI, meanwhile, wastrying to recover its identity as the point of reference for “democraticsocialism” in Italy. Italy was marked out as being unusual by the pecu-liar characteristics of these two movements and the link between them.

This paper – part of a broader work which also includes the Frenchcommunist and socialist parties – aims to analyze the policies of the PSIand the PCI towards the Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and Polishdissent/opposition movements. This analysis will follow through fromthe aftermath of the Prague crisis up until the imposition of Martial Lawin Poland. First, I shall assess the policies of the Italian communists, and

5For the relevance of the dissent issue in Italian politics and, in particular, on theItalian left: Colarizi, S., Gervasoni, M., La cruna dell’ago. Craxi, il partito socialistae la crisi della Repubblica, Bari, Laterza, 2005, p. 39-43; Spiri, A., Zaslavsky, V., “Isocialisti italiani e il dissenso nell’Est Europeo”, in A. Spiri (ed.), Bettino Craxi, ilsocialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale, Venezia, Marsilio, 2006, p. 155-181.

6Colarizi, S., Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943-2006, Bari, Laterza, 2007, p. 78-127.

Valentine Lomellini

281

then those of the Italian socialists looking at developments while alsotaking some specific issues at three different levels. These three levelsare: (i) the international level – the strategies towards Eastern opponentsand the idea of détente and the Italian left’s perception of “developedsocialism”; (ii) the domestic level – the connection between supporting/avoiding dissidents and confrontation within the Italian left; (iii) the“internal” level – the existence of political consensus on the issue ofEastern dissent within the Parties, particularly the discrepancy betweenwhat Italian left leaders’ thought, and what they publicly declared.

This research is based on an extensive work in Italian and foreignarchives (Gramsci Foundation, Filippo Turati Foundation, Bettino CraxiFoundation, Pietro Nenni Foundation, Archivio della Camera dei Depu-tati, Archive of the Municipality of Florence, Fund Francesco Ricci,Fund Luciano Antonetti, UK National Archives, Vladimir BukovskijArchive, National Security Archive, CIA Archives), as well as on ananalysis of the press (L’Unità, Rinascita, L’Avanti, Mondoperaio), andon some interviews.

The Italian Communist Party: A Missed Opportunity

After the events of August 1968, the Italian Communist Partyseemed to become the standard-bearer of the renewal of internationalcommunism. Its condemnation of the Warsaw Pact’s invasion ofCzechoslovakia and its decision to subscribe to just one chapter out offour in the final declaration at the world communist conference inMoscow, one year later, confirmed the Italian communists’ wish tocarry out the idea of “unity within diversity”, postulated by theirpolitical father, Palmiro Togliatti.7 To public opinion, the positive imageof Botteghe Oscure was reinforced through contrast with Frenchcommunism: the PCF had drawn back from their earlier criticisms andsigned all four clauses of the Moscow Conference document.8

Despite public opinion, the international context and domestic eventsled the Italian communists to backpedal at least until 1974-75. Manyreasons explain that choice. First of all, the representation of the USSRas the main protagonist and promoter of détente;9 second, the US’sworsening image – the Vietnam quagmire and Watergate – which tipped

7“Il comunicato della Direzione del PCI”, L’Unità, 24 August 1968. For the Confer-ence of Moscow, the third chapter dealt with “actions and concrete measures againstthe imperialism”. “Il testo del documento principale”, Rinascita, No. 26, 27 June1969, p. 27-34. See also: Barbagallo, F., Enrico Berlinguer, Roma, Carocci, 2006,p. 111-116; Galluzzi, C., La svolta, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer, 1983, p. 229-234.

8Lazar, M., Maisons rouges. Les Partis communistes français et italien de laLibération à nos jours, Aubier, Paris, 1992, p. 144-145.

9Pons, S., Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo, Torino, Einaudi, 2006, p. 10.


282

the balance in favor of the Kremlin; and, third, the PCI’s misunder-standing of internal policy change in the USSR. The exile of someprominent dissidents and emigration from the Soviet bloc, while public-ly condemned, were seen by Italian communist leaders as evidence thatsomething in the Eastern bloc had shifted: dissidents were no longerbeing killed, and exile was neither assassination nor Gulag. Moreover,while shortcomings in Soviet domestic policy were evident, Italiancommunists thought that they had still something to learn from theKremlin. Just as an example, during a meeting of the PCI Direzione in1971, Paolo Bufalini declared that Soviet foreign policy was moreadvanced, capable and modern than that of the PCI.10 Even the differentapproach by Soviet leaders towards Botteghe Oscure was perceived asthe proof that the Soviet establishment was moving on, if very slowly.11

In the PCI’s eyes, these elements substantially confirmed the possibilityof reforming “developed socialism”.

Dealing with the PCI’s policy toward dissent, this belief emerged ontwo different occasions. At first, at the beginning of the 1970s, whileItalian communists were concerned about Czechoslovakian normalisa-tion, the change of leadership in Poland – the Gdańsk events and wide-spread disorders that led to the replacement of Gomulka with EdwardGierek – was understood as a new direction for “existing socialism”.This event, indeed, was perceived by leaders and presented in theParty’s press as a turning point depending on pressure from the masses(as Gierek’s propaganda asserted). The idea that the leadership ofGierek represented a new opportunity not only for Poland, but forsocialism as an international model, and the difficult relations betweenthe Polish and the Italian communists during the Gomulka era, stronglyinfluenced this analysis.12 Moreover, Gierek presented himself as “theface of the renewal”, an image also accepted by Western governments.13

The second time that such beliefs surfaced was with AleksandrSolženicyn and Andrej Sacharov. Solženicyn and Sacharov were two

10Archives of the PCI (APCI), Direzione, Speech of Paolo Bufalini and Gian CarloPajetta, 13 April 1971, MF 017, p. 1214-1242.

11APCI, Direzionze, Speech of Gian Carlo Pajetta, 13 April 1971, MF 017, p. 1214-1242.

12“Il dovere dei comunisti”, Trybuna Ludu, 8 September 1968, APCI, Direzione, MF020, fasc. 996.

13After 1975, France became one of the most privileged interlocutors of Poland. TheUnited States established a strong tie with Warsaw: in 1972, Richard Nixon, in 1975,Gerald Ford, and in 1977 Jimmy Carter officially visited Poland. Poznanski, K.Z.,Poland’s protracted transition: institutional change and economic growth 1970-1994, Cambridge University press, 1996, p. 64; Paczkowski, The Spring will be ours,op. cit., p. 362.

Valentine Lomellini

283

distinguished dissidents, probably the best known to the public of theAtlantic bloc.14

Dealing with such cases, we have to make a distinction. The Italiancommunists were concerned about these dissidents’ fates, and asked theKremlin, complaining about the Soviet attitude towards them. Neverthe-less, Botteghe Oscure openly distanced itself from these opponents. Thisattitude was perhaps predictable; but what was unexpected was thatintellectuals and leaders who were usually very sensitive to the issue ofEastern dissent refused any dialogue with Solženicyn and Sakharovbecause of their disillusionment with existing socialism.15 Italiancommunists such as Lucio Lombardo Radice and Giorgio Napolitanoasserted that no dialogue was possible with those who condemned theSoviet experience. Thus, the PCI developed a contradictory foreignpolicy. In the first half of the decade, the PCI distinguished itself fromthe Soviets, sometimes openly defying the Kremlin: for example withregards to support for the Portuguese socialist leader Mario Soares.16 ButItalian communists were still very prudent in publicly condemningEastern bloc policies towards internal dissidents, particularly if thesedissidents were not recognizably socialist.

This contradiction was confirmed in other circumstances. In recreat-ing PCI-CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) relations, wecannot escape the Czechoslovakian question. Prague ’68 was stillpresent in the memories of the Italian communist ruling class. The PCIreassessed the issue of the Warsaw Pact’s intervention on the occasionof the first anniversary of August 1968, and systematically refused toaccept the normalized Czechoslovakian ruling class.17 Nonetheless, in acontext of growing divergence with the Kremlin18, Italian communists

14Clementi, M., Storia del dissenso sovietico, Roma, Odradekedizioni, 2007, p. 191-193; Daix, P., La verità su Solženitsyn, Torino, Società Editrice Internazionale, 1974;Solženicyn, A., Arcipelago Gulag, Milano, Mondadori, 1995; Sakharov, A.,Mémoires, Paris, Seuil, 1990. See also “L’Affaire Soljenitsyne: un test révélateur surles communistes et la gauche”, Est&Ouest, No. 529, 16-30 April 1974.

15Napolitano, G., “Ancora sul caso Solženicyn”, Rinascita, No. 8, 22 February 1974,p. 7-8; Lombardo Radice, L., “Dove comincia la storia nuova?”, Rinascita, No. 41,17 October 1975, p. 23-24.

16Pons, Berlinguer, op. cit., p. 52-56; Del Pero, M., I limiti della distensione: gli StatiUniti e l’implosione del regime portoghese, in A. Varsori (ed.), Alle origini delpresente. L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, Milano,FrancoAngeli, 2007, p. 39-66.

17As example: APCI, Direzione, 25 September 1969, MF 006, p. 2000; Longo, L., “Lalezione degli avvenimenti dell’ultimo anno in Cecoslovacchia”, L’Unità, 21 August1969, p. 3.

18The PCI organised the Conference of the communist parties of the capitalist world, in1974. This initiative was not appreciated by the Soviets, who openly complainedabout it and tried to limit the meeting’s goals. See Pons, Berlinguer, op. cit., p. 30-38.


284

decided to give to the Kremlin other proofs of their support. AndEastern dissent was considered the best (or the least worst) ground onwhich to make concessions. First, the Italian communists bowed toSoviet pressures officially meeting the “normalised” Czechoslovakianruling class: for the first time after the tragic events of Prague ‘68, thePCI agreed to meet the CSCP through regular exchange delegations.This outcome was not as positive as the Soviets had hoped. The Italiandelegation, led by Emanuele Macaluso, quickly understood that they hadnothing in common with the Czechoslovakian “puppets”.19 Althoughthis became the last official meeting between PCI and CSCP until theend of the decade, it is clear that the Italian communists had made aconcession to the Kremlin. It is even clearer when we remember that itwas linked to the re-definition of relations with the Czechoslovakiandissidents. Joseph Smrkovský – President of the Parliament during thePrague Spring – had proposed to establish a permanent (even ifconfidential) channel of dialogue between Botteghe Oscure and theformer leaders of the “Prague Spring”. Such an offer was refused by theItalian communists’ ruling class.20 If the confrontation over humanrights’ violation lasted until the end of the 1970s, open support for thedissidents in the Eastern bloc was not an issue.21

Soviet financial support, but – even more – the belief that “develop-ed socialism” was reformable, had played an important part in thisdecision. But, even more than this, the existence of a “myth of détente”significantly determined the PCI’s decision. As Silvio Pons has pointedout, support for détente justified the PCI’s place in the internationalcommunist movement.22 I would add that sustaining détente soonbecame a true “myth” for the PCI: détente had to be kept up without anyhesitation. According to Marc Lazar, the PCI still saw reality inManichean terms23: the international division into two blocs was key tounderstanding the world. The need to overcome such a reality – thanksto détente – was the main goal pursued by Botteghe Oscure.

Thus, human rights became an element which had to be sacrificedfor the development of international détente. This idea, obviously, wasnot exclusive to the Italian Communist Party. Consider, for example, the

19APCI, Direzione, 3 April 1974, MF 075, p. 611.

20APCI, Estero – Cecoslovacchia, Report by Emanuele Macaluso, 10 July 1974, MF080, p. 119-121.

21See also the witness statement by Gian Carlo Pajetta, Pajetta, G., Le crisi che hovissuto, Budapest, Praga, Varsavia, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1982, p. 133.

22Pons, Berlinguer, op. cit., p. 9.

23Lazar, M., “La gauche ouest-européenne et l’année 1968 en Tchécoslovaquie: les casfrançais et italien”, in A. Marès (ed.), La Tchécoslovaquie, sismographe de l’Europeau XXe siècle, Paris, Institut d’études slaves, 2009, p. 177-193.

Valentine Lomellini

285

Czechoslovakian crisis. The reactions of the main European govern-ments and of the United States, and, even more – on the ground of theWestern left – that of the SPD, strongly conditioned the PCI’s attitude,and gave a sort of acquiescence to the “Brezhnev doctrine” and to thedivision of the world into two blocs.24 Even in Italy the socialists had asimilar attitude as we will see in the next section.

Actually, not only the international, but even the domestic situationstrongly influenced the PCI’s attitude towards Czechoslovakiannormalisation and the Eastern crises of the early 1970s. In the 1960s andthe following decade, the “strategy of tension”, the possibility of a coupd’État in Italy significantly affected Italian communist leaders. TheKremlin corroborated this idea: the more worried the Italian commu-nists, the more speedy their return to orthodoxy.25 Furthermore, thespread of the students’ movement led Botteghe Oscure to reconfirm itsstrong legacy with the “mother country of socialism”. The surfacing of avaried panorama of leftist tendencies challenged the PCI for theleadership of the workers’ movement: Botteghe Oscure experienced anew situation, seeing a growing (even if many-sided) reality on the left.As the manifesto case showed, the PCI made its links with the SovietUnion the cornerstone of its strategy, flagging up its critical role withinthe international communist movement and refusing – at the same time– new models or allies.26 This position persisted until the beginning ofthe 1980s, a thorn in Berlinguer’s side.

Euro-communism: New Hopes and Old Doubts

From the mid-1970s, the PCI attitude towards dissent in EasternEuropean countries, and – more generally – towards the ruling classes inthe Soviet bloc – started to change in tune with domestic and interna-tional changes. The unexpected consequence of the Helsinki Agree-

24For President Johnson’s reactions and policies about the Czechoslovakian issue, seeCohen, W.I., Bernkopf Tucker, N., Lyndon Johnson, confronts the world. Americanforeign policy 1963-1968, New York, Press Syndicate of the University ofCambridge, 1994. Dealing with the SPD attitude see Potthoff, H., Miller, S, TheSocial Democratic Party of Germany 1848-2005, Bonn, Dietz Verlag, 2006.

25Dealing with the “strategia della tensione”: Crainz, Il paese mancato, op. cit., p. 363-377; Pons, S., “L’Italia e il PCI nella politica estera dell’URSS di Breznev”, inA. Giovagnoli, S. Pons, L’Italia Repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta. TraGuerra Fredda e distensione, Soveria Manelli, Rubbettino, 2003, p. 77-78. Cfr.Zaslavsky, V., “Resistenza e resa dei comunisti italiani”, in Ventunesimo Secolo,No. 16, June 2008, p. 123-141.

26Garzia, A., Da Natta a Natta: storia del Manifesto e del PDUP, Bari, Dedalo, 1985;Rossanda, R., La ragazza del secolo scorso, Torino, Einaudi, 2005; Lomellini, V.,“Alla sinistra del PCI. Il caso de ‘il manifesto’ a Botteghe Oscure”, in Annali Ugo LaMalfa, Vol. XII, 2007, p. 115-139.


286

ment’s signature – in particular over new awareness of public opinionregarding the dissent issue – and the emergence of dissident groups inthe Soviet bloc was followed by a deterioration in the internationalimage of the USSR as “a peaceful superpower”.27 “Soviet imperialism”,in particular in the case of Angola, significantly jeopardized the imageof the Kremlin.28 At the same time, in line with its condemnation of theSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the PCI continued todevelop its autonomy, which became an aspiration for the reform ofglobal communism. Thus, Berlinguer launched the Eurocommunistproject, together with a slightly hesitant Georges Marchais and an enthu-siastic Santiago Carrillo.29 It seemed to be a propitious time for the PCI.Botteghe Oscure thought the international context was becoming morefavorable.30 The new democrat American President, Jimmy Carter,seemed to be more positive about an Italian government including thePCI.31

Moreover, the PCI had the opportunity to support the Italian govern-ment from outside with the unusual formula of the “government ofabstentions”.32 Contemporary with this, détente allowed the appearanceof movements of dissent within the Soviet bloc: the so-called “Third

27Romano, A., From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shapedthe Helsinki CSCE, Brussels, PIE Peter Lang, 2009; Daniel, C.T., The Helsinki effect,Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001. Dealing with the CSCE process andhuman rights, see Garimberti, P., Il dissenso nei Paesi dell’Est. Prima e dopoHelsinki, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1977.

28Cahn, A.H., Killing détente, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park,1998, p. 54-57.

29Rizzo, A., La frontiera dell’eurocomunismo, Bari, Laterza, 1977; Segre, S., A chi fapaura l’eurocomunismo?, Firenze, Guaraldi, 1977.

30Henry Kissinger had been strongly opposed to the Italian communists’ participationin government. See Del Pero, M., Kissinger e l’ascesa dei neoconservatori, Laterza,Roma-Bari, 2006, p. 93.

31Relevant studies and key protagonists have recently showed how much this was avain hope; nonetheless, in the mid-1970s, the PCI and international public opinionseemed to share this idea. Gentiloni Silveri, U., L’Italia sospesa. La crisi degli anniSettanta vista da Washington, Torino, Einaudi, 2009, p. 195-205; Del Pero, M.,“L’Italia e gli Stati Uniti: un legame rinnovato?”, in F. Romero, A. Varsori (eds.),Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione. Le relazioni internazionali dell’Italia (1917-1989), Vol. I, Roma, Carocci, 2006, p. 301-315; Gardner, R., Mission: Italy. Gli annidi piombo raccontati dall’Ambasciatore americano a Roma. 1977-1981, Milano,Mondadori, 2005. The Italian journalist Mario Margiocco advanced this analysis inthe early 1980s: Margiocco, M., Stati Uniti e PCI. 1943-1990, Bari, Laterza, 1981.For some idea of the international hostility to Italian communists in government:Varsori, A., “Puerto Rico (1976): le potenze occidentali e il problema comunista inItalia”, in Ventunesimo secolo, No. 16, giugno 2008, p. 89-121.

32Colarizi, S., Storia politica della Repubblica, 1943-2006, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2007,p. 125-127.

Valentine Lomellini

287

Basket” of the Helsinki Agreement became the point of reference forthis wave of new opponents.33

The spread of such movements aroused curiosity in the PCI:Botteghe Oscure renewed its dialogue with dissidents. From 1976, manycontacts took place with the new movements of dissent, always at aprivate or almost-private level. Nevertheless, the Eurocommunist perioddid not, for various reasons, see a substantial improvement in relationsbetween the PCI and the dissidents. First of all, there was the difficultyof communication: Italian communists were used to having contactswith the Soviet bloc; but, in judging Eastern dissidents, they followedtheir own categories. In 1976, Antonio Rubbi – the Deputy Head of theInternational Section – met the Polish dissident Adam Michnik, leaderof the KOR (Workers’ Defence Committee).34 Later on, the dialoguewas positively remembered by Michnik, who saw the PCI as supportingdissent. Yet, in fact, the view of Rubbi was that “Michnik is like a guyfrom Lotta Continua”.35 This anecdote explains the difficulty inunderstanding the complex phenomenon of Eastern dissent, and incoming to terms with its political and social implications. The surfacingof new forms of dissent was not understood by the PCI, which was, afterall, used to considering as relevant only the “real forces” of Sovietsociety, and to attributing the role of vanguard to the party.36 Thoseelements were no longer valid for Eastern Europe though as the Polishcrisis of 1980-81 and the emergence of the trade union Solidarność clearly showed.37

Indeed, in the second half of the 1970s, a growing gap between thepublic and private speeches of Italian communist leaders becomesevident, but in an unexpected way. When dealing with the human-rights’ violations, private criticism of the PCI towards the CPSU was

33Zubok, V., Zhivago’s Children, op. cit.; Ludmilla, A., Soviet Dissent, Middletown,Wesleyan University Press, 1985; Bugajski, J., Czechoslovakia: Charter 77’s decadeof dissent, New York, Praeger, 1987; Zuzowski, R., Political dissent and oppositionin Poland. The workers’ defense committee “KOR”, Santa Barbara, GreenwoodPress, 1992; Lipski, J.J., KOR, Workers’ Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981,Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.

34Bouyeure, C., L’invention du politique. Une biographie d’Adam Michnik, Lausanne,Les éditions noir sur blanc, 2007.

35APCI, Esteri-Polonia, Notes by Antonio Rubbi to Berlinguer, 16 November 1976,MF 281, p. 0303-0307.

36Guerra, A., Comunismo e comunisti. Dalle “svolte” di Togliatti e Stalin del 1944 alcrollo del comunismo democratico, Bari, Dedalo, 2005, p. 282-283.

37 For a general overview of Solidarność, see: Paczkowski, A., Byrne, M., From

Solidarity to Martial Law: the Polich crisis of 1980-1981: a documentary history,Budapest-New York, Central European University Press, 2007; Tonini, C.,“Solidarnosc, la prima rivoluzione operaia della storia”, in E. Jogalla, G. Leardi(eds.), Solidarność 20 anni dopo, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2002.


288

significantly tougher than what filtered out in leaders’ speeches andpronouncements to the press. That discrepancy emerged in differentsituations.

The Bukovskij case represented a key example. The well known and“repeat offender” Vladimir Bukovskij had been condemned for “diffu-sion of anti-Soviet and defamatory documents to foreign journalists”.38

Berlinguer took part in the campaign for Bukovskij’s release: his actionwas determined by the request of a common friend and of Bukovskij’smother, who stressed Berlinguer’s work for “true democracy and humanrights”.39

The PCI General Secretary wrote to Brezhnev, asking for the Sovietdissident to be set free.40 But this was and remained a private act.Botteghe Oscure did not use such acts as, for example, Marchais did totout the democratic maquillage of the PCF.41 In December 1976, L’Unitàargued that the Bukovkskij-Corvalan exchange was “an episode” whichmarked the difficulty of a “great country” in extending its own successesas “individual freedom rights” were “not perfect yet, or denied”.42

In 1978, Berlinguer confronted Suslov about the Ščaranskij case; yet again the PCI press talked of “brotherhood” rather than confrontation.43

The systematic reference to “anti-communism” which pervaded thehuman-rights campaign, significantly moderated the condemnation oftrials in L’Unità.44

38Clementi, M., Storia del dissenso sovietico, op. cit., p. 162-165; Graziosi, A., L’Urssdal trionfo al degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, Il Mulino, Bologna,2008, p. 422-423.

39APCI, Estero URSS, Letter from Nina Ivanovna Bukovskaija to Enrico Berlinguer,10 June 1976, MF 0241, p. 1304-1305. Vladimir Bukovskij has refused to unveil theidentity of the common friend, who asked for his release. Interview of the author withVladimir Bukovskij, 27 June 2007. On Berlinguer’s commitment to democracy:Veltroni, W., La sfida interrotta. Le idee di Enrico Berlinguer, Baldini & Castaldi,Milano, 1994.

40APCI, Estero URSS, Letter by Enrico Berlinguer to Leonid Brezhnev, 6 August1976, MF 0241, p. 1306-1307.

41In this respect, see for example: “Le XXII Congrès du PCF, l’évolution dumouvement communiste international et les relations PS-PC”, Archives d’histoirecontemporaine, Paris.

42“Due realtà”, L’Unità, 18 dicembre 1976, p. 1. It must be said that L’Unitàrecognized that the issue of “freedom’s limitation” had to be “openly discussed,faced and solved”. See “Problemi irrisolti”, L’Unità, 20 dicembre 1976.

43APCI, Confidential notes by Antonio Rubbi, 5-10 October 1978, MF 365, fasc.7812,p. 0057/0082. Contrasts emerged on cultural grounds as well, for example, within thereview “Problemi della pace e del socialismo”. Conference papers of the meeting onthe review “Problemi della pace e del socialismo”, Prague, 27-29 April 1977. RobertoRuffilli Library, Funds Luciano Antonetti, Anton_Arch 1.Att.PCI 3.NRI 002.

Valentine Lomellini

289

Once again, in the second half of the 1970s, Mlynař, the leader of the Eurocommunist Charter 77 went to Italy, in order to meet the repre-sentatives of the Italian left. While Craxi welcomed Mlynař, Berlinguer refused to meet him. Mlynař only talked to Adalberto Minucci, member of the Direzione and Director of the PCI’s magazine Rinascita.45

The PCI’s prudence in making contact with dissidents was the directoutcome of the PCI’s wish to preserve the Eurocommunist project.While avoiding a confrontation with the Kremlin, Berlinguer couldsafeguard his project of communist reform within the internationalcommunist movement.

The PCI’s attitude towards Eastern dissent had, then, two importantfeatures. First, the existence of Euro-communism, and the determinationof the PCI’s ruling class to protect it. Second, the meaninglessness ofthe Eurocommunist project itself. Maintaining a strong reticence on thedissent issue, the PCI missed the occasion to pursue its universalmission.

Such behavior had international and internal outcomes. At a globallevel, the Kremlin realised that the Eurocommunist project was not areal threat. At an internal level, the discrepancy between the leaders’private utterances and the leaders’ public speeches – a product of thePCI’s desire to preserve Euro-communism – made the project itselfambiguous. And Euro-communism became, as a result, difficult tocommunicate to public opinion and to the grassroots of the party.During the second half of the 1970s, the PCI tried to give a betteranalysis of Soviet bloc societies: the Centre of Studies on the EasternCountries was founded46; conferences dealing with Stalinism and theexperience of Prague 1968 were organised.47 Nevertheless, such a

44“Occhi chiusi”, L’Unità, 14 July 1978. APCI, Confidential notes by Antonio Rubbi,5-10 October 1978, MF 365, fasc.7812, p. 0057/0082.

45 APCI, Notes about the meeting with Mlynař to Enrico Berlinguer, 1977, MF 309,

fasc. 0652-0653. Interview with Luciano Antonetti, 21 January 2008. LucianoAntonetti, expert cadre on Czechoslovakia within the PCI, was a promoter of themeeting and the translator between Minucci and the Czechoslovakian dissident. Heremembers: “I was the interpreter, but it was not a great thing: both of them (Minucciand Mlynař) were not happy about their meeting. Such a thing did not impede, however, that good cooperation between the Italian communist press and Mlynař began, in the following years.” Interview of the author with Luciano Antonetti,Rome, 12 June 2007 and 21 January 2008.

46According to its former Director, the establishment of such a Centre meant that theanalysis of Eastern societies had become an institutionalised issue. Interview of theauthor with Adriano Guerra, Rome, 19 June 2007.

47Istituto Gramsci, Il ’68 cecoslovacco e il socialismo: atti del convegno di studiotenuto alle Frattocchie (Roma) il 7-8 luglio 1978, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1979;Istituto Gramsci, Momenti e problemi della storia dell’URSS, Roma, Editori Riuniti,1978. See also: Boffa, G., Martinet, G., Dialogo sullo stalinismo, Bari, Laterza, 1976.


290

development of issues remained confined within the boundaries ofcultural studies and were not brought into political discourse by the PCI.Political actions in support of dissidents were mainly undertaken byintellectual communists: this kind of action lacked the consistent andorganised protest for victims of the fascist dictatorships.48

That contradiction became even more evident at the beginning of the1980s, when the proclamation of the Martial Law – together with therenewal of the Cold War – induced the PCI to explain to its grassrootsthe latest political failure within the Soviet bloc.49 It cannot be deniedthat Botteghe Oscure attempted an analysis and understanding ofEastern European societies, especially in the second half of the 1970s. Itmust nonetheless be said that the PCI ruling class failed to fulfill thegrowing gap between its own perception of “developed socialism”, andthe image the Italian communist grassroots had of that socialism. ThePCI leaders were fully aware of this gap. During the Polish crises, in ameeting of the Direzione, Pietro Ingrao asked for a reassessment of thereality of the Eastern bloc. The answer provided by Gian Carlo Pajettawas astonishing: it was too late to start looking for all the negativepoints about Soviet communism, that Italian communist leaders had, inany case, long since known about.50 Pajetta’s comment mirrored thereality: the image of “developed socialism” in the PCI press had notbeen sweetened, but it had definitely been partial. It explained theserious limitations on freedom as the contradictions of a great andambitious project – communist society.51

Last but not least, we should mention two other elements whichconditioned Italian communist battles in favour of the dissidents, fromthe second half of the 1970s onwards. First, the necessity of distin-guishing the PCI’s action from the campaign of the American PresidentJimmy Carter, who had made human rights one of the leading themes ofhis Presidency.52 The whole PCI believed that the issue of dissent had to

48See for example, PCI activities in the favour of Chilean dissidents. Santoni, A., IlPCI e giorni del Cile. Alle origini di un mito politico, Roma, Carocci, 2008.

49Paczkowski, The Spring will be ours, op. cit.; Garton Ash, T., The Polish revolution,London, Jonathan Cape, 1983; Kemp-Welch, A., Poland under communism,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

50The exact words were: “Ma non andremo adesso a pescare tutti i dati negativi… chetu, ad esempio, che leggi il russo, conoscevi anche prima e non hai detto…”, APCI,Direzione, Gian Carlo Pajetta, Direzione, 28 January 1982, MF 0508, fasc. 8208,55/77.

51See also: APCI, Fondo Lombardo Radice, Paesi Socialisti, Cartella Polonia, letter byFrancesco Cataluccio to Lucio Lombardo Radice, 28 December 1981.

52An interest in human rights had been present since his candidacy to the USPresidency. Dumbrell, J., The Carter Presidency. A re-evaluation, Manchester andNew York, Manchester University Press, 1993.

Valentine Lomellini

291

be prudently handled. It was a domestic Soviet problem and so verysensitive for the Kremlin: it could be used as “anti-Soviet” tool. TheKremlin was already concerned by Euro-communism. It was importantnot to give rise to any further confrontations.53

Second, in the domestic context, Botteghe Oscure had to face not justil manifesto activism, but also the Italian Socialist Party.54 The dissentissue gave Craxi an important weapon, and Berlinguer another difficulty.

The Italian Socialist Party: Taking a Chance(and Missed Opportunities?)

Dealing with Italian socialist interests towards dissent, historiansfocus on Craxi’s time at the head of the party when the PSI wascommonly seen as the “party of dissidents”.55 There is some basis of factin this approach, but more careful analysis presents new elements thatinduce the reassessment of the paradigms of international and nationalhistoriography here. Analysing the history of the Italian Socialist Party,we should reconsider the evolution that characterised its policy towardsdissent in Eastern Europe, which was significantly linked to the PSIleaders’ idea of détente.

At the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s the Italian SocialistParty was not that of Bettino Craxi: first Pietro Nenni, then FrancescoDe Martino left their mark on party policy.56 At the time of theCzechoslovakian crisis, Italian socialists were unambiguous in theircriticisms. The socialists were part of the Unified Socialist Party, whichincluded socialists and social-democrats.57 In the communiqué publishedon 21 August 1968, the Italian socialist leaders asked for commonaction on behalf of “all the forces of renewal, including those of thecommunist movement”, in order to “support anyone” who fought forsocialism and freedom.58 In doing this, the PSI clearly gave a central

53APCI, Direzione, 18 July 1977, MF 299, p. 111 and following.

54Garzia, Da Natta a Natta, op. cit.

55Spiri, A. (ed.), Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale,Venezia, Marsilio, 2006; Colarizi, S., Gervasoni, M., La cruna dell’ago. Craxi, ilpartito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica, Bari, Laterza, 2005; Ripa di Meana, C.,Mecucci, G., Mosca: fermate la biennale del dissenso. Una storia mai raccontata,Roma, Liberal editore, 2007.

56Mancini has been Secretary as well at the beginning of the 1970s, but he had leftbecause of political scandals. His Secretariat was too short and too compromised toleave a clear mark on this subject.

57Degl’Innocenti, M., Storia del Psi, 3. Dal dopoguerra a oggi, Laterza, Roma-Bari,1993; Di Scala, S., Da Nenni a Craxi: il socialismo italiano visto dagli USA, Milano,Sugarco, 1991.

58“La Direzione socialista condanna l’invasione”, L’Avanti, 22 August 1968, p. 1.


292

role to the Italian Socialist Party. It fell to the PSI to drag the PCI out ofits ambiguity. Given the ideological crisis within communism, the PSIalso had the specific task of creating more favourable conditions for therealisation of détente.59

Détente is central to understanding the attitude of the PSI towardsdissent in the first half of the 1970s. In fact, the concretisation of détentewas absolutely central in the political thought of Nenni, even more sothan support for the East European dissidents. The day after theinvasion, Pietro Nenni – coming back from a meeting of the SocialistInternational – wrote: “We are all Czechoslovakians. But attention: anycrisis within the Warsaw Pact that becomes a confrontation between theWarsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance” was to be avoided.60 The wishto preserve détente was not that far away from the Italian communists’idea: once again, it was the “myth of détente”. The strategy of Ostpolitikwas not irrelevant in shaping the analysis of Pietro Nenni.61

The belief in détente defined the policy towards political repressionin the Soviet bloc. Moreover, in Nenni’s behavior, there was the hiddenidea that opportunities for influencing events in the Eastern bloc werevery few. These two elements explain Nenni’s “duplicity”. Nenni – asleader of his party – openly showed his concern regarding Czechoslo-vakian normalisation and Soviet repression. Nevertheless, in 1969,during a meeting with the Soviets, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, heasked the support of the Kremlin for an Italian seat in the Governors’Council of the AIEA, in return for the Italians being prepared to re-establish regular governmental relations, partially interrupted after theWarsaw Pact’s invasion of Prague.62 Here we clearly see Nenni’sperception of the international and domestic situation: détente was thepriority, and it was central both on universal grounds (between the twosuperpowers), and local grounds (continuity of the centre-left andsocialist legitimacy in Italy). Following this idea, Nenni believed thatthe only way to influence events behind the Iron Curtain was throughdétente. Thus, we can assume that the defence of human rights was acorollary of détente, but it was – at least in that moment – secondary.

The PSI position became even more prudent under the Secretariat ofFrancesco De Martino, who made his alliance with the Italian commu-

59Nenni, P., I conti con la storia. Diario 1967-1971, Vol. 3, Milano, Sugarco, 1983,p. 213.

60Pietro Nenni Foundation (PNF), Serie Governo, b.128, f.2487, Notes by PietroNenni, August 1968.

61Potthoff, H., Miller, S., The Social Democratic Party of Germany 1848-2005, Bonn,Dietz Verlag, 2006, p. 215-219.

62PNF, Serie Governo, b.115, f.2391, Notes about Italian-Soviet speeches, December1968.

Valentine Lomellini

293

nists a pillar of party policy. We should remember that until 1973, theItalian Socialist Party was totally under De Martino’s control, while theautonomist stream was outvoted.63 Considering De Martino’s “strategyof attention” towards Botteghe Oscure, it is not surprising that PSIcriticism towards the PCI over dissent was scaled down. This changewas evident in the public reaction of the PSI towards the Czecho-slovakian trials of 1972. Two elements were particularly relevant.64

In September 1973, the Chilean crisis influenced Italian politics: andthe article of Berlinguer about the possibility of a “historical compro-mise” changed the political equilibrium. A possible accord betweencommunists and christian democrats, favored by international détente,worried Italian socialists, who risked being further reduced by the PCI-DC entente. This situation gave new strength to the autonomist trend,led by the Deputy Secretary Bettino Craxi. He was concerned about thepossible negative consequences of repression in Eastern Europe fordétente. But he was also determined to avoid “any opportunism” whichcould jeopardize the fight for the democracy and freedom.65 Followingthe ideas of his political father, Pietro Nenni66, Craxi believed that in theSoviet Union “an unequal fight between neo-Stalinists and a bravedefence of human rights” was underway. The stance of the PSI wasunambiguous. In any such fight the Italian socialists stood with thedissidents.67

And so, in 1973, Craxi intervened on Solženicyn’s behalf, defendingthe freedom of expression and condemning Soviet attitudes towards theNobel Prize writer. For the first time, the socialist autonomist streamorganised a public debate dealing with dissent where socialists, commu-nists, social-democrats and republicans faced this issue head on.68 Thecriticism towards the Italian communists was definitely central: ClaudioMartelli, a young socialist leader close to Craxi, asserted that the“official behavior” of L’Unità was evidence enough that the PCI was

63Di Scala, S., Da Nenni a Craxi, op. cit., p. 286-289.

64It must be said that Luciano Vasconi, on the socialist weekly Mondoperaio, kept oncriticizing the attitude of the PCI towards dissent. See, for example: Vasconi, L.,“All’Est dissentono anche gli operai”, Mondoperaio, No. 2, February 1972, p. 3-5.

65“Dichiarazione di Craxi”, L’Avanti, 6 September 1973, p. 1.

66PNF, b.131, f.2513, Notes by Pietro Nenni about “Manifesto dei tre scienziati”,19 March 1970.

67Craxi, B., “Solženicyn e i fantasmi del passato”, L’Avanti, 10 January 1974, p. 1;“Intolleranza”, L’Avanti, 13 February 1974, p. 1.

68Massimo Pini organised that conference in Milan. Among others, Giorgio Bocca,Giancarlo Vigorelli, Mario Spinella, Antonio Natali, and Claudio Martelli took partin the initiative. Da Rold G., “Le mistificazioni contro ‘Arcipelago Gulag’”,L’Avanti, 15 February 1974, p. 3.


294

not autonomous from Moscow.69 If the PSI rebuked the communists fortheir prudence and incoherence, it should be said nonetheless, that thePSI support of dissent in the Soviet bloc was characterised by the searchfor acceptable interlocutors, that is to say socialist-oriented dissidents.70

It is very important to stress that, at the beginning of the 1970s, therewas no cohesion on the dissent question in the PSI. That is why the mainconsequence of Craxi’s actions in the dissidents’ favor was internal,within the party itself. It is too often forgotten that, at that date, Craxiwas using the issue not against the communists, but against De Martinoand his allies, in an attempt to change the status quo in the PSI. It was astep on the path to shaping a new leadership. Indeed, from beingrestricted to the autonomists within the party, support of the dissidentscame to characterize the whole party in the second half of the 1970s,turning out to be an element of high cohesion for all socialist politicaltrends. Craxi’s strategy was very clear: he wanted the PSI to become acentral force in the Italian political system. His firmness regarding sucha goal induced Italian communists to suspect that Craxi was a “man ofAmericans”. We have no evidence to confirm the idea of BottegheOscure, but we can be sure that the US Administration will have beenoverjoyed to have an Italian socialist leader who challenged communistson the ground of democratic credibility.71

Ideological rethinking (“Vangelo socialista”), the “humanitarianchoice” over Moro’s kidnapping, the euro-missiles crisis, Europeanintegration and, last but not least, the issue of dissent in the Soviet blocwere all useful elements in reducing the PCI’s force in the PSI’s favor.72

It is in this light that we should see the cultural confrontation betweenCraxi and the PCI.

69Ibid.

70Valdo Spini largely agrees with this idea; nonetheless, he points out the genuine andundifferentiated support of the PSI to Eastern opponents, and the uniquess of theposition of Craxi concerning dissent in the Soviet bloc. Interview of the author withValdo Spini, Rome, 8 October 2008.

71Regarding De Martino’s PSI, US leaders had commented: “That’s the worst socialistparty ever seen.” See Gentiloni Silveri, U., “Gli anni Settanta nel giudizio degli StatiUniti: ‘Un ponte verso l’ignoto’”, in Giovagnoli, Pons, L’Italia repubblicana nellacrisi degli anni ’70, op. cit., p. 110-111. See also Gentiloni Silveri, U., L’Italiasospesa, op. cit., p. 228-229.

72Colarizi, Gervasoni, La cruna dell’ago, op. cit., p. 27-38, 68-75; Giovagnoli, A., Ilcaso Moro, una tragedia repubblicana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995; Lagorio, L.,L’ultima sfida. Gli euromissili, Firenze, Loggia de’ Lanzi, 1998; Varsori, A.,“L’Italia e l’integrazione europea: l’occasione perduta?”, in S. Colarizi, P. Craveri,S. Pons, G. Quagliariello (eds.), Gli anni ottanta come storia, Soveria Mannelli,Rubbettino, 2004, p. 155-184. Dealing with the cultural policy: Coen, F., Borioni, P.,Le cassandre di Mondoperaio. Una stagione creativa della cultura socialista,Venezia, Marsilio, 1999.

Valentine Lomellini

295

The fact that the yearly cultural event, the “Biennale”, focused on thetopic of Eastern bloc dissent was a result of the work of the Italiansocialist, Carlo Ripa di Meana who was – unofficially – in charge of theinternational relations for the PSI.73 Such an event provoked officialcomplaints from the Kremlin, and a wide political debate in Italy:according to Ripa di Meana, this initiative had the complete support ofCraxi.74 Two years after this event, with the help of local communistsand socialists, the Municipality of Florence organised a Conferenceabout dissent: “Dissenso e democrazia nei paesi dell’Est europeo”.Valdo Spini – who became, in the early 1980s, the Deputy Secretary ofthe PSI – had a central role in the organisation. This local initiative soonbecame a national political confrontation between socialists and commu-nists: they were, once again, divided on the question. The socialistswished to sign a statement in support of the dissent in the Soviet bloc, inwhich dissent would be formally recognised as a form of internalopposition. The PCI on the other hand noted that dialogue with the“opposition” would not be possible, if developed to the detriment of the“whole of Soviet society”.75 It was the traditional contraposition bet-ween two understandings of “developed socialism” and two divergentforeign policies.

In this first period, dissent and attitudes to dissent had been a way forthe PSI to distinguish itself at the internal and domestic level; from themid-1970s, it became part of the PSI’s international strategy. PSI policy,in fact, went through three main stages. First, official complaints overhuman rights violations in the Soviet bloc, at the Conference ofBelgrade, in 1977: a delegation led by Carlo Ripa di Meana left the“Biennale” and went to the second appointment of the CSCE process.The socialist President of the “Biennale” brought a list of intellectualswho, in clear violation of the Helsinki agreement, did not have permis-sion to participate in the Italian initiative.76 Although Belgrade was a testfor the commitment of the participant states, it soon became clear thatnone wished to jeopardize détente by raising the issue of human rights.Even the American President Jimmy Carter did not give central impor-

73Interview of the author with Valdo Spini, Rome, 8 October 2008.

74Interview of the author with Carlo Ripa di Meana, Rome, 17 June 2007. See also:Ripa di Meana, C., Cane sciolto, Milano, Kaos, 1999; Ripa di Meana, Mecucci,Mosca: fermate la biennale del dissenso, op. cit.

75For the activity of the Municipality of Florence and dissent, see its Archive, Atti delConsiglio Comunale, Interpellance of Abboni about “Chart 77”, 18 January 1977;speech of Foti, 18 October 1977, p. 696-709. See also: Nadin, P. (ed.), Dissenso edemocrazia nei Paesi dell’Est: dagli atti del Convegno internazionale di Firenze –gennaio 1979, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1980. Guerra, Comunismi e comunisti, op. cit.,p. 292-294.

76Interview of the author with Carlo Ripa di Meana, Rome, 18 June 2007.


296

tance to the issue.77 The attempt then did not have concrete outcomes,but it contributed to bringing the dissidents to public attention.78

The second phase was the candidature of the “Ambassador ofEastern dissent” Jiří Pelikán, the former head of Czechoslovakian na-tional television, in the European elections of 1979 as a PSI candidate.79

The third and last phase was the strong opposition to the SPD“appeasement policy” towards repression in the Soviet bloc, within theSocialist International: this element came to a head with the Polish crisisin 1981. And, as Craxi became more powerful, the issue of dissentdeveloped from an internal to an international matter.

Craxi showed two main characteristics in dealing with dissent in theSoviet bloc: he succeeded in creating cohesion within the party aroundthe issue; and, second, he reassessed Nenni’s idea of détente. Stressingthe common legacy between détente and the defence of human rights,Craxi asserted that “there wouldn’t be true détente, if a State does notrespect human rights”: that was why the PSI had the duty to give “activesolidarity to those social groups who fought for their own rights, topeople unfairly persecuted”.80 In this way, Craxi seized the moment: atthe end of the decade and in the early 1980s, the second Cold Warrewarded his approach.81 To the “moral issue” of the PCI, Craxi opposedanother “moral issue”: how could the PCI promise democraticcommunism, while remaining an ally of the authoritarian “developedsocialism” of the Soviet Union?

Conclusions. The Dialogue that Never Blossomed

I would like, in conclusion, to stress some points from the foregoingdiscussion. First, the very evident “transposition” of an internationalelement – actually, an internal element of the Soviet bloc – in thedomestic Italian context. The communist-socialist confrontation over op-position within the Soviet bloc and the condition of “existing socialism”soon became grounds for battle over the leadership of the Italian left.

77Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency, op. cit.

78Finetti, U., “Ripa di Meana a Belgrado per i visti ai dissidenti”, L’Avanti,17 November 1977, p. 8.

79Caccamo, F., Jiří Pelikán. Un lungo viaggio nell’arcipelago socialista, Venezia,Marsilio, 2007, p. 91-95. For the political experience of a Czechoslovakian dissidentin the Western bloc: Pelikán, J., Carioti, A., Io, esule indigesto. Il Pci e la lezione del1968 a Praga, Milano, Reset, 1998.

80Finetti, U. (ed.), Il socialismo di Craxi, Milano, M&B Publishing, 2003.

81Hitchcock, W., Il continente diviso, op. cit., p. 377-388; Westad, O.A., The GlobalCold War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 348-353.

Valentine Lomellini

297

In this context, while the “myth of détente” strongly affected andconditioned the Italian communist leadership and, indeed, that of the PSIuntil the mid-1970s, Craxi’s Secretariat broke with that custom, mainlyfor internal reasons.

It should be stressed that the PSI became, in the second half of the1970s, an important point of reference for Eastern dissidents. The PSIwas able to fill the vacuum left by the Italian Communist Party, whichhad formerly been fully recognized by dissidents with a socialist back-ground as the main and most important political actor in the Westernworld: the only one able to bring the communist experiment to a newlife. The PCI failed in this mission: though very important communistintellectuals and personalities were sensitive towards dissent, supportinginternal opponents of the Eastern regimes never become party policy.Trying to safeguard both détente and its political project – Euro-communism – the PCI refused support to dissidents and ended tyingitself in knots.

Is it possible then to conclude that the dialogue between thedissidents and the PCI never blossomed, while it flourished between thedissidents and the PSI? The dissidents were undoubtedly given morespace by the PSI, but, there too, the dissent question became a matter ofinternal confrontation, which ended transposing the Cold War reality inItaly and gave – together with the PSI’s mistrust of the Eurocommunistproject – further reasons for a division of the Italian left, dooming anyhope of a change in power in Italy.

THE DIALOGUE THAT NEVER BLOSSOMED? THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ITALIAN LEFT AND THE EASTERN DISSENT

Documents